Taliban Politics and Afghan Legitimate Grievances (Senilis Council document)

8/14/2019 Taliban Politics and Afghan Legitimate Grievances (Senilis Council document)

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POLI CY PAPER

TALIBAN POLI TI CS AND AFGHAN

LEGI TI MATE GRI EVANCES

London, June 2007


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Taliban Pol it ics June 2007

www.senliscouncil.net 2


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Index

Executive Summary 7

I . British Mission in Afghanistan: Overarching Objectivesand Challenges Ahead 13

I I . Achieving Success: Critical Success Factors onRe-Balancing the Strategy in Afghanistan 29

Crit ical Success Factors:

! Decrease number in civilian casualties and provide a comprehensiverelief programme

! Provide immediate food aid and healthcare to Helmands population! An effective and positive counter-narcotics policy! A Grassroots political campaign! An assertive response to Afghan-Pakistani issues

Conclusion 35

Appendices. 37


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A refugee camp in Helmand Province

Calling on the UK to Assume Leadership of a Successful Internat ional

Strategy in Afghanistan

Gordon Brown has a clear policy choice for Afghanistan: either stand by the same failedpolicies, or pursue a successful, coherent peace-building strategy in Afghanistan. Theright choice is clear. The British Government must urgently review its current policiespursued in Afghanistan. Decisive leadership is called for to address the current crisis.The incoherent manner in which the military, development and counter-narcoticscampaigns are undertaken on the ground feed deep insecurity and extreme poverty. Thegovernment should st ep away from Bush/ Blair-led poli cies.

Whilst the establishment of anewly elected government inAfghanistan represents a steptowards freedom, democracy,and prosperity, the countryimperatively needs assistancefor reconstruction, propergovernance and leadership.Misguided development andcounter-narcotics policiesprovide the Taliban withauthority, increased legitimacyand the support of the localpopulation. Afghanistan is at

the brink of becoming aTaliban st ronghold once again.

One of the UK Governments top mission priorities in Afghanistan is to urgently

provide coordinated and substantial humanitarian and development aid to the localpopulation. It is essential that British initiatives are regarded as supportive of, and donot undermine, the efforts of the Afghan Government if not, both the UK and theAfghan Government will fail to gain the support and trust of the Afghan people.


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Counter-narcot ics operati ons, such as forced poppy eradicat ion, mu st stop undermining the stabili sation and peace-building mission.


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Two of this mans children were buried alive during bombing campaigns

of t he I nternati onal Securi ty Assistance Force (I SAF)

Executive Summary

The legitimate grievances of the Afghan people are successfully maximised by theTaliban in their propaganda campaign. Critically, this could allow the Taliban toprogressively become a legitimate political movement in the southern part of thecountry. The United Kingdom and the international community risk losing what hasbeen achieved so far in Afghanistan.

Decades of internal fightingand foreign intervention havedisrupted the rule of law andallowed for illegal activitiesand corruption to flourish. Atpresent, the reality inAfghanistan is that of threeinteracting crises - security,poverty and narcotics. Peaceand stability in Afghanistanwill not be achieved bymilitary means alone. Laggingdevelopment , a booming i llegaldrugs trade, widespreadcorruption and the steadyincrease in civilian casualtiesare challenges that the UK is

called upon to urgentlyaddress. Public resentmenttowards the Karzai Government and international forces are on the rise, with violencenow spreading across Afghanistans relatively secure areas and the capital Kabul.

The British presence in Afghanistan is under threat. To gain the trust and support ofthe local population and achieve its mission in the country, the UK must define a newcoherent strategic course. Without a clear articulation of well-defined objectives andcourse of action, the UK will fail Afghanistan and the British public back home.

A List of Unremitting Challenges

" Taliban polit ics causing an upsurge in violence and insurgency: Afghanistan isravaged by a huge increase in violent attacks in recent months. Critically,violence is now spreading geographically to the relatively secure northern andwestern parts of the country. The legitimate grievances people hold in thecountry are benefiting the Taliban and threaten to turn the Taliban into becominga legit imate polit ical force.

" More and more civilian casualtiesAs a result of intense fighting and the extensiveuse of aerial bombing, large numbers of civilians have been killed. The steady


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Local elders are being ignored.

succession of civilian casualties fuels increasing local distrust of British andint ernati onal t roops.

" Misguided counter-narcotics operations: Insisting on forced eradicationoperations has proved to be both ineffective and counter-productive. In theabsence of immediate alternatives, the livelihoods of rural communities are beingdestroyed, fuelling further public disillusionment towards the UK, internationalforces and the Afghan Government. This has crucially led to increased violence andlawlessness. The US pledge to implement chemical eradication by aerialspraying of poppy crops for the next planting season will be disastrous. Suchill-advised policies put the British military mission at grave risk.

" Lack of vital development aid: Living conditions in Afghanistan, particularly inthe south, remain appalling. The lack of essential aid relief and developmentinfrastructure is maximised by the Taliban to gain local support and undermine thecounter-insurgency mission of British and international forces. The UK isprogressively losing the battle for the hearts and minds.

