Key Messages

KENYA POLICY BRIEFS JANUARY 2020Towards Realisation of Vision 2030

Volume 1 No. 1

Roadside vendors and motorcycle taxis(Photo: Madara Ogot)

ContextKenya’s credit market has gone a fullcircle in just about three years. Before2016, interest rates were to a largeextend liberalized, and relatively high tothe frustration of policymakers. Highinterest rates are an obstacle to domesticinvestments while at the same time theycontribute to bank profitability. The factthat banks were very profitable in thecontext of household and individual in-debtness with low returns on savings wasperceived as unethical and unacceptable.A group of lawmakers moved a motionthat was unanimously passed inparliament in 2016 to introduce interestrate controls2. The objective of theinterest rate controls was to reduce thecost of credit, increase or expand accessto credit while increasing the returns onsavings. However, there is evidence that"the law on interest rate controls obtainedthe opposite effect. Specifically, it led to acollapse of credit to micro, small, andmedium enterprises, as well as individualcredit; shrinking of the loan book of thesmall banks; and reduced financialintermediation” (Alper et al. 2019 p.1).Three years down the line in 2019 the lawthat provided for interest rate controls wasrepealed.

The real problem with interest rate controlswas the inability for banks to price for risk.As such, government bonds became moreattractive to financial institutions asopposed to lending to micro and smallenterprises which were perceived as riskydespite their crucial role in employmentcreation, investments and economicgrowth. The interest rate controls,therefore, created a vacuum where the so-called risky borrowers (firms and individualsalike) had to look for other avenues toaccess to credit. This policy brief is criticalespecially in the wake of the 2019 financialaccess survey that showed that thepercentage of people with access to creditservices was at 82.9 per cent, up from 26.7per cent in 2006 and 75.3 per cent in 2016.

The same survey found that financial health(the ability to cope with unexpectedfinancial demands) was worsening. Much ofthe access to credit is fuelled by aproliferation of lenders using mobile phonetechnology to give quick small loans withterms that are otherwise unfair to thewellbeing of the borrower. This amounts topredatory lending, a lending practice withunfair or abusive loan terms on a borrower.It also amounts to a coercive practice thatconvinces a borrower to take a loan thatthey can do without. In this research, we

Series 1 - Economic Pillar: Financial Services

Taming Predatory Lending for a Resilient Financial System and Economic Growth Dr Joy Kiiru

Pricing for risk by financial institutions, and charging higher interest rates to more risky borrowers is not necessarily bad for the economy.

A more competitive formal financial system will keep bank interest rates low

Tame predatory lending by imposing regulations that protect poor borrowers

Consider social protection to aidthe very poor and vulnerable.Credit/loans may cause moreharm to them

©2020 AuthorsPublished by Office of DVC Research, Innovation and Enterprise, https://uonresearch.org/journal/kpb University of Nairobi, http://www.uonbi.ac.ke

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KENYA POLICY BRIEFS JANUARY 2020Towards Realisation of Vision 2030

Volume 1 No. 1

focus on lending systems targeting thepoor, to give policy recommendations for a healthy and resilient credit system inKenya.

ApproachWe used data collected through a survey toevaluate sources and impact of financialservices to poor households. We utilizedboth theoretical and empirical econometricmodelling methods to analyse the data.

We focus on lending modalities for poorhouseholds and entrepreneurs, in partic-ular, solidarity lending and other sociallysecured loans to demonstrate that the so-called "informal collateral" ideally over-secure loans for the poor and is the gen-esis of predatory lending.

ResultsWe present two main arguments derivedfrom our research: One, policymakersshould not worry about banks being able toprice for risks and to charge “higher”interest rates to more risky borrowers.Moreover, if the banking system is compet-itive, interest rates will remain relatively low.The alternative to bank credit (be it forenterprises or individuals) include informalmoney lenders, investments groups(chamas), and digital mobile app loans. Allthese alternatives charge much higherinterest rates and or impose unfair terms tothe borrower. Our second argumentdemonstrates that in the Kenyan context,characterized by relatively high povertylevels and income inequalities, the demandfor credit (both households and firms) isripe. Poor people or enterprises seek creditas a matter of survival and easily discountor under-rate the real cost of credit. Theirsituation pre-disposes them to predatorylenders. Thus there is the need to regulatecredit markets to ensure that access tocredit not only adds to economic growth butalso resilient financial systems.

