Targeted and Entrapped

7/28/2019 Targeted and Entrapped

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TARGETED AND E NTRAPPED

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Th Ctr fr Hma Right ad Gba Jtic (CHRGJ) at New York University Schoolof Law was established in 2002 to bring together the law school’s teaching, research, clinical,internship, and publishing activities around issues of international human rights law. Through itslitigation, advocacy, and research work, CHRGJ plays a critical role in identifying, denouncing,

and fighting human rights abuses in several key areas of focus, including: Business and HumanRights; Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Caste Discrimination; Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism; Extrajudicial Executions; and Transitional Justice. Philip Alston and Ryan Goodmanare the Center’s Faculty Chairs; Smita Narula and Margaret Satterthwaite are Faculty Directors;Jayne Huckerby is Research Director; and Veerle Opgenhaffen is Senior Program Director.

Th Itratia Hma Right Ciic (IHRC) at New York University School of Law provideshigh quality, professional human rights lawyering services to community-based organizations,nongovernmental human rights organizations, and intergovernmental human rights experts andbodies. The Clinic partners with groups based in the United States and abroad. Workingas researchers, legal advisers, and advocacy partners, Clinic students work side-by-side withhuman rights advocates from around the world. The Clinic is directed by Professor Smita Narulaof the NYU faculty; Amna Akbar is Senior Research Scholar and Advocacy Fellow; and SusanHodges is Clinic Administrator.

All publications and statements of the CHRGJ can be found at its website: www.chrgj.org.

This Report should be cited as: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Targeted and

Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States (New York: NYUSchool of Law, 2011).

© NYU School of Law Center for Human Rights and Global Justice




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC)/Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ)at New York University (NYU) School of Law is enormously grateful to the following individuals for theircontributions in the preparation of this Report. Names are listed under each heading in alphabeticalorder.

PRoJeCT DIReCToRs Amna Akbar, Senior Research Scholar & Advocacy Fellow, CHRGJ/IHRCSmita Narula, Faculty Director, CHRGJ/IHRC

AuTHoRs AnD ReseARCHeRs Amna Akbar, CHRGJ/IHRCChristine Chiu, IHRCSmita Narula, CHRGJ/IHRCTimes Wang, IHRC

RevIew AnD eDIToRIAl Petra BartosiewiczVeena Dubal, Asian Law Caucus (ALC)Aisha GhaniFaisal Hashmi, Muslim Justice Initiative (MJI)

Jayne Huckerby, Research Director, CHRGJVeerle Opgenhaffen, Senior Program Director, CHRGJJennifer Reiss, Associate, CHRGJ

ADDITIonAl ReseARCH, wRITInG, PRoDuCTIon, oR oTHeR AssIsTAnCe Susan Hodges, Clinic Administrator, IHRCKibum Kim, IHRCAudrey Watne, Program Assistant, CHRGJ

ART DIReCTIon

Joe Namy

CoveR PHoTo Lyric R. Cabral

PHoTos Lyric R. CabralS. Nadia HussainDesis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM)




CHRGJ thanks the following individuals for their insights and contributions to this Project: Mike German

(ACLU); Faisal Hashmi (MJI); Arun Kundnani (Open Society Institute); Veena Dubal (ALC); Steven Downs,

Kathy Manley, Lynne Jackson and Project SALAM; Lyric R. Cabral; Aisha Ghani; Petra Bartosiewicz;

Professor Jeanne Theoharis, Brooklyn College; Monami Maulik and the staff at DRUM; Professor Peter

Erlinder, William Mitchell College of Law, and the National Coalition to Protect Civil Freedoms; Jed

Eisenstein; Joe Namy; Anjali Kamat; Ayesha Hoda; Hesham el-Meligy; Emily Berman (Brennan Center

for Justice, NYU School of Law); Beena Ahmad; Vyoma Jha.

Special thanks to Alicia McWilliams, Elizabeth Williams, Lord McWilliams, Zurata Duka, Burim Duka, Ferik

Duka, Lejla Duka, Shahina Parveen, Saniya Siraj, and Lyric R. Cabral.

CHRGJ thanks the Security & Rights Collaborative, a Proteus Fund initiative, for its generous support

of this Project.




CHRGJ

DIoG

DoJ

DoJ oIG

DRuM

eCtHR

FBI

ICCPR

ICeRD

JTTF

Ahcrft Gidi

Gza Gidi

Mkay Gidi

nYPD

Center for Human Rights and Global Justice

Domestic Investigative Operational Guidelines

Department of Justice

Department of Justice, Office of the InspectorGeneral

Desis Rising Up and Moving

European Court of Human Rights

Federal Bureau of Investigation

International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights

International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination

Joint Terrorism Task Force

Attorney General’s Guidelines on FBIUndercover Operations (2002)

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding theUse of FBI Confidential Human Sources (2006)

Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBIOperations (2008)

New York City Police Department

GLOSSARY



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© Lyric R. Cabral. Elizabeth McWilliams, mother of David Williams, prepares macaroni saladat her home in Newburgh, NY.




exeCuTIve suMMARY 2

I. THe ConTexT 6

A. LAw ENfoRCEmENT TRENDs 6

1. Cnlatng mul t Terrrt and Terrr 6

2. Te myt “Radcalzatn” 7

3. “Preentate” Plcng 8

4. Pere Legal fraer 8

B. ThE DomEsTiC LEGAL fRAmEwoRk 9

1. Te muaey Gudelne 9

2. inrant Under te fBi Gudelne 11

3. Te Entrapent Deene 15

Text Boxes

Te NYPD and te handcu Gudelne 12

Cnctn Rely n Prejudcal Edence 16

Entrapent n ter Jurdctn: Te U.k. and Canada 18

II. THe CAses 19

A. DAviD wiLLiAms – “ThE NEwBURGh foUR” (NEwBURGh, NY) 21

1. Te faly 21

2. Te Cae 21

3. Te ipact 23

B. ELJviR, DRiTAN AND shAiN DUkA – “ThE foRT Dix fivE” (ChERRY hiLL, NJ) 26

1. Te faly 26

2. Te Cae 26

3. Te ipact 28

C. shAhAwAR mATiN siRAJ (BAY RiDGE, NY) 33

1. Te faly 33

2. Te Cae 33

3. Te ipact 36

D. PATTERNs 38

III. HuMAn RIGHTs I MPlICATIons AnD oBlIGATIons 39

A. RiGhT To A fAiR TRiAL 39

B. RiGhT To NoN-DisCRimiNATioN 40

C. RiGhTs To fREEDom of RELiGioN AND ExPREssioN 43

Iv. ReCoMMenDATIons AnD ConCluDInG oBseRvATIons 45

CONTENTS



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Wake up, open your eyes, look around you, see how

this world has changed… At least take 5 minutes to

look into these cases, and research, and look for

real proof.

Lejla Duka, age 13, daughter of Dritan

Duka, defendant in the “Fort Dix Five” case

Newburgh is an extremely impoverished town.

How much money did they spend on this whole

production? They need to be investing in our

communities for the future, not spending millions

of dollars on a fake case that makes nobody safer.

Alicia McWilliams, aunt of David Williams,

defendant in the “Newburgh Four” case

There are many stories that overlap. Many men

in our communities have been targeted, and the

women and children are left out in the cold. Shahina Parveen, mother of defendant

Shahawar Matin Siraj



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Executive Summary

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S.government has targeted1 Muslims in theUnited States by sending paid, untrainedinformants2 into mosques and Muslimcommunities. This practice has led to theprosecution of more than 200 individuals in

terrorism-related cases.3 The governmenthas touted these cases as successes in theso-called war against terrorism.4 However,in recent years, former Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) agents,5 local lawmakers,6 the media, the public, and community-basedgroups7 have begun questioning thelegitimacy and efficacy of this practice,alleging that—in many instances—this typeof policing, and the resulting prosecutions,constitute entrapment.8

This Report examines three high-profileterrorism prosecutions in which governmentinformants played a critical role in instigatingand constructing the plots that were thenprosecuted. In all three cases, the FBI or NewYork City Police Department (NYPD) sentpaid informants into Muslim communities orfamilies without any particularized suspicionof criminal activity. Informants pose aparticular set of problems given they work

on behalf of law enforcement but are nottrained as law enforcement.9 Moreover,they often work for a government-conferredbenefit—say, a reduction in a preexistingcriminal sentence or a change in immigrationstatus—in addition to fees for providing useful

information to law enforcement, creating adangerous incentive structure.10

In the cases this Report examines, thegovernment’s informants held themselves outas Muslims and looked in particular to incite

other Muslims to commit acts of violence.The government’s informants introducedand aggressively pushed ideas about violent jihad and, moreover, actually encouraged the defendants to believe it was their duty totake action against the United States. In twoof the three cases, the government reliedon the defendants’ vulnerabilities—povertyand youth, for example—in its inducementmethods. In all three cases, the governmentselected or encouraged the proposed

locations that the defendants would later beaccused of targeting. In all three cases, thegovernment also provided the defendantswith, or encouraged the defendants toacquire, material evidence, such as weaponryor violent videos, which would later be usedto convict them.

The government played a significant rolein instigating and devising the three plotsfeatured in this Report—plots the government

then “foiled” and charged the defendantswith. The defendants in these cases were allconvicted and are facing prison sentencesof 25 years to life. These prosecutions—andothers that similarly rely on the abusive use ofinformants—are central to the government’s



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claim that the country faces a “homegrownthreat” of terrorism. Serious questions havebeen raised about the government’s rolein each of these cases, as well as aroundthe set of laws that have facilitated thesepractices. They also raise fundamentalhuman rights concerns.

Part I.A. of this Report considers fourtrends that have enabled the aggressiveand widespread use of informants in Muslimcommunities: (1) the conflation of Muslimswith terrorism and terrorists; (2) the U.S.government’s adoption of unsupportedtheories about “radicalization” and“homegrown terrorism” in American Muslim11 communities; (3) a shift toward a preventativemodel of policing and prosecuting terrorism,which seeks to intervene prior to any plan tocommit a particular crime; and (4) the lackof accountability and transparency of lawenforcement activities. Part I.B. assesses thedomestic legal framework governing the useof informants in undercover investigations,including the entrapment defense. Drawingon media accounts, court documents, andinterviews, Part II then examines threehigh-profile terrorism prosecutions, looking

closely at the government’s practices ininstigating and constructing the plot throughinformants, and the impacts the prosecutionshave had on the families of the defendants.Part III evaluates the human rights impactsof the practices and policies detailed herein

© Lyric R. Cabral. Alicia McWilliams, reads a letter from hernephew David Williams. The letter reads, “Dear Aunt Alicia. Ilove you and I miss you. It warms me to know that every timeI step into that court room our eyes meet.”

and the corresponding obligations of theU.S. government to respect, protect, andfulfill these human rights. Part Iv concludes

with policy recommendations.

This Report is grounded in consideration ofthe government’s prosecutions against the“Newburgh Four”12 with a focus on defendantDavid Williams; the “Fort Dix Five”13 with afocus on defendants Eljvir, Dritan, and ShainDuka; and the case of Shahawar Matin Siraj.14 Family members of David, Eljvir, Dritan,Shain, and Shahawar were interviewedfor this Report, which builds on the Center

for Human Rights and Global Justice’s(CHRGJ) longstanding work documentingthe impact of U.S. counterterrorism policieson Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, and SouthAsian communities.15 We also interviewedand consulted with experts, journalists, and



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community leaders studying these issues,and drew on court documents and mediaaccounts.

The experiences of the families who wereinterviewed for this Report demonstratethe profound toll government policies are

taking on Muslim communities and families.Counterterrorism law-enforcement policiesand practices are undermining U.S. humanrights obligations to guarantee the rightsto nondiscrimination; a fair trial; freedom ofreligion expression and opinion; as well asthe right to an effective remedy when rightsviolations take place.

The families have been outspoken aboutthe injustice of these tactics and the

prosecutions that they have spawned. Agrowing chorus of commentators, communitymembers, scholars, and policy experts, isbeginning to challenge the legitimacy ofthe government’s practices, and the notionsthat these prosecutions substantiate a“homegrown threat” or provide any security-enhancing benefits.16

The cases highlighted in this Report do notstand alone. A number of cases around the

country have been met with similar concerns,which further suggests that the practiceshighlighted here are illustrative of similarlaw enforcement activities targeting Muslimcommunities around the country.17 As thisReport argues, the U.S. government must put

an end to criminalizing Muslim communities.Not only do these practices fail to enhancepublic safety goals, but they pose intolerablethreats to basic human rights across thecountry.

To abide by these international humanrights obligations, CHRGJ urges the U.S.government to act immediately to implementthe following recommendations with respectto law enforcement and counterterrorisminvestigations, particularly those that involvethe use of extensive surveillance and paidinformants without particularized suspicionof criminal activity:

The U.S. government should reject“radicalization” theories that threaten therights to freedom of religion, opinion, andexpression, and should put an end to thepreventative policing and prosecutionmethods that rely on such theories.18

Congress should hold hearings on theimpact of counterterrorism policieson Muslim, Arab, South Asian, andMiddle Eastern communities in theUnited States. These hearings shouldinclude consideration of current in-telligence-gathering tactics and the

use of informants in counterterrorisminvestigations.

Congress should pass the End RacialProfiling Act, proposed federal legislationto ban racial profiling by law enforcement.



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The Department of Justice (DOJ) shouldrevise its own June 2003 FederalGuidance on Racial Profiling to eliminatethe border and national security loophole,to include a ban on profiling based onreligion and ethnic origin, and to ensurethat the guidance is enforceable.

The DOJ should open an investigationinto all terrorism-related cases involving

the use of an informant since September11, 2001, with a view towards examiningoversight and actions of informants,the circumstances under which theyare deployed, the types of informationthey gather, and their role in instigatingterrorist plots.

Attorney General Holder should issuenew guidelines to replace the MukaseyGuidelines for Domestic FBI Operations

(2008), the 2006 Gonzales Guidelineson Confidential Human Sources, andthe 2002 Ashcroft Guidelines on FBIUndercover Operations. These newguidelines should eliminate authorizationfor the pre-investigation “assessment”

stage. Further, the new guidelinesshould ensure that:

The FBI and other law enforcementagencies do not open investigations,including by using informants, againstindividuals absent particularizedsuspicion of wrongdoing.

The FBI and other law enforcementagencies are not allowed to targetindividuals and communities throughsurveillance, informants, or otherinformation-gathering techniquesbased on race, religion, or nationalorigin, or political and religiousstatements or beliefs.

The FBI is explicitly and consistentlyprohibited from using informants toengage in entrapment or inducementto commit crimes.

The NYPD should revise its guidelinesto only allow for investigations whenthere is an articulable and reasonablesuspicion of criminal activity.

© Lyric R. Cabral. Zurata Duka holds a photo of her son Dritan Duka.



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The practices and policies that are the focusof this Report are, at their core, about thetargeting of Muslims as “potential threats”to the United States. This section talks firstabout law enforcement and cultural trendsfacilitating the prosecutions featured in

this Report; and secondly about the legalframeworks governing the FBI and NYPDin their law enforcement practices, includingthe use of informants and the low thresholdsrequired to commence investigations.

A. la efrcmt Trd

The U.S. government’s focus on Muslims incounterterrorism operations appears to stemfrom a series of assumptions about Muslims

and terrorism, including the following: thatMuslims are more likely to become terrorists;that American Muslims are increasingly being“radicalized” and compelled into committingviolence in the name of Islam; and thatcounterterrorism policies should focus onidentifying individuals who hold certainideologies and exhibit certain behaviorsas indicative of “radicalization” in order tostop them before they can act.19 Theseassumptions, however, find no support in

empirical research. To the contrary, researchconducted by a variety of institutions suggeststhe assumptions in the radicalization theoryare wrong.20 Worse still, governmentpolicies relying on these assumptions greatlyundermine fundamental human rights.21

1. Conflating Muslims with Terrorists

and Terrorism

The first problematic contributing factor to thecurrent situation is the conflation of Muslimswith terrorists and terrorism. The popularnotion of terrorism has become inextricably

linked to Muslims and Islam, due in nosmall part to a host of government policiestargeting Muslims as potential terrorists.22 There is also evidence to suggest that manylaw enforcement agencies are trained withmaterials that construct Muslims as potentialterrorists.23

Moreover, commentators have noted thatthe government tends to use criminalterrorism charges in cases involving Muslim

defendants charged with violent crimes,but not against non-Muslims charged withsimilar conduct.24 Yet, since September11, 2001, there have been more instancesof politically-motivated violence in the U.S.committed by non-Muslims than there havebeen by individuals claiming to be motivatedby Islam.25

In addition, the construction of a terrorist“Other” has conflated notions of race,

ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender,and political views, effectively racializingIslam, Muslims, and Muslim religiouspractice as radically threatening to U.S.national security interests.26 Muslim menhave been constructed as particularly

I. The Context



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dangerous.27 “Muslim” and “Arab” are nolonger discrete signifiers of religion or racebut have been combined—by the media,popular conceptions, and the government’sown practices and policies—into a broadercategory of “Muslim looking people.”28 Muslim cultural and religious practiceshave also been marked in various ways asindicators of potential terrorist criminality.29 In turn, law enforcement officers target thosewho they perceive to look or act like Muslims

in terrorism investigations, surveillance, andprosecutions.30

2. The Myth of “Radicalization”

A second explanatory factor is the viewthat American Muslims are increasinglybeing “radicalized” into committing violencein the name of Islam. The 2007 NYPDreport entitled “Radicalization in the West:The Homegrown Threat” has been pivotal

in popularizing radicalization theories.31 Though the theories underlying the reporthave been criticized as “thinly sourced”and “reductionist,”32 they continue to enjoysupport at the highest levels of government.33 These theories are premised roughly on the

notion that “the path to terrorism has a fixedtrajectory and that each step of the processhas specific, identifiable markers.”34 Yet noempirical, social scientific research supportsthe notion of a “religious conveyer belt” thatpredictably leads to terrorism. In fact, researchsuggests that there is no such process that

can be identified with any confidence.35 Equally troubling, the so-called markers ofradicalization are over-determinate36 andfocused on Muslim religious practice infundamentally discriminatory ways.37

Nonetheless, the U.S. government has playeda role in nurturing the idea that “radicalization”is an identifiable process. In February2011, under the leadership of Senator JoeLieberman, the Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs Committee issued areport on the Fort Hood shooting, calling onthe National Security Council and HomelandSecurity Council to develop “a comprehensivenational approach to countering homegrownradicalization to violent Islamist extremism.”38 In March 2011, Representative Peter Kingheld a widely criticized Congressionalhearing, premised on the assertions thatAmerican Muslims are “radicalizing” at anincreasing rate; that American Muslims are

not doing enough to counter this trend; andthat American Muslim communities are notcooperating with law enforcement.39 Theonly law enforcement witness called byRepresentative King rejected the premise ofthe hearing.40

Dritan and Shain Duka, with Dritan’s children Idris, Yasmine,and Xhebrail.



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B. The Domestic LegalFramework

Since September 11, 2001, as the FBI hassettled into a dual role of an intelligencegathering and law enforcement agency, itsauthority to collect information has expanded,and its focus, in the counterterrorism context,has shifted to a preventative model.50 As aresult, the FBI seems to increasingly rely oninformants, undercover agents, and otherforms of surveillance to gather informationand, allegedly, to prevent terrorism. Seriousquestions have been raised about the efficacyand discriminatory nature of these practices,which seem to target Muslim, Arab, SouthAsian, and Middle Eastern communities

as well as activists critical of U.S. foreignpolicy.51 In the last few years, the FBI’s useof informants, cooperating witnesses, andundercover agents in political and religiousspaces has come under increased scrutinyand criticism.52

Informants pose a particular set ofproblems given they work on behalf of lawenforcement but are not trained as lawenforcement.53 Moreover, they often work

for a government-conferred benefit—say, areduction in a preexisting criminal sentenceor change in immigration status—in additionto fees for providing useful information tolaw enforcement, creating a dangerousincentive structure.54

The following section closely examinesthe issue of informants by looking at thedomestic legal framework governing the useof informants, to wit, the relevant FBI andNYPD guidelines for such activities; and theentrapment defense. As it will reveal, there

are almost no limits placed on when or howlaw enforcement agencies use informants.

1. Th Mkay Gidi

From World War II through to the 1970s, theFBI conducted a series of covert domesticoperations aimed at various groups consideredto be antagonistic to the U.S. government,including through the oft-criticizedCOINTELPRO program.55 As part of these

operations, the FBI systematically surveilledand worked to undermine the “New Left,”including individuals thought to be membersof the Communist Party, Black and women’sliberation struggles, and other groups criticalof the U.S. government.56 The UnitedStates Senate Select Committee to StudyGovernmental Operations with Respect toIntelligence Activities—also known as theChurch Committee—found that the FBIrelied on “secret informants . . . wiretaps,

microphone ‘bugs,’ surreptitious mail opening,and break ins, [sweeping] in vast amounts ofinformation about the personal lives, viewsand associations of American citizens”and “conducted a sophisticated vigilanteoperation aimed squarely at preventing



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the exercise of First Amendment rights ofspeech and association, on the theory thatpreventing the growth of dangerous groupsand the propagation of dangerous ideaswould protect the national security and deterviolence.”57

Against this background, in 1976, AttorneyGeneral Edward Levi promulgated thefirst Attorney General Guidelines.58 In thewords of Attorney General Levi, theseGuidelines “proceed from the propositionthat Government monitoring of individualsor groups because they hold unpopular orcontroversial political views is intolerable inour society.”59 For the first time, the AttorneyGeneral placed express limits on the FBI’s

investigative techniques in order to protectagainst the types of abuses that markedCOINTELPRO.

As documented in a recent study by theBrennan Center for Justice at NYU Schoolof Law, over the years, particularly afterSeptember 11, 2001, Attorneys Generalhave steadily eroded the Guidelines.60 Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s 2008Guidelines—currently in effect—reinforced

that trend, eviscerating the Guidelinessufficiently as to bring us almost full circle toa pre-Guidelines era.

The Mukasey Guidelines are profoundlytroubling in that they allow the FBI to

authorize informants and other surveillancetechniques without any factual predicateor nexus to suspected criminal conduct.61 Under these Guidelines, for instance, it ispermissible for the FBI to broadly instructinformants to gather names, emails, and

phone numbers of particularly devoutmosque attendees, without any particularnexus to suspected criminal activity.62

More specifically, (1) the Guidelines authorizethe FBI to undertake “assessments”63 priorto preliminary investigations, in situationswhere there is no “information or . . .allegation indicating” wrongdoing or a threatto national security; (2) in this assessmentstage, the Guidelines permit the FBI to

use intrusive investigative techniques suchas “recruiting and tasking informants toattend meetings or events surreptitiously”;“questioning people or engaging them inconversation while misrepresenting theagent’s true identity”; and, “engaging indefinite physical surveillance of homes,offices and individuals”; and (3) theGuidelines “eliminat[e] or reduc[e] many ofthe requirements for supervisory approvalof particular investigative techniques and

temporal limits on investigative activity.”64

The Guidelines are implemented by theFBI’s Domestic Investigative OperationalGuidelines (DIOGs), which are available tothe public only in highly redacted form.65



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Although heavy redactions prevent a holisticassessment of the DIOGs, it is clear that

the DIOGs allow for the FBI to engage ininvestigative activity “based in part—or even

primarily” on “‘the exercise of First Amendmentrights or on the race, ethnicity, national origin

or religion.’ of their subject.”66 The DIOGsalso allow the FBI to collect “information

regarding ethnic and racial behaviors‘reasonably believed to be associated with

a particular criminal or terrorist element ofan ethnic community’” and “to collect ‘the

locations of ethnic-oriented businesses andother facilities’ (likely including religious

facilities such as mosques) because‘members of certain terrorist organizations

live and operate primarily within a certainconcentrated community of the same

ethnicity.’”67

The Guidelines and DIOGs work togetherto authorize extensive surveillance, infor-

mation-gathering, and “geo-mapping” ofMuslim communities, creating a troubling law

enforcement approach of targeting entire

communities, rather than policing individuals

on the basis of particularized suspicion of

criminal activity.68

In tandem with the Guidelines and DIOGs,

the 2003 DOJ Guidance Regarding the

Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement

Agencies69 bans profiling on the basis of

race and ethnicity, but does not explicitly banprofiling on the basis of religion or national

origin. It also creates loopholes for racial

profiling in the national security and border

security contexts.

2. Ifrmat udr th FBIGidi

While the Mukasey Guidelines and DIOGs

allow the FBI to recruit informants and

place them within communities withoutany suspicion of specific criminal activity,

they also authorize informants to engage

in activities that would otherwise be illegal,

and do not contain an unequivocal ban on

entrapment.70

FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, heavily redacted section on “Undisclosed Participants”



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The NYPD and the Handschu Guidelines

Since September 11, 2001, the FBI, NYPD, and other law enforcement agencieshave increasingly directed their surveillance and investigation activities—includingthe use of informants—at Muslim communities in an effort to identify would-beterrorists. Although the targets may be different, these aggressive tactics are

not new. In the midst of COINTELPRO, the NYPD, like the FBI, infiltrated andkept dossiers on individuals thought to be affiliated with the “New Left”—thoseconsidered to be radical at that time.83

In 1971, a group of activists brought a class action in federal court against theMayor of the City of New York, its Police Commissioner, and the New York CityPolice Department’s Public Security Section, formerly known as the SpecialServices Division. The plaintiffs in Handschu v. Special Services Division alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by the Special ServicesDivision’s surveillance and other investigatory activities against them and theirorganizations.84 In 1985, the court approved a settlement prohibiting the NYPD

from investigating political and religious organizations and groups unless therewas “specific information” that the group was linked to a crime that had beencommitted or was about to be committed.85 The settlement also established asystem of record-keeping and procedures for approval of investigations by athree-member body, called the Handschu Authority.86 The system set up a “papertrail” enabling individuals to access information about whether they were underinvestigation, what information had been gathered, and how it was gathered.87 The terms of the settlement came to be known as the “Handschu Guidelines.”

In September 2002, New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly moved to modifythe 1985 Handschu consent decree on the grounds that the guidelines did not

reflect our “more dangerous, constantly changing world, one with challenges andthreats that were never envisioned when the Handschu guidelines were written.”88 In February 2003, the court determined that the NYPD should be permitted tomodify the 1985 decree in a way that was consistent with the FBI Guidelines.89 In

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August 2003, the court approved the modified guidelines submitted by the NYPD,

opening the door to the same kind of abuses the original Handschu Guidelines

were designed to safeguard against.90 The revised guidelines provide substantially

fewer protections than the original Handschu Guidelines, and lower the substantive

threshold required for investigation.91 In fact, the revised guidelines explicitly statein the preamble, “In the view of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies,

the prevention of future attacks requires the development of intelligence and the

investigation of potential terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.”92 The

revised guidelines allow the NYPD to initiate investigations based on speech

or expression protected by the First Amendment.93 There are no restrictions

placed on the use of informants except that their deployment must be authorized

by the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Division.94 In fact, the revised

guidelines give enormous discretion to the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy

Commissioner now has the authority to internally approve investigations and

investigatory techniques, rather than having to subject the decision to approval

from the quasi-independent Handschu Authority.95

In addition to the relaxation of Handschu Guidelines, the NYPD has grown in

size, scope, and resources since 2001. In 2002, Commissioner Kelly created

the Counterterrorism Bureau of the NYPD,96 which, in turn, participates in the

NYPD-FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF),97 one of many JTTFs across the

country.98 Although the NYPD collaborates with the FBI through the JTTF,

it appears to have developed its own independent machinery for operating

counterterrorism investigations within New York and around the world, largely

without federal oversight.99 The NYPD has become a leading advocate for law

enforcement based on the flawed radicalization model.100

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The Mukasey Guidelines point to theAttorney General’s Guidelines Regarding theUse of FBI Confidential Human Sources—promulgated in 2006 by then-AttorneyGeneral Alberto Gonzales—for additionalguidance on the use of informants.71 Both

the Mukasey and Gonzales Guidelinesexplicitly contemplate that informants will beauthorized to engage in illegal activity, withlimitations only on acts of violence and actsthat would be unlawful if performed by anactual FBI agent.72

Departing from prior sets of guidelinespromulgated by John Ashcroft and JanetReno,73 the Gonzales Guidelines do notrequire FBI agents to prohibit informants

from engaging in entrapment. Whereasprior guidelines prohibited the FBI frompermitting an informant to “participate in anact that constitutes an obstruction of justice(e.g. perjury, witness tampering, witnessintimidation, entrapment, or the fabrication,alteration, or destruction of evidence),”or to “initiate a plan or strategy to commita federal, state, or local offense,”74 theGonzales Guidelines’ General Provisionssection removed these prohibitions.

The Gonzalez Guidelines address entrapmentobliquely.75 While they require the FBIagent to provide a prospective informantunconditional prohibitions on violence andunlawful gathering of evidence, FBI agents

are only required to provide instructions onentrapment “if applicable.”76 The Guidelinesdo not, however, explain under whatconditions these instructions must be given.

