Tanada - Tan

8/22/2019 Tanada - Tan

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Tanada vs. Tuvera

146 s 446Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence Facts:Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the

disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had notbeen published as required by Law. The government argued that while

publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwiseprovided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become

effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in

affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court

ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublishedPresidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners

suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of generalapplicability and those which are not. The publication means complete

publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a

comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion

was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And onthe clause unless otherwiseprovided in Article 2 of the new civil code

meant that thepublication required therein was not always imperative, that the

publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issues:(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official

gazette.(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in

full.

Held:(1) The court held that all statute including those of local

application shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall

begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed bythe legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the content of the laws.


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Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:

In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of

Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines

(CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked

with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of

PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project

(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the

MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It

was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of

Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the

FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-

Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares,

PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This

caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such

lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of

preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI

and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas

admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the

contract is null and void.

Issue:

w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations

in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987

Constitution

w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint

venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:

On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered

by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA


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may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of

these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,

subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural

resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to

disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make

such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.

Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are

the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15

hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership

of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156

hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being

contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation

of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the

reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed

for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the publicdomain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution

which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the

public domain.


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KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia Case Digest

KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia (239 SCRA 386)

Facts: On June 26,1990, Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos issued memorandumcircular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB, Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing

provincial buses operators to charge passengers within a range of 15% above and 15%below, the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. On December 5, 1990 privaterespondent PBOAP filed an application for fare rate increase to P0.085 and again it wasreduced to P0.065 per kilometer rate. The application was opposed by the PhilippineConsumer Foundation Inc. that the proposed rate were exorbitant and unreasonable andthat the application contained no allegation on the rate o return on December 14, 1990.Public respondent LTFRB granted the fare rate increase on March 16, 1994. PetitionerKMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, itwas dismissed for lack of merit, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to reduce andincrease fare rated based on the circular order issued by the LTFRB?

Held: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial busoperators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal andinvalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority, Potestasdelegata non delegari protest what has been delegated further delegation of suchpower would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed inthe delegate inandated to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is adelicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sounddiscretion with the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to bothpublic utility and the public.


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IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec.

18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP

Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the

proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the

PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

The President declared that the services of the Marines in the

anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a

reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shallhave improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the

deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and

unconstitutional.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the

necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the

PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions

on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character

of the PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily

exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.

Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke

such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
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sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such

equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the

Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction

places the calling out power in a different category from the

power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the

Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers

and provided for their revocation and review without any

qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers

highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and

broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is

considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and

the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the

curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and

individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by

Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full

discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the

armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that

the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The

present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is

no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no

justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of

the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized

in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment

of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian

supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes


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permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.

The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility

patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does

not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real

authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian

institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the

Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,

there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.

Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility

patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.


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Executive Secretary vs. The Court of Appeals

[GR 131719, 25 May 2004]

Second Division, Callejo Sr. (J): 3 concur, 1 on official leave

Facts: Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act

of 1995, took effect on 15 July 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the 7 April

1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian

Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a petition for

declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l)

and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining The

Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, OWWA Administrator, and POEA Administrator from enforcing

the assailed provisions of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that RA

8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules were needed. It prayed that the court

issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m)

on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of

criminal actions for illegal recruitments. On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a temporary

restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days therefrom. After the Executive Secretary,

et al. filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the

amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other corporations which it

alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary

restraining order enjoining the Executive Secretary, et al. from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i),

Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1

and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of RA 8042. Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042

violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution (i.e. discrimination against unskilled workers,

discrimination against licensed and registered recruiters, among others) In their answer to the

petition, the Executive Secretary, et al. alleged, inter alia, that (a) Acro-Phil has no cause of

action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing RA 8042

not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the

Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of

the State. After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court

issued on 21 August 1995, an order granting Acro-Phils plea for a writ of preliminary injunction

upon a bond of P50,000. Acro-Phil posted the requisite bond and on 24 August 1995, the trial

court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Section 2, subsections

(g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections


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(a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 of RA 8042,

pending the termination of the proceedings. The Executive Secretary, et al. filed a petition for

certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction

issued by the trial court. They asserted that Acro-Phil is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner

in the trial court, as it was inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit corporation, couldsustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any

damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered

recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who

would sustain the said injury or damage, not Acro-Phil. On 5 December 1997, the appellate court

came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and

writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the

Executive Secretary, et al.s motion for reconsideration ofthe said decision. They thus filed a

petition for review on certiorari.

I ssue: Whether ACRO-Phil has locus standi.

Held:PARTLY YES. ACRO-Phil has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in

representation of the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended

petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its

members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An

association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members

are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,

the Court held that standing jus tertii would be recognized only if it can be shown that the partysuing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the third party would be

diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claims.

