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Men of the Leibstandarte stand guard before their Fuhrer's office at theBerlin Chancellery (note the initials A H above the door). An identical dutywas carried out at the Chancellor's residence in the Wilhelmstrasse.

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Paul Hausser, commander of the I S.S Panzer Corps

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Tanks and Schützenpanzerwagen Das Reich

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Blitzkrieg

PrefaceBLITZKRIEG" or lightning war is not a German term for just anykind of quickly waged and violent war. It is a name for a special kindof quickly waged and violent war which has a technique of its own.The ideas which lie back of this technique began taking shape in Ger-many in the period after the failure of either the Allies or the Ger-mans to break through on the Western Front during 1915 and 1916,and they matured after the outbreak of the civil war in Spain.While some of the guiding conceptions of the Blitzkrieg were triedout in Ethiopia, the results were not considered conclusive. TheEthiopians were a semi-savage people, and they lacked the modernarmament and equipment necessary to offer the Italian invaders thekind of resistance essential if Blitzkrieg were to receive a real andcomplete battlefield test. But Spain furnished a fine proving ground.Then Albania was a dress rehearsal. And in Poland the system wasput to the final proof.The technique of Blitzkrieg is based on the principle of surprise as op-posed to an effort to crush an enemy by bringing an overwhelmingsuperiority in numbers and armament to bear against him. It can belikened to the swift and deadly thrust of a rapier as opposed to thecrushing blow of a battle-axe or a war club. The objective is not theenemy civilian population but the enemy armed forces, both groundand air.From the days of earliest military history, surprise has played a prom-inent part in winning victory. When coupled with better tactics -- thatis, superior methods of combat on the battlefield -- surprise has al-ways given victory against an enemy that relies on superior numbersand courage.The Christians talked of "Mongol hordes" in an effort to explain theirown quick and bloody defeats at Mongol hands. There were no mili-tary Mongol hordes in superior numbers. Probably the Christiansoutnumbered the Mongols in all the battles fought. But the Mongolsused their ability to make long, hard marches on their tough Asiatichorses to take by surprise the slow-moving, ponderous masses ofknights, men-at-arms and foot soldiers composing the Christian ar-mies. In battle the Mongols had a definite tactical scheme. First theirmounted archers, keeping out of reach of the Christians, shot holes intheir ranks. When in consequence a certain amount of confusion hadbeen created, then -- and only then -- did they charge. The Christianshad no tactics in the proper sense of the word. They simply moved

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forward en masse, trusting to courage and numbers.The war of 1914-1918 offered a parallel, so far as fundamentals areconcerned. The Allies, conscious of their superior potential resources,leaned strongly towards the idea of crushing Germany and Austria-Hungary by sheer weight of numbers and metal. Too many of the Al-lied conferences held during the early years of the war resulted innothing but an agreement for all the Allies -- West, East and South --to make a simultaneous general attack.The Allies adopted the usury idea of wearing the enemy down by kill-ing and wounding large numbers of his troops. This method seemedparticularly attractive because the enemy was distinctly inferior inman power. But it produced the really terrible Allied casualty lists.Nor did it result in any military advantage sufficient to compensatefor even a fraction of the losses.The artillery preparations for the large-scale Allied and German at-tacks were kept up for days at a time. Enormous quantities of shellswere "dumped" on enemy positions. Yet again and again when the in-fantry went forward they found enough enemy machine guns still inaction to cause enormous losses. What was worse, while groundwould be captured, the expected crumbling of the enemy and theopening of a path for a break-through to decisive victory did not ma-terialize. The Allied attacks on the Somme, the German ones on Ver-dun, are the best examples of the fallacy of the idea of crushing an en-emy by usury methods.As a consequence of these failures, leaders began seeking more andmore for methods based on superior tactical skill and on surprise.Von Mackensen's break through the Russian line on the Dunajec Riv-er in 1915 was an example of superior tactics. He used the artilleryrolling barrage to protect his advancing infantry -- the first time sucha barrage had been used on a large scale.The successful British attack with tanks at Cambrai was a surprise. Itwas successful because of the use of a new instrument of war; thetank surprised the Germans. The successful German attack on theRussian Riga line was a surprise attack without a warning artillerypreparation. The artillery gave close support to the infantry during itsforward advance. In this advance there was no rigid timetable, withthe infantry advancing at a given rate per minute back of an artillerybarrage which moved forward according to a precise schedule. In-stead, the artillery concentrated its fire on the localities in the enemyline which were the strongest and could offer the greatest resistanceto the attacking infantry. While this was going on, the attacking infan-try pushed in around the flanks of those positions and cut them off. If

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they did not surrender, infantry was left to watch them while themain force went on. This happened regardless of whether or nottroops on the right or left kept up. A considerable number of heavytrench mortars and light artillery kept up with the infantry to smashopposition where they could, and, where they could not, to smother itwith a concentration of fire, while the infantry broke through theweaker spots and outflanked and cut off the stronger ones. The attackwas like a tide coming in, rushing around the rocks which it cannotroll forward as it does the pebbles and shells. But the tide neverthe-less finishes by submerging the rocks.The success of the Riga experiment led to the use of the method on alarge scale against the British in March and April 1918, and againstthe French in May. These surprise attacks, employing new artilleryand infantry tactics, were so successful that in each case they justmissed achieving a complete break-through. Victory for Germanywould probably have been the result had a break-through occurred.Fortunately, the Germans lacked the reserve necessary to keep the at-tacks going; while the Allies possessed reserves enough finally to stopthem. The Germans were exhausted just as a break-through seemedimminent.The attack of July 15 and 16, 1918, from Château-Thierry on theMarne to Rheims, and thence across the Champagne to the ArgonneForest, was the last occasion when the Germans made this sort of anattack on a large scale. From just east of Château-Thierry to Rheimsthe attack penetrated deeply and threatened a break-through. How-ever, in the Champagne new defensive tactics were used. Only a fewmen were left in the front line and the artillery and infantry wereecheloned in depth. They barely succeeded in stopping the Germans.1

Once again, the probabilities are that the Germans would have bro-ken through had they possessed the reserves to continue the attack.Then came the Franco-American counterattack from Château-Thierry to Soissons, begun on July 18. It drove deep into the westernflank of the German salient which had been made by the May attackand enlarged by the successes on July 15 and 16 between Château-Thierry and Rheims. The continuation of this attack, and the tremen-dous increase in the Allied reserves due to the continuous arrival inFrance of the American troops by the hundreds of thousands, robbedGermany of the initiative and put her on the defensive until the Armi-stice ended the fighting.However, neither the events themselves nor the ensuing German de-feat were evidence that the new method of attack was wrong. On thecontrary, the more the record of the fighting was studied the clearer it

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seemed that the method of surprise attack was correct. Such was theorigin of the idea of the Blitzkrieg, which gradually developed in Ger-man minds. It offered a technique of successful surprise and of theexploitation of it by tactics which could rapidly be adjusted to meetsuccessfully each local situation, rather than a plan of formal tacticsbased on artillery and infantry timetables rigidly laid down before thebattle.However, the children of the gas engine -- the tank, the armored carand the airplane -- played only a limited part in the German attackswhich I have described above. The Germans had but few tanks. Theirairplanes did a limited amount of bombing and machine gunning oftroops on the ground; but the technique had not yet been evolved forenabling airplanes to give full and continuous support in an attack.The British and French, however, had developed the tank and hadbeen devoting considerable effort to a study of its best tactical uses.From the beginning their views diverged into two separate concep-tions. The French considered the tank as an accompanying weapon tohelp the infantry overcome enemy machine guns and move forward.They therefore distributed it along the line of the attacking infantry.The British used this type of tank tactics also. But more and more aschool developed in England which wanted the tanks utilized ingroups, to smash a hole entirely through the enemy line; the tankswould use their own speed and fire power and would not be helddown to the pace of the accompanying infantry. In general, the parti-sans of this plan wished to revive something like the crushing chargeof the armored knight against the unarmored foot soldier.On August 8, 1918, such an attack was made. It was a great success.The lack of morale shown by the German foot soldier on this occasioncaused Ludendorff to call August 8 the black day of the war. Believersin the tank as a weapon in itself, as opposed to the conception that itwas merely a weapon to support the infantry, were jubilant.The leader of this school of thought was General Fuller, who, I be-lieve, possesses one of the most brilliant military minds so far pro-duced in this century. Since 1918 he has had more to do than any oth-er soldier with developing the uses of the tank, armored car and othermotor vehicles for land combat. In planning the Blitzkrieg, the Ger-mans adopted many of his ideas. Another officer whose brilliant mili-tary mind has helped shape the Blitzkrieg technique is an Italian,General Giulio Douhet.Soldiers have long studied the problems involved in breaking througha relatively short front when there is a dense population in the reartrained and ready to come to arms within a few days. Some believers

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in the growing power of aviation argued that the airplane providedthe answer. Airplanes would bomb the civilian population and soshatter their morale that whether or not the nation had been trainedin universal military service it would sue for peace even before itsarmy had been beaten in battle.General Giulio Douhet's name has been erroneously attached to thisidea. What he advocated was the preparation in time of peace of alarge aviation force which, when war comes, will be ready to take offinto enemy country without delay. Its objective would not be the civil-ian population, but the things used by a country first to mobilize andthen to concentrate its war strength. "Mobilization" is calling to thecolors the civilians who form the trained reserve. This takes time."Concentration" is moving the units of the army, after they have beenraised to war strength, from the places of local assembly -- by rail,ship, bus and on foot -- to the localities where they are to commencefighting. This also takes time. Thus the essential in each of the twoprocesses needed to bring even the most modern, up-to-date army tothe point where it can become effective is time.But a large aviation, prepared in advance, needs no time in order tobecome effective. It already is mobilized and concentrated. It canstart immediately for its goal. From this fact there followed a logicaldeduction. Why not use an air force against those means which an en-emy uses, first to mobilize his troops and then to concentrate them?The means in question consists of barracks, stables, gun sheds, arsen-als, railways, railway stations, bridges, ships, docks, electric lightplants and power plants of all kinds. As Douhet conceived it, aviationwould be used to make a surprise attack; but the surprise would notbe in respect to the places attacked but in respect to the moment ofthe attack.Up to the start of the Italian campaign in Ethiopia those military ex-perts who were trying to decide what new equipment science and in-dustry had placed in the locker of Mars, in order to make more effec-tive use of the age-old principles of surprise, had reached three mainconclusions: 1, despite the development of trench systems, surprisebased on adequate artillery and infantry tactics was still feasible; 2,under certain circumstances, an attack of a large number of tanks canproduce an effect which is decisive locally if not for the whole front;and 3, the essential factor is time. Even nations with conscript armiesneed a period of about ten days to complete mobilization, and a fur-ther period for concentration. Now no nation can afford to mobilizeand concentrate its full body of troops in peacetime as a merely pre-cautionary measure, still less can it remain in that condition indefi-

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nitely. Therefore, the period required by a potential enemy for mobili-zation and concentration provides an opportunity for effective sur-prise; and this is a type of attack for which the machine children ofthe gas engine are especially fitted.It was to prevent a German surprise attack of this sort that the Magi-not Line was conceived and built. Knowing that partially garrisonedfortifications can be captured by surprise, the French created a spe-cial corps of troops to garrison it permanently.Ethiopia provided new experience and new ideas. I shall not go intodetails. Suffice it to say that the Italians found that while aviationalone could seriously damage the enemy by bombing points of mili-tary importance out of artillery reach, such bombings did not producedecisive results. Only when the aviation acted in direct support oftroops operating on the ground were decisive victories gained. Theyalso found that tanks operating alone not only failed to produce deci-sive results but frequently were in great danger, and sometimes werelost, when surrounded by enemy infantry. They found, further, thattanks operating in conjunction with infantry, artillery, cavalry andaviation as well produced excellent results.In other words, the conclusion reached in Ethiopia was that tanksand aviation, far from replacing ground troops in any way, simplyadded two more essentials to an up-to-date army. Furthermore, de-spite Italian achievements in road building, the Italians found as theyadvanced that mechanized transport was not a substitute for animalsif their troops were to be able to fight and were to be supplied any-where and everywhere. In Ethiopia, the Italians used many thou-sands of horses, mules, donkeys and camels. In other words, neitherin combat nor on the march had the gas engine and its progeny re-placed the known tools of war. They had simply added to their num-ber. However, due to the speed of the new mechanical instruments,the possibility of surprise attack had, under certain conditions, beentremendously increased. In cases where mechanized and motorizedtroops 2 supported by airplanes could act, a surprise blow could bestruck in a way never before possible.However, the conclusions drawn from the Italian campaign in Ethio-pia were tentative. They could not be considered conclusive becausethe Ethiopians were deficient in artillery of all types, and had practi-cally no tanks or aviation at all. But new opportunities for experimen-tation soon were provided in Spain. Until the battle of Teruel in thewinter of 1937-38 the civil conflict in Spain did not assume the char-acter of what could be defined as war (grand warfare); it consistedmerely of isolated operations (minor warfare). Beginning with the

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battle of Teruel, however, and continuing through the final campaignin Catalonia, the number of troops, guns, tanks and planes engagedwas sufficiently large to permit one to draw some definite conclu-sions. 3

The operations in the final period of warfare in Spain fall into two cat-egories -- hard-fought, knockdown and drag-out battles; and pur-suits. Teruel, Alfambra, Sarrión, Ebro and Segre belong in the firstclass. The separate operations leading up to the advance on and cap-ture of Castellón-de-la-Plana consisted of a series of stubborn smallbattles fought along a wide front. The operations after Alfambra, ter-minated only when Franco reached the Segre and Ebro Rivers andthe Mediterranean at Vinaroz, were a large-scale pursuit. The opera-tions in Catalonia after the crossing of the Segre and Ebro Rivers andthe capture of the main positions beyond were another large-scalepursuit. It terminated only when the remnants of the governmentalarmies were driven across the French frontier.The results showed that weapons and tactics essential in one of thetwo categories of fighting were frequently of little use in the other. Ina hard-fought battle the ability to give and take hard blows wasproved to be absolutely necessary. Speed at the sacrifice of this abilityintroduced dangers which frequently led to defeat. Therefore artillerywith first-class fire power, heavily armed infantry, armored tankswith cannon and huge quantities of ammunition were required orelse defeat was certain. Similarly, the ability of such troops and theirsupplies to move fast was entirely subordinate to their ability tomarch and fight regardless of the difficulties of terrain. Therefore,while motor transport and mechanized heavy artillery and tanks wereused wherever the ground permitted, the troops as a whole dependedupon horses, mules and donkeys.For pursuit, on the other hand, the primary requisite was speed, incombination with enough combat power to overcome whatever minorresistance rear guards and the braver elements of defeated troopsmight put up. The elements that produced the best results were lightspeedy tanks armed with machine guns, armored cars and motor-cycle infantry where the terrain permitted their use; on other ter-rains, horse cavalry was needed. All this had to be backed up by in-fantry and by artillery carried in motor trucks where that was possi-ble; in other cases infantry had to march. As the pursuit continued,the infantry would be more and more outdistanced until it was asmuch as several days in the rear.The light tanks were shown to be useless in heavy battle becausewhere they were not destroyed by artillery fire they were burnt or cap-

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tured by the enemy infantry. Even the armored tanks that carriedcannon failed when they attacked enemy infantry alone. 4 Theyproved useful only when they attacked with, and were backed up by,their own infantry, preceded first by a heavy artillery bombardmentand then by a heavy aviation bombardment of the enemy position.Thus for hard-fought combat the French theory of tanks as infantrysupport weapons proved to be correct; while for pursuit General Full-er's theory of mechanized vehicles acting independently was shownto be correct.In Spain aviation played a rôle which few had foreseen in advance.Such reliable evidence as exists shows that bombing of civilian popu-lations did not produce results worth the risk to planes and pilots,particularly where modern anti-aircraft fire had to be faced. Bombingof important military objectives far in the rear, in accordance withDouhet's theory, while producing considerable damage, was never de-cisive. This was due to the fact that since airplanes are unable to cap-ture (i.e. occupy) and hold territory, they could not prevent the ene-my from renewing activity in the localities which had been bombed assoon as the bombing ceased. Also, due to lack of accuracy in bombingand an inability to keep up the bombing incessantly, the destructionaccomplished was never total.However, in battle and pursuit, the rôle played by the Spanish, Italianand German aviation was so important that we are safe in saying thatin battle where two sides are equal in everything but aviation, theside which possesses it and uses it as it was used in Spain will win.In heavy combat, as the preparatory artillery fire ceased, heavy bomb-ing planes bombed and re-bombed the enemy positions from one endto the other. This was followed, during the advance of the attackinginfantry and tanks, by continuous diving attacks and light bombingand machine gunning of the enemy positions by the assault aviation.For pursuit, airplanes bombed and machine gunned retreating enemyelements far to the rear. Their bombs and heavy machine guns alsofurnished the light mechanized and horse cavalry with the high-ex-plosive and heavy machine gun fire which their artillery and heavymachine guns frequently could not provide because they were unableto keep up. In other words, this support from the aviation preventedthe artillery and heavy machine guns of the enemy's rear guard fromholding up the light mechanized forces and horse cavalry, whichwould have given the main enemy forces a chance to retreat in orderor to organize a new defensive position.Thus in the one real test, that of battle, the Spanish war proved: 1,that the children of the gas engine could not accomplish decisive re-

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sults alone; 2, that in heavy combat, while their support is essential,they are subordinate to the infantry and artillery, as their speed can-not compensate for their inability (unlike the infantry and artillery)to take and give heavy blows; and 3, that for pursuit, or against an en-emy lacking the artillery of various types and the tanks and aviationnecessary for successful defense, light and mechanized forces sup-ported by aviation can strike surprise blows which may prove deci-sive.With the acceptance by the German and Italian High Commands andGeneral Staffs of the accuracy of this third conclusion, and followingthe reorganization and rearmament of their armed forces accord-ingly, the long evolution of the theory of Blitzkrieg was over. It wasready for use as a well-rounded conception of military strategy.It is important to note the difference between the third and the sec-ond conclusions just recorded. The third lies at the basis of the ideaof Blitzkrieg; the second indicates conditions under which it couldnot work and therefore should not be tried.Thus Blitzkrieg would not be tried against the Maginot Line. Nor,probably, would it be tried against an enemy with a strong air forceand numerous large-caliber anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns -- in oth-er words, an enemy prepared not only to engage in hard combatagainst infantry and artillery but also against tanks, armored cars andaviation.The seizure of Albania gave the Italians the opportunity to indulge ina dress rehearsal of Blitzkrieg. They knew just what force the Alba-nians could mobilize and how long mobilization would require. Theyknew that while the Albanians, once they were mobilized, could put arespectable force of infantry and field artillery into the field, theylacked aviation, armored tanks with cannon, and large-caliber anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. In other words, the period needed by theAlbanians for mobilization provided the time needed to execute a suc-cessful surprise attack. Lack of matériel for heavy combat meant thatthe Albanian power of resistance against aviation and light troop at-tacks was so slight that the Italians need not send across the Adriaticthe troops and matériel necessary for heavy combat. Actually theysent only 23,000 light troops, backed up by armored motorized divi-sions and supported by aviation. The reports that these troops had tomake numerous assaults before they succeeded in landing are notsupported 5 by reliable evidence. Inside of a few days the light arm-ored cars and motorcycle troops, backed by more heavily armoredand armed mechanized troops, and supported by aviation, had occu-pied all of Albania. Twelve hundred Grenadier Guard Infantry, fully

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equipped and armed, were flown over the Adriatic and landed nearthe capital just as the advance elements of the light troops enteredthe city. If the light troops had met with any resistance from KingZog's troops, the Grenadiers were there to reinforce them. It was allover before the average Albanian knew what was happening. The Al-banian dress rehearsal showed that the technique of Blitzkrieg hadbeen properly developed.The suppression of the Polish Republic proved that a brave, well-armed, well-equipped and well-trained army, according to ordinarystandards, is incapable of resisting a Blitzkrieg attack. True, the Polesmade strategic errors in trying to defend all of Poland, instead of ac-cepting the invasion of the western part of their territory as a neces-sary evil and concentrating their army where it could have made themost effective resistance. But even if they had adopted this correctstrategical procedure they would have been beaten. The reason forthis statement is that the Poles lacked the aviation, the well-armoredtanks with cannon, and the large-caliber anti-tank and anti-aircraftguns which would be needed to stop and defeat a Blitzkrieg force.And I might say in passing that the Regular Army and NationalGuard of the United States would fare no better today, and for exactlythe same reason.The Blitzkrieg technique, as exemplified so successfully in Poland,follows certain well-defined successive steps:1. An airplane attack is made on all enemy aviation and aërodromes.2. An airplane attack is made on all railway junctions and stations,barracks, depots, bridges, and motor convoys on roads -- that is,everything used by an army for mobilization and concentration. (Ifthe aviation is large enough it carries out 1 and 2 simultaneously.)3. While this is going on, the artillery of all calibers which already isin place near the border heavily shells all the enemy batteries,trenches and other works, while the regular infantry assaults andtakes them. Heavy bombing and light diving bombing and machinegunning by airplanes assist this preparation. These operations by thetroops armed and trained for hard combat open the way for the Blitz-krieg troops. Of course, if there are no minor fortifications or organ-ized resistance of any kind at the frontier, this step is not necessary.In those circumstances the Blitzkrieg troops start their invasion di-rectly after steps 1 and 2 have been executed.4. The light divisions made up of motorcycle infantry and machineguns, armored cars, light tanks (carried in trucks), horse cavalry, andsometimes horse artillery (light) and artillery carried in trucks, leadthe way.

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5. After the light divisions come the armored divisions, each com-posed of about 400 tanks (generally medium-sized), motorized infan-try, artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and engineers. Thelight and armored divisions are closely supported by aviation, whichis ready at all times with heavy bombing planes and diving lightbombing and machine gun planes to help overcome any enemy resist-ance.6. Next come infantry and artillery in motor trucks. Italy also has ar-rangements to pick up infantry units and fly them wherever needed.Reliable reports indicate that Germany has at least four regularly or-ganized air regiments, each consisting of a fully equipped and armedregiment of infantry, with the transport planes necessary to fly themall at one and the same time. The purpose of these is to reinforcequickly the light and armored divisions should they meet with moreresistance than they can overcome with their aviation support. Thetroops would not be landed by parachute in the rear of the enemy, aprocedure few military men would care to sanction; troops so landedwould probably be a present to the enemy. Instead, the airplanes landjust out of enemy artillery range, in the rear of their own troops.The Blitzkrieg troops do not attempt to engage in knockdown, drag-out combat with enemy troops prepared for this type of fighting. In-stead, they go around the flanks, leaving the other job to the regulardivisions which come plodding along in the rear.No nation in Central Europe or the Balkans is armed and equipped,any more than was Poland, to withstand a Blitzkrieg attack. Nor isTurkey. The possibility therefore is that in the not distant future ei-ther Germany or Italy, or both, will use their special light and arm-ored divisions and aviation to enforce their will in these regionsshould any of the countries involved dare to be intractable either eco-nomically or militarily.

Common interpretationThe classic interpretation of blitzkrieg is that of German tactical andoperational methodology in the first half of the Second World Warthat was often hailed as a new method of warfare. The word, meaning"lightning war", in its strategic means is associated with a series ofquick and decisive short battles to deliver a knockout blow to an ene-my state before it could fully mobilize. The tactical meaning of blitz-krieg involves a coordinated military effort by tanks, mobilized infan-try, artillery and aircraft, to create an overwhelming local superiorityin combat power, to overwhelm an enemy and break through itslines. Blitzkrieg as used by Germany had considerable psychological,

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or as some writers call, "terror" elements, such as the noise-makingsirens on the Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers to affect the morale of ene-my forces. The devices were largely removed when the enemy becameused to the noise, after the Battle of France in 1940, bombs some-times having whistles attached instead. It is also common for writersto include psychological tactics behind the line, using Fifth colum-nists to spread rumours and untruths among the civil population inthe theatre of operations.The origins of the term blitzkrieg are obscure. It was never used inthe title of a military doctrine or handbook of the German army or airforce. It seems rarely to have been used in the German military pressbefore 1939. Recent research conducted at the German military his-torical institute at Freiburg has found only two military articles fromthe 1930s in which it is employed. Neither article advocates any radi-cally new military doctrine or approach to war. Both use the termsimply to mean a swift strategic knockout. The first, published in1935, deals primarily with food (and to a lesser extent with raw mate-rial) supplies in wartime. The term blitzkrieg is here employed withreference to Germany’s efforts to win a quick victory in the FirstWorld War and is not associated with the use of armoured or mecha-nised forces or with airpower. The argument is that Germany mustdevelop self-sufficiency in food supplies because it might again proveimpossible to deal a swift knockout to her enemies and a protractedtotal war might prove unavoidable. The second article, published in1938, states that launching a swift strategic knockout has great attrac-tions for Germany but appears to accept that such a knockout will bevery difficult to achieve by land attack under modern conditions (es-pecially in view of the existence of systems of fortification like theMaginot Line) unless an exceptionally high degree of surprise isachieved. The author vaguely suggests that a massive strategic air at-tack might hold out better prospects, but that topic is not explored inany detail.Another relatively early use of the term in a German-language workwas in a book by Fritz Sternberg, a Jewish Marxist political econo-mist who was a refugee from the Third Reich. Entitled Die DeutscheKriegsstärke (German War Strength), it was published in Paris in1939. It had been preceded by an English-language edition of 1938called Germany and a Lightning War. The German edition uses theterm blitzkrieg. The book’s argument is that Germany is not preparedeconomically for a long war but might win a lightning war. It does nottreat in any detail operational and tactical matters, and does not sug-gest that the German armed forces have evolved a radically new op-

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erational method. It offers scant clues as to how German lightningvictories might be won.

Battle of ProkhorovkaThe Battle of Prokhorovka (12 July 1943) was fought on the EasternFront during the Second World War as part of the Battle of Kursk inthe Soviet Union (450 kilometers / 280 miles south of Moscow). Prin-cipally, the German Wehrmacht's Fourth Panzer Army clashed withthe Soviet Red Army's 5th Guards Tank Army. It is the largest tankbattle in military history. On 5 July 1943 the Oberkommando derWehrmacht launched Operation Citadel. The aim of the GermanHigh Command was to destroy the considerable Soviet forces in theKursk salient. Destroying the Red Army in the field would recover thestrategic initiative for the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. The op-eration was to be achieved by five German field armies, which were tostrike in a pincer movement on either side of the Kursk Bulge. TheSoviet Supreme Command, the Stavka, foresaw the German attackand prepared a defence in depth along the lines of the military deepoperations theory. Soviet marshal Georgy Zhukov convinced JosephStalin that the Red Army should remain defensive and wear down theGerman Army. When the German forces had been worn down suffi-ciently by the Red Army defence, the Soviets would release their op-erational reserve in a counter-offensive to destroy the weakened Ger-man spearhead.In the ensuing Battle of Kursk, German forces were halted on thenorthern Orel sector. However, in the south the formations of Wehr-macht and Waffen-SS achieved a deeper penetration, approachingProkhorovka. The Red Army was forced to commit its operational re-serves sooner than it would have wished. The resulting clash of ar-mour occurred on 12 July 1943 and became known as one of the larg-est tank battles in history.This was the pivotal battle of the German offensive to encircle Sovietforces in the Kursk salient. Its culmination and outcome are a matterof contention. The German assault failed to achieve its objective. TheSoviets succeeded in winning a series of defensive engagements andprevented the German formations breaking through their lines, butSoviet attacks against German positions were repulsed. By the end ofthe battle both sides had suffered heavy losses. The Soviet losses weremuch higher, but larger operational and strategic manpower and ma-teriel reserves enabled the Red Army to retain the strategic and op-erational initiative.

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BackgroundIn the winter of 1942–1943 the German Sixth Army had been lostduring the Battle of Stalingrad. The subsequent Soviet operations—Operation Uranus, Operation Winter Storm, and Operation Little Sat-urn—threatened the position of Army Group South. The Soviet opera-tions, if successful, may have destroyed the entire Army Group. Theseoperations led to the liberation of most of the Caucasus from Germanoccupation at a cost of only 70,000 casualties. Keen for more success,Stalin had ordered the Red Army to encircle German Army GroupSouth by thrusting through to Rostov-on-Don. The Red Army ad-vanced but became overstretched. Erich von Manstein recognisedthis and organised an improvised counter-offensive which resulted inthe Third Battle of Kharkov. In a repeat of the Second Battle of Khar-kov, mobile German forces pinched off the flanks of the Soviet spear-head and destroyed them. The German victory had enabled the Wehr-macht and SS forces to recapture Kharkov on 14 March 1943 anddrove the Red Army back over the northern Don River. In the processthey punched a bulge into the Soviet lines to create a salient some 150miles from north to south. The Germans took some 9,000 prisonersand counted 23,000 Soviet dead. Soviet figures counted 45,000killed and captured.German forces also recaptured Belgorod to the south of Kursk, butthe Soviets held Kursk. The German advance beyond Kharkov wassoon slowed to a halt as Soviet resistance grew stronger. Neither hadthe strength to continue offensive operations and the Kursk salientwas formed. Adolf Hitler and the German High Command selectedthe relatively narrow Kursk sector for their next major offensive in anattempt to crush Soviet operational and strategic reserves. This wasto restore equilibrium to the Eastern Front and win back the strategicinitiative. Soviet intelligence recognised the Kursk bulge would be thefocus of a major German offensive in the summer. The Soviet strate-gic defence of Kursk, unlike Moscow in 1941, would not occur alongthe entire front. This enabled the Soviets to prepare a strong defencein depth of up to 100 kilometres deep. The Soviets committed 10 So-viet Army Fronts, containing 40 combined armies and five tank ar-mies operating on a 2000 kilometre front to a depth of 600–700 kilo-metres. The Stavka authorised a defensive strategy aimed at wearingdown the German spearhead by forcing them to breakthrough multi-ple lines of heavily fortified positions, defended by Soviet units withcombined arms capabilities. When the German offensive withered,the Soviet operational armour reserves would be released to counter-attack and destroy the weakened enemy

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The Forces

GermanThe German forces involved were primarily from three Waffen-SS di-visions, all of which had already suffered losses during the precedingdays. The 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 2ndSS Panzer Division Das Reich, and 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopfhad begun the offensive with 456 tanks and 137 assault guns, includ-ing only 35 Tiger I tanks. A further brigade may have been involvedin the fighting; the 10th Panzer Brigade had been created on 23 June1943 and had 45 Tiger tanks on strength. It is possible that this unitjoined the 2nd SS Panzer Division, which would have bolstered itsstrength to 70 Tigers. The total number of tanks and assault gunsavailable on 11 July was about 400, including 70 Tigers.Soviet sources claim that the Germans possessed 500–700 tanks.German sources are not complete for tank strength returns of 12 July.According to available German sources, 294 German tanks wereavailable on 11 July between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd SS PanzergrenadierDivisions (77, 95, and 122 tanks respectively). The following day, 12July, the figures for the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division are un-known, but the strength returns for the remaining two divisions were103 and 121. On 13 July, returns indicate 70, 107, and 74 tanks avail-able. By 14 July the returns were 78, 115, and 73 tanks. On 15 July, adecrease to 85, 99, and 77 was recorded. The last record, for 16 July,recorded 96, 103, and 96 tanks operational for the three divisions.The II SS Panzer Corps began the Battle of Kursk with 494 tanks; by12 July its strength had dropped by exactly 200.German air power amounted to one Luftwaffe Korps, VIII Flieger-korps. It had 966 aircraft on its order of battle on 5 July 1943. Attri-tion had been low over the previous week. Between 5–8 July, theGeneralquartiermeister der Luftwaffe reported the loss of only 41aircraft. Losses for the period 8–11 July are not clear, although it isknown that around 220 aircraft were lost altogether on the southernface of the Kursk bulge between 5–31 July.

SovietOn the Soviet side the main formation involved was the 5th GuardsTank Army. The total tank strength of the army stood at ca. 800–850tanks. Many of these, however, were the light T-70 tanks. The 5thGuards Tank Army had some 409 T-34, 188 T-70, 31 Churchill infan-try tanks, 48 self-propelled guns of the SU-122 and SU-76 type, and asmall but unknown number of heavy KV-1 tanks. Contrary to claims

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in some accounts of the battle, no SU-152 or SU-85 assault guns werefielded. According to Soviet sources these figures do not include the2nd Tank Corps, 2nd Guards Tank Corps, or the 1529th Self-pro-pelled gun Regiment.The Red Army fielded the Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Corps and Soviet29th Tank Corps, Soviet 18th Tank Corps in the first echelon. The So-viet 5th mechanised Corps and the already weakened Soviet 2ndTank Corps were kept in reserve. The 18th Tank Corps fielded 144tanks on the afternoon of 11 July, while the 29th Tank Corps fielded212 tanks and self-propelled guns.Together with the formations committed during the day, the totalnumber of Soviet tanks in the battle probably reached 500.The Soviet 1st Tank Army also attacked elements of the GermanXLVIII Panzer Corps, but this was not directly related to the tank bat-tle of Prokhorovka. Research reveals that 294 German and 616 Sovietarmoured fighting vehicles (AFV), up to a maximum of 429 Germanand 870 Soviet AFV took part in the battle of Prokhorovka. Soviet avi-ation amounted to a weak concentration of forces. The Red AirForce's 2nd Air Army, despite bitter losses in the past week, couldmuster 472 operational aircraft. Of this fleet, 266 were fighter air-craft, 160 Russian bombers and 90 Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmoviks. The17th Air Army was also committed. It had also suffered a high attri-tion rate but could field some 300 operational aircraft. Air power wasthus even, making it imperative that it be used wisely

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Order of Battle

German Army

Army Group Centre (Günther von Kluge)

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Army Group SouthErich von Manstein

Luftwaffe

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Soviet ArmyWestern FrontVasili Sokolovsky

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Bryansk Front (Markian Popov)

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Central FrontKonstantin Rokossovsky

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Voronezh FrontNikolai Vatutin

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Steppe FrontIvan Konev

German advance before ProkhorovkaAfter several delays in waiting for the new equipment to reach thefront, the German offensive was launched on 5 July 1943. Generalo-berst Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SSPanzer Corps, had fought through 10–15 miles of Soviet defenses con-sisting of high-density minefields, entrenched infantry, and anti-tankguns arranged in elaborate pakfront anti-tank zones. The attack pene-trated into the third defensive to a depth of 35 kilometers but wasstopped by the 1st Guards Tank Army on the third day of the offen-sive. II SS Panzer Corps managed to defeat the 1st and 2nd defensebelt on its first and second day of the offensive. The attack wasslowed down by contant Soviet armoured counterattacks and manyinfantry divisions brought up from the Reserve on the 3rd and next 7days. Between 5 and 11 July, the II SS Panzer Corps came close todriving a wedge between the 1st Guards Tank Army and Soviet 69thArmy. The battles had been difficult, but the Fourth Panzer Army hadmanaged to break through the main Soviet defence zones. The Ger-mans claimed 1,000 Soviet tanks destroyed since 5 July. The 48thPanzer Corps alone claimed to have eliminated 1,300 Soviet soldiersand to have taken 7,000 Soviet prisoners. The 48th claimed to havedestroyed or captured 170 Soviet tanks and 180 heavy mortars alongwith large amounts of Russian anti-tank and artillery guns.

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The II SS Panzer Corps broke through the third line of Soviet defen-ces at Prokhorovka. The Germans wrongly believed they had made abreakthrough and they prepared to exploit the opportunity the fol-lowing day. They thought they had defeated the last of the Soviet re-serve units, but unknown to the Germans, the Steppe Front underIvan Konev stood ready as a reserve to conduct a counter-offensive.Following the German success up to 11 July, and against Konev's pro-tests, Zhukov allowed the Stavka to release two Russian made ar-mies, the 5th Guards Tank Army under General Pavel Rotmistrov andthe 5th Guards Army from Steppe Front to meet the German threat.The 42nd Guards Rifle Division was committed immediately. Afterforced road marches, the Soviet forces reached Prokhorovka on thenight of 11 July. The Soviet Fronts were now ready to launch theircounter offensive.

German offensive plansThe German plan at Prokhorovka was to press on with the generalcampaign plan for Citadel by forcing the Soviet defences open in thesouth and link up with the northern pincer at Kursk. The attack coin-cided with an effort by the 48th Panzer Corps to thrust against thePsyol River to the south west. The station of Prokhorovka was the

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prime tactical target. The capture of the station, it was hoped, wouldenable a breakthrough by the Fourth Panzer Army in this sector. Thiswould allow the Wehrmacht to break into the operational and strate-gic depths of the Soviet rear and to complete the encirclement of theSoviet forces in and around Kursk.

Soviet counter offensive plansThe Kursk battle had reached its critical point on 11 and 12 July. Thepenetration by II SS Panzer Corps succeeded in reaching the Prokhor-ovka station and threatened to encircle the Soviet 1st Tank Army. Thestation lay in the heart of the Voronezh Front defences. On 11 July,Marshal Zhukov ordered a counter offensive of five Soviet armies, in-cluding two from the Steppe Front against the spearhead to begin on12 July. The Soviet armies, together with the 1st Tank Army underMajor-General Mikhail Katukov, were supposed to attack the Ger-man forces and cut off the penetration from the Russian river in Pro-chorovka, trapping and then destroying the advanced German forces.The attack by 5th Guards Tank Army was aimed at the II SS PanzerCorps, while the other three armies were attacking XLVIII PanzerCorps and LII Army Corps.The attack plan for 5th Guards Tank Army had major shortcomings,in that it neglected a proper artillery preparation, ordered the Soviettankers to use high speed to overcome the shortcomings in armourand weaponry of their tanks, and put the main attack into a sector inwhich an anti-tank ditch dug by Soviet troops protected the Germanforces to some degree. Moreover, most of the Soviet aviation was con-centrated on the northern flank of the southern sector, leaving theLuftwaffe in complete control of the skies over Prokhorovka. To com-plicate matters further, the Soviet air-to-ground communication sys-tem failed resulting in German aviation delivering heavy lossesagainst the Russians in the opening hours.

The battle

The morning battlesAt 06:50 hours on 12 July, the II SS Panzer Corps began their attack.Simultaneously, the Soviets initiated their opening offensive moves.Aircraft from both sides arrived over their respective support pointsand a huge aerial battle developed. The II SS reported "very strongenemy air activity [...] at 07:10».For the first time during the Kurskbattle, the Soviet Air Armies had flown more sorties than the Luft-waffe over the southern sector. The 17 and 2 Air Armies flew 893 sor-

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ties while the VIII Fliegerkorps flew some 654 missions. The Luft-waffe units were ordered by the commander of VIII. FliegerkorpsHans Seidemann to concentrate on covering the advance of the II SS.The attack by the 48th Panzer Corps further north was to be given on-ly sporadic support by Jagdgeschwader 3 and Jagdgeschwader 52.The air battle became critical to the success of the respective attacksof Soviet and German ground forces. Without proper defensive airsupport, and in the face of Soviet aerial assaults, the 48th PanzerCorps was forced onto the defensive. The 11th Panzer Division noted,"there was some German air activity but more Soviet, including somedive-bomber attacks".To increase the pressure, the 48th Panzer Corps was engaged by theSoviet 10th Tank Corps and the Soviet 1st Tank Army. However, theLuftwaffe also struck back with ground attack missions. Heinkel He111s inflicted heavy losses on Soviet 69th Army and the 5th GuardsTank Army. Such was the weakness of both sides' fighter forces thatno losses in this sector were reported on 12 July. One result of the in-activity of the Luftwaffe over the 48th Panzer Corps was that the Pan-zerkorps halted its offensive action. Without any supporting diver-sion attacks, the II SS launched its assault against the 5th GuardsTanks Army. Both the 5th Guards and the II SS had launched their of-fensives simultaneously. The German plan was for Totenkopf tolaunch an assault north of the Psel to extend the bridgehead that hadbeen gained there.The Das Reich and Leibstandarte SS divisions were not involved inthe assault, and had a defensive mission until Totenkopf reported asuccess.The Soviet attack started at 09:15. General-Leytenant Rotmistrovcommitted around 430 tanks and assault guns in a frontal attack,with another 70 following in a second wave. The attack was a disas-ter. The Luftwaffe responded quickly to air support requests andlarge formations of Junkers Ju 87 Stukas, bomb-carrying Focke-WulfFw 190s and Henschel Hs 129 tank busters equipped with BK 3737 mm Bordkanone appeared over the Soviet armoured formations.The Soviet tanks were caught out in the open. Supported by Germanartillery and German tank fire, the attack was defeated. The battle-field was covered in thick smoke from exploding Soviet tanks, makingit difficult for either side to see. Normally the 37 mm was not enoughto destroy a Soviet tank. But the Soviets, expecting light resistance atfirst, had left their metal fuel containers on their rear engine blocks.The Soviet 31st Tank brigade attached to the 29th Tank Corps re-ported, "We suffer heavy losses in tanks through enemy artillery and

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aircraft. At 10:30 hours our tanks reached the Komsomolets statefarm, but due to continuous air attacks, they were unable to advanceany further and shifted to the defence". In total the 5th Guards TankArmy, Soviet 18th Tank Corps, and the 29th Tank Corps lost some400 of their 800 tanks in the morning attack.One reason for the failure was the lack on the part of the Soviets of anefficient air-to-ground system. The Soviet air assault units could notreact quickly enough to sudden enemy movements. Moreover, the2nd and 17th Air Armies were concentrated over the 48th PanzerCorps giving the Luftwaffe unhindered access to the exposed Sovietarmour. The Soviet 31st Tank Corps commander reported, "Our ownair cover was fully absent until 13:00 hours". The 5th Guards TankArmy complained, "the enemy's aircraft literally hung above our com-bat formations throughout the entire battle, while our own aircraft,and particularly the fighter aviation, was totally insufficient".

Afternoon battlesThe reserves of 5th Guards Tank Army had to be sent south, to de-fend against a German attack by III Panzer Corps. With the loss ofthese reserves, any hope that may have been left of dealing a majordefeat through offensive action to the II SS Panzer Corps ended. ButGerman advances also failed. Despite appalling losses, the SovietTank Armies held the line and prevented the II SS from making abreakthrough. Most of the tank battles were fought in fairly closequarters as the Soviets learned from their defeat in the morning ac-tion. The losses in men were roughly 5,500 on the Soviet side and850 on the German. Tank losses are disputed, but around 300 Sovietand 70 to 80 German AFV were lost in the German offensive actions.