" Effective Grassroots politics: Public information warfare is Afghanistan is key towinning the support and trust of the local population. At present, psychologicaloperations are lacking the coordination, means of communication and claritynecessary for a successful planned information campaign. Instead, the Taliban hasemployed a winning propaganda, building on the international communitys failureto improve the lives of the Afghan people in the south.

" Distant neighbouring relations: Therelations between Afghanistan andPakistan are critical for the stabilityof both countries and in evolvingregional dynamics. The porousborder is a major source ofinstability for both Afghanistan andPakistan by exploiting the ill-defined border, the Taliban isregrouping and gaini ng more power.

" Karzai Government under threat:Inst abilit y and corrupt ion withi n t he

Government are effectively leadingto a governance crisis. Thedeterioration of the securitysituation, lack of provision of urgentdevelopment and the support ofaggressive counter-narcoticsoperations have led to widespreadresentment towards the AfghanGovernment. Karzai is losing thesupport of h is own people.


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Changing Poli tical Dynamics: I raq scenarios in Afghanistan

During 2001 and 2002 the international community was fighting what remained ofTali ban resistance and their foreign Al Qaeda brothers-in-arms. Since then, thepoli t ical dynamic has changed considerably. The remain ing core of fundamentalistTaliban has benefited from a widespread, often legitimate, set of grievances -economic, political and social. This has given birth to a resurgent, grassrootsTaliban movement.

Poverty, lack of economic opportunities and broken promises have fuelled thismovement and increased the scope and perceived legitimacy of the Taliban.Recently and much like in Iraq, the Taliban have stepped up attacks in largely

populated areas, producing high civilian casualties.

This has magnified the perception that the Afghan Government and internationalcommunity are unable to provide security. The growing Taliban support base andthe increased scope of attacks are destabilising and de-legitimising the AfghanGovernment in the eyes of its people.

These attacks, in conjunction with US-led bombing tactics that have also producedhigh civilian casualties, are changing the political dynamics in Afghanistan. TheTaliban has begun to tip the scales it its favour.

The Way Forward: Balancing Objectives and Strategies

The key for a successful mission in Afghanistan is for the international community andthe Afghan Government to garner public support by visibly improving life chances forall Afghans. The UK and NATO must be able to collectively demonstrate that theirpresence in the country is essential to building lasting peace and supporting theelected Afghan Government i n i ts reconst ructi on effort s.

" A coherent campaign: Building on the underpinnings of the counter-insurgencytheory, the military mission must be accompanied by the provision of immediate

aid and development. Balancing the military and development efforts both interms of project implementation and spending is essential to winning the heartsand minds in Afghanistan. Without an effective development and aid infrastructureand limiting civilian casualties, the counter-insurgency campaign of British troopsis bound to f ail.

" A development-based Poppy for Medicine initiative: The next planting season isof crucial importance, signalling the choice between the destructive policy ofchemical and ground spraying, and positive development-based initiatives. ThePoppy for Medicine initiative, advocating for the licensed cultivation of poppy formedicinal purposes, would allow the central government and the UK to engage


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Poppies ready to be used for the production of Afghan morphine

positively with rural communities and help break the ties and dependency on theillegal drugs market and the Taliban. The next planting season can mark a new,affirmative beginning with the implementation of Poppy for Medicine pilot

projects.

" Conveying a positive message and supporting Afghanistans local structures:There needs to be an immediate and drastic improvement in demoralising theTaliban and conveying the democratic vision of Afghanistan. The UK and theinternational community must actively demonstrate their strong commitment tosupport and help the Afghan people and its elected Government. The traditionallocal assemblies (jirgas, shuras) are particularly valuable in the fragile south,voicing local concerns to be addressed and functioning as a law enforcementforum. Crucially, a stable and secure environment within local communities wouldhelp rebuild local support for the Karzai Government, the UK and NATO presence.

" An assertive response to Afghan-Pakistani issues: Both Afghanistan and Pakistanwill benefit from a close relationship aiming to address their shared problems andachieve stability. The UK and the international community could assist bothPakistan and Afghanistan by proposing the establishment of a joint presidentialcommittee, co-chaired by the Presidents of both countries, with the sole purposeof working together constructively and persistently on joint problem solving.

The UK has the opportunity to assume leadership of a successful international strategyto build peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. Past mistakes must not be repeated instead, a renewed commitment to effectively addressing Afghanistans interactingcrises of securit y, development and counter-narcotics ought t o be made.

Gordon Brown must exemplify the leadership and vigour to overcome failedpolicies and pave the way for a coherent, Afghan-oriented mission. Afghanistan isbeing lost - there is no time to waste.


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The burning remains of a British military vehicle in Helmand province following a roadside bomb explosion


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Humanitarian efforts: Will Gordon Brown ensure someone takescare of this malnourished child?

I . UK Mission in Afghanistan: Overarching Objectives andChallenges Ahead

The UK, along with the US and other nations, has been engaged vigorously in re-building Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban in autumn 2001. To properlyassess the UK strategy in Afghanistan, it is essential to reflect on the objectives of themission as t hese were origi nally envisaged and t hereaft er port rayed in policy-making.