Herein, ACRO-Phil filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

for and in behalf of its 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members,

and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing ACRO-Phil to file the said suit for

and in their behalf. The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, ACRO-Phil was

organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of

the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating

and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership;enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as

the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the

manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish

the purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its

members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. ACRO-Phil asserts

that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and


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employees thereof. ACRO-Phil is but the medium through which its individual members seek to

make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However,

ACROPHIL has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. The

Court notes that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in

failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies itclaimed to represent, ACRO-Phil failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of

Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which

ACRO-Phil filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed

amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.


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KilosBayan v Guingona G.R. No. 113375. May 5, 1994.07/08/2010

0 Comments

Facts:On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it hadgiven the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line

lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be

submitted not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by

the Chief Executive."

1.5 The Lessor is expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery

development plan ('Development Plan') which will include the game, the

marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the games to all the cities

and municipalities of the country within five (5) years.

1.7 The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise, hardware

and software capability, maintenance support, and financial resources. The

Development Plan shall have a substantial bearing on the choice of the Lessor.

The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least sixty percent (60%) of

its shares owned by Filipino shareholders. . .

1.8 Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO

without any additional consideration. 3

The petitioners raise the following points of law to wit:

a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited

from holding and conducting Lotteries 'in collaboration, association or joint

venture with any person, association, company or entity';

b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional

franchise is required before any person may be allowed to establish and operate

said telecommunications system;

c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60%

Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified

from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; andd) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the

Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-

line Lotto and telecommunications systems."

Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the

Berjaya Group "undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by
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selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.

Issue:In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, the issues are

regarding:

(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and

(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1

of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from

holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture

with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."

Held:Requirement of standing was waived by the Court. (a)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged

Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine

Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming

Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and

invalid.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE

PERMANENT.

Ratio:A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which itmay, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the

issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed

aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of

these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing

aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (a)

The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is

its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC

which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight

years.

As may be expected, it will induce in PGMC an active interest and

participation in the success of PCSO that is not expected of an ordinary

detached lessor who gets to be paid his rental feewhether the lessee's

business prospers or not. PGMC's share in the operation depends on its own

performance and the effectiveness of its collaboration with PCSO. Although


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the contract pretends otherwise, PGMC is a co-investor with PCSO in what is

practically, if not in a strictly legal sense, a joint venture.


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Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 159139, 13 January 2004]

En Banc, Panganiban (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 concurs in result, 2 filed

separate opinions, 1 also filed a separate opinion to which 1 joined, 1 dissents in separate opinion

to which 1 joined

Facts: On 7 June 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to

conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body

to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM). On 22 December 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 authorizing

Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and

canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll

body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and

materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. Initially intending to

implement the automation during the 11 May 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in its

Resolution 2985 dated 9 February 1998 -- eventually decided against full national implementation

and limited the automation to the ARMM. However, due to the failure of the machines to read

correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for

the entire Province of Sulu. In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for

both national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been

acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints. On 29 October 2002,

Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. Itresolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely,

Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II - Automated Counting and

Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission. On 24 January 2003, President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to

fund the AES for the 10 May 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the

release of an additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation

to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid." On 11 February 2003, Comelec issued Resolution 5929

clarifying certain eligibility criteria for bidders and the schedule of activities for the project

bidding. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bidding and Awards Committee (BAC) found the Mega

Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible.

For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and

the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the

Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of

failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on 15


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April 2003, promulgated Resolution 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission

publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on 16 May 2003. On 29 May

2003, five individuals and entities (including the Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a

letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to

MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been

conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural

requirements, they sought a re-bidding. In a letter-reply dated 6 June 2003, the Comelec chairman

-- speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive assistant -- rejected the protest and

declared that the award "would stand up to the strictest scrutiny." Hence, the present petition for

certiorari.

I ssue: Whether ITF, et. al. have the locus standi to file the case questioning the validity of the

election computerization bidding.

Held:The issues central to the case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest."

As alleged, Comelecs flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified

entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Any taint on the

sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith

in the democratic system of government. Further, the award of any contract for automation

involves disbursement of public funds are in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest

requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Truly, our nations

political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004

elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of the case is "a matter of

public concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public

interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal

standing, following the liberal policy of the Court whenever a case involves "an issue of

overarching significance to our society." ITF, et. al.s legal standing should therefore be

recognized and upheld. Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when

there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to

any improper purpose"; or when petitioner(s) seek to restrain respondent(s) from "wasting publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." Herein, Ma. Corazon M.