The outcomeWhile the exact losses on each side cannot be established precisely,the outcome is clearer. Neither the Fifth Guards Tank Army nor theII SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives that day. The sud-den and violent attack by strong Soviet reserves and the need tobreak off the assault by the German 9th Army on the northernshoulder of the Kursk salient due to Operation Kutuzov contributedto the decision of Adolf Hitler to discontinue the attack, the implica-tions of which made him 'sick to his stomach' when he considered it.A parallel attack by the Red Army against the new 6th Army on theMius river south of Kharkov necessitated the withdrawal of reserveforces held to exploit any success on the southern shoulder of Kursk,and the OKW also had to draw on some German troops from the

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Eastern Front to bolster the Mediterranean theater following the An-glo-American invasion of Sicily on the night of 9–10 July 1943. Re-gardless of the tactical outcome, the Battle of Prokhorovka wasturned into a critical propaganda and operational victory for the RedArmy. The Germans had first thought they were almost through thedefenses and were expecting nothing more than a few anti-tank guns;instead, they met over 800 tanks. Clearly the Soviets were not beaten,and this had a significant impact upon German decision making.

The German advantage in quality of officers and men was now erod-ing and the self-confident Soviets were ready to begin launching larg-er offensives and driving the German forces back towards Germany.From this point forward, the strategic initiative would remain withthe Red Army.

The end of Zitadelle in the southWhile the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 Ju-ly, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, evenafter 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted andheavily depleted, had breached the first two defensive belts and be-lieved that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact atleast five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not

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as strong as the initial belts, and some of them did not have troopsdeployed. Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major partsof their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available un-committed Red Army reserves were far larger than the few availableGerman reserves.On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely de-pleted, the Germans then had to face Operation Polkovodets Ru-myantsev, an offensive launched to smash the German forces in theBelgorod–Kharkov area which was launched on 3 August. Belgorodfell on 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resist-ance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Sovietsconsidered the Battle of Kursk over.

Southern analysisThe German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attackfrontage width and penetration depth tended to drop as the attackproceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. A30-kilometer-wide (19 mi) attack frontage on 5 July became 20 kmwide by 7 July and 15 km by 9 July. Likewise, the depth of penetra-tion dropped from 9 km on 5 July to 5 km on 8 July and 2–3 km eachday thereafter until the attack was cancelled. Red Army minefieldsand artillery were successful in delaying the German attack and in-flicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Ger-mans allowed their own reserves to be brought up into threatenedsectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the opera-tions by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at nightimmediately in front of the expected German attack areas. Therewere no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artil-lery, indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Di-vision, which began the operation with 118 tanks. On 10 July, afterfive days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers,and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corpsreported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair,out of the 200 it started with on 5 July.

Hitler cancels the operationOn the night of 9–10 July, the Western Allies mounted an amphibi-ous invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned Günthervon Kluge and Erich von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquartersin East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call offOperation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, argu-

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ing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory: "on no account shouldwe let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had com-mitted were decisively beaten". In an unusual reversal of their roles,Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive,but on 16 July, he ordered a withdrawal and canceled the operation.He then ordered the entire SS Panzer Corps to be transferred to Italy.Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tacticalbattle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in theirmemoirs, and by some historians. For example, it has been pointedout that the SS Panzer Corps would have taken three months to betransferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected theoutcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vi-tal.Only one German division, the 1st SS Panzer Division LeibstandarteAdolf Hitler, departed for Italy, without their equipment. The remain-der stayed to face the Red Army counteroffensive launched in thewake of the failed German offensive.

Großdeutschland Tigers after "Zitadelle"

1. Introduction:After Operation "Zitadelle" (the Battle of Kursk) failed to achieve itsobjectives, the Russians launched a major offensive against the weak-ened Germans forces in both Heeresgruppe Mitte and Süd. ThePanzertruppen were forced onto the defense and with rare excep-tions had no choice but to continuously react to their opponentsmoves. The Panzer forces, which had already become very proficientin the counterattack tactics, now had to fight against overwhelmingodds. No new tactics are revealed in the following reports, just therealization by most of the Tiger-Abteilungen commanders that inorder to survive, Tigers had to fight in the same way of the other,lighter Panzers. In many cases the commanders of the units to whichthe Tiger-Abteilungen were attached did not even grasped themost fundamental concepts of the Tiger's capabilities or the basicprinciples of tank tactics. Not only did the Tiger-Abteilungen haveto fight against overwhelming odds, they were frequently handi-capped by the incompetence of their own higher commanders.

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Fig The Tiger tactical number B01 of th 10th company of theIII Abteilung of the "Großdeutschland" Division passes infront of some divisional vehicles.Additional units with Tigers sent to the East Front in the latter half of1943 included the 3.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung505, the Stab.2, and 3.Kompanie/schwere Panzer Abteilung502, the Stab.10 and 11.Kompanien/III.(Tiger) Abtei-lung/Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 509, the 1. and2.Kompanien/schwere Panzer Abteilung 101/SS-Panzer-Grenadier Division "LSSAH" and schwere Panzer-Abteilung501 .of the 11th company of the III Abteilung of the Großdeutsch-land Panzer Grenadier Division during August and September1943 in the region of Achtyrka-Kharkov-Poltava. Großdeutschland Ti-gers covered the German retreat towards the new lines for the de-fense on the Dniepr. This Tiger is completely camouflaged and withspare track links on the front plate.2. Großdeutschland Tigers In Action: After "Zitadelle".The third (heavy) Abteilung of the Panzer-Regiment Groß-deutschland was formed on 1 July 1943. Tigers from the 3.Kompa-nie/schwere Panzer Abteilung 501 (10 Tigers), and from3./schwere Panzer Abteilung 504 (11 Tigers) were transferred,to form the new schwere Abteilung.

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Fig Above: Tiger I (tactical number B12)In mid-August, the Stab, 10. and 11.Kompanie of the III.(Tiger)Abteilung /Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland joined the di-vision at the front. On 31 August 1943, Major Gomille, commander ofthe III.(Tiger) Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment Großdeutsch-land , wrote the following report on how they were greatly hamperedby not having their Werkstatt-Kompanie and other necessaryservices: 14 August 1943 - Abteilung command post in the forest2 kilometers southeast of Jassenowole.About midday, the columns from the last transport arrived at thecommand post. The trains were unloaded at Nisch.Ssirowatka, caus-ing a road march of 110 kilometers. The general condition of the Ab-teilung was:Stab : 3 Tiger-Befehlswagen7 S.P.W. of the Aufklaerungs-Zug without weapons10.Kp. : Complete (except for one Tiger still in Germany)11.Kp. : 4 Tigers and most of the equipment for the maintenancegroup burned out during transport.9.Kp. : Not a single operational Tiger (this was formerly the13.Kp/Pz.Rgt.G.D. ).Missing: The entire Stabs-Kompanie and Werkstatt-Kompanie(minus one Zug ), and all the vehicles for the Stab .Three Tiger-Befehlswagen and 13 Tigers from the 10. and11.Kompanien were operational on the evening of 14 August 1943.Ten Tigers had fallen out due to major and minor mechanical prob-

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lems during the march from Nisch Ssirowatka to the Abteilung com-mand post. The first major effects were already appearing that werecaused by the Abteilung having to go into action without any sup-ply, repair services, Bergezug (recovery platoon) and repair parts.The lack of any services necessary for maintaining a Panzer unit be-came increasing critical during the following days in action.Orders came in from the Regiment at 12:00 hours for the Abtei-lung to be prepared for action by 03:00 hours the next day. Theywere to go into action toward Belsk (30 kilometers southwest of Akh-tyrka), where the Russians had already crossed the Vorskla with theirforces. It was thought that the enemy would reinforce this bridgeheadwith stronger forces and advance toward the north in order to envel-op our own bridgehead at Akhtyrka from the west.Leutnant Jantzke (leader of the Abteilung Aufklaerungs-Zug )was sent out on a scouting patrol to determine the condition of theroads and bridges as well as the terrain in the entire sector up toBelsk. About 18:30 hours, the Abteilung moved out of the assemblyarea toward the southwest with an assignment that Grun was to beheld, no matter what. However, the enemy had already taken Grunand had sent out his reconnaissance patrols further to war the north.By nightfall, the Abteilung had arrived at Persche Trawnja (5 kilo-meters northwest of Grun), where the Abteilung and other elementsof the division prepared to attack the next day.15 August 1943 - At 04:00 hours, commander conference at thesouthwest exit from Jassennowoje. The operations officer of the divi-sion, Oberst von Natzmer, commanded a Kampfgruppe consisting ofPanzer-Regiment Großdeutschland ( Tiger Abteilung, I.Ab-teilung, and a Panther-Kompanie ), Aufklaerungs-Abteilung(mot) , and II.Sf./Artillerie-Regiment Großdeutschland ,which was ordered to advance through Grun and Budy to Belsk anddestroy the enemy that had broken through the front.At 06:30 hours, the Kampfgruppe set off in the following forma-tion: Tiger-Abteilung in the lead, followed by the I.Abteilung andPanther-Kompanie , which were to provide flank protection forthe leading Tiger-Abteilung . The Panzer-Regiment was es-corted by the Sf.Artillerie- Abteilung .The Abteilung advanced toward Grun along both sides of the road.About 1 kilometer north of Grun, the Abteilung came under heavyanti-tank gunfire from the ridge line east of the north edge of the vil-lage, the first Tiger ran onto mines which caused only light damage.The Abteilung t hen received an order to attack along the edge ofthe village of Grun. The Abteilung turned to the left and gained the

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ridge line. From here two deep ravines, very difficult to negotiate andrunning across the direction of attack, had to be crossed. For this pur-pose, the main body of the 10.Kompanie was assigned to providecovering fire while the 11.Kompanie immediately continued to at-tack. When crossing both ravines, the Abteilung was subjected toraging fire out of the right flank from the edge of the village from nu-merous, excellently camouflaged heavy anti-tank guns and several as-sault guns on T-34 chassis. This enemy force wasn't completely si-lenced until after a lengthily firefight.Hauptmann von Villebois, commander of the 10.Kompanie , wasseverely wounded during this action. His Tiger was hit eight times by12.2 cm shells from the assault guns on T-34 chassis. One hit pene-trated the hull side. the turret was hit six times, three of which causedonly small dents, while two hits caused fractures and small pieces tobreak off. The sixth hit broke out a large piece (about two handwidths) from the turret armor that flew into the fighting compart-ment. The entire electrical firing circuit for the main gun wasknocked out by the hits and several vision blocks were destroyed orbroke out of the weak holders. The weld seam on the hull was sprungopen for about 50 cm from the location of the penetration, so that itwasn't possible for the Werkstatt to repair it.

Fig Tiger tactical number A02, 9th company, III Abteilung,Panzer-Grenadier Division Großdeutschland, 1943.After reaching the cemetery, the Abteilung turned toward the rightand entered the village, destroyed two assault guns on T-34 chassis ina short fight, and advanced up to the south edge of Grun without en-countering any enemy resistance worth mentioning.Now the Abteilung still had six operational Tigers, of which twowere Befehlswagen . Five Tigers had fallen out due to damagecaused by hits, one Tiger from mines, and the rest from mechanical

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failure. Driving in the lead, the Abteilung continued the attack to-ward the southwest, turned at the road from Grun to Budy, and con-tinued to advance with the right wing along the road.The north edge of Budy was stubbornly defended by Russian anti-tank and anti- aircraft guns. The enemy was destroyed without a sin-gle loss. After filling up with ammunition and fuel, about 19:00 hoursthe Abteilung started off again toward Belsk, driving in the leadwith the last three Tigers that were still combat operational. The mid-dle of Belsk was reached at about 01:00 hours after, additional anti-tank guns were destroyed and a mine barrier cleared without any fur-ther losses. The Panzer attacks had been excellently supported by theII.(Sf.)/Artillerie-Regiment Großdeutschland .Personnel Losses: One man killed, one officer severely wounded, andthree officers and three men lightly wounded.Equipment Losses: Six Tigers damaged by enemy action (five by hitsand one by mines). Seven Tigers fell out due to mechanical failures(engine, transmission, and gun).Results: 21 anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and artillery pieces;eight tanks and assault guns; and one armored car destroyer.16 August 1943 - March from Belsk through Grun to the forest 2kilometers southwest of Akhtyrka. Five operational Tigers.17 August 1943 - 10 operational Tigers.18 August 1943 - The division was supposed to advance from Akh-tyrka toward the southwest through Kaplunowka and Parchomokowain order to gain contact with the SS units advancing south of the Mer-la. Elements of the 10.Panzer-Grenadier-Division on the rightand elements of the 7.Panzer-Division o n the left provided flankprotection for Großdeutschland . On the previous day, the Abtei-lung commander had previously scouted the assembly area and theterrain over which the attack was to occur. The terrain was very suit-able for a Panzer attack due to very rolling hills.FKL-Kompanie 311 , attached to the Abteilung , was sent by thedivision to another location to provide security. Mines were not ex-pected in the first sector to be attacked, because on the previous daysthe enemy had continuously pulled in new forces and had attackedwith tanks and infantry almost without interruption.For this attack, the I.(SPW) Battalion/Panzer-Grenadier-Regi-ment Großdeutschland and the II.(Sf.)/Artillerie-RegimentGroßdeutschland were attached to the Panzer-Regiment (Ti-ger-Abteilung, I.Abteilung, 2.Panther-Kompanie ). The Ti-ger-Abteilung had orders to drive in the front on a wide front alongthe right side of the road from Akthyrka to Michailowka to break

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through the first Russian position and gain the important heights byPoint 171.1 (3 kilometers northeast of Michailowka) as quickly as pos-sible. The I.Abteilung was assigned the task of screening the rightand left flanks of the Tiger-Abteilung , while the Panthers had or-ders to provide covering fire for the Tigers from favorable firing posi-tions overlooking the rolling terrain.In order to deceive the enemy about our intentions, about 08:00hours, after a short barrage from the artillery, the Fuesillier-Regi-ment Großdeutschland attacked the enemy-occupied village ofBoich-Osero. About 08:30 hours, the Panzer-Regiment startedtheir own attack. After leaving the city of Akthyrka, the Abteilungreceived anti-tank fire from the west and southwest edge of Boich-Osero. While going into firing positions, eight Tigers hit mines simul-taneously. These were all German wooden box mines under whichthe enemy had sometimes laid one or two heavy shells (apparently 21cm) to increase the explosive effect. The minefield was so thick thatmost of the Panzers hit three or four mines at the same time. Whilethe simple wooden box mines caused only superficial damage, themines coupled with shells resulted in heavy damage. Five Tigers werelightly damaged, while three Tigers were immobilized with majordamage to the tracks and suspension. The Abteilung did not get intofurther action on this day because of the mine damage.Personnel Losses: One man wounded (bomb fragment).Equipment Losses: Eight Tigers on mines.Results: Five anti-tank guns destroyed.Four Tigers were operational in the evening.19 August 1943 - The four operational Tigers of the Abteilung ,under the command of Oberleutnant Arnold, joined up with the Reg-iment . These four Tigers were employed at the left front of the for-mation during the attack on Parchornowka. In this battle against astrong Russian anti-tank front, one Tiger was knocked out by a hitfrom an assault gun on a T-34 chassis. The round clearly penetratedthe left side of the superstructure by the driver. After this strong anti-tank gun position was destroyed, the attack advanced toward Parch-ornowka, where the enemy quite stubbornly defended the edge of thevillage with anti-tank guns and T-34 and KV-1 tanks.Personnel Losses: Three men dead, one wounded.Equipment Losses: One Tiger heavily damaged (superstructure sidepenetrated), the guns on two Tigers damaged.Results: 12 tanks, 12 heavy anti-tank guns, and six light anti-tankguns destroyed.Five Tigers were operational in the evening.

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20 August 1943 - During late afternoon, the unit moved south andgained contact with SS-Division Totenkopf . Five enemy tankswere knocked out by the two remaining operational Tigers. Three Ti-gers had suffered mechanical breakdowns; two of them had problemswith their transmissions and electrical generators.22 August 1943 - During a localized counterattack, directly North-west of Parchornowka, one Tiger was sent in and destroyed six heavyanti-tank guns and numerous anti-tank rifles.23 August 1943 - On this day, the Abteilung commander tookover the Panzergruppe (two Tigers, nine Panthers, three PzKpfwIV lang, three PzKpfw IV kurz, three PzKpfw III lang, three Flamm-panzer, and one PzBefWg.). In the sector of the Grenadier Regi-ment , east and northeast of Michailowka (12 kilometers of South-west of Akthyrka). This was almost all of the operational Panzers inthe Regiment . Operations were restricted to repulsing several ene-my tank attacks.Equipment Losses: One Tiger hit on the gun.Results: 25 tanks and 7 guns destroyed.24 August 1943 - During the night of 24/25 August, the divisionmoved to to the west and southwest and prepared to defend an areain the general line about 2 to 3 kilometers west of the Parchornowkato Bugrowatij road. At the same time, all the operational Panzersfrom the Regiment arrived under the command of Major Gomille.While one group of Panzers was positioned in an especially threat-ened sector of the Fuesilier and Grenadier-Regiments , the Ab-teilung commander held back all of the rest of the Panzers near hiscommand post, ready to attack at any time. During the afternoon, onorders from the division, any Panzers that were not fully operationalhad to be sent to Kotelwa in order to ensure that all Panzers could bepulled back behind the new main defense line during the maneuversplanned for that evening to break off contact with the enemy.Only two Tigers and five Panthers were left with the Abteilungcommander. About 17:00 hours, the enemy started to attack ourweak lines with several tanks and very strong infantry. While the ene-my penetration into the Grenadier-Regiment was brought to ahalt by an immediate counter attack in which four enemy tanks wereknocked out, the enemy broke through the 7.Panzer-Division tothe left of Großdeutschland . However, no enemy tanks were lo-cated there when our own Panzers attacked to relieve the left-handneighbor.About 23:00 hours, the maneuvers to break contact were initiated.Only two Tigers were still operational, the rest having fallen out from

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hits or mechanical breakdown. With the aid of these two Tigers, afterintensive effort lasting until dawn, the other damaged Panzers wereable to be towed behind the new main defense line by Kotelwa.26 August 1943 - After giving up the five Panthers, the Abteilungcommander on the morning of 26 August remained in possession ofonly two conditionally operational Tigers, which had arrived in thenew bivouac area for the Regiment at Budischtscha at about 11:00hours. About 1300 hours, both of these Tigers had to be sent farthertoward Kotelwa because the enemy had broken through directly eastof Kotelwa with tanks and infantry. One of the Tigers broke downfrom engine and transmission failure in Kotelwa. After knocking outtwo T-34 tanks, the other Tiger was hit in the suspension, sight, andgun by 7.62 cm rounds so that it was no longer combat operational.Both Tigers were recovered.9 September 1943 - 2 Tigers are lost in action.27 September 1943 - Withdrawal across the Dniepr near Kremen-chug.29 September 1943 - 4 Tigers are lost in action.9 October 1943 - 5 Tigers are lost in action.18 October 1943 - 13 Tigers are lost, and 10 Tigers (ex-Pz.Lehr)that were to be delivered to III.Abt.Pz.Rgt.Großdeutschland arecaptured by the Russians while being transported by train.20 October 1943 - 7 Tigers are lost in action, 23 Tigers on hand,taking part on the action near Krivoi Rog.23 October 1943 - 6 Tigers are lost in action.8 - 15 November 1943 - 3 Tigers are lost in action.16 November 1943 - 1 Tiger is lost in action, 13 operational.21 December 1943 - 7 Tigers operational, combat in the vicinity ofKirovograd.6 March 1944 - 6 Tigers delivered, 19 operational.8 March 1944 - 1 Tiger lost in action.10 March 1944 - 3 Tigers destroyed by crew, to avoid falling intoenemy's hands.21 March 1944 - 1 more Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew, as above.By the end of March 1944 - Transferred to Chisinau area.20 April 1944 - 6 Tigers delivered, 20 operational.6 May 44 - 8 Tigers delivered, 4 transferred to 3.SS.Panzerdivi-sion Totenkopf, 24 operational.18 May 1944 - 6 Tigers delivered, 2 transferred to 3.SS.Panzerdi-vision Totenkopf, 28 operational.1 June 1944 - 2 Tigers are lost in action - aerial attack - 6 Tigers de-livered, 19 out of 34 operational.

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10 June-26 July 1944 - Rest and Refit near Bacau.5 August 1944 - Arrival in Gumbinnen area. Immediately sent tocombat.6 August 1944 - 4 Tigers put out of action by JS-2 Stalin heavytanks.9 - 23 August 1944 - 6 Tigers lost in action, 12 Tigers delivered.September 1944 - 7 Tigers are lost in action.1 October 1944 - 11 out of 33 Tigers operational.9 October 1944 - 8 Tigers are lost in action, 7 either destroyed bycrew or by aerial attacks.Late October 1944 - 10 Tigers written off, either lost in action ordestroyed by crew.1 November 1944 - 8 of 15 Tigers operational, unit refitting duringNovember-December 1944.13 December 1944 - The unit is designated as schwere Panzer-Abteilung Großdeutschland.16 December 1944 - 4 Tigers delivered, 2 transferred to s.Pz.Abt.502. Operational: 17 Tigers.January 1945 - 6 Tigers lost in action.1 February 1945 - 4 out of 11 Tigers operational. Incorporated intothe division'sKampfgruppe.19 March 1945 - The remaining Tigers of schwere Panzer-Abtei-lung Großdeutschland make their last stand, defending the Balgapocket in East Prussia.Tiger I, sPzAbt.505, Russia, February, 1944.In addition to sending new units to the East Front, both the schwerePanzer-Abteilung 503 and 506 were issued new Tiger I and refur-bished in rest areas behind the front in early 1944. Schwere Pan-zer-Abteilung 503 , decimated in March and April, was sent backto Germany and then employed on the invasion Front. The schwerePanzer-Abteilung 507 in March and schwere Panzer-Abtei-lung 510 in July were the two last units to be completely outfittedwith the Tiger I and sent to the East Front.

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Fig PzKpfw VI Tiger I E versus JS-2 "Stalin" Heavy RussianTankThe September 1944 issue of the Nachrichtenblatt der Panzer-truppen included a report from a Tiger-Kompanie that hadknocked out numerous Josef Stalin tanks in a short period: The Ti-ger Kompanie was ordered to throw out the enemy who penetratedinto a wood, and then continue to advance. About 12:15 hours, togeth-er with an Infanterie-Batallion the Tiger Kompanie started toattack. The thick forest caused extremely poor visibility (50 meters),and a narrow trail forced the Tiger-Kompanie to advance in a sin-gle row. The Russian infantry fled their positions as soon as the Ti-gers appeared. The anti-tank guns, which were pulled forward intoposition by the enemy within three-quarters of an hour after enteringthe woods, were quickly destroyed in spite of the difficulty of seeingthe targets. Some of the anti-tank guns were destroyed by hits andsome were rolled over. Numerous undamaged anti-tank guns fell intoour hands.After the lead Zug of the Tiger Kompanie advanced 2 kilometersthrough the forest, the Zug leader suddenly noticed knocked-downtrees and saw a large muzzle-break (Josef Stalin) directly in front ofhim. He immediately gave the fire command: " Panzergranate! Cu-pola sight! Fire!" At the same time he was hit twice by 4.5 cm anti-tank gun shells that robbed him of his sight. In the interim, a secondTiger of the Zug driving through the woods pulled up on line with theZug leader's Tiger. In spite of poor visibility, the Zug leader startedthe firefight at a range of 35 meters. In response, the Josef Stalin tankpulled back behind a small hill. In the meantime, the second Tigerhad taken the lead and fired three shot at the enemy tank. When theround was fired, the Tiger itself was hit by a 12.2 cm shell on the front

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below the radio operator's section. Apparently this armor-piercingshell didn't penetrate through because the Tiger was standing at anangle from the target. The enemy tank was knocked out of action by ashot which penetrated the gun. A second Josef Stalin tank attemptedto cover the first as it pulled back. During a short firefight, one ofthese two Tigers hit the second tank under the gun. This round pene-trated, immediately setting the enemy tank on fire. The rate of fire ofthe Josef Stalin tanks was comparatively slow.

Fig The Josef Stalin 2 heavy tank - heavy inclined armorplus a 122 mm D-25T gun.The Kompanie commander made the following observations thatwere derived from their experience in fighting Josef Stalin tanks:When a Tiger appears, most Josef Stalin tanks turn away and attemptto1. avoid a firefight.2. In many cases, the Josef Stalin tanks let themselves engage in afirefight only at long range (over 2000 meters) and also only whenthey themselves are in favorable positions on the edge of of a wood,village, or ridgeline. The enemy crews lean toward evacuating theirtank immediately after the first shot 3. is fired at them.In all cases the Russian strived to prevent a Josef Stalin tank fromfalling into our hands and with all means available attempted to towthe tank away or to blow it up.4. The Josef Stalin can also be knocked out, even if a penetration ofthe frontal armor can't be achieved at long range. (A different Tiger-Abteilung reported that the front of a Josef Stalin tank can be pene-trated by a Tiger only at ranges less than 500 meters.)5. An attempt should be made to gain the flank or the rear of the Jo-sef Stalin tank and destroy it with concentrated fire.6. In addition, a firefight with Josef Stalin tanks should not be under-taken in less than Zug strength. Employment of single Tigers meanstheir loss.

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7. It has been proven to be useful, after the first hits are registered, toblind the Josef Stalin by firing Sprenggranaten (high explosiveshells).8. Remarks by the Generalinpekteur der Panzertruppen:1. These experiences are in accordance with those of other Tiger unitsand are correct.In regard to point 4 - It would be desirable for the opponent to haveobserved the same attempt by all of our Tiger crews. " An undes-troyed Tiger may never fall into enemy hands!" This principle mustbe achieved by every crew member by exemplary operational readi-ness.2. With regard to points 5 and 6 - At a time when there are 12.2 cmtank guns and 5.7 cm anti-tank guns on the Eastern Front, just like9.2 anti-tank/anti-aircraft guns on the Western Front and in Italy,the Tiger can no longer disregard the tactical principles that apply tothe other types of Panzers. Also, just like other Panzers, a few Tigerscan't drive up on a ridgeline to observe the terrain. In just such a sit-uation, three Tigers received direct hits and were destroyed by 12.2cm shells, resulting in all but two of the crew members being killed.The principles of Panzer tactics - that Panzers should only cross aridgeline together, rapidly (leaf-frogging by bounds) and under cover-ing fire, or else the Panzers must drive around the height - were defi-nitely not unknown in this Tiger-Abteilung . Statements like "thickfur", "impregnable", and the "security" of the crews of the Tigers,which have become established phrases by other units and also parti-ally within the Panzertruppe , must be wiped out and debunked.Instead, it is especially important for Tiger units to pay direct atten-tion to the general combat principles applicable for tank-versus-tankcombat.3. In regard to Point 7 - This statement is correct; however, three Ti-gers should not flee from five Josef Stalin tanks only because theycan't start the firefight at full Zug strength. Cases will also occurwhich an entire Zug isn't always available. Many times tank-versus-tank combat will be decided, not by the number of tanks, but muchmore by superior tactics.4. In regard to Point 8 - In connection with this it may be stated thatthe Josef Stalin tanks not only can be penetrated from the flanks andrear by Tigers and Panthers but also by the Pz.Kpfw.IV and theSturmgeschütze .5. For those interested in knowing the Russian side of the Tiger I ver-sus JS-2 controversy, pay a visit to the Russian Battlefield web-site, and search for the IS-2 in Comparison with Its German

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Counterparts page.

The Waffen S.S at the Battle of Kursk

Prior to beginning a study of the Waffen SS, and its impact at the Bat-tle of Kursk, it is necessary to have an understanding of what the Waf-fen SS really was.Of all the German organizations during WWII, the SS is by far themost infamous, and the least understood amongst average historians.The SS was in fact not a monolithic "Black Corps" ofgoose steppingGestapo men, as is often depicted in popular media and in manythird rate historical works. The SS was in reality a complex politicaland military organization made up of three separate and distinctbranches, all related but equally unique in their functions and goals.The Allgemeine SS (General SS) was the main branch of this over-whelmingly complex organization, and it served a political and ad-ministrative role. The SS-Totenkopfverbande (SS Deaths Head Or-ganization) and later, the Waffen SS (Armed SS), were the other twobranches that made up the structure of the SS. The Waffen SS,formed in 1940, was the true military formation ofthe larger SS, andas such, it is the main focus ofthis paper. Formed from the SS-Ver-fungstruppe after the Campaign in France in 1940, the Waffen SSwould become an elite military formation of nearly 900,000 men bythe time World War II was over. Its units would spearhead someofthe most crucial battles ofthe war, while its men would shouldersome ofthe most difficult and daunting combat operations ofall oftheunits in the German military. The Waffen SS is sometimes thought ofas the fourth branch ofthe German Wehrmacht (Heer, Luftwaffe,Kriegsmarine) as in the field it came under the direct tactical controlof the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or High Command),although this notion is technically incorrect as strategic control re-mained within the hands of the SS. To this day the actions ofthe Waf-fen SS and its former members are vilified for ultimately being a partofthe larger structure ofthe political Allgemeine SS, regardless ofthefact that the Waffen SS was a front line combat organization.The Waffen SS itself was something unusually special. It had startedout as a small-sized personal bodyguard for Adolf Hitler, but gradu-ally expanded into a full-scale military force under the guidance ofanumber of disgruntled former Army officers who saw the Waffen SSas a chance to break out from the conservative mold that the GermanArmy had become mired in. The Waffen SS was designed from thestart to be a highly mobile assault force whose soldiers were wellversed in the art ofhandling modem, close-combat weapons. The

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training regimen therefore resembled that given to special comman-dos in other countries, but it pre-dated u.s. and British commandotraining by nearly a decade.Waffen SS recruitment standards went through several stages duringthe course of the war. Designed at first to be an elite formation of Ger-mans, it grew to be so large through attrition, and the demands for re-placements, that it inevitably abandoned all but its most basic re-quirements, and opened its ranks to anyone, regardless of race, eth-nicity, or nationality. In the beginning, recruitment standards forWaffen SS soldiers were very stringent. Potential recruits were ex-pected to be between the ages ofseventeen and twenty-two, and aminimum ofsixty-nine inches tall. They also could not have a crimi-nal record of any kind. Enlisted men were required to have a pure"Aryan" genealogy dating back to the year 1800; an officer's geneal-ogy had to be pur.e dating back to the year 1750.The requirements were in fact so stringent that only fifteen out-ofevery one hundred applicants were accepted. It is also worth stress-ing that the stringent selection process that was maintained in theelite divisions during the early part of the war meant that men whocould have served as NCOs and junior officers in other units, servedas Privates in the best SS units.The young men who joined the SS were trained like no other army inthe world. Military and academic instruction was intensive, but it wasthe physical training that was the most rigorous. They excelled atsports, and each ofthem would have performed with distinction at theOlympic Games. The extraordinary physical endurance ofthe SS onthe Russian front was due to this intensive training. It was on thefront lines that the results ofthe SS physical training could really benoticed. An SS officer or NCO had the same rigorous training as thesoldiers. The officers, NCOs, and privates competed in the samesports events, and only the best man won, regardless ofrank, creatingan atmosphere that sponsored team work, mutual respect, and reli-ance. This created a real brotherhood which literally energized the en-tire Waffen SS. In one field, that ofinternal personnel organization,the Waffen-SS has yet to be imitated much less surpassed.The Waffen-SS was probably the most "democratic" armed force inmodem times. Rigid formality and class structure between officersand other ranks was strictly forbidden. An officer held down his posi-tion only because he had proven himself a better soldier than hismen, not because ofany rank in society, family connections or superi-or academic education. There was also the ideological training. Theywere taught why they were fighting, and saw the kind of Germany

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that was being resurrected before their very eyes. They were shownhow Germany was being morally united through class reconciliationand physically united through the return oflost German homelands.They were made aware oftheir kinship with all ofthe other Germansliving in foreign lands, such as Poland, Russia, the Sudentenland, andother parts of Europe. They were taught that all Germans representedan ethnic unity. Young SS men were educated in two military aca-demies, one in Bad Tolz, the other in Braunschweig. These academieswere totally different from the grim barracks of the past. Combiningaesthetics with the latest technology, they were located in the middleof hundreds of acres of beautiful country. The SS had proved them-selves in action. They were not empty talking politicians, but theygave their lives, the first to go and fight in an extraordinary spurt ofcomradeship. This comradeship was one ofthe most distinctive char-acteristics ofthe SS: the SS leader was the comrade ofthe others. Therelationship ofequality and mutual respect between soldiers, NCOs,and officers was always present. SS officers and NCOs always ledtheir troops into battle, and were the first to meet the enemy. Halfo-fall ofthe SS divisional commanders were killed in action. There isnot another army in the world where this happened. SS soldiers werenot sent to slaughter by behind-the-line leaders, they followed theirleaders with passionate loyalty. Every SS commander knew andtaught all his men, and could expect the loyalty oftheir men by theirexample. The life expectancy of an SS officer at the front was threemonths; an NCO was only expected to survive 9 weeks.Waffen SS basic training lasted three weeks. The focus, aside fromthe physical training already mentioned, was character training, andweapons training. From the outset the system promoted combattraining and maneuvers at the expense oftraditional drill. The focuswas on battlefield tactics and independently thinking officers andNCOs. An SS recruit might be told to dig himself into the groundknowing that within a prescribed time, tanks would drive over hishead, whether the hole was completed or not.A new fonn of soldiering emerged. Waffen SS troops could coverthree kilometers in full field dress in twenty minutes; such a thingwas unheard ofin the Anny. The Waffen SS believed in stressing ag-gressiveness, initiative, and self-reliance. These were achieved byrealistic live firing exercises, rigid discipline, and obedience. As a re-sult, the premier Waffen SS Divisions had superior marksmanshipskills, and was very proficient at night maneuvers and camouflagetechniques. The Waffen SS was always open to new ideas and innova-tions in tenns oftraining; the Panzer crews ofthe 12th SS Panzer Divi-

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sion were required as part oftheir training to spend a week workingon the assembly line at the MAN tank factory in Nuremburg. As thewar progressed, lessons learned on the field of battle were quicklyadopted in the training establishments. This was often to teach theproblems encountered in various terrains and climates, and techni-ques to overcome these obstacles, and ultimately saved many lives.The SS soldiers were held to higher standards and were subjected tothe strictest discipline. Sentences handed down by SS courts weremore severe than sentences passed by other courts for the same of-fense. There also was a camaraderie fostered by infonnal relation-ships between the officers, NCOs, and men, in contrast to the stiff dis-cipline prevalent in the regular Gennan anny and the Allied forces.Officers and men addressed each other as "Kamerad" when off duty.An example ofdiscipline in the Waffen SS was the standing rule thatlocks were forbidden on lockers; such was the emphasis on trust andloyalty. Obedience was unconditional. This helps explain the remark-able ability of the Liebstandarte (LSSAH) and Hitlerjugend (HJ) divi-sions to quickly incorporate and indoctrinate raw replacements.It did not take long for the initial resentment ofthe Waffen SS by theAnny to grow to admiration, and from late 1941, the Anny often be-came dependent on them. The Waffen SS came to be known as the"Fuhrer's Fire Brigade", always being sent into difficult and even im-possible situations to bolster or rescue regular Anny units, often atgreat costs in both men and equipment to them. The Waffen SS wereoften kept at the front for prolonged periods oftime without rest or re-fit because their qualities were so often needed and depended upon itwas feared that whole fronts might collapse. As General Eberhardvon Mackensen wrote: " Every division wishes it had the Leibstan-darte as its neighbor, as much during the attack as the defense. Its in-ner discipline, its cool dare deviltry, its cheerful enterprise, its un-shakeable firmness in a crisis ... its exemplary toughness, its camar-aderie (which deserves special praise), all these are outstanding andcannot be surpassed". In July 1941 the LSSAH took part in the inva-sion ofRussia and it was during this campaign that the Waffen SS,and in particular the LSSAH earned their reputation for their ferocityduring battle. The eagerness ofthe Waffen SS for combat coupledwith their fanaticism bordered on the reckless and during the open-ing stages of World War II, many ofthem were killed in action.The weapon used by the Waffen SS at the Battle ofKursk that I will fo-cus on in this paper is the Panzerkampfwagen VI, or "Tiger". It isprobably the most famous and feared Gennan tank ofthe war, andrightfully so. The Tiger was manned by a crew of five, three ofwhom

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manned the turret and main gun. The first ofthese was theCommander, typically an NCO, the most important member ofthecrew. His central role involved the sighting oftargets, and directingother members ofthe crew from his rotating cupola situated at the leftrear ofthe turret. The commander's role called for high levels of con-centration and coordination, attributes that were especially criticalduring close-quarter combat. The second crewman, located inside thecramped turret below, and in front ofthe commander was the gunner.His primary tasks were traversal ofthe turret, the sighting oftargets,and the firing ofthe 88mm Ll56 Kwk main gun. The third memberofthe crew, located on the right hand side ofthe turret was the loader,who was responsible for the loading ofthe appropriate type ofammu-nition as specified by the gunner into the breech ofthe main gun. Thefourth position was that ofthe driver, who was seated in the frontofthe hull on the left hand side. It was the driver's sole responsibilityto maneuver the vehicle safely and coordinate effectively with thecommander. In more experienced crews, the driver more often thannot assisted the gunner in locking onto targets by turning towards theenemy, a technique which compensated for the slow rate ofturret tra-verse in the Tiger. The fifth and final crewmember was the bow ma-chine gunner/radio operator, who was seated at the front of the hullto the right ofthe driver. As the title suggests, this man was responsi-ble for maintaining radio contact with other tanks in the platoon, andfor manning the MG34 machine gun mounted in the front plate ofthehull.The battlefield strengths ofthe Tiger were essentially defined by thevehicles two major characteristics. First, was its exceptionally thickarmor plating, particularly in the front hull and turret, which was insome places 100mm thick. Second, was its powerful 88mm Ll56 KwKmain gun. During the battle ofKursk, the standard opponent faced byTiger crews was the Russian T-34. Although a formidable tank for it'stime, the T-34 would have to close in to suicidal distances to evenhave a chance against a Tiger. Conversely, the powerful gun mountedon the Tiger could destroy opponents at massive distances. On thewide expanses ofthe Russian front, these capabilities more than madeup for the Tiger's inherent weaknesses, which included its slow rateofturret traverse, lack ofmobility, and vulnerable rear and hull top ar-mor plate. The 88mm Ll56 K wK main gun was an adaptation ofthesuccessful anti-tank version ofthe famous "eightyeight" Flak gun, andwas capable ofpenetrating 112mm of armor at a distance of 1400M. Itwas capable of firing armor piercing, high explosive, or high explo-sive, anti-tank rounds. Each Tiger carried 92 rounds of main gun am-

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munition, and was also equipped with two 7.92mm, MG34 machineguns for use against infantry personnel, and light vehicles.The Battle ofKursk was a significant battle on the Eastern Front of-World War II. It remains the largest armored engagement of alltime, and included the most costly single day ofaerial warfare in his-tory. Initiated as a German offensive, the Soviet defense managed tostop their ambitions and launch a successful counteroffensive.The German Army relied on armored forces to push through enemylines at highspeed, the famous Blitzkrieg tactic. This meant they wereonly able to assume the offense during the summer when the Russiansummer had dried out the ground enough for the tanks to be highlymobile. The Eastern Front had thus developed into a series of Ger-man advances in the summer, followed by Soviet counterattacks inthe winter.In the winter of 1942 the Soviets won conclusively during the Battleof Stalingrad. One complete German army had been lost, along withabout 300,000 men, seriously depleting German strength in the east.With an Allied invasion of Europe clearly looming, Hitler realizedthat an outright defeat ofthe Soviets before the western Allies arrivedwas unlikely, and decided to force the Soviets to a draw.In February and March 1943 Erich von Manstein had completed anoffensive during the Second Battle ofKharkov, leaving the front linerunning roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south.In the middle was a large 200 km wide and 150 km deep salient(bulge) in the lines between German forward positions near Orel inthe north, and Manstein's recently captured Kharkov in the south.Manstein pressed for a new offensive based on the same successfullines he had just pursued at Kharkov, when he cut off an overex-tended Soviet offensive. He suggested tricking the Soviets into attack-ing in the south against the desperately re-forming 6th Army, leadingthem into the Donets Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would thenturn south from Kharkov on the eastern side ofthe Donets River to-wards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing ofthe Red Armyagainst the Sea of Azov.OKW did not approve the plan, and instead turned their attention tothe obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. There werethree complete armies in and around the salient, and pinching it off-would trap almost a fifth ofthe Red Army's manpower. It would alsoresult in a much straighter and shorter line, and capture the strategi-cally useful railway town ofKursk located on the main north-southrailway line running from Rostov to Moscow.In March the plans were settled. Walther Model's 9th Army would at-

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tack south from Orel while Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army De-tachment Kempf under the overall command ofManstein would at-tack north from Kharkov. They were to meet near Kursk, but ifthe of-fensive went well they were allowed to continue forward on their owninitiative, with a general plan to create a new line on the Don Riverfar to the east. Unlike recent efforts, Hitler gave the General Staffconsiderable control over the planning ofthe battle. Over the next fewweeks they continued to increase the scope ofthe forces attached tothe front, stripping the entire German line ofpractically anything re-motely useful in the upcoming battle. The battle was first set for May4, but then delayed until June 12, and finally July 4 in order to allowmore time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially thenew Tiger tanks. It is worth discussing this plan in terms ofthe tradi-tional, and successful, blitzkrieg tactic used up to this point. Blitz-krieg depended on massing all available troops at a single point onthe enemy line, breaking through, and then running as fast as possi-ble to cut offthe front line troops from supply and information. Directcombat was to be avoided at all costs; there is no point in attacking astrongpoint ifthe same ends can be had by instead attacking thetrucks supplying them. The best place for Blitzkrieg was the least ex-pected, which is why they had attacked through the Ardennes in1940, and towards Stalingrad in 1942. OKW's Operation Citadel wasthe antithesis ofthis concept. The point of attack was painfully ob-vious to anyone with a map, and reflected World War I thinking morethan the Blitzkrieg. A number ofGerman commanders questioned theidea, notably Heinz Guderian.The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Soviets fourmonths in which to prepare, and with every passing day they turnedthe salient into one ofthe most heavily defended points on earth. TheRed Army laid over 400,000 landmines and dug about 5,000 kilo-meters oftrenches, with positions as far back as 175km. In addition,they massed a huge army oftheir own, including some 1,300,000men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,400 aircraft. It wasstill unclear whether or not it would help; in the past the Germanshad overrun their lines with seeming ease. In the four months beforethe Germans felt ready, they had collected 200 ofthe new Panthertanks, 90 Elefant tank destroyers, every flyable Henschel Hs 129ground attack aircraft, as well as a host ofTiger Is and late modelPanzer IV s. In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assaultguns, 1,800 aircraft and 900,000 men. It was the greatest concentra-tion of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler ex-pressed doubts about its adequacy.