In 2005, the DOJ Office of the Inspector

General (DOJ OIG) released a report77

onthe FBI’s compliance with, among otherthings, the 2002 Ashcroft Guidelines on FBIUndercover Operations.78 The UndercoverOperations Guidelines include a sectionregarding entrapment. The languagereflects the contours of the entrapmentdefense—which will be explained in thenext section—and a concern about runningafoul of the doctrine in court. Though theUndercover Operations Guidelines counsel

that entrapment should be “avoided,” theyprovide a number of conditions under which“an inducement to an individual to engagein crime is authorized.”79 In the 2005 DOJOIG report, the DOJ OIG declined to reviewthe FBI’s compliance with the section onentrapment on the grounds that the section“largely addresses authorization issuesthat we analyzed through examinationof the Guidelines’ general authorizationprovisions.”80 Thus, nowhere in this

301-page report is there any review of theissue of entrapment.

A more recent 2010 report by theDOJ OIG on the FBI’s investigations ofdomestic advocacy groups raised similar



15


concerns about the FBI’s compliance

with its own guidelines. For example, the

DOJ OIG reviewed documents that “gave

the impression” that the FBI focused

on a particular group “as a result of

its anti-war views.” The DOJ OIG alsofound “the FBI extended the duration of

investigations involving advocacy groups

or their members without sufficient basis”;

as well as “instances in which the FBI used

questionable techniques and improperly

collected and retained First Amendment

information in FBI files.”81

The 2005 and 2010 DOJ reports raise

concerns about the FBI’s compliance with

its own permissive guidelines.

Amongst those who have been critical of the

FBI’s lack of compliance is Mike German, a

former FBI domestic counterterrorism agent,

currently serving as Senior Policy Counsel

at the ACLU. In an interview with CHRGJ,

German noted that the 2005 Report “showed

that the FBI was out of compliance with

its guidelines to an extraordinary extent.”

German also said that “the Attorney General

guidelines are FBI policy. If they’re not being

followed, that’s a signal that something’s

wrong. The policies were derived from cases

where the FBI overreached.”82

3. Th etrapmt Df

As the previous section demonstrated, therelevant FBI guidelines provide few checkson an expansive set of available surveillancetools, including informants. However, thoseindicted after an investigation involvingthe aggressive use of an informant haverecourse to the judicially created entrapmentdefense. To mount a successful entrapmentdefense, the defendant must show by apreponderance of the evidence that thegovernment induced him or her to committhe crime charged.101 If the defendant issuccessful in proving inducement, thegovernment must prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that the defendant was predisposed

to commit the crime charged. Althoughthe standards for establishing inducementand predisposition vary across the federalcircuits and between states,102 “the principalelement in the defense of entrapment [is]the defendant’s predisposition to committhe crime.”103 Focused on predisposition,the “subjective test” prevails as the generalstandard in federal courts. The alternative“objective” test focuses on the conductof the government actors, rather than the

mental state of the defendant.104

Though it has yet to succeed, the entrapmentdefense has been raised in a number offederal criminal terrorism cases relyingon a paid, undercover informant.105 The



16


The types of evidence relied upon by the government in terrorism-related prosecutions are

highly prejudicial, and build on the conflation of Muslim religious practice, political opinions

critical of U.S. foreign policy, and terrorism. The prejudicial nature of relying on such evidence

is magnified in the context of an entrapment defense, when the defendant’s predisposition

to commit the charged crimes is at issue. The evidence shown in court used to establish

predisposition to commit the charged crime—violent videos, unpopular political and religiousspeech, and, in some cases, weaponry109—is in fundamental tension with rights to a fair trial,

nondiscrimination, and freedom of religion, expression, and opinion.110 The evidence tends to

correlate what should be protected speech and expression with predisposition for criminality.111

Moreover, from videos to weaponry the material is often either provided by or obtained at the

encouragement of the informant.112 In the case of unpopular political and religious speech, the

speech is often reflective of—or encouraged by—the informant’s own speech and attempts to

incite the defendants over several months. Thus, whether the defendants would have committed

the charged crimes on their own is highly questionable.113 But given the sensational evidence,

government rhetoric about the threat of “homegrown terrorism,” and rising Islamophobia, it is not

surprising that juries have opted to conclude that the defendants in question were predisposedto committing terrorism-related crimes.

The seeming conflation of unpopular political and religious views with the notion of predisposition

to criminal activity114 raises particular human rights concerns in regards to U.S. obligations

to protect rights to a fair trial, nondiscrimination, and freedom of religion, expression, and

opinion.115 In investigating or trying Muslim defendants, law enforcement agents and the courts

have equated the expression of religious ideas—or even the possession of particular print and

video materials—as evidence of a desire to commit terrorism.116 There is no empirical research

that establishes a causal link between any political or religious viewpoint with a propensity

to commit violent acts.117

However, much of the evidence presented at trials to convict theindividuals highlighted in this Report (as well as other defendants in terrorism prosecutions)

is based on the problematic assumption that religious and political views or speech constitute

proof of intent or predisposition.

Convictions Rely on Prejudicial108 Evidence

16



17


defendants are usually able to demonstrategovernment inducement by a preponderanceof the evidence, shifting the burden to thegovernment to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that the individual defendant waspredisposed to commit the crime prior tomeeting the informant.106 But the entrapment

defense has consistently failed, because juries have either found that there was noinducement or that the government hadproved predisposition beyond a reasonabledoubt.107

To the extent that the policing andprosecutorial policies relied upon in thesecases go unquestioned, these caseswill further legitimate the practice ofinvestigating individuals based solely on

their religious and political views. As formerFBI Agent Mike German notes,

“If the government targets somebodybased on political advocacy, and canlure a few people into committing badacts, then a successful prosecution inthose cases justifies future targeting ofpeople who are in the same position. . . .Whether these cases could survive anentrapment defense is not the relevant

question. It’s whether it’s appropriatefor the government to act in a way wherethey’re aggrandizing the nature of thethreat. It’s just difficult to understandwhat the legitimate government interestis in these cases.”118

Dritan Duka with his wife, Jennifer Marino, and their childrenLejla, Xhebrail, Yasmine, Idris, and Annesa, at the FederalDetention Center in Philadelphia, during Dritan’s first visit withhis children in prison.



18


Peer jurisdictions, including the U.K. and Canada, have dealt with entrapment cases by adopting

an objective test, based on a view that the violation is best understood as government abuse

of process, and that the courts should not permit prosecutions predicated on that abuse.

In both jurisdictions, the analysis focuses on the propriety of police conduct in light of the

circumstances.119

Common factors in both jurisdictions in assessing government conduct include the nature and

extent of police inducement, the particular vulnerability of the defendant, the extent of police

intrusiveness, and the nature of the offense.120

In the U.K., the overriding consideration is whether the conduct of the police was so seriously

improper as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.121

In Canada, additional factors include whether the police exploited the compassion, sympathy,

or friendship of the target, and whether the police conduct is aimed at undermining otherconstitutional values.122

Notably, both jurisdictions have rejected focusing on predisposition, and have counseled instead

for a focus on the propriety of government conduct.123 If applied to the cases considered in

this Report, such standards would likely lead to different results on the question of entrapment.

Entrapment in other Jurisdictions: The U.K. and Canada

Between the FBI Guidelines and the

entrapment defense, there are effectively no

legal protections placed on the government’suse of informants.124 Substantive defenses

like entrapment or outrageous government

conduct exist, but in particular in the terrorism

context, the virtual equation of political and

religious viewpoints with predisposition

renders the entrapment defense

ineffectual.125 Civil rights lawsuits are also

theoretically possible, but seem unlikely tosucceed.126 As the three case studies that

follow will illustrate, this lack of protection

essentially leaves the individuals—and their

families—caught up in these FBI-incited

plots with little recourse to justice.

18



19


II. The Cases

This section describes three New York-areacases involving the government’s targeteduse of informants in Muslim communities.However, it is important to note that the useof these tactics in is not limited to New Yorkor New Jersey. There have been a number

of cases around the country that have raisedsimilar concerns, suggesting the practiceshighlighted in these cases are illustrative oflarger patterns of law enforcement activitiesthat target Muslim communities around thecountry.127

The accounts that follow are drawn from acombination of interviews with the defendants’family members, court documents, andmedia coverage. The accounts seek to move

beyond the government’s one-dimensionalportrayals of the defendants in these casesas terrorists, providing a fuller picture of thegovernment’s role in constructing the plots atissue and highlighting the human toll of theseabusive government policies and practices.The specter of terrorism allegations has casta shadow on the defendants, as well as onfamily members who have lost their sons,husbands, brothers, or fathers, and havesuffered stigmatization and harassment as a

result of these government-incited plots.



20


© Lyric R. Cabral. Elizabeth McWilliams, mother of David Williams holds her son’s school photograph.



21


A. David Williams – “The Newburgh Four” (Newburgh, NY)

1. Th Famiy

When David Williams was 10 years old, hismother Elizabeth moved the family fromBrooklyn to Newburgh.128 David’s fatherhad gone to prison on drug charges and shewanted to get away from crime in the city.129 But Newburgh was a city on the decline.As David got older, he began selling drugs,and eventually wound up serving a five-yearprison sentence.130

After his release in 2007 at the age of 24,David set about getting his life in order. Withno high school degree and a conviction onhis record, he faced significant challenges.Nonetheless, Elizabeth recalls, “He was

doing good. I told him, even though youhave a felony, you can still go to college.”Despite his learning disabilities, he pursuedhis education at ASA College in Brooklyn.131

To his younger brother, Lord McWilliams,David was the only father figure he had.Together with their other brother, Hassan,David steered Lord away from making thesame mistakes he had made. “He alwaystried to show me the do’s and don’ts of

life, told me to stay in school, stay off thestreets,” says Lord.132 In early 2009, Lordwas planning on joining the military, withhis sights set on the elite Navy SEALs. InMarch, however, his stomach swelled to afrightening size and doctors diagnosed him

with liver cancer. Lord was immediatelyhospitalized and David was devastated.

“It was the first time I saw David cry,” Lordhas said. “For him not to be able to protectme, I can only imagine how he felt.”133

Elizabeth anticipated how David would react.“I didn’t want to tell him how serious it was,because I didn’t want him to go back toselling drugs. I told him Lord was going tobe OK.”134

David’s aunt, Alicia McWilliams, recalls thetime well. “David watched his brother almostdie and be revived five times. He knew Lordneeded a liver. The whole experience took

him for a loop.”135

2. Th Ca

In April 2009, David was presented withan opportunity to make the kind of moneyhe needed to help Lord and more.136 Anacquaintance by the name of JamesCromitie told him about a wealthy Pakistanibusinessman he knew as Maqsood.137 Hehad offered Cromitie $250,000, several

luxury cars, and financing for a barbershop,to help him carry out a terrorist attack in theUnited States; Hussain also encouragedCromitie’s anti-Semitism.138 Maqsood hadasked Cromitie to find lookouts, who wouldalso be paid. But the lookouts, Maqsood



22


repeatedly insisted, had to be Muslim.139 AsDavid would later tell it, Cromitie had a planto get the money before they would actuallycarry out the plot. Either way, Cromitie toldDavid nobody would get hurt.140

Maqsood’s real name was Shahed Hussain.He was a paid FBI informant who—forthe previous eight months—had beenencouraging Cromitie to agree to a plotto plant bombs at a local synagogue.141 Originally sent into Newburgh to report onthe local mosque, Masjid Al-Iklas, he focusedon Cromitie after the mosque regulars grewsuspicious of his attempts toengage them in discussionsabout violent jihad.142

Hussain had priorexperience investigatingon behalf of the FBI. Hehad helped the FBI obtainconvictions in a controversial case againsta pizza-parlor owner and a local imam inAlbany.143 Hussain’s apparent generositywasn’t limited to Cromitie. He told Elizabeththat when Lord got better, he would take thewhole family to Disney World. Lord recalls,

“When my mom first told me that, I thought,that’s nice of him.”144

On May 13, 2009, at the FBI’s direction,Hussain drove Cromitie, David, and twoothers—Laguerre Payen and Onta Williams

(no relation to David)—to the Bronx to conductsurveillance on various synagogues.145 Next he drove them to Connecticut to lookat the Stinger missile they were to use.146 Unbeknownst to David and the others, theweapons were fake and supplied by the

FBI.147

The night of May 20th, Hussain droveCromitie, Payen, and the two Williamsesto the Bronx. The FBI had placed twocars in front of the proposed targets andinstructed Hussain to have Cromitie placethe explosives in their trunks.148 Hussain

dropped David off first and then drove theremaining men to the first car.149 Beforereaching the second car, Hussain turnedoff his recording device.150 The four werearrested shortly after.151

At the time, Lord was at home in Newburgh.He had just come home from chemotherapyand was playing cards with a friend. “I heard aboom at the door. I thought something mustbe wrong, because it wasn’t a knock, it waslike someone kicking at the door. Then the

“we gt pulled nt a pltcal gae. Te cae adrected, prduced, and crpted by te fBi, and alltey needed ere puppet.”



23


SWAT team stormed in, I put my hands up,and sat down.” Lord and his family memberswere taken outside and watched as the FBIremoved evidence from their home. “At first,I thought my brother had stored drugs in ourhouse. But then I started hearing the words

terrorism, mass destruction, and I was very

confused.”152

At first, Alicia’s anger was directed at hernephew. “I thought, what the f*** did youdo?” But the more she learned about thecase, the more her anger shifted toward thegovernment.

“We got pulled into a political game. Thecase was directed, produced, and scripted bythe FBI, and all they needed were puppets.”At the initial jury selection in White Plains,she recalls, “They had snipers on the roof.

That was just for show.”

Alicia also recalls that when David was lockedup in White Plains, people kept slipping notesunder his door calling him a terrorist.153 “Hewas judged, tried, and convicted while inside.

The guards were told to go hard on him. Inthese cases, you’re guilty until proven guilty.”

In October 2010, after eight days ofdeliberation, the jury returned a guiltyverdict.154 On May 3, 2011, the judge

denied the defendants’ motions for dismissalon the bases of outrageous governmentconduct and entrapment.155 Sentencingis scheduled for June 2011. The chargescarry a minimum sentence of 25 years, andthe men could face life in prison.156

3. Th Impact

The damage to the family has been profound.Since David’s arrest, Elizabeth has struggled.

“The friends I thought I had, I didn’t have,” shesays. She was evicted from the apartmentwhere the original raid was conducted. Andshe’s had a hard time finding work or aregular place to stay.157

Lord, now 22, feels responsible. In his mind,“David was put in this position because I gotsick.” Since the arrest, he has been harassedfor being Muslim and for being the brother ofan accused terrorist. “Being called a terrorist

hurts more than if people say other things.Sometimes, I want to throw in the towel. Ithink, if life is this hard, maybe death is easier.”For a while, he even stopped taking hiscancer medication. “My brother said, you’renot taking your medication, if you die, who is

“Beng called a terrrt urt re tan peple ay ter tng. sete,i ant t tr n te tel….”



24


going to take care of mom? Now, I see that

was selfish. I’m taking my medication now.I’m trying to hold my mother together.”158

For her part, Alicia McWilliams has gone

from feeling abandoned by her community,

to becoming a leading organizer around the

issues raised by her nephew’s case. Alicia

particularly laments the resources wasted

on the case. “Newburgh is an extremely

impoverished town. How much money did

they spend on this whole production? They

need to be investing in our communities forthe future, not spending millions of dollars

on a fake case that makes nobody safer.”159

“We have to ask ourselves, who is going to

protect us from this government overreach?”

she adds. When asked if she feels daunted

or scared, she says, “No. I’m going to keepfighting for David until the end of time.”160

Alicia quickly realized that David’s case was just one of dozens of cases where informants

were inserted into Muslim communities tolure young Muslim men into participating in

concocted plots.161 She became close withseveral other families and urged them to

speak out. “They’re going to have to learn todeal with the fear that’s going to come with

speaking out on behalf of their loved ones.”Despite these difficulties, Alicia notes that

organizing around David’s case has also beena fulfilling and positive process. “I’m learning

about new cultures and religions.” But sheinsisted the issue is not exclusively a Muslim

one. “This affects all of us, as Americans.”

As Lord puts it, “At first, I asked myself, whymy family? But then I learned that it’s bigger

than us.”

“Neburg an etreelypered tn. h uc

ney dd tey pend n t leprductn? Tey need t be netngn ur cunte r te uture, ntpendng lln dllar n a aecae tat ae nbdy aer.”

Alicia McWilliams, aunt of David Williams, in her living room.



25


It was a family full of love, respect, trust, harmony, and dignity. The tables outside, in the backyard,

used to be filled with people. People would come over from Staten Island, Brooklyn, and have

barbeques. I still have the tables outside, 24 chairs… but now it’s gone with the wind. My sons are

political prisoners, not terrorists.

Frik Dka, ag 64 (fathr f ejir, Drita ad shai Dka)

Ferik Duka, father of the Duka brothers, with his grandchildren Idris, Yasmine, Lejla, and Xhebrail.



26


B. Eljvir, Dritan and Shain Duka – “The Fort Dix Five”

(Cherry Hill, NJ)

1. Th Famiy

Family was everything to brothers Eljvir,Dritan, and Shain Duka. They workedseven days a week for their father’s roofingbusiness and urged their father, Ferik Duka,to retire. Ferik remembers, “They stoppedme from working. They told me, ‘You aren’tgoing to work anymore; you’ve workedenough. You came to this country withnothing, you worked for us. No more workfor you and Mommy.’”162

When the brothers weren’t working tosupport the family, they spent their free timewith Dritan’s five children. “We were alwaysgoing to the park, picnics, we went to SixFlags every year, and every Friday we’d all

go to the mosque. We had a really fun timetogether as a family. Our family was tight,”reminisces Dritan’s eldest daughter, LejlaDuka.163 Except for one year when Dritanmoved his family to a nearby apartment, allthree brothers and their families lived in thesame house with their parents and youngerbrother Burim in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.

The Dukas are ethnic Albanians whoemigrated to the United States when Eljvir,Dritan, and Shain were six, four, and oneand a half years old, respectively. Zurataand Ferik Duka came to America to escapediscrimination in the former Yugoslavia and

make a better life for their sons. They hadno idea that two decades later their sonswould themselves end up the victims ofdiscrimination—at the hands of the countrythey had believed in—with all three sentto prison for the rest of their lives164 onterrorism charges for a plot that was, in fact,created by the FBI.165

2. Th Ca

The chain of events that turned the Dukas’world upside down began in January 2006when Eljvir, Dritan, and Shain asked theirfather if they could take a vacation for thefirst time in years.

The four brothers spent their week off inthe Pocono Mountains with eight friends.To remember the trip, they made a DVD ofthe vacation from video footage they hadrecorded over the course of the week. Their

youngest brother, Burim Duka, who was onthe trip, explains, “there were 11 of us [guys],and we wanted to make copies for everyone,so we went to Circuit City. The clerk watchingthe video heard us saying Allahu Akbar [Godis Great], and turned it into the police station.

“we ere alay gng t te par,

pcnc, e ent t s flag eeryyear, and eery frday e’d all g tte que. we ad a really un tetgeter a a aly. our aly atgt.”



27


They turned it over to the FBI. And then theFBI started following us.”166

The vacation video footage showed theDuka brothers and their friends engaging inrecreational activities—riding horses, skiing,

playing paintball, shooting at a firing range,and pulling pranks. But after seeing the DVD,the FBI targeted the Duka brothers and twoof their friends, Mohammed Shnewer167 andSerdar Tatar, as the subjects of a costly andintensive investigation that would last morethan a year.168

The government sent paid informants,Mahmoud Omar and Besnik Bakalli, to CherryHill. The Duka brothers became especially

close to Bakalli, an Albanian national.169

The brothers brought Bakalli to their housewhere Zurata cooked him Albanian meals.“We respected him. We loved him as a son,”explains Ferik.170 The brothers thoughtBakalli was their friend when, in fact, he wasbeing paid by the government and givenlegal status to spy on the Duka family.171

Over the course of more than a year, Omarand Bakalli secretly recorded hundreds

of hours of conversations172

with theDuka brothers, Shnewer, and Tatar. Bothinformants bombarded the men with talk ofviolence, trying to goad them into action byquestioning their manhood and encouragingthem to download videos depicting individuals

committing violent acts in the name of Islam.

In August 2006, the informant Omar droveMohammed Shnewer to Fort Dix andother sites, which the government latercharacterized as “reconnaissance.”173 A few

months later, Omar approached the brotherswith a list of weapons, offering to help themprocure more guns. Burim explains, “Mybrothers wanted the guns because theywere going to the Poconos again with theirfriends and didn’t want to wait in line fortarget shooting with such a big group.”174

The brothers never made it to their nextvacation. On May 7, 2007, Dritan and Shainwere arrested when they went to pick up the

guns. Eljvir was arrested at Dritan’s apartmentin front of Burim and Dritan’s entire family.

The trial took place in Camden, New Jersey.“Eight weeks. We never missed a day.9/9:30 to 4:30pm in the courtroom,” saysFerik of his and Zurata’s attendance duringthe trial.175

The three Duka brothers, MohammedShnewer, and Serdar Tatar were charged with

conspiracy to attack Fort Dix and weaponspossession.176 In a conspiracy case, any actof any member is attributed to the group as awhole and the informants intentionally triedto create enough ties between the brothers,Shnewer, and Tatar to make this argument.177



28


Though there were grounds for theentrapment defense,178 the Duka brothers’attorneys focused instead on the brothers’lack of awareness of any plot whatsoever.They argued that the brothers had noknowledge of the alleged agreement tocommit a crime and as a result there wasinsufficient evidence to prove conspiracy.179 The informant Omar even testified on thestand that the Duka brothers had no idea

about the plan, nor any knowledge of the tripthat he and Shnewer had taken to Fort Dix.180 The Duka brothers can also be heard on thetapes rejecting the informants’ attempts toprovoke them into expressing support forviolent jihad. For example, Eljvir’s lawyernoted in his opening statement that Eljvircan be heard on tape saying that stagingan attack is “haram” (forbidden) and thatsoldiers on U.S. soil have not done anythingto warrant such measures.181

Nevertheless, the jury convicted the Dukabrothers and their co-defendants. By virtueof an extraordinary government request, the jury that heard the case was anonymous,meaning that none of the parties, their

counsel, the public, orthe media was awareof the identities ofthe jury membersat trial. The use ofanonymous juries

has been criticizedfor biasing the jury itself to perceive of thedefendants as so dangerous as to requireanonymity.182 After the trial, juror numberthree publicly stated that the jury was sure“they were going to do it”—that the menwould eventually have carried out an attackon the Fort Dix army base.183 The Dukafamily questions the impartiality of the jury, particularly juror number three, whoseson—a marine—had been wounded in Iraq.

She publicly admitted that watching someof the videos shown at trial—videos theinformants downloaded or encouraged themen to download—had reminded her of theattack on her son.184

3. Th Impact

Ferik and Zurata Duka came to thiscountry as hopeful immigrants, learned thelanguage, started a successful business,

were well-respected in the community, and,most importantly, had created a close-knitand loving family.

All of this changed when the governmentdecided to target their sons. Eljvir, Dritan,

© Lyric R. Cabral. Zurata Duka, mother of the Duka brothers, in her home praying.



29


and Shain have now been in prison for almostfour years and will remain there for the rest oftheir lives unless their appeal is successful.185 Zurata struggles to articulate the devastatingeffects that the case has had on their lives:“I can’t explain it. We are not the people that

we used to be, happy. We are not the samepeople…we’re not here anymore.”186

The same night that the FBI arrested hissons, Ferik Duka was arrested and held inimmigration detention for a month.187

Amidst everything else, Dritan’s family wassummarily evicted from the apartment theyhad rented. Zurata recalls,

“They [the landlord] said ‘get out of the

apartment these are terrorists.’ Theygave us three days’ time to get ourclothes. We had to get clothes from theapartment and bring them to our house,which was surrounded by news people.I had the truck, but nobody to drive,nobody to help.”188

After the eviction, Dritan’s five childrenmoved in with their grandparents and uncleBurim, where they’ve lived ever since.

Without his brothers to run the roofingbusiness, Burim dropped out of high schoolto support his remaining family members.Noting that his nieces and nephews are“like orphans now,” Burim said, “it’s me who

supports them now… I basically support fourfamilies.”189 Shouldering a heavy burden fora 20-year old, Burim now runs one of theDukas’ roofing companies; Ferik came out ofretirement to run the other.

At the time of the arrests, the Dukas’ roofingcompanies had over $400,000 in contracts.

These dried up almost immediately after thebrothers were arrested. People who hadworked with Ferik for more than a decadetook their business elsewhere. Their biggestcustomer, the local fire department, called tosay they had been warned by the governmentnot to do business with the Dukas. Internetsites labeled their businesses as being “runby terrorists,”190 and they received harassingphone calls at their businesses. While they

once dreamt of building four neighboringhouses, one for each brother, today they arebarely able to make ends meet.

The neighborhood that the Dukas havecalled home for more than a decade has

“obaa, te Jutce Departent – teyae t ear. Tey are nt dng tergt tng; tey ae t tp pntngte nger at nncent mul peple.”

Zurata Dua, ter te Dua brter



30


become inhospitable to them. Though somehave stuck by the family, many neighbors

have stopped talking to them. When thebrothers were first arrested, strangers woulddrive by the house yelling “terrorist.” TheMuslim community in Cherry Hill has alsodistanced itself from the family. “They said

‘we are scared,’” explains Ferik.191

Ferik and Burim are convinced that they areoften followed while driving. The whole familysuspects that they remain under 24-hour

government surveillance. Zurata expressedfear of retaliation against herself, or evenagainst 13-year-old Lejla, for speaking outabout the case. “Disappearances are notunheard of in this country,” she said, herformer confidence in freedom and justice in

America shattered.192

The family does not fly, unwilling to facehours of questioning at the airport, if not

worse. Zurata and Ferik’s worst nightmareis that Burim might become the next victimof a government set-up. “The governmentalready took three of my sons… what’s tostop them from taking Burim too?” asksZurata.193

Instead, when they have to travel, the Dukasdrive. They drove two days straight in July2010 to Colorado to visit Eljvir, Dritan, and

Shain, where they are housed in the nation’sonly supermax prison. It was the first timethey had seen them in months and they had

to interact with them from behind a glass

wall. It was the first time that Eljvir met his

daughter Fatima, who was born after his

arrest.

While the rest of his family was in Colorado,

Burim remained at home. He was denied

permission to visit his brothers without anyfurther explanation. “Everyone called us

‘four peas in a pod,’ we were that close. I

went with my brothers everywhere. And now

I haven’t seen my brothers in four years,”

recalls Burim.194

In the four years since the arrests, the

members of the Duka family have worked

hard to raise awareness about the case and

what they see as the systemic injustice of

counterterrorism operations in the UnitedStates today. “If we don’t speak up, who

else is going to? The more people we get

[to listen], the more the FBI will realize they

have to stop what they’re doing. We have

to start a trial against the FBI, to hold them

accountable for what’s going on,” explains

Burim, who runs the FreeFortDixFive.com

website on his brothers’ behalf.195

Lejla, who began speaking publicly aboutthe case when she was only 11 years old,

adds “it’s not just my father’s case, there are

thousands of cases just like this, and we

need to step forward, so we can actually be

a free country.”196



31


“We saw around 50 federal agents. They were all dressed

in black. They were in the dumpsters even. I came out of

the car to see what was going on. They pointed guns at us.

They put Dritan in handcuffs. They had me in handcuffs.

They had dogs trained on us, foaming at their mouths,

which was scary because we couldn’t protect ourselves.

The nieces and nephews were just in the truck crying. I

was 15. I thought I was in a dream when that was going

on, during the arrest.”

Brim Dka, ag 20 (brthr f ejir, Drita ad shai

Dka), dcribig Drita’ arrt



32


© S. Nadia Hussain. Shahina Parveen, mother of Shahawar Matin Siraj, attending the 2011 South Asian Summitin Washington, D.C., hosted by South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT).



33


C. Shahawar Siraj Matin (Bay Ridge, NY)

1. Th Famiy

When Shahawar Matin Siraj was 16 yearsold, his mother, Shahina Parveen, moved hisfamily from Pakistan to the United States.They applied for asylum for fear of facingpersecution as Ismaili Muslims, a religiousminority in Pakistan. Like many immigrantsbefore them, they settled in Jackson Heights,Queens, and have lived there ever since.197

With his father, Siraj Abdul Rehman, unableto work due to health problems, Shahawarbegan supporting the family financiallyshortly after arriving in the country. With atenth-grade education, he held a variety of jobs before becoming a clerk at his uncle’sbookstore, Islamic Books and Tapes, in Bay

Ridge, Brooklyn.198

Although he took on the responsibilities ofan adult, his mother and sister rememberhis childlike qualities. “He was an honest,hard-working, and immature kid,” his motherShahina recalls. Even while he was working,Shahina says, “I always knew where my sonwas. I was always aware of his whereabouts.”Shahawar’s sister, Saniya, now 24 years old,also recalls his innocent and trusting nature.