Endorsing a Coherent Security and Development Mission in Afghanist an

In October 2001, following the dramatic events of September 11, the UK Prime MinisterTony Blair announced Britains commitment in Afghanistan with British forces engagedin milit ary action against t argets inside t he country.

We are taking action on all three fronts: military, diplomatic and humanitarian. We

have to act to alleviate the appalling suffering of the Afghan people and deliverstability.

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, October 2001

Throughout the six years of Britishengagement in Afghanistan, the UKGovernment has reiterated its initialproclamation underlining that itsmission in Afghanistan is to help theAfghan people to build their economyand democracy, and to protect thereconst ruction of t he count ry.

Importantly, the UK Governmentemphasised the fundamental linkagebetween security and developmentefforts in Afghanistan. Acknowledgingthat success in Afghanistan will not be

achieved by military means alone, theUK speaks of the need to marrytogether the elements of security andforce with those of reconstruction anddevelopment. Former DefenceSecretary John Reid stressed thatstability in Afghanistan depends on aviable legitimate economy, withAfghanistan having the infrastructureand capabilit y t o govern i tself effect ively.


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A clear need to balance military efforts with sustainable development

Within a coherent policy, the role for the military is to help maintain and create aframework of security on which legitimate Afghan institutions can grow and thrive. Inthis context, NATO, through its leadership of the International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF), has a major role to play.

The international community needs to work in a coordinated way across all the

different lines of operation security, governance, law and order, reconstructionand development to deliver a truly comprehensive approach.

Defence Secretary Des Browne, November 2006

Counter-narcotics policy hasaccurately been considered as

an integral component of theefforts in Afghanistan. Since2001, the UK Government andthe international communityhave emphasised thedetrimental role of the drugstrade in financing the Talibanregime, and have thus strivento tackle the illegal drugsproduction. Counter-narcoticsproclamations have focused on

the efforts to build up theAfghan police and army, and toreconst ruct the economy on a basis t hat does not depend on narcot ics.

Countering the illegal drugs production in Afghanistan is a very difficult yet vitalmission, f or which t he UK has lead responsibi li ty.

The Promise of a Last ing Commit ment

Throughout the last six years, the UK has been reassuring the Afghan Government andits people of its strong commitment to the countrys stability and development.

We will not turn our back on Afghanistan because it is right to remain engaged we promised that we would do so and if we do not, Afghanistan may return to thefai led sta te in which we found it aft er 9/ 11 . For us to remain engaged in thereconstruction of Afghanistan is not merely right it is manifestly in our interest.

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, December 2001

Prime Minister Blair reaffirmed this promise throughout the years ensuring that inrelation to the British forces and boosting the development effort in Afghanistan, theUK wil l do whatever is necessary t o succeed.


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Primitive pumps provide water to villages but are not accessible tomany people in rural areas

AFGHANI STAN AT A GLANCE

GDP per capita: USD 3001

Malnutrition: 7 milli on, 22% of the t otal population

Population below minimum level of dietary energy:20.4%1

Life Expectancy: 44 years

I nfant mortality: 13.5%

Under fi ve mortalit y: 25%

Access to clean water in urban areas: 38%

Access to clean water in rural areas: 7%

Access to adequate sanitation: 12%

Adult Literacy Rates: 28.1%

Adult Literacy Rate for women: 15%

Exhibiting its commitment, the UKhas commissioned a significant

military contribution, with otherNATO countries engaging somewhatdisproportionately. UKs militaryengagement in Afghanistan hasincreased three-fold since 2001,with approximately 6,700 troopscurrently employed and theseexpected to increase to 7,700 byAugust 2007. Military engagementis accompanied by an equalimportant increase in expenditure

with the estimated cost ofoperations for 2006-2007 reaching770 million. British troops aredoing a commendable job under the most difficult circumstances in the insecure

Helmand province.

Significant funds for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan have also beenpledged. The UK is Afghanistans second largest donor of funds after the US with totalspending exceeding 500 mil lion.

The international community has

learned its lesson in Afghanistanthe hard way. The overthrow ofthe Taliban regime in autumn2001 was recklessly viewed as alasting success, allowing forcorruption to thrive andinsurgent actors to reinstate. TheTaliban are now re-gainingcontrol of the southern part,illegal activities are flourishingand the country is ravaged byextreme poverty. Improvementsin security and reconstructionthat the UK and the internationalcommunity have striven toachieve in Afghanistan are atrisk. Afghanistans future isseverely under threat. It isimperative the commitment of the UK and NATO in Afghanistan is for the long-run butwith immediate action. A hurried exit strategy would prove catastrophic forAfghanistan, the region and international security.


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Extreme poverty is still abundant despite almost six years of British presence inAfghanistan

The UK mission in Afghanistan as originally envisaged incorporating the keyelement for success a comprehensive strategy which integrates the threeessential strands of security, development and counter-narcotics. The UK did get itright on paper. But are these mission statements reflected in equally coherent

policies and operations?