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Preliminary fighting started on the 4th of July. In the afternoonJunkers Ju 87 Stukas bombed a two mile wide gap in the front lineson the north in a short period of 10 minutes, and then turned forhome while the German artillery opened up to continue the pound-ing. Hoth's armored spearhead, the 3rd Panzer Corps then advancedon the Soviet positions around Savidovka. At the same time theGrossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Regiment attacked Butovo intorrential rain, and the high ground around Butovo was taken by 11thPanzer Division. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher forGrossdeutschland and 3rd Panzer Division who met stiff Soviet resist-ance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. In the souththe 2nd SS Panzer Corps were launching their preliminary attacks tosecure observation posts, and again were met with stiff resistance un-til assault troops equipped with flame-throwers cleared the bunkersand outposts. At 2230 the Soviets hit back with an artillery bombard-ment which, aided by the torrential rain, slowed the German ad-vance. By this time Zhukov had been briefed on the informationabout the start ofthe offensive gained by the German prisoners anddecided to launch a pre-emptive artillery bombardment on the Ger-man positions. The real battle opened on 5 July 1943. The Soviets,now aware even ofthe exact time, commenced a massive artillerybombardment ofthe German lines 10 minutes prior. This was soonfollowed by a massive attack by the VVS on the Luftwaffe airbases inthe area, in an attempt to reverse the tables on the old German "trick"ofwiping out local air support within the first hour ofbattle. The nextfew hours turned into what is likely the largest air battle to ever befought. The Luftwaffe defended itself successfully and lost very littleofits fighting power, but from now on it was challenged by the So-viets.The 9th Panzer Army in the north found itself almost unable to move.Within only minutes of starting forward they were trapped in thehuge defensive minefields, and needed engineering units to come upand clear them under artillery fire. Model's army had fewer tanksthan Manstein had in the south. He also used a different tactic, usingonly some units at a time thus saving the others for later use, whereasthe Germans usually would attack with everything they had got tomaximize the effect. This was something they were able to do becauseoftheir superior training oflow-ranking officers and individual sol-diers. For some reason Model did not use this tactic, though.After a week they had moved only 10km into the lines, and on the12th the Soviets launched their northern arm against the 2nd Army atOrel. The 9th had to be withdrawn and their part in the offensive was

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over. Their casualty rate versus the Red Army was about 5:3 in theirfavor. This was however far worse than usual, and very far fromwhere it needed to be in order to keep up with the steady influx ofnewsoldiers and materiel for the Red Army.In the south things went somewhat better for the Germans. The arm-ored spearhead ofthe Hoth's 4th Panzer Army forced their way for-ward, and by the 6th were some 30km behind the lines at the smalltown Prokhorovka. Considering that they had attacked without the el-ement of surprise against a dug-in and numerically superior enemy,this was quite an achievement.The Red Army was forced to deploy troops originally planned to beused in the counteroffensive. The German flank, however, was unpro-tected as Kempfs divisions were stalled by 7th Guards Army, and byheavy rain, after crossing the River Donets. The 5th Guards TankArmy was situated to the east ofProkhorovka and was preparing acounterattack oftheir own when II SS Panzer Corps arrived and an in-tense struggle ensued. The Soviets managed to halt the SS -but onlyjust. There was now little to stop the 4th Panzer Army, and it lookedlike a breakout was a very real possibility. The Soviets decided to de-ploy the rest of the 5th Guards.On 12 July the Luftwaffe and artillery units bombed the Soviet posi-tions as the SS divisions formed up. The German advance started andthey were astonished to see masses of Soviet armor advancing to-wards them. What followed was the largest tank engagement ever,with over 1,500 tanks in close contact. The air forces ofboth countriesflew overhead, but they were unable to see anything through the dustand smoke pouring out from destroyed tanks. On the ground,commanders were unable to keep track of developments and the bat-tle rapidly degenerated into an immense number ofconfused and bit-ter small-unit actions, often at close quarters. The fighting raged onall day, and by evening the last shots were being fired as the two sidesdisengaged.It was a Soviet victory only in one sense, the German attack washalted. Most Soviet tanks were destroyed by the Germans at longrange, and relatively few were involved in short range exchanges off-ire. German losses were actually relatively few and for most of theday they were fighting in good order. The Soviet losses were 322tanks, of which more than half beyond repair, more than 1000 deadand an additional 2500 missing or wounded. German losses were lessthan 20% ofthat. The Germans had however planned to be on the of-fensive that day, and because ofthe Red Army attack their advancehad been halted.

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The overall battle ofKursk still hung in the balance. German forces onthe southern wing were exhausted and heavily atritted, but at thesame time faced equally weak defenses and were in excellent posi-tion, clear ofthe defensive works and with no forces between themand Kursk.On 11 July in the midst ofCitadel, US and British forces landed on Si-cily. Hitler called von Kluge and Manstein to his Wolfsschanze head-quarters in East Prussia and declared that he was calling Citadel off.Manstein was furious, and argued that one final effort and the battlecould be won. Hitler would have none ofit, particularly as the Sovietshad launched their counteroffensive in the north. Some German unitswere immediately sent off to Italy, and only limited attacks continuedin the south, to get rid ofa Soviet force squeezed between two Germanarmies. On the 22nd both forces were utterly exhausted and fighting(officially) drew to a close. The battle was not a clear-cut victory forthe Soviets who had suffered much higher casualties than the Ger-mans. The Germans however had for the first time lost substantialterritories during summer and had not been able to achieve theirgoals. A new front had opened in Italy diverting their attention. Bothsides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and theindustrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regainedthe initiative after Kursk.The Germans lost approximately 56,000 men killed. The Soviet casu-alty figures were not released until the end of the communist regime,and comprised 250,000 killed and 600,000 wounded. They also lost50% of their tank strength during the Kursk offensive. The fightingqualities of the Germanic Waffen SS divisions were established in theearly stages ofthe war, and grew in intensity and did not cease untilthe end of hostilities in 1945. This was particularly evident on theEastern Front where the fighting was the most brutal.The Waffen SS won a unique reputation for daring elan and unfailingprofessionalism in combat. Yet if their courage was unquestioned, sotoo was the fear and loathing which they elicited; even eventuallyamongst their own people, and in the regular soldiers alongsidewhom they fought. The Waffen SS played a conspicuous role in mostofthe important German triumphs, far disproportionate to their num-bers. In the long period ofdecline and retreat, the Germans weresteadily pushed back from the east and west. Despite sustaining hor-rendous casualties, their discipline remained unbroken, and theirfighting ardor unimpaired, almost to the very end.

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1° S.S Panzer Division LeibstandarteThe deep severity of the winter of 1941-42 had inevitably sloweddown widespread military activity on the Russian front. A Soviet of-fensive and local breakthrough near Dnepropetrovsk, south-east ofKharkov, brought III Corps out to seal the breach; the Leibstandarteheld the line while the German operation was executed. It was not un-til the thaw and the mud had cleared, and the vehicles were able tomove, that Army Group South could fulfil the order to destroy the en-emy in front of the Don with the eventual aim of seizing the oil-pro-ducing centres of die Caucasus.Hitler now had a fresh preoccupation. Along with another period ofrefitting and reinforcement, Leibstandarte was plucked from thecommand of Army Group South in June and sent to the coast ofFrance, here the Führer believed an Allied invasion was posible.Meanwhile, the Nazi leader had recognised that v.e progress of hiswar was dictating the need for increased manpower and a tighter,more cohesive rommand centre. The Leibstandarte’s panzer battal-ion was enlarged into a regiment of two tank battalions.Added muscle was provided by an early appearance of the new 60-ton tank leviathans, the Tigers. Infantry was beefed with two panzergrenadier regiments, while artillery now had four battalions. Duringthe closing months of 1942, the Leibstandarte was designated SSPanzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. The resultof all these changes was increased recruitment, but any head countwas misleading since some 75 per cent of the men was deficient intraining.

Dire outlookThe re-emergence of the Leibstandarte on the Eastern Front at theend of December 1942 coincided with an increasingly dire outlook forthe Wehrmacht, which was faced with nothing less than the collapseof the entire Southern Front. East of Kharkov, Hungarian and Italiansatellite armies were in disarray. On 12 January 1943, there was amassive Soviet attack from Orel to Rostov.Then came the death ride of 6th Army at Stalingrad, with the loss ofmore than 200,000 men. It was a sad irony for those who, back inOctober 1941, had heard Hitler address the German people and pro-claim: I declare today, and I declare it without any reservation, thatthe enemy in the east has been struck down and will never rise again... Behind our troops there already lies a territory twice the size of theGerman Reich when I came to power in 1933.' SS Panzer Corps, com-manded by General of Mountain Troops Hubert Lanz, had been as-

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signed the task of defending Kharkov by General (later Field Mar-shal) Erich von Manstein, an order backed by Hitler, who had de-clared that at all costs the city must be held. At deployment, the Leib-standarte took up a defensive position along the Donetz, with DasReich holding outposts east of the river. The troops were thinlyspread along a front stretching some 110km (70 miles) at Chege-vayev, which was on the Donetz itself. They were under the tempo-rary command of Fritz Witt, who was standing in for an absent Die-trich, the latter having been called to conference with Hitler. Lanz'smen were forced back in a swirl of snowstorms which failed to hinderthe Russian advance.Total annihilation faced 320th Infantry Division, fighting its wayback to the Donetz line and saddled with 1500 wounded whose com-rades were not prepared to surrender to the Russians. Once again, en-ter the Leibstandarte in a 'fire brigade' role. This time, the initiativebelonged to SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Jochen Peiper, who led the 3rdBattalion of 2nd SS Panzer Division. It penetrated deep into enemyterritory, forming a protective screen to release the wounded and pullback to the Donetz. Unfortunately, the ice on the river was too thin tobear Peiper's armoured vehicles. He was faced with the intimidatingprospect of turning back into enemy territory and finding an areawhere the river could safely be forded.

KharkovAll attention was now on Kharkov, however, which was virtually sur-rounded and where Hitler refused to countenance withdrawal. Thepacks of Soviet tanks had penetrated to the edge of the city, renderingnorthern, northwestern and southeastern defences useless. SS-Ober-gruppenjuhrer Paul Hausser made a cool survey of the situation. Thecorps diary entry 138/43 of 14 February 1943 read in part: 'InsideKharkov mob firing at troops and vehicles. No forces available formopping up since everything in frontline. City, including railway, stores and ammunition dumps, effec-tively dynamited at Army orders. Gift burning. Systematic with-drawal increasingly improbable each day ... Request renewed Fiihrerdecision.' The reply was predictable: 'Panzer Corps will hold to thelast man.' General Lanz saw himself as his master's voice and stoodfirm.Hausser was an experienced general staff officer of the old Imperialarmy who had retired from the Reichswehr with the rank of lieuten-ant general and who, conscious of the need for self-preservation, hadlater enlisted with the Waffen-SS. Even so, he was prepared to chal-

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lenge Hitler and pressed his case, but Lanz still refused to allow with-drawal. During the night 14/15 February, the Russians had broken in-to the northwestern and southwestern parts of the city. Consciousthat he was putting his entire career on the line, Hausser ignoredboth his Führer's order and the obduracy of Lanz. He mounted abreak-out to the south-west between the encircling Russian armies,regrouping around Krasnograd.The news of the withdrawal was greeted by an ecstatic Stalin: 'Themass expulsion from the Soviet Union has begun.' The newly self-pro-claimed Marshal of the Soviet Union was premature in his cel-ebration, but the abandonment of Kharkov, however temporary, wasan indication of how Germany's fortunes in the east were changing.In a fine fury, Hitler took an aircraft to von Manstein's headquarters,demanding Hausser's dismissal, but was persuaded that no alterna-tive to the yielding of Kharkov had been possible. Mollified, Hitler re-prieved Hausser and sacked Lanz instead. Still, the Führer managedto signify his disapproval by postponing Hausser's Oak Leaves to hisKnight's Cross. Von Manstein's plan, to be implemented by Hausser,was to stand firm at Krasnograd, thus luring the pursuing Russiansinto a trap. Strength was improved by the arrival of the Totenkopf 'di-vision, which had earlier linked up with the three panzer divisions of48th Panzer Corps. The too armoured corps, one Army and one SS,as the components of 4th Panzer Army, went on to launch a con-certed attack with effective air support northwards towards Pavlo-grad and Losuvaya. On 25 February, 4th Panzer Army wiped out a So-viet army group led by General M.M. Popov.This undoubtedly boosted morale, as did the trapping of Soviet forcesbetween the defensive lines of 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division andthe two attacking divisions of the SS Panzer Corps. By 3 March, theSoviet forces had been encircled west of Bereka, which lay north ofKrasnograd on a direct line to Kharkov. Three days later, the Corpshad reached Valki, which lay to the north-west of the city. The aimwas to thrust the Russians back across the Donetz. With that objec-tive achieved by the advanced guard of the Leibstandarte, the assaulton Kharkov was under way. The order came from Colonel GeneralHermann Hoth, as commander of 4th Panzer Army, 'to seal off Khar-kov tightly from west to north. Conditions inside the city are to bereconnoitred. Opportunities to seize the city by a coup are to be uti-lised.'The northern role was assigned to the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf,with Das Reich attacking from the west and south. Resistance waslight; Hausser felt sufficiently confident to take Kharkov by direct as-

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sault. On 11 March, one battalion from Totenkopf joined Leibstan-darte and Das Reich. SS-Brigadefuhrer Fritz Witt of Leibstandarteput in a two-pronged assault with 3rd SS Battalion in the van, cuttingthe Kharkov-Byelgorod road. The Leibstandarte went in, togetherwith the 22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Late on the afternoonof 15 March, four days after 'Panzer' Meyer's battalion had gained theeastern edge of town amid bitter, house-to-house fighting, the last ofthe Soviet resistance crumbled. Kharkov once again belonged to theThird Reich. With his characteristic opportunism, Goebbels gearedhis Propaganda Ministry to declaim:In Poland and in France, in Greece and above all in the endless ex-panses of the east, the Leibstandarte has stood in battle, and thesame men have committed themselves with arms for the National So-cialist Greater Germany, who, even before 1933, strove in the blackSchutzstaffel for the victory of the National Socialist movement.'That their Obergruppenfuhrer, their soldier of the First World War,the fighter of November 1923, the loyal companion of the Ftihrer, theold SS leader and present general of the Wqffen-SS, who exactly tenyears ago set up the Leibstandarte and commanded it as a Regimentand now as a Division in the field, was today decorated with OakLeaves with Swords, is their greatestjoy and greatest pride.'

Calm periodAfter Kharkov, a period of relative calm ensued. It was then time tocontemplate renewed offensive operations in the summer of 1943.The reconquest of Kharkov was rightly regarded as a considerabletriumph, but the cost had been 11,000 dead for the SS Panzer Corpsand 4500 for the Leibstandarte. The Wehrmacht, still tinder theshadow of defeat at Stalingrad, argued for a period of defensive war-fare, with emphasis on lightning local attacks designed to wear downthe Soviet army. But Hitler had been brooding long hours over hismaps, extolling at his daily conferences the need for the grand flour-ish which once and for all would annihilate the enemy. If this werenot done, the Fiihrer declared, Soviet troops could well achieve aclear route to the Ukraine and thence to be able to sweep the Ger-mans out of the Crimea. There were other considerations beyond Eu-rope. Defeat for Germany was looking probable, not least in the Navy(Kriegsmarine) where, in May alone, a total of 43 U-boats were lostagainst a monthly launching rate of 15. In North Africa, Field Mar-shal Erwin Rommel's Army Group Africa was facing a critical supplysituation. Hitler, shuttling between his military compound Wolf-sschanze (Wolf's Lair) in the gloomy Gorlitz forest, and the Berghof,

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his mountain retreat in southern Bavaria, searched for the source ofthe victory he so badly needed. As he pored over his maps, his atten-tion fastened on a vast section of the Eastern Front fighting line. Thiswas an area which extended north from Belgorod, lying north-west ofKharkov, to the distant area of Orel. In the centre was the Kursk sali-ent, or bulge. Kursk itself was an industrial city with valuable coal-mining, engineering and manufacturing centres.

KurskIntelligence sources had alerted Hitler to enormous offensive Sovietstrength at this point, with a sterling input of field forces. In thewords of von Manstein: 'The whole salient was just begging to besliced off.' As the German planners saw it, there were two options.The first was a pre-emptive strike designed to hit the Soviets beforethey attacked. Alternatively, they could wait for them to move andlaunch a counterattack. The latter emerged as the most feasible.There would be a wait for the Soviet attack in the face of whichground would be given. The fallback would be to the River Dniepr,followed by a massive strike from around Kharkov, which would takethe Soviet advance in its flank. Then would come cut-off and encircle-ment. There was only one flaw. To Hitler, the merest hint of givingground, even as the preface to a counterattack, was heresy. His re-fusal to have anything to do with such a proposal revealed the overallstrategicdefects of this corporal-turned-supreme commander. While he pos-sessed the scintillating talent for conceiving the grand flourish, therewas also an inbuilt petulance of character, which expressed itself infury at the mere suggestion that the detested Russian hordes be al-lowed any gains whatsoever at the expense of his forces.This weakness was next compounded by doubt and dithering. Hitlerconfessed to Guderian: 'Whenever I think of this attack my stomachturns over.' Guderian was blunt: 'Leave it alone!' Finally, however,Hitler was not to be dissuaded, even when it was pointed out to himthat, if there were an Allied landing in Europe and the Kursk cam-paign went ahead, there would be no available forces to fill the gap.D-Day, first proposed for 1 May, was altered to a succession of otherdates before being fixed irrevocably for 5 July 1942; it was code-named Citadel (Zitadelle). By then, there was a fresh threat to Hitler.A high-level encrypted intelligence report, compiled by a group of se-nior Wehrmacht officers on 2 July, had reached Lieutenant GeneralM. E. Katukov, the commander of 1st Tank Army. It contained noth-ing less than full details of the anticipated German attack, including

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its date. The Soviets were indebted to ULTR\, the intelligence sourcein Britain derived from the interception and decryption of German Icoded signal traffic. In addition, valuable material had reached a Ger-man emigre and anti-fascist named Rudolph Rossler, codenamed'Lucy', who worked out of Lucerne and had contacts at the highestlevel within Stavka, the Soviet Supreme High Command. This advant-age, as well as the delay in launching Citadel, enabled the Russians toset about constructing a deeply armed system of fortifications andminefields. Recruitment, too, was up; the strength of the Red Armywas bolstered by the delivery of 6000 armoured fighting vehicles.The weeks leading up to Citadel were significant for the Leibstan-darte; Sepp Dietrich, his men learnt, would not himself be takingpart in the Kursk offensive. On 4 June, he handed over command toSS-Brigadeführer Theodor Wisch, an SS highflier still in his earlythirties. From Berlin, Sepp Dietrich set about activating a new com-mand, I SS Panzer Corps. Its creation had sprung from Himmler's de-sire to bolster his power and his influence by arguing for still furtherexpansion of the Waffen-SS. The Reichsführer-SS insisted that newblood should be drawn from the Hitler Jugend; discussions weresoon in progress between Reichjugendführer Artur Axmann and theSS leadership. It emerged that elements of the Leibstandarte and theSS Panzer Grenadier Division Hitler Jugend (later 12th SS Panzer Di-vision Hitler Jugend) would constitute I SS Panzer Corps, withHausser's corps being demoted to II SS Panzer Corps. The Leibstan-darte would supply the officers and senior non-commissioned offi-cers.

Dietrich promotedAs for Dietrich, an entirely new rank was created specifically for him.He became SS-Obergruppenführer und Panzergeneral der Waffen-SS. It was a promotion that came in the midst of a personal crisis.Dietrich - and he was not alone in this - was thinking the unthink-able: given the sheer numerical superiority in men and material pos-sessed by the Soviets, he was edging towards the view that a decisivevictory by Germany in the east was no longer possible. As he was nota man to muffle his opinions, Dietrich's reservations reached Himm-ler. Such was the extent of Dietrich's prestige, however, that theReichsführer-SS felt he could only issue the following written rebuke:'Whatever you think about the war in the east, I know best ... We aresure the Russians can and will be defeated.'As for Citadel, Hitler's plan was a classic pincer operation, movingfrom the north and south, both jaws heading to meet at a point east

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of Kursk. The thrust against the northern flank of the salient was tobe carried out by General Walter Model's 9th Army -seven infantryand eight panzer and panzer grenadier divisions - while the southernflank belonged to General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army. As faras armament was concerned, the Germans threw in everything theyhad, greatly exceeding their resources at the start of the Russian cam-paign. The battle plan of Marshal Georgi Zhukov was sizing up to bean aggressive defence. This involved forcing his enemy to make thefirst move. When the Germans were worn down, counteroffensiveswould follow. No less than 40 per cent of the Red Army's entire infan-try and armoured divisions was to implement the plan. An extra50,000 men were kept in reserve. General Konstantin Rokossovsky'sCentral Front would defend Kursk's northern side, while the Voro-nezh Front of General Nikolai Vatutin would be responsible for thesouth.As the date for Citadel grew ever closer, the Germans massed theirforces: 50 divisions, a total of 900,000 men, with a further 20 divi-sions in reserve, plus 2700 tanks, including Tigers and Panthers. Inits advance to the salient, the SS Panzer Corps, as part of 4th PanzerArmy with a tank strength of 343, was to penetrate the first defensivebelt via Beresov village and Sadeynoye. At Beresov, flame-throwingunits were to head the panzer grenadiers, fighting their way in. Be-yond lay the second belt between Lutchki and Jakovlevo. For the op-eration to the north-east, 167th Infantry Division, as part of SS Corps,had the task of guarding the left flank. The corps was a coiled spring.

Waiting to beginOne Leibstandarte man wrote: 'For reasons of security we have notbeen allowed to move about during the daytime and you can under-stand how hard this is, but now the waiting is over ... It is cold blackoutside :he Command bunker. Black clouds cover the sky and therain is streaming down ... The barrage has just begun. I can feel itsforce even down here deep in the earth.'During the Russian summer, dawn speedily sees off the night, so at0330 hours on 5 July 1943, Operation Citadel began. It was destinedto last for six hours. Another Leibstandarte man recorded in his jour-nals: T saw our leading Tiger sections roar away and vanish almostcompletely in the peculiar silver/grey tall grass which is a feature ofthe area ... Our mine lifting teams mark the position of Ivan's minesby lying down alongside them, thus using their bodies to mark a gapin the field. There are thousands of mines all over the area.' The rap-id advance of the Leibstandarte was exhilarating, with the first defen-

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sive positions falling easily and the tank squadrons encircling andwiping out the enemy.This did not last. All too soon there was the full force of the massedheavy artillery of the Russians and their tight network of explodingmines to be faced. The day belonged equally to tank men and foot sol-diers. Of the former, 55-Obersturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann, in theturret of his Tiger with its five-man crew, knocked out a clutch of T-34s with his platoon. An indication of the extent of the Leibstandartes, collective adrenalin to say nothing of its early arrogance - wasafforded when Wisch made a sudden appearance near the Tigers andwas greeted by one of his commanders with the words: 'Lunch inKursk!' By the end of the day, Wittmann had claimed eight enemytanks and seven anti-tank guns had been knocked out. It was not hisonly achievement.

Wittmann's successBarely an hour later, as his Tiger engaged anti-tank guns, Wittmann'scrackling radio was telling him that the company's Wendorff platoonwas in deep trouble. All at once, his Tigers were plunging through thenearby copse, only to come up against the rear of another Soviet anti-tank strongpoint. Wendorffs plight was to be surrounded by a clutchof T-34s, which had put paid to one of the platoon's Tigers. Witt-mann, spirits riding high, sped to the aid of Wendorff. Three T-34swere knocked out. The bag for the day was eight enemy tanks andseven anti-tank guns destroyed.

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Fig A Leibstandarte Sturmgeschutz (assault gun) III orStuG IIIBy no means all the SS men felt the same relish. SS-SturmannGunther Borchers of the Leibstandarte recorded in his diary: T am ina flame-throwing team, and we are to lead the Company attack. Thisis a real suicide mission. We have to get within 30 metres [90ft] ofthe Russians before we open fire. It's time to write out the last willand testament.'The foot soldiers fought their way across the minefields and troughsto the first Soviet trench lines, where there were belts of trenches pro-tected by barbed wire and minefields. There was hand-to-hand fight-ing with grenades, machine pistols, rifles, bayonets and occasionallytrenching tools, employed to cleave the skulls of the enemy. As for theminefields, their density was such that a German corps could find it-self lifting as many as 40,000 mines in a single day. 6

The second day of Citadel saw postponement of the Leibstandartethrust until the afternoon because of bad weather. The dug-in tanksof the 1st Red Tank Army then came up against flame-throwers andconstant counterattacks. The High Command War Diary of 6 Julywas scarcely cheerful; the element of surprise had not been achieved

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and there had been no decisive breakthrough. This meant that bothflanks of the SS Corps were now open to Soviet counterblows. True,the War Diary was claiming, on 8 July, that 400 Russian tanks hadbeen destroyed, but another entry revealed that the SS Corps had on-ly 400 Panthers still operational out of the original 200. Many mem-bers of the tank crews, facing their first battle, fled their machines interror to take refuge in the trenches from a fire which would barbecuethem.A fundamental fault lay in the panzer arm itself. The Tigers, despitetheir considerable power and 88mm (3.46in) guns, were lumberingleviathans with a cross-country speed of barely 19kmph (12mph) andan operation range of 96km (60 miles). The Ferdinands, heavy tank-destroyer Tigers with a vast thickness of armour, suffered from weaksuspensions which frequently immobilised them, while the remote-control demolition Goliaths were not up to the job. It was the SovietT-34, however, which had provided the Germans with their greatestshock.-The German tank crews reported its agility in comparisonwith the Tiger and, along with other Soviet tanks, its speed in climb-ing slopes and swamps. A big advantage enjoyed by the Soviets wasthat the T-34 was in mass production; heavy losses were therefore ofless consequence than they were to the Germans. This was to be par-ticularly so during the battle of Kursk, where the High CommandWar Diary was to record the destruction of 663 Soviet tanks, a figuregreater than the loss to the Germans. While Russian losses were re-placeable, however, the losses of the Germans were irrevocable.Attack by Leibstandarte in a northeasterly direction along the Tetere-vino-Prokhorovka road, south-east of the River Psel, had beenmarked by some impressive achievements. Obersturmfuhrer Rudolfvon Ribbentrop, commander of No. 6 Company of 1st SS Panzer Regi-ment and son of the German Foreign Minister, had faced 154 T-34sand a Soviet infantry battalion advancing between Prokorovka andTeterevino. The troop had lost three machines out of seven, withfighting taking place at less than 180m (200yds). It succeeded inclearing a path through the Soviet area on the route to Oboyan, whichlay some 60km (37 miles) from Kursk. But the capture of P/okhorov-ka, to the south-east of Kursk, proved an impossibility, both becauseof strong enemy resistance and the seas of mud created by the drivingrain. Just to the south, the Soviet 5th Guards tank army mounted itsfurious assault. Hope centred on 3rd Panzer Corps of Army Detach-ment Kempf, which had a vital role in protecting Hausser's rightflank; however, it failed to appear. On 10 July, the Soviet VoronezhFront, with a force of 10 corps, went over to the coun-teroffensive. On

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the plain to Kursk's southeast, two mighty tank armies deployed forwhat, up to that time, was the greatest tank battle in history.Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, of the Soviet 5th Tank Army,clashed with the Leibstandarte at 0400 hours two days later. A regi-ment of T-34s was annihilated. The main clash came just outside Pro-khorovka, where Rotmistrov viewed the battlefield from a nearby hill.He later wrote: 'The tanks were moving across the steppe in smallpacks, under cover of patches of woodland and hedges. The bursts ofgunfire merged into one continuous, mighty roar. The Soviet tanksthrust into the German advanced formations at full speed and pene-trated the German tank screen. The T-34s were knocking out Tigersat extremely close range, since their powerful guns and massive ar-mour no longer gave them an advantage in close combat...Frequently when a tank was hit, its ammunition and fuel blew up,and torn-off turrets were flung through the air over dozens of yards ...Soon the whole sky was shrouded by the thick smoke of the burningwrecks. On the black, scorched earth, the gutted tanks burnt liketorches.'Rotmistrov could have added that the tanks which thundered into thefray across the open steps were both Soviet and German, since eachside charged at they knew not what, guns spitting furiously, even de-stroying their own side. Theorists of tank warfare said one of theprime tactical rules was that the panzers should exploit enemy weak-ness, not pitch tank against tank. The rule book was blown into obliv-ion.Along with it went the concept of Blitzkrieg as a long, continuoussweep capable of bypassing even the strongest defences. Blitzkriegwas dead, along with Citadel itself. German losses were put at 70,000killed or wounded, 3000 tanks, 1000 guns and much other warmater-iel. Soviet losses were not revealed. In Moscow, impatient queuesformed for newspapers and the headlines were exultant. Among themost memorable was 'THE TIGERS ARE BURNING'.After the war, Guderian reflected: 'The armoured formations, re-formed and re-equipped with much effort, had lost heavily in bothmen and equipment, and would now be unemployable for a long timeto come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated intime to defend the Eastern Front; as for being able to use them in de-fence of the Western Front against the Allied landings that threat-ened the next spring, this was even more questionable. Needless tosay, the Russians exploited their victory to the full.'There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front; nowthe enemy undisputably held the initiative. In the east, the Germans

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had ceased to be the hammer and had become the anvil.

KurskThe spring 'rasputitsa' halted offensive operations, giving the Leib-standarte SS Adolf Hitler time to rest and refit. By early June 1943,the division had been fully refitted and was now under the commandof SS-Brigadeführer, Theodor Wisch. Its armour strength was 12 Ti-ger Is, 72 Panzer IVs, 16 Panzer III and Panzer IIs, and 31 StuGs. Inlate June 1943, the formation of I SS Panzer Corps meant that Hauss-er's SS Panzer Corps was renamed II SS Panzer Corps.The II SS Panzer Corps was moved north to Belgorod in preparationfor the upcoming summer offensive; Zittadelle. The LSSAH, alongwith the Totenkopf and Das Reich, was to form the spearhead of Gen-eraloberst Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, tasked with breachingthe southern flank of the Kursk salient. Generalfeldmarschall WalterModel's 9th Army was to breach the northern flank, and the twoforces were to meet near the city of Kursk, to the east, thereby encir-cling a large Soviet force.The II SS Panzer Corps reached its assembly areas on 28 June andbegan preparing for the assault. The attack was set for 5 July, and onthe 4th, the II SS Panzer Corps, as well as the XLVIII Panzer Corpson its left and the III Panzer Corps on the right, began minor attacksto secure observation posts. Fighting lasted throughout the day, withthe LSSAH's Pioneer Battalion seeing heavy action clearing out theentrenched Soviets. 7

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The LSSAH's panzers, advancing in Panzerkeils 8(wedges), soon raninto the Soviet Pakfronts. The elaborate system of Soviet defencesslowed the attack, but unlike in Model's sector, the 4th Panzer Army,spearheaded by the II SS Panzer Corps and the LSSAH, was nothalted, and eventually broke through.By 9 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had advanced 30 miles (48 km)north, and were nearing the small town of Prokhorovka. The LSSAHagain took the lead, by now its armour strength was reduced to just77 armoured vehicles. The 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, sup-ported by several tanks, advanced straight up the road to Prokhorov-ka against heavy resistance. By midday, the grenadiers had clearedthe Komsomolets State Farm and begun the attack on Hill 241.6,which they secured shortly after nightfall on 10 July.The next day the advance resumed, with the division capturing Ok-tiabr'skii State Farm and Hill 252.2 in heavy fighting against SovietParatroops of the 9th Guards Airborne Division. On 12 July, the So-viets threw the 5th Guards Tank Army into a counterattack near Pro-khorovka. Two tank corps faced the LSSAH, hitting the advancingGermans around Oktiabr'skii State Farm and Hill 252.2. In the ensu-ing fighting, the outnumbered Germans inflicted heavy casualties onthe Soviets, knocking out many tanks. In the process, the LSSAH alsosuffered relatively light casualties; however the Soviet counterattack

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had stalled the German advance, and the division was forced to fallback to Oktiabr'skii. The Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army lost 300 tanksdestroyed and further 300 damaged on 12 July. Fighting continuedthe next day, but the focus of the Soviet attack had then shifted to theTotenkopf, on the left of the LSSAH.With the Battle of Prokhorovka still in the balance, a massive Sovietcounteroffensive near Orel caused Hitler to order the cessation of Cit-adel. The II SS Panzer Corps was pulled back. The LSSAH was or-dered out of the line; having suffered 2,753 casualties including 474killed. 11 tanks were also lost during Operation Citadel. The divisionwas then sent to Italy to help stabilise the situation there caused bythe deposal of Benito Mussolini by the Badoglio government and theAllied invasion of Sicily on 10 July. The division left behind its ar-mour and equipment, which was given to Das Reich and Totenkopf.

Order of BattleOn 5/1/43 the LSSAH Panzer Regiment was ordered to reorganize.Personnel from the 1/LSSAH were sent back to Germany. Of thesemen, 328 were then sent to form the 12th Panzer Regiment of the12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Jugend." The remainder were used toform a new 1/LSSAH Panzer Regiment that was to be equipped withPanzer MkV (Panther) Tanks. This new 1/LSSAH Panzer Regimentwas then organized with a staff company with eight Panzer Mk Vtanks, and four companies with 22 Panzer MkV tanks each. It was notfully equipped until mid-July and did not participate in OperationCitadel. The remaining 2/LSSAH Panzer Regiment was raised to fourcompanies, each of which had 22 Mk IV tanks. The Tiger Company ofthe division was authorized to have 15 Tiger Tanks, including onecommand tank.On 5/15/43 the 1st and 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment finally formedthe 19th (Reconnaissance) Company and the 20th (Pioneer) Com-pany using the pioneer platoons of the heavy companies. On 5/16/43the heavy mortar platoons were detached from the machine-gun com-panies and reattached to the battalions' heavy companies.Shortly before the battle of Kursk, on 7/1/43, the division's panzerforces were organized and equipped as follows:2/1st SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had:1 Panzer Staff Company4 Medium Panzer Companies

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13th Heavy Panzer Company

Records show that on 7/4/43 it also had 18 (motZ) PAK 75mm, 2175mm self-propelled anti-tank guns, and 34 sturmgeschiitz. Docu-ments indicate that the Tiger tanks were assigned to the 13th Com-pany of the LSSAH Panzer Regiment.After Kursk the division was withdrawn from the front and sent intoAustria where it was rebuilt and refitted. The I/Panzer RegimentLSSAH rejoined the division and was now equipped with Panzer MkV(Panthers) Tanks. On 9/7/43 the division had 23 Panzer Mk VI andfour under repair, 65 Panzer MkV and six more under repair, 51 Pan-zer Mk IV and three under repair, and 8 command tanks with twomore under repair.In August 1943 the former Observation Battery was reorganized as aNebelwerfer Battery and added to the artillery regiment as the 11th(Werfer) Battery.On 10/7/43 an armored flak platoon was organized in the 3/2nd Pan-zergrenadier Regiment.

1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf HitlerOn 10/22/43 the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte SSAdolf Hitler was renamed as the 1st SS Panzer Division LeibstandarteSS Adolf Hitler. Its assigned units were:1/,2/,3/1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment LSSAH1/,2/,3/2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment LSSAH1st SS Reconnaissance Battalion LSSAH (6 companies)1/,2/lst SS Panzer Regiment LSSAH (13 companies)1st SS Panzerjager (Battalion LSSAH (3 companies)1st SS Sturmgeschutz Battalion LSSAH (3 batteries)1/,2/,3/,4/1st SS Artillery Regiment LSSAH included a survey battery1st SS Flak Battalion LSSAH (5 batteries)1st SS Pioneer Battalion LSSAH (4 companies)1st SS Armored Signal Battalion LSSAH (2 companies)1st SS Projector (Werfer) LSSAH (raised 9/44)

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1st SS Replacement (Ersatz) Battalion LSSAH (raised 10/44)1st SS Divisional (Einheiten) Support UnitsOn 10/22/43 the panzerjager battalion was renamed the S.S Panzer-jagerabteilung 1/LSSAH. This formation suffered heavy casualtiesand in early 1944 only one company, with 17 percent of authorizedstrength . It was then transferred to the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hit-ler Jugend." In addition, the sturmgeschiitz battalion on was re-named the SS-Sturmgeschutzabteilung 1.In early November 1943 the 1st SS Panzer Regiment had beenbrought back to nearly full strength and was organized as follows:1/,2/1st SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Panzer CompanyEach Battalion had:1 Panzer Staff Company4 Medium Companies1 Heavy Panzer Company Mk VI 27

The bulk of the division was withdrawn from combat on 12/4/43 anda kampfgruppe was organized that remained in combat. The 1st SSPanzer Regiment was reduced to a battalion of three companies, oneeach of Mk PV, MkV and MkVI tanks. On 4/11/44 the kampfgruppewas withdrawn from combat and transferred to OB West where it wasreincorporated into the reforming division and rebuilt. The 1/1 st SSPanzer Regiment was subsequently rebuilt with four companies, eachwith 17 Panther tanks.The 2/lst SS Panzer Regiment was rebuilt withfour companies, each with 22 Mk IV tanks.On the same date the reconnaissance battalion was renamed the SS-Panzer-Aufklärungsabteilung1/LSSAH. On the same date flak battalion was renamed the SS-Pan-zer-Flakabteilung 1/LSSAH. In November the 6th Flak Battery wasdetached to the corps staff of the I SS Panzer Corps as a flak com-pany. An interesting chart inT-78, Roll 417 shows that eight Mk VI Ti-ger Tanks were dispatched from the factory in December 1943 to thedivision, despite no organizational charts indicating the assignmentof a Tiger tank detachment. On 4/28/44 the division was organizedas follows:DivisionDivision Staff

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Divisional Escort CompanyMotorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)Self Propelled Flak Platoon (4 20mm guns)Self Propelled Anti-Tank Platoon (3 LMGs & 3 75mm PAK 40)Infantry Gun Platoon (2 75mm leIG)Mixed Panzergrenadier Platoon (4 HMGs, 6 LMGs, & 2 80mm mor-tars)1st SS Panzer RegimentRegimental StaffSelf Propelled Flak Platoon (6 20mm guns)1st Panzer Battalion (1-4th Companies) (MkV Panthers)Panzer Maintenance Platoon2nd Panzer Battalion (5-8th Companies) (Mk IV Panzers)1 Halftrack Pioneer Company (40 LMGs & 6 flamethrowers)1 Panzer Maintenance Company 1 (mot)Panzer Supply Column1st SS Panzergrenadier RegimentRegimental Staff1st Battalion 1-3rd Companies (4 HMGs, 18 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars& 2 flamethrowers)4th Company (12 HMGs & 6 80mm mortars)5th Company1 Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 50mm PAK 38)1 Infantry Gun Section (2 75mm leIG)2nd Battalion (6-10th Companies) (same as 1st Battalion)3rd Battalion (11-15th Companies) (same as 1st Battalion)16th (self-propelled flak) Company (12 20mm & 4 LMGs)17th (self-propelled infantry gun) Company (6 150mmsIG&7LMGs)18th (self-propelled panzerjäger) Company (9 75mm PAK 40 & 9LMGs)2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regimentsame as 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment1st SS Reconnaissance BattalionBattalion Staff1 Armored Car Company (18 20mm & 24 LMGs)1 Armored Car Company (16 20mm & 25LMGs)2 (halftrack) Companies (4 HMGs, 56 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars & 337mm PAK 36)1 (halftrack) Company1 Pioneer Platoon (13 LMGs & 1 75mm gun)1 Panzerjager Platoon (9 LMGs & 3 75mm PAK 40)

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1 Infantry Gun Section (2 75mm leIG & 4 LMGs)1 Gun Section (8 LMGs & 6 75mm guns)1 (mot) Reconnaissance Supply Column (3 LMGs)1st SS Panzerjager BattalionBattalion Staff2 Self Propelled Panzerjager Companies (6 75mm PAK 40 & 10LMGs ea)1 Self Propelled Panzerjager Company (6 88mm & 10 LMGs ea)1st SS Sturmgeschütz BattalionStaff1-3rd Sturmgeschutz Batteries (11 StuG & 2 LMGs ea)1st SS Panzer Artillery Regiment1st (Self Propelled) Battalion:Staff & (self-propelled) Staff Battery (6 LMGs)2 Self Propelled leFH Batteries (6 SdKfz 124 Wespe with 105mmleFH ea)1 Self Propelled sFH Battery (6 SdKfz 165 Hummel with 150mm sFH)2nd BattalionStaff & Staff Battery (2 LMGs)4th, 5th & 6th (motZ) Batteries (4 105mm leFH & 2 LMGs ea)3rd BattalionStaff & (mot) Staff Battery (6 LMGs)7th, 8th, & 9th (motZ) Batteries (4 150mm sFH & 2 LMGs ea)Attached1 (motZ) Battery (4 100mm K18 & 2 LMGs)1 (motZ) Nebelwerfer Battery (6 150/210mm launchers)1st SS Flak BattalionStaff & Staff Battery3 (motZ) Heavy Flak Batteries (4 88mm, 3 20mm & 2 LMGs ea)2 Self Propelled Medium Flak Batteries (9 37mm & 4 LMGs ea)1 (motZ) Searchlight Platoon (3 600mm searchlights)1st SS Panzer Pioneer BattalionStaff (2 LMGs)1 (halftrack) Pioneer Reconnaissance Platoon (2 LMGs)1 (halftrack) Pioneer Company (43 LMGs, 3 heavy anti-tank rifles, 280mm mortars & 6 flamethrowers)2 (mot) Pioneer Companies (2 HMGs, 18 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars &6 flamethrowers)1 (mot) Heavy Panzer Bridging Train (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Pioneer Supply Column (1 LMG)1st SS Panzer Signals Battalion1 (mot) Telephone Company (5 LMGs)

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1 Panzer Radio Company (35 LMGs)1 (mot) Signals Supply Column (4 LMGs)1st SS Supply Troop1/,2/,3/,4/lstSS (mot) 120 ton Transportation Companies (8 LMGsea)5/1st SS (mot) Heavy Supply Column (4 LMGs)7,8/,9/,10/1st SS (mot) heavy Fuel Columns (4 LMGs ea)1st SS (mot) Workshop Company (4 LMGs)1st SS (mot) Supply Company (8 LMGs)1st SS Truck Park1/,2/,3/1st SS (mot) Maintenance Companies (4 LMGs)1st SS (mot) 75 ton Heavy Maintenance Supply ColumnMedical1/,2/1st SS (mot) Medical Companies (2 LMGs ea)1/,2/,3/lst SS AmbulancesAdministration1st SS (mot) Bakery Company (6 LMGs)1st SS (mot) Butcher Company (6 LMGs)1st SS (mot) Divisional Administration Platoon (2 LMGs)1st SS (mot) Field Post Office (2 LMGs)

2° S.S Das Reich Panzer DivisionBy late 1942, the tide of World War II began to turn against the ThirdReich. In North Africa, German forces under the command of FieldMarshal Erwin Rommel suffered a decisive defeat at El Alamein. Onthe Eastern Front, the Red Army dealt a more serious blow to the Na-zi war effort when the Soviets launched a winter offensive thatsmashed several Romanian, Italian and Hungarian divisions, forcingAxis troops in the area to fall back to the River Dnieper. At Stalin-grad, the Russians encircled the German 6th Army and repulsed allattempts to relieve the beleaguered garrison. By February 1943, thecity and the surviving remnants of the German Army had fallen intoRussian hands. Three months later, Allied forces swept their Axis ad-versaries completely out of North Africa.To help blunt the Soviet assault against German positions on theEastern Front, Adolf Hitler dispatched the recently organized I SSPanzer Corps into the area. After performing this mission, the SStroops were to initiate an aggressive counter-offensive, aimed at re-taking the territory that had been lost to the Russians. Led by SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, the corps included three of thebest divisions in the German armed forces: Leibstandarie, Totenkopf,and Das Reich, which was now under the command of SS-Grup-

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penführer Georg Keppler. All three of these divisions had been reor-ganized as panzergrenadier formations.