“If you said something nice to him, he was allyours. He was a little immature. He believedin people.”199

Mother and sister also note Shahawar’sgenerosity. “After September 11, he

volunteered to donate blood for the victims.He was sad that all these people werehurting, and he wanted to help.” Saniyarecalls, “Shahawar shared everything withme. He taught me how to play Pokémon andcar-racing video games.”200

2. Th Ca

Starting in November 2002, an undercoverpolice officer, known only by his alias, KamilPasha, started hanging around the bookstoreand getting to know Shahawar.201 Heengaged Shahawar in discussions about—among other things—9/11, Osama binLaden, and suicide bombings in Palestine.202 Shahawar made statements during these

conversations that would later be usedagainst him at trial.

Around the same time, a 50-year old Egyp-tian-American named Osama Eldawoodywas looking to work for the NYPD. He hadoffered to help investigate ID fraud amongimmigrants but, instead, the NYPD toldhim that they wanted him to be their “eyesand ears” within the Muslim community.203 Eldawoody agreed and was soon sent to a

mosque in Staten Island.204 He proved tobe an eager recruit: his first day on the jobhe took down the license plate numbers ofevery car in the mosque’s parking lot.205

Over the next several months, Eldawoody



34


made 575 visits to various mosques andfiled some 350 reports.206 Eventually, hewas sent to the Islamic Society of Bay Ridge,where he developed a reputation for beingtheatrically devout and outspoken.207

According to Shahina, Eldawoody’s originaltarget was the mosque’s imam, Sheikh RedaShata: “The informant first went after theimam but when that didn’t work, he startedhanging out at the mosque looking for aneasier target. When he couldn’t get theimam, he came for my son.” 208

In September 2003, the NYPD toldEldawoody to befriend Shahawar.209 Eldawoody did and reported that he foundShahawar “impressionable.”210 He alsobecame close with Shahawar’s friend, James

Elshafay, a 19-year-old schizophrenic, whowould later testify against Shahawar at trial.

With time, Shahawar came to regardEldawoody as an elder. “I am like your son,”he said. Eldawoody reciprocated, calling

Shahawar his “son.”211 Eldawoody began

driving Shahawar home nearly every day, and

expounded on his views regarding Islamic

duties and politics. Eldawoody cursed

America, and insisted that “it was lawful to

spill a non-Muslim’s blood.”212 Eldawoody

also said that his imam had issued a fatwato kill American soldiers.213 He also said

that he didn’t want to die of cirrhosis whileMuslims were still suffering—that he wanted

to “do something.”214

Shahina recalls that she and her husband

were troubled by the burgeoning relationship

between Shahawar and Eldawoody. “I warned

Shahawar about Eldawoody, because hewas a bad driver. For a while, he stopped

getting a ride, but then started up again. I

told him not to, but he said, ‘He’s a sick man,

he’s dying.’”215

In April 2004, when the abuse of detainees

by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib216 first becamepublic, Eldawoody seized on the opportunity

to take things to the next level. Shahina

explains that Eldawoody started showing

Shahawar “awful, awful scary photos of Abu

Ghraib and Guantanamo. If you show thesepictures even to a non-Muslim, it’ll make

them crazy. No one can bear these photos,

Eldawoody showed Shahawar these photos

and said, ‘it’s your duty as a Muslim to do jihad in response.’”217

“our entre aly cared, tey’recared t tal n ur ue. one ur

aunt an’t called u n tree year.we dn’t een t t er becauee’ t cared.”



35


After months of Eldawoody’s campaign,Shahawar finally crumbled when he wasshown pictures of young Iraqi girls beingthreatened and raped; he told Eldawoodythat they had to do something.218 Eldawoodythen told him about a group called “The

Brotherhood,” with operatives in upstateNew York who could help them.219 Then, inMay 2004, Eldawoody told his handlers, “Ibelieve it’s time to record.”220

At some point around that same time, hisfriend James Elshafay shared a crude mapof Staten Island—marked with the jail, policestations, and surrounding bridges—withShahawar.221 Shahawar turned the mapover to Eldawoody, who said he would show

it to the Brotherhood.222 Despite Elshafay’smental problems, Eldawoody flattered himand queried him about how best to blow upthe Verrazano Bridge.223

In early August of that year—possibly to

impress Eldawoody—Shahawar suggestedthat a bomb at the 34th Street subwaystation late at night would cause greateconomic damage without killing anyone.224 Once again, Eldawoody proved eager. Hesuggested using uranium-235 and remote-

controlled detonation, and even offered toobtain the nuclear material from the Russianmafia.225 Though Shahawar grew uneasy,226 Eldawoody pressed on, asking if the stationhad surveillance cameras.227 On August21st, he drove Shahawar and Elshafayto survey the station.228 They returned toEldawoody’s car and drew up maps, whichwould be used against Shahawar at trial.229

Just two days later, while driving Shahawar

and Elshafay home, Eldawoody had surprisingnews for the pair: “Brother Nazeem is . . .very happy. Very, very impressed.”230 WhenShahawar asked, “Who is Brother Nazeem?”Eldawoody replied that he was a higher upin the Brotherhood and that he was, “very,very, very happy with 34th. He’s very happywith 34th.”231

Shahawar has said he was taken aback by howquickly things were developing. Shahawar

asked if this “Brother Nazeem” understoodthat there was to be no killing, and changedthe subject several times,232 but Eldawoodywas intent on getting a commitment andrepeatedly asked how Shahawar plannedto contribute.233 Shahawar refused to plant

© DRUM. Shahina Parveen (second from left), mother ofShahawar Matin Siraj, in Washington D.C.



36


any bombs, but tentatively agreed to serveas a lookout.234 However, he insisted that hewould first need his mother’s permission.235 Unsatisfied with this stipulation, Eldawoodythreatened to tell “the Brotherhood” and said,“If you tell me you don’t feel comfortable, if

you don’t want to do it, let me tell him straight.. . . You don’t want to do it?”236 Shahawar’sresponse was, “No, I don’t want to do it.”237 Eldawoody then ratcheted up the pressure:“Okay. Okay. That’s what I’m going to callhim to let him know, okay? Why didn’t youtell me before?”238 Shahawar: replied “I don’tknow I have to do it. I know that I am makinga plan. But, you know, I don’t know that I’mgoing to go and do it. And so that fast?No, impossible.”239 Nonetheless Eldawoodypersisted and Shahawar finally agreed tobe a lookout.240 This seemed to appeaseEldawoody. Before getting out of the car,Shahawar apologized.241

There was no further contact between thethree.242 Elshafay would later testify thatShahawar had tried to back out of the plan.243

The following week, the police askedShahawar to come to the station about

an unresolved misdemeanor charge and,when Shahawar went to the station, he wasarrested on conspiracy charges.244

At his trial in Brooklyn, the defense arguedthat Shahawar had been entrapped.245 In its

rebuttal, which focused on predisposition,the government relied heavily on statementsShahawar had made in the presence of KamilPasha.246 A jury found Shahawar guilty andhe was sentenced to 30 years in prison.247

3. Th Impact

The day after Shahawar was sentenced,Immigrations and Customs Enforcement(ICE) agents took Shahina, Saniya, and Sirajinto custody.248 Shahina and Saniya spentthe next 11 days in a detention center inElizabeth, New Jersey.249 “The conditionswere really bad,” says Saniya, “We didn’t haveany privacy and had to take showers in frontof everyone else. They separated us for two

days. My mom was crying and crying, yelling‘Don’t go, don’t take her.’ She didn’t sleep theentire night.”250

Supporters protested outside the facility andscrambled to raise money for the family’s bail.When Shahina and Saniya were released,they found that the government had seizedtheir bank account and confiscated theirpassports and IDs, leaving their lives intatters. Siraj would spend the next six

months in immigration detention.

“They made us beggars,” Shahina says. Saniyatook time off from school, as money wasdiverted to lawyers. With both breadwinnersbehind bars, Shahina went to work at the

“Tey’e runed y cldren’ uture . . .Year ae been ated. [my daugter’]

n te ter a ‘terrrt.’”



37


very bookstore where Eldawoody had firstbefriended her son. When her husband waseventually released six months after theirson’s arrest, he took over her position at thebookstore. Since then, he has worked sevendays a week, all while under house arrest.

“Our entire family is scared,” laments Saniya.“They’re scared to talk in our house. Oneof our aunts hasn’t called us in three years.We don’t even visit with her because she’stoo scared.” The cousins whom Shahawarused to play with no longer visit the Sirajhousehold. Formerly friendly neighbors havealso kept their distance.251

At first Shahina and Saniya were fearful andwithdrawn as well. Mother and daughterwere stigmatized by Shahawar’s arrest, andtraumatized by their own immigration arrestand detention. After being released fromdetention, Saniya was afraid they wouldcome back and says she “began havingnightmares.”

Shahina said the ramifications of her son’scase have extended to all aspects of her life.“I’m worried about my daughter’s prospectsfor marriage and employment. They’ve

ruined my children’s future, my daughter’scollege. Years have been wasted. She’snow the sister of a ‘terrorist.’”

Over time, however—and faced with thegrowing awareness that Shahawar’s case

is actually part of a larger pattern—Shahinaand Saniya began to combat their sense ofisolation. Through a community organizationcalled Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM),both Shahina and Saniya have become vocaladvocates, both for Shahawar and against

the government’s use of informants to targetMuslims and concoct fake terrorist plots. “I’mnot scared anymore,” says Saniya, “I got thatstrong feeling from DRUM, because a lot ofpeople supported us. I learned a lot, and mymom became more active. She spoke out. Ispoke out.”

Shahina echoes the sense that they arepart of a larger justice movement. “I went toDRUM in 2006, and since then, I realized that

we were not the only ones being targeted,but that there are many families who havebeen targeted, and many families with manysons in jail.”

“There are many stories that overlap. Manymen in our communities have been targeted,and the women and children are left out inthe cold.”



38


As with other cases around the country,252 the three cases outlined in this Report allinvolved the use of informants where therewas no previous evidence to suggest that thedefendants were planning to commit violentacts before the FBI

or NYPD intervened.The government’sinformants not onlyheld themselvesout as Muslims, butalso focused theirattempts at incitementon Muslims. Theg o v e r n m e n t ’ sinformants introducedand aggressively

pushed ideas aboutviolent jihad and even encouraged thedefendants to believe that it was their dutyto take action against the United States. Intwo of the three cases, the government reliedon the defendants’ vulnerabilities—povertyand youth, for example—in its inducementmethods. In all three cases the governmentselected or encouraged the proposedlocations that the defendants would laterbe accused of targeting. Likewise, in all

three cases, the government providedthe defendants with—or encouraged thedefendants to acquire—material evidence,such as weaponry or violent videos, whichwould later be used to convict them.

The government played a significant rolein instigating and devising the three plotsfeatured in this Report—plots the governmentthen “foiled” and charged the defendantswith. Despite this fact, the defendants

in these cases

were all convictedand are facingprison sentencesof 25 years to life.These and similarprosecutions thatrely on the abusiveuse of informantshave been central tosubstantiating thegovernment’s claim

that, as a country,we face a “homegrown threat” of terrorism.Each case also raises serious questionsabout both the government’s role and theset of laws being used to facilitate thesepractices.

These cases and other documentedpractices are suggestive of larger patterns oflaw enforcement activities that are targetingMuslim communities around the country.253

As elaborated below, these practices, andtheir impacts, raise a number of serioushuman rights concerns.

D. Patterns

“Tere are any tretat erlap. many en nur cunte ae beentargeted, and te en andcldren are let ut n te cld.”

sana Pareen, ter

saaar matn sraj



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II I. Human Rights Implications and Obligations

The practices described in this Report raiseserious concerns about the U.S. government’scompliance with its international humanrights obligations. As described below,international treaties ratified by the UnitedStates guarantee, among other rights, the

rights to: a fair trial, non-discrimination, andfreedom of expression and religion. As aState Party to the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and theInternational Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of Racial Discrimination(ICERD),254 the United States is obligatedto respect, protect, and fulfill the rightscontained in these treaties for all individualswithin its territory or under its jurisdiction,and must do so in a non-discriminatory

manner.255 Under international law, a numberof these rights apply equally to citizens andnon-citizens.256

International human rights law alsorecognizes that the State has a duty toprotect its nationals and others againstviolence, including terrorism. Specifically,States must protect the right to life throughpolicing and other security measures.257 States must, however, simultaneously comply

with international human rights law whiletaking steps to protect national security.258 As described below, the U.S. government’spractices and policies that are the subjectof this Report implicate the rights to a fairtrial, non-discrimination, and freedom of

expression and religion, all of which areprotected under international law.

Although we focus our analysis on the rightsobligations that the United States has asto the defendants and Muslim communities

more broadly, the experiences of the familiesof the defendants also raise significanthuman rights issues.259

A. Right t a Fair Tria

Pursuant to its obligations under theICCPR and ICERD, the United States mustguarantee the right to a fair trial, and mustdo so in a non-discriminatory manner.260 TheU.N. Human Rights Committee, (the body

responsible for monitoring implementation ofthe ICCPR) has not yet had the opportunityto consider the issue of entrapment or theuse of informants in a manner that is directlyon point to the cases that are the subjectof this Report. However, the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights (ECtHR), a leadingauthority on human rights law, has appliedanalogous fair trial provisions to undercoverpolice investigations.261 In particular, theECtHR recognizes that a fair trial requires

that all aspects of a criminal proceeding befair, including “the way in which evidencewas taken.”262 With regard to undercoverinvestigations, the ECtHR has held thatproceedings resulting from investigationswhere police incite the commission of a



40


crime are fundamentally deprived of theirfairness. Thus, to ensure that due processand the right to a fair trial are not violated,undercover agents must investigate in “anessentially passive manner,” and cannot “exertsuch an influence on the subject as to incitethe commission of an offense that would

otherwise not have been committed.”263 Otherwise, using the evidence obtained byincitement would result in the defendant“being definitively deprived of a fair trial fromthe outset.”264

In assessing whether the governmentincited the crime, the ECtHR considerswhether the agents pressured orthreatened the defendant, or whetherobjective circumstances were such that the

government had good reason to believe thatthe defendant would have committed thecrime on their own—for example, given priorrelated convictions—which would indicatepredisposition.265

Incitements by government agents to committhe crime during the investigation phasehave serious implications for assessing theoverall fairness of criminal proceedingsas a whole.266 In the three cases detailed

in this Report, the informants, working onbehalf of the government, went far beyondinvestigating in a passive manner. On thecontrary, the government’s informants playeda significant role in instigating and devisingthe plots for which the defendants were later

convicted. The government did not have anyparticularized suspicion of criminal activity atthe time the informants met the defendants.Nor did any of the defendants have priorrelated convictions. In other words, thegovernment had no good reason to believethe defendants would have committed the

crime on their own. These actions haveserious implications for the defendants’rights to a fair trial, and as described furtherbelow, to their rights to non-discrimination,and freedom of religion, expression, andopinion.

B. Right t n-Dicrimiati

The prohibition on discrimination is one ofthe pillars of the protections guaranteed

by both ICERD and ICCPR, constituting aperemptory norm of international law fromwhich no derogation is permitted,267 even intimes of public emergency.268 The ICCPRprohibits discrimination on the grounds ofrace, color, sex, language, religion, politicalor other opinion, national or social origin,property, birth or other status.269 UnderICERD, State Parties “condemn racialdiscrimination and undertake to pursue byall appropriate means and without delay a

policy of eliminating racial discrimination inall its forms.”270 ICERD defines prohibited“racial discrimination” broadly to include

“any distinction, exclusion, restriction orpreference based on race, colour, descent,



41


or national or ethnic origin which has the

purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing

the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,

on an equal footing, of human rights and

fundamental freedoms in the political,

economic, social, cultural or any other field

of public life.”271

Although ICERD, on its face, does not

cover discrimination based on religion, the

Convention has been interpreted to prohibit

religious discrimination, especially when

consistently tied to racial discrimination.272

The construction of a terrorist “Other” in

the post-September 11, 2001, context

has conflated notions of race, ethnicity,

religion, national origin, gender, and political

views, effectively racializing Islam, Muslims,and Muslim religious practice as radical

and dangerous to U.S. national security

interests.273

In all three of the cases highlighted in

this Report, the government used paid

informants to incite the defendants to

act. While the facts of each case are

distinct, David Williams; Eljvir, Dritan, and

Shain Duka; and Shahawar Matin Sirajwere all targeted by the government for

investigation, surveillance, and the use of

informants because they are Muslim, a fact

that implicates the fundamental right to non-

discrimination.274

Under international law, policies that imposea disproportionate burden on particulargroups—whether purposely or in effect—must be justified in order not to constituteprohibited discrimination.275 In determiningwhether the government’s targeting ofMuslims for surveillance and coercive

counterterrorism investigations is illegalunder international law, two key questionsmust be addressed.

First: Do the government’s investigation

policies and practices have the purpose

or effect of disproportionately burdening

a particular racial, ethnic, religious, or

national group? 276

Though the burden to prove intent under

international human rights law is high, thepolicies and practices highlighted in thisReport suggest the government is targetingMuslim communities with law enforcementand intelligence-gathering activities likesurveillance and informants, absent anyparticularized reason to suspect criminalactivity.277

The government has argued thatcounterterrorism investigations targeting

Muslims do not constitute discriminationbecause law enforcement officials onlylaunch investigations when they havegood reason to believe that the subjectsare planning to commit a crime. However,the FBI Guidelines and DIOGs allow



42


for investigations and the collection ofinformation focusing on certain ethniccommunities, without any factual predicateor evidence of criminality.278

As the cases mentioned in this Report clearly

demonstrate—encouraged by the preventativemodel’s focus on “radicalization”—thegovernment is taking action before any realindication of criminality arises. Instead, thegovernment appears to be targeting Muslimcommunities on the basis of their religiousand cultural identities and practices, as wellas expression of religious and political beliefs,absent any nexus to criminal behavior.279 TheNYPD Radicalization Report, for example,identifies “[w]earing traditional Islamic clothing

[and] growing a beard,” as signs of the, “self-identification” phase of radicalization.280

The laws, policies, and practices ofcounterterrorism policing—including thosedocumented in this Report—have resulted ingreater law enforcement scrutiny of Muslimcommunities around the United Statesin a manner that targets Muslim religiouspractice, such as attendance at the mosque,or expression of political opinions critical of

U.S. foreign policy, raising troubling humanrights impacts and concerns. Whatever theintent, the government’s investigation andsurveillance policies have a discriminatoryeffect, with the burdensome impact ofsurveillance, informant, and government-

manufactured plots—as well as terrorismprosecutions—falling disproportionately onMuslim communities.281

Second: Is this disproportionate burden justified? International law allows

discrimination to be justified in certaincircumstances, where the aim of themeasure is legitimate and the differentiationis objective, reasonable, and proportional to that aim.282

Policies and practices that have the purposeor effect of disproportionately burdening aparticular racial, ethnic, religious, or nationalgroup must be justified in order not toconstitute prohibited discrimination.283 Factors that may be considered indetermining whether a burden is justifiedinclude:

1. The importance of the right infringed bythe measure;284

2. The aim and legitimacy of the measure;285

3. Whether the measure uses criteria thatare “objective and reasonable”;286 and,

4. Whether the means used are proportionalto, and effectively advance, the aim.287

With regard to the first point, the rightsto non-discrimination, a fair trial, and tofreedom of religion, expression, and opinion(discussed further below) are fundamentalhuman rights.288 In considering the second



43


factor—the legitimacy of the aim or objective

pursued—while the government’s overarching

aim is arguably to identify potential threats

and, thereby, defend national security, as

noted above, these aims must be pursued in

compliance with human rights norms.289

On the final two criteria, the targeting and

surveillance of Muslim communities writ

large—as well as the use of informants

to incite Muslims to engage in speech or

conduct that will later be used to support a

government-concocted terrorism plot—are

simply not justified when one considers the

following points:

Law enforcement activities appear to

be triggered simply by virtue of the

subjects being Muslim, without any

actual indication of criminal behavior,

suggesting that the criteria used is

neither “objective” nor “reasonable.”

The government expends significant

resources paying informants and

manufacturing terrorist plots. These

actions do not make the country safer

and, in fact, divert limited resources away

from monitoring actual threats.290

The government’s use of informants and

surveillance in Muslim communities insti-

tutionalizes and legitimizes Islamophobia

and xenophobia in the general public.291

C. Right t Frdm fRigi ad epri

The ICCPR guarantees the rights to freedomof thought, conscience, and religion,292 andto freedom of opinion and expression.293 The Human Rights Committee has madeclear that the Article 18 right to freedomof thought, conscience and religion… “isfar-reaching and profound; it encompassesfreedom of thought on all matters, personalconviction and the commitment to religion orbelief, whether manifested individually or incommunity with others.”294 The Article 19right to freedom of opinion, expression andinformation is similarly broad, encompassing“the freedom to seek, receive and impart

information and ideas of all kinds.”295

The right to freedom of thought, conscience,and religion is directly affected whenthe government’s surveillance andcounterterrorism investigations targetindividuals because of their faith.296 Thegovernment’s targeting of the Muslimcommunity in law enforcement operationsalso implicates the right to freedom ofopinion and expression when individuals are

subjected to greater scrutiny because of theparticular political opinions they express.297 Anti-radicalization policies and resultantlaw enforcement practices—coupled withthe general climate of Islamophobia theyfoment—also have an indirect chilling effect



44


on freedom of expression and religion in theMuslim community more broadly.298

Many Muslims—or those perceived to beMuslim—have intentionally altered how theypractice or manifest their religion,299 Forexample, many have altered their physicalappearance or dress, curtailed public prayer

or worship, changed their names, or nowavoid the discussion of politically-chargedtopics.300 As such, the effects of targetedsurveillance and discrimination againstthe Muslim community have had seriousimplications for both the freedom of religion(Article 18) and the freedom of opinion andexpression (Article 19). Many AmericanMuslims are unable to practice their religionfreely and are constrained in their ability toexpress their religious and political viewswithout fear. Studies have shown that amajority of Muslims believe it has become“more difficult to be a Muslim in America,”while almost three-quarters have expressedthe concern that “U.S. anti-terrorism policiessingle out Muslims for extra surveillance.”301

Arun Kundnani, Open Society InstituteFellow and author of Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, has doneextensive research on the effects of anti-

radicalization policies in the U.K. and, morerecently, in the United States. In an interviewwith CHRGJ, he explained,

“When you unpack the concept ofradicalization, it tends to involve some

notion of ideology or ideas as the driver of

violence, even though that is inconsistentwith empirical research. This points in thedirection of criminalizing the ideas thatare thought to motivate violence. Thereis a drive to say that this set of ideas,this ideology is not entitled to freedom of

expression.”302

Kundnani has observed the real-lifeeffects of these concerns amongst Muslim

communities.

“The radicalization model implies that

those expressing radical views shouldexpect the FBI to infiltrate their mosquesor community organizations. As a result,there has been a real chilling effect on

expression. I have seen a reluctance toexpress views on issues such as Palestine

or American foreign policy, in order toavoid attracting the attention of lawenforcement.”303

The U.N. Special Rapporteur on thePromotion and Protection of HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms whileCountering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin,has reinforced this general critique of the

government’s conflation of religion andterrorism, noting that the United Statesshould “not act in a manner which mightbe seen as advocating the use of race andreligion for the identification of persons asterrorists.”304



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IV. Recommendations and Concluding Observations

The United States must abide by itsinternational human rights obligations andmust ensure the rights detailed above to allwithin its territory or under its jurisdiction ina non-discriminatory manner. The U.S. mustalso provide an effective remedy for human

rights violations.305 It has thus far provedimpossible for persons who have sufferedrights violations as a result of the practicesdescribed in this Report to gain redress.306 To abide by these international humanrights obligations, CHRGJ urges the U.S.government to act immediately to implementthe following recommendations with respectto law enforcement and counterterrorisminvestigations, particularly those that involvethe use of extensive surveillance and paid

informants without particularized suspicionof criminal activity:

The U.S. government should reject“radicalization” theories that threaten therights to freedom of religion, opinion, andexpression, and should put an end to thepreventative policing and prosecutionmethods that rely on such theories.18

Congress should hold hearings on theimpact of counterterrorism policieson Muslim, Arab, South Asian, andMiddle Eastern communities in theUnited States. These hearings shouldinclude consideration of current in-telligence-gathering tactics and the

use of informants in counterterrorisminvestigations.

Congress should pass the EndRacial Profiling Act, proposed federallegislation to ban racial profiling by law

enforcement. The DOJ should revise its own June

2003 Federal Guidance on RacialProfiling to eliminate the border andnational security loophole, to include aban on profiling based on religion andethnic origin, and to ensure that theguidance is enforceable.

The DOJ should open an investigationinto all terrorism-related cases involving

the use of an informant since September11, 2001, with a view towards examiningoversight and actions of informants,the circumstances under which theyare deployed, the types of informationthey gather, and their role in instigatingterrorist plots.

Attorney General Holder should issuenew guidelines to replace the MukaseyGuidelines for Domestic FBI Operations

(2008), the 2006 Gonzales Guidelineson Confidential Human Sources, andthe 2002 Ashcroft Guidelines on FBIUndercover Operations. These newguidelines should eliminate authorizationfor the pre-investigation “assessment”



46


stage. Further, the new guidelinesshould ensure that:

The FBI and other law enforcementagencies do not open investigations,including by using informants, against

individuals absent particularizedsuspicion of wrongdoing.

The FBI and other law enforcementagencies are not allowed to targetindividuals and communities throughsurveillance, informants, or otherinformation-gathering techniquesbased on race, religion, or nationalorigin, or political and religiousstatements or beliefs.

The FBI is explicitly and consistentlyprohibited from using informants toengage in entrapment or inducementto commit crimes.

The NYPD should revise its guidelinesto only allow for investigations whenthere is an articulable and reasonablesuspicion of criminal activity.

CHRGJ additionally urges the U.S.government to implement the January 2011recommendations of the U.N. WorkingGroup on the U.S. Universal PeriodicReview (UPR).308 Among other things, theUPR Working Group recommended thatthe United States amend its definition

of racial profiling to conform with therequirements of ICERD; that it make alldomestic anti-terrorism legislation andaction fully consistent with human rightsstandards; that it devises specific programsaimed at countering growing Islamophobic

and xenophobic trends in society; and thatit pass the End Racial Profiling Act andcomprehensive state legislation prohibitingracial profiling.

Since September 11, 2001, the governmenthas targeted Muslims in America in avariety of particularly intense and broadways, including by sending paid untrainedinformants into mosques and Muslimcommunities. This practice has led to a

number of high-profile terrorism prosecutionsthat support the government’s claim that weface a “homegrown threat.” A closer lookat the government practices underlininga number of these cases raises seriousquestions about the U.S. government’s roleand purpose in inciting and devising theseplots in Muslim communities. To abide byits obligations to ensure fundamental humanrights, the U.S. government must put an endto this discriminatory targeting of Muslim

communities.



47


© Lyric R. Cabral. Zurata Duka (center) and Faten Shnewer (right) speak at a rally in Foley Square, near NewYork City’s federal courthouses, about their sons’ involvement in the Fort Dix Five case. Alicia McWilliams (backleft) watches on stage, awaiting her opportunity to speak on behalf of her nephew, David Williams, and theNewburgh Four case.



48


1 Te ter “targetng” a ued n t Reprt encpae derental treatent nddual r grup eterntentnally r n eect, bt c rae cncern under nternatnal uan rgt la prbtn n

dcrnatn, c ll be re ully eplred later n te Reprt. 2 T Reprt cncerned prarly t nrant, and nt cperatr r pad undercer cer. See Dad A.harr, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U

Rev. L. & Soc. chaNge 123, 128 (2010) (dtngung nrant are under te cntrl la enrceentr nrant apprac la enrceent t nratn ter n ltn, and ntng tat en laenrceent ue te rer n que, t “delberately target tee nttutn and te nddual tn ter netgatn.”); ceNteR oN Law aNd SecURitY, NYU SchooL of Law, teRRoRiSt tRiaL RepoRt caRd, SeptembeR

11, 2001-SeptembeR 11, 2009 42 (2009), available at ttp://.laandecurty.rg/Prtal/0/dcuent/02_ TTRCfnalJan142.pd [erenater 2009 cLS teRRoRiSt tRiaL RepoRt caRd] (eplanng tat tug tecncally“te derence beteen an nrant and a cperatr largely depend n eter r nt a ral agreeent cperatn a been gned,” te re cllqual raer dtngue beteen te t baed n eter tenddual eer ntended t ad any alleged terrrt actty, t “nrant” reerrng t te tut any uc ntent);intere t me Geran (Apr. 5, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenater ChRGJ intere t me Geran].