The current Brit ish policy in Afghanistan is ineffecti ve.


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Afghanistans Security Situation in September 2006


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Afghanistans Security Situation in June 2007


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Unrelenting Errors in Policy Implementation are endangering the

Peace-Building Mission

Following decades of internal fighting and external intervention, Afghanistan haslonged for lasting peace. A foreign engagement in Afghanistan has to be built on abase of a stronger peace, seeking to build economic prosperity, political stability andmilit ary securit y.

Building peace in Afghanistan essentially translates into a constructive relationshipbetween the Afghan Government, its people and the international community; provisionof development aid and a sustainable solution to the opium issue; elucidating on thelasting benefits of democracy and promoting education across the country; directengagement with the rural communities and local institutions (jirgas, shuras); and apositive engagement between Afghanistan and its neighbours including Pakistan.

Winning the support and trust of the Afghan people and empowering the KarzaiGovernment are indispensable components of a successful peace-building mission.

Winning over the heartsand minds of young menis crucial to the peacebuilding efforts of

Afghanistan

Winning over the hearts and minds of young men is crucial to the peace building efforts of Afghanistan


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Another mi sfi re by th e internati onal communit y

Misst eps in I mplementing a Coherent Campaign

The overall mission of stability anddevelopment in Afghanistan isbeing seriously compromised byinsufficient and conflictingoperations. Misguided counter-narcotics policies, lack ofsustainable development fundingand aid infrastructure, ill-fated Psy-Ops and public informationoperations, inadequate militarycoordination between international

forces and a steady succession ofcivilian casualties have resulted inincreasing anti-occupation hostilityand distrust of t he Afghan CentralGovernment.

The past six years have seen a succession of polit ical errors, neglect and missedopportunities.

Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, June 20071

" Lack of military coordination between international forces and a steadysuccession of civilian casualties

NATO has a vital role to play in securing Afghanistan and facilitating to establish alasting culture of democracy and peace. However, the military campaign is sufferingfrom a rather disproportionate national commitment from its members and reluctancefor greater and more coordinated engagement.

The extensive use of aerial bombing, often as compensation for the limited number of

troops on the ground, and the indiscriminate manner in which Afghan civilians arebeing killed are fuelling public frustration and worsening the relations with the AfghanGovernment. This critically undermines the ability of the UK and its troops to presenttheir mission as a humanitarian war to help the Afghan people and gain their support.

1 Ashraf Ghani, Rescue Plan for an Afghanistan perilously close to it s t ipping poin t, 19 June 2006,[ online] Available at: htt p:/ / www.e-ariana.com/ ariana/ eariana.nsf/ aa8e81dc17f7b0eb87256c030066e73b/ 86e50f584601c46c872572ff00433ffe?OpenDocument


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Extreme poverty is driving young Afghans into the hands of the Taliban

No compensation for the deaths of innocent civilians killed in NATO-ISAF

operationsSince NATO-ISAF took command of operations in Afghanistan in October 2006,compensation given for innocent civilians killed in combat-weary provinces in the southhas been meagre. The Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund, the compensationfund created by NATO-ISAF in December 2006 to help war victims, is thus far beingfunded by only four out of the 37 troop contributing nations. The initial contributioncame from the Netherlands followed by Sweden, the Czech Republic and Lithuania.None of the bigger countries with extensive military operations in Afghanistan havecontributed to the fund. This is sending a message of Abandonment to the Afghanpeople

The situation is at a criticalpoint. Whilst anti-occupation

hostility is rising, theinsurgency has spread topreviously relatively stable

areas and imperils thegovernance and stabilisation.

Insurgents are no longer merelytargeting Afghan security

forces and foreign troops, buthave started targeting civiliansas well. Public support for the

Afghan Government andinternational forces is steadilybeing lost. The British andinternational mission is now

severely under threat.

" Development and aid policies failing to complement military effortsAfghanistan is facing a poverty crisis of an unprecedented magnitude. Notwithstanding

five years of international assistance, the country still ranks at the bottom of alldevelopment indicators. The majority of the population suffers from shortages ofhousing, clean water, electricity, medical care and jobs. With overall poor infrastructureand lack of resources for social development, Afghanistan descends further intopoverty.

In 2000 the United Nations adopted eight Millennium Development Goals with the aimof ending extreme poverty. These Goals set out clear objectives for achieving progresstowards specific poverty indicators such as halving the proportion of people whoseincome is less than $1 a day, halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger,and reducing the under-five child mortality rate by two thirds. Afghanistan is the only


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Crop eradicati on only leads to more poverty

Asian country to have not met or to be on track to meet more than two of the Goals.Adequate shelter and sufficient food must be made immediately available to allAfghans, especially in t he ravaged southern part of t he country. The achievement of the

targets encapsulated in these internationally agreed-upon goals would signalAfghanistans sustainable measurable progress towards achieving peace and prosperity.