Our study revealed that 10 per cent of thesample used at least 75 per cent of theloans for immediate consumption needs,another 57 per cent used at least 75 percent of their loans for productive activityand only 33 per cent used the entire creditfor productive activity. Loan repaymentsconsisted of stringent regulations by bothborrowers and microfinance institutions.For example, there were weekly meetingsto collect all due loans, make loan instal-ments and mitigate imminent default by anygroup member. The loan officer would

preside over the meetings and would notadjourn till all due loan instalments havebeen redeemed. In case of imminentthreat of default for any outstanding loaninstalment, the group officials wereresponsible. They carry out immediatefundraising including borrowing frominformal money lenders just to redeemthe group but with consequences to thedefaulting member. Sanctions to thedefaulter include threats, penalties, socialstigma and alienation. Confiscation ofprivate property was also rampant.However, its group members whoconfiscate each other's property in caseof default. Repayment rates by jointliability groups stood well over 90 percent. The poor are therefore trapped in asituation where default would lead to botheconomic and social costs. In oursample, only about 20 per cent of therespondents repaid their loan instalmentsthrough returns from their enterprises, therest of the sample experienced distressrepayments. Distress repayments includeborrowing to repay (62 per cent), sale ofpre-existing property (17 per cent) andactual confiscation of private property bygroup members (4 per cent).

Another important finding from our studyis that the so-called better-off poor (notthe poorest) are in a better position tobenefit from small loans as long as theloans jump-start them into productiveactivities within their areas of expertise.Finally, the very poor are too poor tobenefit from market-driven interventionslike microcredit. What the very poor needare non-market interventions like socialprotection services as a matter ofsurvival. Access to credit will notnecessarily turn a poor person into anentrepreneur and hence the need for arealistic policy on access to credit andentrepreneurship to ensure that onlyviable enterprises or households accesscredit. The implication is far-reachingespecially to mobile phone app-basedlending that preys on the youth and othervulnerable persons.

Policy Recommendations

Short-Term Regulations that encourage the viable

selection of households andentrepreneurs into solidarity borrowinggroups should be encouraged. For

example, outlawing informal contractsthat allow group members to confiscatedefaulters' private property.

Financial resources even though held assecurity for loans advanced to solidaritygroups, should be held in interest-bearing accounts, unlike the currentscenario where such accounts bear nointerest. “Forced savings" are part of thereason why poor people's loans areover-secured and should bediscouraged or made to work for them.

Consider social protection for the verypoor, as they may benefit from market-driven interventions like credit.

Medium-Term Banking regulations should ensure a

competitive banking system to keep in-terest rates low.

Regulate digital lending to create astable and resilient banking system.

AcknowledgementsThis policy brief is derived from the researchpaper: Kiiru, Joy (2018): Institutional MoralHazard and Inclusive Finance: When Good is Notso Good. OIDA International Journal ofSustainable Development, Ontario InternationalDevelopment Agency, Canada ISSN 1923-6654(print) ISSN 1923-6662 (online).

The research was generously funded by theFederal Ministry of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment BMZ – Germany.

ReferencesAlper, C. Emre; Benedict, Clements, Niko

Hobdari, and Rafel Moya Porcel (2019) “DoInterest Rate Controls Work? Evidence fromKenya.” IMF working paper WP/19/119.

Central Bank of Kenya., Kenya NationalBureau of Statistics, and Financial DeepeningTrust- Kenya (2019) 2019 Finaccess HouseholdSurvey, Access, Usage, Quality. Available onhttps://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/financial_inclusion/1035460079_2019%20FinAcces%20Report%20(web).pdf Date accessed 15thAugust 2019

Kiiru, Joy (2018) “Institutional Moral Hazardand Inclusive Finance: When Good is Not soGood.” OIDA International Journal of SustainableDevelopment, Ontario International DevelopmentAgency, Canada.

Kiiru, J. (2007) “Microfinance: Getting Moneyto the Poor or Making Money out of Poverty?What was the Promise?” International Journal ofFinance and the Common Good. Special IssueSeptember 2007.

AuthorDr Joy M. Kiiru (jmueni@uonbi.ac.ke )School of Economics, University of Nairobi, P.O.Box 30197-00100, Nairobi, Kenya.

©2020 AuthorsPublished by Office of DVC Research, Innovation and Enterprise, https://uonresearch.org/journal/kpb University of Nairobi, http://www.uonbi.ac.ke

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