3 Accrdng t te Center n La and securty (CLs), nce septeber 2001, nrant ae been ued n 210terrr precutn erall, and n 97 (62 percent) te t g-prle terrr precutn. CLs reprt998 terrr precutn nce septeber 2001. 2009 cLS teRRoRiSt tRiaL RepoRt caRd, supra nte 2 at 46;ceNteR oN Law aNd SecURitY, NYU SchooL of Law, teRRoRiSt tRiaL RepoRt caRd, SeptembeR 11, 2001-SeptembeR

11, 2010 4, 20 (2010), available at ttp://.laandecurty.rg/Prtal/0/dcuent/01_TTRC20101.pd.CLs’ karen Greenberg a cented: “Te cnctn rate r te cae tat nled nrant alta undred percent; t’ 97 percent. s tat ge yu a nd ene prtant [nrant] are and ueul tey’e been.” Anjal kaat and Jace sen, Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance onPaid Informants Raises Questions about Validity of Terrorism Cases, democRacY Now!, oct. 6, 2010, availableat ttp://.decracyn.rg/2010/10/6/entrapent_r_lng_terrr_b_relance [erenater Entrapment or Foiling Terror ]. A marc 2011 CLs pre releae nted tat 128 natnal ecurty / terrr cae (eult-deendant) ae nled nrant, tug t ee ter etd cuntng cae a canged nce te2009 TTRC, ang t dcult t ue te data r any analy abut te rate relance n nrant. Center r

La and securty, TTRC Update: inrant Cae & te Entrapent Deene (mar. 24, 2011) [erenater marc2011 CLs TTRC Update].

4 Celete katz & Cry seaz, Heroes Honored after Foiling Terror Plot to Bomb Riverdale Synagogues,N.Y. daiLY NewS, maY 22, 2009, available at ttp://artcle.nydalyne.c/2009-05-22/ne/17922274_1_ jae-crte-ynaggue-plt; sean Alan, FBI: Army Base ‘Dodged A Bullet’: Authorities Arrest Six ‘Islamic Militants’ Who Aimed To Kill Soldiers At New Jersey’s Fort Dix, cbS NewS, may 8, 2008, available at ttp://.cbne.c/tre/2007/05/08/terrr/an2773084.tl; Crag hrtz, Anatomy of a Foiled Plot: Two would-be Bombers of the Herald Square Subway Station Find that Three is a Crowd, N.Y. mag., may 21,2005, available at ttp://nyag.c/nyetr/ne/eature/10559/ [erenater hrtz, Anatomy of a Foiled Plot ].

5 frer fBi Agent Jae wedc and me Geran ae cally crtczed te fBi’ ue urellance andnrant. See Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3 (qutng wedc a ayng, “Yu jut can’t cntnue

t, yu n, t get a elect grup peple are repnble r petty cre, ge te uge aunt ney, and end te nt a all nrty cunty, deperate becaue te recen and r ntbeng tere, and uggetng peple ct cre, and nt epect an epln t appen, becaue tey’redeperate r ney and te nrant erng uge reard.”); ChRGJ intere t me Geran, supra nte 2 (“weter tee cae culd ure an entrapent deene nt te releant quetn. it’ etert’ apprprate r te gernent actng n a ay ere tey’re aggrandzng te nature te treat. it’ jutdcult t undertand at te legtate gernent nteret n tee cae.” ). See also FBI Expands Probe

ENDNOTES



49


into Antiwar Activists, democRacY Now!, Dec. 23, 2010, available at ttp://.decracyn.rg/2010/12/23/b_epand_prbe_nt_antar_actt (qutng Geran a ayng, “we’re ntereted n a lt derent nefBi prgra. Tere’ a Dan manageent prgra, c purprt t all te fBi t cllect racal andetnc degrapc nratn and ap ur cunte acr te natn by race and etncty”). 6 Te Albany Cn Cuncl a paed a relutn callng n te Departent Jutce t ree t

cnctn mul en, Yan Are and maed han, ere entrapent a at ue. Jrdan Carle-Eangelt, Albany council calls on feds to re-open Muslims’ case, timeS UNioN, Apr. 6, 2010, available at ttp://blg.teunn.c/lcalpltc/6578/albany-cuncl-call-n-ed-t-re-pen-ul-cae/; Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3 (qutng Albany Cn Cuncl meber Dnc Callar a ayng, “it eele, yu n, tey dd t, tee actn, becaue tey ad t tat tey ere beng—yu n, te ederalgernent tryng t be tug n terrr. But te act tat yu ae t end n, yu n, an agentprcateur, ateer yu ant t call te, n rder t entrap ene, ’ nt dng anytng llegal t begnt, i ean, ere t gng? And ten, ere de t tp?”).

7 See Ala Cang, Four Men Convicted In Plot to Bomb New York Synagogues, wNYC, oct. 18, 2010, availableat ttp://.nyc.rg/artcle/nyc-ne/2010/ct/18/ur-en-cncted-plt-bb-ne-yr-ynaggue/(qutng karen Greenberg t CLs abut te Neburg fur cae, “Tere ere quetn een at te end te tral abut eactly ad been te ntatr [sic ] . . . eter t ad been te nrant r eter t ad beenne te ur accued.”); Guy Lan, The Fear Factory, RoLLiNg StoNe, feb. 7, 2008, at 62, available at ttp://

guylan.c/pd/rllngtne/earactry.pd (qutng Dad Cle a ayng, “en yu’re preng peple tundertae cnduct tey uld ae neer undertaen tut an nrant pung te alng, tere a real quetn yu’re creatng cre, nt preentng cre.”); ira Gla & Petra Bartcecz, Arms Trader 2009, thiS ameRicaN

Life , Aug. 7, 2009, aalable at ttp://.taercanle.rg/rad-arce/epde/387/ar-trader-2009[erenater Gla & Bartcecz, Arms Trader 2009] (qutng Azz huq dcung te Neburg fur cae,“bacally at yu ae ere te t recent cae n a ere cae n c an alleged terrr cnpracy ntated and pued alng by a gernent nrant”); CoUNciL oN ameRicaN iSLamic ReLatioNS (caiR), the

fbi’S USe of iNfoRmaNtS, RecRUitmeNt aNd iNtimidatioN withiN mUSLim commUNitieS, available at ttp://ca.car.c/dnlad.pp?=/dnlad/CAiR_fBi_Abue_Anntated_surce_Lt--Artcle_and_Cae.pd [erenaterCAiR, the fbi’S USe of iNfoRmaNtS, RecRUitmeNt aNd iNtimidatioN withiN mUSLim commUNitieS] (“Te fBi aued nrant and agent prcateur t nltrate que, berend and pre rpper nt angncrnatng tateent, r nduce ulnerable mul nt dcung llct actty.”); stepen Dn, victimS of

ameRica’S diRtY waRS: tacticS aNd ReaSoNS fRom coiNteLpRo to the waR oN teRRoR (2011), available at ttp://.prjectala.rg/dnlad/vct__Aerca_Drty_war.pd (ntng tat, n te cntet te “war

n Terrr,” “[p]reepte precutn nle nt nly cnctng nncent deendant cntred r ae cre,but al ttng and breang prcedural rule n rder t cnnce a jury, te eda, and te Aercan publc tatte nncent deendant are really gulty and dangeru.”); Natnal Rad Prject, Presumed Guilty: AmericanMuslims and Arabs, mar. 22, 2011, available at ttp://.radprject.rg/2011/03/preued-gulty-aercan-ul-and-arab/ (ntereng veena Dubal, Aan La Caucu Natnal securty and Cl Rgt Prgrasta Attrney, Dnc Callar, Albany Cn Cuncl meber, aly eber deendant carged tterrr-related ene, fred kreatu, and ter); wade E. sad, The Terrorist Informant, 85 wa. L. Re.687 (2010); Ta Cnctta, From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy, Publc Eye mag.(suer 2009), available at ttp://.publceye.rg/agazne/24n2/eent-t-que.tl. See also Jn seran, A Person Otherwise Innocent: Policing Entrapment in Preventative, Undercover CounterterrorismInvestigations, 11 U. Pa. J. Cnt. L. 1475 (2009); harr, supra nte 2.

8 Graa Rayan, Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues? A Defendant Finally SpeaksOut, the viLLage voice, mar. 2, 2011, available at ttp://.llagece.c/2011-03-02/ne/ere-te-

neburg-4-really-ut-t-bl-up-ynaggue/ [erenater Rayan, Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues? ]; Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3; PBs, Before the Fact: The Fort Dix Five, PBsNeed t kn, sep. 10, 2010, available at ttp://de.pb.rg/de/1588640291/#; Lan, supra nte 7;Rne Tepet, In Lodi Terrorism Case, Intent Was the Clincher, L.a. timeS, may 1, 2006, available at ttp://artcle.late.c/2006/ay/01/lcal/e-ld1; Aanda Rpley, The Fort Dix Verdict: A Victory for Pre-emptiveProsecutions, time .com, Dec. 23, 2008, available at ttp://.te.c/te/natn/artcle/0,8599,1868370,00.tl#zz1kNGCxk5 (“snce 9/11, te fBi a begun ung legn mul r Arabc nrant, any



50


te llegal grant t crnal recrd, t try t rt ut radcal bere tey tre. But te trategy a ledt accuatn tat te nrant are teele atcng te cre, a carge tat ung er te entre frt Dprceedng.”). Te Aercan Cl Lberte Unn sutern Calrna and te Cuncl n Aercan ilacRelatn recently brugt ut n beal tree mul plant agant te fBi, allegng te fBi payng Cragmntel t urey, nltrate, and recrd cneratn n que. Cplant, Yar fazaga . federal Bureau inetgatn, N. sA Cv 11-00301 (C.D.Ca. feb. 22, 2011). See also san L, FBI violated 1st Amendment

rights of Muslims, suit alleges, L.a. timeS, feb. 24, 2011, available at ttp://artcle.late.c/2011/eb/24/lcal/la-e-b-ul-20110224; Jenner medna, Suit Accuses F.B.I. of Spying at Mosques in California, N.Y.

timeS, feb. 24, 2011, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2011/02/25/u/25que.tl. mntel a elued te fBi. sctt Gler, Suit by Alleged Informant Says FBI Endangered His Life, L.a. timeS, Jan. 23, 2010,available at ttp://artcle.late.c/2010/jan/23/lcal/la-e-nrant23-2010jan23. Te ue nranta been crtczed utde te cntet cunterterrr a ell. See, e.g., Aleandra Natap, Snitching: TheInstitutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. ciNN . L. Re. 645, 645 (2004) (“Te ue crnal nrantn te U.s. jutce yte a bece a lurng c-legal nttutn unt tel. Caracterzed by ecrecy,unettered la enrceent dcretn, and nral negtatn t crnal upect, te nrant nttutnbt ebde and eacerbate e te t prbleatc eature te crnal jutce prce.”).

9 frer fBi Agent me Geran—currently te Plcy Cunel n Natnal securty t te Aercan ClLberte Unn—pnt ut tat unle cer, nrant are untraned, and pe a ubtantally greater r latng te rgt te tey netgate. ChRGJ intere t me Geran, supra nte 2.

10 Natap, supra nte 8, at 651-52 (“[A]n nrant prde nratn abut ene ele’ crnal cnductn ecange r e gernent-cnerred benet, uually lenence r n cre, but al r a lat ee, apercentage te tae n a drug deal, gernent erce, preerental treatent, r lenence r ene ele”).See also Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3; ceNteR foR hUmaN RightS aNd gLobaL JUStice, aSiaN ameRicaN

LegaL defeNSe aNd edUcatioN fUNd , UNdeR the RadaR: mUSLimS depoRted, detaiNed, aNd deNied oN UNSUbStaNtiated

teRRoRiSm aLLegatioNS 13-14 (2011) [erenater UNdeR the RadaR].

11 T Reprt ue te ter “Aercan mul” and “mul Aercan” ntercangeably. Tee ter arentended t cer bt ctzen and nn-ctzen.

12 Unted state . Crte, N. 09 Cr. 558 (s.D.N.Y.).

13 Unted state . sneer, N 07 Cr. 459 (D.N.J.).

14 Unted state . sraj, N. 05 Cr. 104 (E.D.N.Y.).

15 See UNdeR the RadaR, supra nte 10; ceNteR foR hUmaN RightS aNd gLobaL JUStice, ameRicaNS oN hoLd:

pRofiLiNg, citizeNShip, aNd the “waR oN teRRoR” (2007) [erenater ameRicaNS oN hoLd]; Dcuentary: Aercann hld – Prlng, Prejudce, and Natnal securty (Center r huan Rgt and Glbal Jutce 2010); ceNteR

foR hUmaN RightS aNd gLobaL JUStice, iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS: RaciaL pRofiLiNg aNd LethaL foRce iN the “waR

oN teRRoR” 19 (2006), available at ttp://.crgj.rg/dc/ChRGJ%20irreerble%20Cnequence%20June%202006.pd [erenater iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS].

16 See supra nte 5-8.

17 Altug t Reprt glgt te gernent’ cae agant te Neburg fur, frt D fe, and saaarsraj matn, tee cae are n any ay nt eceptnal. our reearc cae acr at leat 20 ter terrr

precutn n recent year agant mul deendant tat nled e cbnatn pad nrant,electn r netgatn baed n perceed relgu dentty, r a plt tat a created by te gernent(target elected by te fBi, ae untn prded by gernent agent, nrant r ter gernent agentpreured deendant nt cttng act r c tey ere eentually precuted, etc.). Tee precutnnclude sa sar haun (Ccag, iL), Antn martnez (Baltre, mD), Yan Are and maedhan (Albany, NY), te Lberty Cty seen (ma, fL), had hayat and Uer hayat (Ld, CA), maedoan maud (Prtland, oR), ha sad (Dalla, Tx), Tar sa (Ne Yr, NY), te Detrt Ua



51


cae (Detrt, mi), Ruell Dereta, Abdul kadr, Abdul Nur, Dnald Ner, and karee ibra (Ne Yr, NY),sayed har Aed and Eanul “sa” sadequee (Atlanta, GA), and Derrc saree (Rcd, iL). slartactc ere ued n te cae agant heant Laan (Near, NJ), nt mul. Prject sALAm a annlne databae pt-septeber 11, 2001 terrr-related precutn and cnctn mul, c qute a bt re epane tan te tpc t Reprt. it aalable at ttp://.prjectala.rg/databae.tl. See generally Dn, supra nte 7. See also sad, supra nte 7, at 689 (ntng n dcun Batte,

hayat, Laan, and sraj tat, “regardle eter an nrant’ cnduct legally cnttute entrapent,eeral te pt-9/11 cae glgt tuatn n c te etence a real treat t natnal ecurty aquetnable”); seran, supra nte 7, at 1500 (ntng n dcun Batte, hayat, Laan, and sraj tatn eac cae te fBi ntated te cntact, prded equpent r ney, ncted te deendant t partcpate nte plt, cntrbuted t r cpletely degned te plt, cultated cle relatnp t te deendant, andencuraged deendant en tey reted); Lan, supra nte 7 (tatng tat “a cler npectn te caebrugt by [Jnt Terrr Ta frce] reeal tat t te precutn ad ne tng n cn: Tedeendant ped lttle any dentrable treat t anyne r anytng”); Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3.

Addtnal nratn n tee cae can be und at te llng urce.sa sar haun (Ccag, iL): Andy Gr, Anne seeney and Jerey Grner, Lebanese immigrant

charged in Wrigleyville bomb plot, chi. tRib ., sep. 20, 2010, available at ttp://artcle.ccagtrbune.c/2010-09-20/ne/ct-et-rgleylle-bb-plt-20100920_1_car-bb-pny-bb-terrr-plt;

spa Tareen, Sami Samir Hassoun Arrested In Alleged Chicago Bomb Plot, hUffiNgtoN poSt, sep. 20, 2010,ttp://.ungtnpt.c/2010/09/20/a-ar-aun-arret_n_732120.tl.

Antn martnez (Baltre, mD): Ben Nucl, Lawyer: FBI entrapped Baltimore bomb plot suspect, SaLoN,Dec. 13, 2010, ttp://.aln.c/ne/eature/2010/12/13/u_recrutng_center_bb_plt_1; maraGld, Bomb Plot Case May Be Harbinger, waSh. poSt, Dec. 14, 2010, available at ttp://.angtnpt.c/p-dyn/cntent/artcle/2010/12/13/AR2010121305708.tl.

Yan Are and maed han (Albany, NY): Paul Gundal, Suspicion, Acceptance in Wake of Terror Trial, timeS UNioN (Albany), oct. 12, 2006, at B1, available at ttp://albarce.erlnne.net/eb/ql..requet?neage&aged=6362940; America at a Crossroads – Security Versus Liberty: The Other War (PBs telen bradcat Apr. 20, 2007,) nratn available at ttp://.pb.rg/eta/crrad/abut/_ecurty__lberty.tl.

Te Lberty Cty seen (ma, fL): “Aspirational Rather than Operational”–7 Arrested in Miami Terror Plot (democRacY Now! telen bradcat, Jun. 26, 2006) available at ttp://.decracyn.rg/2006/6/26/apratnal_rater_tan_peratnal_7_arreted; Aanda Rpley, Preemptive Terror Trials: Strike Two, time , Dec.

13, 2007, available at ttp://.te.c/te/natn/artcle/0,8599,1694430,00.tl.had hayat and Uer hayat (Ld, CA): Ay waldan, Prophetic Justice, the atLaNtic, oct. 2006,

available at ttp://.teatlantc.c/agazne/arce/2006/10/prpetc-jutce/5234/; PBs, frntlne, TeEney wtn: Te Terrr Cae n Ld, Calrna, ttp://.pb.rg/gb/page/rntlne/eneytn/ld/(lat ted may 12, 2011).

maed oan maud (Prtland, oR): Dna Teple-Ratn, Alleged Portland Bomber to ClaimEntrapment, NPR, N. 30, 2010, ttp://.npr.rg/2010/11/30/131704930/alleged-prtland-bber-t-cla-entrapent; Jel mllan and Ean Perez, Teen in Oregon Bomb Sting to be Arraigned, waLL St. J. , N.29, 2010, available at ttp://nlne.j.c/artcle/sB10001424052748704700204575642900598623706.tl.

ha sad (Dalla, Tx): Jan Traan, Dallas bombing plotter Hosam Smadi sentenced to 24 years in prison, daLLaS moRNiNg NewS, oct. 19, 2010, available at ttp://.dallane.c/ne/cunty-ne/dalla/eadlne/20101019-Dalla-bbng-pltter-ha-sad-entenced-2540.ece; Rbert wlny, For Trying to Blow Up Fountain Place, Hosam Smadi’s Sentenced to 24 Years in Prison, daLLaS obSeRveR bLogS,

oct. 19, 2010, ttp://blg.dallaberer.c/unarpar/2010/10/r_tryng_t_bl_up_untan.pp#.Tar sa (Ne Yr, NY): Alan feuer, Bronx Man Pleads Guilty In Terror Case, N.Y. timeS, Apr. 5, 2007,

available at ttp://elect.nyte.c/gt/abtract.tl?re=f30C12f83D5B0C768CDDAD0894Df404482&partner=rnyt&ec=r; Alan feuer, Tapes Capture Bold Claims Of Bronx Man In Terror Plot , N.Y. timeS, may 8,2007, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2007/05/08/nyregn/08terrr.tl.

Te Detrt Ua cae (Detrt, mi): margaret Luca Agu, Eleven members/associates of Ummahcharged with federal violations, detRoit examiNeR, oct. 28, 2009, available at ttp://.eaner.c/legal-



52


ne-n-detrt/eleen-eber-acate--ua-carged-t-ederal-latn; steen Gray, Why WasA Controversial Imam Shot 20 Times? , time , feb. 1, 2010, available at ttp://.te.c/te/natn/artcle/0,8599,1958229,00.tl.

Ruell Dereta, Abdul kadr, Abdul Nur, Dnald Ner, and karee ibra (Ne Yr, NY): A.G. sulzberger,Lawyers Dispute Suspects’ Intent in J.F.K. Bomb Plot Trial, N.Y. timeS, Jun. 30, 2010, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2010/07/01/nyregn/01terrr.tl?re=ruelldereta; T hay, Russell Defreitas, JFK

Cargo Handler, Sentenced To Life For Bomb Plot, hUffiNgtoN poSt, feb. 17, 2011, ttp://.ungtnpt.c/2011/02/17/ruell-dereta-j-car_n_824793.tl (lat ted may 11, 2011).sayed har Aed and Eanul “sa” sadequee (Atlanta, GA): PBs, frntlne wrld, Canada: Te Cell

Net Dr, (Telen bradcat, Jan. 30, 2007), trancrpt available at ttp://.pb.rg/rntlnerld/abut/epde/602_trancrpt.tl; Aley hay, Georgia men get lengthy prison time for supporting terrorists, CNN,Dec. 14, 2009, ttp://artcle.cnn.c/2009-12-14/jutce/terrr.entence_1_terrrt-adequee-and-aed-yed-ar-aed?_=Pm:CRimE.

Derrc saree (Rcd, iL): Lan, supra nte 7; Perre Ta, Lone Wolf Charged with Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush, abcNewS, Dec. 8, 2006, ttp://abcne.g.c/TeLa/try?d=2710776&page=1(lat ted may 11, 2011); Illinois Terror Suspect Pleads Guilty , USa todaY, N. 28, 2007, available at ttp://.uatday.c/ne/natn/2007-11-28-llnn-terrr-plea_N.t.

heant Laan (Near, NJ): Gla & Bartcecz, Arms Trader 2009, supra nte 7; Rbert hanley, ManAccused of a Scheme to Sell Missiles Praised bin Laden on Tapes, N.Y. timeS, Jan. 9, 2005, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2005/01/09/nyregn/09le.tl?pageanted=prnt&ptn=.

18 Altug tate ae an blgatn under te rgt t le t prtect natnal ecurty, tey ut nt d at teepene ter ter uan rgt blgatn, r eaple cplyng t te rgt t reed epren,pnn, and relgn under Artcle 18 and 19 te iCCPR. See supra nte 292 and 293.

19 mitcheLL SiLbeR aNd aRviN bhatt, N.Y.c. poLice dep’t, RadicaLizatioN iN the weSt: the homegRowN thReat

(2007) [erenater SiLbeR & bhatt, NYpd RadicaLizatioN RepoRt] a 2007 reprt by te NYPD, eeple teeauptn.

20 faiza pateL, bReNNaN ceNteR foR JUStice, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN (2011), available at ttp://.brennancenter.rg/cntent/reurce/retnng_radcalzatn [erenater pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN] (ctng mi5 tudycncludng tat “tere n ngle patay t etre” all te tuded “ad taen trngly derent jurneyt lent etret actty;” ctng rer CiA cae cer marc sagean analyzed 500 cae and cncludedtat “[]ne cannt ply dra a lne, put arer n t and gauge ere peple are alng t pat t ee

eter tey are cle t cttng atrcte;” ctng Rand Crpratn tudy baed n 14 year reearcc a unable t denty te ubet nddual uld ct lence, c a “ten a atter appentance.”).

21 See infra Part iii.

22 T Reprt cue n dcrnatry la enrceent practce agant mul n te U.s., recgnzng tatte cnlatn race, relgn, and natnal rgn a reulted n a uc larger categry pern cndered“mul” tan nly te adere t ila, ncludng nn-mul eber mddle Eatern, sut Aan,and Arab cunte. See, e.g., iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 20 (analyzng t t ll plcer alleged ucde bber and te pact n mul and te perceed t be mul); ameRicaNS oN hoLd, supra nte 15, at 35 (dcuentng te fBi nae cec prce n te cntet te cnluence natnalecurty and gratn plcy, and te pact n mul, mddle Eatern, sut Aan, and Arab cunte);UNdeR the RadaR, supra nte 10, at 1 (dcuentng te U.s. gernent’ “deplyent ler edentary

tandard and lac due prce guarantee n te gratn yte agant mul t urter argnalzet targeted grup n te nae natnal ecurty”); mUSLim advocateS, UNReaSoNabLe iNtRUSioNS: iNveStigatiNg

the poLiticS, faith & fiNaNceS of ameRicaNS RetURNiNg home (2009), available at ttp://.uladcate.rg/g/interrgatn_map2.jpg [erenater UNReaSoNabLe iNtRUSioNS: iNveStigatiNg the poLiticS, faith & fiNaNceS of

ameRicaNS RetURNiNg home]; aSiaN Law caUcUS, RetURNiNg home: how U.S. goveRNmeNt pRacticeS UNdeRmiNe civiL

RightS at oUR NatioN’S dooRStepS (2009) (erenater RetURNiNg home), available at ttp://.aanlacaucu.rg/p-cntent/uplad/2009/04/Returnng%20he.pd; RightS woRkiNg gRoUp, faceS of RaciaL pRofiLiNg: a



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RepoRt fRom commUNitieS acRoSS ameRica 24-34 (2010) [erenater Rwg RaciaL pRofiLiNg RepoRt], availableat ttp://.rgtrnggrup.rg/te/deault/le/rg-reprt-eb.pd (“fllng te tragc eent sept.11, 2001, eber Arab, mddle Eatern, mul and sut Aan cunte becae autatcally upecta te gernent, n te nae natnal ecurty, pleented prgra and plce tat prled nddual tee cunte baed n ter perceed race, etncty, relgn r natnal rgn. meber teecunte ere ncreangly and dprprtnately placed under urellance, tpped, earced, nterrgated,

detaned and labeled ‘terrr upect.’ Te gernent al began aggreely ung cl gratnla, crnal la and crnal prcedure n a eepng and dcrnatry anner t target eber teecunte.”); srn snnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and CounterterrorismInterviews, 77 bRook. L. Rev. (rtcng 2011) (dcung fBi and Cut and Brder Prtectn ntere mul baed n and nqurng abut pltcal. relgu, and cultural epren and acatn); muneeri. Aad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 caL. L. Rev.

1259 (2004) (“Te pycal lence eerced upn te bde Arab, mul, and sut Aan a beenaccpaned by a legal and pltcal lence tard tee cunte. . . . Taen tgeter, te ultple aaultn te bde and rgt Arab, mul, and sut Aan prduce a pyclgcal lence a ell andreracalze te cunte tey target a “mul-lng” regner unrty eberp n te natnalplty.”); T Lnnger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 iowa

L. Rev. 1201, 1204-1206 (2004) (ntng tat “que ae ccuped t te f.B.i.’ attentn” nce 2002and tat “te f.B.i. a ued a arety netgate tecnque t ntr rpper at que . . . [ncludng]cndental nrant, undercer agent, urellance caera, lyer, and ubpena r pne recrd”

(tnte tted)). See also murad huan, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harmin Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YaLe L.J. 920, 926 (2008) [erenater huan,Defending the Faithful ]; pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 20.

23 See thomaS ciNcotta, poLiticaL ReSeaRch aSSociateS, maNUfactURiNg the mUSLim meNace: pRivate fiRmS, pUbLic

SeRvaNtS, aNd the thReat to RightS aNd SecURitY 1 (2011): “A nne-nt netgatn ... nd tat gernentagence repnble r detc ecurty ae nadequate ecan t enure qualty and cntencyn terrr preparedne tranng prded by prate endr; publc erant are regularly preented tleadng, nlaatry, and dangeru nratn abut te nature te terrr treat trug gly pltczedenar, ndutry cnerence, trade publcatn, and electrnc eda. in place und ll tranng andntellgence breng, a cal and nluental ub-grup te prate cunterterrr tranng ndutry aretcnpracy tere abut ecret jad capagn t replace te U.s. Cnttutn t sara la, and eectelypugn all ila—a rld relgn t 1.3 blln—aderent a nerently lent and een terrrtc.” Earlert year, t becae publc tat te NYPD a ung a l called The Third Jihad n tranng n t cer. The

Village Voice decrbed t a “a pectacularly ene ear Aercan mul. . . . it 72 nute gruee tage bbng carnage, renzed crd, burnng Aercan lag, lang curce, and eetngulla.” T Rbbn, NYPD Cops’ Training Included in Anti-Muslim Horror Flick: Experiments in Terror, the

viLLage voice, Jan. 19, 2011, available at ttp://.llagece.c/2011-01-19/clun/nypd-cp-tranng-ncluded-an-ant-ul-rrr-lc/. See also Arun venugpal, NYPD Asked to Explain Alleged Screening of Anti-Muslim Film, wNYC, mar. 22, 2011, available at ttp://.nyc.rg/blg/nyc-ne-blg/2011/ar/22/nypd-aed-eplan-creenng-ant-ul-l/ (“mul grup and elected cal are callng n te NYPD teplan y t allegedly creened a cntreral dcuentary nn a ‘Te Trd Jad’ r tranee.”).

24 See, e.g., sctt hrtn, What Makes a Domestic Terrorist, the ceNteRLiNe: the bLog of the ceNteR oN Law

aNd SecURitY, Jan. 12, 2011, available at ttp://centerlneblg.rg/2011/01/12/nlne-pen-ru-ater-tucn/(qutng eeral terrr epert decrbng cae ere terrrtc act by nn-mul ere nt treated adetc terrr); saar Azz, Why Isn’t Jared Lee Loughner a Homegrown Terrorist? , tRUthoUt, Jan. 12, 2011,available at ttp://arce.trutut.rg/y-nt-jared-lee-lugner-a-egrn-terrrt66783 (quetnng y

Jared Lugner’ pltcally tated tng U.s. Rep. Gabrelle Grd a nt been raed a detcterrr).