Thus far, international military expenditure has outpaced development and aidspending by 900 percent. The striking disparity between military and developmentspending reflects the lack of balance and coordination among the two policies withsevere implicat ions on t he overall mission in Afghanistan.

Failing to address the immediate and basic needs of the Afghan population has led

to increasing public disillusionment and distrust towards the Afghan Governmentand the international community. The lack of development and aid infrastructure has

also been maximised by the insurgents to gain local support - villages ravaged bypoverty are now the recruitment ground for the Taliban. UK and NATO military officialsand soldiers on the ground have expressed their frustration with the lack ofcoordination between security and development operations. Inadequate developmentaid puts the military efforts at grave risk. When Brit ish soldiers ( re) conquer terrainon the Taliban, there are no development agencies or NGOs that can seriously build

on this to make the military victory sustainable through development andreconstruction.

Balancing the military and development efforts is essential to winning the hearts andminds in Afghanistan. Without an effective development and aid infrastructure, the

counter-insurgency campaign of British and NATO forces is bound to failure.

" Misguided counter-narcotics operations undermine Afghanistans stabilityThe endemic drugs crisis lies at thenexus of development and securityin Afghanistan. As counter-narcotics challenges facing Afghanand international forces in theprovince intensify, security and

overall reconstruction effortsbecome irreconcilable. Thecommendable job of the Britishmilitary in southern Afghanistan isseverely undermined by unbalancedpolicies in the area of counter-narcotics. Aggressive poppyeradication has proved to beineffective and extremely dangerousfor the UK and NATO mission.


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Left behind with no alternative livelihoods: Villagers observingeradication operations

Failing to address the illegal drugs trade has been a critical strategic mistake, withillegal drug culti vat ion in t he southern provinces currently f uelli ng insurgent act ivit ies.

The number of Afghan farmers involved in poppy cultivation has increased by 44percent in 2006, reaching almost three million, whilst overall cultivation has climbedby 59 percent. Earlier in June 2007, the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Minister, HabibullahQaderi, has recently warned that poppy production in Helmand, Uruzgan and Nangararprovinces will increase significantly this year compared to 2006. It is generallypredicted that opium production will increase by as much as 20 percent by the end of2007.

" Hard-line US policy promises chemical spraying of poppy cropsThe US insists on the success of aggressive eradicat ion poli cy, especially advocat ingaerial and ground herbicide eradication, citing the Colombian experience. Since the

1980s, Colombia has targeted poppy plantings with aerial spraying of chemicals. 3However, the reality in Colombia provides ample evidence of the ineffectiveness of croperadication and the social and security costs this has inflicted on the population thelivelihoods of rural communities have been destroyed leading to mass displacement andinstability. What is more, this policy has proved to be entirely futile in reducing theillegal drugs trade. Despite record-setting fumigation and manual eradicationoperations, in 2006 coca cultivation in Colombia has hit a 20-year high. Crucially,the narcotics trade has been a major funding and recruitment pool for Colombianinsurgency groups, with the latter offering farmers protection from eradication andturning the local populati on against the Central Government.

The detrimental impact ofpoppy eradication is even morepronounced in Afghanistan, oneof the worlds poorestcountries. In the absence ofimmediate alternativelivelihoods and large-scaleemployment programmesparticularly for the land poor,aggressive eradicationoperations reinforce farmers

economic vulnerability andexacerbate poverty. There havebeen widespread allegations inthe rural communities that theeradication process is corruptedat many levels and that ittypically targets the poor and those located in more visible locations. Afghan crop

3 For a detailed description of chemical eradication policies in Afghanistan, see: Francisco Thoumi,Jorrit Kamminga, James MacGregor a.o., Impact Assessment of Crop Eradication in Afghanistan andLessons Learned from Latin America and South East Asia (January 2006). Available at:htt ps:/ / www.senliscouncil.net/ modules/ publications/ 009_publicati on.


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Chemical spraying wi ll leave th e already

fragile soil infertile for years after

eradication teams are either bribed by larger, resource-rich farmers or prefer toavoid this group because of fear for retaliatory attacks. The inconsistent andunequal nature of eradication policies carried out has created increasing resentmentamong the local population. In particular, international troops are currently perceivedas a purely military force, which jointly with the Afghan government, embark ontargeted forceful action against farmers and their families.

As a result of aggressive eradication operations, local confidence in the Afghangovernment and international forces is being lost. Crucially, this leaves room for theTaliban to maximise on the public disillusionment, to offer protection for opiumcultivation and, thus, effectively gain the support of rural communities.

Successful counter-narcot ics in tervent ions require notonly the necessary economic infrastructure but, more

importantly, institutions of formal governance andmechanisms of social protection. In the absence ofimmediate viable economic alternatives and with theauthority of the central government to be shrinkingvisibly in favour of anti-government forces and narco-traffickers, forced eradication proves a disastrouspolicy in the fragile Afghanistan. Aggressivechemical spraying eradication will not only poison

the land but, more importantly, poison therelationship with the Afghan people.