Top priority moveIn January 1943, the SS corps went to the southern sector of the frontto repel an attack that had been launched by the Soviet 3rd GuardsTank Army. Because their presence in the region was so desperatelyneeded, the SS divisions received top priority in the use of road andrail transportation. After assembling at an area near the city of Khar-kov, Hausser's forces were to maintain a bridgehead situated betweenVolokomovka and Kupiansk on the River Oskol. Although the SScorps was supposed to operate as a unified organization, the exigen-cies of war forced Army Group South to disperse its elements into dif-ferent areas. Das Reich was the first SS division to reach the front. Ar-riving in the middle of January, the Der Führer Regiment was in thearea before the other elements of the division and immediately wentto work against the Soviet war machine. West of the River Oskol, thesoldiers of the Red Army seemed as if they were about to achieve abreakthrough at Voroshilovgrad. To prevent such a disaster for theGermans, Army Group South formed a battle group that was com-prised of Der Fuhrer's 1st Battalion, two field artillery batteries, oneFlak battery, and two companies from other parts of the regiment. At-tached to the 6th Panzer Division, this battle group was to aid in thedefence of the town. On 22 January, the SS troops marched 205km(127 miles) to their battle zone and remained there until early March.By the end of the month, the main part of I SS Panzer Corps had ar-rived and was arrayed at its assigned position on the River Oskol.While 2nd Battalion, DerFuhrer Regiment occupied a sector close tothe river, the Deutschland Regiment covered a piece of woodlandsouth-west of Kamenka, as well as areas west of Borki, Kosinka andOlovatka. As the SS troops moved into their positions, they encoun-tered the surviving remnants of the decimated Italian 8th Army re-treating past the front lines and into safer areas. In addition, severaldepleted German units filed past the SS formations, including the320th D'ivision. Hausser's troops quickly learned from the demoral-ized state of these withdrawing forces that they would face formida-ble adversaries in the southern sector of the Eastern Front.Shortly after taking up their positions along the River Oskol, the com-manding officers in the SS corps learned that the Red Army hadripped large holes in the German defence line and recaptured aconsiderable amount of territory, including the important city ofKursk. The Russians were also in close pursuit of the rearguard ele-

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ments of the Italian and Romanian armies that they had mauled.Moreover, intelligence sources soon revealed that the Soviets in-tended to push the Germans back to the River Dnieper and thus re-take the city of Kharkov. As a result, Army Group South had to utilizethe SS corps as a defensive group, despite the fact that Hitler had en-visioned this new formation as an offensive weapon. Fortunately forthe soldiers in Das Reich and the other SS divisions, the Red Armywinter offensive was just starting to lose its momentum by the timeHausser arrived. By late January, the Soviets had strained their logis-tical lines and lacked ammunition for their infantry, artillery andarmoured units. Although the Red Army still had plenty of troops tohurl at the Germans, its dwindling firepower enabled the SS units tohold their ground more effectively and perhaps maintain enoughstrength to mount a punishing counter-offensive.

Massed attacksAs soon as the regiments and battalions of the Das Reich Division set-tled into their assigned positions, they had to beat back attacks beinglaunched by division-size Soviet forces. By utilizing their over-whelming numerical superiority, the Red Army units graduallypushed back 2nd Battalion, Der Fuhrer Regiment and forced it towithdraw from its bridgehead on the River Oskol in early February.As the Soviets approached the River Donetz and came closer to Khar-kov, they created a salient that separated the main part of the DasReich Division from its Reconnaissance Battalion.On 7 February, the Red Army launched a new offensive that wasaimed at taking Kharkov. To achieve this objective, Stavka (the HighCommand of the Soviet Armed Forces) developed a plan that calledfor a pincer movement that would force I SS Panzer Corps either toevacuate the city or remain entrapped in a pocket. The southern armof this two-pronged assault covered a wide area located between theright flank of the Leibstandarte and the left flank of the 320th Divi-sion. The northern arm was less imposing and was situated north-east of Belgorod.Although they were aware that this offensive would probably result inthe encirclement of Kharkov, the Germans attempted to relocate todefensive positions on the western bank of the Donets which theyhoped would be adequate enough to hold the city without being sur-rounded. Thus, the Das Reich Division pulled back from its areaalong the Oskol on 9 February during a heavy blizzard. Obscured bythe weather conditions, Soviet snipers harassed the retreating Ger-mans, who were forced to march across ground that was covered with

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deep snow. Not surprisingly, many vehicles got stuck during this re-treat.On the other side of the Donets, the SS soldiers were dismayed tofind out that the Russians had already reached the area. As a result,the Das Reich Division pulled back even further and set up new posi-tions much closer to Kharkov. To thwart the Soviet pincer action thatthreatened to entrap in the city, Hausser ordered a bold counter-at-tack against the southern arm of the Red Army advance. His plancalled for a battle group to sweep southward and sever this append-age from the main part of the Soviet juggernaut.To ensure that his battle group had enough men to accomplish thistask, Hausser had to pull some of his troops from the front lines. Healso moved his divisions further to the west to give the task forcemore time to perform its mission. This unit consisted of the DerFuhrer Regiment and the Motorcycle Battalion from the Das ReichDivision, along with two units from the LeibstandarteDivision. On 10February, the battle group assembled at the town of Merefa to startits operation.The following day, the SS units sprang into action. While the two DasReich formations constituted the centre of the counter-attack, theother two SS units occupied the flanks. Although confronted withpunishing snowstorms, the battle group travelled quickly until itsarmoured vehicles approached enemy rear echelon units 50km (31miles) behind the Russian lines. While the SS took their opponentsby surprise, Stuka dive-bombers hammered Red Army positions fromthe sky. Within a short period of time, the Germans amputated thesouthern pincer of the Soviet attack and obliterated the 7th GuardCavalry Corps.After performing this feat, the SS battle group continued movingsouth until it made contact with soldiers from the 320th Division.With this mission complete, Hausser broke apart the group and re-turned its units to their respective divisions. Although these units hadsuffered heavy losses during the counter-attack, their men were inhigh spirits and gratified by the result of the operation. By this time,Keppler had to step down as commander of the Das Reich Divisionbecause of a brain haemorrhage, and was replaced by Herbert ErnstVahl.Undeterred by this setback, the Red Army renewed its offensive onKharkov. Although the SS divisions held their ground at Rogan andTernovoya, the Soviets had more success to the south, and seized thesuburb of Smiyev. Fortunately for the SS corps, overextended supplylines prevented enemy infantrymen from receiving adequate artillery

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support.As a result, they suffered terrible losses in wave after wave of assaultsagainst positions that were protected by MG 42 machine guns. A newweapon in the German arsenal, the MG 42 had a rapid rate of fire anda deafening noise. The Soviets referred to it as 'Hitler's Saw'. Germanpanzer and artillery units also wreaked havoc upon the Red Army at-tack.Despite these high casualty rates, the Soviets used their seeminglylimitless supply of manpower to push the SS divisions back closer toKharkov.Vastly outnumbered and severely depleted, the Germans relied upontheir discipline, training, dedication and courage to keep the RedArmy from collapsing their lines and sending them into a panickedrout. Although he had been ordered by Hitler to hold the city at allcosts, Hausser found this task increasingly difficult when the Sovietsseized Belgorod and were now moving north-west of the SS corps: theGermans were threatened with another possible encirclement.To the north-east, the Russians were punching holes in the perimeteraround Kharkov. By the evening of the 14th February, they hadpushed into the suburbs and were penetrating rear echelon areas ofthe SS Panzer Corps. To buy more time, a group of battle tanks fromthe Das Reich Division launched a punishing counter-attack in thenorth-western part of the city. Although this action brought a tempo-rary halt to the Soviet offensive on Kharkov, it seemed as if Hausser'stroops were slipping into another pincer.

Suggested withdrawalDetermined to see his division survive this ordeal. Hausser advisedhis superior officers in Army Group South to allow him to pull hiscorps out of Kharkov. To dramatize the futility of remaining in thecity, he predicted that the Soviets would take it within two or threedays, even if he sacrificed every man in his command. In response tothis plea, the Wehrmacht strategists merely reiterated to Hausserthat the order to hold Kharkov had come from Hitler himself. Thus,in order to save his command from annihilation, Hausser had to defyhis Fuhrer and, on 15 February, order an evacuation.With Soviet troops closing in on Kharkov, the withdrawal from thecity became a harrowing experience. Although Das Reich panzerunits had repulsed an enemy attack north-west of the city, Russianarmoured groups managed to seize part of Rogan and thus tightenthe gauntlet that seemed to be ensnaring the SS divisions. With theSS corps now confined to a narrow 1.6km(1 mile) wide corridor run-

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ning from the centre of Kharkov to the German lines, the Russianswere able to pour a rain of artillery shells into the city while the Ger-mans evacuated.As the Red Army tightened its grip, Hausser received two more or-ders to remain in Kharkov, even as his corps was preparing to retreat.Not surprisingly, he paid little attention to these messages. While theSS corps pulled out, Hitler personally visited the headquarters ofArmy Group South at Zaporozhye. Incensed that his order to holdKharkov at all costs had been disobeyed, he ordered the groupcommander, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, to place Hausser'stroops at the front of a counter-attack which would be aimed at re-taking the city. Late in the afternoon, the Soviets pushed through thesouth-eastern suburbs. By this time, Hausser was leading his divi-sions south of die city until they re-grouped at an area on the oppo-site bank of the River Udy. The Russians were now able to captureKharkov, but dieir success placed them in a salient that renderedthem vulnerable to a punishing offensive. This might produce a resultsimilar to the one they had achieved against I SS Panzer Corps. Pre-sented with such a promising opportunity, Manstein wasted no timeplanning a counter-attack. In his battle plan, the SS corps was toserve as the upper arm in a pincer movement around the city, whilethe rest of the 4th Panzer Army constituted the lower arm.

ReorganizationDuring the preparation for this counter-attack, some elements of I SSPanzer Corps underwent reorganization to adjust for the severelosses suffered during the defence of Kharkov. Within the Das ReichDivision, the surviving members of the Panzer Regiment were as-sembled into a single battalion. With more than half of its vehicles de-stroyed or disabled, the tank unit was incapable of functioning as afull-size regiment. Other depleted regiments within the corps experi-enced similar amalgamation. While the SS corps underwent thesechanges, Hausser congratulated his men for their willingness to worktogether under extremely adverse conditions. He was particular:'pleased with the ability of diverse units that had never worked togeth-er to cooperate and coordinate their offensive and defensive actions.In late February, the Red Army was still pressing the German lines,but with much less speed or force. South of Kharkov, the VoronezhFront was heading due west. Meanwhile, the South-West and SouthFronts moved south-west to establish bridgeheads on the Dnieperand seize the city of Dniepropetrovsk. Before he could re-take Khar-kov, Manstein had to destroy these enemy forces that were advancing

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on Dniepropetrovsk. At the time, his Army Group South occupied anarea between Rostov and Krasnograd.From 19 February to 4 March, the Germans thus waged an aggressivecounter-attack in an area between the Donets and Dnieper rivers. Atthe start of the operation, fog, snowfall and dampness bedevilled sol-diers on both sides. Charged with the task of seizing Peretschepinoand destroying all enemy forces west and south-west of Krasnograd,the Das Reich Division marched into battle with companies that hadan average size of only 60 men. To get to their objective, the SS sol-diers had to negotiate their way through a minefield. Because the bat-teries in their mine detectors were dead, the men of the DeutschlandRegiment were forced to locate the concealed explosives by stickingtheir bayonets into the snow. After they cleared a path for the divi-sion, 3rd Battalion, Der Führer Regiment rushed through and spear-headed the drive to Peretschepino. Supported by SP and tank units,the battalion ripped into the enemy flank and blocked a main roadthat the Red Army was using to reach the Dnieper. After repulsingseveral assaults on this position, the SS troops settled into the areafor the night. During the course of the day, they had advancedroughly 90km (56 miles). When they received a letter of encourage-ment from Hitler, they were even more motivated to continue theirmission.The following day, the division received an order to proceed another60km (37 miles) and seize a different objective, the town of Pavlo-grad. By this time, weather conditions had improved. During their ad-vance to this new objective, the SS units noticed a Soviet force - com-prising a regiment with five tanks approaching the Dnieper. Whilethe Deutschland Regiment prepared an ambush, a squadron of Stu-kas descended from the sky and knocked out four tanks. The SS regi-ment then destroyed the fifth, as well as two artillery pieces. Aftersweeping aside the surviving remnants of the Russian regiment, thedivision seized the town on 24 February.At nearby sectors, other German divisions experienced similar suc-cess. As a result, Manstein's forces were able to blunt the Red Army'sthrust to the Dnieper and push the Soviets out of areas south of Khar-kov. With this task accomplished, the Das Reich Division headednorth-east to capture the city. Determined to hold Kharkov at allcosts, Stavka sent fresh reinforcements against the Germans. In addi-tion, the Soviet High Command dispatched the 1st Guards Army andsix tank formations into the region to launch another attack on Dnie-propetrovsk.Before the Russian Army could attempt this feat, it had to defend the

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important railway centre of Losovaya, which was being attacked bythe Das Reich and Totenkopf divisions. After a three-day battle, theSS divisions routed the Red Army and captured the town. By the endof the month, the SS corps and other formations within the 4th Pan-zer Army had created a salient that was 100km (62 miles) wide andextended 120km (75 miles) east into Soviet-held territory.

New opportunityThe next objective for the Das Reich Division was the seizure of theheights surrounding Yefremovka. In the late night of 1 March, the di-vision began this operation amid a heavy downpour that turned roadsinto muddy creeks. During this sluggish move towards the objective,the Russian 3rd Tank Army moved into an area near Bereka so that itwas now positioned between the Das Reich and Leibstandarte divi-sions. When notified of this, Hausser immediately recognized an op-portunity to entrap the enemy force, and ordered the two SS divisionsto swing around and cut off any retreat to the east.In an ensuing battle that lasted for three days, the SS divisions haddifficulty receiving adequate amounts of equipment. Foul weatherand poor road conditions were preventing supply trucks from reach-ing combat units. Heinz Macher, a company commander in the DasReich Pioneer Battalion, noted the problem created by the ensuingammunition shortages during the fighting at Yefremovka. Tn a bombcrater only five metres from us two Russian soldiers were defendingthemselves bravely,' he recalled, 'fighting for their lives.' BecauseMacher and his battalion commander had no hand-grenades left, 'weeach picked up pieces of ice and rock and threw them at the enemy.They naturally thought we were throwing hand-grenades and ducked.We leapt up, rushed forward and in a short charge had soon over-powered and disarmed them'.Despite the problems created by chronic shortages of ammunitionand supplies, the Germans relentlessly hammered the 3rd TankArmy. During the course of the battle, they obliterated three infantrydivisions, three tank brigades, and a cavalry corps. Since the start ofManstein's counter-offensive, the actions carried out by the divisionsof Army Group South had led to the death or capture of roughly100,000 Soviet soldiers.

Kharkov regainedAt Hitler's insistence, Manstein assigned to the SS Panzer Corps amajor role in the recapture of the cit)/. This task became somewhateasier when Red Army forces west and north-west of Kharkov with-

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drew to the east. In early March, the SS divisions moved towardstheir objective. During the advance, the Der Führer Regimentguarded the eastern flank of the corps. As he approached Kharkov,Hausser assembled a battle group consisting of 3rd Battalion,Deutschland Regiment and a panzer battalion from the Totenkopf Di-vision. With little effort, this battle group seized a suburban area westof the city and prepared for the German attack that was to begin onthe morning of the 11th March.The attack on Kharkov began as scheduled, and a savage battle forpossession of the city quickly ensued. By mid-afternoon, SS troopshad taken the Salyutine railway station and were beating back the So-viet attempts to retake the facility. Fighting within the southern sec-tion of the city, the Der Führer Regiment pushed through well de-fended enemy positions and blocked the Udy-Merefa Road. In thenorthern part of Kharkov, the Deutschland Regiment encounteredmore stubborn resistance until its 3rd Battalion outflanked the Rus-sians and forced them to retreat.Later in the day, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army ordered theDas Reich Division to spearhead an assault into the centre of Khar-kov and entrap an enemy garrison occupying the industrial district,which was located in the south-eastern part of the city. To accomplishthis task, the Deutschland Regiment's 16th (Pioneer) Company hadto capture an anti-tank ditch and establish a bridgehead that wouldenable the division's heavy vehicles to reach the objective.Led by SS-Untersturmführer Heinz Macher, the pioneer companywas to deal with the enemy troops which were now occupying houseslocated behind the ditch. The Russians had the advantage of a goodview from which they were able to shoot at the Germans.In the early morning of 13 March, Macher led his troops to the ditchunder a covering barrage from an artillery battery. Despite this aid,the pioneers drew fire from several directions as they crossed the ob-stacle. Undeterred, the SS unit fought its way past mortar- and ma-chine-gun fire and seized a group of houses adjacent to the anti-tanktrench. With their bridgehead secure, the rest of the regiment movedacross and pressed on to the city centre. To enable the SPs to moveforward, the pioneers broke down the walls of the ditch. Eventually,the Der Führer Totenkopf panzer battle group arrived to join thedrive deep into the city.By this time, enemy resistance had begun to waver. Although the Rus-sians within Kharkov still had superior numbers and firepower, theywere becoming disorganized, demoralized and worn down from thecontinuous fighting. As the SS divisions drove further into the city,

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their troops fought and decimated the 1st and 2nd Tank Guard Corps,as well as four infantry divisions. On 15 March, the Germans de-stroyed the last remnants of the Red Army garrison at a tractor fac-tory located 6km (3.7 miles) east of the city. With this feat accom-plished. Kharkov once again fell into Manstein's hands.Without spending much time savouring his achievement, the FieldMarshal resolved to press his advantage. Sensing the potential to doyet more damage to the Soviet war machine, he planned further at-tacks that were aimed at re-taking more of the territory that the Ger-mans had lost to the Red Army winter offensive of 1942-43. Ulti-mately, he and other senior strategists in Army Group South hoped todestroy Soviet forces occupying a large salient around Kursk, andthen recapture the city. On 19 March, the Germans seized the town ofBelgorod, thus securing uncontested control over all land situated be-tween the Dnieper and Donets Rivers. By this time, the spring thawhad swept across the Ukrainian landscape, melting the snow and cov-ering the ground with large amounts of mud. Motorized transporta-tion was hindered by the weather and as a result, the attack on Kurskhad to wait.

Further changesDuring this break in the fighting, the Das Reich Division underwentmore reorganization and re-supply to adjust for the losses sufferedduring the fight for Kharkov. Most notably, many artillery batteriestraded in their static field pieces for SP guns. In addition, Hausser'sorganization acquired a new name and would now be known as II SSPanzer Corps. The Das Reich Division also experienced changes inleadership. Its commander, Herbert Ernst Vahl, had been severelywounded in action and was temporarily replaced by SS-OberführerKurt Brasack. Finally, the commander of the Der Führer Regiment,Otto Kumm, received the Oak Leaves Medal and a promotion thattransferred him out of the division. Eventually, he went to Yugoslaviaand became the commander of 7th SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs DivisionPrinz Eugen.Meanwhile, most of the soldiers of Das Reich and other divisions sta-tioned in the area did their best to coexist peacefully with the localpopulation. To facilitate cordial relations, some German units pro-vided the malnourished residents of Kharkov and nearby areas withbread and soup. Soldiers from Das Reich who were quartered in So-viet houses generally treated their hosts with respect. The Germansalso employed cobblers and skilled artisans who were able to makedecent money mending boots and other useful equipment.

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Indoctrination ignoredIn many instances, the SS soldiers ignored their Nazi racial indoctri-nation and openly fraternized with the Slavic 'subhumans'. Before theattack on Kursk, the Germans and their Ukrainian hosts even stageddances and feasts to pass the time. Despite its origin as an armedbranch of the NSDAP, the Waffen-SS was becoming less political anddeveloping an affinity with the Wehrmacht. Like their Army counter-parts, many SS soldiers were more interested in waging a successfulwar against a Bolshevik regime than in imposing an oppressive racialorder upon Eastern Europe. The Aryan 'supermen' of the Waffen-SSwere all too willing to accept anti-communist Russians, Ukrainiansand other Slavic groups into its ranks. Ironically, the most noticeabletension to emerge during this brief pause in the fighting took placebetween the frontline soldiers and the Nazi officials returning to re-store order to the area. When these bureaucrats found SS and Armytroops occupying facilities that had belonged to the bureaucrats be-fore the Soviet winter offensive, fighting often broke out. Not surpris-ingly, the combat veterans usually prevailed in these brawls.

Kursk the objectiveBy the summer of 1943, both sides knew that Kursk would be thenext target for the German armed forces in the Eastern Front. Be-cause Hitler and OKH anticipated that an invasion somewhere inWestern Europe would be launched by British and American forces,they sought to score a decisive victory in the Soviet Union. If the Ger-mans succeeded in collapsing the Russian salient around Kursk, theycould shorten their front line by about 500km (311 miles). With lessterritory to cover, OKH could send more divisions to France, Italyand other possible sites of an Allied landing. Moreover, such anachievement might inflict severe damage and even destroy the RedArmy, thus enabling the Axis powers to deal with this threat to thewest more effectively.Like earlier offensives in the region, Operation 'Citadel' was to be apincer action against Soviet forces at Kursk. North of the city, FieldMarshal Walther Model was to lead his 9th Army into the upper wallof the salient with three panzer corps. On the other side of the salient,General Hermann Hoth and the three panzer corps within his 4thPanzer Army were to strike from the south. Hausser's SS divisionswere attached to this latter organization. Essentially, the objective ofthe operation was similar to that which had been accomplished atKiev. The two armies were to drive inwards until they linked up, thuspinching off the salient and turning it into an isolated pocket filled

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with trapped Soviet forces.When Communist agents confirmed that the next German offensivewould take place at Kursk, the Red Army prepared an elaborate net-work of defences around the salient. Its troops excavated severallayers of trenches and laid minefields at important locations. Sovietcommanders also positioned anti-tank units throughout the salient toblunt the panzer formations. Stavka hoped that if the Germans suf-fered a decisive defeat in Operation 'Citadel', then the Red Armymight be able to launch a punishing counter-offensive and break theback of the Nazi war machine.

Soviet attackTo deprive the Germans of much-needed manpower for the offensive,the Red Army launched an attack against the 2nd Panzer Army,which was situated north of the 9th Army. By performing thismanoeuvre, Stavka intended to expose the left flank of the 9th Army,thus forcing Model to divert some of his forces from the Kursk attack.Although this action seemed to be a sensible tactic, it was based uponan erroneous assumption. The Soviets thought that the main part ofthe German offensive would be at the northern wall of the salient,when the larger concentration of forces was actually in the south.On 28 June, Hoth and his staff received an intelligence report indicat-ing that the Red Army had four infantry divisions arrayed across thefirst line of trenches in the sector facing his army, as well as two moredivisions on the second line. The senior commanders of the 4th Pan-zer Army also suspected that the Soviets had at least two armouredcorps in the area. Aware that a penetration of these lines of defencewould bring a swift counter-attack upon both of their flanks, Hothand his strategists issued instructions to their divisions.First, the three corps under Hoth's command were to break throughthe first two lines of defence at an area near Belgorod. On the left,XLVIII Panzer Corps was to head towards the town of Syrtzevo, whilean armoured formation known as Operational Group Kempf droveacross an area east of Belgorod. Between these two organizations, IISS Panzer Corps was to play the most important role in the southernpincer of the offensive. Hausser's divisions were to head toward thetowns of Pokrovka and Yakovlevo, then turn north-east and capturestrategic high ground near Prokhorovka. The 4th Panzer Army identi-fied the seizure of this piece of land as a crucial step to ensure the clo-sure of the Kursk pocket. During this action, the Kempf group wassupposed to protect the eastern flank of the SS divisions. If the ad-vance into enemy territory went as planned, the SS corps and the

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Kempf group would effectively create a pincer formation that coulddestroy the Soviet troops within its grasp. After accomplishing thisfeat, the two formations were to unite at Prokhorovka and charge intoKursk.At their starting positions, the SS divisions covered a sector that was20km (12 miles) wide. The Totenkopf occupied the left flank of theadvance, while the Leibstandarte was in the centre and Das Reichheld the right. Several hours before the attack was to begin on themorning of 5 July, 3rd Battalion and a group of pioneers armed withflame-throwers from the Deutschland Regiment infiltrated enemylines. After striking Russian outposts from behind, the battle groupswung around and attacked the main line positions in front of them.These actions softened up the Red Army defences in front of the SScorps and helped its divisions over-run, the first line of trenches.When the main attack began, Deutschland's 2nd and 3rd Battalionsconstituted the spearhead of the SS advance. Because of an intensedownpour that had turned the countryside into a gigantic quagmireof mud and swampland, tank and SP units were unable to provide ad-equate support for the infantrymen, who soon became involved inbrutal, hand-to-hand combat. Hans Huber, a member of a flame-throwing unit attached to 3rd Battalion, described his role in the as-sault: T fired a burst of flame as we approached every zig-zag in thetrench and at every strong point. It was a strange feeling to serve thisdestructive weapon and it was terrifying to see the flames eat theirway forward and envelop the Russian defenders.'While utilizing his flame-thrower, Huber recalled, 'soon I was col-oured black from head to foot from the fuel oil and my face was burntfrom the flames which bounced back off the trench walls or whichwere blown back at us by the strong wind. I could hardly see'. How-ever, he conceded that the weapon was an effective instrument in en-suring the success of the German attack, noting that 'the enemy couldnot fight against flame-throwers and so we made good progress, tak-ing many prisoners'. .

ExhaustionEventually, Stuka dive-bombers appeared on the scene and ham-mered enemy positions relentlessly, enabling 3rd Battalion to captureBeresov. The battalion was also supposed to seize a ridge known asPoint 233, which was situated north of the town. However, the SSmen were too exhausted and depleted from high casualty rates. Tocomplete the mission, 1st Battalion leapfrogged past them andpushed the Russians off the ridge. By mid-afternoon, the Das Reich

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Division had met all of its objectives for the day but still pressed for-ward in an effort to over-run the second line of trenches in the Kursksalient.Although the division made considerable progress, its troops couldnot dislodge the Soviet forces occupying the defences because poorroad conditions and minefields had prevented SS tank and SP unitsfrom reaching the area and providing necessary coverage for thegrenadiers. Thus, the division waited until the next morning beforecontinuing with its advance. During the course of the night, SS unitscarried out small-scale attacks against enemy outposts. On the sec-ond day of Operation Citadel, the Der Fuhrer Regiment replacedDeutschland as the spearhead of the SS offensive. In an attack uponanother piece of high ground that had been designated Point 243, theregiment had difficulty ascending the muddy slopes of the objective.Enemy artillery and machine-gun fire ripped into its battalions. Laterin the morning, the division pounded the Russians with artilleryshells, enabling the Der Fuhrer Regiment to seize the heights. Thispiece of territory provided the SS corps with access to a road that ranto Lutschki.By this time, Stavka was aware that the main thrust of the German of-fensive was in the south, rather than the north, and so shifted its de-fences to deal more effectively with II SS Panzer Corps and othernearby German formations. As a result, the 5th Guards Tank Armyand other reserve units in the Red Army headed towards Prokhorov-ka to blunt the Nazi advance. Stavka also planned to launch punish-ing counterattacks at the German divisions in order to bleed themwhite. Meanwhile, the Das Reich Division initiated another assault inorder to capture an elevated area containing several villages situatednorth of Prokhorovka, as well as a railway line at Belenichino. Spear-headed by 3rd Battalion, Der Fuhrer Regiment, the assault beganbadly. Soviet warplanes and artillery batteries tore into the SS troops.In a battle report, a battalion commander described the heroic leader-ship exhibited by a junior officer named Kruger serving in his com-mand. During the attack, the battalion commander recalled, 'a riflebullet struck his pocket and ignited an incendiary grenade he was car-rying. Untersturmfilhrer Kruger tore off his trousers and continuedto fight completely naked. He fought at the head of the Company un-til the objective was gained.' A week later, Kruger died in combat.

Regained momentumWhen the rest of the regiment joined the fight, the attack gainedmore momentum and the Germans managed to open a substantial

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gap in the enemy lines. On 8 July, the Red Army threw more arm-oured units at the advancing SS divisions. By this time, the focus ofthe battle for Kursk had clearly shifted to the southern sector. Whenit seemed as if the SS corps and the Kempf group were going to sur-round the Soviet garrison at Prokhorovka, the Red Army respondedwith a savage counter-attack. At Teterevino, 3rd Battalion, DerFuhrer Regiment held its ground against an armoured assault untileven" unit in the Das Reich Division reached the area to participatein the fight for this and other villages and the ridges upon which theysat. With the help of Stukas fitted with anti-tank cannons, attacksupon the SS divisions were kept off for a brief period. But beforeHausser's troops could resume offensive actions, the Red Armyhurled more infantry and armoured units at them. Most notably, aformation of 60 Russian battle tanks threatened SS supply lines bytrying to block the main road running from Belgorod to Oboyan.However, this threat soon abated when several Luftwaffe warplanesarrived, knocked out about 50 tanks, and killed several foot soldiers.At the same time, Das Reich and the other SS divisions repelled a ser-ies of armoured assaults at Teterevino, destroying almost 300 enemyarmoured vehicles during the course of the day.On 9July, the three SS divisions concentrated their forces in order torenew their offensive against the Red Army. To prevent this action,several corps from the Russian 1st Tank Army attacked the Germansfrom three directions. In the ensuing battle, the SS divisions tookmany heavy blows, but they held their ground against extreme Rus-sian pressure. Although Hausser's forces were in danger of being en-circled, they received orders from 4th Panzer Army headquarters topush forward and attack Soviet troops north-east of Beregovoy. Dur-ing this operation, Das Reich guarded the eastern flank of the othertwo SS divisions. En route to its objective, II SS Panzer Corps becameinvolved in a massive tank battle in the hills around Prokhorovka on12 July. This engagement would be the climax of Operation 'Citadel'.While the Leibstandarte and the Totenkopf divisions went on the of-fensive, Das Reich remained on the defensive, repelling several infan-try and armoured attacks. Oil the second day of the battle, Hausserput the Das Reich Division into action and it fought a duel with IIGuards Tank Corps. After several hours of combat, the battle reacheda:: indecisive conclusion. By nightfall, the two belligerents retired in astate of exhaustion.Although both sides had lost several hundred tanks and thousands oftroops, the Red Army was able either to repair or replace its losses,while the SS divisions were becoming worn down. Meanwhile, the en-

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tire offensive against Kursk seemed to be falling apart. On the north-ern wall of the salient, the 9th Army was unable to make much prog-ress; Field Marshal Model had to deal with a Russian counter-offen-sive that had been launched above the Kursk area. Moreover, the Al-lied landings on Sicily forced Hitler and OKW to contemplate the pos-sibility of diverting much-needed troops from the Eastern Frontdown to Italy.Despite this bleak situation, the SS divisions continued to fight likewildcats. On 14 July, Das Reich launched another attack on Beleni-chino. In a battle that raged from house to house, the 1st and 3rd Bat-talions of the Der Fuhrer Regiment destroyed 12 tanks while Stukasquadrons bombed and strafed enemy forces in and near the village.By the end of the day, Belenichino was in German hands. While theDer Fuhrer Regiment consolidated its control over the area, DasReich's Panzer Regiment repelled an armoured assault that wasaimed at re-taking the village.Unfortunately for the Third Reich, the victory at Belenichino turnedout to be the last hurrah of Operation 'Citadel'. Although the 4th Pan-zer Army had taken a considerable amount of territory, it was still130km (81 miles) south of the 9th Army. Thus, the Red Army stillcontrolled a large piece of territory that connected the city of Kursk tothe rest of the Soviet battle lines. After several days of fighting, thetwo German armies had barely dented the salient and were in no con-dition to launch more assaults against it. Not surprisingly, both sideshad sustained heavy losses. The Germans had suffered about100,000 casualties, while the Soviets lost 250,000 men killed and600,000 wounded. The Red Army had also sacrificed roughly 50 percent of its armoured vehicles.Although Hitler had not officially ended Operation 'Citadel', the cam-paign would soon come to an end for II SS Panzer Corps. Removedfrom the area, the Das Reich Division was to participate in a series ofbattles against a counter-offensive that the Red Army had launchedalong the River Mius. By this time, the Leibstandarte Division haddeparted for Italy. When it left the Eastern Front, it turned over itsarmoured fighting vehicles to Das Reich. Its departure also led to thedissolution of II SS Panzer Corps. In place of this formation, ArmyGroup South assembled a new corps that consisted of Das Reich, theTotenkopf, and the 3rd Army Panzer Division.At the end of the month, this new organization reached the Mius andengaged enemy forces that were moving into the area. As usual, theDas Reich troops distinguished themselves with their bravery. At thetown of Stepanovka, Heinz Macher noted that 'a small piece of shrap-

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nel from a 17.2 shell hit me in the left forearm and our platoonstretcher-bearer put on a field dressing. For a scratch like that onedid not abandon one's mates'. A few minutes later, another shell frag-ment 'severed the nerve in my upper left arm. End of the Act'.

Soviet attack bluntedAt another location along the Mius, Held Ruhl and a comrade relaxedbriefly after repelling a Soviet armoured unit: ' Oberscharfiihrer Top-fer, an infantry platoon commander, stopped with me and we both litcigarettes. He died in my arms,' Ruhl recalled, 'but no shot had beenfired. The doctor found that the cause of death was a hand-grenadesplinter which had struck and penetrated his temple. He had beenwounded on the previous day but had refused to go back. He was de-termined to stay with the attack until it was finished.' After three daysof combat, the SS units blunted the Red Army drive, pushing the Rus-sians back across the river. In mid-August, the Das Reich Division re-turned to Kharkov when Stavka launched another attack on the city.While the Soviet 53rd rushed the city from the north, the 57th Armyassailed its objective from the south. At first, the Red Army offensivestalled in the face of well-prepared defences established by ArmyGroup South. In the first two days of battle, the Russians lost 184 bat-tle tanks. However, on 22 August Manstein had to evacuate his forces- once again in defiance of Hitler's order - when the Soviets seemedas if they were about to encircle Kharkov yet again. Now recapturedby the Russians, the city had changed hands for the last time in thewar.

Tank victoriesBy this time, the Das Reich Division had already been pulled out ofthe area in order to intercept enemy forces that were driving towardsthe River Dnieper. On the same day of the Kharkov evacuation, acompany of Panther tanks destroyed 53 enemy vehicles during athree-hour battle with a large Soviet armoured formation. This en-gagement inaugurated a series of similar victories for the SS divisionthat lasted until the end of the month, when its commanders receivedan order to withdraw to the western bank of the Dnieper.During the month of September, the Das Reich Division pulled backto the river, fighting Soviet troops along the way on many occasions.On 12 September, the Reconnaissance Battalion and an armouredunit consisting of 14 Panther tanks ambushed a Red Army armouredformation that had overrun the division's positions. In the ensuingbattle, the SS Panzer and Reconnaissance troops destroyed a total of

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78 T-34 battle tanks. A week later, the division reached the Dnieperat an area near Kremechug, only to find that the Russians had al-ready successfully crossed the river.At the end of September, in an effort to prevent large numbers of ene-my forces from consolidating control of areas west of the Dnieper, theDas Reich division attacked the village of Grebeni, where the RedArmy had established several small bridgeheads. With a great deal ofhelp from two flame-throwing armoured vehicles, the Der FuhrerRegiment seized the town. By this time, the regiment had only 500surviving soldiers in its ranks. Fighting for these bridgeheads contin-ued until early October.

Soviet pressureDespite these successes, the overwhelming power of the Soviet armedforces continued to push the Germans westward. In early November,Army Group South had to abandon Kiev. South-west of the city, theDas Reich Division and other German formations did what theycould to keep the Red Army from inarching across the western Uk-raine. In this region, the division fought several inconclusive battlesthat depleted its regiments and battalions even further. By December,DasReichvfas no longer able to function as a full-size division andhad to be re-formed into a smaller organization that would be knownas the Panzer Battle Group Das Reich.The new panzer battle group contained 500( troops and included aninfantry regiment comprised of 1st Battalion, Deutschland Regimentand 2nd Battalion, Der Fuhrer Regiment. It also contained an arm-oured battalion that included two tank companies, as well as the Re-connaissance Battalion, two SP companies, a pioneer company, andvarious heaw weapons units. While this group remained in the East-ern Front as a component of XLII Corps, the other surviving ele-ments of the Das Reich Division returned to Germany after roughly10 months of almost continuous service in the batdefield.On Christmas Eve, the Red Army launched another offensive andquickly created two salients in the German lines, forcing ArmyGroup, South to pull back its forces to new positions east of Zhitomir.Near Studenizza, a Das Reich SP unit kept several T-34 tanks at baywhile the rest of the division retreated. After beating back the Sovietforces in this area, an SP crewman named Hans Woltersdorf peeredinto the first vehicle that his group had knocked out, noting that 'theinterior was sickening.

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Fig T-34 soviet tank preparing for offensiveA headless torso, bleedine flesh and guts splattered the walls'. Out-side the T-34, the Soviet tank driver died in SS captivity. The back ofhis head had been smashed, exposing his bloodied brains. There wasfroth on his lips,' Woltersdorf recalled, 'typical of this type of woundwhere the brain is dead but the lungs are still working.'

Rearguard actionTo reach its new line of defence, Battle Group Das Reich had to crossthe River Tetrev. While the unit's infantrymen and SP units carriedout a holding action that kept the Soviets at bay, the pioneers hastilyconstructed a temporary bridge that enabled the SS vehicles to crossthe river. When the last of the Germans reached the other bank, thepioneers detonated the bridge, preventing the Russians from continu-ing the attack, at least for a short time. For the rest of the winter, theSS battle group saw more action as the Red Army continued to pushthe Germans westward and out of the Ukraine. By-January 1944, theunit had lost more than 1000 of its 5000 troops. In March, these sur-vivors had to fight their way through enemy forces out of a pocket be-fore reaching the relative safety of the 4th Panzer Army at Buszacz.On 8 April, the soldiers of Das Reich at last departed the front linesand marched 80km (49 miles) across Galicia to climb on board atrain that would take them back to Germany. After 13 hard months ofservice in the Eastern Front, at the end of April, the 800 survivorsfrom Panzer Battle Group Das Reich reached Toulouse in south-westFrance and rejoined the rest of their division.

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3rd S.S Panzer Division TotenkopfThe SS Division Totenkopf ("Death's Head"), also known as 3. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Totenkopf and 3. SS-Panzer-Division To-tenkopf, was one of the 38 divisions fielded by the Waffen-SS duringWorld War II. Prior to achieving division status, the formation wasknown as Kampfgruppe Eicke. The division is infamous due to its in-signia and the fact that most of the initial enlisted soldiers were SS-Totenkopfverbände (SS concentration camp guards). The Totenkopfdivision was numbered with the "Germanic" divisions of the Waffen-SS. These included also the SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte SSAdolf Hitler, SS-Panzer Division Das Reich, and SS-Panzer DivisionWiking.

Formation and Fall GelbThe SS Division Totenkopf was formed in October 1939. The Toten-kopf was initially formed from concentration camp guards of the 1st(Oberbayern), 2nd (Brandenburg) and 3rd (Thüringen) Standarten(regiments) of the SS-Totenkopfverbände, and soldiers from the SS-Heimwehr Danzig. The division had officers from the SS-Verfügung-struppe (SS-VT), of whom many had seen action in Poland. The divi-sion was commanded by SS-Obergruppenführer Theodor Eicke.Through the Battle of France the division was generally equippedwith ex-Czech weapons.Having missed the Polish campaign, Totenkopf was initially held inreserve during the assault into France and the Low Countries in May1940. They were committed on 16 May to the Front in Belgium. TheTotenkopf soldiers fought fanatically, suffering heavy losses.Within a week of this initial commitment the division's first warcrime had already been committed. At Le Paradis 4th Kompanie, IAbteilung, commanded by SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Knöchlein, ma-chine-gunned 97 out of 99 British officers and members of the RoyalNorfolk Regiment after they had surrendered to them; two survived.After the war, Knöchlein was tried by a British Court and convictedfor war crimes in 1948. He was sentenced to death and hanged.Totenkopf saw action a number of times during the French campaign.To the north-east of Cambrai the division took 16,000 French prison-ers. Whilst subsequently trying to drive through to the coast they en-countered a major Anglo-French force which they had a great deal ofdifficulty stopping and came perilously close to panic. Totenkopf hadto resort to firing artillery pieces in an anti-tank role, and were savedonly by the intervention of Luftwaffe dive-bombers. It then sufferedheavy losses during the taking of the La Bassée Canal. Further stiff re-

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sistance was then encountered at both Béthune and Le Paradis. TheFrench surrender found the division located near the Spanish border,where it was to stay, resting and refitting, until April 1941. Totenkopfhad suffered heavy losses during the campaign, including over 300officers. Replacement personnel were supplied, this time via regularWaffen-SS recruitment as opposed to coming from the camps. Flakand artillery battalions were added to its strength. Local vehicleswere also commandeered from the French, many of the divisionssoft-skinned transports during Barbarossa were of French origin.