25 aLeJaNdRo J. beUteL, mUSLim pUbLic affaiRS coUNciL, data oN poSt-9/11 teRRoRiSm iN the UNited StateS 2 (latupdated Aprl 18, 2011), available at ttp://.pac.rg/aet/dc/publcatn/mPAC-Pt-911-Terrr--Data.pd; ChRGJ intere t me Geran, supra nte 2 (ctng eeral cae). Reearc a ntat mul a a grup are nt re lely tan ter t ct terrrt act. Accrdng t te sutern



54


Perty La Center, n January 2011 alne “a ne-Naz a arreted eaded r te Arzna brder t a dzeneade grenade; a terrrt bb attac n a martn Luter kng Jr. Day parade n spane, wa., aaerted ater plce dantled a ptcated ant-pernnel eapn; and a an cal ad ad a lngtry antgernent actte a arreted utde a paced que n Dearbrn, mc., and cargedt peng eple t unlaul ntent. Tat’ n addtn, te ae nt, t te tng U.s.Rep. Gabrelle Grd n Arzna, an attac tat let dead and ay ae ad a pltcal denn.” Nne

te upect arreted n any tee ncdent a mul. mar Pt, sutern Perty La Center, TheYear in Hate and Extremism, intellgence Reprt N. 141 (sprng 2011), available at ttp://.plcenter.rg/get-nred/ntellgence-reprt/bre-all-ue/2011/prng/te-year-n-ate-etre-2010. See also DadDayen, Sheriff Lee Baca, Only Law Enforcement Witness at King’s Muslim Radicalization Hearings, SpeaksOut, fiRedogLake, mar. 9., 2011, ttp://ne.redglae.c/2011/03/09/er-lee-baca-nly-la-enrceent-tne-at-ng-ul-radcalzatn-earng-pea-ut/ (“snce 9/11, 77 etret ert r attac aebeen carred ut by nn-mul etret n te Unted state,” ad [L Angele Cunty ser Lee] Baca. inaddtn, te lat 10 terrr plt attepted by mul, een te ae been tarted by mul cngrard. ‘T nt a mul prble, t’ a peple prble.’”).

26 See supra nte 22.

27 See, e.g., Rupal oza, Contrapuntal geographies of threat and security: the United States, India, and Israel, 25(1) eNviRoNmeNt aNd pLaNNiNg d: SocietY aNd Space 9 (2007).


29 See, e.g., snnar, supra nte 22. See generally supra nte 22.

30 See supra nte 22. See also ameRicaNS oN hoLd, supra nte 15, at 35. (decrbng eber te scunty ae been targeted n part becaue tey ear turban, ealy dentable anetatn ter at.Aardeep sng, Eecute Drectr te s Caltn eplaned, “our artcle at and ur natnal rgnae ade u upect—bt r prate and publc actr. our prary artcle at, te turban, dented nt cuntry t terrr.”).

31 SiLbeR & bhatt, NYpd RadicaLizatioN RepoRt, supra nte 19.

32 pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 20, at 1.

33 S. comm. oN homeLaNd SecURitY aNd gov’t affaiRS, a tickiNg time bomb: coUNteRteRRoRiSm LeSSoNS fRom the

U.S. goveRNmeNt’S faiLURe to pReveNt the foRt hood attack (2011) [erenater foRt hood RepoRt], available at ttp://gac.enate.g/publc/_le/frt_hd/frthdReprt.pd.

34 SiLbeR & bhatt, NYpd RadicaLizatioN RepoRt, supra nte 19; Patel, Rethinking Radicalization, supra nte 20;intere t Arun kundnan, open scety inttute fell (Apr. 6, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenaterChRGJ intere t Arun kundnan] (“wen yu unpac te cncept radcalzatn, t tend t nle entn delgy r dea a te drer lence, een tug tat ncntent t eprcal reearc. Tpnt n te drectn crnalzng te dea tat are tugt t tate lence. Tere a dre t ay tatt et dea, t delgy nt enttled t reed epren.”).

35 See pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 20, at 2-3, 8-9.

36 Te NYPD reprt, r eaple, nte at te ae te tat “A range cecnc and pyclgcalactr ae been acated t te ae cen t radcalze nclude te bred and/r rutrated,ucceul cllege tudent, te uneplyed, te ecnd and trd generatn, ne grant, petty crnal,and prn parlee” and tat arer te “pre-radcalzatn pae” nclude “ddle-cla bacgrund; ntecncally dettute” and “[l]ttle, any, crnal try.” SiLbeR & bhatt, NYpd RadicaLizatioN RepoRt, supra nte 19, at 24, 25.



55


37 See, e.g., id. at 33 (dentyng “wearng tradtnal ilac cltng, grng a beard” a gn te “el-dentcatn” pae radcalzatn). See also iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 7-8.

38 Te frt hd reprt al requeted tat te fBi prduce an n-dept analy te delgy “lentilat etre.” foRt hood RepoRt, supra nte 33, at 43.

39 The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response: HearingBefore H. Homeland Security Comm., 112t Cng. (mar. 10, 2011) [erenater King Hearing], available at ttp://eland.ue.g/earng/earng-%E2%80%9C-etent-radcalzatn-aercan-ul-cunty-and-c-unty-repne%E2%80%9D. fr te range crtc, see, e.g., Mother of 9/11 Victim Condemns KingHearing on Muslim ‘Radicalization,’ democRacY Now!, mar. 11, 2011, available at ttp://.decracyn.rg/2011/3/11/ter__9_11_ct_cnden; Letter r cl rgt rganzatn t Rep. Peter kng,mar. 7, 2011, available at ttp://talngpnte.c/dcuent/2011/03/prgree-grup-crtcze-ng-r-targetng-ul.pp?page=1; Je sten, Rep. Peter King’s plan for hearings on Muslim ‘radicalization’ draws criticism from all sides, waSh. poSt, Jan. 21, 2011, available at ttp://ce.angtnpt.c/py-tal/2011/01/rep_ng_radcal_ul_ear.tl.

40 See, e.g., Jrdy Yager, King hearing ‘counterproductive,’ L.A. County sheriff testifies, the hiLL, mar. 10, 2011,available at ttp://tell.c/blg/blg-breng-r/ne/148651-ng-earng-cunterprducte-la-cunty-er-tete; Dad Dayen, Sheriff Lee Baca, Only Law Enforcement Witness at King’s Muslim Radicalization

Hearings, Speaks Out, fiRedogLake, mar. 9., 2011, ttp://ne.redglae.c/2011/03/09/er-lee-baca-nly-la-enrceent-tne-at-ng-ul-radcalzatn-earng-pea-ut/.

41 exec. office of the pReSideNt, NatioNaL SecURitY StRategY 19 (2010), available at ttp://.teue.g/te/deault/le/r_eer/natnal_ecurty_trategy.pd; ipleentng Recendatn te 9/11Cn Act 2007, Pub. L. N. 110-53, 121 stat. 266, § 2402(b) (2007) (cded at 6 U.s.C. § 347)(degnatng Dhs a lead agency n cbatng radcalzatn). Te Radcalzatn and Etret meagngGrup te Natnal Cunterterrr Center (NCTC) (c part te ce te Drectr Natnalintellgence (DNi)), lead te intellgence Cunty’ ert n radcalzatn ue. See Nat’l CunterterrrCtr., Abut U, ttp://.nctc.g/abut_u/abut_nctc.tl (lat ted Aprl 21, 2011); Nne Year ater9/11: Cnrntng te Terrrt Treat t te heland: hearng Bere te s. C. n heland securtyand G’t Aar, 111t Cng. 1, 4 (2010) (tateent r te recrd by Rbert s. mueller, iii, Dr., fed. Bureau inetgatn) available at ttp://gac.enate.g/publc/nde.c?fueActn=fle.ve&flestre_ d=9cda2966-30ed-48e2-b3a9-7d400b617e5.

42 See david coLe & JULeS LobeL, LeSS Safe, LeSS fRee: whY ameRica iS LoSiNg the waR oN teRRoR 1-19 (2007)[erenater coLe & LobeL, LeSS Safe, LeSS fRee]; emiLY beRmaN, bReNNaN ceNteR foR JUStice, domeStic iNteLLigeNce:

New poweRS, New RiSkS 5-6, 13-15 (2011), available at ttp://brennan.3cdn.net/b80aa0bab0b425857d_ jd6b8776.pd [erenater New poweRS, New RiSkS]. See also Gla & Bartcecz, Arms Trader 2009, supra nte 7 (lat ted may 11, 2011).

43 pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 20, at 19-25.

44 See, e.g., snnar, supra nte 22. See generally supra nte 22.

45 See, e.g., pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 20, at 21-23, 30; CAiR, the fbi’S USe of iNfoRmaNtS,

RecRUitmeNt aNd iNtimidatioN withiN mUSLim commUNitieS, supra nte 7.

46 See generally coLe & LobeL, LeSS Safe, LeSS fRee , supra nte 42; seran, supra nte 7.

47 See generally seran, supra nte 7; coLe & LobeL, LeSS Safe, LeSS fRee , supra nte 42.

48 beRmaN, supra nte 42, at 1-3.



56


49 US dep’t of JUStice, civiL RightS diviSioN, gUidaNce RegaRdiNg the USe of Race bY fedeRaL Law eNfoRcemeNt

ageNcieS (2003), available at ttp://.letc.g/tranng/prgra/legal-dn/dnlad-artcle-and-aq/dnlad/dj-gudance/racalprlng.pd/dnlad [erenater 2003 doJ RaciaL pRofiLiNg gUidaNce].

50 US dep’t of JUStice, attoRNeY geNeRaL’S gUideLiNeS foR domeStic fbi opeRatioNS 9 (2008) [erenater mUkaSeY

gUideLiNeS] (dcung te fBi a “an ntellgence a ell a a la enrceent agency”). See also coLe & LobeL,

LeSS Safe, LeSS fRee , supra nte 42, at 1-19. Te fBi’ legal autrty, and te Attrney General’ autrty ter a bradly rded ederal tatute. see 28 U.s.C. § 533 (2000) (“Te Attrney General ay appnt cal- (1) t detect and precute cre agant te Unted state; (2) t at n te prtectn te pern te Predent; (3) t at n te prtectn te pern te Attrney General; (4) t cnduct uc ternetgatn regardng cal atter under te cntrl te Departent Jutce and te Departent state a ay be drected by te Attrney General.”).

51 See supra nte 22. See also US dep’t of JUStice, office of iNSpectoR geNeRaL, a Review of the fbi’S

iNveStigatioNS of ceRtaiN domeStic advocacY gRoUpS (2010) [erenater 2010 doJ oig Review of the fbi’S

iNveStigatioNS of ceRtaiN domeStic advocacY gRoUpS].

52 See supra nte 5-8. Te gernent’ ue nrant a al been crtczed utde te cntet cunterterrr plce. See, e.g., Natap, supra nte 8.

53

frer fBi Agent me Geran—currently te Plcy Cunel n Natnal securty t te Aercan ClLberte Unn—pnt ut tat unle cer, nrant are untraned, and pe a ubtantally greater r latng te rgt te tey netgate. ChRGJ intere t me Geran, supra nte 2.

54 Natap, supra nte 8, at 651-52 (“[A]n nrant prde nratn abut ene ele’ crnal cnductn ecange r e gernent-cnerred benet, uually lenence r n cre, but al r a lat ee, apercentage te tae n a drug deal, gernent erce, preerental treatent, r lenence r ene ele”).See also eNtRapmeNt oR foiLiNg teRRoR, supra nte 3; UNdeR the RadaR, supra nte 10, at 13-14.

55 US dep’t of JUStice, office of the iNSpectoR geNeRaL, SpeciaL RepoRt: the fedeRaL bUReaU of iNveStigatioN ’S

compLiaNce with the attoRNeY geNeRaL’S iNveStigative gUideLiNeS 29-36 (2005) [erenater 2005 doJ RepoRt],available at ttp://.jutce.g/g/pecal/0509/nal.pd; beRmaN, supra nte 42, at 8-9.

56 beRmaN, supra nte 42, at 8-9.

57 senate select Cttee t study Gernental operatn t Repect t intellgence Actte, Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, s. Rep. N. 94-755, at 23-37.

58 2005 doJ RepoRt, supra nte 53, at 29-36. At t te, Cngre a cnderng enactng a leglatecarter recnttutng te fBi under a general tatutry raer. Ater te Le Gudelne ere ued,eer, Cngre let tng ere tey td.

59 Id. at 36 (ctng FBI Oversight, hearng Bere te subcttee n Cl and Cnttutnal Rgt tehue Cttee n te Judcary, 95t Cng. pt. 1, 20-26 (1978) (nternal qutatn ar tted)).

60 beRmaN, supra nte 42.

61 See 2010 DoJ oiG Review of the fbi’S iNveStigatioNS of ceRtaiN domeStic advocacY gRoUpS, supra nte 51,

at 5-27.

62 See, e.g., san L, Lawsuit contends FBI violated rights of hundreds of Muslim Americans, L.a. timeS bLog, feb. 22, 2011, available at ttp://lateblg.late.c/lan/2011/02/b-ul-cunte-laut-aclu.tl?lan; L, supra nte 8; medna, supra nte 8; Gler, supra nte 8. See also Cplant, Yar fazaga .federal Bureau inetgatn, N. sA Cv 11-00301 (C.D. Ca. feb. 22, 2011).



57


63 “Aeent ay be carred ut t detect, btan nratn abut, r preent r prtect agant ederalcre r treat t te natnal ecurty r t cllect regn ntellgence.” mUkaSeY gUideLiNeS, supra nte 50, atv.A.1.

64 “Aeent…requre an autrzed purpe but nt any partcular actual predcatn.” beRmaN, supra nte42, at 2, 17, 22. See Jere P. Bjelpera & mar A. Randl, Cngrenal Reearc serce, the fedeRaL

bUReaU of iNveStigatioN aNd teRRoRiSm iNveStigatioNS, 1 (Apr. 27 2011) (ntng te Gudelne and DioG prde

“te fBi re leeay t engage n practe netgate r tat de nt depend n crnal predcatn (.e.,a neu t pat r uture crnal actty).”).

65 mul Adcate, a Calrna-baed adcacy rganzatn, led a freed inratn Act requet rte DioG. See mul Adcate, mul Adcate ee fBi Gudelne n Racal Prlng mulAercan, June 17, 2009, ttp://.uladcate.rg/end_prlng/ul_adcate_ee_b_gu_1.tl (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011). Te DoJ releaed redacted ecerpt te DioG, aalable ere: mulAdcate, Departent Jutce Cntnue t Cla fBi Gudelne n secrecy, Jan. 19, 2010, ttp://.uladcate.rg/latet/prlng_update/cunty_alert_ee_legal_ad.tl (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011).

66 beRmaN, supra nte 42, at 24.

67 Id.

68 Te L Angele Plce Departent’ eperent t ge-appng mul cunte t ell-nn.Rcard wntn, Jean-Paul Renaud, and Paul Prngle, LAPD To Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.a. timeS, N. 9,2007, at A1; Rcard wntn and Terea watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.a. timeS, N. 15,2007, at A1; see also Letter t Cander mcael P. Dnng, Cunter-Terrr/Crnal intellgence Bureau,L Angele Plce Departent r Ranjana Natarajan & Peter Bbrng, sta Attrney, ACLU suternCalrna, farana Y. kera, mul Adcate, saeel syed, ilac sura Cuncl, and hua Aylu,Cuncl n Aercan ilac Relatn (N. 8, 2007), available at ttp://.aclu-c.rg/attac//ul_ appng_letter.pd (epreng “grae cncern” abut te LAPD’ cunty-appng plan).

69 2003 doJ RaciaL pRofiLiNg gUidaNce, supra nte 49.

70 mUkaSeY gUideLiNeS, supra nte 50, at v.C.2 (“otere llegal actty by a uan urce ut be appredn cnrty t te Attrney General’ Gudelne Regardng te Ue fBi Cndental huan surce.”).See also id. at vi.6.C.3.a (“wen t appear tat a uan urce a engaged n crnal actty n te cure

an netgatn under tee Gudelne, te fBi all prceed a prded n te Attrney General’ GudelneRegardng te Ue fBi Cndental huan surce.”).

71 See US dep’t of JUStice, attoRNeY geNeRaL’S gUideLiNeS RegaRdiNg the USe of fbi coNfideNtiaL hUmaN SoURceS (2006) [erenater goNzaLeS gUideLiNeS].

72 Te Gnzale Gudelne eplctly cnteplate tat nrant ll be autrzed t engage n llegal actty,but place lt n te pble autrzatn n a ectn enttled “Autrzatn otere illegal Actty.”Under te General Prn tat ectn, te Gudelne prde tat “Te fBi neer pertted t autrzea Cndental huan surce t: partcpate n any act lence ecept n el-deene” r t “partcpate nan act degned t btan nratn r te fBi tat uld be unlaul cnducted by a la enrceentagent (e.g., breang and enterng, llegal retappng, llegal penng and taperng t te al, r trepaauntng t an llegal earc).” Id. at v.A.2.a., v.A.2.b. See also mUkaSeY gUideLiNeS, supra nte 50, at v.C.2.

73 Te 2006 Gnzale Gudelne replaced Attrney General Jn Acrt’ 2002 Gudelne Regardng teUe Cndental inrant. goNzaLeS gUideLiNeS, supra nte 71, at i.A.3. see Us Dep’t Jutce, attoRNeY

geNeRaL’S gUideLiNeS RegaRdiNg the USe of coNfideNtiaL iNfoRmaNtS (2002) [erenater 2002 attoRNeY geNeRaL’S

gUideLiNeS RegaRdiNg the USe of coNfideNtiaL iNfoRmaNtS].

74 Id. at ii i.C.1.b (epa added).



58


75 See goNzaLeS gUideLiNeS, supra nte 71, at v.B.3.a..C, D. C.f. 2002 attoRNeY geNeRaL’S gUideLiNeS RegaRdiNg

the USe of coNfideNtiaL iNfoRmaNtS, supra nte 73, at ii i.C.4.a.()(B), (D).

76 speccally, te Gnzale Gudelne prde tat te ntructn t te prpecte nrant ut tate tat,“under n crcutance ay te Cndental huan surce: A. [engage n lence]; B. [engage n unlauledence gaterng]; C. i applcable: partcpate n an act tat cnttute btructn jutce (e.g. perjury,

tne taperng, tne ntdatn, entrapent, r te abrcatn, alteratn, r detructn edence); D. iapplcable: ntate r ntgate a plan r trategy t ct a ederal, tate, r lcal ene.” goNzaLeS gUideLiNeS, supra nte 69, at v.B.3.a. (epa n rgnal).

77 2005 doJ oig RepoRt, supra nte 55.

78 US dep’t of JUStice, attoRNeY geNeRaL’S gUideLiNeS oN UNdeRcoveR opeRatioNS (2002) [erenater doJ

gUideLiNeS oN UNdeRcoveR opeRatioNS]. See also eLectRoNic fRoNtieR foUNdatioN, patteRNS of miScoNdUct: fbi

iNteLLigeNce vioLatioNS fRom 2001-2008 (2011).

79 doJ gUideLiNeS oN UNdeRcoveR opeRatioNS, supra nte 78, at v.

80 2005 DoJ oiG Reprt, supra nte 55, at 150.

81

2010 DoJ oiG Review of the fbi’S iNveStigatioNS of ceRtaiN domeStic advocacY gRoUpS, supra nte 51, at186-91. See also US dep’t of JUStice, office of iNSpectoR geNeRaL et aL., UNcLaSSified RepoRt oN the pReSideNt’S

SURveiLLaNce pRogRam (2009).

82 ChRGJ intere t me Geran, supra nte 2.

83 See handcu . specal serce D., 605 f. supp. 1384, 1388 (s.D.N.Y. 1985); N.Y. Cl Lberte Unn,handcu . specal serce Dn (callengng NYPD urellance practce targetng pltcal grup),ttp://.nyclu.rg/cae/andcu--pecal-erce-dn-callengng-nypd-urellance-practce-target-ng-pltca (ntng tat te Handschu cae a aed at callengng t te NYPD’ practce ncludng “teantenance der n pltcal actt and te ue aru undercer and urellance tecnquet ntr te actte pltcal rganzatn and nddual”) (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011); Cp Berlet andAbby scer, Political Profiling: Police Spy on Peaceful Activists, amNeStY iNt’L mag., available at ttp://.anetyua.rg/anetyn/prlng.tl (“Beteen 1904 and 1985, te NYPD antaned tuand le

and at te deplyed undercer agent prcateur t drupt rganzng. in te Blac Panter cae, t a aplce py nurtured te dea bbng Ne Yr plce tatn and departent tre.”).

84 Handschu, 605 f. supp. at 1388.

85 Id. at 1390.

86 Id.

87 Id. at 1391.

88 Lenard Lett, NYPD Seeks to Overturn Surveillance Rules, NewSdaY, sep. 25, 2002, available at ttp://.neday.c/ne/nypd-ee-t-erturn-urellance-rule-1.364071.

89 Ne Yr Adry Cttee T Te U.s. Cn on Cl Rgt, Plce surellance PltcalActty -- Te htry and Current state te handcu Decree, Tetny o Artur N. Eenberg, ttp://.nyclu.rg/cntent/tetny-plce-urellance--pltcal-actty-try-and-current-tate--and-cu-de (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011).

90 See handcu . specal ser. D., 288 f. supp. 2d 411, 420 (s.D.N.Y. 2003). Te reed gudelne arencluded n te decn a an append tartng n p. 420.



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91 Te reed gudelne peccally tate: “Tee gudelne elnate any te retrctn te rerhandcu Gudelne, and prde te Departent t te autrty and leblty neceary t cnductnetgatn nlng pltcal actty, ncludng terrr netgatn.” Id. at 420.

92 Id. (epa added).

93 Id. at ii(1).

94 Id, at vi(A)(1).

95 Id.

96 Crag hrtz, The NYPD’s War on Terror, N.Y. mag., available at ttp://nyag.c/nyetr/ne/eature/n_8286/ [erenater hrtz, The NYPD’s War on Terror ]; chRiS dickeY, SecURiNg the citY:

iNSide ameRica’S beSt coUNteRteRRoR foRce—the NYpd (2009) [erenater dickeY, SecURiNg the citY];wlla fnnegan, The Terrorism Beat, New YoRkeR, Jul. 25, 2005, available at ttp://.neyrer.c/arce/2005/07/25/050725a_act2 (ntng tat erea prr t 2001 te NYPD ad “eer tan t dzencer rng te terrr beat ull te[,] [t]day, tere are abut a tuand”).

97 Cunterterrr Unt, NYC.g, ttp://.nyc.g/tl/nypd/tl/adntratn/cunterterrr_unt.tl (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011). Te NYPD’ eparate intellgence Dn perate te internatnal LanPrgra, c ee t unctn tut ederal ergt. See Je sten, NYPD Intelligence Detectives GoTheir Own Way, waSh. poSt, N. 10, 2010, ttp://blg.angtnpt.c/py-tal/2010/11/nypd_regn_ cp_play_utd.tl (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011) (“wt ce n 11 regn captal and an unpubled budget,te iLP’ ar-lung cunterterrr cp perate utde te autrty tp U.s. cal abrad, ncludng teAercan abaadr and te CiA tatn ce, te nnal ead U.s. ntellgence n regn cuntre.Neter te Drectr Natnal intellgence nr te Departent heland securty ae any jurdctn erte prgra. Nr ae eter dne a tudy te NYPD’ regn peratn t nt U.s. cunterterrrprgra -- r dn’t, cal ay.”).

98 Te Ne Yr JTTf al nclude eber te NY state Plce, te NY/NJ Prt Autrty Plce, te U.s.maral’ serce, te Bureau Alcl, Tbacc and frear, and te U.s. secret serce. “wt re tan2,000 fBi agent n agned t 102 ta rce, te JTTf ae eectely bece a at, qua-ecret

ar te ederal gernent, granted eepng ne per tat uttrp te any ter la-enrceentagency. Te JTTf cnt nt nly lcal plce, fBi pecal agent and ederal netgatr r igratnand te iRs, but cert perate r te CiA. Te ta rce ae tu eectely detryed te ‘all’ tattrcally eted beteen la enrceent and ntellgence-gaterng.” Lan, supra nte 7. in 2005, Prtlandbecae te nly cty t tdra r te JTTf er cncern abut lac ergt, tug te cty nrecnderng rejnng a a negtated agreeent t te fBi. See J Redden, Adams says JTTF Proposal Protects City, Civil Liberties, poRtLaNd tRib ., Apr. 20, 2011, available at ttp://prtlandtrbune.c/ne/try.pp?try_d=130331081305173700.

99 hrtz, The NYPD’s War on Terror, supra nte 96 (qutng Cner kelly a ang ad, “i ne eculdn’t rely n te ederal gernent…i n t r y n eperence. we’re dng all te tng e’redng becaue te ederal gernent n’t dng te. it’ nt enug t ay t’ ter jb te jb n’t bengdne.”); sten, supra nte 97. (“Cen and kelly ae nt been y abut ter antpaty r te U.s. ntellgencecunty n general and te fBi peccally, ayng te rer a dentrated t can’t prtect Ne Yr and

accung te latter tldng aluable nratn.”).

100 SiLbeR & bhatt, NYpd RadicaLizatioN RepoRt, supra nte 19; pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 20,at 14.

101 See, e.g., matte . Unted state, 485 U.s. 58, 63 (1988); seran . Unted state, 356 U.s. 369,376-378, (1958), Unted state . Ruell, 411 U.s. 423, 435-436 (1973).



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102 in te secnd Crcut, r eaple, nduceent nclude “lctng, prpng, ntatng, bracng ruggetng te cn te ene carged.” Unted state . Brand, 467 f.3d 179, 189 (2d Cr. 2006). inte seent Crcut, tere al et te dctrne etrardnary nduceent. Unted state . haddad, 462 f.3d783 (7t Cr. 2006). in all crcut, te gernent erely er pprtunte r aclte r te cn te ene, ten te entrapent deene al. Al, deceptn alne de nt cnttute entrapent; te

deceptn ut actually “plant te crnal degn n te nd te deendant.” Sherman, 356 U.s. at 372. inte secnd Crcut, predptn ay be n by (1) an etng cure crnal cnduct lar t te crer c te deendant carged; (2) an already red degn n te part te accued t ct te crer c e carged; r (3) a llngne t ct te cre r c e carged a edenced by teaccued’ ready repne t te nduceent. Brand, 467 f.3d at 191. in te seent Crcut, predptn alrequre tat te deendant ae been n a ptn t ct te cre carged prr t gernent nleent,uc tat te deendant uld ae been lely t ct te cre tut te gernent’ elp. Unted state. hllngrt, 27 f.3d 1196, 1200 (7t Cr. 1994) (en banc).

103 Russell, 411 U.s. at 433. in t latet rulng n te entrapent deene, te supree Curt underlnedpredptn a te cal pnt te analy. See Jacbn . Unted state, 503 U.s. 540 (1992).

104 sad, supra nte 7, at 693-94 (ctng Brande’ artculatn te bjecte tet n dent n Casey v.United States, 276 U.s. 413, 423-25 (1928)).

105 Accrdng t te Center r La and securty, nce septeber 11, 2001, n tral, ten deendant “cargedt terrr-related cre ae rally argued te entrapent deene,” but nne ae prealed. in addtnt maad sneer, Jae Crte, Dad wlla, onta wlla, Laguerre Payen, and saaar matnsraj, heant Laan, Yan Are, maed han, and Nareal Batte ae rally argued entrapent.marc 2011 CLs TTRC Update, supra nte 3. Te pre releae nte tat n eac tee cae n centrapent a rally argued, te gernent agent a an nrant a pped t an undercer cer. Id. See also sad, supra nte 7, at 688-91, 715-32; 2010 CLs Terrrt Tral Reprt Card, supra nte 4, at 20 (“A septeber 2010, te entrapent deene a neer been ued ucceully n a pt-9/11 ederal terrrtral.”). See also 2009 CLs Terrrt Tral Reprt Card, supra nte 2, at 45-48. United States v. Al-Moayad, 545f.3d 139, 159-79 (2d Cr. 2008) a rare cae ere, tug te entrapent deene aled, te secnd CrcutCurt Appeal reered te cnctn n te grund tat te gernent depred te deendant a artral n ter ue nlaatry prejudcal edence, regardng, inter alia, a bbng n irael tat deendant ereuncnnected t, and age oaa bn Laden).

106 See Jacobson, 503 U.s. at 548-49 (“were te Gernent a nduced an nddual t brea te la andte deene entrapent at ue, a t a n t cae, te precutn ut pre beynd reanabledubt tat te deendant a dped t ct te crnal act prior to first being approached by Government agents.”) (epa added, ctatn and tnte tted).