" A Grassroots political campaignAnother front in t he war on Afghanistan is t he war of the mind. In Afghanistans fragilesecurity and political situation, public perceptions of the conflict and of the role ofint ernational forces are pivotal t o t he eff orts to buil d last ing peace and stabili t y. I n t hecontext of the psychological warfare, how actions or inaction are perceived by theAfghan people is equally, if often not more, significant than what actually occurs onthe ground. Hence, winning the support and trust of the local population is crucial tothe British and NATO mission in Afghanistan.

I ntegral t o percept ion management, psychological operati ons (Psy-Ops) are designed t o

induce or reinforce certain attitudes and behaviours. In order to increase theireffectiveness, Psy-Ops in Afghanistan ought to target both the local population and theenemys beli efs.

Planned operations employed by the British and NATO military should seek to conveyinformation and indicators to the local population in order to garner its support andconfidence. However, the campaign in southern Afghanistan has been of suchconsiderable intensity and hindered by a lack of provision of immediate aid anddevelopment, aggressive eradication operations which destroy the livelihoods of ruralcommunities and a steady succession in civilian casualties. All these misguided policies


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have led to increasing local resentment against international forces and the AfghanGovernment.

Currently, Psy-Ops in Afghanistan are lacking the coordination, means ofcommunication and clarity necessary for a successful planned information campaign.For instance, whilst the message to be conveyed may be clear and targeted. Instead,the enemy has been employing a winning propaganda campaign, building on theinternational communitys failure to improve the lives of the Afghan people in the

south combined with a carrot ( incentives such as protection from poppyeradication) and sti ck ( threats) tactic. This has led to a situation in which theTaliban has become a legi t imate poli t ical movement in certain areas.

It is imperative that the UK and international community invest in a planned, effectiveGrassroots political campaign. There needs to be an immediate and drastic improvement

in demoralising the Taliban, and in conveying the democratic vision of Afghanistan andthe strong commitment to support and help the Afghan people and its electedGovernment.

Recurring Errors Undermine Afghan Ownership

Unbalanced military and development commitments, irrational counter-narcoticspolicies which further exacerbate poverty, a dramatic increase in civilian casualties andan inadequate public information campaign have led to increasing publicdisillusionment and severely undermine the Karzai Government. A disjointedneighbourhood policy, especially towards Pakistan, is also a challenge that must beproperly addressed.

Disillusioned Afghans are losing trust in the National or International authorities


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The remains of a truck after a Taliban ambush

High Versus Low Politi cal Risk Policies ( for Karzai government and Internationalcommunity)

High Polit ical Risk Low Polit ical RiskPredominantly military campaign to defeatthe insurgency

Matching development with securityspending

Aerial bombing campaigns Targeted counter-i nsurgency operat ionsLack of development and humanitari an aid I dent if ying and responding t o t he basic

needs of local communitiesForced crop eradicat ion Alternative li velihoods, Poppy for Medicine

project, targeted eradication once farmershave a choice between the legal and illegaleconomy

Instability and corruption within the Karzai Government are also rising, with thecountry now heading steadily for a governance crisis. Proclamations of promotingAfghan ownership of the stabilisation and development efforts have failed to realise.The vast majority of the local population in the south feels marginalised they are leftto live in the poorest and most insecure conditions. In their perceptions, the visionof the New Afghanistan i s an imposed vision.

Whilst the Central Government grows weaker and Afghan people feel disengaged fromthe efforts to build peace and prosperity, the Taliban is gaining increasing local supportand threatens t o dest roy Afghanistan once again.

In autumn 2001, the UK and the international community were presented with theopportunity to re-build the fragile Afghanistan and signal the beginning of aconstructive relationship with the Muslim world. Now the UK is presented with theopportunity to realise that promise.

As the country responsible for theestablishment of stability in the frailand hi ghly insecure Helmand provinceas well as coordinating theinternational counter-narcoticsefforts in the country, the UK canlead international efforts by

employing a coherent campaign toaddress the interacting crises ofsecurity, development and counter-narcotics. The UKs contribution toAfghanistan is unquestionable.British troops in the country areexpected to further increase inAugust 2007 in order to better tacklethe rise in insurgency. Deliberations on additional deployment to Afghanistan in 2008have also been expressed, especially in view of the possibility to pull out troops fromIraq.


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Street scene in Lashkar Gah

I I . Achieving Success: Crit ical Success Factors on Re-Balancingthe Strategy in Afghanistan

Security, development and counter-narcotics strategies remain incoherent and limitedin their capacity to impact positively on the very basic needs of the Afghan people,especially in Helmand province. The failure to demonstrably address extreme poverty,the significant imbalance between military and development efforts and the pursuit ofcounter-productive poppy eradication operations are all undermining the UKs vitalmission in the country.

To achieve its mission tobring sustainable peace andprosperity to the south and

Afghanistan as a whole, theUK must learn from itsmistakes and move awayfrom failed Bush/ Blairpolitics. It shoulddemonstrate the politicaland military flexibilitynecessary to chart a newstrategic course of policyaction. As such, it mustidentify coherent criticalsuccess factors aiming to re-balance security,development and counter-narcoti cs efforts.