Barbarossa-Demjansk PocketIn April 1941, the division was ordered East to join Generalfeldmar-schall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Army Group North. Leeb's ArmyGroup was tasked with advancing on Leningrad and formed thenorthern wing of Operation Barbarossa. Totenkopf saw action in Lith-uania and Latvia, and by July had breached the vaunted Stalin Line.The division then advanced by Demjansk to Leningrad where it wasinvolved in heavy fighting from 31 July to 25 August. During Autumnand Winter of 1941, the Soviets launched a number of operationsagainst the German lines in the Northern sector of the Front. Duringone of these operations, the Division was encircled for severalmonths near Demjansk in what would come to be known as the Dem-jansk Pocket. During these kessel battles, Totenkopf suffered sogreatly that, due to its reduced size, it was re-designated Kampf-gruppe Eicke. The division was involved in ferocious fighting to holdthe pocket. SS-Hauptsturmführer Erwin Meierdress of the Sturm-geschütze-Batterie (Assault Gun) Totenkopf formed a Kampfgruppeof about 120 soldiers and held the strategic town of Bjakowo despiterepeated determined enemy attempts to capture the town. Duringthese battles, Meierdress personally destroyed several enemy tanks inhis StuG III. He was awarded the Iron Cross for his actions duringthis period. In April 1942, the division broke out of the pocket andmanaged to reach friendly lines. At Demjansk, about 80% of its sol-diers were killed, wounded or missing in action. The remnants of theDivision were pulled out of action in late October, 1942 and sent toFrance to be refitted. While in France, the Division took part in CaseAnton, the takeover of Vichy France in November 1942. For this oper-ation, the division was supplied with a Panzer battalion and redesig-nated 3.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Totenkopf. The division re-mained in France until February, 1943, when their old commander,Theodor Eicke, resumed control.

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Kharkov – KurskIn Early February 1943 Totenkopf was transferred back to the East-ern Front as part of Erich von Manstein's Army Group South. The di-vision, as a part of SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser's SS PanzerCorps, took part in the Third Battle of Kharkov, blunting the Sovietoffensive. During this campaign, Theodor Eicke was killed when hisFieseler Storch spotter aircraft was shot down while on final ap-proach to a front line unit. The division mounted an assault to securethe crash site and recover their commander's body, and thereafterEicke's body was buried with full military honours. Hermann Priesssucceeded Eicke as commander.The SS Panzer Corps, including Totenkopf, was then shifted north totake part in Operation Citadel, the great offensive to reduce the Kursksalient. It was during February 1943 that the 3rd SS Panzer Regimentreceived a company of Tiger I heavy tanks (9th Company/3rd SS Pan-zer Regiment). This company was near full strength by the time Cita-del commenced having honed their tank-killing skills during the Ger-man counterstroke to recapture the cities of Kharkov and Belgorodduring the spring of 1943.The attack was launched on 5 July 1943, after a massive Soviet artil-lery barrage fell on the German assembly areas. The II SS PanzerCorps (renamed after the formation of the I SS Panzer Corps onemonth earlier) was to attack the southern flank of the salient as thespearhead for Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army. TheTotenkopf covered the advance on the II SS Panzer Corps left flank,with the Leibstandarte forming the spearhead. 3rd SS Panzer Regi-ment advanced in a panzerkeil across the hot and dusty steppe. De-spite encountering stiff Soviet resistance and several pakfronts, theTotenkopf's panzers continued the advance, albeit at a slower pacethan had been planned. Hausser ordered his II SS Panzer Corps tosplit in two, with the Totenkopf crossing the Psel river northwardsand then continuing on towards the town of Prokhorovka.In the early morning of 9 July, 6th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment The-odor Eicke attacked northwards, crossing the Psel and attempted toseize the strategic Hill 226.6, located to the east of the fortified villageof Kliuchi.The attack was rebuffed by the defending Soviets. The failure to cap-ture the hill meant that the drive along the north bank of the Psel wastemporarily halted, forcing Hausser to also delay the Southern ad-vance. In the afternoon, regiment Eicke managed to redeem itself bycapturing the hill, but the northern advance slowed and the majorityof the division was still south of the Psel, where elements of SS-Pan-

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zergrenadier-Regiment 5 Thule continued to advance towards Pro-khorovka and cover the flank of the Leibstandarte.By 11 July, SS-Hauptsturmführer Erwin Meierdress had led his 1stCompany/3rd SS Panzer Regiment across the Psel on hastily con-structed pontoon bridges, reinforcing the tenuous position. Theforces in the bridgehead were subjected to several furious Soviet at-tacks, but with the support of Meierdress' panzers they held theirground and slowly expanded the bridgehead, securing the village ofKliuchi. Strong Soviet opposition had severely slowed the division'sadvance along the north bank.In the afternoon of 12 July, near the village of Andre'evka on thesouth bank of the Psel, the Soviets launched a major counterattackagainst Regiment Thule and the division's StuG battalion.SS-Brigadeführer Hermann Priess, the Totenkopf's commander, or-dered Meierdress' abteilung to advance and support the beleagueredforces. The PzKpfw IIIs and PzKpfw IVs of Meierdress' unit were sup-ported by the Totenkopf's Tiger I company, 9th Company/3rd SSPanzer Regiment. In ferocious combat with the lead units of the 5thGuards Tank Army, Meierdress managed to halt the Soviet assault,destroying many Soviet T-34s, but at the cost of the majority of thedivision's remaining operational panzers.While the II SS Panzer Corps had halted the Soviet counteroffensiveand inflicted heavy casualties, it had exhausted itself and was no lon-ger capable of offensive action. Manstein attempted to commit his re-serve, the XXIV Panzer Corps, but Hitler refused to authorize this.On 14 July, Hitler called off the operation.

Battles on the Mius Front – Retreat to the DnieprAlong with Das Reich, the division was reassigned to General der In-fanterie Karl-Adolf Hollidt's reformed 6th Army in the Southern Uk-raine. The 6th Army was tasked with eliminating the Soviet bridge-head over the Mius River.Totenkopf was involved in heavy fighting over the next several weeks.During the July–August battles for Hill 213 and the town of Stepa-nowka, the division suffered heavy losses, and over the course of thecampaign on the Mius-Front it suffered more casualties than it hadduring Operation Citadel. By the time the Soviet bridgehead waseliminated, the division had lost 1500 soldiers and the Panzer regi-ment was reduced to 20 tanks.The Totenkopf was then moved north, back to Kharkov. Along withDas Reich, Totenkopf, took part in the battles to halt Operation Ru-myantsev and to prevent the Soviet capture of the city. Although the

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two divisions managed to halt the offensive, inflicting heavy casual-ties and destroying over 800 tanks, the Soviets outflanked the de-fenders, forcing them to abandon the city on 23 August.By early September, the Totenkopf reached the Dniepr. Elements ofthe Soviet 5th GuardsTank Army had forced a crossing at Kremenchug and were soonthreatening to break through the Dniepr line. Totenkopf was throwninto action against the bridgehead.In October 1943, the division was reformed as 3rd SS Panzer DivisionTotenkopf. The Panzer abteilung (battalion) was officially upgradedto a regiment, and the two Panzergrenadier regiments were given thehonorary titles Theodor Eicke and Totenkopf.After holding the Kremenchug bridgehead for several months, the So-viets finally broke out, pushing Totenkopf and the other axis divisionsinvolved back towards the Romanian border. By November, Toten-kopf was engaged fighting intense defensive actions against Soviet at-tacks over the vital town of Krivoi Rog to the west of the Dniepr.

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Map Battle of Kursk 4 July - 1 August 1943

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Order of BattleFormed on 11/9/42 in South France by the 1st Army as the "SS Pan-zergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" from the SS Totenkopf (mot) Divi-sion. When organized it consisted of:1/,2/,3/1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Totenkopf"1/, 2/, 3/3rd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Totenkopf"1/,2/3rd SS Panzer Regiment "Totenkopf" (from the battalion formedin the Summer of 1943).S.S Totenkopf Reconnaissance Battalion (4 companies)1/,2/,3/,4/SS Totenkopf Artillery RegimentSS Totenkopf Panzerjäger Battalion (3 companies)S.S Totenkopf Flak Battalion (4 batteries)SS Totenkopf Sturmgeschütz Battalion (4 batteries)S.S Totenkopf Pioneer Battalion (3 companies)SSTotenkopf Signals Battalion (2 companies)The Thule Schützen Regiment was absorbed into the 1st SS Panzer-grenadier Regiment "Totenkopf." The two panzer grenadier regi-ments were named the 1 st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Thule" andthe 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke." In February1943 the 3rd SS Panzer Regiment was organized and equipped as fol-lows:1/,2/3rd SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had:1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies 4th Heavy Panzer Company

On 5/1/43 the 3rd SS Panzer Regiment was reorganized such that itsbattalions each had two medium and one light panzer company. Inthe summer of 1943 the reconnaissance battalion was reinforced tosix companies and the panzer regiment was reinforced to eight com-panies. For the battle of Kursk the division had 114 tanks and 28 as-sault guns. Included was a company of 11 Tiger tanks. On 7/1/43 the

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panzer inventory and organization of the 3rd SS Panzer Regimentwas as follows:1/,2/3rd SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had1 Panzer Staff Company2 Medium Panzer Companies1 Light Panzer Company9th Heavy Panzer Company

On 10/21/43 the division was reorganized by the order of the Fuhreras a Panzer Division. On 10/22/43 the division was given the number3 and the panzer grenadier regiments were renumbered the 5th SSPanzergrenadier Regiment "Thule" and the 6th SS Panzer-grenadierRegiment "Theodor Eicke." All other portions of the division werenumbered "3rd." In December 1943 the Panzerjager Battalion wasdisbanded and the Sturmgeschutz battalion was rebuilt.

Panzer-Grenadier-Division GroßdeutschlandThe Großdeutschland Division was an elite Heer combat unit of theWehrmacht. The Großdeutschland was considered to be the premierunit of the German Army and as such it was one of best-equippedunit of the German Armed Forces, receiving equipment before all oth-er units. The roots of the unit go back to 1921 when the guard units ofthe city of Berlin (Wachregiment Berlin) was created. It became laterInfantry Regiment Großdeutschland9. The Regiment GD saw actionin France in 1940. It was attached to Panzer Group 2 in the openingphases of Barbarossa, being nearly annihilated in the vicious fightingoutside of Moscow in late 1941. On the last day of February 1942, Ri-fle Battalion GD (all that was left of the original Regiment) was dis-banded and two battalions formed a new GD Regiment out of rein-

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forcements arriving from Neuruppin.The Regiment moved to Orel after a period in the front line, and on 1Apr 1942, arising out of the need for new motorized formations forthe summer offensives of 1942, an announcement was made at a regi-mental parade at Rjetschiza: "Effective immediately the former Infan-try Regiment Großdeutschland is expanded to the Infantry DivisionGroßdeutschland.»

Infantry Division Großdeutschland 1942While resting and refitting near Orel, the Infantry Regiment Groß-deutschland reorganized and expanded to become Infanterie-Divi-sion Großdeutschland (mot). The existing Regiment became Infant-erie-Regiment Großdeutschland 1, and was joined by the newlyformed Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland 2. Supporting units inthe form of a Panzer battalion, an assault gun battalion and increasedflak, artillery and engineers were added with the upgrade to divisio-nal status. After the reorganization, the Großdeutschland Divisionwas assigned to XLVIII. Panzerkorps during the opening phases ofFall Blau, the assault on Stalingrad. The division took part in the suc-cessful attacks to cross the upper Don river and to capture Voronezh.In August, the division was pulled back to the north bank of the Do-nets and held as a mobile reserve and fire-brigade counterattackforce. During the combined Soviet winter offensives Operation Ura-nus and Operation Mars, the Division was involved in heavy winterfighting near Rzhev. The Division sustained heavy losses in the Rzhevsalient, effectively making the division combat ineffective. It waspulled out of the lines and refitted.

KharkovIn January–February 1943, Großdeutschland and XLVIII.Panzer-korps, along with the II SS Panzer Corps took part in the Third Battleof Kharkov. The division fought alongside the 1.SS Division Leibstan-darte SS Adolf Hitler, 2.SS Division Das Reich and 3.SS Division To-tenkopf during these battles. After the fall of Kharkov, the Groß-deutschland was again pulled back and refitted. At this time, the divi-sion was equipped with a company of Tigers, an unusual additionmaking GD the only Panzergrenadier division to have its own heavytanks, and the only non-Waffen SS division at that time to have itsown Tigers (they were normally deployed in independent heavy tankbattalions).

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Panzergrenadier Division GroßdeutschlandIn June 1943, with the addition of armoured personnel carriers andTigers the division was redesignated Panzergrenadier-Division Groß-deutschland, though in reality it now had more armoured vehiclesthan most full scale panzer divisions.

KurskThe newly re-equipped division was attached to the German FourthPanzer Army of Generaloberst Hermann Hoth, and was to take a ma-jor role (again paired with the SS-Panzerkorps) in Operation Citadel,the battles to sever the Kursk salient. During the buildup period, abrigade of two battalions of new Panther Ausf. D tanks came underthe operational control of Großdeutschland. After the launch of Cita-del, the division was heavily engaged in the fight to penetrate thesouthern flank of the salient. The new Panthers were plagued by tech-nical problems, suffering from engine fires and mechanical break-downs, many before reaching the battle. Contrary to popular belief,GD did not take part in the epic tank battle of Prokhovrovkha, andthe Panther tanks were not engaged as most were broken down bythe time the battle started. However they witnessed the battle as theywere held in reserve. The division fought on until it was pulled backto Tomarovka on 18 July 1943.

Defensive battlesAfter the canceled Kursk offensive, the division was transferred backto Heeresgruppe Mitte, and resumed its role as mobile reserve. TheTiger tank company was expanded to an entire battalion, becomingthe III. Battalion of the Panzer Regiment. GD saw heavy fightingaround Karachev before being transferred back to XLVIII Panzer-korps in late August. For the rest of 1943, Großdeutschland was en-gaged in the fighting withdrawal from the eastern Ukraine, takingpart in battles around Kharkov, Belgorod, and finally on the Dnieper,ending the year fighting strong enemy forces near Michurin-Rog, eastof Krivoi-Rog. It was during this period that the division earned thenickname "die Feuerwehr" (The Fire Brigade).

Generalleutnant der Reserve Hyazinth Graf Von Gross-Zauche Und CamminetzThose who have even a cursory knowledge of the use of armor inWorld War II immediately recognize the name of Michael Wittmann.He, with his daring solo attack on units of the British 7th Armored Di-vision at Villers Bocage on June 12th, 1944, would go down in history

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as one of the best "tank aces" of the war. There were, however, nu-merous other tank commanders that, though largely unknown, per-formed almost miraculous service in the Panzerwaffe. Such a manwas GeneralleutnantHyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Gross-Zauche und Comminetz. Hisservice to Germany was mostly on the East Front against the Rus-sians. That in itself could account for the fact that so many western-ers have not heard the name. He would eventually become known assimply "der Panzergraf". This name came primarily as a result of hisaristocratic and military heritage.Born on 30 July 1893 to a wealthy family in Upper Silesia, Graf(Count) Strachwitz (whose Christian name, by tradition in his family,was given to first born sons for over 700 years in homage to Saint Hy-azinth) attended military school in Berlin and in 1912 joined the Regi-ment Garde du Corps as a commissioned officer. The unit was a verysocially exclusive one, being the most senior regiment of the PrussianArmy. Graf Strachwitz distinguished himself in sports before the FirstWorld War, and saw action as a junior officer, being captured duringa patrol early in the war and spending long years in captivity after adeath sentence (for wearing civilian clothes on the patrol) was com-muted. Nonetheless, he had time enough to win both the Iron CrossII Class and I Class.Another of the Panzer Graf's character traits was an almost inordi-nate boldness. He had no hesitation in doing the most unconvention-al if the situation demanded it. When the First World War did breakout, Strachwitz was one of the first to offer himself for service. Hespecifically requested long-range patrol work behind French lines.His performance, though brief, was spectacular. It read like a novel.He was able to secure and pass on valuable intelligence on the enemyand also performed various acts of sabotage against the French. Hehad a number of close calls, barely escaping capture.On one occasion he and his men found themselves soaked to the skinin one of their operations. They stripped to dry themselves and theiruniforms when they came under attack by French colonial forcessearching for them.The Count was able to procure civilian clothes for himself and hismen (he spoke fluent French), but was captured shortly after. Havingbeen taken prisoner in civilian attire, Strachwitz was put on trial as aspy, but was acquitted. He was, nevertheless sent to a penal colony in-stead of a prisoner of war facility. His health deteriorated rapidly.When moved to a POW camp, he attempted to escape but sufferedserious injuries. Finally he feigned madness in such a way as to be

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committed to an asylum where he spent the remainder of the war.Between the wars, Graf Strachwitz helped in the defense of Silesiaagainst Polish incursions, in the turmoil that was post-war Germany,and after a time he left the military to run the family estate (Gross-stein). As a reserve officer, he attended exercises of Reiter (Cavalry)Regiment 7 and Panzer Regiment 2 during the 1930s. He served withthe latter regiment in Poland, France and the Balkans.During this time Strachwitz had retained his commission as a reserveofficer in the Reichsheer's Cavalry Regiment. In 1934 he attendedsome Army maneuvers of the newly forming German Army. He wascaptured with the idea of armored forces, their mobility and poten-tial. This type of action fit the Count's personality well. It only took amoment for him to decide that this would be the branch of the mili-tary in which he would serve.His application was accepted and he joined a large number of youngGermans who would form the beginnings of Germany's first "Panzer"division. He became a lower ranking officer in the 2nd Panzer Regi-ment. The Count served with that unit in battles in Poland, Franceand the Balkans.He performed well as a tank commander and his boldness knew nobounds. Early on he established a premise that he maintainedthroughout the war. "Tanks must not be allowed to stand still. Theymust be permanently on the move and always led from the front".This dictum ruled his life as a tank commander throughout his ca-reer.Though always courteous and respectful, Strachwitz was a fighter. Heshowed the enemy no mercy. He never let fear or adverse circumstan-ces control his efforts. During the campaign in France, Strachwitz, inhis command tank, found himself cut off from their own forces and ina well-garrisoned French town. Knowing if he turned to flee, hewould be cut down by a hundred French guns now trained on him.So he dismounted from his tank, strode forward with confidence to-ward the sentries posted at the entrance to the town and demandedto speak to the French commander. Again in faultless French he an-nounced to the French officer that unless he surrendered the garrisonto him at once, his panzer regiment, hidden nearby would open fire.After a moment's hesitation, the officer capitulated and had his menlay down their arms.By the beginning of Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, Strachwitzhad been promoted to Colonel and was leading a battalion of tanksacross the Bug River. His divisional commander, Gen. Walther Nehr-ing, had hitched a ride with him. Once on the opposite shore, the

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Count took his commander to a rendezvous point with the rest of thedivisional command and was off immediately.He and a number of his tanks quickly shattered some initial Sovietdefenses and entered the rear area of the enemy's lines, creating hav-oc. It was estimated that with a platoon of PzKpfw. III tanks Strach-witz would account for over 300 trucks and other pieces of Russianequipment. With German tanks running amok in their rear, the sol-diers panicked and headed east at top speed.After six days of fast advances, the leading German tank columns ofthe 1st Panzer Group came under attack from a sporadic and poorlyexecuted counterattack by four Russian Mechanized Corps, orches-trated by General Mikhail Kirponos, commander of the SouthwestFront. It would be the largest single battle of tanks in history until thebattle of Kursk two years later.The Germans were hit hard repeatedly from both the north and thesouth in the Dubno area as the Soviets sought to cut off the leadingGerman columns and annihilate them. The Russian tanks, thoughmore numerous and at times more powerful than the German ones,were poorly led and fed piece-meal into the fight.By the afternoon of the 29th, it was apparent that the major effort bythe Russians had failed. The Germans had been stopped, that wastrue, but it turned out to be only a temporary delay. It seemed thatthe Russians had gotten their fill of battle and were ready to back off,but not so, the "Panzer Graf". As the enemy tanks and infantry beganwithdrawing under the cover of night, they were followed closely bytanks of Strachwitz's battalion.Even though the last two days had been filled with fighting, burningtanks and fiery explosions, the Count, seemingly impervious to weari-ness and fatigue, led his men to hiding places near the Russian bivou-ac. At first light, when the Russian's forces began stirring, Strachwitzlaunched yet another attack, crushing the enemy and penetrating tothe enemy artillery positions. It had been the Soviet artillery that hadbeen one of the more serious problems in the earlier fighting and theCount was going to make sure that these guns would not be usedagainst his brothers in arms again. Again the enemy suffered heavycasualties from the iron hand of Strachwitz. Graf Strachwitz (holdingthe rank of Major) commanded the first battalion of Panzer Regiment2, being awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on 25 August1941. Before the end of the year, Strachwitz would be the recipient ofanother rarely given German medal, the German Cross in Gold. Ithad been instituted in September 1941. It had a two-fold purpose. Itwas to be awarded in cases of bravery that went above the reach of

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the Iron Cross 1st Class but not quite to the level of the Knight'sCross. Strachwitz and a few others were awarded this medal afterhaving already received the Knight's Cross in recognition of their con-tinued valor and service to their country.By 1942, the Count was known to all as "der Panzergraf". He seemedto lead a charmed life and was always in the van of the advance. Histank would be the first piece of German armor to enter the city of Sta-lingrad in the fall of 1942. On that occasion his tank and those of hismen made a deep penetration to the Russian airfield. There hewrought more havoc with estimates as high as 150 aircraft destroyedduring the battle. The Count was also present when the German SixthArmy found itself suddenly cut off and in danger of extermination. Asthe winter slammed into the fearful, half-frozen Germans within theRussian trap, Strachwitz and his panzers became a big part of the de-fenses. His tanks and men seemed to be always supplied. That wasbecause the Count made one and another foray into and beyond Rus-sian front lines to get the supplies he needed.During this period he would be given the Oakleaves to add to his IronCross when he set up the perfect ambush for encroaching Soviettanks. As was his custom, he had his men hide and make their tanksblend in with the countryside. As one after another of the enemy's ar-mor appeared and approached, Strachwitz held his tanks in check,not allowing them to fire until the right moment. When it came, itwas a disaster for the Russians. In a series of brilliant maneuvers thetanks of the Count accounted for over 100 enemy tanks without los-ing a single one of their own. It was a phenomenal exhibition of cour-age and cunning in the most adverse of circumstances. In the longrun, however, the enemy would overpower the German Sixth Army.Even the skills of the Count could not keep his crews invulnerable.Sheer weight of numbers began depleting Strachwitz's tanks andmen. There seemed to be no end to them. A few days later Strachwitzwas seriously wounded and evacuated by air. He would not be at Sta-lingrad when the rest of the German forces surrendered to the So-viets.After fighting in the Stalingrad area, von Strachwitz commanded asan Oberst the Panzer Regiment of the elite Panzer Grenadier DivisionGroßdeutschland. Having only a handful of tanks, the Großdeutsch-land division needed capable men like von Strachwitz to lead theirtanks against a numerically superior Russian Army. On one occasion,he laid an ambush with four of his panzers deep inside Soviet lines.The Russian tanks never expected the enemy so deep in their ownrear, and the German group destroyed 105 Russian tanks in less than

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an hour, without the loss of a single panzer.Once Strachwitz had been nursed back to health, he was given thecommand of one of the newly forming schwere Panzer Abteilungen(heavy tank battalions), equipped with the new monster, the Panzer-kampfwagen VI E, "Tiger" tank. He was soon back in the thick of bat-tle, this time with the top-notch Gross Deutschland Division, thistime in the boiling "kessel" known as Kharkov. Being the key to move-ment to the east or west, Kharkov became one of the most contestedcities in military history. It would swap hands four times during theGerman-Russian conflict.It was early 1943 and General von Manstein, against the Fuhrer's di-rective, skillfully evacuated Kharkov and let the enemy overextendhimself. He would then take the city back for himself. Late one eve-ning Strachwitz was visiting one of his advanced observation postsand saw for himself the sudden appearance of dozens of Russiantanks as they crested the hill and descended into the valley. Theywere headed right toward him and his forces. The Count ordered histanks to hold their positions.When the Soviet armor finally stopped, waiting for the dawn, Strach-witz got his forces in order. When the first rays of daylight began tochange and pierced the blackness, the Russian tanks cranked theirengines and began to move.The Tigers of the Großdeutshland Heavy Battalion still had not beendetected. Once more the audacious master of deception had fooledthe enemy. Waiting can be perhaps the most trying element of war,but the Count's men were well disciplined and waited for the order tofire. When it came, the gates of hell seemed to open up before theRussian tank crews. As the German 88's cracked sharply in the earlymorning, they cut a path of death through the Soviet tanks. Withinminutes over 18 enemy tanks were destroyed. The tank crews stillalive immediately began to withdraw their vehicles. As was his cus-tom, however, the Count would not allow this. He continued to pur-sue the Russians as they sought to leave the battlefield and before theday had ended, the entire Soviet tank force had been destroyed. Onlyone of the Tigers suffered any significant damage, but it was repairedby German mechanics brought forward by Strachwitz before dark-ness came.On 13 November 1942, he became the 144th soldier to be awarded theOak Leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. By January 1943,"der Panzergraf" (The Armored Count, as he was by then known) wasan Oberst and given command of Panzer Regiment Großdeutschland.Not long after followed the award of the Swords to the Knight's Cross

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of the Iron Cross, on 28 March 1943, for his part in the counterattackat Kharkov.In 1943, the Generals Hubert Lanz and Hans Speidel and colonel Hy-azinth Graf von Strachwitz decided with the headquarters of thegroup of armies B in Walki in Russia, to stop Hitler at the aerodromeof Poltawa with a quota carefully selected of the division armoredunder the command of von Strachwitz, and to cut down it in theevent of resistance, which it was obviously necessary to take into ac-count. The Field-marshal Rommel was also informed of these plans,but he was then in Africa.But Hitler landed against any waiting in Saporoshe and not with Pol-tawa. In November 1943, Strachwitz left the Großdeutschland onwhat were termed grounds of ill health in the official record. Off therecord, tension existed between Graf Strachwitz and GD's divisionalcommander, Generalleutnant "Papa" Hoernlein. Some veterans feelthat the true reason for his leaving lied there. Graf Strachwitz hasbeen described as a good tactician at the battalion and regimental lev-el, but also as being inflexible, not open to compromise.Being recalled to active duty after extended sick leave in January1944, and with promotion to Generalmajor d.R. (der Reserve), GrafStrachwitz went on to become the 11th soldier of the German ArmedForces to be awarded the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the IronCross, on 15 April 1944.He briefly commanded the 1st Panzer Division during this time.Onceagain his tactical brilliance came to the fore. Scraping together what-ever he could to form "Fire Brigades", Strachwitz continued to shoreup the crumbling German defenses.Again and again he was able to accomplish the impossible. In ArmyGroup North a new saying arose, "Strachwitz is here - he'll sort itout!" This was the cry of more than one battlefield commander whenthe Panzer Graf came to the rescue. In late 1944 the Count, still con-ducting himself as a warrior instead of a military paper-pusher, exe-cuted victories far out of proportion to his resource. George Forty de-tails a series of actions with Strachwitz in his Tiger for which hewould receive the rarely awarded "Diamonds" addition to his IronCross. Only a handful of German soldiers and tankers would beawarded this highly distinguished medal during the war.In an effort to recapture the Latvian port near Riga, Strachwitz took asmall force of ten Tiger tanks and fifteen half-tracks full of Panzergre-nadiers in a large loop around Tuccum. Surprising an entire battalionof T-34s in the town, all lined up neatly, he availed himself of the gun-nery officer of the battleship Lutzow and had the big 11" guns destroy

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many of the Russian tanks. Strachwitz and his men finished off therest, used the captured enemy fuel and supplies from a Russian sup-ply area.From there he took a small force, headed north surprised a Sovietarmored Corps by getting behind it. He positioned his four Tigertanks well and watched as the Russian tanks rolled onward. This wasa favorite tactic of the Tiger tank commanders. When the time wasright, the Panzer Graf had his tanks open fire. It created havoc amongthe Russian tanks. They thought they were being fired on from thefront and did not realize the shells were coming from their flanks.Soon dozens of Russian tanks were left twisted smoking hulks. TheRussian commander, with more Germans at the front of his column,thought he was surrounded by a much larger force and surrenderedhis entire corps. Leaving some infantry and halftracks to control thesituation, Strachwitz continued on his war odyssey, reaching Riga, en-tering the town and capturing it. A group of high ranking German of-ficers later entered the city, noticed the Panzer Graf sitting atop theturret of his Tiger and shouted, "Nice going, Lieutenant!" Strachwitzwore no rank badges in combat. Laughing, Strachwitz answeredthem, "You're not talking to a lieutenant. I'm only a general".Colonel Count Strachwitz von Gross Zauche und Camminetz was themost decorated regimental officer of the German panzer army inWWII. He was awarded all the grades of the Iron Cross, including theKnight's Cross on August 1941 and Oakleaves on 13 November 1942,the Swords on 28 March 1943, and Diamonds on 15 April 1944 whencommanding a battle group in the sector of Army Group North. Origi-nally a cavalryman, Strachwitz belonged to an old military familywith estates in Silesia. He served during WWI and with the Freikorps,and fought during the campaigns in Poland and France.However, he made his reputation on the Eastern Front, exploitingwith small battle groups to fight Russian armor. When isolated fromfriendly units he also showed courage outside his vehicle, fightinghand-to-hand against Russian infantry until his crew had repairedthe tank. He became famous for his rapid advances, breaking throughenemy lines and disrupting enemy headquarters and supply units. Onone occasion he was the first to cross a river bridge, attacking a col-umn of hundreds of Russian trucks and guns. As a result of this ac-tion, Strachwitz and his small Kampfgruppe would take 18,000 So-viet prisoners, 28 batteries of artillery and dozens of vehicles, includ-ing tanks, SP guns and many trucks. Such actions seem impossible tomany westerners who fail to grasp the enormity of the war in the east.After forming one of the first Tiger battalions, his disciplined crews

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were able to destroy many Russian tanks during the fighting for Khar-kov. Von Strachwitz commanded the 1st Panzer Division and later asarmor commander he was sent to Army Group North. Here he tookpart in the first offensive to reestablish contact with Army GroupNorth which had just been encircled for the first time. From Septem-ber 1944 the various elements of Gruppe Strachwitz were used to cov-er the retreat of Army Group North into the Courland Sector. Verylate in the war, while being driven to the headquarters of one of thedivisions under his command, he was badly hurt in an automobile ac-cident. In spite of the severity of his injuries, including many brokenbones and a fractured skull, the good count was not about to succumbto an untimely death outside of combat. His determination broughthim back into the action just before the end of the war. Still oncrutches, he formed a new command of anti-tank fighters at Bad Ku-dova. He eventually surrendered to the western Allies by traveling toBavaria.Although von Strachwitz was a wonderful tactician at the battalionand regimental level, he was inflexible at times and unwilling to com-promise. These qualities limited his success with larger units, and hewas never used as a real divison commander. But in a situation wherea battlegroup could operate independently, and when Strachwitz didnot have to deal with equal or superior ranked officers, he was a greatarmor commander. Wounded no fewer than fourteen times duringthe war, he survived the front. Having lost two sons during the war,he would go on to lose his wife while in captivity.His Silesian estate was taken by the Russians, and Strachwitz re-mained in West Germany upon his release from US custody. After abrief journey to Syria to help organize the military there (and his sub-sequent flight from Syria after the ruling power was overthrown), hesettled on an estate in Bavaria in 1951, where he lived until 1968, andofficers of the Bundeswehr held a watch at his coffin as a sign of rec-ognition for his outstanding military career. He lies today in Gra-benstätt, Germany.

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Annexes

Citadel 1943

After suffering two disastrous winters in the east, a revitalized panzerforce enjoying new weapons and equipment - Tigers, Panthers andFerdinands - is assembled on sectors north and south of a huge andstrongly defended Red Army salient centred on Kursk. Operation 'Cit-adel' involving Army Croups Centre and South will strike concentri-cally to eliminate the salient.Hoth Fourth Pz-Army 5 July 1943 responsible to Army Group Southwill carry the main weight of the offensive; SS PzKorps (Hausser) pro-viding the cutting edge; Army Abteilung (AA) Kempf in support.Model Ninth Army responsible to Army Group Centre will co-operatein attacks from the north. But 'Citadel' is not a success.Losing more than half its armoured strength, 'Citadel' fails to breakthe deeply echeloned Russian defence and after seven days' fighting

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when the offensive coincides with 'Husky', the Allied invasion of Si-cily, Hitler calls it off. (Panzer Action in Italy, page 201.)Critically drained of resources, the German Army will never recoverthe strategic initiative. Fourth Pz-Army, failing to reach Kursk andlink up with Ninth Army, is shattered in the attempt; the decimatedpanzer divisions lose their power and German domination of Euro-pean Russia is permanently broken.Twenty panzer/panzer grenadier divisions (including OKH reserve)plus infantry and Army troops assemble for 'Citadel' led by Hoth andKempf (Army Group South) and Model (Army Group Centre).Hoth (1) Fourth Pz-Army, II SS PzK Hausser: 1st SS PzDiv, 2nd SSPzDiv, 3 SS PzDiv: XXXXVIII PzK von Knobelsdorff; 3rd, llth PzDivs,Gross Deutschland, 167th Inf Div, 10 Pz (Panther) Bde Decker, III AKOtt, two Inf divs.Kempf (2) Army Abteilung, 111 PzK Breith: 6th, 7th, 19th PzDivs,168 Inf Div, 503 (Tiger) Bn; XI AK Raus, three Inf divs: XXXXII AKthree Inf divs.Model (3) Ninth Army, XXXXVII PzK Lemelsen: 2nd, 4th, 9th,20th PzDivs, 505 Hvy (Tiger) PzBn, 6th Inf Div, XXXXI PzK Harpe:18th PzDiv, 10th PzGrDiv, 653, 654 Pzjaeger (Ferdinand) Bns;XXXXVI PzK Zorn: Five infantry divisions and Gruppe von Manteuf-fel: XX and XXIII AK with seven infantry divs.A Gr South Reserve (uncommitted) XXIV PzK Nehring: 5th SS 'Wik-ing', 17th PzDiv.OKH/A Gr Centre Reserve 5th PzDiv (OKH) switched to SecondPz-Army, 12th PzDiv, 36th I.D. Mot.A Gr Centre Von Kluge; 21 divs inc 6 PzDivs, 2 Pzgr, 700-800tanks (45 Tigers), 350 assault guns.A Gr South Von Manstein; 22 divs inc 11 PzDivs, 1 Pz bde, 1,300tanks (101 Tigers), 250 assault guns. (Total 2,700 tanks/assault guns,inc. 146 Tigers).Luftwaffe (1) (2) Dessloch, 4th Air Fleet, Seidemann VIII Air Corps- 1st, 4th Air Divs. 1,100 airc. © Greim, 6th Air Fleet, Deichmann 1Air Corps - 700 aircraft (Total 1,800 aircraft).Red Army/Air Force Rokossovsky Central Fr; Vatutin VoronezhFr; Konev Steppe Fr (from 18 July). 100 divs inc five tank armies,3,306 tanks and assault guns, 2,650 aircraft.

Last Proclamation Adolf Hitler: Soldiers Of The GermanEastern Front!15th April 1945The Leader's Order.

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Order Of The Day. 15th April, 1945.For the last time our deadly enemies the Jewish Bolsheviks havelaunched their massive forces to the attack. Their aim is to reduceGermany to ruins and to exterminate our Folk. Many of you soldiersin the east already know the fate which threatens, above all, Germanwomen, girls, and children. While the old men and children will bemurdered, the women and girls will be reduced to barrackroomwhores. The remainder will be marched off to Siberia.We have foreseen this thrust, and since last January have done every-thing possible to construct a strong Front. The enemy will be greetedby massive artillery fire. Gaps in our infantry have been made goodby countless new units. Our Front is being strengthened by emer-gency units, newly raised units, and by the Germanic Folk Militia.This time the Bolshevik will meet the ancient fate of Asia -- he mustand shall bleed to death before the capital of the German Reich. Who-ever fails in his duty at this moment behaves as a traitor to our Folk.The Regiment or Division which abandons its position acts so dis-gracefully that it must be ashamed before the women and childrenwho are withstanding the terror of bombing in our cities. Above all,be on your guard against the few treacherous Officers and soldierswho, in order to preserve their pitiful lives, fight against us in Russianpay, perhaps even wearing German uniform. Anyone ordering you toretreat will, unless you know him well personally, be immediately ar-rested and, if necessary, killed on the spot, no matter what rank hemay hold. If every soldier on the Eastern Front does his duty in thedays and weeks which lie ahead, the last assault of Asia will crumple,just as the invasion by our enemies in the west will finally fail, in spiteof everything.Berlin remains German, Vienna will be German again, and Europewill never be Russian.Form yourselves into a sworn brotherhood, to defend, not the emptyconception of a Fatherland, but your homes, your wives, your chil-dren, and, with them, our future. In these hours, the whole GermanFolk looks to you, my fighters in the east, and only hopes that, thanksto your resolution and fanaticism, thanks to your weapons, and underyour leadership, the Bolshevik assault will be choked in a bath ofblood. At this moment, when Fate has removed from the Earth thegreatest war criminal of all time, the turning point of this war will bedecided.Adolf Hitler.

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Origins of the Schutz Staffel or SS

OriginsThe origins of the SS lie right back at the genesis of the Nazi move-ment in Germany in 1923. These were turbulent times, and few thenwould have been willing to bet on the outcome of the struggle fordomination of Germany between the Nazis and the Communists. Thetwo sides often battled violently in the streets, and injuries anddeaths were far from uncommon. It was clear that some form ofbodyguard element was required to protect those who spoke at Nazioutdoor meetings. The SA Stormtroopers, the Sturmabteilung, or"Brownshirts', were little more than an unruly rabble, most of themunemployed :hugs with no real loyalty to Hitler, but useful for meet-ing the opposing Communists head on in countless violent streetfights while, in the main, being by no means trustworthy or disci-plined enough to provide reliable bodyguards for the Party leader-ship.Hitler, however, had been impressed by the performance of at leastsome of his 'minders', and in March 1923 he decided to form an elite,dedicated bodyguard unit from a number of such dependable com-rades. The task of forming this trusted band was delegated to hisfaithful chauffeur, Julius Schreck, and another trusted follower, JosefBerchtold. To begin with, this group was simply a small detachmentwithin the SA, and was known as the Stabswache, or HeadquarterGuard. Within a few weeks it had been expanded and took on thename Stosstrupp Adolf Hitler. This so-called 'Shock Troop' took partin the abortive Munich Putsch of 9 November 1923, providing per-sonal protection for Hitler. On Hitler's release from Landsberg Prisonfollowing the abortive Putsch, he decided to reform his bodyguard,and once again turned to Julius Schreck to create this new unit. Ini-tially, it consisted of just eight chosen men, and thanks to HermannGoring was given the title of Schutz Staffel, or 'Protection Squad'.This was a reference to Goring's highly successful career as a fighterpilot during the First World War, when this title was used for aircraftallocated to flying escort duties.It was intended that the Schutz Staffel, which rapidly became knownby its abbreviated form 'SS', would not exceed ten men plus one offi-cer in each district, the exception to this being the Reich's capital city,Berlin, where the SS detachment was to be double the normal size.The elite status of the SS was enhanced by the extremely high stand-ards of physical fitness and general appearance of those recruited toits ranks, but most importantly, by the fact that its owed its alle-

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giance, not to the Party, but to the person of Adolf Hitler himself.In April 1926, Schreck relinquished command of the SS to another ofHitler's most loyal followers, Josef Berchtold, who had by this timerecovered from wounds he had received marching by Hitler's sideduring the Munich Putsch. The general ranks of the brownshirt army,the SA, were highly suspicious and resentful of this new elite unitwhich appeared in their midst, the SS still at this time being subordi-nate to the SA. This resentment grew when Hitler entrusted the careof the so-called 'Blutfahne', a Nazi flag splattered with the blood ofthose marchers killed or wounded during the Putsch, and which had,to the Nazis, acquired the status almost of a holy relic, to the SS. TheSA had previously cared for the Blutfahne.The situation was far from ideal, with the SA's resentment matchedby the SS's rancour by reason of its subordination to the SA. SS unitsin any area were eventually restricted to a maximum of 10 per cent ofthe size of the SA contingent, and this only when the SA unit to whichit was subordinated actually reached its full, allocated strength. TheSA therefore found it easy to manipulate the size of SS units overwhich it had control, many SA units also taking great delight in allo-cating the most menial task to their SS contingents.Resentful of the restrictions placed on the development of the SS,Berchtold resigned, command passing to his deputy, Erhardt Heiden.Heiden, unfortunately, had no more success than Berchtold in cir-cumventing the spiteful machinations of the SA, and he too lasted foronly a short time as commander of the SS before he resigned. The SAno doubt took great pleasure in this, and anticipated just as easilymanipulating his successor. In this they were to be greatly mistaken.Heiden's successor was another veteran of the Munich Putsch, oneHeinrich Himmler. Though his appearance was far from impressive,with his pincenez spectacles and rather weedy turnout, Himmler wasa superb organiser and was fired with enthusiasm for, and dedicationto, the success of the SS. In 1928 he was appointed Reichsführer-SS.