107 See, e.g., Unted state. . Laan, 480 f.3d 171, 174 (3d Cr. 2007) (upldng te jury’ rejectn Laan’ entrapent deene); Unted state . sraj, 468 f. supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 2008 wL2675826 (2d Cr. June 9, 2008) (upldng te jury’ rejectn sraj’ entrapent deene); Unted state. Crte et al., 2011 wL 1663618 (s.D.N.Y. may 3, 2011) (upldng te jury’ rejectn te deendant’entrapent deene). See also Unted state . Crte et al., 2011 wL 1663626 (s.D.N.Y. may 3, 2011)(denyng deendant’ tn r dal n te ba utrageu gernent cnduct). Altug Jacobson requre tat te gernent pre tat te deendant a predped prr t cng nt cntact tgernent agent, te secnd Crcut pert te gernent t pre tat te deendant a predped by,

ang ter tng, edence tat te deendant a “ready and llng” t accept te nduceent and ctte cre. See Unted state . Brand, 467 f.3d at 194 (“[A] deendant predped t ct a cre e ready and llng tut peruan t ct te cre carged and aatng any prptu pprtunty td and predptn can be n by te accued’ ready repne t te nduceent.”) (nternal ctatnand qutatn ar tted). Tu, n te cae agant te Neburg fur, te precutn argued tat tedeendant ere predped becaue tey ere ready and llng t accept te nrant’ er $250,000.See Trancrpt oral Arguent Unted state . Crte et al, N. 09-CR-558 (s.D.N.Y 2010) [erenater



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Neburg fur Tral Trancrpt] at 3224.

108 federal Rule Edence Rule 403 prde tat “[E]dence ay be ecluded t prbate alue ubtantally uteged by te danger unar prejudce, cnun te ue, r leadng te jury. . ..” Lttle, any, te edence reerenced n t ectn a prbate te nddual deendant’ prpentyt pernally engage n lent act. Nearly all te edence, eer, a prejudcal becaue t a gly

grapc, cntreral, r tere unppular, and t uld be dcult, nt pble, r a jury t dacateuc edence r te deendant’ nddual prpenty t ct lence. A current Atant secretaryr intergernental Aar n te Unted state Departent heland securty Julette kayye a beenquted a ayng, “in t clate [ ear terrr], jure are nt ang te bet decn . . . Jure getayed—and nrant get pad.” ethaN bRowN, SNitch: iNfoRmaNtS, coopeRatoRS & the coRRUptioN of JUStice

(2007) 130, 134 [erenater bRowN, SNitch]. See also waldan, supra nte 17. (“Te Unted state nprecutng upected terrrt n te ba ter ntentn, nt jut ter actn. But n te cae ilacetret, can Aercan jurr arly eg rd and bele en mul teele can’t agree nat tey ean?”). But see Siraj, 468 f. supp. at 420 (“Deendant al argue tat allng te undercercer’ tetny rae ‘cnderable frt Aendent cncern’ by crnalzng legtate pltcal dcure.heer, een te undercer cer teted t tateent ade by deendant tat ay be decrbed arelectng deendant’ pltcal e, te tateent ere prperly adtted . . . . Tat deendant’ tateentcntan pltcal epren de nt nulate deendant r ter ue at tral ere te tateent al rebut tetny t pre predptn.”).

109 fr eaple, n te Neburg fur cae, te gernent brugt n a tnger le C4 eple; and n tefrt D fe cae, te gernent brugt n jad de—all t prejudcal and prded t te deendantby te nrant r at ter encurageent. in anter cae, Unted state . Are, te gernent dplayed atnger le, prded by te nrant, n a ney launderng cae. Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3.

110 fr re n tee rgt, ee infra Part iii.

111 Cnder, r eaple, t reanng by te secnd Crcut Curt Appeal n arng sraj’ cnctn:“matn callenge te adn t b purcaed r te ilac btre ere e red (ne atmatn’ pernal recendatn). Te dtrct curt acted tn t und dcretn n adttng te b.T te etent matn recended te b, tey ere releant t predptn; and t te etent teb ere r ale n te p ere matn red, tey tended t rebut matn’ aertn tat te cperatngtne rt eped t radcal ila and lent jad.” Unted state . sraj, 468 f. supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y.

2007), aff’d 2008 wL 2675826 at *2 (2d Cr. June 9, 2008). See also Siraj, 468 f. supp. at 420 (“Deendantal argue tat allng te undercer cer’ tetny rae ‘cnderable frt Aendent cncern’ bycrnalzng legtate pltcal dcure. heer, een te undercer cer teted t tateent adeby deendant tat ay be decrbed a relectng deendant’ pltcal e, te tateent ere prperlyadtted . . . . Tat deendant’ tateent cntan pltcal epren de nt nulate deendant r ter ueat tral ere te tateent al rebut tetny t pre predptn.”). See also sad, supra nte 7, at697 (“Dentratng predptn can terere bece a reerendu n a deendant’ pltcal r relgue en te nqury cue n ypatetc te deendant t terrrt bjecte.”), 717 (“in rebuttal tsraj’ entrapent deene, te undercer cer teted abut sraj’ prae oaa Bn Laden and upprtr urter bbng n te Unted state. furter, te tral a te adn edence sraj’ upprt ral-Qaeda, haa, haa leader, lence agant Je, and b and de endrng and prang -calledlent jad, c bltered te gernent’ predptn arguent.” (tnte tted)).

112 See, e.g., te Neburg fur Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 107, at 66 (ntng tat ae eple ued ere

prded by te nrant n tat cae) and infra Part ii. Tere’ al te ue curt allng n prejudcaledence unrelated t te carge agant te deendant. See, e.g., Unted state . Al-mayad, 545 f.3d 139,159-79 (2d Cr. 2008) (ndng te dtrct curt ctted prejudcal errr, deprng deendant a ar tral, nadttng edence regardng, inter alia, a bbng n irael tat deendant ere uncnnected t, and age oaa bn Laden).

113 See sad, supra nte 7, at 689 (“[R]egardle eter an nrant’ cnduct legally cnttute entrapent,



62


eeral te pt-9/11 cae glgt tuatn n c te etence any real treat t natnal ecurty aquetnable.”).


115 See infra Part iii.

116 fr eaple, te Dua brter becae target an fBi netgatn ater agent a te DvD ngte rdng re and yellng “Allau Abar” (“Gd Great”). At tral, te gernent reled n large partn maed sneer’ pen “de prduced by al Qaeda, al Qaeda n iraq.” frt D fe TralTrancrpt, infra nte 168, at 1523/22-25, 1542/1-25. See also New poweRS, New RiSkS, supra nte 42, at29 (“Accrdng t te fBi tel, ptental ndcatr terrrt actty nclude tang nte, drang dagra,epung unppular e, r tang ptgrap, and ter la enrceent rganzatn ae epreed tee tat ncreaed relgty upcu a ell.”).

Tere are eaple n te brder enrceent cntet a ell. Tareq Abu fayad a tpped at sanfrancc internatnal Arprt ere cut cal und at tey tered t be “jadt ateral” n cputer, ncludng al-Jazeera ne tre and a 9/11 cnpracy tery de dnladed n laptp. Abufayad ad te ateral ere ne artcle abut current eent n Gaza tat e a plannng t read laterand tat e ad neer jned r upprted haa. Neertele, te 9t Crcut ad gratn cal adreanably cncluded tat Abu fayad a lely t engage n r upprt terrr. UNdeR the RadaR, supra nte

10, at 12; Tareq i.J. Abu fayad . Erc hlder, 632 f.3d 623, 625 (9t Cr. 2011). See generally UNReaSoNabLe iNtRUSioNS: iNveStigatiNg the poLiticS, faith & f iNaNceS of ameRicaNS RetURNiNg home, supra nte 22; RetURNiNg

home , supra nte 22.


118 ChRGJ intere t me Geran, supra nte 2.

119 R. . mac, [1988] 2 s.C.R. 903 (Can.); R. . Lely, [2001] UkhL 53 (U.k.).

120 Mack, [1988] 2 s.C.R. 903; Lely, [2001] UkhL 53 at ¶¶ 24-29.

121 Loosely, [2001] UkhL 53 at ¶ 25.

122 Mack, [1988] 2 s.C.R. 903 at ¶¶ 131, 139-49

123 A Lrd Ncll eplaned, “Predptn de nt ae acceptable at uld tere be unacceptablecnduct n te part te plce r ter la enrceent agence. Predptn de nt negate ue tate per.” Loosely, [2001] UkhL 53 at ¶ 22.

124 See, e.g., sauel J. Rac, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 s. caL. L. Rev. 575, 591-592 (2010) ( “Ntnly a te supree Curt nt arded prtectn agant gernent npng trug undercer agentr cndental nrant; t a al eplctly eepted uan ntellgence, r “unt,” r cerage by tefrt and furt Aendent. wle te fBi a trcal ly ped lt n t n ablty t cnduct uanntellgence gaterng by requrng crnal predcatn bere a urce culd be njected nt a grup, r eaple,te nternal rule ae been ubtantally relaed n te year llng 9/11. T gap n dctrne epecallytrng n e te untng prtance uan ntellgence a part a brader cunterterrr trategy.”).See also harr, supra nte 2, at 141-155 (“[w]e are let t ne erarcng pren te la tat gern

te ue nrant. Te furt Aendent ard la enrceent nearly ull dcretn t decde enand t ue nrant. Deene le entrapent rean available at tral, but tee deene ee reteretcal tan real n ter at tey gt d t regn n nrant actty. wle nddual can brng clut, rele ee unlely. fnally, te fBi a largely abandned nternal regulatn a a ay t regulate dcretner en and y agent can place nrant n frt Aendent-ente place le relgu nttutn.”).

125 Te utrageu gernent cnduct deene grunded n due prce. T deene a eter te



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gernent’ cnduct durng te netgatn a utrageu a t “c te cncence.” Te supreeCurt a epazed te narrne te deene, and, ndeed, a yet t ear a cae baed n te deene.Tu, t unlely t be an aenue trug c deendant can eectely callenge te ue nrant ncunterterrr netgatn. See, e.g. Unted state . Ruell, 411 U.s. 423, 431-432 (1973); haptn .Unted state, 425 U.s. 484 (1976) (eplanng te narrne te utrageu gernent cnduct deene).mt recently, te curt n te Neburg fur cae dened deendant’ tn r dal n te ba

utrageu gernent cnduct. Unted state . Crte et al., 2011 wL 1663626 (s.D.N.Y. may 3, 2011).See also Aanda J. screber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the FBI’s Troubled Relationship withits Confidential Informants, 34 coLUm. J. L. & Soc. pRobS. 301 (2001); see also Danel v. ward, Confidential Informants in National Security Investigations, 47 b.c. L. Rev. 627 (2006).

126 harr, supra 2, at 158.


128 intere t Elzabet mcwlla, ter Dad wlla (Apr. 7, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenaterChRGJ intere t Elzabet mcwlla].

129 Id. See Rayan, Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues?, supra nte 8.

130 ChRGJ intere t Elzabet mcwlla, supra nte 128.

131 Id.; Eal r Lyrc R. Cabral, Aprl 28, 2011 (n le t ChRGJ).

132 intere t Lrd mcwlla, brter Dad wlla (Apr. 4, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenaterChRGJ intere t Lrd mcwlla].

133 Id.

134 ChRGJ intere t Elzabet mcwlla, supra nte 128. 135 intere t Alca mcwlla, aunt Dad wlla (mar. 8, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenaterChRGJ intere t Alca mcwlla].

136 Id.

137 Rayan, Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues?, supra nte 8.

138 Neburg fur Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 107, at 1036 (huan adttng e ad ered $250,000 t Crte,but ntng t a a “cde rd” r te ct te peratn), 890 (huan adttng e ered t pay r abarberp r Crte), 894 (huan adttng e ered a Bmw t Crte). See also, e.g., id. 1613 (huanadttng e tld Crte tat Je are repnble r te el n te rld and tat tey uld be elnated). 139 Id. at 1718 (huan adttng e tld Crte t uld be nce t ae mul “bde”); Gernent Ebt109-E2-T, Neber 29, 2008 recrdng: (ater Crte alely tell huan tat e a a tea gter,huan a: “But d yu tn tee, tee guy tat yu’re talng abut are mu-, ll d [t] r te neyr r te caue?”); Gernent Ebt 133-E2-T, Deceber 17, 2008 recrdng (huan ay t Crte, “ituld be nce, brter. it uld be really nce. we can ae re bde t u. Real, gd mul brter

uld be nce, yu n? And…” Crte: “Yea, but r ere, ha?”); Gernent Ebt 116-E1-T, Aprl 7,2009 recrdng: (huan ay t Crte “i e can [get a] lut. i e can, get a cuple , cuple guy…Lut. And u, tey ae t belee nt t, yu n t’ nt nly r te ney. it’… tey ae t belee.”Crte: “it’ nt [abut] ney [r e].” huan: “oay, but i’ talng abut te lut guy . . . Te lutguy a nt t be, tey ae t belee nt t, ya n?” And ten later, ater Crte catce te nt and er:“i tn tey uld be mul...” huan: “it uld be r te caue, yu n? it uld be r te caue. Ler te ney, re r te caue.”).



64


140 Id.

141 huan et Crte n June 2008. fr June trug Aprl 2009, huan tred t peruade Crte tct jad. See generally, Ted Cner, The Pathetic Newburgh Four: Should the FBI really be baiting sad-sack homegrown terrorists? , SLate, N. 23, 2010, available at ttp://.late.c/d/2275735/ (lat ted Aprl28, 2011) [erenater Cner, The Pathetic Newburgh Four ]; Gernent Ebt 101-E2-T, octber 12, 2008

recrdng: Ater Crte cplan abut beng treated by ebdy becaue e a mul, Crteay “But ete i jut ant t grab and a, ll . But i’ mul, insha’Allah, Alla ll tae care t. huan reple: “Insha’Allah , yu brter, yu really ae t d etng, yu ae t d t n jad,and try t d etng.” Crte: “N, becaue yu’re angry.”; Gernent Ebt 101-E4-T, octber 12,2008 recrdng: ater Crte agan cplan abut beng dcrnated agant r beng mul, but tate ll cange bele and ll “de a mul,” huan ay, “ Insha’Allah . A a mul, yu uld de ra, r a caue…”; Gernent Ebt 101-E5-T, octber 12, 2008 recrdng: ater Crte ay etngabut Aercan regn plcy, huan ay, “But… Alla, Alla alay, Alla subhana wa tala alay ad tat,(unntellgble) hadiths, tat… el ge t g, ten Alla ae ay t drp te. . . . i tn tat el reacng t g at a pnt, ere yu, e, all tee brter, ae t ce up t a lutn t tae te eldn. Tat’ , t’ te hadith.;” Gernent Ebt 102-E1-T, octber 19, 2008 recrdng: ater Crteagan laent abut regn plcy ue, huan ay, “i tn yur nd and y nd r a te ae tng,yu n? . . . A, a te ae tugt, abut te rld and abut ila . . . And en i, en i ee tee, teemur, tee, tee Yahud , llng te Paletne, llng mul, llng peple n, n iraq r n Agantan,

ne ur brter, i, i alay tn abut gng r a caue, yu n? fr a caue ila. hae yu eertugt abut tat, brter?” See also, e.g., Neburg fur Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 107, at 1696 (huanadttng e encuraged Crte “[]any te” t ce up t a plan, and “[]any te” t decde n atarget).

142 See Rayan, Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues? , supra nte 8 (qutng iasalauddn maad r te que: “Tey ad t nddual a talng abut jad—tere’ etngrng t t guy, e’ nt real. Peple tugt e a an fBi agent. Te guy a ng.”); Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3 (qutng ia saluddn maad: “i tarted earng r derent eber tecunty tat e a talng tu abut jad and etng abut a grup n Patan and tellng te brtertey uld g er and elp te n Patan becaue e’ a part e grup.”); Cner, The Pathetic Newburgh Four, supra nte 139.

143 Te gernent’ target n tat cae a Yan Are, a kurd reugee r iraq a te a a

que n Albany, NY. Te fBi ent an nrant, saed huen – te ae nrant n te Neburg furcae – t bece cle t a eber Are’ que, maed han, ned a pzzera. Te nranteentually ered han a lan r pzzera. he ad te lan ad ce r te ale a le t a terrrtgrup. han accepted te lan and aed Are t tne te lan. Tey ere arreted n ultple cargencludng cnprng t ad a terrrt grup and prde upprt r a eapn a detructn, a ell aney-launderng and upprtng a regn terrrt rganzatn. Tey ere cncted and entenced t 15 yearn prn eac. fr re nratn, ee te mul sldarty Cttee’ ebte, ttp://.nepajac.rg/Are&han.t and Entrapment or Foiling Terror, supra nte 3.

144 ChRGJ intere t Lrd mcwlla, supra nte 130.

145 Neburg fur Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 107, at 2056. Accrdng t ne artcle, Dad wlla aceduled t be entenced n a grand larceny carge n t date, but te fBi ad te date canged. Rayan,Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues?, supra nte 8.

146 fBi specal Agent Rbert fuller teted tat te purpe t tep a t get te deendant t cr tatelne. Neburg fur Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 107, at 256.

147 Id., at 427 (Agent Rbert fuller decrbng cntactng te “ubttutn unt” tn te “eple unt” nAprl 5, 2009, t ee en at tey culd upply iED [pred eple dece] and tnger le).



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148 Id., at 256.

149 Id., at 387, 1048, 1201, 2104.

150 Id., at 2126. it unclear eter te bb—all ae—ere eer “actated.” Id., at 572-80. Te treeeple dece ere nt receed r eaned by Agent fuller untl t ee ater te arret, n June 3, at

c te, accrdng t andrtten nte and tetny, nly ne te eple ad bt te tc andte acated cell pne turned n. Bere te tral a ed r wte Plan t manattan, te precutnad ent a letter t te deene ayng tat uld ae ptgrapc edence tat gt cnr te ptn te tce. Tey neer prduced tat edence. Dad wlla ay te eple ere neer n. Rayan,Were the Newburgh 4 Really Out to Blow Up Synagogues?, supra nte 8; Eal r Lyrc R. Cabral, supra nte129.

151 Unted state . Crte, N. 09 Cr. 558 (s.D.N.Y).

152 Id.

153 A range cncern ae been raed abut te treatent mul n te ederal prn yte. See, e.g., mcelle Gldberg, The Prisoner-Abuse Scandal At Home, SaLoN.com, may 19, 2004, available at ttp://.aln.c/ne/eature/2004/05/19/addy (dcung te Brlyn metrpltan Detentn Center’ guard’

abue mul prner); sally Eberardt and Jeanne Tear, Guantanamos Here at Home, the NatioN, Jan. 20, 2011, available at ttp://.tenatn.c/artcle/157896/guant%C3%A1na-ere-e (pntngut te ue ltary cnneent and specal Adntrate meaure agant mul deendant); Ala male,Gitmo in the Heartland, the NatioN, mar. 10, 2011, available at ttp://.tenatn.c/artcle/159161/gt-eartland (dcung Cuncatn manageent Unt antaned by te ederal Bureau Prn,ere mul and enrnental actt are eld).

154 All te deendant ere carged t ne cunt cnpracy t ue eapn a detructn tn teUnted state, tree cunt attept t ue eapn a detructn tn te Unted state, ne cunt cnpracy t acqure and ue ant-arcrat le, ne cunt attept t acqure and ue ant-arcrat le,ne cunt cnpracy t ll cer and eplyee te Unted state, and ne cunt attept t llcer and eplyee te Unted state. indctent, Unted state . Crte, (s.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009). Teyere cncted all carge, ecept Laguerre Payen and onta wlla ere und nt gulty te lat cunt:attept t ll cer and eplyee te Unted state. See ttp://tpc.nyte.c/tpc/reerence/

tetpc/peple/p/laguerre_payen/nde.tl.

155 Unted state . Crte, 2011 wL 1663618 (s.D.N.Y. may 3, 2011); Unted state . Crte, 2011 wL1663626 (s.D.N.Y. may 3, 2011).

156 fBi/DoJ Pre Releae, octber 18, 2010, fur men fund Gulty Plttng t Bb Ne Yr synaggueand Je Cunty Center and t st mltary Plane t stnger mle, ttp://.b.g/neyr/pre-releae/2010/ny101810.t (lat ted Aprl 28, 2011).

157 ChRGJ intere t Elzabet mcwlla, supra nte 128.

158 ChRGJ intere t Lrd mcwlla, supra nte 132.

159 ChRGJ intere t Alca mcwlla, supra nte 135.

160 Id .

161 See supra nte 5-8, 17.

162 intere t fer Dua, ater Dua brter (mar. 25, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenater ChRGJintere t fer Dua].



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163 intere t Lejla Dua, daugter and nece Dua brter (mar. 25, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ)[erenater ChRGJ intere t Lejla Dua].

164 Drtan and san Dua ere entenced t le n prn plu 30 year. Eljr Dua a entenced t le nprn.

165 All tree brter ere carged t cnpracy t urder eber te U.s. ltary, attept t urdereber te U.s. ltary, pen and attepted pen rear n urterance a cre lence, and pen rear by an llegal alen. Drtan and san ere al carged t pen acnegun and pen rear by an llegal alen. Te brter ere cncted all carge eceptattepted urder and, n Eljr’ cae, pen and attepted pen rear n urterance a cre lence.

166 intere t Bur Dua, brter Dua brter (mar. 26, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ [erenater ChRGJintere t Bur Dua].

167 Eljr Dua arred t maed sneer’ ter, ang te brter-n-la n addtn t lng-terend.

168 federal Precutr wlla E. ftzpatrc nted n penng tateent tat te netgatn nled “dzen”

plce, detecte, netgatr, and pecal agent engaged n any etd urellance ncludng pycalurellance, electrnc urellance, and urellance by nrant. Tral trancrpt Unted state . sneer et al,N 07 Cr. 459 (D.N.J.). [erenater frt D fe Tral Trancrpt], at 1536/20-25, 1537/1-3. Bur Dua attendedall but tree day brter’ tral. he tated, “Te judge uld alay tal abut te lln dllar teypent n t cae. Le ney a te rean t nd y brter gulty… Jut becaue yu pent lln dllarden’t ean yu ae t put nncent peple n jal.” ChRGJ intere t Bur Dua, supra nte 164.

169 JTTf eber Jn sterel, a gernent tne, teted at tral tat Baall a nerted nt te netgatnpeccally t target te Dua brter nce e a Albanan and uld be able t relate t te better. frt Dfe Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 168, at 2669/1-7.

170 ChRGJ intere t fer Dua, supra nte 162.

171 federal Precutr wlla E. ftzpatrc n penng tateent decrbed oar a “a all te te”

“began t cperate en e gt n truble t te la.” frt D fe Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 168, at1532/13-14. Deene Attrney Rcc Cpparne claed tat oar ad been pad $238,000. Id., at 1559/14.ftzpatrc decrbed Baall a “an Albanan natnal , a tug guy r te treet.” “he a abut t be deprtedbac t Albana en e agreed t cperate t te fBi. he a al pad e ney… an gal tatu, e ant e rt legal tatu at te end t prce…te fBi brugt ter and ater rAlbana t te Unted state.” Id., at 1532/20-25, 1533/1-6.

172 Id., at 1625/16 (mcael Rley penng tateent).

173 federal Precutr wlla E. ftzpatrc decrbed a “recnnaance” maed sneer’ t tnrant maud oar t frt D, mcGure, Laeurt, frt mnut, Der Ar frce Bae, te CatGuard n Pladelpa, and e ederal buldng n Augut 11t and 13t, 2006. Id., at 1538/17-25, 1539/1-3.

174 ChRGJ intere t Bur Dua, supra nte 164. Accrdng t te penng tateent federal Precutr

wlla E. ftzpatrc, Drtan and san rdered ur m16’, ully autatc acne gun, and tree Ak47,eautatc aault eapn. ftzpatrc reer t te a “eapn ar.” frt D fe Tral Trancrpt,supra nte 168, at 1517/20-23. Accrdng t Deene Attrney mcael hu, te brter ere purcang teeapn r recreatnal purpe r ter net trp t te Pcn nce n preu trp tere eren’t enugt g arund and tey ddn’t le atng n lne. Id., at 1595/17-25, 1596/1-7. maud oar teted at traltat Drtan “Tny” Dua ndcated t tat e anted t buy re gun t ad ang t at n lne r targettng n te Pcn. Id., at 3673/18-25, 3674/1-5.



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176 Te ull lt carge and cnctn are a ll: Cunt 1: All e deendant ere carged tcnpracy t urder eber te U.s. ltary. All e deendant ere cncted n Cunt 1. Cunt 2:All e deendant ere carged t attept t urder eber te U.s. ltary. All e deendant ereacqutted n Cunt 2. Cunt 3: san, Drtan, and Eljr Dua ere carged t pen and attepted

pen rear n urterance a cre lence. Drtan and san ere cncted n Cunt 3, but Eljra acqutted. Cunt 4: maed sneer a carged t attepted pen rear n urterance a cre lence. sneer a cncted n Cunt 4. Cunt 5: Drtan and san Dua ere carged tpen acnegun. Bt ere cncted n Cunt 5. Cunt 6: Drtan and san Dua ere cargedt pen rear by an llegal alen. Bt ere cncted n Cunt 6. Cunt 7: san, Drtan, andEljr Dua ere carged t pen rear by an llegal alen. All tree ere cncted n Cunt 7.superedng indctent, Unted state . sneer, (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2008); Jury verdct fr, Shnewer, (D.N.J.Dec. 22, 2008).

177 Eljr Dua’ Deene Attrney Try Arce argued n penng tateent tat oar a ntent n brngngEljr nt te plt nce e needed re peple t ae ut te cnpracy. Arce nte tat te recrdng relecttat oar aed maed sneer 400 te r Augut 2-septeber 22, 2006 and ad t sneer “ill yur eet r ene le sulayan [Eljr].” frt D fe Tral Trancrpt, supra nte 168, at 1611/7-19.

178 Ge mulll, Did informant’s actions aid Fort Dix plotters?: Entrapment defense may be presented incourt for alleged plot against U.S., msNBC, may 10, 2007, available at ttp://.nbc.n.c/d/18601345/41023075 (lat ted may 12, 2011); Dad kcene, The Role of an F.B.I. Informer DrawsPraise as Well as Questions About Legitimacy, N.Y. timeS, may 10, 2007, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2007/05/10/nyregn/10nrer.tl?re=lgn.

179 Drtan Dua’ Deene Attrney mcael hu argued n penng tateent, “Tny [Drtan] Dua ad nnledge maud oar and maad sneer’ alleged agreeent. he ad n dea tat tey ereang tee tal tat te gernent reerrng t. At te end t cae yu ll deterne tat Tny Duant nly ddn’t n abut t alleged agreeent, e ddn’t n at te gal r bjecte ere talleged agreeent, and certanly at n pnt n te dd Tny Dua jn n t alleged agreeent.” frt D feTral Trancrpt, supra nte 168, at 1578/12-19. Eljr Dua’ Deene Attrney Try Arce argued n penngtateent tat oar a ntent n brngng Eljr nt te plt nce e needed re peple t ae ut tecnpracy. Arce nte tat te recrdng relect tat oar aed maed sneer 400 te r

Augut 2-septeber 22, 2006 and ad t sneer “i ll yur eet r ene le sulayan [Eljr].” Id.,at 1611/7-19.

180 maed oar’ tetny at tral relected n nueru place tat te Dua brter ere unaare te alleged plt t attac frt D. oar teted tat Eljr Dua neer ndcated t at any te tat e aaare tat oar and sneer ad traeled t Der (te ae trp ere tey allegedly urelled frt D). oarteted tat sneer ad tld tat e ad nred Eljr, but Eljr neer ad anytng t oar t cnrt. Id., at 3463/1-10. oar teted tat en e aed Eljr Dua oar ad pen t abut te allegedplt, Eljr dd nt n at e a talng abut. Id., at 3477/19-25, 3478/1-5. oar teted tat e tred teet t Eljr repeatedly but tat “tryng t eet t sulayan [anter nae tat Eljr ge by] eentallya dcult a t t eet t Gerge Bu.” Id., at 3485/2-5. oar teted tat e ad a cneratn tsneer abut te lgtc and etdlgy attacng frt D but at n te dd e ear any nd plannngr pecc t nature r te Dua brter r serdar Tatar. Id., at 3548/4-9. oar teted tat at nepnt durng te netgatn, e ent t te fBi and tld te tat Tny [Drtan] and san ad ntng t d

t te alleged plt. Id., at 3727/7-25.

181 Try Arce, penng tateent, id., at 1620/21-25.

182 Natnal Center r state Curt, Te Center r Jury stude, Annyu Jure: frequently Aed Quetn,ttp://.nccnlne.rg/Jure/innAnnyufAQ.t (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011) (decrbng annyu jure, ncludng ter adantage and dadantage).



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183 Try Graa, Fort Dix Juror: ‘They Were Going To Do It’ phiLadeLphia iNqUiReR, Jan. 25, 2009, available at ttp://artcle.plly.c/2009-01-25/ne/25280685_1_jurr-rt-d-plt-erdct.

184 Id. (“Jurr N. 3 a a n ered t tur t te marne n iraq, ere e a unded by rapneland receed te Purple heart and Brnze star. one de n partcular, called Bagdad snper, a dcult r

er t atc, e ad. in ne cene, a nper t an Aercan ercean n te bac, te ae place er na unded. ‘i tugt i a eeng y n gettng t,’ e ad.”).

185 At te end Augut 2010, layer r te frt D fe led an appeal te cnctn n te 3rd Crcut.Unted state . sneer N. 09292, 09299-302 (3rd Cr.).

186 intere t Zurata Dua, ter Dua deendant (mar. 26, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenaterChRGJ intere t Zurata Dua].