A complete overhaul of counter-narcotics, aid and development infrastructure inAfghanistan is imperative.

Critical success factor: Decrease number in civilian casualties and provide a

comprehensive relief programme

Increased incidents involving civilian casualties have proved to be detrimental inwinning the support and trust of the Afghan people. The UK and especially the US and

NATO forces must adopt a policy of zero innocent casualties. Air strikes should belimited to those instances where the target is well defined and civilians will not bevictimised. The damaging impact of civilian casualties on the relations between militaryforces foreign and Afghan and the local population is much higher than having asmall number of Taliban uni ts escape by hi ding among t he people.

NATO requires a greater number of boots on the ground to avoid the civilian deaths causedby destructive aerial bombing campaigns and to effectively suppress Taliban activity.Civilian killings must end if the international forces wish to gain support from the Afghanpeople. NATO member countries contributions should be standardised in order todemonst rate a commit ment t o stabili ty i n Afghanistan.


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Another civilian casualty, one of many

The lack of a coordinated campaign to provide immediate aid relief and compensationto the war victims has further increased anti-occupation hostility. The Post Operations

Humanitarian Relief Fund by NATO-ISAF should signal the demonstrable commitment ofall troops-contributing nations in Afghanistan. Instead, at present, only four countrieshave contributed to this fund remarkably, neither the UK nor any of those nationswith extensive milit ary operati ons have contributed t o t he fund.

The UK and the internationalcommunity need to understandthat providing compensation andrelief aid is crucially important insustaining the support of thepopulation. NATO countries must

immediately contributesufficient financial support to

the Post OperationsHumanitarian Relief Fund in

order to provide medical,rehabilitation and developmentaid necessary to the villagesbombed and the familiesaffected. To win t he crucial batt lefor the hearts and minds of theAfghan people, military tactics

pursued by the international forces stationed in Afghanistan must be immediatelyrevised with the objective to limit civilian casualties, provide immediate aid relief andrespect the Afghan sensibilities, particularly during house searches.

Cri t ical success fact or: Provide immediate food aid and healthcare to HelmandspopulationThe striking disparity between military and development spending reflects the lack ofbalance and coordination among the two policies with severe implications on theoverall mission in Afghanistan. The populations legitimate grievances regarding theappalling living conditions must be immediately addressed. The current system of foodand medical aid is dysfunctional and inadequate to even address the minimum needs of

the victims of fighting, poppy eradication and drought. Immediate widespread food aidis urgently required, including essential food distribution amongst displaced personsliv ing in refugee camps.

The absence of healthcare is a decisive hurdle in winning the public support. The fewhospitals established across the southern part of the country remain in a state ofcomplete decay, lacking the resources necessary to provide even the basic care. The UKmust provide the funds and assets required to immediately improve healthcarefacilities. A key element of the effort to improve healthcare is the provision of mobilefield hospitals, especially for the emergency treatment of civilian casualties.


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Eradicate poverty and hunger instead of poppy

The United Nations Millennium Development Goals provide a clear set of objectivesfor provi ding immediate aid and accomplishing sustainable progress in Afghanist an. Theachievement of these targets is essential to ensure lasting peace and prosperity in

Afghanistan.

United Nations Millennium Development Goals4

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger2. Achieve universal primary educat ion3. Promote gender equality and empower women4. Reduce child mortality, especially under the age of five5. I mprove maternal health6. Combat HI V/ AIDS, malaria and ot her diseases7. Ensure environmental sustainability, including sustainable access to safe drinking water8. Develop a global partnership for development, including provision of access to

affordable essential drugs in developing countries

The UK must provide the essential funding and resources to help achieve theMillennium Development Goals focusing on the provision of immediate food aid andhealthcare. Balancing military expenditure and development spending is a firm firststep towards prosperity and stability in Afghanistan.

A substantial decrease in the

number of the malnourished Afghanpopulation, reducing child andmaternal mortality rates, improvingaccess to essential healthcare andmedicines as well as building thedevelopment infrastructurenecessary are all critical successfactors for the UK mission inAfghanistan.

4 A full articulation of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals is available online at:htt p:/ / www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/ goals.html


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7.3 billion

82.5 billi on

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Military Development

In

US$billions

Development versus Military spending

Who should benefit: the Taliban, orthose in need of affordable Afghan-made medicines such as cancer andHIV/AIDS patients?

Critical success factor: An effective and positive counter-narcotics policy

In the absence of substantial access to viable alternativelegal livelihoods, all poppy eradication campaigns mustimmediately cease. Forceful eradication operations,especially chemical spraying as strongly advocated by theUS, alienate rural communities and fuel instability.Furthermore, alternative livelihoods have failed to have asignificant impact because of under-prioritisation, lack offunding and of implementing bodies. Senlis Council surveyresults reveal that misguided counter-narcotics operationssuch as poppy eradication contribute to the growingpoverty crisis 80 percent of the population in southernAfghanistan is facing food insecurity.