Akol, Miguel Uy, Eduardo H. Lopez, Augusto C. Lagman, Rex C. Drilon, Miguel Hilado, Ley

Salcedo, and Manuel Alcuaz Jr., suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that

public funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was

defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law


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and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain the Commission On Elections; Comelec

Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.; Comelec Bidding And Award Committee Chairman Eduardo D.

Mejos And Members Gideon De Guzman, Jose F. Balbuena, Lamberto P. Llamas, And

Bartolome Sinocruz Jr.; Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.; And Mega Pacific Consortium from

implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of public

funds pursuant thereto. Thus, the Court hold that ITF, et. al. possess locus standi.


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Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]

En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join

Facts:

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator

Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator

Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following

Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution

84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on

COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously

with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term

each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that the

Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only

for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on

30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results

from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-

005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution 01-

005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)

years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)

years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph

Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th,respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo

Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only

COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from

proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest

number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term

seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-

005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend

that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed

to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required

under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate

in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or

regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,

consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates

seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly


18/36

required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that

because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial

candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were

no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for

thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a

temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing

any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the

petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant

petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally

disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the

issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.

Held:

Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest ina case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the

challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily

sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that this

Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be

allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some

actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the

government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the

injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of

standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their

capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and

Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized

grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all

the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in

their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition

because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x

extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses

of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELECor that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand,

the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to

give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. The Court has the

discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of

legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has

adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is


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able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the

issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside

technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same treatment to Tolentino and

Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they raise important

issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in the

petition is likely to arise again.


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BLAS F. OPLE

v.

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITOHABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO

VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to

prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis

considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by

civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No.

308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"

on two important constitutional grounds,

viz

:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly

intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the

rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against

furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation

on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the

instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the

heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency

Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On

April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue:

WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling:

YES

Rationale:

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues

relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case atbar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to

uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a

distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the

requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a

usurpation of legislative power.


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4

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS),

petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the

misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the

Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308

have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid

per se

and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be

promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves

have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As

early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the

publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID)

card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat

representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the

national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show theirunswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of

the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters

insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its

result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental

right.


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People vs. Vera

[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]

First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result

Facts:

The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai BankingCorporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and

Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The

People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649)

of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court.

Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the

aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the

CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a

protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the

length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the

bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of

conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and

2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and

with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court,

on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5

years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of

prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed amotion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were

denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18

December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on

certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the

petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November

1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second

alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the

case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial

court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu

Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he

was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good

conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the


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application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial

of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose

O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the

Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu

Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging,

among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section

2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection

(1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the

reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because

section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said

law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective

provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April

19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an unduedelegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,

Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private

prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the

constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a

resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime

of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the

latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an

exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a

motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial

was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional

motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were

set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of

counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici

curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6

August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for

the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and

forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for

intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the

last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his

motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene

as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the

postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing


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of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the

motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the

circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was

signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at

this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary

legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in

the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng

for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him,

exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the

judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the

defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was

accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the

Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and

Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and

the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The

unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have

a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will

sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if

Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose

name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside.

Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds

is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an

invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity

of its own laws.


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ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime

of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectivelyfashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from theconstitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said lawthat it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimesalready punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates thefundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses.Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, thepetitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity ofthe law using the facial challenge.

Ruling:On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute

vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficientnotice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vaguenessdoctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary

intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only beinvoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, whereinclarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may notinvoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vaguenessdoctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld,not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose maynot be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade thearea of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is


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allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possiblechilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the lawcannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative actsis the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establishthat no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developedfor facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the

established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not beheard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applyingto other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. Onits face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground thatthey might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionallyprotected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imaginedthan real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in theCongress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusionperpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition isdismissed for lacking merit.

ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Issues:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that wouldinform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the languageof law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c thepetitioner is alleged to have committed.We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse

petitioner in his defense.Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition ofthe terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overtor criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Lawunconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right tobe informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of hisfundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms areused herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standardsthat men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in itsapplication. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)

respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the partiestargeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridleddiscretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of theGovernment muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which isoverbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possibleharm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighedby the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived


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grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimesof plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crimeof plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by theaccused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overtor criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused alwayshas in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, andunless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt thatculpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm ofconstitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accusedagainst conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crimechargedthe element of the offense.

Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is hissubmission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and thatSec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element ofthe crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder

We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements ofplunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for theprosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4

does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but onlyoperated in furtherance of a remedy.