187 Accrdng t fer Dua, te Dua aly led paper t adjut ter gratn tatu ultple te, ndcatngtat te gernent a aare tat tey ere n te cuntry tut prper dcuentatn lng bere fer’arret and detentn. fer aert tat e a pad tae nce 1985 and tat e n t cpane and tealy’ e. fer a detaned r ne nt bere eeng an gratn judge, rdered releae.ChRGJ intere t fer Dua, supra nte 162.

188 ChRGJ intere t Zurata Dua, supra nte 186.

189 ChRJG intere t Bur Dua, supra nte 166.

190 fr an eaple a ebte tat dente te Dua’ rng bune by nae a ell a label te aterrrt, ee ttp://.realtyd.c/ru/11--tpc-dcun/20497-terrrt-cey-ue-2.tl(lat ted may 7, 2011).


192 ChRGJ intere t Zurata Dua, supra nte 186.

193 Id.

194 ChRGJ intere t Bur Dua, supra nte 166.

195 Id.

196 ChRGJ intere t Lejla Dua, supra nte 163.

197 intere t sana Pareen, ter saaar sraj matn (mar. 27, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ[erenater ChRGJ intere t sana Pareen].

198 Id.

199 Id.; intere t sanya sraj, ter saaar sraj matn (mar. 27, 2011) (n le t ChRGJ) [erenaterChRGJ intere t sanya sraj].

200 Id.

201 See, e.g., wlla k. Rabau, Undercover Officer Testifies in Bomb Trial, N.Y. timeS, may 18, 2006, availableat ttp://.nyte.c/2006/05/18/nyregn/18erald.tl.



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202 Unted state . saaar matn sraj, 1:05-cr-00104-NG (E.D.N.Y. sep. 6 2006), merandu La nsupprt mtn r a Ne Tral Puruant t fed. R. Cr. P. 33(a), at 9-10 (ctng tral trancrpt) [erenatermtn r a Ne Tral].

203 bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 108, at 122.

204

Id.

205 Id.

206 wlla k. Rabau, Trial Opens Window on Shadowing of Muslims, N.Y. timeS, may 28, 2006, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2006/05/28/nyregn/28tactc.tl?_r=1.

207 hrtz, Anatomy of a Foiled Plot, supra nte 4 (“[T]e nrant cae t te que and ntrducedel a a relgu an. he tld eeryne ater a a ell-nn autr ilac b n Egypt. ‘wene eard te call r prayer, e uld tart t cry.’”); Rbn sulan, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage? waSh. poSt, may 29, 2007, available at ttp://.angtnpt.c/p-dyn/cntent/artcle/2007/05/28/AR2007052801401.tl [erenater sulan, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Settingthe Stage? ] (“Eldady a dpatced t eeral que bere e a aed t nltrate te ilac scety Bay Rdge, a trernt que n te cty’ larget Arab cunty. he becae nn r prayng erently

e uld eep. once, e bjected t te preence t nn-mul n te que n rder t ee anatcalabut relgn, e tld andler, Detecte stepen Andre.”).

208 Zen Ra, ne te under te ilac scety Bay Rdge, al aert tat te a, seReda sata, a Eldady’ rgnal target. hrtz, Anatomy of a Foiled Plot, supra nte 4. se Redasata al belee tat e a a target, ayng tat n 2003, Eldady tred t dra nt an llct bunedeal. Andrea Elltt, Undercover Work Deepens Police-Muslim Tensions, N.Y. timeS, may 27, 2006, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2006/05/27/nyregn/27ul.tl?pageanted=prnt. Te NYPD dene t cla.hrtz, Anatomy of a Foiled Plot, supra nte 4.

209 Id. (reprtng tat te NYPD agned Eldady t deelp a relatnp t saaar and t gan trut, a e nt ater tey ad gtten tp abut saaar’ pltcal retrc).

210 sulan, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage?, supra nte 207.

211 wlla k. Rabau, Lawyer Confronts Informer in Subway-Bomb Plot Case, N.Y. timeS, may 5, 2006,available at ttp://.nyte.c/2006/05/05/nyregn/05erald.tl; sulan, The Informer: Behind theScenes, or Setting the Stage?, supra nte 207.

212 amitava kUmaR, a foReigNeR caRRYiNg iN the cRook of hiS aRm a tiNY bomb 124 (2010).

213 bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 108, at 124-25.; wlla k. Rabau, Staten Island Man Describes Shattered Life, Then a Plot to Bomb a Subway Station, N.Y. timeS, may 10, 2006, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2006/05/10/nyregn/10erald.tl.

214 bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 108, at 125 (qutng saaar).

215 ChRGJ intere t sana Pareen, supra at nte 197.

216 See, e.g., seyur her, Torture at Abu Ghraib, New YoRkeR, may 10, 2004, available at ttp://.neyrer.c/arce/2004/05/10/040510a_act.

217 See bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 108, at 126.



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218 Id.; wlla k. Rabau, Defendant Says Police Informer Pushed Him Into Bomb Plot, N.Y. timeS, may 16,2006, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2006/05/16/nyregn/16erald.tl?ta=y.

219 dickeY, SecURiNg the citY, supra nte 96.

220 sulan, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage?, supra nte 207; hrtz, Anatomy of a

Foiled Plot, supra nte 4, al reprt tat te recrdng began n June. See also saaar matn sraj . Untedstate, Cae 1:10-c-00791-NG, (E.D.N.Y. feb. 22, 2010), mtn t vacate sentence Puruant t 28 U.s.C.§ 2255 [erenater habea Pettn] at 7, ntng tat recrdng began n may, but uable recrdng ere ntade untl June.

221 kuar, supra nte 212, at 124.

222 Id., at 125.

223 Id.

224 Id.; dickeY, SecURiNg the citY, supra nte 96, at 191; bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 106, at 127; habea Pettn,supra nte 220, at 8.

225

wlla k. Rabau, In Tapes of Subway Plot Suspect, A Disjoined Torrent of Hatred, N.Y. timeS, Apr. 26,2006, available at ttp://query.nyte.c/gt/ullpage.tl?re=9C04E2Df133ff935A15757C0A9609C8B63. bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 108 at 127; sad, supra nte 7 at 716.

226 bRowN, SNitch, supra nte 108, at 127.

227 kUmaR, supra nte 212 at 125.

228 hrtz, Anatomy of a Foiled Plot, supra nte 4; kUmaR, supra nte 212, at 125.

229 Id.

230 habea Pettn, Siraj, N. 05 Cr. 104 (E.D.N.Y.), at 23 (Gernent Ebt 19-A, at 3 (trancrpt Augut23, 2004 de recrdng) [erenater G’t. E. 19-A]); dickeY, SecURiNg the citY, supra nte 94, at 194; kUmaR,

supra nte 210, at 113.

231 G’t E. 19-A, supra nte 230, at 3.

232 Id. at 4 (ater Eldady ay tat 34t st. a been appred, saaar: “wat nd , te tng e ll ue?h? Tell tat, a, tat e are ery careul abut te peple’ le.” Eldady: “oay.” saaar: “haeyu tld t?” Eldady: “we’e pe any tng.” saaar: “i dn’t ant t be te ne tat i put tand peple de.” Eldady: “N, n. he agree, e agree abut lt tng. Becaue tat’ te prncple, yun? N ucdng, n llng.” saaar: “N llng. only ecny prble.”); Id. at 5 (saaar cangete ubject t a Patan parade eld te preu day); Id. at 13 (saaar brng up te preu day’ paradeagan, ere e ay ebdy ad tey anted t ll Predent Bu, and a t); Id. at 13, 14, 15, 17, 22,24, 25, 26.

233 G’t E. 19-A, supra nte 230, at 11 (Eldady: “s t’ earced and eerytng are yu gng t bac

ut?” saaar: “N.” Eldady: “Are yu gnna tell n?” saaar: “wat? Abut at?” Eldady:“Abut tat, yu n, dng jad?” saaar: “N. i’ nt talng abut jad. Becaue bere jad tere aree crcutance, rgt?”); Id. at 15 (saaar: “i ll, i ll tay r a le beng untl i ae t, yu n, a y ’ pern. Eery ngle tng atter, yu n? i ll ae t t ay.” Eldady: “well, ay. here te pnt. Yu llng t d t?” saaar: “i ll r t te brter, tat’ t. A a planner r ateer.But t puttng tere? i’ nt ure.”); Id. at 18 (saaar: “i ll ee at appen. i ll agree t r t tebrter but nt t puttng te tng er tere.” Eldady: “o, ay. wceer yu ay. Te ter te yu ad



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derent. N yu ay derent. i dn’t n at’ net te. D yu ant e t call up ha a lttle bt t tell yur pnn? . . .” saaar: “N, yu g and tal t n prble. in alla. Tell eery ngle tngtat i tld yu.” Eldady: “Tat yu’re—are nt gng t d t.” saaar: “N, i ll nt be te ne t d t.”) Id. at 19 (Eldady: “oay. oay. And matn, yu are ut jad.” saaar: “Yu, ateer yu tn. Brter.”saaar: “i a ang yu.” saaar: “i’ nt talng abut jad. Plannng al jad, brter. i’ nly talngabut te tuatn tat i a gng t be elpng n t tuatn and i ant t be ready.” Eldady: “help, at

nd elp?” saaar: “Any nd elp, brter, t den’t atter t e.”); Id. at 22 (Eldady: “oay. slet’ g. s yur aner ?” saaar: “[Unntellgble]” Eldady: “hu?” saaar: “[Unntellgble].” [Paue]saaar and Elaay te eat belt, and Elaay ay “Tan yu.”); Id. at 23 (ater a paue, Eldady: “sat d yu bt guy are llng t d? wat d yu ant e t tell ?” Elaay er t drp te bb, butay e’ neperenced. Elaay and Eldady dcure. Ten, ater a paue, Eldady: “s at’ yur part,matn? Yur part ut? Yu dn’t anna ntng? Yu dn’t anna elp?” saaar: “wt te 34t tng?”Eldady: “Yea, 34t. Tey actually reued, a, te dea te verrazan, tey tld e tey reued te dea te verrazan.” saaar: “[Unntellgble] i ee yu tarted ng agan. Yu ae t cntrl yurel.” Teyg n t tal abut ng r a le.) Id. at 31 (ater a paue, Eldady: “s yu ant t d anytng eceptr carryng.” saaar: “Yea plannng—anytng, yu can ue e.” Eldady: “oay, tat’ at i’ gng ttell .”).

234 G’t E. 19-A, supra nte 230, at 4-35.

235 Id. at 15.

236 Id. at 17.

237 Id.

238 Id.

239 G’t E. 19-A, supra nte 230, at 17.

240 Id. at 35.

241 Id. at 45. habea Pettn, supra nte 220, at 8 (ctng Elaay’ tral tetny). heer, becaue saaaradn’t taen any arate tep t tdra r te cnpracy ater Augut 23, te deene a nt aalable

t at tral.

242 habea Pettn, supra nte 226, at 12.

243 Id. at 8 (ctng tral trancrpt).

244 Id. at 11-12.

245 U.s. . sraj, 468 f. supp. 2d 408, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).

246 Id. at 416; mtn r Ne Tral, supra nte 202, at 21-22 (uarzng edence ued n rebuttal).

247 Pre Releae, U.s. Dep’t Jutce, saaar matn sraj sentenced t Trty Year iprnent rCnprng T Place Eple at te 34t street subay statn n Ne Yr (Jan. 8, 2007), available at ttp://

.jutce.g/raj_pr.pd.

248 wlla k. Rabau, 3 Relatives of Plotters Are Held by Officials , N.Y. timeS, Jan. 10, 2007, available at ttp://.nyte.c/2007/01/10/nyregn/10plt.tl?pageanted=prnt.

249 Jenner manley, Pakistani Family Held, Advocates Mobilize, qUeeNS chRoN., Jan. 18, 2007, available at ttp://.zre.c/te/ne.c?ned=17727444&BRD=2731&PAG=461&dept_d=574903&r=6.



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250 ChRGJ intere t sanya sraj, supra nte 199.

251 Dad harr decrbe a lar try nlng a aly n Beaertn, oregn ere a lcal attrney regularly attended a que tat ad been nltrated by nrant a errneuly arreted. Te cuntya aare tat nrant ere n ter dt and ere reluctant t rally t upprt te deendant r aly, ut

ear tat tey teele uld bece te ubject gernent crutny and pbly arret. Te attrneya releaed ater eeral ee, receed an aplgy r te fBi, and ettled a laut agant te fBi r tlln dllar. harr, supra nte 2, at 167-68.


253 See supra nte 5-8, 17.

254 internatnal Cenant n Cl and Pltcal Rgt (iCCPR), G.A. Re. 2200A (xxi), UN GAoR, 21t se.,supp. (N. 16), at 52, UN Dc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.s.171, entered into force marc 23, 1976,available at ttp://.cr.rg/engl/la/ccpr.t [erenater iCCPR]; Unted Natn Treaty Cllectn,statu internatnal Cenant n Cl and Pltcal Rgt, available at ttp://treate.un.rg/Page/veDetal.ap?rc=TREATY&tdg_n=iv-4&capter=4&lang=en (lat ted Apr. 28, 2011); internatnal Cnentnn te Elnatn All fr Racal Dcrnatn (iCERD), G.A. Re. 2106 (xx), Anne, U.N. GAoR 20 t

se. supp. (N. 14) at 47, U.N. Dc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.s. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969,available at ttp://2.cr.rg/engl/la/cerd.t; Unted Natn Treaty Cllectn, statu internatnalCnentn n te Elnatn All fr Racal Dcrnatn, ttp://treate.un.rg/Page/veDetal.ap?rc=TREATY&tdg_n=iv-2&capter=4&lang=en (lat ted Apr. 28, 2011).

255 See iCCPR, supra nte 254, art. 2(1) (“Eac state Party t te preent Cenant undertae t repect andt enure t all nddual tn t terrtry and ubject t t jurdctn te rgt recgnzed n te preentCenant, tut dtnctn any nd, uc a race, clur, e, language, relgn, pltcal r ter pnn,natnal r cal rgn, prperty, brt r ter tatu.”); id. art. 26 (“All pern are equal bere te la andare enttled tut any dcrnatn t te equal prtectn te la. in t repect, te la all prbt anydcrnatn and guarantee t all pern equal and eecte prtectn agant dcrnatn n any grunduc a race, clur, e, language, relgn, pltcal r ter pnn, natnal r cal rgn, prperty, brt rter tatu.”); and iCERD, supra nte 254, art. 1 (“te ter ‘racal dcrnatn’ all ean any dtnctn,eclun, retrctn r preerence baed n race, clur, decent, r natnal r etnc rgn c a te

purpe r eect nullyng r parng te recgntn, enjyent r eerce, n an equal tng, uanrgt and undaental reed n te pltcal, ecnc, cal, cultural r any ter eld publc le.”); andart. 5 (“in cplance t te undaental blgatn lad dn n artcle 2 t Cnentn, state Parteundertae t prbt and t elnate racal dcrnatn n all t r and t guarantee te rgt eeryne,tut dtnctn a t race, clur, r natnal r etnc rgn, t equalty bere te la…”).

256 Te iCCPR, supra nte 254, nly all dtnctn beteen nn-ctzen and ctzen r te rgt tpartcpate n publc aar, t te and ld ce, and t ae acce t publc erce (Art. 25) and te rgt treed eent (Art. 12(1)). See also UN h.R. C., General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant (Tenty-seent en, 1986), ¶2 reprinted in compiLatioN of geNeRaL commeNtS aNd geNeRaL

RecommeNdatioNS adopted bY hUmaN RightS tReatY bodieS, U.N. Dc. hRi/GEN/1/Re.6 at 140 (2003),available at ttp://.uncr.c/tb/dc.n/%28sybl%29/bc561aa81bc5d86ec12563ed004aaa1b?opendcuent(“Eceptnally, e te rgt recgnzed n te Cenant are eprely applcable nly t ctzen (art. 25),le artcle 13 apple nly t alen. heer, te Cttee’ eperence n eanng reprt tat n

a nuber cuntre ter rgt tat alen uld enjy under te Cenant are dened t te r are ubjectt ltatn tat cannt alay be juted under te Cenant.”); id. ¶3 (“it n prncple a atter r te statet decde t ll adt t t terrtry.”). Te CERD Cttee a ade clear tat een tug iCERDpert state t derentate beteen ctzen and nn-ctzen (Art. 1(2)), tey ut tll “ad undernngte bac prbtn n dcrnatn.” UN Cttee n te Elnatn Racal Dcrnatn, General Recommendation No. 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, ¶¶ 1-3, U.N. Dc. CERD/C/64/mc.11/re.3(oct. 1, 2004) [erenater CERD General Recommendation 30 ].



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257 T duty prarly et ut n Artcle 6 te iCCPR, supra nte 254, c read: “1. Eery uan benga te nerent rgt t le. T rgt all be prtected by la. N ne all be arbtrarly depred le…” Artcle 6 pe a legal duty n state t eerce due dlgence n prtectng te le eery perntn ter terrtry and jurdctn r attac by crnal. See Jénez vaca . Clba, Cuncatn N.859/1999, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/74/D/859/1999, ¶7.3 (UN h.R. C. 2002). T duty nclude an blgatn

t tae reanable and apprprate eaure t prtect te le pern under a state’ jurdctn and t becgnzant treat t ter pernal ecurty. Delgad Páez . Clba, Cuncatn N. 195/1985, U.N.Dc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985, ¶5.5 (UN h.R. C. 1990).

258 See, e.g., UN h.R. C., Cncludng oberatn: Etna ¶8, U.N. Dc. CCPR/Co/77/EsT (2003). Seealso Reprt te independent Epert n te Prtectn huan Rgt and fundaental freed wleCunterng Terrr ¶¶7, 8, UN Dc. E/CN.4/2005/103 (2005), available at ttp://.cr.rg/engl/bde/cr/dc/61cr/E.CN.4.2005.103.pd (tatng tat uan rgt and te gt agant terrr “are ntanttetcal, but cpleentary repnblte state,” and recallng tat “en dratng te [iCCPR] andaru regnal uan rgt ntruent, state ere eenly aare te need t tre a realtc balancebeteen te requreent natnal ecurty and te prtectn uan rgt.”); office of the U.N. high

commiSSioNeR foR hUmaN RightS (ohchR), digeSt of JURiSpRUdeNce of the U.N. aNd RegioNaL oRgaNizatioNS oN

the pRotectioN of hUmaN RightS whiLe coUNteRiNg teRRoRiSm 3, 11-12 (2003), available at ttp://.cr.rg/Dcuent/Publcatn/DgetJurprudenceen.pd; iNteRNatioNaL commiSSioN of JURiStS, beRLiN decLaRatioN

oN UphoLdiNg hUmaN RightS aNd the RULe of Law iN combatiNg teRRoRiSm 1 (2004).

259 A lne cae bere te Eurpean Curt huan Rgt and te UN huan Rgt Cttee recgnze,r eaple, tat rgt aly eber can be drectly lated a a reult te enrced dappearance aled ne. Te cae cu n Artcle 7 te iCCPR c artculate te rgt agant trture and ter cruel,nuan, and degradng (CiD) treatent, and te equalent prbtn n trture and nuan r degradngtreatent r punent under Artcle 3 te Eurpean Cnentn n huan Rgt. Te cae nd latn Artcle 7 te iCCPR and Artcle 3 te Eurpean Cnentn arng ut ngng etnal pan andanety uered by cle aly eber te dappeared and trtured a tey capagned r jutce. T teetent tat te practce utlned n t Reprt late te deendant’ rgt t a ar tral, ten, tere’ an arguenttat te ngng etnal uerng and anety uered by te ale a a reult tee precutn culdcnttute a drect latn te aly eber’ rgt. Te etent anety and tre uered an prtantactr, a te ay te tate repnd t te aly eber’ deand r accuntablty. See kurt . Turey,App. N. 24276/94 (E.Ct.h.R Caber Judgent), may 25, 1998, ¶¶ 130-34 (ndng an Artcle 3 latn

n te grund tat a ter uered nuan r degradng treatent a a reult er n’ dappearance);Cypru . Turey, App. N. 25781/94 (E.Ct.h.R Grand Caber Judgent) may 10, 2001, ¶¶ 154-58 (ndngan Artcle 3 latn n te grund tat ale dappeared Gree Cyprt uered nuan r degradngtreatent a a reult te dappearance); Tįurtaį . Turey, App. N. 23531/94 (E. C’n. h.R. Decn),oct. 29, 1998, ¶¶ 302-09 (ndng an Artcle 3 latn n te grund tat a ater uered nuan rdegradng treatent a a reult n’ dappearance); Qunter . Uruguay, U.N. hu. Rt. C.,Cuncatn N. 107/1981, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/oP/2 at 198 (1990 [rt publcatn]), ¶ 14, (1981) (ndngan Artcle 7 latn n te grund tat a ter uered rgt latn, ncludng a t Artcle 7, a a reult er daugter’ trture and dappearance); Lyaec . Belaru, U.N. hu. Rt. C., CuncatnN. 887/1999, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999 ¶¶ 9.2, 10 (2003) (ndng an Artcle 7 latn n tegrund “cntnued angu and ental tre caued . . . [t] te ter te cndened prner, by tepertng uncertanty te crcutance tat led t eecutn, a ell a te lcatn graete”). Tespecal Rapprteur n te prtn and prtectn uan rgt and undaental reed le cunterngterrr, martn scenn, a al und tat:

Cunter-terrr eaure ae ad perble gendered cllateral eect tat are tenneter acnledged nr cpenated. indeed, enrced dappearance ale detanee nte nae cunterng terrr ae ad “pecal renance” r eale aly eber, bear te burden anety, araent, cal eclun and ecnc ardp ccaned byte l te ale breadnner. slar eect enue r te prlnged detentn tut



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tral ale aly eber, te practce etrardnary rendtn, and rced deprtatn ale aly eber, undernng te enjyent ecnc, cal and cultural rgt, uca te rgt t adequate ung, and te rgt taly le.

…

A t ter cunter-terrr eaure tat pact trd parte (e.g., dappearance),en n tee ale ten bear te egt tee tree, jepardzng nueruecnc, cal and cultural rgt prtected te internatnal Cenant n Ecnc, scaland Cultural Rgt, ncludng prtectn and atance accrded t te aly and t cldrenand yung pern (art. 10); te rgt t an adequate tandard lng, ncludng adequated ung (art. 11); te rgt t ealt (art. 12); and te rgt t educatn (art. 13 14). suceaure al underne te enjyent en’ aru cl pltcal rgt guaranteed byte internatnal Cenant n Cl and Pltcal Rgt, uc a te prtectn agant arbtraryr unlaul ntererence t aly and pracy (art. 17) and prtectn te aly (art. 23).

Unted Natn, Reprt te Unted Natn specal Rapprteur n te Prtn and Prtectn huanRgt and fundaental freed wle Cunterng Terrr, martn scenn, U.N. Dc. A/64/211, ¶¶ 30-41(Aug 3, 2009) (ctng Cunter-Terrr ipleentatn Ta frce rng grup n prtectng uan rgt

le cunterng terrr, Epert enar n ‘Te ipact Terrr and Cunter-terrr meaure n teEnjyent Ecnc, scal and Cultural Rgt (EsCR) (5-7 Neber 2008), U.N. Dc. A/hRC/10/9, ¶ 28(2009)). Te U.s. a nt rated te an ntruent r te prtectn ecnc, cal and cultural rgt,te internatnal Cenant n Ecnc, scal and Cultural Rgt, but t nnetele a pecc blgatnunder iCERD t guarantee equalty n te enjyent ecnc, cal and cultural rgt. T prded rbt n te dentn “racal dcrnatn” n Artcle 1(1) (c reer t retrctn n “uan rgt andundaental reed n te pltcal, ecnc, cal, cultural r any ter eld publc le”) and Artcle 5(e),c peccally requre state parte t enure equalty n ecnc, cal and cultural rgt, ncludng tergt t publc ealt, edcal care, cal ecurty and cal erce. internatnal Cenant n Ecnc,scal and Cultural Rgt (iCEsCR), G.A. re. 2200A (xxi), 21 U.N. GAoR supp. (N. 16) at 49, U.N. Dc.A/6316 (1966), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.s. 3, available at ttp://.cr.rg/engl/la/cecr.t; office of the U.S. high comm’R foR hUmaN RightS, iNt’L coveNaNt oN SociaL aNd cULtURaL RightS New

YoRk , 16 Dec.1966, available at ttp://.cr.rg/engl/cuntre/ratcatn/3.t. See also amNeStY

iNt’L, pakiStaN: hUmaN RightS igNoRed iN the “waR oN teRRoR” 59-61, Ai inde AsA 33/036/2006 (septeber

2006); aL-amiN kimathi & aLtaN bUtt, edS., mUSLim hUmaN RightS foRUm, hoRN of teRRoR, 19-21(2008).

260 Artcle 14 te iCCPR guarantee, inter alia, te rgt “t a ar and publc earng by a cpetent,ndependent and partal trbunal etabled by la;” “t be tred tut undue delay;” “t nt be cpelled ttety agant el”; “t ae adequate te and aclte r te preparatn deene and t cuncatet cunel n cng”; “t be preued nncent untl pren gulty”; and t ae a “cnctn andentence [be] reeed by a ger trbunal.” Art. 14(1), (2), (3), (5) iCCPR, supra nte 254. Under Artcle 2 te iCCPR, state parte ut “repect and t enure t all nddual tn t terrtry and ubject t t jurdctn te r gt recgnzed n te preent Cenant, tut dtnctn any nd, uc a race, clur,e, language, relgn, pltcal r ter pnn, natnal r cal rgn, prperty, brt r ter tatu.” iCCPRArtcle 26 renrce tat “All pern are equal bere te la and are enttled tut any dcrnatn t teequal prtectn te la. in t repect, te la all prbt any dcrnatn and guarantee t all pernequal and eecte prtectn agant dcrnatn n any grund uc a race, clur, e, language, relgn,pltcal r ter pnn, natnal r cal rgn, prperty, brt r ter tatu.” iCERD supra nte 254, art. 5(a)

(“in cplance t te undaental blgatn lad dn n artcle 2 t Cnentn, state Parte undertaet prbt and t elnate racal dcrnatn n all t r and t guarantee te rgt eeryne, tutdtnctn a t race, clur, r natnal r etnc rgn, t equalty bere te la, ntably n te enjyent tellng rgt: (a) Te rgt t equal treatent bere te trbunal and all ter rgan adnterng jutce…”).

261 Artcle 6 te Eurpean Cnentn n huan Rgt (EChR) cntan a rgt t ar tral prn lart tat und n Artcle 14 te iCCPR. speccally, EChR Artcle 6 guarantee, inter alia, te rgt t “a ar



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and publc earng tn a reanable te by an ndependent and partal trbunal etabled by la;” t “bepreued nncent untl pred gulty accrdng t la;” t “be nred prptly… te nature and caue te accuatn agant ;” t “ae adequate te and te aclte r te preparatn deence” and t“eane r ae eaned tnee agant and t btan te attendance and eanatn tneen beal under te ae cndtn a tnee agant .” in deternng te cntent te iCCPR,te internatnal Curt Jutce a led t analgu regnal uan rgt treate and decn. See

Cae Cncernng Aadu sad Dall (Rep. Gunea . De. Rep. te Cng), i.C.J., N. 30 2010, ¶68(nterpretng Artcle 13 te iCCPR n lgt te Eurpean Curt huan Rgt’ nterpretatn Artcle 1 Prtcl N. 7 te Eurpean Cnentn huan Rgt).

262 van mecelen and oter . te Neterland, App. n. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93(Caber Judgent), Apr. 23 1997, ¶50, available at ttp://cp.ecr.ce.nt/tp197/e.ap?actn=tl&dcuentid=695907&prtal=b&urce=eternalbydcnuber&table=f69A27fD8fB86142Bf01C1166DEA398649; Teera de Catr . Prtugal, App. n. 25829/94 (Caber Judgent), Jun. 9, 1998, ¶34,available at ttp://cp.ecr.ce.nt/tp197/e.ap?actn=tl&dcuentid=696070&prtal=b&urce=eternalbydcnuber&table=f69A27fD8fB86142Bf01C1166DEA398649; Raanaua Ltuana, App.n. 74420/01 (Grand Caber Judgent), feb. 5, 2008, ¶55, available at ttp://cp.ecr.ce.nt/tp197/e.ap?actn=tl&dcuentid=828596&prtal=b&urce=eternalbydcnuber&table=f69A27fD8fB86142Bf01C1166DEA398649.

263 Teixeira de Castro, App. n. 25829/94, at ¶ 38; Ramanauskas, App. n. 74420/01, at ¶ 55.

264 Teixeira de Castro, App. n. 25829/94, at ¶ 38-39; Ramanauskas, App. n. 74420/01, at ¶ 73. See also Declan Rce, Between Rhetoric and Reality: Sociological and Republican Perspectives on Entrapment , 4 iNt’L

J. evideNce & pRoof 77, 86 (2000) (ntng tat Teixeira a plcatn r Autrala becaue te rgt t a artral n Artcle 14 te iCCPR rrr Artcle 6 te EChR); sn Brntt, Entrapment, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: A Licence to Deviate? 29 hoNg koNg L.J. 216 (1999) (ntng tat te Teixeira de Castro decn a racatn r hng kng nce te rgt t a ar tral guaranteed by Artcle 14 te iCCPR,t c hng kng a state party).