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By 1929 Himmler had persuaded Hitler to approve a recruitmentplan for the SS, 10 and within a year it had grown in strength toaround one thousand men, although still subordinated to the SA. In1931 there occurred an incident which was to greatly enhance the sta-tus of the SS in the eyes of Hitler. The Berlin SA had been growing re-sentful of what it saw as Hitler's favouritism towards the BavarianSA, based in Munich, which was of course the 'spiritual home' of Naz-ism. On 1 April, the SS in Berlin alerted Hitler to the fact that the SAleader, Oberführer Walther Stennes, had revolted and occupied thepremises of the Nazi newspaper Der Angriff, published by the Gau-leiter of Berlin, Josef Goebbels, and had evicted the Nazi propagandachief. In the event, however, the revolt quickly fizzled out through

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lack of support, and the rebel SA members were quickly purged. Hit-ler was greatly appreciative that the SS had remained loyal duringthis potentially dangerous episode and publicly congratulated them.Himmler's reward was to be appointed as Head of Party Security.From this position of power, Himmler set about expanding his nas-cent SS empire, so that by the end of 1932 it had grown in strength tosome 50.000 men.By this time, life in Germany had deteriorated into a situation of neartotal anarchy, with armed Nazis and Communists battling in thestreets. Hitler's promises of full employment and a return of law andorder swung the votes in the 1933 elections in his favour, and on 30January Reichsprasident von Hindenburg appointed Hitler to the of-fice of Chancellor. Within a month, the Reichstag building was guttedin an arson attack, for which the Communists were "lamed, and Hit-ler lost no time in issuing a proclamation granting police powers tothe SA and the SS. This resulted in over 15.000 SS men being swornin as police 'auxiliaries', and the round-up of political opponents be-gan.The original SS was required to provide security for the Party hier-archy in general, but at this point Hitler decided to form a specialarmed bodyguard unit from within the ranks of the SS whose purposewould be to provide him personally with a protective escort. The taskof raising this 'elite within an elite' was given to one of his mosttrusted friends, the Bavarian SS-Gruppenführer, Josef 'Sepp' Die-trich. Dietrich, a decorated combat veteran of the First World War,set to work immediately, and by March 1933 had established a guardunit of some 120 hand-picked men which was to become known asthe SS-Stabswache Berlin. In late April, this guard unit moved intothe old Officer Cadet Institute at Berlin-Lichterfelde.Within just twomonths it was undergoing expansion, and the enlarged unit was re-named as the SS-Sonderkommando Zossen.A further special guard element known as SS-SonderkommandoJüterbog was formed in May, interestingly, with a number of at-tached Army officers to assist with training, and in September bothwere brought together to form the Adolf Hitler Standarte, each mem-ber of the unit being issued with a cuffband bearing Hitler's name.From July to October of 1933, these elite SS guards provided securityat Hitler's retreat at the Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden in Bavaria.On 9 November 1933, on the tenth anniversary of the Munich Putsch,this regiment took a personal oath of fealty to Adolf Hitler and had itsname amended to Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, once again empha-sising its unique elite status. (The Leib-Hussaren, Leib-Standarte, of

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Imperial Germany were the direct equivalent of the 'Life Guards' inother nations such as Great Britain, traditionally entrusted with thesafety of the monarch or head of State.)The wording of the oath was as follows:I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as leader and Chancellor of the Germannation, loyalty and courage. I vow to you and to the superiors ap-pointed to you, obedience unto death, so help me God.The similarities between the Praetorian Guard of Roman times andHitler's new SS Elite Guard are too obvious to be coincidental.The recruitment criteria for this unit \vere extremely selective. Appli-cants had to be between seventeen and twenty-two years of age. aminimum of 5 ft 11 in tall, later raised to 6 ft Min, and in perfect phys-ical health.Shortly thereafter, the unit terminology of the Allgemeine-SS, theSchar, Sturm and Sturmbann began to be replaced by the equivalentmilitary terms, such as Zug (Platoon), Kompanie (Company) and Ba-taillon (Battalion) as used in the Wehrmacht, further enhancing themilitary status of the armed SS.Around this time, a number of other small, armed detachmentswere being created at SS-Abschnitt level throughout Germany. Lim-ited to a size of 100 men (the police also raised several such quasi-military units, known as 'Hundertschaften') and in critical areas,these units were brought together to form the so-called Politische Be-reitschaften. On 24 September 1934, Hitler decreed that the Politi-sche Bereitschaften be brought together to form a new armed SSforce to be known as the SS-Verfügungstruppe. In March 1933,Himmler had been appointed Police President of Munich andfounded the first concentration camp ai Dachau. This was rapidlyjoined by others ai Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. These thoughthoroughly unpleasant places, were worlds apart from thedeath campf established later during the Holocaust. Ii was intendedthat potential enemies of the State who were considered dangerousbui who had not been found guilty in court ol any specific crimewould be detained ir these camps for 're-education'. Indeed thoughtreatment was often brutal, man) were subsequently released whenno longei considered a threat, a luxury of course noi available to laterinmates. It was around this time that the first of the Wachverbdnde,01 Guard Units, were formed to staff these camps under the com-mand of SS-Oberführer Theodor Eicke. By 1935, five full battalions,or Wachsturmbanne, of these troops had been formed - Oberbayern(at Dachau), Elbe (at Lichtenburg), Sachsen (at Sachsenburg), Ost-friesland (at Esterwegen) and Brandenburg (at Oranienburg).

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In 1937, further reorganisation saw these battalions formed intothree full deathshead regiments: SS-Totenkopfstandarten Ober-bayern (at Dachau), Brandenburg (at Sachsenhausen) and Thurin-gen (at Buchenwald). These units would become officially designatedas the SS-Totenkopfverbände in 1936. Post-Anschluss, a fourth regi-ment, SS-Totenkopfstandarte Ostmark, was established at the con-centration camp at Mauthausen in Austria, and in 1939, a fifth, SS-Totenkopfstandarte Dietrich Eckardt, was also formed.From a beginning as little more than brutal thugs guarding haplessconcentration camp inmates, the SS-Totenkopvërbande (SS-TV)would become a well-trained military force, though no less brutal inits methods, which would in turn provide the Waffen-SS with theunit that would become the formidable 3 SS-Panzer Division Toten-kopf.Meanwhile the SA continued its expansion, and the Army grew evermore concerned at rumours that the brownshirts considered them-selves as a revolutionary force which would replace the regular Army.Hitler too was becoming concerned that the SA was slipping beyondhis control, seeing its allegiance being owed to its own commander-in-chief, SA-Stabschef Ernst Rohm, and Rohm's enemies lost no timein feeding Hitler's mistrust of his once-valued comrade. Eventually,Rohm demanded the formation of a people's army to replace the reg-ular Army, which he would personally command. This was the finalstraw for both Hitler and the generals of the regular Army. There wasnow a real danger of civil war, and Hitler was determined to elimi-nate this threat from within his own movement. . To execute his plan,Hitler called up his most trusted men, the SS. He called a meeting ofSA leaders for 30 June 1934, at which the unsuspecting SA leaderswere quickly arrested by SS troops and those determined as the ring-leaders executed. The SS of course also took the opportunity of set-tling some of its own old scores, and eventually over 300 were exe-cuted in what was to become known as the 'Night of the Long Knives'.A new 'puppet' leader, Viktor Lütze, was appointed to command theSA, with Hitler confident that this weak and colourless individualwould prove no threat. He was correct. The SA was reduced to a merequarter of its former size and at the same time was disarmed. Itwould no longer pose a threat to Hitler or be a serious obstacle to thedevelopment of the SS.Once again, the SS had proved itself loyal, prepared to act outside thelaw, and even commit murder when its Führer so wished. In reward,Hitler declared the SS to now be a fully independent branch of theParty, no longer subordinate to the disgraced and humiliated SA.

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During this period of struggle, the SS had mushroomed to some200,000 strong. Recruitment criteria had been relaxed due to theneed for rapid expansion to allow the SS to better withstand the pres-sure placed upon it by the resentful brownshirts. With the threat ofthe SA removed, however, Himmler immediately set about restoringits elite status. Many members were no longer considered appropri-ate for the new, reborn, elite SS. and over 60.000 men were droppedfrom its ranks.In October 1934. an SS officer cadet training school (SS-Junker-schule) was opened at Bad Tolz in Bavaria, and was joined in 1935 bva further establishment in Brunswick (SS-Junkerschule Braunsch-weig). Several highly experienced former Army officers were re-cruited to provide the SS trainees with high-quality military training.The first full regiment of SS-Verfügungstruppe was created around acore of former members of the Politische Bereitschaften when threeSturmbanne were amalgamated under the title SS-Standarte I Deuts-chlandm Munich.A further regiment, SS-Standarte 2 Germania, was formed in Ham-burg, and following the 1938 Anschluss with Austria, a third regimentwas formed in Vienna under the title SS-Standarte 3 Der Führer.With the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, the SS-Verfügungstruppeand the SS-Totenkopfverbände at his disposal, Himmler now had therequisite raw material to provide the nucleus for the creation of hisown SS army.The Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) was Adolf Hitler's per-sonal bodyguard. Initially the size of a regiment (brigade), the LSSAHeventually grew into an elite division-sized unit. The term Leibstan-darte was derived partly from Leibgarde – a somewhat archaic Ger-man translation of "Garde du Corps" or personal bodyguard of a mili-tary leader ("Leib" = lit. "body, torso") – and Standarte: the Schutz-staffel (SS) or Sturmabteilung (SA) term for a regiment-sized unit.The LSSAH independently participated in combat during the inva-sion of Poland, and was amalgamated into the Waffen-SS togetherwith the SS-Verfügungstruppe (SS-VT) and the combat units of theSS-Totenkopfverbände (SS-TV) prior to Operation Barbarossa in1941. By the end of World War II it had been increased in size from aregiment to a Panzer division.The Leibstandarte division's symbol was a skeleton key, in honour ofits first commander, Josef "Sepp" Dietrich 11 (Dietrich is German forskeleton key or lock pick); it was retained and modified to later serveas the symbol for I SS Panzer Corps. The elite division, a componentof the Waffen-SS, was found guilty of war crimes in the Nuremberg

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Trials. Members of the LSSAH participated in numerous atrocities.They murdered at least an estimated 5.000 prisoners of war in the pe-riod 1940–1945, mostly on the Eastern Front.Newsreel propaganda films produced in Nazi Germany during the lifeof the Third Reich featured footage of elite members of HeinrichHimmler's Schutzslaffel (SS Protection Squad), immaculate in theirblack and silver uniforms, standing like robots before the BerlinReich Chancellery. These were the troops of the Leibstandarte SSAdolf Hitler, responsible for the safety of their Fiihrer, a bodyguardcontingent destined to rise under the clash of arms to become thepremier panzer division of the Wafen-SS.Those who served in the Leibstandarte and in the armed SS as awhole enjoyed a special status and glamour, the remnants of which,even amid the ashes of defeat, the dwindling number of veterans arekeen to preserve.There is some justification for this. The armed echelons of the Schutz-staffel, with their double-S runic sleeve flash and belt buckles in-scribed with the motto Meine Ehre heisst Treue ('My Honour Is Loy-alty') fought with considerable bravery on the front line during WorldWar II. What this does not take into account, however, and whatapologists to this day conveniently ignore, are the many crimes ofbrutality which can be laid directly at the door of the Leibstandarte.

To reach the truth means taking a look beyond the popular image of

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the immaculate uniforms and marching bands of these SS paragons.The origins lie deep in a Germany still in the shadow of the 11th dayof the 11th month of the year 1918. Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had vainlyintended to abdicate only as German Emperor, but still retain hisrights as King of Prussia, had finally taken his withered arm and shat-tered imperial ambitions into exile. For the .army, rich in the tradi-tions of battle triumphs stretching back to the days of Frederick theGreat, there was a legacy of shame and submission at its enforcedemasculation by the victors, following the Treaty of Versailles 12. Butfor many whose husbands, brothers and son's had perished on thebattlefields of France and Flanders, there was weary resignation anda longing to be rid of militarism. There was little sympathy for thosethat found the Allied terms unacceptable and even less for the notionthat, in the words of Philipp Scheidemann, first Chancellor of theWeimar 13 Republic, the 'hand should wither' before any shameful de-mands - 'intolerable for any nation' - were agreed by signature. 14

Other voices of resentment and fury, however, drowned all calls formoderation. Mass meetings were held throughout the country whichwere ripe with sullen threat to national order. Aggression soon fol-lowed. Cities became minor battlefields - convenient areas of violencefor a variety of terrorist groups such as the Spartacists, forerunner ofthe German Communist Party, and groups of ex-servicemen formedas the Stahlhelm and the Freikorps, who clashed with the manpowerof the Reichswehr, the standing army acting as the Chancellor'sGuard. In Bavaria, a Soviet-style regime assumed power with an opti-mistic programme of land reform, workers' control and participationin government. Although such heresies were defeated with consum-mate savagery, the legacy of Bavarian socialism was to be the birth ofa new movement. Adolf Hitler, its chief architect, was fuelled by twohatreds: the teachings of Karl Marx and, above all, a loathing of Jews,whom he saw as 'rats, parasites and bloodsuckers'.During World War I, Hitler had served as a Lance Corporal (Ge-freiter) in the 16th Bavarian Infantry (List Regiment). Before his dis-charge, he had attended one of the soldiers' indoctrination classeswith which the Reichswehr supplemented its armed combat of left-wing subversion. As a Bildungsoffizier (Instruction Officer), he re-ceived orders to investigate - in fact, spy on - a collection of national-ist veterans and beer-willing nationalists, as well as general misfits,who made up the all but bankrupt Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (GermanWorkers' Party). The group certainly had some resonance for Hitler,especially where the-fifth of its 25 Points was concerned: 'None butmembers of the nation may be citizens of the state. None but those of

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German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation.No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation.'The future Ftihrer joined as Party Member No. 555 and, by January1920, had emerged as its leader. During the next month, in an impas-sioned speech held in a Munich beer hall, he demanded the adoptionof all 25 points. He was already thinking ahead, however, and plan-ning a far more radical programme, paramount to which was the de-mand that all Jews be denied office and citizenship. The name of theparty was changed that April to National-sozialistische Deutsche Ar-beiterpartei (the NSDAP, or National Socialist Party).15

FoundationBefore long came the call for a campaign of hate and subversionwhere blood would literally spill onto the streets of German townsand cities. In such dangerous times, none was exempt from the threatof violence, party leaders and would-be dictators least of all. Hence,in 1923, came the emergence of the Stabswache (HeadquartersGuard), a pretentious name for the activities of its two leading strong-men, Joseph Berchtold, a stationer, and Julius Schreck, a chauffeur,both of whom were assigned a crude bodyguard role by Hitler. Thispair were joined by several adherents who were, for the most part, la-bourers from the lower middle or working classes of Munich, thelikes of Ulrich Graf, butcher by trade and ama-:eur boxer by night;Emil Maurice, a watchmaker with a criminal record; and ChristianWeber, a penniless former groom.The Stosstrupp (Shock Troop) Adolf Hitler, which incorporated theStabswache, at first consisted of some 30 thugs much addicted topunch-ups with opponents and the copious use of boots, knives,blackjacks and rubber truncheons. These toughs, many of them re-cruited from the Freikorps, in time became members of the infinitelymore powerful Sturmabteilung (SA, or Storm Troopers). This was thecreation of Freikorps leader Ernst Rohm, who built up a 2000-strongprivate army, boosted by Freikorps volunteers who became SA stormtroopers. The original Stabswache, nevertheless, does deserve atleast a footnote in the history of pre-war Germany, laying as it did thefoundations for a force responsible solely to Hitler with the task ofprotecting him from all enemies, by whatever method and, if neces-sary, with individuals' lives. The Leibstandarte of the future was toexist essentially for the same purpose.On 9 November 1923, a crucial event took place, although few fore-saw its repercussions at the time. In Munich, a 600-strong group ofSA, led by Hitler, made an ill-judged bid to snatch power from the na-

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tionalist and rigidly independent leaders of Bavaria and proclaim anew government, in the so-called Beer Hall Putsch. This intended po-litical coup was an embarrassing failure which degenerated intosemi-farce, at a cost of around a dozen Stosstrupp lives, SA casualtiesand short-term imprisonment for Hitler. While Hitler languished inLandsberg jail, the various factions became even more fragmentedand uncontrollable. On release, Hitler made up his mind. He hadneed for a single, cohesive protection force. 16

In April 1925, eight men came together to create a new Stabswache.Within two weeks, it had become the SS, destined to be controlled bythe myopic Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, the one-time indus-trial chemist who was dedicated to the pursuit of homeopathy, herbalcures and, most of all, dreams of a racially pure Germany. Even with-in the tight embrace of the SS, however, Hitler wanted the services ofmen who would be loyal to him exclusively, as he made clear in one ofhis countless dissertations: i'Being convinced that there are always circumstances in which elitetroops are called for, I created in 1922-23 "the Adolf Hitler ShockTroops". They were made up of men who were ready for revolutionand knew that some things would come to hard knocks. When I cameout of Landsberg everything was broken up and scattered in some-times rival bands. I told myself then that I needed a bodyguard, evena very restricted one, but made up of men who would be enlistedwithout conditions, even to march against their own brothers, only20 men to a city (on condition that one counts on them absolutely)rather than a,dubious mass ... But it was with Himmler that the SSbecame an extraordinary body of men, devoted to an ideal, loyal todeath.' 17

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SEEP DIETRICH

Hitler had no intention of being saddled with a 'dubious mass'. Lessthan two months after coming to power as Chancellor of the Reich inJanuary 1933, he turned to an old party comrade and former body-guard, Josef (familiarly known as 'Sepp') Dietrich, a strong-jawed,thick-accented Bavarian, and former artilleryman. That same year, inMay, Dietrich was able to report to Hitler that he had formed a head-quarters guard of loyal SS men titled the SS-Stabswache Berlin, con-veniently quartered near the Reich Chancellery. Then came two moreStabswache incarnations, with two more successive changes of title.First, there was the SS-Sonderkommando Zossen (Special Comman-do), a designation which signified something of the guard's elite char-acter. Secondly, as a result of its merger with Sonderkommando Ju-terbog, it received first the title Adolf-Hitler-Standarte. Then, at thebehest of Hitler himself, this was changed to Leibstandarte SS AdolfHitler, (SS Bodyguard Regiment Adolf Hitler), a name chosen delib-erately to prompt memories of the old Bavarian Life Guards.The announcement of the name change was made on the last dayof the Nazi Party rally held in the Luitpoldhalle at Nuremberg in Sep-tember 1935, nine months after Hitler came to power. The cere-monial event, staged with all the elaborate spectacle that PropagandaMinister Joseph Goebbels could muster, carried the self-confident ti-tle 'Congress of Victory'. Here, the towers of Kleig lights shone on60.000 Hitler Youth, parading with the slogans of 'Blood and Hon-our' and 'Germany Awake'. At the rear of the stage was the German

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eagle, its talons enclosing the golden laurel-wreathed swastika, andbeneath which stood 60 stalwarts of the SS in their uniforms of blackand silver, their dress swords drawn and shouldered.Once Hitler had arrived precisely at 17>00 hours, flanked by Reich-sfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich, head of theReich Central Security Office, he took his place on his podium. Thespectators were then treated to a lengthy, bombastic speech lastingover an hour, the overall theme of which was 'the reward of virtue'(Turgenheld). Deserving of such rewards, Hitler made clear, werethose who had kept the faith, not only with him personally, lull also loilic ideals of Germany and National Socialism. Keeping that faith hadmeant conducting a ceaseless, ruthles campaign against treachery,wherever it was manifest. Special tribute was paid to Heinrich Himm-ler 'my Ignatius Loyola' - and to (hose who served will) him, Hitler'sfaithful guards, his Stabswache. It was to be their reward to have aspecial name crealcd Tor them, 'a name indelibly associated with thatof their FuhrerA sardonic presence at Nuremberg that day was a correspondentfrom the Nan York Times newspaper, who found Hitler's revelation'singularly uninteresting after all the guff that had preceded it... Allwe got for our pains was the knowledge that henceforth his Stabsw-ache would be officially known as Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.' Atthe time, no one could guess, of course, how significant for Germanythat change of name was going to be. One man who showed morethan a proprietary interest was, naturally enough, Himmler. Andtherein lay the seeds of conflict. From the very start, it was obviousthat Hitler intended this new organisation to be an elite, responsibleand answerable to him. This was underlined graphically by yet anoth-er spectacular event.On 9 November 1933, 11 months after Hitler became Reich Chancel-lor at the Munich Feldherrnhalle War Memorial in the Odeonplatz,some 830 men were mustered, facing the Theatinerkirche. The street-lights were extinguished and the square lit solely by torches. In aWagnerian touch, at midnight, after the last strike of the bell fromthe Theatinerkirche, Hitler arrived, accompanied by Himmler; Gener-al Werner von Blomberg, the Minister of Defence; and Grup-penführer Sepp Dietrich, who presented his life guard for swearingin.

Swearing the oath

First came a paraphrase of the SS oath, spoken by Heinrich Himmler:'We swear to you, Adolf Hitler, loyalty and bravery. We promise this

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to you and will be obedient until death.' Then, from the SS men camerecital of the full oath: 'I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Führer andReich Chancellor, loyalty and bravery. I vow to you, and those youhave named to command me, obedience unto death. So help me God.'To at least one SS observer, Emil Helfferich, it was a moment of ec-stasy. Helfferich referred to 'splendid young men, serious of face,exemplary in bearing and turnout. An elite. Tears came to my eyeswhen, by the light of torches, thousands of voices repeated the oath inchorus. It was like a prayer.' From that year on, newly enrolled mem-bers of the Leibstandarte who had yet to take their oath were sent toMunich for the annual ceremony held in front 18 of the Feldherrn-halle.Himmler remained insatiable for as much power as possible. He con-stantly pointed out that Hitler's own guard was, from the moment ofits inception, firmly wedded to the SS, and was fond of quoting theParty's Organisation Book.'The original and most important duty of the SS is to serve as the pro-tector of the Fuhrer ... By decree, its sphere of duties has been en-larged to include the internal security of the Reich.' This declaration,Himmler assumed, entitled him to regard the Leibstandarte as hisown territory, as, in theory at least, he ultimately commanded it.The reality was somewhat different. It was Sepp Dietrich who had thedirect ear of the Fiihrer and from whom Himmler took his orders.This inevitably led to conflict between Dietrich and Himmler. In thewords of an indignant Himmler, the Leibstandarte was, 'a completelaw unto itself. It does and allows anything it likes without taking theslightest notice of orders from above.' Dietrich's opinion of the otherman was made abundantly clear to his American interrogators afterthe war: 'This guy tried to imitate the Führer. His appetite for powercould not be satisfied. On top of this he was a great hand at hoardingand scrounging. He received money from everywhere and everybody... I had quite a number of rows with Himmler.'This was an understatement. Himmler, with his icy stare behindgranny spectacles, could reduce many SS subordinates to quaking jel-ly. By contrast, Dietrich, contemptuous of social niceties and fre-quently foul-mouthed into the bargain, had no such respect. On oneoccasion, during the course of a discussion between the two men, Die-trich exploded: 'My position as guard commander will no more allowyour interference on security matters than it will upon the morality ofmy men. They are mine and we are Hitler's. Now go back to your of-fice and let us get back on with the job.'

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The responsibilities of the Leibstandarte grew. The highest profile re-mained that 24-hour guard duty outside the Chancellery and, particu-larly, the Führer's residence in Berlin's Wilhelmstrasse. This last

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presence especially struck visitors to Nazi Germany in the early yearsof Hitler's power. 19

Among them was the British MP Henry ('Chips') Channon, who wrotein his diary: 'No one is allowed to walk immediately in front of it, andsentries motion one to cross to the other side of the street.'It was not long before the black-uniformed SS had taken over insidethe Chancellery. Visitors were obliged to pass through three rings ofSS guards before it was possible to get anywhere near Hitler. Guestsat the Fuhrer's table were served by bright, young waiters in neat,white jackets, Leibstandarte men. When Hitler ventured out, he wasensconced within a posse of open, black limousines filled with the SSin their full dress uniforms.From Leibstandarte members had also sprung the Führerbegleit-kommando (FBK, or Escort Commando), a handpicked detachmentof some 40 men, 10 officers and 30 enlisted men. Their role was notonly one of routine guard duty, but also to act as orderlies, valets andcouriers. They were also required to serve as soldiers at short notice.Although those who were not considered of battle material were ruth-lessly weeded out, many Leibstandarte men later attested that Hitlerhad taken a personal, even paternal, interest in their wellbeing. Dis-missals were infrequent. Here the Fiihrer exhibited a calculated self-interest; those dismissed from the 'family' were prone to be potentialsecurity risks.

The SAHitler, meanwhile, had other preoccupations, not least of which wasthe threat posed by Ernst Rohm, who had remained one of the mostdedicated of his early followers. As chief of staff of the SA, Rohm hadunder his control two and a half million storm troopers, together witha seat in the Cabinet. Rohm had his own ambitions, however, and aCabinet post was not enough to keep him quiet.The crunch came in February 1934, when the SA leader presented tothe Cabinet a proposal to set up an entirely new Ministry of Defence,embracing a People's Army, the SS, the SA and all veteran groups.Such an idea was plainly insupportable, particularly in light of thisbelligerent statement by Rohm: 'Anyone who thinks that the task ofthe SA has been accomplished will have to get used to the idea thatwe are here and that we intend to stay here, come what may.'Hitler acted. In June 1934, Dietrich secured the transport necessaryto lift the Leibstandarte to southern Germany, together with a supplyof arms. Two companies of the Leibstandarte were sent from Berlinto Kaufering, outside Munich. 20

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Orders given to Sepp Dietrich were direct and brutal: he was handedthe names of six prominent SA men and told to organise squad andgo to the Stadelheim prison in Munich, where the prisoners - formerfriends and colleagues, incidentally — were held and shoot them. Die-trich arrived with 'six good shots to ensure that nothing messy hap-pened'. After some delay, the executions, amateurish and messy,went ahead. Figures as to just how many perished in what ultimatelybecame known as The Night of the Long Knives' are confusing,although many sources have quoted 150 victims of I he firing squads.Ernst Rohm was among them. Those who survived, in the words ofGerald Reitlinger in his The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 'found themselvesmembers of an organisation as innocuous as the Women's Institutemovement'.Apart from Dietrich's role in the blood purge of the SA dissidents, theLeibstandarte was also active elsewhere. Members of mobile squads,designated Einsatzkommandos (Action Commandos), were let loosewith the remit to snatch anyone with even the remotest connectionwith dissidents. The addiction of these mobile squads of the Leibstan-darte to patent gangsterism - which could be compared to the activ-ities of the likes of Al Capone in the United States -is graphically illus-trated by the manner of the killing of Erich Klausener, a director inthe Transport Ministry and President of the Catholic Action. SS-Hauptsturmführer Kurt Gildisch, who described himself as 'an en-

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thusiastic National Socialist', entered Klausener's office building andencountered his victim on the way to the washroom. Gildisch,seemingly in no hurry, escorted Klausener back to his office and toldhim he was under arrest. Klausener then turned his back on Gildisch,searching in a cupboard for his jacket. The SS killer drew his weaponand fired. In a bid to make the killing look like suicide, Gildisch thenplaced his Mauser near the body's right hand and, before leaving, puta double guard on the door. His eventual reward was promotion toSturmbannführer.

The SS formationsIn the wake of the purge of the SA, all who dared to oppose the re-gime lived under the shadow of the enhanced power of the SS, the su-preme arbiter of terror in Hitler's Germany, which emerged withthree militarised formations. These were the Leibstandarte SS AdolfHitler, the SS-Verfugungstruppe (SS-VT, or Special Purpose Troops,designated the Waffen-SS in 1940) and the SS-Totenkopfverbande(Death's Head detachments).The SS-VT had its origins in the early development of Germany as apolice state, where the slightest hint of civic disobedience and unrestwas not tolerated. Conveniently, the SS-VT emerged from anorganisation already to hand. This was the SS-Politische Bereitschaf-ten (Political Readiness Squads), consisting of full-time armed unitsof company strength. Eventually, the squads were absorbed into theSS-VT, but it was from these squads that the Leibstandarte receivedits early training. In the course of a secret order, dated 2 February1935, Hitler set out his vision of the SS-VT, which was to consist ofthree Standarten or regiments, together with an engineer and signalsbattalion. In the event of war, the SS-VT was to be 'incorporated intothe Army. They are then subordinated to military law which also ap-ply to matters of recruitment.The Army also maintained some control over the SS-VT, notably inthe fields of military training and the right of inspection.Hitler felt keenly the need to proclaim to the German people the vir-tues of National Socialism, the SS-VT and, in particular, the Leibstan-darte. An opportunity to do so was afforded by the holding of a plebi-scite in the Saarland on 12 January 1935, which resulted in its inhabi-tants voting overwhelmingly - 477.000 to 48.000 - to return the coal-rich territory to the Reich. Hitler, anxious to visit the Saarland, en-trusted some of the escort duties to the Leibstandarte, which wouldprovide an excellent showcase for the emerging power of National So-cialism. The Army had been slow in coming forwards for the escort

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role and was put firmly in its place. The Fuhrer proclaimed: 'If thearmy is reluctant to lead the way, a suitable spearhead will be pro-vided by the Leibstandarte.' 21

At the end of February, around 16.000 men — Dietrich's motorcyclecompany, two line companies of the 1st Battalion, two companiesfrom the 2nd Battalion and one from the 3rd - arrived in Saarbruck-en. The reception accorded the Leibstandarte was ecstatic, as re-flected in this hyperbole from one newspaper: 'Hitler's men - they areas Gods come to show the way for the new Germany.' . Sepp Die-trich's star was already high. The former baker's boy, farm labourer,waiter and chauffeur who, by the end of World War I, had reachedthe rank of Oberfeldwebel (sergeant major) had, in 1929, been ele-vated to the rank of SS-Standartenfuhrer (colonel) for his work in or-ganising the SS in southern Bavaria. Dietrich rose to Oberführer rankless than a year later, taking command of SS Abschnitt Sud (SS Sec-tion South). From then on, there was a straight career progressionfrom SS-Gruppenführer in 1931 to SS-Obergruppenführer in July1934, and ever upwards.The prestige of the SS-VT - and with it the Leibstandarte - ran in par-allel with Dietrich's own rapid promotions. By May 1935, member-ship of the SS-VT was regarded as military service with the armedforces and, in the following year, the SS-VT had acquired its own gen-eral staff, with an SS-VT inspectorate commanded by ex-ReichswehrLieutenant General Paul Hausser 22. Lest any section of the SS-VT en-tertain lofty ideas, Hitler was ever present with stern reminders suchas the injunction that the SS-VT 'forms no part of the Wehrrnacht norof the police. It is a permanent armed force at my disposal.' Hitlerwent further. Matters of recruiting and training inideological and political matters were to be in the care of the Reich-sführer-SS. He emphasised, however, that Himmler's role would be'in accordance with directives issued by me'. The message was clear:in Army matters, the Commander in Chief was to be the sole author-ity.Conflict between the SS-VT and the Army was inevitable. The Wehr-macht, with no small degree of snobbery, considered the SS-VT to bebeyond the pale socially, as well as being political upstarts. Therewere frequent complaints that members of the SS refused to saluteArmy officers; there were instances of unseemly brawls. One manwho helped to bridge the gap and formed an immediate rapport withDietrich was General Heinz Guderian, revered as Germany's leadingexponent of armoured warfare and commander of XVI Panzer Corps.Dietrich learned that he would be under Guderian's command for

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what, in March 1938, Hitler was terming the 'liberation' of his nativeAustria, his self-proclaimed mission to return that country to Ger-many.One incident illustrated the extent to which Dietrich had the ear ofthe Fiihrer. In his memoirs, Panzer Leader, Guderian wrote: 'Itseemed to me that the Anschluss [union] should be completed with-out any fighting. I felt that for both countries it was an occasion forrejoicing. It therefore occurred to me that as a sign of our friendlyfeelings the tanks might well be beflagged and decked with greenery.I asked Sepp Dietrich to enquire if Hitler would give his approval tothis, and half an hour later I was informed that he did.'Everywhere, the reception was joyful. World War I veterans with dec-orations pinned to their chests lined the streets. Flowers and foodwere pressed on the contingents of the Leibstandarte who joined Gu-derian's panzer units after their long drive from Berlin. Hitler, whohad set off for Vienna, received a tumultuous welcome, while the de-tachment from Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, charged with hissafety, strove to keep up with their Fiihrer's breakneck progress,flanking his car.The Leibstandarte's members could be forgiven for reflecting withsome satisfaction that it had shown up well in comparison with theArmy. The much-vaunted panzer units had experienced mechanicaltrouble on the road from Salzburg, and had been left stranded. An an-gry Guderian brushed this aside, defending his troops by saying thatthe breakdowns were trivial. Whatever the truth, the men of the Leib-standarte had covered no less than 965km (600 miles) in some 48hours. Cooperation with the Army had been total. The 2nd Panzer Di-vision remained in the area of Vienna until the autumn, when it wasreplaced by Austrians. The Leibstandarte and the staff of XVI ArmyCorps returned to Berlin in April.Hitler next turned his attention to Czechoslovakia, issuing on 20 Mayhis directive for Operation Green (Case Grun), the occupation of theSudetenland with its German minority. Once again, the Leibstan-darte took part in the invasion under the command of Guderian'sXVI Panzer Corps and, again, the tanks were draped in greenery. ForHitler's entry, a guard of honour was made up of three companies,one each from 1st Panzer Regiment, 1st Rifle Regiment and the Leib-standarte. This incursion was followed six months later by occu-pation of Bohemia and Moravia.

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Origins

The pre-SS formations:Stabswache (SA Control), 1923Stosstrupp Adolf Hitler (SA Control), 1923

The formation of the SS:Stabswache, 1925Schutzstaffel, 1925

The Leibstandarte units:Stabswache (SA controlled) – 1923Stoßtrupp Adolf Hitler (SA controlled) – 1923Stabswache (not under SA control) – March 1933SS-Stabswache Berlin – 1933SS-Sonderkommando Zossen – 1933SS-Sonderkommando Jüterbog – 1933SS-Sonderkommando Berlin – September 1933Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler – November 1933Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler – April 1934Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler – 1939SS-Division (mot.) Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler – 1941SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler – 19431. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler – 1943

Years (1923–1933)In the earliest days of the NSDAP, leaders realized that bodyguardunits composed of trustworthy and loyal men would be a wise devel-opment. Ernst Röhm formed a guard formation from the 19.Granat-werfer-Kompanie; from this formation the Sturmabteilung 23 (SA)soon evolved. Adolf Hitler, realizing the potential threat the SA pre-sented, ordered the formation of a bodyguard for himself in early1923. Originally the unit was composed of only eight men, com-manded by Julius Schreck and Joseph Berchtold. It was designatedthe Stabswache (Staff Guard). The Stabswache were issued uniquebadges, but at this point the Stabswache was still was under overallSA control. Schreck resurrected the use of the Totenkopf (death'shead) as the unit's insignia, a symbol various elite forces had usedthroughout the Prussian kingdom and the later German Empire. 24

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Soon after its formation, the unit was renamed Stoßtrupp (ShockTroop) 'Adolf Hitler'. On 9 November 1923 the Stoßtrupp, along withthe SA and several other NSDAP paramilitary units, took part in theabortive Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. In the aftermath of the putsch,Hitler was imprisoned and the NSDAP and all associated formations,including the Stoßtrupp, were officially disbanded.Shortly after his release from prison in April 1925, Hitler ordered theformation of a new bodyguard unit, the Schutzkommando (Protec-tion Command). The unit was renamed the Sturmstaffel (AssaultSquadron) shortly thereafter, and in November was renamed theSchutzstaffel, abbreviated to SS.By March 1933 the SS had grown from a tiny personal bodyguardunit to a formation of over 50.000 men. The decision was made toform a new bodyguard unit, again called the Stabswache, using capa-ble and trustworthy SS men, mostly from the 1st SS Standarte operat-ing out of Munich to form its cadre. By 1933 this unit was under thecommand of Josef "Sepp" Dietrich who selected 117 men for the SS-Stabswache Berlin. Out of these initial 117, three eventually becamedivisional commanders, at least eight would become regimentalcommanders, fifteen became battalion commanders, and over thirtybecame company commanders, all within the Waffen-SS. Eleven men

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from the first company of 117 went on to win the Knights Cross, andforty of them were awarded the German Cross in gold for bravery.Later in 1933, two further training units were formed: SS-Sonder-kommando Zossen, and a second unit, designated SS-Sonderkom-mando Jüterbog.In September 1933 the two Sonderkommando 25 merged into the SS-Sonderkommando Berlin. In November 1933, on the 10th anniver-sary of the Beer Hall Putsch, the Sonderkommando took part in therally and memorial service at the Feldherrnhalle, erected in the placewhere many NSDAP members had fallen during the putsch. All mem-bers of the Sonderkommando swore personal allegiance to Hitler. Toconclude this ceremony, the Sonderkommando received a new title,"Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (LAH).On 13 April 1934, Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer-SS, orderedthe Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) to be renamed "LeibstandarteSS Adolf Hitler" (LSSAH). Himmler inserted the SS initials into thename to make it clear that the unit was independent from the SA orarmy. In late June, the LSSAH was called into action for the firsttime. Stabschef-SA Ernst Röhm 26 began to push for greater influencefor his already powerful SA. Hitler decided that the SA had to be putin its place, and ordered Himmler and Hermann Göring to preparetheir elite units, Himmler's Leibstandarte and Göring's Landespoli-zeigruppe General Göring, for immediate action. The LSSAH formedtwo companies under the control of Jürgen Wagner and Otto Reich,these formations were moved to Munich on 30 June.Hitler ordered all SA leaders to attend a meeting at the HanselbauerHotel in Bad Wiessee, near Munich. Hitler joined Sepp Dietrich and aunit from the Leibstandarte and travelled to Bad Wiessee to person-ally oversee Röhm's arrest on 30 June. On 1 July Hitler finally agreedwith Göring and Himmler that Röhm should be executed. In what theNazis called the Röhm Putsch, but otherwise came to be known as theNight of the Long Knives,27 companies of the LSSAH, together withthe Gestapo and Göring's Landespolizeigruppe, performed DeathSquad actions. At least 177 people were executed without trial overthe next few days.This action succeeded in effectively decapitating the SA and removingRöhm's threat to Hitler's leadership. In recognition of their actions,both the LSSAH and the Landespolizeigruppe General Göring wereexpanded to regimental size and motorized. In addition, the SS be-came an independent organization, no longer part of the SA.As the SS swelled with new recruits, the LSSAH represented the pin-nacle of Hitler's Aryan ideal. Strict recruitment regulations meant

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that only those deemed sufficiently Aryan—as well as being physicallyfit and National Socialists—would be admitted.The LSSAH provided the honour guard at many of the NurembergRallies, and in 1935 took part in the reoccupation of the Saarland.The Leibstandarte was in the vanguard of the march into Austria aspart of the Anschluss, and in 1938 the unit took part in the occupa-tion of the Sudetenland. By 1939, the LSSAH was a full infantry regi-ment with three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and anti-tank, reconnaissance and engineer subunits. Soon after its involve-ment in the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, the LSSAH was re-designated "Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler(mot.)". When Hitler ordered the formation of an SS division in mid-1939, the Leibstandarte was designated to form its own unit, unlikethe other Standarten of the SS-Verfügungstruppe (SS-VT) (SS-Standarte Deutschland, SS-Standarte Germania, and SS-StandarteDer Führer). The Polish crisis of August 1939 put these plans onhold, and the LSSAH was ordered to join XIII. Armeekorps, a part ofArmy Group South, which was preparing for the attack on Poland.During the initial stages of the Invasion of Poland, the LeibstandarteSS Adolf Hitler was attached to the 17. Infanterie-Division andtasked with providing flank protection for the southern pincer. Theregiment was involved in several battles against Polish cavalry bri-gades attempting to hit the flanks of the German advance. At Pabia-nice, a town near Łódź, the LSSAH fought off elements of the Polish28th Infantry Division and the Wołyńska Cavalry Brigade in closecombat. Throughout the campaign, the unit was notorious for burn-ing villages.After the success at Pabianice, the LSSAH was sent to the area nearWarsaw and attached to the 4.Panzer-Division under GeneraloberstGeorg-Hans Reinhardt. The unit saw action preventing encircled Pol-ish units from escaping, and repelling several desperate attempts byother Polish troops to break through. The LSSAH had proved itself aneffective fighting formation during the campaign, although severalHeer (army) Generals had reservations about the high casualtieswhich the LSSAH and the SS-VT units had sustained in combat. On18–19 September at Błonie near Warsaw, around 50 Jews were mur-dered by soldiers from the division.

Invasion of FranceIn early 1940 the LSSAH was expanded into a full independent mo-torized infantry regiment and a Sturmgeschütz (Assault Gun) batterywas added to their establishment. The regiment was shifted to the

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Dutch border for the launch of Fall Gelb. It was to form the vanguardof the ground advance into the Netherlands, tasked with capturing avital bridge over the IJssel, attacking the main line of defence at theGrebbeberg (the Grebbeline), and linking up with the Fall-schirmjäger of Generaloberst Kurt Student's airborne forces, the7.Flieger-Division and the 22.Luftlande-Infanterie-Division. 28

Fall Gelb—the invasion of France and the Low Countries—waslaunched on 10 May 1940. On that day, the LSSAH crossed the Dutchborder, covered over 75 kilometres (47 mi), and secured a crossingover the IJssel near Zutphen after discovering that their target bridgehad been destroyed. Over the next four days, the LSSAH covered over215 kilometres (134 mi), and earned itself dubious fame by acciden-tally shooting at and seriously wounding Generaloberst Student atRotterdam. After the surrender of the Netherlands on 15 May, theregiment formed part of the reserve for Army Group B.After the British armoured counterattack at Arras, the LSSAH, alongwith the SS-Verfügungs-Division, was moved to the front to hold theperimeter around Dunkirk and reduce the size of the pocket contain-ing the encircled British Expeditionary Force and French forces. NearWormhoudt, the LSSAH ignored Hitler's orders for the advance tohalt and continued the attack, suppressing the British artillery posi-tions on the Wattenberg Heights. During this battle the regiment suf-fered heavy casualties.After the attack, soldiers of LSSAH's II.Batallion, under the com-

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mand of SS-Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Mohnke, were mistakenlyinformed that their divisional commander, Sepp Dietrich, had beenkilled in the fighting. In what is known as the Wormhoudt massacre,about 80 British POWs of 2nd Battalion of the Royal WarwickshireRegiment were murdered in retaliation for the supposed death of Die-trich. Although it is unarguable that the massacre occurred,Mohnke's level of involvement is impossible to know, he was neverbrought to trial.