What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engenderthat moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accusedbeyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether itis within the power of Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely becausethe constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in aprosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the

crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guiltyknowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminatesthe requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation onS.B. No.733Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the schemeor conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or


28/36

criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the actsconstituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must beproved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised PenalCode to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea isan element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by

his criminal intent.Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemedto have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include itamong the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their verynature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like ananimal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or hergrowth as a human being.There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance andimplications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political andeconomic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and providefor its poor and underprivileged masses.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies thatit is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherentlywrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in aspecial law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly malain se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as thePlunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, thepetition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit


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UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed RegionalDirector of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V.Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. OnAugust 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential

memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of

internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during hisincumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the followingmalfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the

said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the

issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of thepetitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against thelatter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft andCorruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly

informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to

send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, andLiabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet.Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the

PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required

answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGCissued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a primafacie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) chargesagainst petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the

recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued

Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from theservice, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under thelaw.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to

Security of Tenure.

(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted
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government agency and whether the petitioner can raise theissue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion forreconsideration of the trial courts decision.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the

charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner'sdismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Held:Petitioner maintains that as a career executive serviceofficer, he can only be removed for cause and under the

Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of

the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, hisdismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his

right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful

study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court ofAppeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure,

petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the

PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer andother pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal

revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings

before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that hisprotestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any

factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was aviolation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure.According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of

Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of

tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemicof evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that

he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce

sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. Asregards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was onlyposed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise

for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to lastissue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration,the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to

the institution of the criminal case. The charges included inAdministrative Order No. 152 were based on the results ofinvestigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal

charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is


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dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by thepetitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning thefinding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.

However, taking into account the antecedent facts and

circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of itsequity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of thecharges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct

and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of theBureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested

in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the SolicitorGeneral, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No.152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot

be overlooked.


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Arceta vs. Mangrobang [GR 152895, 15 June 2004]

Resolution En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 12 concur, 1 on official leave

Facts: The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with

violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging inan Information that on or about 16 September 1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank

check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in

CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit

with the drawee bank for the payment, and despite receipt of notice of such

dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to

make arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving

notice. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the

Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned

out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in

futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus

go against prevailing jurisprudence. On 21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and

pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment

should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she

would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed

the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary

restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP

22). On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a chargesheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of

Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging in the Information that on or about

the month of January 2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the

amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well

knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the

drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which

check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and with

intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of

P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has

been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss

the charges against her on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise

believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the

charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a


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petition with the Supreme Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the

said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.

Issue: Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present

economic and financial crisis, else due to the undue burden made upon the MeTC bybouncing checks cases.

Held: When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the

established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if

the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and

controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the

constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest

opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the

case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdictionover a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due

regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable to agree

that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find the

constitutional question raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy

below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify

its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,

and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the

contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22

by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even

the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to

declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant

consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there

exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial

system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency

substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial

communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened

immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the allegedinvalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower

courts lies elsewhere.


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LAMBERTO MACIAS, Lorenzo Teves, Fausto Dugenio, Rogaciano Mercado, Mariano

Perdices VS THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and Vicente Gella in his capacity as

National Treasurer

PONENTE: BENGZON(Jose), J

FACTS: (1) Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented fromimplementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts in this

country. It is unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the

House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been

furnished the Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was

approved more than three years after the return of the last census of our

population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of

inhabitants of the several provinces. (2) after hearing both parties, court declared

the said RA void.

ISSUE: Constitutionality of RA 3040

HELD: REITERATES resolution declaring that RA 3040 ingfringed the

provision of the Constitution and is therefore VOID.

ANALYSIS: Petitioners as voters and congressman and governor of the aggrieved

provinces have PERSONALITY to SUE. Constitution DIRECTS apportionment of

members of the House of Representatives be according to the member of their

respective inhabitants in their city/province. COURTS MAY declare an

unconstitutional apportionment law VOID.

Republic Act 3040 - AN ACT TO APPORTION REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTSIN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE SECTION ONE

HUNDRED SIXTEEN AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AS AMENDED.

o Republic Act 3040 manifests that (a) it gave Cebu seven members,while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it

gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population

got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila

and Cotabato got more than both five members having been assigned

to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while

Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) Bulacan vs. with 557,691 got

two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and

(f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while

Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.


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TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local

Government Code

Facts:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act

Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of

Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and

the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.

Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite

for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and

contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the

Local Government Code because:

The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living

within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in

the plebiscite.

The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only

be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the

governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:

WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the

Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio

may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered

except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,

and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or

units affected? NO.

Held:

Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial

alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in

the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new


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province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of

the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected.

The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundarieswould be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of

those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed

province of Negros del Norte.

Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or

compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is

applicable, to wit:

when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the

people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at

bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.

The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The

substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the

adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the

petitioners.

SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

Tanada - Tan

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