265 Teixeira de Castro, App. n. 25829/94, at ¶ 38; Ramanauskas, App. n. 74420/01, at ¶ 67.

266 See also wee . Unted state, 232 U.s. 383 (1914) (deeng edence gatered n latn te furtAendent nadble at tral).

267 See, e.g., UN Cttee n te Elnatn Racal Dcrnatn, Statement on Racial Discriminationand Measures to Combat Terrorism, ¶ 4, U.N. Dc. E/CN.4/sub.2/2003/23/Add. 1 (N. 1, 2002), availableat ttp://.uncr.c/tb/dc.n/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044331/4b63c02a6cc5e33c1256c690034a465/$fiLE/N0264357.dc (recallng tat “te prbtn racal dcrnatn a pereptry nr nternatnal la r c n dergatn pertted”).

268 Art. 4(1) iCCPR, supra nte 254 (“Ntng n te preent Cenant ay be nterpreted a plyng r anystate, grup r pern any rgt t engage n any actty r perr any act aed at te detructn any tergt and reed recgnzed eren r at ter ltatn t a greater etent tan prded r n te preentCenant”).

269 Id. art. 2(1), 26.

270 Art. 2(1) iCERD, supra nte 254.

271 Id. Art. 1(1).

272 UN comm. oN h.R., impLemeNtatioN of the pRogRamme of actioN foR the thiRd decade to combat RaciSm aNd

RaciaL diScRimiNatioN, UN Dc. E/CN.4/1997/68/Add.1 (Dec. 5, 1996) (“[A]ltug relgn a nt ncludedn te Cnentn a ne te grund n c racal dcrnatn a prbted … [t]e Cttee tel



76


ete ad t tae nt accunt relgu apect en tey appeared t be part a cntent trend dcrnatn agant e peple”).


274 See infra Part ii.

275 iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 20. Te huan Rgt Cttee a tated tat dtnctnunder Artcle 26 can nly be cntent t te Cenant tey are reanable, bjecte, and aed ataceng a purpe c reanable under te Cenant. U.N. h.R. C, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination (Trty-seent en, 1989), ¶13, U.N. Dc_hRi\GEN\1\Re.1 at 26. [erenater HRCGeneral Comment No. 18] (“te Cttee bere tat nt eery derentatn treatent ll cnttutedcrnatn, te crtera r uc derentatn are reanable and bjecte and te a t acee apurpe c legtate under te Cenant”). karaurt . Autra, Cuncatn N. 965/2000, ¶ 8.3,U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/74/D/965/2000 (UN h.R. C. 2002); Bre . Te Neterland, CuncatnN. 172/1984, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/oP/2 at 196 (UN h.R. C. 1984 ); sprenger . Te Neterland,Cuncatn N. 395/1990, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/44/D/395/1990 (UN h.R. C. 1992); kaanag .ireland, Cuncatn N. 819/1998 U.N. CCPR/C/76/D/1114/2002/Re.1 (UN h.R. C. 1999).

276 UN C. n te Elnatn Racal Dcrnatn, General Recommendation No. 14: Definition of Racial Discrimination, (frty-secnd en, mar. 22, 1993), ¶ 2, U.N. Dc A/48/18 at 114, [erenater CERDCommittee General Recommendation 14]; HRC General Comment No. 18, supra nte 275, ¶ 7. iRReveRSibLe

coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 21.

277 See supra nte 22. Lnnger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape, supra nte 22, at 1244 (“i tere n peccedence upprtng upcn a que, and te f.B.i. netgate te que anyay, te nly eplanatnr te netgatn a uneral upcn mul.”), 1246-1247 (“se berer ae und teDepartent’ denal racal and relgu prlng t be dngenuu en cntrated t te actual actte ederal la enrceent agent.” (ctng Tn Lcy et al., Al-Qaeda Records Solve Many 9/11 Puzzles, But Others Linger, U.S.a. todaY, Aug. 29, 2002, (“U.s. cal ay te ne plcy nt degned t target que,but te f.B.i. cung n que a neer bere.”); Danel Ppe, Counterterrorism or Witch Hunt?, Nat’L

poSt, feb. 4, 2003, available at 2003 wL 11542987 (“argung tat g-leel cal n Jutce Departentuld nt be crtczng racal prlng en f.B.i. agent ae n cce but t ue t trategy”) (nternalqutatn ar tted)). in 2010, te U.N. huan Rgt Cuncl reeed te U.s. uan rgt recrd apart te Uneral Perdc Ree prce and recended tat te U.s.: “Ree, t a e t teraendent and elnatn, all la and practce tat dcrnate agant Arcan, Arab and mul Aercan,a ell a grant, n te adntratn jutce, ncludng racal and relgu prlng” (recendatn 64)and tat te U.s. “Dee pecc prgra aed at cunterng grng ilapbc and enpbc trendn cety” (recendatn 98). Te U.s. ndcated t upprt n part r bt recendatn. UN wrngGrup n te Uneral Perdc Ree, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United States of America, (steent en, huan Rgt Cuncl, Jan. 4, 2011), U.N. Dc A/hRC/16/1, available at ttp://.tate.g/dcuent/rganzatn/158198.pd.

278 See supra Part i.B.

279 Bearal prlng ete ered a a “nn-dcrnatry” alternate t racal prlng. heer,te bearal pattern tat la enrceent cer are tld ndcate a ptental terrrt treat are ten jutpre tat reult n te ae prlng mul. iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 7 (“ocer are

encuraged t l r pern ‘ublng (prayer)’; ‘…udden cange n bear—r eaple, a anatcallyrelgu pern tng e club (r te reere)…’; and te ell ‘cented ater (r rtual purcatn).’Tee relgn-baed ndcatr, le neutral n ter ace, en read n cnjunctn t ter part teTranng key tat ae eplct reerence t ‘ad,’ ‘jad’ and ‘mul zealt,’ ll lead t te dprprtnatetargetng mul r te perceed t be mul”). See also huan, Defending the Faithful, supra nte 22,at 926 (ntng tat “cnduct-baed” prlng can dprprtnately burden a ngle nrty grup by targetngcnduct tat gncantly crrelated t eberp but n n ay nerently ndcate rngdng”).T cnlatn race, relgn, and ter denter a been tered “cultural prlng,” r te ubttutn



77


epren culture a a pry r dentyng nddual ay be predped t ct terrrt act. Id.

280 SiLbeR & bhatt, NYpd RadicaLizatioN RepoRt, supra nte 19, at 33.

281 See infra Part i.A. and nte 22.

282 Art. 1(3) iCERD, supra nte 254; “Under te Cnentn, derental treatent baed n ctzenp r

gratn tatu ll cnttute dcrnatn te crtera r uc derentatn, judged n te lgt tebjecte and purpe te Cnentn, are nt appled puruant t a legtate a, and are nt prprtnalt te aceeent t a.” CERD Committee General Recommendation 30, supra nte 256, ¶ 4. Seealso CERD Committee General Recommendation 14, supra nte 276, ¶ 2; U. N. Cttee n te Elnatn Racal Dcrnatn, General Recommendation No. 20: Non-discriminatory implementation of rights and freedoms (Art. 5), ¶ 2, U.N. Dc. hRi\GEN\1\Re.6, at 208 (mar. 15, 1996); iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS,supra nte 15, at 20. Te huan Rgt Cttee a al tated tat dtnctn under Artcle 26 can nlybe cntent t te Cenant tey are reanable, bjecte, and aed at aceng a purpe c reanable under te Cenant. HRC General Comment 18, supra nte 275, at ¶ 13 (“te Cttee beretat nt eery derentatn treatent ll cnttute dcrnatn, te crtera r uc derentatn arereanable and bjecte and te a t acee a purpe c legtate under te Cenant.”). karaurt. Autra, Cuncatn N. 965/2000, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/74/D/965/2000 (UN h.R. C. 2002);Bre . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N. 172/1984, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/oP/2 at 196 (UN h.R. C.1984 ); sprenger . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N. 395/1990, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/44/D/395/1990 (UN

h.R. C. 1992); kaanag . ireland, Cuncatn N. 819/1998 U.N. CCPR/C/76/D/1114/2002/Re.1(UN h.R. C. 1999).

283 iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 31.

284 Id.

285 hRC, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, supra nte 275, ¶ 13. fr eaple t tet appl ed,see, e.g., Arauj-Jngen . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N. 418/1990, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/49/D/418/1990,¶ 7.4, (UN h.R. C. oct. 22, 1993) (ndng tat te requreent tat applcant r uneplyent benetbe uneplyed at te applcatn reanable and bjecte gen tat te purpe uneplyent-ben-et leglatn t prde atance t te uneplyed); Dannng . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N.180/1984, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/oP/2 at 205, ¶ 1.4 (UN h.R. C. Apr. 9, 1997) (ndng tat derentatnbeteen benet receed by arred cuple and cuple erely cabtng are baed n reanable and

bjecte crtera); fn . france, Cuncatn N. 666/1995, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/67/D/666/1995, ¶ 10.3(UN h.R. C. N. 9, 1999) (ndng tat te decn by france t requre cncentu bjectr t ereduble te perd ltary erce late Artcle 26 te iCCPR a derentatn a baed n purprtedneed t acertan eter bele cncentu bjectr a genune, c nt reanable and bjecte);Gueye . france, Cuncatn N. 196/1985, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶ 9.5 (UN h.R. C.Apr. 6, 1989) (ndng tat derentatn by c lder senegalee rgn ere pad nerr penn tlder frenc rgn n te frenc ary erng n senegal a nt reanable and bjecte and ntedtat ere adntrate cnenence nt a ucent jutcatn r derentatng n cnlct t Artcle 26 te iCCPR); Järnen . fnland, Cuncatn N. 295/1988, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/39/D/295/1988, ¶¶6.4 - 6.6 (UN h.R. C. Aug. 15, 1990) (ndng tat a 16- nt perd clan, nn-cbate ercer cncentu bjectr, cpared t nly 8 nt r cbat erce, a nn-punte and jutable);snjder . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N. 651/1995, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/63/D/651/1995, ¶ 8.3 (UNh.R. C. Jul. 27, 1998) (ndng tat te requreent tat nn-redent benecare tate ealt nurancepay a cntrbutn en redent benecare are nt requred t d a juted n te ba tat alure t

ae t derentatn uld deplete te und aalable t te nurance cee). See also CERD CommitteeGeneral Recommendation 14, supra nte 276, ¶ 2.

286 iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 31; Bre . Te Neterland, supra nte 282, at ¶ 13. See,e.g., Dannng . te Neterland, supra nte 285, ¶ 13 (“Te rgt t equalty bere te la and t equal prtectn te la tut any dcrnatn de nt ae all derence treatent dcrnatry. A derentatnbaed n reanable and bjecte crtera de nt aunt t prbted dcrnatn tn te eanng



78


artcle 26.”); Gueye . france, supra nte 285, ¶ 9.4 (“‘te rgt t equalty bere te la and t equal prtectn te la tut any dcrnatn de nt ae all derence treatent dcrnatry. A derentatnbaed n reanable and bjecte crtera de nt aunt t prbted dcrnatn tn te eanng artcle 26’”); Ceban . Ruan federatn, Cuncatn N. 790/1997, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/72/D/790/1997,¶ 7.2 (UN h.R. C. Jul. 24, 2001) (“i dtnctn are ade, tey ut be baed n bjecte and reanablegrund”); Julan . Ne Zealand, Cuncatn N. 601/1994, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/59/D/601/1994, ¶ 8.5 (UN

h.R. C. Apr. 3, 1997) (ntng te Cttee’ prr jurprudence “accrdng t c a dtnctn baedn bjecte and reanable crtera de nt cnttute dcrnatn tn te eanng artcle 26 teCenant…”); Nee . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N. 425/1991, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/51/D/425/1990, ¶7.2 (UN h.R. C. Jul. 15, 1994) (“te rgt t equalty bere te la and t te equal prtectn 55 te latut any dcrnatn de nt ae all derence treatent dcrnatry. A derentatn baed nreanable and bjecte crtera de nt aunt t prbted dcrnatn tn te eanng artcle 26.”);oulajn . Te Neterland, Cuncatn N. 426/1990, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/46/D/406/1990/426/1990. ¶7.3 (UN h.R. C. oct. 23, 1992) (“Te prncple nn-dcrnatn and equalty bere te la pletat any dtnctn n te enjyent benet ut be baed n reanable and bjecte crtera.”); Pauger. Autra, Cuncatn N. 716/1996, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/44/D/415/1990, ¶ 7.3 (UN h.R. C. mar. 26,1992) (“Te Cttee reterate t cntant jurprudence tat te rgt t equalty bere te la and t teequal prtectn te la tut any dcrnatn de nt ae all derence treatent dcrnatry. Aderentatn baed n reanable and bjecte crtera de nt aunt t prbted dcrnatn tn teeanng artcle 26”).

287 iRReveRSibLe coNSeqUeNceS, supra nte 15, at 31. See, e.g., kall .Pland, Cuncatn N. 552/1993,U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/60/D/552/1993 (UN h.R. C. Jul. 14, 1997) (nddual pnn by Cttee eberElzabet Eatt and Cecla medna Qurga, cgned by Crtne Canet, dentng) (dagreeng t teCttee’ ndng tat te rgt te applcant ad nt been lated, and tatng tat te tet “dcrnatn”under te Cenant requre te Cttee t eane eter te clacatn n quetn “a bt aneceary and prprtnate ean r ecurng a legtate bjecte”); Tnen . Autrala, Cuncatn N.488/1992, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶¶ 6.2 - 6.4 (UN h.R. C. 2004) (t Autrala dentyngte llng tet t deterne eter a eaure cnttute “dcrnatn”: (a) weter Taanan ladra a dtnctn n te ba e r eual rentatn; (b) weter mr. Tnen a ct dcrnatn;(c) weter tere are reanable and bjecte crtera r te dtnctn; (d) weter Taanan la are aprprtnal ean t acee a legtate a under te Cenant); krtjánn . iceland, Cuncatn N.951/2000, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/78/D/951/2000, ¶ 7.2 (UN h.R. C. Jul. 16, 2003) (state party argung tat“te a te derentatn laul and baed n bjecte and reanable cnderatn and tat tere

reanable prprtnalty beteen te ean eplyed and te a purued”).

288 See supra nte 265 (te rgt t nn-dcrnatn a pereptry nr under nternatnal la), 258 (tateparte t te iCCPR are blgated t enure te rgt t a ar tral); infra nte 290 (tate parte t te iCCPRare blgated t enure te rgt t reed tugt, cncence, and relgn) and 291 (tate parte t teiCCPR are blgated t enure te rgt t reed pnn and epren).


290 See infra nte 5-8; Lnnger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape, supra nte 22, at 1254-1255 (“Cunterterrrnetgatn ae draned a treendu aunt te f.B.i.’ reurce n recent year. in a 2002 audt tef.B.i., Cptrller General Dad m. waler dcued a ‘ae e reurce t cunterterrr.’ f.B.i.Drectr Rbert mueller a nted tat te nuber pernnel deted t cunterterrr a dubled ncesepteber 11, 2001. wtn te cunterterrr prgra, te f.B.i. a deted t reurce alt entrely t

netgatng treat ped by mul… Tu, n any leel, te preccupatn t relgn a eed teallcatn reurce n te f.B.i.”); New poweRS, New RiSkS, supra nte 42, at 32 (“Tere general cnenutat prlng neecte; nnetele, la enrceent a engaged n eeral tactc targeted prednantly atte mul cunty a a le, and t unrtunate eect. indeed tee any detc ant-terrr plced nt ee t ae ade u aer—n act, te ppte gt be true. in e cae, data cllected under teeprgra rean unanalyzed, atng cuntle an ur”). illutratng te ctlne current cunterterrrtecnque, oar maud, an nrant n te frt D fe cae, alleged t ae been pad $238,000 r a lttle



79


re tan a year’ r. Dapne Eatar, Terrorism Cases Hinge on Paid Informants, waSh. iNd., Dec. 19, 2008,available at ttp://angtnndependent.c/22674/terrr-cae-nge-n-pad-nrant.

291 Racal prlng and targetng a partcular cunty n la enrceent ert “end te eage tnrte tat tey are eed at all te a ptental crnal; tat tey are nt alued eber cety;and tat tey cannt rely n te plce r prtectn,” “eaggerate any derence tat d et beteen tat

cunty and te ppulatn at large,” and “perpetuate[] and eacerbate[] nequalty, negate teretypeabut nrte, and dcrnatn and lence baed n tee teretype.” New poweRS, New RiSkS, supra nte 42, at 36. See also ameRicaNS oN hoLd, supra nte 15, at 30; Aad, supra nte 22.

292 Art. 18 iCCPR nte:

1. Eeryne all ae te rgt t reed tugt, cncence and relgn. T rgtall nclude reed t ae r t adpt a relgn r bele cce, and reed, eternddually r n cunty t ter and n publc r prate, t anet relgn r belen rp, berance, practce and teacng.2. N ne all be ubject t cercn c uld par reed t ae r t adpt arelgn r bele cce.

293 Art. 19 iCCPR (prdng, inter alia, tat, “1. Eeryne all ae te rgt t ld pnn tut ntererence;”

and “2. Eeryne all ae te rgt t reed epren; t rgt all nclude reed t ee, receeand part nratn and dea all nd, regardle rnter, eter rally, n rtng r n prnt, n te r art, r trug any ter eda cce”).

294 U.N. h.R. C, General Comment No. 22, Article 18: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, (frty-Egt en, 1993), ¶1, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/21/Re.1/Add.4. Artcle 18(3) de qualy tat,“freed t anet ne’ relgn r bele ay be ubject nly t uc ltatn a are precrbed by laand are neceary t prtect publc aety, rder, ealt, r ral r te undaental rgt and reed ter.” slarly, Artcle 19(3) te iCCPR nte tat te rgt t reed epren carre t t pecaldute and repnblte: “it ay terere be ubject t certan retrctn, but tee all nly be uc a areprded by la and are neceary: (a) fr repect te rgt r reputatn ter; (b) fr te prtectn natnal ecurty r publc rder (rdre publc), r publc ealt r ral.” heer, tee ltatn are ntapplcable t te ue tat are te ubject t Reprt. Te huan Rgt Cttee a, r eaple, tatedtat “paragrap 3 artcle 18 t be trctly nterpreted: retrctn are nt alled n grund nt peced

tere, een tey uld be alled a retrctn t ter rgt prtected n te Cenant, uc a natnalecurty.” Te Cttee al aerted tat: “Ltatn ay be appled nly r te purpe r c teyere precrbed and ut be drectly related and prprtnate t te pecc need n c tey are predcated.Retrctn ay nt be ped r dcrnatry purpe r appled n a dcrnatry anner.” Id. ¶ 7.

295 Art. 19(2) iCCPR, supra nte 293.

296 here t prtant t nte tat eprcal reearc a n tat tere n lnage beteen ila andterrr, n act uggetng tat trng relgu cnctn ay actually reduce te leld tat an nddualll ct lent act n te nae ila. See pateL, RethiNkiNg RadicaLizatioN, supra nte 13, at 10 (“A recenttudy 117 egrn terrrt n te Unted state and Unted kngd (“fDD study”) ea ned te lnagebeteen terrr and a cnerate undertandng ila….te fDD study a unable t etabl tat agncant prprtn actual terrrt ebted te “relgu” bear dented a ndcate radcalzatn.fr eaple, nly 17.1 percent te aple ebted l tlerance r perceed telgcal deance and nly

15.4 percent te aple attepted t pe ter relgu bele n ter. Te relately l crrelatnbeteen relgty and terrr—n a tudy tat eeed aed at ndng uc a crrelatn— a trng ndcatntat cnerate relgu bele ay play a leer rle n radcalzatn tan ne gt aue. oerall, teaalable reearc de nt upprt te e tat ila dre terrr r tat berng te mul at—eena partcularly trngent r cnerate arety tat at— a tep n te pat t lence. in act, tat reearcugget te ppte: intead prtng radcalzatn, a trng relgu dentty culd ell ere t nculatepeple agant turnng t lence n te nae ila.”).



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297 U.N. h.R. C, Drat General Cent N. 34 (Upn cpletn te rt readng by te huan RgtCttee), Artcle 19, (one hundred and frt en, 2011), ¶8, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.6. Tehuan Rgt Cttee n te prce reng t general cent n Artcle 19 reed pnn,epren, and nratn. A t rtng, t ad publed a drat at ll bece General CentN. 34. Te Drat General Cent nte, “N pern ay be ubject t te parent any rgt under teCenant n te ba r er actual, perceed r upped pnn. All r pnn are prtected,

ncludng pnn a pltcal, centc, trc, ral r relgu nature. it ncpatble t paragrap1 t crnale te ldng an pnn. Te araent, ntdatn r tgatatn a pern, ncludngarret, detentn, tral r prnent r rean te pnn tey ay ld, cnttute a latn artcle19, paragrap 1.” See also 2010 doJ oig Review of the fbi’S iNveStigatioNS of ceRtaiN domeStic advocacY

gRoUpS, supra nte 51, at 186-91 (ndng tat “n e cae. . . te fBi etended te duratn netgatnnlng adcacy grup r ter eber tut ucent ba. T ad practcal pact n ubject,e nae ere antaned n atclt a a reult and e trael and nteractn t la enrceentere traced.”).

298 huan, Defending the Faithful, supra nte 22, at 934 (“[A]pplcatn te tate’ cerce netgatryper t eber [a] cunty can gncantly deter ter cultural epren. Te greater te dgntary andtgatc ct t te nddual are prled, te re lely tat ear uture crutny ll peraely cllter cunty eber’ llngne t engage n cnduct tat dene te”).

299 ameRicaNS oN hoLd, supra nte 15.

300 harr, supra nte 2 (decrbng te cllng eect depread nltratn nrant and undercerplce cer n te mul cunty ncludng a mul g cl enr n tn “w arund?”bere talng abut pltc; a teacer aerted tat t’ “le a plce tate;” and a Paletnan grant ntentnally de nt “cure ut te yte.”); Rwg RaciaL pRofiLiNg RepoRt, supra nte 22, at 31 (decrbngan ncdent n february 2009 n c lcal redent n CA dcered tat ter que ad been nltratedby te fBi. “Lcal redent reprt tat te urellance caued te t ad te que and pray at e,t ad ang cartable cntrbutn—c a undaental tenet te mul at—and t reran rang cneratn abut pltcal ue uc a U.s. regn plcy”). At tral, Drtan Dua’ deene attrneymcael hu decrbed te Dua brter’ nternalzatn ilapba and te auptn tat all mulare terrrt, “[Tey elt a ] yu can’t trut mul n te Unted state anyre, all te terrrt, all te are ere t d u ar. s tey elt uzzled. Tey elt le tey culdn’t pea ter nd. Tat tey culdn’ttal abut ter relgn…But tey ne, and Tny [Drtan] ay t er and er agan, yu gt t be careul

at yu ay, peple lten and peple gt ear at yu ay and tae t ut cntet. Yu gt t be careul.All te te e ay tat. Tey elt uzzled. Tey elt le tey culdn’t epre teele.” frt D fe TralTrancrpt, at 1583/1-13. New poweRS, New RiSkS, supra nte 42, at 30 (ctng edence tat mul are adnggng t que and prayng at e ntead – mul leader ae reprted a decreae n attendance atrelgu erce; tat e que ae requeted tat peaer ad pltcal eage; and tat cartablednatn t mul rganzatn ae decreaed). T nd el-cenrp late te rgt t ree peecand epren prtected under bt te frt Aendent and te iCCPR and te nablty t rp reelylate te rgt t reed relgn al prtected under tee ae ntruent.

301 pew ReSeaRch ceNteR, mUSLim ameRicaNS: middLe cLaSS aNd moStLY maiNStReam (2007), ttp://pereearc.rg/pub/483/ul-aercan (lat ted Apr. 29, 2011).

302 ChRGJ intere t Arun kundnan, supra at nte 34.

303 Id.

304 Unted Natn, Reprt te Unted Natn specal Rapprteur n te Prtn and Prtectn huanRgt and fundaental freed wle Cunterng Terrr, martn scenn, mn t te Unted state Aerca, A/hRC/6/17/Add.3, ¶ 65 (Neber 22, 2007).

305 Artcle 2(3) te iCCPR tate:



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Eac state Party t te preent Cenant undertae:(a) T enure tat any pern e rgt r reed a eren recgnzed are lated allae an eecte reedy, ntttandng tat te latn a been ctted by pernactng n an cal capacty;(b) T enure tat any pern clang uc a reedy all ae rgt teret deterned by

cpetent judcal, adntrate r leglate autrte, r by any ter cpetent autrtyprded r by te legal yte te state, and t deelp te pblte judcal reedy;(c) T enure tat te cpetent autrte all enrce uc reede en granted.

meanle n ter General Cent N. 31, te UN huan Rgt Cttee a nted:

Artcle 2, paragrap 3, requre tat n addtn t eecte prtectn Cenant rgtstate Parte ut enure tat nddual al ae acceble and eecte reede tndcate te rgt. suc reede uld be apprprately adapted a t tae accunt te pecal ulnerablty certan categre pern, ncludng n partcular cldren.Te Cttee attace prtance t state Parte’ etablng apprprate judcal andadntrate ecan r addreng cla rgt latn under detc la.Te Cttee nte tat te enjyent te rgt recgnzed under te Cenant canbe eectely aured by te judcary n any derent ay, ncludng drect applcablty

te Cenant, applcatn cparable cnttutnal r ter prn la, r tenterprete eect te Cenant n te applcatn natnal la. Adntrate ecanare partcularly requred t ge eect t te general blgatn t netgate allegatn latn prptly, trugly and eectely trug ndependent and partal bde.Natnal uan rgt nttutn, ended t apprprate per, can cntrbute t tend. A alure by a state Party t netgate allegatn latn culd n and tel gere t a eparate breac te Cenant. Ceatn an ngng latn an eentaleleent te rgt t an eecte reedy.

U.N. h.R. C, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of The General Legal Obligation Imposed on StatesParties to the Covenant (Egtet en, 2004), ¶15, U.N. Dc. CCPR/C/21/Re.1/Add.13.

306 mul Aercan callengng te gernent’ aru practce targeted urellance and crutny aeby and large aled n te curt. See, e.g., huan, supra nte 22. A nted abe, te entrapent deene a

neer been ucceully ued n a terrr tral. 2009 cLS teRRoRiSt tRiaL RepoRt caRd, supra nte 2, at 20.

307 Altug tate ae an blgatn under te rgt t le t prtect natnal ecurty, tey ut nt d at teepene ter ter uan rgt blgatn, r eaple cplyng t te rgt t reed epren,pnn, and relgn under Artcle 18 and 19 te iCCPR. See supra nte 292 and 293.

308 UN hR Cuncl, Reprt te wrng Grup n te Uneral Perdc Ree, Unted state Aerca, UNDc. A/hRC/16/11 (Jan. 4, 2011).



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Wake up, open your eyes, look around you, see how this world has changed… At

least take 5 minutes to look into these cases, and research, and look for real proof.

Lejla Duka, age 13 (daughter of Dritan Duka)




snce te eent septeber 11, 2001, te Unted state gernent a been targetngmul by endng pad, untraned nrant nt que and mul cunte trugutte cuntry. T practce a led t te precutn re tan 200 nddual n terrr-related cae.

Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States eanetree g-prle terrr precutn n c te gernent’ nrant played a crtcalrle n ntgatng and cntructng te plt tat eentually led t precutn. in all tree cae,te gernent ent pad nrant nt mul cunte tut any ba r upcn current r eentual crnal actty. Te gernent’ nrant ntrduced, cultated, and tenaggreely pued dea abut lent jad, encuragng te deendant t belee tat t ater duty t tae actn agant te Unted state. Te nrant elected r encuraged te

prped lcatn tat te deendant uld later be accued targetng, and al prded tedeendant t—r encuraged te deendant t acqure—ateral edence, uc a eapnry rlent de, c uld later be ued t cnct te. Te deendant n tee cae ae allbeen cncted and currently ace prn entence 25 year t le.

Te ntere eatured n t Reprt, t ale te deendant, dentrate te prundtll tee gernent plce are tang n mul cunte. Tee precutn—and tertat larly rely n te abue ue nrant—ae al been ntruental t perpetuatngte gernent’ cla tat te Unted state ace a “egrn treat” terrr, and aebltered call r te cntnued ue nrant n mul cunte.

Targeted and Entrapped buld n ChRGJ’ etene eperte n te area racal prlng and

cunterterrr. Drang n curt dcuent, ntere, and eda accunt, te Reprt raequetn abut te gernent’ rle n eac tee cae. Te Reprt cnder ey trend ncunterterrr la enrceent plce tat ae acltated tee practce and ealuate teundaental uan rgt at tae. it cnclude t plcy recendatn aed at enurngtat te U.s. gernent le up t t blgatn t guarantee, tut dcrnatn, te rgtt: a ar tral; reed relgn, epren, and pnn; and an eecte reedy.

Targeted and Entrapped

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