Campaign in the BalkansAfter the conclusion of the Western campaign on 22 June 1940, theLSSAH spent six months in Metz (Moselle). It was expanded to bri-gade size (6.500 soldiers). Despite this, it retained the designation'regiment'. A 'Flak battalion' and a StuG Batterie were among theunits added to the LSSAH. A new flag was presented by HeinrichHimmler in September 1940. During the later months of 1940, theregiment trained in amphibious assaults on the Moselle River inpreparation for Operation Sealion, the invasion of England. After theLuftwaffe's failure in the Battle of Britain and the cancellation of theplanned invasion, the LSSAH was shifted to Bulgaria in February1941 in preparation for Operation Marita, part of the planned inva-sion of Greece and Yugoslavia.The operation was launched on 6 April 1941. The LSSAH was to fol-low the route of the 9.Panzer-Division, part of General der Panzer-truppen Georg Stumme's XL Panzer Corps. The regiment crossed theborder near Prilep and was soon deep in Greek territory.The LSSAH captured Vevi on 10 April. SS-Sturmbannführer KurtMeyer's reinforced Aufklärungs-Abteilung (reconnaissance unit),LSSAH was tasked with clearing resistance from the Kleisoura Passsouth-west of Vevi and driving through to the Kastoria area to cut offretreating Greek and British Commonwealth forces. Resistance fromthe Greek 20th Division was fierce. According to some accounts, theSS were inspired to capture the Kleisoura Pass only after Meyer threwa live grenade at the feet of some of his soldiers. 29

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SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Witt's I.Batallion was tasked with clear-ing the Klidi Pass just south of Vevi, which was strongly defended byAustralian, British and New Zealand troops. Witt's battalion was rein-forced and renamed Kampfgruppe "Witt". An Australian officerwrote of the Germans' "insolence" in driving "trucks down the mainroad — to within 3,000 yards (2,700 m) of our infantry" and thereunloading the SS troops.The Germans were forced off the road and faced fierce resistance formore than two days. On the morning of 12 April the Germanslaunched a frontal assault, and by late afternoon the pass wascleared.With the fall of the two passes the main line of resistance of the GreekFirst Army was broken, and the campaign became a battle to preventthe escape of the enemy. On 20 April, following a pitched battle in the5,000-foot (1,500 m)-high Metsovon Pass in the Pindus Mountains,the commander of the Greek First Army surrendered the entire Hel-lenic Army to Dietrich. British Commonwealth troops were now theonly Allied forces remaining in Greece, and they were falling backacross the Corinth Canal to the Peloponnesos. By 26 April the LSSAHhad reached the Gulf of Patras, and in an effort to cut off the retreat-ing British Commonwealth forces, Dietrich ordered that his regimentcross the Gulf and secure the town of Patras in the Peloponnesos. 30

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Since no transport vessels were available, the LSSAH commandeeredfishing boats and successfully completed the crossing, but wereforced to leave much of their heavy equipment behind. By 30 Aprilthe last British Commonwealth troops had either been captured or es-caped. The LSSAH occupied a position of honour in the victory pa-rade through Athens. After Operation Marita, the LSSAH was or-dered north to join the forces of Army Group South massing for thelaunch of Operation Barbarossa.

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Operation BarbarossaFollowing Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler's outstanding performanceduring Marita, Himmler ordered that it should be upgraded to divi-sional status. The regiment, already the size of a reinforced brigade,was redesignated "SS-Division (mot.) Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler".There was no time to refit it to full divisional status before the launchof Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of the Soviet Union—and sothe new "division" remained the size of a reinforced brigade.The LSSAH was attached to the LIV Army Corps and held in reserveduring the opening stages of the attack. In August 1941 it was trans-ferred to III Panzer Corps, part of Generalfeldmarschall Ewald vonKleist's 1st Panzer Group. During this time, the LSSAH was involvedin the Battle of Uman and the subsequent capture of Kiev. The divi-sion was involved in heavy fighting, with Meyer's Abteilung particu-larly distinguishing itself. According to a postwar account of a Waf-fen-SS journalist, after finding the mutilated bodies of six dead divi-sional members who had been previously captured and executed inTaganrog, the division murdered 4.000 Soviet prisoners in reprisal.For want of reliable evidence, the allegations remained unproven. 31

In early September, the division returned to LIV Army Corps, whichwas preparing to launch an offensive to clear the Crimean peninsula.

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The operation was launched on 17 September 1941. The LSSAH wasinvolved in heavy fighting for the town of Perekop before advancingacross the Perekop Isthmus to assault the Soviet defensive positionsnear the Tartar Ditch.In November the LSSAH was transferred back to 1st Panzer Groupand took part in the heavy fighting for the city of Rostov-on-Don,which was captured in late November. During Operation Barbarossa,the division had penetrated 960 kilometres (600 mi) into Soviet terri-tory.Heavy Soviet counterattacks during the winter meant that ArmyGroup South had to fall back from Rostov to defensive lines on theriver Mius. The LSSAH spent the winter fighting ferocious defensivebattles in temperatures of down to −40 °C (−40 °F), with minimalwinter clothing and only 150 grams of rations per man per day. De-spite this, the division held. After the spring rasputitsa (seasonalmud) had cleared, the exhausted division joined in Fall Blau, partici-pating in the fighting to retake Rostov-on-Don, which was recapturedin late July 1942. Severely understrength and completely exhausted,the LSSAH was pulled out of the line. The division was ordered to theNormandy region of occupied France to join the newly-formed SSPanzer Corps and to be reformed as a Panzergrenadier division.

KharkovThe Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler spent the remainder of 1942 refit-ting as a panzergrenadier division. Thanks to the efforts of HeinrichHimmler (Reichsführer-SS), along with SS-Obergruppenführer PaulHausser, the SS Panzer Corps commander, the three SS Panzergre-nadier divisions (LSSAH), Das Reich and Totenkopf were to beformed with a full regiment of tanks rather than only a Battalion.This meant that the SS Panzergrenadier divisions were full-strengthPanzer divisions in all but name. The division also received nine Tiger1 tanks, and these were formed into the 13th (schwere) Company/1stSS Panzer Regiment.The collapse of the front around Stalingrad and the encirclement ofthe German Sixth Army meant that the entire eastern front was closeto collapse. General Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein, commanderof Army Group Don, requested reinforcements to halt the Soviet at-tack near Kharkov. The SS Panzer Corps was ordered east to joinManstein's forces.Arriving at the front in late January 1943, the LSSAH was thrown in-to the line defending Kharkov itself as a part of Hausser's SS PanzerCorps.Facing them were the hundreds of T-34 tanks of Mobile Group

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Popov, a Soviet armoured Army sized formation which formed thespearhead of the Soviet advance. On 8–9 February 1943, the LSSAH's1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment under SS-Sturmbannführer FritzWitt, fighting alongside SS-Sturmbannführer Max Wünsche's I/1stSS Panzer Regiment, fought a bitter delaying action near the town ofMerefa, halting a major Soviet attack. The division fought in manydesperate defensive battles over the next few weeks, gradually beingpushed back into the city of Kharkov itself.Despite inflicting heavy losses on the Soviets, and repelling all enemyattacks, the Soviets succeeded in outflanking the corps. On 15 Febru-ary, Hausser disregardred Hitler's orders to hold the city at all costsand ordered the SS Panzer Corps to abandon the city and withdrawtowards Krasnograd. Over the next week, the SS Panzer Corps anni-hilated Mobile Group Popov in a series of hard fought battles. TheLSSAH was a major participant in these battles, destroying severalSoviet divisions and inflicting heavy losses.Hausser now ordered that Kharkov be recaptured. The LSSAH, DasReich and Totenkopf were to form the spearhead of the attack. It gotunderway on 7 March. The LSSAH was formed into three Kampf-gruppen (battlegroups) which would attack towards and captureKharkov. Over nine days, the LSSAH would take part in the battles totake the city. Kampfgruppe "Meyer", under Meyer's command, pene-trated as far as Red Square before being cut off. Kampfgruppe "Witt"saw heavy fighting against a Soviet blocking force near Dergatschi be-fore it also broke through into the city.Both Kampfgruppen were repeatedly cut off during the confusedfighting, and it was not until Kampfgruppe "Peiper", under JoachimPeiper, broke through that the defenders were finally overwhelmed.By 17 March, the battle was over and Kharkov was back in Germanhands, with Peiper's Kampfgruppe having penetrated as far as Bel-gorod.After recapturing Kharkov, soldiers of the LSSAH engaged in themurder of wounded Soviet soldiers that were located in the city's mili-tary hospital; several hundred perished. Additionally, per the Com-missar Order, captured Soviet officers and commissars were rou-tinely executed.In honour of the 4.500 casualties suffered by the Leibstandarte in thefighting, Kharkov's Red Square was renamed Platz der LeibstandarteSS Adolf Hitler by the Germans. The division was pulled back formuch needed rest and refit. One major change in the LSSAH now oc-curred; their commander Sepp Dietrich after ten years in commandwas promoted to form a new Corps, the 1st SS Panzer Corps Leib-

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standarte and the LSSAH was to supply all the senior officers for thenew headquarters. At the same time a new SS division would beformed from members of the Hitler Youth and the LSSAH would sup-ply all of the Regimental, Battalion and most of the Companycommanders. In time this new division would become the 12th SSPanzer Division (Hitlerjugend).

3rd S.S Panzer Division Totenkopf

The SS Division Totenkopf ("Death's Head"), also known as 3. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Totenkopf and 3. SS-Panzer-Division To-tenkopf, was one of the 38 divisions fielded by the Waffen-SS duringWorld War II. Prior to achieving division status, the formation wasknown as Kampfgruppe Eicke. The division is infamous due to its in-signia and the fact that most of the initial enlisted soldiers were SS-Totenkopfverbände (SS concentration camp guards). The Totenkopfdivision was numbered with the "Germanic" divisions of the Waffen-SS. These included also the SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte SSAdolf Hitler, SS-Panzer Division Das Reich, and SS-Panzer DivisionWiking.

Fig No 1 Tactical insignia

Formation and Fall GelbThe SS Division Totenkopf was formed in October 1939. The Toten-kopf was initially formed from concentration camp guards of the 1st(Oberbayern), 2nd (Brandenburg) and 3rd (Thüringen) Standarten(regiments) of the SS-Totenkopfverbände, and soldiers from the SS-Heimwehr Danzig. The division had officers from the SS-Verfügung-struppe (SS-VT), of whom many had seen action in Poland. The divi-

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sion was commanded by SS-Obergruppenführer Theodor Eicke.Through the Battle of France the division was generally equippedwith ex-Czech weapons.Having missed the Polish campaign, Totenkopf was initially held inreserve during the assault into France and the Low Countries in May1940. They were committed on 16 May to the Front in Belgium. TheTotenkopf soldiers fought fanatically, suffering heavy losses.Within a week of this initial commitment the division's first warcrime had already been committed. At Le Paradis 4th Kompanie, IAbteilung, commanded by SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Knöchlein, ma-chine-gunned 97 out of 99 British officers and members of the RoyalNorfolk Regiment after they had surrendered to them; two survived.After the war, Knöchlein was tried by a British Court and convictedfor war crimes in 1948. He was sentenced to death and hanged.

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Fig Motorcyclists (German: Kradschützen) from the SS Division "To-tenkopf" during the invasion of Russia in September 1941Totenkopf saw action a number of times during the French campaign.To the north-east of Cambrai the division took 16,000 French prison-ers. Whilst subsequently trying to drive through to the coast they en-countered a major Anglo-French force which they had a great deal ofdifficulty stopping and came perilously close to panic. Totenkopf hadto resort to firing artillery pieces in an anti-tank role, and were savedonly by the intervention of Luftwaffe dive-bombers. It then sufferedheavy losses during the taking of the La Bassée Canal. Further stiff re-sistance was then encountered at both Béthune and Le Paradis. TheFrench surrender found the division located near the Spanish border,where it was to stay, resting and refitting, until April 1941. Totenkopfhad suffered heavy losses during the campaign, including over 300officers. Replacement personnel were supplied, this time via regularWaffen-SS recruitment as opposed to coming from the camps. Flakand artillery battalions were added to its strength. Local vehicleswere also commandeered from the French, many of the divisionssoft-skinned transports during Barbarossa were of French origin.

Barbarossa-Demjansk PocketIn April 1941, the division was ordered East to join Generalfeldmar-schall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Army Group North. Leeb's ArmyGroup was tasked with advancing on Leningrad and formed thenorthern wing of Operation Barbarossa. Totenkopf saw action in Lith-uania and Latvia, and by July had breached the vaunted Stalin Line.The division then advanced by Demjansk to Leningrad where it wasinvolved in heavy fighting from 31 July to 25 August. During Autumnand Winter of 1941, the Soviets launched a number of operationsagainst the German lines in the Northern sector of the Front. Duringone of these operations, the Division was encircled for severalmonths near Demjansk in what would come to be known as the Dem-jansk Pocket. During these kessel battles, Totenkopf suffered sogreatly that, due to its reduced size, it was re-designated Kampf-gruppe Eicke. The division was involved in ferocious fighting to holdthe pocket. SS-Hauptsturmführer Erwin Meierdress of the Sturm-geschütze-Batterie (Assault Gun) Totenkopf formed a Kampfgruppeof about 120 soldiers and held the strategic town of Bjakowo despiterepeated determined enemy attempts to capture the town. Duringthese battles, Meierdress personally destroyed several enemy tanks inhis StuG III. He was awarded the Iron Cross for his actions duringthis period. In April 1942, the division broke out of the pocket and

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managed to reach friendly lines. At Demjansk, about 80% of its sol-diers were killed, wounded or missing in action. The remnants of theDivision were pulled out of action in late October, 1942 and sent toFrance to be refitted. While in France, the Division took part in CaseAnton, the takeover of Vichy France in November 1942. For this oper-ation, the division was supplied with a Panzer battalion and redesig-nated 3.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Totenkopf. The division re-mained in France until February, 1943, when their old commander,Theodor Eicke, resumed control.

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Fig Tanks and Schützenpanzerwagen 3° S.S Panzer Division Toten-kopf

Kharkov – KurskIn Early February 1943 Totenkopf was transferred back to the East-ern Front as part of Erich von Manstein's Army Group South. The di-vision, as a part of SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser's SS PanzerCorps, took part in the Third Battle of Kharkov, blunting the Sovietoffensive. During this campaign, Theodor Eicke was killed when hisFieseler Storch spotter aircraft was shot down while on final ap-proach to a front line unit. The division mounted an assault to securethe crash site and recover their commander's body, and thereafterEicke's body was buried with full military honours. Hermann Priesssucceeded Eicke as commander.The SS Panzer Corps, including Totenkopf, was then shifted north totake part in Operation Citadel, the great offensive to reduce the Kursksalient. It was during February 1943 that the 3rd SS Panzer Regimentreceived a company of Tiger I heavy tanks (9th Company/3rd SS Pan-zer Regiment). This company was near full strength by the time Cita-del commenced having honed their tank-killing skills during the Ger-man counterstroke to recapture the cities of Kharkov and Belgorodduring the spring of 1943.The attack was launched on 5 July 1943, after a massive Soviet artil-lery barrage fell on the German assembly areas. The II SS PanzerCorps (renamed after the formation of the I SS Panzer Corps onemonth earlier) was to attack the southern flank of the salient as thespearhead for Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army. TheTotenkopf covered the advance on the II SS Panzer Corps left flank,with the Leibstandarte forming the spearhead. 3rd SS Panzer Regi-ment advanced in a panzerkeil across the hot and dusty steppe. De-spite encountering stiff Soviet resistance and several pakfronts, theTotenkopf's panzers continued the advance, albeit at a slower pacethan had been planned. Hausser ordered his II SS Panzer Corps tosplit in two, with the Totenkopf crossing the Psel river northwardsand then continuing on towards the town of Prokhorovka.In the early morning of 9 July, 6th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment The-odor Eicke attacked northwards, crossing the Psel and attempted toseize the strategic Hill 226.6, located to the east of the fortified villageof Kliuchi.The attack was rebuffed by the defending Soviets. The failure to cap-ture the hill meant that the drive along the north bank of the Psel wastemporarily halted, forcing Hausser to also delay the Southern ad-

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vance. In the afternoon, regiment Eicke managed to redeem itself bycapturing the hill, but the northern advance slowed and the majorityof the division was still south of the Psel, where elements of SS-Pan-zergrenadier-Regiment 5 Thule continued to advance towards Pro-khorovka and cover the flank of the Leibstandarte.By 11 July, SS-Hauptsturmführer Erwin Meierdress had led his 1stCompany/3rd SS Panzer Regiment across the Psel on hastily con-structed pontoon bridges, reinforcing the tenuous position. Theforces in the bridgehead were subjected to several furious Soviet at-tacks, but with the support of Meierdress' panzers they held theirground and slowly expanded the bridgehead, securing the village ofKliuchi. Strong Soviet opposition had severely slowed the division'sadvance along the north bank.In the afternoon of 12 July, near the village of Andre'evka on thesouth bank of the Psel, the Soviets launched a major counterattackagainst Regiment Thule and the division's StuG battalion.SS-Brigadeführer Hermann Priess, the Totenkopf's commander, or-dered Meierdress' abteilung to advance and support the beleagueredforces. The PzKpfw IIIs and PzKpfw IVs of Meierdress' unit were sup-ported by the Totenkopf's Tiger I company, 9th Company/3rd SSPanzer Regiment. In ferocious combat with the lead units of the 5thGuards Tank Army, Meierdress managed to halt the Soviet assault,destroying many Soviet T-34s, but at the cost of the majority of thedivision's remaining operational panzers.While the II SS Panzer Corps had halted the Soviet counteroffensiveand inflicted heavy casualties, it had exhausted itself and was no lon-ger capable of offensive action. Manstein attempted to commit his re-serve, the XXIV Panzer Corps, but Hitler refused to authorize this.On 14 July, Hitler called off the operation.

Battles on the Mius Front – Retreat to the DnieprAlong with Das Reich, the division was reassigned to General der In-fanterie Karl-Adolf Hollidt's reformed 6th Army in the Southern Uk-raine. The 6th Army was tasked with eliminating the Soviet bridge-head over the Mius River.Totenkopf was involved in heavy fighting over the next several weeks.During the July–August battles for Hill 213 and the town of Stepa-nowka, the division suffered heavy losses, and over the course of thecampaign on the Mius-Front it suffered more casualties than it hadduring Operation Citadel.By the time the Soviet bridgehead was eliminated, the division hadlost 1500 soldiers and the Panzer regiment was reduced to 20 tanks.

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The Totenkopf was then moved north, back to Kharkov. Along withDas Reich, Totenkopf, took part in the battles to halt Operation Ru-myantsev and to prevent the Soviet capture of the city. Although thetwo divisions managed to halt the offensive, inflicting heavy casual-ties and destroying over 800 tanks, the Soviets outflanked the de-fenders, forcing them to abandon the city on 23 August.By early September, the Totenkopf reached the Dniepr. Elements ofthe Soviet 5th GuardsTank Army had forced a crossing at Kremenchug and were soonthreatening to break through the Dniepr line. Totenkopf was throwninto action against the bridgehead.In October 1943, the division was reformed as 3rd SS Panzer DivisionTotenkopf. The Panzer abteilung (battalion) was officially upgradedto a regiment, and the two Panzergrenadier regiments were given thehonorary titles Theodor Eicke and Totenkopf.After holding the Kremenchug bridgehead for several months, the So-viets finally broke out, pushing Totenkopf and the other axis divisionsinvolved back towards the Romanian border. By November, Toten-kopf was engaged fighting intense defensive actions against Soviet at-tacks over the vital town of Krivoi Rog to the west of the Dniepr.

WarsawIn January 1944, Totenkopf was still engaged in heavy defensivefighting east of the Dniepr near Krivoi Rog, where a breakthroughnevertheless evaded the Soviets, due in great part to the actions of theTotenkopf and the Heer's Panzergrenadier-Division "Großdeutsch-land". In February 1944, 56,000 German troops were trapped in theKorsun Pocket. Totenkopf was sent towards Cherkassy to assist in therelief attempts. The division attacked towards the city of Korsun, at-tempting to secure a crossing over the Gniloy-Tilkich river. The 1stPanzer Division, fighting alongside the Totenkopf, achieved a linkupwith the encircled forces.In the second week of March, after a fierce battle near Kirovograd,the Totenkopf fell back behind the Bug River. Totenkopf immediatelybegan taking up new defensive positions. After two weeks of heavyfighting, again alongside the Panzergrenadier-Division "Groß-deutschland" west of Ivanovka, the Axis forces again fell back, with-drawing to the Dniestr on the Romanian border near Iaşi.

In the first week of April, Totenkopf gained a moment's respite as itrested in the area near Târgu Frumos in Romania. The division re-ceived replacements and new equipment, it's panzer regiment taking

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charge of a consignment of Panther tanks to replace some of the out-dated PzKpfw IVs. In the second week of April, heavy Soviet attackstowards Târgul Frumos meant that Totenkopf was back in action,playing a role in the decisive defensive victory. By 7 May, the fronthad quietened and the Totenkopf went back to the business of reor-ganizing.In a battle near Iaşi, elements of the division, together with elementsof the Panzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland, managed to haltan armoured assault by the Red Army. The assault, which in many as-pects bore similarities to those of the later British Operation Good-wood, was carried out by approximately 500 tanks.In early July, the division was ordered to the area near Grodno in Po-land, where it would form a part of SS-Obergruppenführer HerbertGille's IV SS Panzer Corps, covering the approaches to Warsaw nearModlin.After The Soviet Operation Bagration and the destruction of ArmyGroup Centre the German lines had been pushed back over300 miles, to the outskirts of the Polish capital. The Totenkopf ar-rived at the Warsaw front in late July 1944. After the launch of Opera-tion Bagration and the collapse of Army Group Centre, the central-Eastern front was a mess; the IV. SS-Panzerkorps was one of the fewformations standing in the way of the Soviet advance. On 1 August1944, the Armia Krajowa (the Polish Home Army), rose up in Warsawitself. A column of Totenkopf Tigers was caught up in the fighting,and several were lost. The Totenkopf itself was not involved in thesuppression of the revolt, instead guarding the front lines, and fight-ing off several Soviet probing attacks into the city's eastern suburbs.In several furious battles near the town of Modlin in mid August, theTotenkopf, fighting alongside the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking"and the Hermann Göring Panzer Division virtually annihilated theSoviet 3rd Tank Corps, which had contained a division of communistPoles. The terrain around Modlin is excellent for armour, and Toten-kopf's panzers exploited this to their advantage, engaging Soviettanks from a range where the superiority of the German optics andthe 75 mm high-velocity gun gave the Panthers an edge over the T-34s.

Budapest Relief AttemptsThe efforts of the Totenkopf, Wiking and Hermann Göring divisionsallowed the Germans to hold the Vistula line and establish ArmyGroup Vistula. In December 1944, the IX SS Mountain Corps (AlpineCorps-Croatia) was encircled in Budapest. Hitler ordered the IV SS

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Panzer Corps to redeploy south to relieve the 95,000 Germans andHungarians trapped in the city. The corps arrived just before NewYear's Eve, and was immediately thrown into action.The relief attempts were to be codenamed Operation Konrad. Thefirst attack was Konrad I. The plan was for a joint attack by the Wik-ing and Totenkopf from the town of Tata attacking along the Bicske-Budapest line. The attack was launched on New Year's Day, 1945.Despite initial gains, Konrad I ran into heavy Soviet opposition nearBicske, during the battle the 1st Battalion, 3rd SS Panzer Regiment'scommander, SS-Sturmbannführer Erwin Meierdress was killed.After the failure of the first operation, Totenkopf and Wikinglaunched an assault aimed at reaching the city centre. Named Opera-tion Konrad II, the attack was launched on 7 January from just southof Esztergom. It reached as far as Budapest's northern suburbs, by 12January panzergrenadiers of the "Wiking" division spotted thechurch spires and turrets of the Hungarian capital's skyline. How-ever, despite its success, Gille's corps was overextended and vulner-able, so it was ordered to fall back as part of a ruse to encircle Sovietunits north of the city.

Fig Panzerkampfwagen V Ausf A S.S panzer Rgiment TotenkopfOperation Konrad III got underway on 20 January 1945. Attackingfrom the south of Budapest, it aimed at encircling ten Red Army divi-sions. However, the relief forces could not achieve their goal, despitetearing a 15-mile hole in the Soviets' line and destroying the 135th Ri-fle Corps. Although they had been on the verge of rescuing the IX SSMountain Corps, the encircled troops could not be reached and sotherefore capitulated in mid-February. The division was pulled backto the west, executing a fighting withdrawal from Budapest to thearea near Lake Balaton, where the 6th SS Panzer Army under SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef Dietrich was massing for the upcomingOperation Frühlingserwachen (Operation Spring Awakening).

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Gille's corps was too depleted to take part in the assault, instead itprovided flank support to assaulting divisions during the beginningof the operation.Totenkopf, together with Wiking, performed a holding action on theleft flank of the offensive, in the area between Velenczesee-Stuhlweis-senberg. As Frühlingserwachen progressed, the division was heavilyengaged, preventing Soviet efforts from outflanking the advancingGerman forces.As the offensive stalled, the Soviets launched a major attack, theVienna Offensive, on 16 March. Attacking the border between the To-tenkopf and the Hungarian 2nd Armoured Division, contact was soonlost between the two formations. Acting quickly, the 6th Armycommander, Generaloberst Hermann Balck, recommended movingthe I SS Panzer Corps north to plug the gap and prevent the encircle-ment of the IV SS Panzer Corps. Despite this quick thinking, a FührerOrder authorising this move was slow in coming, and when the divi-sions finally began moving, it was too late.On 22 March, the Red Army encirclement of the Totenkopf and Wik-ing was almost complete. Desperate, Balck threw the veteran 9th SSPanzer Division "Hohenstaufen", into the area to hold open a routewhich could be used to withdraw - the Berhida Corridor. In the battleto hold it open, the "Hohenstaufen" bled itself white, but Gille's corpsmanaged to escape.

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Fig Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf break for a meal besidethe wreck of a Soviet T-34 somewhere in Romania, 1944On 24 March, another Soviet attack threw the exhausted IV SS Pan-zer Corps back towards Vienna, and all contact was lost with theneighbouring I SS Panzer Corps. This destroyed any resemblance ofan organised line of defence. The remnants of the Totenkopf executeda fighting withdrawal into Czechoslovakia. By early-May, they werewithin reach of the American forces, to whom the division officially

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surrendered on 9 May. The Americans promptly handed Totenkopfback to the Soviets, and many Totenkopf soldiers died in Soviet Gu-lags.

War crimesThe division was involved in several war crimes, most notably a mas-sacre of British soldiers during the Battle of France.

PolandTheodor Eicke, who was the commandant of the Dachau concentra-tion camp, inspector of the camps and murderer of Ernst Röhm, laterbecame the commander of the 3 SS Totenkopf Division. With the in-vasion of Poland, the Totenkopfverbände troops were called on tocarry out "police and security measures" in rear areas. What thesemeasures involved is demonstrated by the record of SS TotenkopfStandarte "Brandenburg". It arrived in Włocławek on 22 September1939 and embarked on a four day "Jewish action" that included theburning of synagogues and the execution en-masse of the leaders ofthe Jewish community. On 29 September the Standarte travelled toBydgoszcz to conduct an "intelligentsia action". Approximately 800Polish civilians and what the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) termed "poten-tial resistance leaders" were killed. The Totenkopfverbände was tobecome one of the elite SS divisions, but from the start they wereamong the first executors of a policy of systematic extermination.

Le Paradis MassacreThe Le Paradis massacre was a war crime committed by members ofthe 14th Company, SS Division Totenkopf, under the command ofHauptsturmführer Fritz Knöchlein. It took place on 27 May 1940,during the Battle of France, at a time when the British ExpeditionaryForce (BEF) was attempting to retreat through the Pas-de-Calais re-gion during the Battle of Dunkirk.Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Norfolk Regiment, had be-come isolated from their regiment. They occupied and defended afarmhouse against an attack by Waffen-SS forces in the village of LeParadis. After running out of ammunition, the defenders surrenderedto the German troops. The Germans led them across the road to awall, and machine-gunned them. Ninety-seven British troops died.Two survived, with injuries, and hid until they were captured by Ger-man forces several days later.After the war, Knöchlein was located, tried and convicted by a warcrimes court, the two survivors acted as witnesses against him. For

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his part in the massacre, Knöchlein was executed in 1949.

Order of Battle

SS Totenkopf Division (SS-TK)Formed on 10/16/39 in Dachau, it contained:1st SS Totenkopf (mot) Infantry Regiment1st Battalion (1-4th Companies)2nd Battalion (5-8th Companies)3rd Battalion (9-12th Companies)13th-14th Companies2nd SS Totenkopf (mot) Infantry Regiment1st Battalion (1-4th Companies)2nd Battalion (5-8th Companies)3rd Battalion (9-12th Companies)13th-14th Companies3rd SS Totenkopf (mot) Infantry Regiment1st Battalion (1-4th Companies)2nd Battalion (5-8th Companies)3rd Battalion (9-12th Companies)13th-14th CompaniesSS Totenkopf Reconnaissance Battalion (2 motorcycle companies & 1armored car platoon)SS Totenkopf Panzerabwehr (Anti-Tank) Battalion (3 companies)1/,2/,3/SS Totenkopf Artillery Regiment (3 batteries per battalion)SS Totenkopf Pioneer Battalion (3 companies)SS Totenkopf Signals Battalion (2 companies)During the winter the division added the 4/SS Totenkopf ArtilleryRegiment, which was a heavy battalion. Among the other thingsadded were a panzerjager company and a flak company to each of theinfantry regiments. There are also indications that a motorcycle re-connaissance company was added. In 1942 it added the SS TotenkopfFeldersatz Battalion and the SS Totenkopf Flak Battalion. On5/10/40 the SSTotenkopf (mot) Division was organized and equippedas follows:Division Staff1 Divisional Staff (2 HMGs)1 (mot) SS Divisional Mapping Detachment3 (mot) Infantry Regiments, each withRegimental Staff Company, with1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Engineer Platoon (3 LMGs)

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1 (mot) Motorcycle Platoon (4 LMGs)3 (mot) Battalions, each with3 (mot) Infantry Companies (12 LMGs & 3 50mm mortars ea)1 (mot) Machine Gun Company, with (12 HMGs & 6 80mm mortars)1 (mot) Infantry Support Gun Company (2 150mmsIG & 6 75mm leIG) 1 (mot) Panzerjager Company (12 37mm PAK 36& 6 LMGs)1 Light (mot) Supply Column (later eliminated)SSTotenkopf Panzerjager Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon3 (mot) Panzerjäger Companies (9 37mm PAK 36,2 50mm PAK 38 &6 LMGs)3rd Panzerjäger Company later equipped with (3 50mm PAK 38, 837mm PAK 36 & 6 LMGs)SS Totenkopf Reconnaissance Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon2 Motorcycle Companies (3 50mm mortars, 2 HMGs, & 18 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Support Company, with1 Light Armored Car Platoon (1 HMG & 3 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 & 1 LMG)1 Mortar Platoon (6 80mm mortars)1 Infantry Support Gun Section (2 75mm leIG guns)1 Engineer Platoon (3 LMGs)SS Totenkopf Artillery Regiment1 (mot) Signals Platoon2 (mot) Weather Detachments3 (mot) Battalions, each with1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Calibration Detachment3 (motZ) Batteries (4 105mm leFH 18 & 2 LMGs)1 (mot) Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Calibration Detachment3 (motZ) Batteries (4 150mm sFH 18 & 2 LMGs)SS Totenkopf Signals Battalion1 (mot) Radio Company1 (mot) Telephone Company1 Light (mot) Signals Supply ColumnS.S Totenkopf Feldersatz Battalion3 Companies S.S Totenkopf Pioneer Battalion3 (mot) Pioneer Companies (9 LMGs ea)1 (mot) "B" Bridging Train

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1 Light (mot) Engineering Supply ColumnSupply Train1st-5th Light (mot) Supply Columns6th-7th Heavy (mot) Supply Columns13th-15th Light (mot) Supply Columns (added later)10th-12th Heavy (mot) POL Supply Columns1st, 2nd, & 3rd (mot) Maintenance CompaniesSST (mot) Supply CompanyCommissary ServiceSST (mot) Bakery Platoon (later Company)SST (mot) Butcher Platoon (later Company)SST (mot) Division Administration Medical Service1st-3rd SST Ambulance ColumnsSST (mot) Field Hospital1st & 2nd SST Medical Companies OtherSST (mot) Military Police PlatoonSST (mot) Field Post OfficeOn 22 April 1941 the division contained:1st SS Infantry1st-3rd Battalions13th Company14th Company15th Company16th Company2nd SS Infantry1st-3rd Battalions13th Company14th Company 15th CompanyRegiment Reconnaissance BattalionArtillery Regiment1st (light) Battalion2nd (light) Battalion3rd (light) Battalion4th (heavy) BattalionRegiment SturmgeschützBattery PanzerjägerBattalion FlakBattalion PioneerBattalion Signals3rd SS Infantry Regimentlst-3rd Battalions13th Company

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14th Company15th Company16th CompanySupply TroopDivisional AdministrationMedical ServiceIntendant ServiceMilitary Police DetachmentField Post OfficeOn 5/16/41 a new organization was issued for the division that re-mained in effect until 10/15/42. That organization was as follows:Divisional Staff1 Divisional Staff (4 HMGs)1 (mot) Mapping Platoon2 (mot) Infantry Regiments, each with1 (mot) Regimental Staff Company, with1 Signals Platoon1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 50mm PAK 38 & 2 LMGs)3 (mot) Battalions, each with3 Infantry Companies, each with (18 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 80mm mor-tars & 2 flamethrowers)1 Support Company with1 Engineer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Section (3 50mm PAK 38 guns)1 Infantry Support Gun Platoon (4 75mm leIG & 3 28mm sPzBu 41guns)1 (mot) Infantry Support Company (4 75mm leIG)SS Totenkopf Armored Troop, with1 Armored Staff Company1 Medium Armored Company2 Light Armored Companies1 Armored Maintenance PlatoonSS Totenkopf Motorcycle (Volkswagen) Regiment1 (mot) Staff & Staff Company, with1 Signals Platoon1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Platoon (3 50mm PAK 38 & 2 LMGs)2 (mot) Battalions, each with1 (mot) Staff Platoon3 (mot) Infantry Companies (18 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 50mm mortarsea)

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1 (mot) Heavy Machine Gun Company (12 HMGs & 6 80mm mor-tars)1 (mot) Support Company, with1 Engineer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Section (3 50mm PAK 38 guns & 2 LMGs)1 Infantry Support Gun Section (2 75mm leIG)SS Totenkopf Artillery RegimentRegimental Staff1 (mot) Staff Battery1 (mot) Observation Battery1st-3rd (mot) Artillery Battalions, each with1 (mot) Battalion Staff Battery3 (motZ) Batteries (3 105mm leFH 18 & 2 LMGs ea)4th (mot) Artillery Battalion1 (mot) Battalion Staff Battery2 (motZ) Batteries (3 150mm sFH 18 & 2 LMGs ea)1 (motZ) Battery (3 100mm K18 guns & 2 LMGs)5th (mot) Flak Battalion1 (mot) Battalion Staff Battery1 Self Propelled Flak Battery (8 20mm & 2 quad 20mm AA)1 Self Propelled Flak Battery (9 37mm guns)1 (motZ) Flak Battery (4 88mm guns & 3 20mm guns)1 Light (mot) Supply ColumnSS Totenkopf Reconnaissance Battalion1 Armored Car Company (18 50mm PAK 38 & 24 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Company (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, & 18 LMGs)1 (mot) Company, with1 Engineer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Self Propelled Section (3 50mm PAK 38 guns)1 Infantry Support Gun Platoon (2 75mm leIG)1 (mot) Light Reconnaissance Supply ColumnSS Totenkopf Panzerjager Battalion1 Self Propelled Panzerjager Company (9 75mm PAK 40 & 6 LMGs)2 (motZ) Panzerjager Companies (9 75mm & 6 LMGs)SS Totenkopf Signals Battalion1 (mot) Radio Company (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Telephone Company (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Signals Supply Column (2 LMGs)SS Totenkopf Pioneer Battalion3 (mot) Pioneer Companies (18 LMGs & 2 flamethrowers ea)1 (mot) Light "B" Bridging Train (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Supply Column

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Commissary1 (mot) Division Administration (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Butcher Company (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Bakery Company (2 LMGs)Supply Train12 (mot) Light Supply Columns (2 LMGs ea)3 (mot) Light Fuel Supply Columns (2 LMGs ea)3 (mot) Maintenance Companies (2 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Light Supply Company (2 LMGs)Medical2 (mot) Medical Companies (2 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Field Hospital (2 LMGs)3 Ambulance Companies (2 LMGs ea)Other1 (mot) Military Police Company1 (mot) Field Post1 (mot) SS "KB" Platoon

Fig Mittlerer Komandopanzerwagen Ausf BApparently during the combat in Russia it was very heavily commit-ted early in the campaign. On 6/28/41 one of the two infantry regi-ments was so heavily damaged in combat around the Diinaburgbridgehead that it was temporarily disbanded. On 3/6/42 it wasorganized like the SS Das Reich Division, the 3rd SS Tank Regimentwas formed, as was the SSTotenkopf Motorcycle Battalion. The mo-torcycle battalion was formed from the 3/9th SS Infantry Regiment.On 24 April 1942 the division was organized and equipped as follows:Divisional Staff1 Divisional Staff (4 HMGs)

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1 (mot) Mapping Platoon2 (mot) Infantry Regiments, each with1 Signals Platoon1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Platoon (3 75mm PAK 40 & 2 LMGs)3 (mot) Battalions, each with3 Infantry Companies, each with (18 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 80mm mor-tars & 2 flamethrowers)1 Support Company with1 Engineer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Section (3 75mm PAK 40 guns)1 Panzerjager Section (3 28mm PzB 41 guns)1 Infantry Support Gun Platoon (4 75mm leIG)1 (mot) Infantry Support Company (4 105mm sIG)SS Totenkopf Armored Troop, with1 Armored Staff Company1 Medium Armored Company2 Light Armored Companies1 Armored Maintenance PlatoonSS Totenkopf Motorcycle Battalion1 (mot) Staff3 (mot) Reconnaissance Companies (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, &18 LMGs)1 (mot) Machine Gun Company (6 80mm Mortars & HMGs)1 (mot) Reconnaissance Company1 Infantry Gun Platoon (2 75mm leIG)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 75mm PAK 40 & 2 LMGs)1 Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)SSTotenkopf Artillery RegimentRegimental Staff1 (mot) Staff Battery1 (mot) Observation Battery1st-3rd (mot) Artillery Battalions, each with1 (mot) Battalion Staff Battery3 (motZ) Batteries (3 105mm leFH 18 & 2 LMGs ea)4th (mot) Artillery Battalion1 (mot) Battalion Staff Battery2 (motZ) Batteries (3 150mm sFH 18 & 2 LMGs ea)1 (motZ) Battery (3 100mm K18 guns & 2 LMGs)SS Totenkopf (mot) Flak Battalion1 (mot) Battalion Staff Battery1 Self Propelled Flak Battery (8 20mm & 2 quad 20mm AA)

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1 Self Propelled Flak Battery (9 37mm guns)1 (motZ) Flak Battery (4 88mm guns & 3 self-propelled 20mm guns)1 (mot) Light Flak Supply ColumnSS Totenkopf Reconnaissance Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 Armored Car Company (18 50mm PAK 38 & 24 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Company (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, & 18 LMGs)1 (mot) Company, with1 Engineer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Panzerjäger Section (3 75mm PAK 40 guns)1 Infantry Gun Platoon (2 75mm leIG)1 (mot) Light Reconnaissance Supply ColumnSS Totenkopf Panzerjager Battalion1 Self Propelled Panzerjager Company (9 75mm PAK 40 & 6 LMGs)2 (motZ) Panzerjager Companies (9 75mm & 6 LMGs)SSTotenkopf Signals Battalion1 (mot) Radio Company (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Telephone Company (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Signals Supply Column (2 LMGs)SSTotenkopf Pioneer Battalion3 (mot) Pioneer Companies (18 LMGs & 2 flamethrowers ea)1 (mot) Light "B" Bridging Train (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Supply Column (2 LMGs)Commissary1 (mot) Division Administration (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Butcher Company (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Bakery Company (2 LMGs)Supply Train12 (mot) Light Supply Columns (2 LMGs ea)3 (mot) Light Fuel Supply Columns (2 LMGs ea)3 (mot) Maintenance Companies (2 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Light Supply Company (2 LMGs)Medical2 (mot) Medical Companies (2 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Field Hospital (2 LMGs)3 Ambulance Companies (2 LMGs ea)Other1 (mot) Military Police Company1 (mot) Field Post1 (mot) SS "KB" PlatoonOn 8/1/42 it added the Thule Schützen Regiment as a fast regiment.After heavy losses in Russia, it was moved to France for refitting. On

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11/9/42 it was reorganized into the SS Totenkopf Panzergrenadier Di-vision.

3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf"Formed on 11/9/42 in South France by the 1st Army as the "SS Pan-zergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" from the SS Totenkopf (mot) Divi-sion. When organized it consisted of:1/,2/,3/1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Totenkopf"1/, 2/, 3/3rd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Totenkopf"1/,2/3rd SS Panzer Regiment "Totenkopf" (from the battalion formedin the Summer of 1943).S.S Totenkopf Reconnaissance Battalion (4 companies)1/,2/,3/,4/SS Totenkopf Artillery RegimentSS Totenkopf Panzerjäger Battalion (3 companies)S.S Totenkopf Flak Battalion (4 batteries)SS Totenkopf Sturmgeschütz Battalion (4 batteries)S.S Totenkopf Pioneer Battalion (3 companies)SSTotenkopf Signals Battalion (2 companies)The Thule Schützen Regiment was absorbed into the 1st SS Panzer-grenadier Regiment "Totenkopf." The two panzer grenadier regi-ments were named the 1 st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Thule" andthe 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke." In February1943 the 3rd SS Panzer Regiment was organized and equipped as fol-lows:1/,2/3rd SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had:1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies 4th Heavy Panzer Company

On 5/1/43 the 3rd SS Panzer Regiment was reorganized such that itsbattalions each had two medium and one light panzer company. Inthe summer of 1943 the reconnaissance battalion was reinforced tosix companies and the panzer regiment was reinforced to eight com-panies. For the battle of Kursk the division had 114 tanks and 28 as-

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sault guns. Included was a company of 11 Tiger tanks. On 7/1/43 thepanzer inventory and organization of the 3rd SS Panzer Regimentwas as follows:1/,2/3rd SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had1 Panzer Staff Company2 Medium Panzer Companies1 Light Panzer Company9th Heavy Panzer Company

On 10/21/43 the division was reorganized by the order of the Fuhreras a Panzer Division. On 10/22/43 the division was given the number3 and the panzer grenadier regiments were renumbered the 5th SSPanzergrenadier Regiment "Thule" and the 6th SS Panzer-grenadierRegiment "Theodor Eicke." All other portions of the division werenumbered "3rd." In December 1943 the Panzerjager Battalion wasdisbanded and the Sturmgeschutz battalion was rebuilt.

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5th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Thule"1st Battalion (1-4th Companies)2nd Battalion (5-8th Companies)3rd Battalion (9-12th Companies)13th Company14th Company16th Company6th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke"same as 5th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment3rd Panzer Regiment1st Battalion (1-4th Companies)2nd Battalion (5-8th Companies)

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Heavy CompanyPioneer Company3rd Artillery Regiment1st (self-propelled) Battalion (1-3rd Companies)2nd Battalion (4-6th Companies)3rd Battalion (7-9th Companies)4th Battalion (10-12th Companies)3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (5 companies)3rd Sturmgeschütz Battalion (4 batteries)3rd SS Flak Battalion (4 batteries & observation battery)3rd Pioneer Battalion (3 companies)3rd Signals Battalion (2 companies)In July 1944 the division was organized and equipped as follows:Division Staff1 Divisional Staff (2 LMGs)1 Divisional Band1 (mot) Mapping Detachment(mot) Military Police Detachment (15 LMGs)1 (mot) Escort Company1 Self Propelled Flak Battery (4 20mm flak, 4 HMGs & 6 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)Totenkopf SS Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff & (mot) Staff Company1 Panzer Signals Platoon1 Panzer Platoon1 Panzer Flak Battery (8 37mm flak guns)1 Panzer Maintenance Company (4 LMGs)1st Panzer Battalion1 Battalion Staff (1 LMG)1 Battalion Staff Company (11 LMGs)4 Panzer Companies (22 MkV Panther Tanks ea)1 (mot) Supply Company (4 LMGs)2nd Panzer Battalion1 Battalion Staff (1 LMG)1 Battalion Staff Company (11 LMGs)4 Panzer Companies (22 Mk IV Tanks ea)1 (mot) Supply Company (4 LMGs)1st Totenkopf SS Panzergrenadier Regiment1 Regimental Staff & (mot) Staff Company1 Staff Platoon (1 LMG)1 Signals Platoon (7 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Platoon (4 LMGs)

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1st (halftraS|) Battalion1 Battalion Staff (6 LMGs)1 (mot) Supply Company (4 LMGs)3 (halftrack) Panzergrenadier Companies (4 HMGs, 29 LMGs, 280mm mortars, 6 20mm & 2 75mm leIG)1 (halftrack) Heavy Panzergrenadier Company1 Mortar Platoon (2 LMGs & 4 120mm mortars)1 Gun Platoon (6 75mm & 4 LMGs)2nd Battalion1 Battalion Staff1 (mot) Supply Company (4 LMGs)3 (mot) Panzergrenadier Companies (4 HMGs, 18 LMGs & 2 80mmmortars)1 (mot) Heavy Panzergrenadier Company1 Mortar Platoon (2 LMGs & 4 120mm mortars)1 Gun Platoon (6 75mm & 4 LMGs)3rd Battalionsame as 2nd Battalion1 Self Propelled Heavy Infantry Gun Company (6150mmsIG)1 Self Propelled Flak Company(12 20mm & 2 LMGs)1 (mot) Pioneer Company1 (mot) Pioneer Staff Platoon (1 LMG)1 (halftrack) Pioneer Platoon (12 LMGs, 1 20mm & 6 flamethrowers)1 (mot) Pioneer Platoon (8 LMGs & 12 flamethrowers)1 (mot) Pioneer Platoon (2 HMGs & 2 80mm mortars)1 (halftrack) Pioneer Platoon (6 LMGs & 6 flamethrowers)2nd Totenkopf SS Panzergrenadier Regiment1 Regimental Staff & (mot) Staff Company1 Staff Platoon (1 LMG) 1 Signals Platoon (7 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Platoon (4 LMGs)1st (mot) Battalion1 Battalion Staff1 (mot) Supply Company (4 LMGs)3 (mot) Panzergrenadier Companies (4 HMGs, 18 LMGs & 2 80mmmortars)1 (mot) Heavy Panzergrenadier Company1 Mortar Platoon (2 LMGs & 4 120mm mortars)1 Gun Platoon (6 75mm & 4 LMGs)2nd & 3rd (mot) Battalionssame as 1st Battalion1 Self Propelled Heavy Infantry Gun Company (6150mmsIG)

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1 Self Propelled Flak Company (12 20mm & 2 LMGs)1 (mot) Pioneer Company(2 HMGs, 12 LMGS, 2 80mm mortars & 18 flamethrowers)Totenkopf SS Panzerjager Battalion1 Battalion Staff & Staff Platoon (1 LMG & 1 jagdpanzer IV)2 Jagdpanzer Companies (14 Jagdpanzer IV)1 (motZ) Panzerjager Company (12 75mm PAK & 12LMGs)1 (mot) Supply Company (3 LMGs)Totenkopf SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion1 Battalion Staff (3 LMGs)1 Battalion Staff Company1 Armored Car Platoon (3 75mm, 13 20mm & 16 LMGs)1 (mot) Signals Platoon (7 LMGs)1 Armored Car Company (16 20mm & 25 LMGs)1 (halftrack) Reconnaissance Company (2 75mm, 2 80mm mortars, &44 LMGs)1 (halftrack) Reconnaissance Company (4 HMGs, 29 LMGs, 2 80mmmortars, 6 20mm & 2 75mm guns)1 (halftrack) Reconnaissance Company1 Staff Platoon (2 LMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (6 75mm, 2 LMGs)1 Platoon (2 LMGs & 6 80mm mortars)1 Pioneer Platoon (13 LMGs)1 Supply Company (4 LMGs)Totenkopf SS Artillery Regiment1 Regimental Staff & (mot) Staff Battery (2 LMGs)1 Self Propelled Flak Battery (4 quad 20mm guns)1st Self Propelled Battalion1 Battalion Staff & Staff Battery (2 LMGs)2 Self Propelled Batteries (6 150mm sFH SdKfz 165 Hummel)1 Self Propelled Battery (6 105mm leFH SdKfz 124Wespe ea)2nd & 3rd Battalions, each with1 Battalion Staff & Staff Battery (2 LMGs)2 (motZ) Batteries (6 105mm leFH & 6 LMGs ea)4th Battalion1 Battalion Staff & Staff Battery (2 LMGs)2 (motZ) Batteries (6 150mm sFH & 6 LMGs ea)1 (motZ) Battery (6 105mm K & 6 LMGs ea)Totenkopf SS Flak Battalion1 Battalion Staff & Staff Battery (1 LMG)3 (motZ) Heavy Batteries (4 88mm, 3 20mm & 4 LMGs)1 (motZ) Medium Battery (9 37mm & 4 LMGs)

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1 (mot) Searchlight Battery (4 600mm searchlights)Totenkopf SS Pioneer Battalion1 Battalion Staff (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Battalion Staff Company (6 LMGs)1 (halftrack) Reconnaissance Platoon (8 LMGs)1 (halftrack) Pioneer Company (2 HMGs, 46 LMGs, 6 flamethrowers,& 2 80mm mortars)2 (mot) Pioneer Companies (2 HMGs, 18 LMGs, 6 flamethrowers, & 280mm mortars ea)1 (mot) Light Panzer Bridging Train (3 LMGs)Totenkopf SS Signals Battalion1 Panzer Telephone Company (14 LMGs)1 Panzer Radio Company (20 LMGs)1 (mot) Supply Column (1 LMG)Feldersatz Battalion2-5th CompaniesSupply Troop1 (tmot) Supply Battalion Staff (2 LMGs)6 (mot) 120 ton Transportation Companies (8 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Supply Company (8 LMGs)1 (mot) Ordnance Company (4 LMGs)2 (mot) Maintenance Companies (5 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Maintenance Company (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Maintenance Supply Column (4 LMGs)Other1 (mot) Bakery Company (5 LMGs)1 (mot) Butcher Company (4 LMGs)1 (mot) Divisional Administration Platoon (2 LMGs)2 (mot) Medical Companies (4 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Decontamination Company3 Ambulances (1 LMG ea)1 (mot) Field Post Office (2 LMGs)The division capitulated to the Americans by Linz in 1945.

Ranks in German Army

FahnenjunkerA cadet is a trainee. The term is frequently used to refer those train-ing to become an officer in the military, often a person who is a juniortrainee. Its meaning may vary between countries. The term is alsoused in civilian contexts and as a general attributive, for example inits original sense of a branch of a ruling house which is not currently

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in the direct line of succession.

FähnrichFähnrich is an officer candidate rank in the Austrian Bundesheerand German Bundeswehr. However, Fähnrich ranks are often incor-rectly compared with the rank of ensign, which shares a similar ety-mology but is a full-fledged (albeit junior) commissioned officer rank.The word Fähnrich comes from an older German military title, Fah-nenträger (flag bearer), and first became a distinct military rank inGermany 1 January 1899.

LieutenantA lieutenant (abbreviated Lt., LT., Lieut. and LEUT.) is a junior com-missioned officer in many nations' armed forces.The meaning of lieutenant differs in different military formations(see comparative military ranks), but is often subdivided into senior(first lieutenant) and junior (second lieutenant) ranks. In navies it isoften equivalent to the army rank of captain; it may also indicate aparticular post rather than a rank. The rank is also used in fire serv-ices, emergency medical services, security services and police forces.Lieutenant may also appear as part of a title used in various other or-ganizations with a codified command structure. It often designatessomeone who is "second-in-command," and as such, may precede thename of the rank directly above it. For example, a "lieutenant master"is likely to be second-in-command to the "master" in an organizationusing both ranks. Notable uses include lieutenant governor in variousgovernments, and Quebec lieutenant in Canadian politics.

OberleutnantOberleutnant is a junior officer rank in the militaries of Germany,Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Switzerland and Austria.In the German Army, it dates from the early 19th century. Translatedas "senior lieutenant", the rank is typically bestowed upon commis-sioned officers after five to six years of active duty service.Oberleutnant is used by both the German Army and the German AirForce. In the NATO military comparison system, a German Ober-leutnant is the equivalent of a first lieutenant in the Army/Air Forcesof Allied nations.Other usesThe equivalent naval rank is Oberleutnant zur See.In Nazi Germany, within the SS, SA and Waffen-SS, the rank of Ober-sturmführer was considered the equivalent of an Oberleutnant in the

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German Army.

HauptmannHauptmann is a German word usually translated as captain when itis used as an officer's rank in the German, Austrian and Swiss armies.While "haupt" in contemporary German means "main", it also hasthe dated meaning of "head", i.e. Hauptmann literally translates to"head man", which is also the etymological root of "captain" (fromLatin caput head). It equates to Captain in the British and US Ar-mies, and is rated OF-2 in NATO.More generally, it can be used to denote the head of any hierarchi-cally structured group of people, often as a compound word. For ex-ample, a Feuerwehrhauptmann is the captain of a fire brigade, whilethe word Räuberhauptmann refers to the leader of a gang of robbers.Official Austrian titles incorporating the word include Landeshaupt-mann, Bezirkshauptmann, Burghauptmann and Berghauptmann.In Saxony during the Weimar Republic, the titles of Kreishauptmannand Amtshauptmann were held by senior civil servants.It might cognates with the Swedish word Hövitsman that have thesame root meaning "Head man" or "the man at the head" and thatare closely related to the word "hövding" meaning Chieftain. Both ti-tles are since medieval times used for titles within the administrationof the state rather then within the military.

MajorMajor is a rank of commissioned officer, with corresponding ranksexisting in many military forces. When used unhyphenated, in con-junction with no other indicator of rank, the term refers to the rankjust senior to that of an army captain and just below the rank of lieu-tenant colonel. It is considered the most junior of the field ranks. Insome militaries, notably France and Ireland, the rank is referred to ascommandant, while in others it is known as captain-major. It is alsoused in some police forces and other paramilitary rank structures,such as the New York State Police, New Jersey State Police and sev-eral others. As a police rank, Major roughly corresponds to the UKrank of Superintendent.When used in hyphenated or combined fashion, the term can also im-ply seniority at other levels of rank, including general-major or ma-jor general, denoting a mid-level general officer, and sergeant major,denoting the most senior NCO of a military unit.It can also be used with a hyphen to denote the leader of a militaryband such as in pipe-major or drum-major.

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OberstleutnantOberstleutnant is a German Army and German Air Force rank equalto Lieutenant Colonel, above Major, and below Oberst.There are two paygrade associated to the rank of Oberstleutnant. Pay-grade A14 is the standard level paygrade whereas A15 is assigned tosenior Oberstleutnant personnel.Oberstleutnant of the General Staff or Reserve have the words "imGeneralstabsdienst" (i.G.), "der Reserve" (d.R.) after their rank—thus: "OTL i.G.", "OTL d.R."Oberstleutnant who are definitely retired are described as "außer Di-enst" (a.D.)During World War II, the SS maintained an equivalent rank knownas Obersturmbannführer

OberstOberst is a military rank in several German-speaking and Scandina-vian countries, equivalent to Colonel. It is currently used by both theground and air forces of Austria, Germany, Switzerland DDenmarkaand Norway. The Swedish rank överste is a direct translation, as arethe Finnish rank eversti and the Icelandic rank ofursti. In the Nether-lands the rank overste is used as a synonym for a lieutenant colonel.

GeneralmajorThe German rank of general most likely saw its first use within the re-ligious orders of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, al-beit in modified forms and usage from the current understanding ofgeneral. By the 16th century, with the rise of standing armies, theGerman states had begun to appoint generals from the nobility tolead armies in battle.A standard rank system was developed during the Thirty Years War,with the highest rank of General usually reserved for the ruling sover-eign (e.g. the Kaiser or Elector) and the actual field commander hold-ing the rank of Generalleutnant. Feldmarschall was a lower rank atthat time, as was Generalwachtmeister.By the 17th and 18th centuries, the rank of general was present in allthe militaries of the German states, and saw its greatest usage by themilitaries of Bavaria and Prussia. It was these two militaries that cre-ated the concept of the “general staff”, which was often manned en-tirely by members of the nobility. To be a general implied member-ship in the noble class as a count or Graf, baron or Freiherr (this alsoaccounts for most German generals of this era having the prefix “von”before their names)

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GeneralleutnantLieutenant General is a military rank used in many countries. Therank traces its origins to the Middle Ages where the title of lieutenantgeneral was held by the second in command on the battlefield, whowas normally subordinate to a captain general.In modern armies, lieutenant general normally ranks immediately be-low general and above major general; it is equivalent to the navy rankof vice admiral, and in air forces with a separate rank structure, it isequivalent to air marshal. A lieutenant general commands an armycorps, made up of typically three army divisions, and consisting ofaround 60,000 soldiers.The term major general is a shortened version of the previous termsergeant major general, which was also subordinate to lieutenant gen-eral. This is why a lieutenant general outranks a major general,whereas a major is senior to a lieutenant.In many countries, the rank of corps general has replaced the earlierrank of lieutenant general (e.g. France, Italy). (The ranks of corpsgeneral and lieutenant colonel general are intended to solve the appa-rent lieutenant general / major general anomaly). However, for con-venience, this is often translated into English as lieutenant general.In a number of states, the rank of lieutenant general is the highestarmy rank in use. In Lithuania and Latvia, the chief of defence is alieutenant general, and in the Irish Defence Forces and Israeli forcesthe Chief of Staff holds this rank.

General der ArtilleryGeneral of the artillery may mean:1. a rank of general in the Imperial Army, Reichswehr or Wehrmacht

- the second-highest regular rank below Generaloberst. Cavalry of-ficers of equivalent rank were called general of the cavalry, and in-fantry officers of equivalent rank general of the infantry. TheWehrmacht also had General der Panzertruppen (tank troops),General der Gebirgstruppen (mountain troops), General der Pio-niere (engineers), General der Fallschirmtruppen (parachutetroops), General der Nachrichtentruppen (communicationstroops). Today in the Bundeswehr, the rank of lieutenant generalcorresponds to the traditional rank of general of the artillery.There was no equivalent rank in the army of East Germany, whereit was merged into that of Generaloberst.

2. in the Bundeswehr, the position of an artillery officer responsiblefor certain questions of troop training and equipment, usually withthe rank of Brigadegenerals. The position of general of the artillery

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is connected with that of commander of the artillery school. Corre-sponding service positions also exist for other branches of thearmy. Since in this usage it refers to a position not a rank, anOberst is sometimes "General of" his respective type of troops. Theform of address is usually Herr General and/or Herr Oberst ; theform of address Herr General der Artillerie is unorthodox, since itdoes not refer to a rank.

GeneraloberstA supreme general or senior general (Generaloberst, sometimes mis-translated "colonel-general" by analogy to Oberst, "colonel") was thesecond highest general officer rank—below field marshal (General-feldmarschall)—in the Prussian army as well as in the DeutschesHeer of Imperial Germany (1871-1919), the Reichswehr of the Wei-mar Republic (1921-1933), and the Wehrmacht (which included theLuftwaffe, established in 1935) of Nazi Germany (1933-1945).The rank was created originally for Emperor William I—then Princeof Prussia—because traditionally members of the royal family werenot promoted to the rank of a field marshal.Since the rank of Generalfeldmarschall was also reserved for war-time promotions, the additional rank of a "supreme general in the ca-pacity of a field marshal" — the Generaloberst im Range eines Gener-alfeldmarschalls — was created for promotions during peace. Suchgenerals were entitled to wear four pips on their shoulder boards,compared to the normal three.The equivalent ranks of a colonel general were in the:

Kriegsmarine - Generaladmiral ("general admiral")Schutzstaffel (SS) - SS-Oberst-GruppenführerSturmabteilung (SA) - no equivalentOrdnungspolizei (Orpo) - Generaloberst der Polizei ("colonel gen-eral of police")

GeneralfelsmarschallGeneralfeldmarschall in German (usually translated simply as Gen-eral Field Marshal), was the highest military rank in the armies ofseveral German states including the Austrian Empire and Kingdom oPPrussia (later the German Empire).Originally used in the Holy Roman Empire, the rank of Generalfeld-marschall became the highest military rank in the Habsburg Mon-archy equivalent to that of Marshall in France or Field Marshall inEngland. Following the fall of the Holy Roman Empire, it was kept inthe armies of the Austrian Empire (1804-1867) then in these of the

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Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1919). The Prussian army also usedit as the army equivalent to a navy Grand Admiral (German: Großad-miral) and was later used as a rank on the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffeof Germany during WWII.

In GermanyIn the German-Prussian Army and later in the Wehrmacht, the rankhad several privileges, such as elevation to nobility, equal rank withministers of the royal cabinet, right of direct report to the monarch,and a constant escort/protection. In 1854, the rank of Colonel-Gener-al (German: Generaloberst) was created in order to promote thenPrussian prince William (William I, German Emperor) to senior rankwithout breaking the rule that only wartime field commanders couldreceive the rank of field marshal for a victory in a decisive battle orthe capture of a fortification or major town. In 1870 Prince FriedrichKarl of Prussia and Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm—who had com-manded armies during the Franco-Prussian War—became the firstPrussian princes appointed field marshals.

Ranks in Waffen S.S

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Index

Paul Hausser, commander of the I S.S Panzer Corps .......................... 6Tanks and Schützenpanzerwagen Das Reich....................................... 7

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Blitzkrieg...............................................................................................8Preface ..............................................................................................8Common interpretation ................................................................. 18

Battle of Prokhorovka.........................................................................20Background .................................................................................... 21The Forces ......................................................................................22

German ......................................................................................22Soviet..........................................................................................22

Order of Battle................................................................................24German Army ............................................................................24Army Group Centre (Günther von Kluge) .................................24Soviet Army................................................................................26Voronezh Front..........................................................................29Steppe Front ..............................................................................30

German advance before Prokhorovka ...........................................30German offensive plans ................................................................. 31Soviet counter offensive plans ....................................................... 32The battle........................................................................................ 32

The morning battles................................................................... 32Afternoon battles .......................................................................34The outcome ..............................................................................34The end of Zitadelle in the south............................................... 35Southern analysis.......................................................................36

Hitler cancels the operation...........................................................36Großdeutschland Tigers after "Zitadelle" ...................................... 37

Fig The Tiger tactical number B01 of th 10th company of the IIIAbteilung of the "Großdeutschland" Division passes in front ofsome divisional vehicles. ...........................................................38Fig Above: Tiger I (tactical number B12) ..................................39Fig Tiger tactical number A02, 9th company, III Abteilung, Pan-zer-Grenadier Division Großdeutschland, 1943........................ 41Fig PzKpfw VI Tiger I E versus JS-2 "Stalin" Heavy RussianTank ........................................................................................... 47Fig The Josef Stalin 2 heavy tank - heavy inclined armor plus a122 mm D-25T gun. ...................................................................48

The Waffen S.S at the Battle of Kursk................................................501° S.S Panzer Division Leibstandarte .................................................60

Kharkov .......................................................................................... 61Calm period ....................................................................................63Kursk ..............................................................................................64Dietrich promoted.......................................................................... 65Waiting to begin .............................................................................66

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Wittmann's success ........................................................................ 67Fig A Leibstandarte Sturmgeschutz (assault gun) III or StuG III68

Kursk ...............................................................................................71Order of Battle ........................................................................... 731st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler............... 74

2° S.S Das Reich Panzer Division....................................................... 78Top priority move........................................................................... 79Massed attacks ...............................................................................80Suggested withdrawal ....................................................................82Reorganization ...............................................................................83New opportunity ............................................................................85Kharkov regained ...........................................................................85Further changes ............................................................................. 87Indoctrination ignored...................................................................88Kursk the objective.........................................................................88Soviet attack ...................................................................................89Exhaustion .....................................................................................90Regained momentum..................................................................... 91Soviet attack blunted......................................................................94Tank victories .................................................................................94Soviet pressure ............................................................................... 95

Fig T-34 soviet tank preparing for offensive .............................96Rearguard action............................................................................96

3rd S.S Panzer Division Totenkopf .................................................... 97Formation and Fall Gelb ................................................................ 97Barbarossa-Demjansk Pocket ........................................................98Kharkov – Kursk ............................................................................99Battles on the Mius Front – Retreat to the Dniepr...................... 100

Map Battle of Kursk 4 July - 1 August 1943 ..................................... 102Order of Battle ......................................................................... 103

Panzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland ................................. 104Infantry Division Großdeutschland 1942 .................................... 105Kharkov ........................................................................................ 105Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland ............................... 106

Kursk........................................................................................ 106Defensive battles...................................................................... 106

Generalleutnant der Reserve Hyazinth Graf Von Gross-ZaucheUnd Camminetz ........................................................................... 106

Annexes ............................................................................................. 115Citadel 1943 ....................................................................................... 115Last Proclamation Adolf Hitler: Soldiers Of The German Eastern

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Front! .................................................................................................116Origins of the Schutz Staffel or SS ....................................................118

Origins ...........................................................................................118Foundation ....................................................................................127Seep Dietrich ................................................................................ 129

Swearing the oath ............................................................................. 130The SA .......................................................................................... 133The SS formations........................................................................ 135Origins .......................................................................................... 138Years (1923–1933) ....................................................................... 138Invasion of France.........................................................................141Campaign in the Balkans ............................................................. 143Operation Barbarossa .................................................................. 146Kharkov .........................................................................................147

3rd S.S Panzer Division Totenkopf .................................................. 149Fig No 1 Tactical insignia ................................................................. 149

Formation and Fall Gelb .............................................................. 149Fig Motorcyclists (German: Kradschützen) from the SS Division "To-tenkopf" during the invasion of Russia in September 1941 .............. 151

Barbarossa-Demjansk Pocket ....................................................... 151Fig Tanks and Schützenpanzerwagen 3° S.S Panzer Division Toten-kopf ................................................................................................... 154

Kharkov – Kursk .......................................................................... 154Battles on the Mius Front – Retreat to the Dniepr.......................155Warsaw......................................................................................... 156Budapest Relief Attempts .............................................................157

Fig Panzerkampfwagen V Ausf A S.S panzer Rgiment Totenkopf... 158Fig Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf break for a meal besidethe wreck of a Soviet T-34 somewhere in Romania, 1944 ............... 160

War crimes ....................................................................................161Poland............................................................................................161Le Paradis Massacre......................................................................161

Order of Battle .................................................................................. 162Fig Mittlerer Komandopanzerwagen Ausf B.....................................167

3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" ............................................ 170Ranks in German Army.....................................................................176

Fahnenjunker ................................................................................176Fähnrich ........................................................................................177Lieutenant .....................................................................................177Oberleutnant .................................................................................177Hauptmann .................................................................................. 178Major ............................................................................................ 178

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Oberstleutnant ..............................................................................179Oberst ............................................................................................179Generalmajor ................................................................................179Generalleutnant ........................................................................... 180General der Artillery .................................................................... 180Generaloberst ................................................................................181Generalfelsmarschall ....................................................................181

In Germany .............................................................................. 182Annexe VIII Ranks in Waffen S.S .................................................... 182Bibliography ..................................................................................... 185Index................................................................................................. 193Notes................................................................................................. 196

Notes

1 The author was in the line near Suippes during this attack and was an eye-witness of how narrow was the margin of victory for the French and Ameri-cans.2 Mechanized troops are infantry, cavalry and artillery which use motorizedmatériel in battle. Motorized troops are infantry, artillery and cavalry whichuse motor transport to get them to the battlefield but which, once there,fight as in the days before the advent of the gas engine.3 In the Catalonian offensive Franco assaulted with 352,000 troops, 16,300of them Italians. In the Seros sector alone 448 guns fired 120,000 roundsfor the jump-off of 5 infantry divisions on a front of 10 kilometers. These 5divisions totalled around 80,000 men.4 In the battle of Fuente de Ebro seven companies of Franco's infantry, un-supported by artillery, decisively defeated from 90 to 100 tanks attackingalone.5 In fact, such evidence as I could accumulate on the spot was to the con-trary. I talked shortly after the invasion with all the eyewitnesses I couldfind. The marks of shell fire, etc., indicated no resistance of any conse-quence.6 A Leibstandarte Sturmgeschutz (assault gun) III or StuG III seen at Khar-kov in the spring of 1943. The StuG III was used in both a support and ananti-tank role, the latter increasingly important as Soviet tank numbersgrew.7 The Panzerkeil - Offensive Tactics Diagram

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8 The Panzerkeil (Armoured Wedge) was an offensive armoured tactic devel-oped by German forces on the Eastern Front during World War II. The pan-zerkeil was developed in response to the Soviet employment of the pakfrontdefence.

The panzerkeil was an offensive formation used by armoured vehicles, mostcommonly tanks. The tanks would form into a wedge-shaped formation,with the most heavily armed and armoured vehicles forming the tip. At thebattle of Kursk, Tiger Is (Panzer VIE) would form the tip, Panthers (PanzerV) the base (where available), with the Panzer IVs and Panzer IIIs formingthe wings.The advantage of the panzerkeil was that the anti-tank gunners of the op-posing pakfront would be forced to constantly adjust their ranges due to thedepth of the formation. Also, the heavily armoured Tigers and Pantherswould bear the brunt of the anti-tank fire, leaving the more vulnerabletanks safe from enemy fire.The panzerkeil achieved mixed results. During Operation Citadel, the pan-zerkeil enabled the spearheads of Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's 4th Pan-zer Army to break through the elaborate Soviet defences. Meanwhile, inGeneralfeldmarschall Walter Model's 9th Army sector, tank units using thepanzerkeil tactic failed to achieve a breakthrough, and suffered heavy lossesdue to anti-tank fire.9 The Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland (German: Infanterie-Regiment"Großdeutschland"; "Greater Germany" Infantry Regiment) was an éliteGerman Heer ceremonial and combat unit which saw action during WorldWar II. The regiment served in the campaigns in France and the Low Coun-tries in 1940. It then served exclusively on the Eastern Front until the endof the war. It was annihilated near Pillau in May 1945. Großdeutschland issometimes mistakenly perceived to be part of the Waffen-SS, whereas it wasactually a unit of the regular German Army (Heer). In 1942 it was expandedto become the Großdeutschland Division, the best-equipped division in theWehrmacht, which received equipment before all other units (includingsome Waffen-SS units).10 An S.S of the S.S Totenkopf Standarte Oberbayern11 Josef "Sepp" Dietrich (28 May 1892 – 21 April 1966) was a German Waf-fen-SS General and a member of the Nazi Party of Nazi Germany. He wasone of Nazi Germany's most decorated soldiers and commanded formationsup to Army level during World War II. Prior to 1929, he was Adolf Hitler'schauffeur and bodyguard but received rapid promotion after his participa-tion in the murder of Hitler's political opponents during the Night of theLong Knives. After the war, he was imprisoned by the United States for warcrimes and later by Germany for murder.

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12 The Treaty of Versailles (French: Traité de Versailles) was one of thepeace treaties at the end of World War I. It ended the state of war betweenGermany and the Allied Powers. It was signed on 28 June 1919, exactly fiveyears after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The other Cen-tral Powers on the German side of World War I were dealt with in separatetreaties. Although the armistice, signed on 11 November 1918, ended the ac-tual fighting, it took six months of negotiations at the Paris Peace Confer-ence to conclude the peace treaty. The treaty was registered by the Secretar-iat of the League of Nations on 21 October 1919, and was printed in TheLeague of Nations Treaty Series. Of the many provisions in the treaty, oneof the most important and controversial required "Germany [to] accept theresponsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and dam-age" during the war (the other members of the Central Powers signed trea-ties containing similar articles). This article, Article 231, later becameknown as the War Guilt clause. The treaty forced Germany to disarm, makesubstantial territorial concessions, and pay reparations to certain countriesthat had formed the Entente powers. In 1921 the total cost of these repara-tions was assessed at 132 billion Marks (then $31.4 billion or £6.6 billion,roughly equivalent to US $442 billion or UK £284 billion in 2013). At thetime economists, notably John Maynard Keynes predicted that the treatywas too harsh—a "Carthaginian peace", and said the figure was excessiveand counterproductive. However, many historians have judged the repara-tion figure to be lenient, a sum that was designed to look imposing but wasin fact not, that had little impact on the German economy and analyzed thetreaty as a whole to be quite restrained and not as harsh as it could havebeen. The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals amongthe victors was a compromise that left none contented: Germany was notpacified or conciliated, nor permanently weakened. The problems thatarose from the treaty would lead to the Locarno Treaties, which improvedrelations between Germany and the other European Powers, and the rene-gotiation of the reparation system resulting in the Dawes Plan, the YoungPlan, and finally the postponement of reparations at the Lausanne Confer-ence of 1932. The reparations were finally paid off by Germany after WorldWar II.

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13 The Weimar Republic (German: Weimarer Republik) is the name givenby historians to the federal republic and parliamentary representative de-mocracy established in 1919 in Germany to replace the imperial form of gov-ernment. It was named after Weimar, the city where the constitutional as-sembly took place. Following World War I, the republic emerged from theGerman Revolution in November 1918. In 1919, a national assembly wasconvened in Weimar, where a new constitution for the German Reich waswritten, then adopted on 11 August of that same year. In its fourteen years,the Weimar Republic faced numerous problems, including hyperinflation,political extremists (with paramilitaries – both left and right wing), andcontinuing contentious relationships with the victors of World War I. How-ever, it did eliminate most of the requirements of the Treaty of Versailles, inthat Germany never completely met the disarmament requirements, andeventually only paid a small portion of the total reparations required by thetreaty, which were reduced twice by restructuring Germany's debt throughthe Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, (with the last payment finally beingmade on 3 October 2010), reformed the currency, and unified tax policiesand the railway system. The ensuing period of liberal democracy lapsed by1930, when President Hindenburg assumed dictatorial emergency powersto back the administrations of Chancellors Brüning, Papen, Schleicher andfinally Hitler. Between 1930 and 1933 the Great Depression, even worsenedby Brüning's policy of deflation, led to a surge in unemployment. It lead tothe ascent of the nascent Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler in 1933. The legalmeasures taken by the new Nazi government in February and March 1933,commonly known as the Machtergreifung (seizure of power) meant thatthe government could legislate contrary to the constitution. The republicnominally continued to exist until 1945, as the constitution was never for-mally repealed, but the measures taken by the Nazis in the early part oftheir rule rendered the constitution irrelevant. Thus, 1933 is usually seen asthe end of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of Hitler's Third Reich.14 Members of the Freikorps dismount lorries in post-war Berlin.

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15 The National Socialist German Workers' Party (German: Nationalsozia-listische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei abbreviated NSDAP), commonly knownin English as the Nazi Party, was a political party in Germany between 1920and 1945. Its predecessor, the German Workers' Party (DAP), existed from1919 to 1920. The term Nazi is German and stems from Nationalsozialist,due to the pronunciation of Latin -tion- as -tsion- in German (rather than-shon- as it is in English), with German Z being pronounced as 'ts'. Theparty was founded out of the German nationalist extremists, racist, populistmovement anti-communist Freikorps paramilitary culture that foughtagainst the uprisings of communist revolutionaries in post-World War IGermany. However far from all Freikorps were involved in the founding ofthe DAP/NSDAP-party. Advocacy of a form of socialism by right-wing fig-ures and movements in Germany became common during and after WorldWar I, influencing Nazism. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck of the Conserva-tive Revolutionary movement coined the term "Third Reich", and advocatedan ideology combining the nationalism of the right and the socialism of theleft. Prominent Conservative Revolutionary member Oswald Spengler's con-ception of a "Prussian Socialism" influenced the Nazis. The party was cre-ated as a means to draw workers away from communism and into völkischnationalism. Initially, Nazi political strategy focused on anti-big business,anti-bourgeois, and anti-capitalist rhetoric, although such aspects were lat-er downplayed in order to gain the support of industrial entities, and in1930s the party's focus shifted to antisemitic and anti-Marxist themes. Tomaintain the supposed purity and strength of a postulated 'Aryan race', theNazis sought to exterminate or impose exclusionary segregation upon "de-generate" and "asocial" groups that included: Jews, homosexuals, Romani,blacks, the physically and mentally handicapped, Jehovah's Witnesses andpolitical opponents. The persecution reached its climax when the party con-trolled German state organized the systematic murder of approximately sixmillion Jews and five million people from the other targeted groups, inwhat has become known as the Holocaust. The party's leader Adolf Hitlerwas appointed Chancellor of Germany by President Paul von Hindenburg in1933. Hitler rapidly established a totalitarian regime known as the ThirdReich. Following the defeat of the Third Reich at the conclusion of WorldWar II in Europe, the party was "completely and finally abolished and de-clared to be illegal" by the Allied occupying powers.16 Parteiadler der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei17 Hitler in Berlin in May 1927, surrounded by early adherents of the fledg-ling Nazi movement. He is followed by Julius Schreck (in peaked cap), oneof his original bodyguards, who also acted as Hitler's chauffeur.

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18 The Feldherrnhalle (sometimes also written Feldherrenhalle, "Field Mar-shals' Hall") is a monumental loggia in Munich, Germany. It was built be-tween 1841 and 1844 at the southern end of Munich's Ludwigstrasse next tothe Palais Preysing and east of the Hofgarten. Previously the Gothic Schwa-binger Tor (gate) occupied that place. Friedrich von Gärtner built the Feld-herrnhalle at the behest of King Ludwig I of Bavaria after the example of theLoggia dei Lanzi in Florence. The Feldherrnhalle was a symbol of the hon-ours of the Bavarian Army. It contains statues of military leaders JohannTilly and Karl Philipp von Wrede. The central sculptural group was addedin 1882, after the Franco-Prussian War.On Friday morning, 9 November 1923, the Feldherrnhalle was the scene ofa confrontation between the Bavarian State Police and an illegally organizedmarch by the followers of Adolf Hitler. When ordered to stop the marcherscontinued; the State Police felt threatened and opened fire. Four policemenand sixteen marchers were killed and a number were wounded, includingHermann Göring. As a result, Hitler was arrested and sentenced to a prisonterm. This was one of the efforts by the Nazis to take over the BavarianState, commonly referred to as the Beer Hall Putsch. On 25 April 1995 Rein-hold Elstner a World War II veteran committed self-immolation in front ofFeldhernhalle to protest against "the ongoing official slander and demoniza-tion of the German people and German soldiers". A relief picture of theFeldherrnhalle also appears on the Blood Order medal of the Nazi party.19 Hitler acknowledges the crowd from a window in the Chancellery after theNight of the Long Knives in 193420 On 30 January 1937, during celebrations for the fourth anniversary of theNazi's ascension to power in Germany, Hitler greets Leibstandartecommander Sepp Dietrich (in helmet).21 Men of the Leibstandarte stand guard before their Fuhrer's office at theBerlin Chancellery (note the initials A H above the door). An identical dutywas carried out at the Chancellor's residence in the Wilhelmstrasse.22 Paul "Papa" Hausser (October 7, 1880 – December 21, 1972) was an offi-cer in the German Army, achieving the high rank of lieutenant-general inthe inter-war Reichswehr. After retirement from the regular Army he be-came the "father" (thus the nickname “Papa”) of the Waffen-SS and one ofits most eminent leaders. Battling in both the Eastern and Western fronts ofWorld War II, he was seriously wounded twice, losing an eye in the first in-cident. After the war he became a member of the HIAG which sought to re-habilitate the reputation and legal status of the Waffen-SS.

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23 The Sturmabteilung (SA); Storm Detachment or Assault Division, orBrownshirts) functioned as the original paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party.It played a key role in Adolf Hitler's rise to power in the 1920s and 1930s.Their main assignments were providing protection for Nazi rallies and as-semblies, disrupting the meetings of the opposing parties, fighting againstthe paramilitary units of the opposing parties (esp. the Rotfrontkämpfer-bund) and intimidating Jewish citizens (e.g. the Nazi boycott of Jewish busi-nesses(. The SA was the first Nazi paramilitary group to develop pseudo-military titles for bestowal upon its members. The SA ranks were adoptedby several other Nazi Party groups, chief amongst them the SS, itself origi-nally a branch of the SA. SA men were often called "brownshirts" for the col-our of their uniforms (similar to Benito Mussolini's blackshirts). Brown-col-oured shirts were chosen as the SA uniform because a large batch of themwere cheaply available after World War I, having originally been orderedduring the war for colonial troops posted to Germany's former African colo-nies. The SA became disempowered after Adolf Hitler ordered the "Bloodpurge" of 1934. This event became known as the Night of the Long Knives.The SA was effectively superseded by the SS, although it was not formallydissolved and banned until after the Third Reich's final capitulation to theAllied powers in 1945.24 Unit insignia of 1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler25 Sonderkommandos were work units of Nazi death camp prisoners, com-posed almost entirely of Jews, who were forced, on threat of their owndeaths, to aid with the disposal of gas chamber victims during The Holo-caust. The death-camp Sonderkommando, who were always inmates,should not be confused with the SS-Sonderkommandos which were ad hocunits formed from various SS offices between 1938 through 1945. The termitself in German means "special unit", and was part of the vague and euphe-mistic language which the Nazis used to refer to aspects of the Final Solu-tion (cf. Einsatzgruppen).

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26 Ernst Julius Günther Röhm (28 November 1887 – 2 July 1934) was a Ger-man officer in the Bavarian Army and later an early Nazi leader. He was aco-founder of the Sturmabteilung ("Storm Battalion"; SA), the Nazi Partymilitia, and later was its commander. In 1934, as part of the Night of theLong Knives, he was executed on Adolf Hitler's orders as a potential rival.Ernst Röhm was born in Munich, the youngest of three children (older sis-ter and brother). His father, a railway official, was described as "a harshman". Although the family had no military tradition, Röhm entered the Roy-al Bavarian 10th Infantry Regiment Prinz Ludwig at Ingolstadt as a cadeton 23 July 1906 and was commissioned on 12 March 1908. At the outbreakof war in August 1914, he was adjutant of the 1st Battalion, 10th InfantryRegiment König. The following month, he was seriously wounded in theface at Chanot Wood in Lorraine and carried the scars for the rest of his life.He was promoted to first lieutenant (Oberleutnant) in April 1915. During anattack on the fortification at Thiaumont, Verdun, on 23 June 1916, he sus-tained a serious chest wound and spent the remainder of the war in Franceand Romania as a staff officer. He had been awarded the Iron Cross FirstClass on 20 June 1916, three days before being wounded at Verdun, andwas promoted to captain (Hauptmann) in April 1917. In October 1918,while serving on the Staff of the Gardekorps, he contracted the deadlySpanish influenza and was not expected to live, but survived and recoveredafter a lengthy convalescence. Following the armistice on 11 November 1918that ended the war, Röhm continued his military career as an adjutant inthe Reichswehr. He was one of the senior members in Colonel von Epp'sBayerisches Freikorps für den Grenzschutz Ost (Freikorps Epp), formed atOhrdruf in April 1919, which finally overturned the Munich Soviet Republicby force of arms on 3 May 1919. In 1919 he joined the German Workers'Party (DAP), which soon became the National Socialist German WorkersParty (NSDAP). Röhm's resignation from the Reichswehr was accepted inNovember 1923 during his time as a prisoner at Stadelheim prison. Follow-ing the failed Beer Hall Putsch of 9 November 1923, Röhm, Hitler, GeneralErich Ludendorff, Lt-Colonel Kriebel and six others were tried in February1924 for high treason. Röhm was found guilty and sentenced to a year andthree months in prison, but the sentence was suspended and he wasgranted a conditional discharge.

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27 The Night of the Long Knives (German: Nacht der langen Mess-er (help·info)), sometimes called Operation Hummingbird or, in Germany,the Röhm-Putsch, was a purge that took place in Nazi Germany betweenJune 30 and July 2, 1934, when the Nazi regime carried out a series of polit-ical murders. Leading figures of the left-wing Strasserist faction of the NaziParty, along with its figurehead, Gregor Strasser, were murdered, as wereprominent conservative anti-Nazis (such as former Chancellor Kurt vonSchleicher and Gustav Ritter von Kahr, who had suppressed Hitler's BeerHall Putsch in 1923). Many of those killed were leaders of the Sturmabtei-lung (SA), the paramilitary brownshirts. Adolf Hitler moved against the SAand its leader, Ernst Röhm, because he saw the independence of the SA andthe penchant of its members for street violence as a direct threat to hisnewly gained political power. Hitler also wanted to conciliate leaders of theReichswehr, the official German military who feared and despised the SA—in particular Röhm's ambition to absorb the Reichswehr into the SA underRöhm's leadership. Additionally, Hitler was uncomfortable with Röhm'soutspoken support for a "second revolution" to redistribute wealth. (InRöhm's view Hitler's election had accomplished the "nationalistic" revolu-tion but had left unfulfilled the "socialistic" motive in National Socialism.)Finally, Hitler used the purge to attack or eliminate critics of his new re-gime, especially those loyal to Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, as well asto settle scores with old enemies. At least 85 people died during the purge,although the final death toll may have been in the hundreds, and more thana thousand perceived opponents were arrested. Most of the killings werecarried out by the Schutzstaffel (SS) and the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspoli-zei), the regime's secret police. The purge strengthened and consolidatedthe support of the Reichswehr for Hitler. It also provided a legal groundingfor the Nazi regime, as the German courts and cabinet quickly swept asidecenturies of legal prohibition against extra-judicial killings to demonstratetheir loyalty to the regime. The Night of the Long Knives was a turningpoint for the German government. It established Hitler as "the supremejudge of the German people", as he put it in his July 13, 1934 speech to theReichstag28 Heinrich Himmler inspecting a tank of the 1st SS Division, Metz, Septem-ber 194029 Panzerspähwagen (Fu) 8-rad Aufklärungs Abteilung LSSAH30 A Panzerjäger (tank destroyer) Marder III, Kharkov, February 194331 Fritz Witt, Kharkov March 1943