Instead, a development-based approach which recognisesthe opium poppy as a potential economic resource forAfghanistan must be adopted. A village-based Poppy forMedicine campaign, advocating the licensed poppycultivation for medicinal purposes, maximises Afghanistans tradition of strong

local control systems and provides the necessary leverage for economicdiversification. Crucially, Poppy for Medicine would allow the central government


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Winning the hearts and minds of the local population iscritical for the international communitys success inAfghanistan

and the international community to engage positively with rural communities andhelp break the ties and dependency on the illegal drugs market and the Taliban.

The next planting season is of crucial importance, signaling the choice between thedestructive policy of chemical and ground spraying, and testing the Poppy forMedicine scheme. The UK should take the leadership on counter-narcoticsefforts and endorse the implementation of Poppy for Medicine Pilot Projects in

Helmand province for the next planting season in order to test the

controllability and economic effectiveness of this counter-narcotics initiative.Keeping to the same aggressive counter-narcotics policies will prove catastrophicfor both the Afghan Government and the UKs mission in Afghanistan. 5

Critical success factor: Engaging directly with local population to understand

their legitimate grievancesThe UK, the international community and the Afghan Government must listen andrespond to the legitimate local grievances related to the impoverishment of ruralcommunities, poppy eradication operations and civilian casualties. Accordingly,systematic consultation of British forces and the Afghan Government with localpopulation in the south and across Afghanistan should be intensified in order forpolicies to reflect the priorities and real needs of the Afghan people.

Jirgas function as a forum ofconsensus-building and lawenforcement in local communities, and

may prove particularly valuable in thefragile south. The UK must build onAfghanistans available resources andsupport these local assemblies. Givinga voice to the Afghans is a step aheadtowards achieving our securityobjectives. Another crucial element inwinning the hearts and minds of theAfghan people is a successfulinformation campaign. Psychologicaloperations pursued by the UK and

international forces must be wellcoordinated using the most efficient means of communications and clarity necessary.Public information campaigns in Afghanistan are key to winning the support and

trust of the local population.

5 For fu rther informatio n about an int egrated counter-narcot ics, counter-insurgency, anddevelopment grassroots initiative for Afghanistan, see The Senlis Council, Poppy for Medicine:Licensing poppy for t he production of essenti al medicines: an int egrated counter-narcot ics,development , and counter-i nsurgency model for Afghanistan, June 2006, [online] Available at:htt p:/ / www.senliscouncil .net/ modules/ publicatio ns/ 022_publication


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Critical success factor: Advancing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan

The ill-defined border between Helmand province and Pakistan is of particular concern

with the Taliban gaining increasing power. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan will benefitfrom a close relationship aiming to address their shared problems and achieve regionalstability.

The UK and the international community could assist both Pakistan and Afghanistan byproposing the establishment of a joint presidential committee, co-chaired by thePresidents of both countries, with the sole purpose of working together constructivelyand persistently on joint problem solving. Such a joint presidential committee couldbe facilitated by a neutral third party in the short term that has the trust of bothpresidents. For example, General David Richards, Former Commander of NATO-I SAF, i sintimately familiar with the challenges facing both countries, particularly from asecurity point of view, and has the respect and trust of both Presidents.

The remains of a suicide bomber in Lashkar Gah.


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Conclusion

Charting a New Strategic Course in AfghanistanAround 7,000 British troops now stationed in Helmand province are engaged indaily fighting against the Taliban, in the heaviest military engagement since WorldWar II and the war in Korea. So far, the British forces in Afghanistan haveregrettably suffered 60 fatal casualties.

But the commendable job of the British military in southern Afghanistan is severelycompromised by an incoherent mission characterised by unbalanced and ineffectiveBush/ Blair poli cies in t he areas of development and counter-narcot ics.Notwithstanding deliberations on the importance of linking stabilisation and

development efforts, a list of unremitting problems continue to put the UKoperations at grave risk lack of development and aid infrastructure, a steadysuccession of civilian casualties, destructive counter-narcotics policies such asforceful crop eradication, and entrenched corruption. Crucially, the UK is nowprogressively losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.

The Taliban are gaining increasing control over the south whilst violence is nowspreading geographically to the north and west of the country. Local resentmenttowards the Karzai Government and anti-occupation hostility are rapidly rising. TheUK cannot risk Afghanistan becoming once again a sanctuary for terrorists.Afghanistan needs to be stabilised. For this, a clear targeted mission which

encompasses effective development and a positive counter-narcotics strategy mustbe immediately art iculated.

The UK mission is at a crossroads. A clear articulation of the UKs strategicobjectives in Afghanistan and the path to achieving these goals is urgentlyrequired. Success in Afghanistan will not be achieved by military means alone.Unless immediate action is employed to respond to Afghanistans interacting crisesof insecurity, poverty and narcotics, the UK efforts in the country are bound to failand Afghanistan will be lost.


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Appendix 1: Transcripts of Senlis Film interviews

1. I nterview wit h Bibi Shakkira

Since the drought has started four years ago, we have been travelling around

But recently we moved to this camp because our village was bombed.

There are so many things that I need, I dont have any shelter, I dont haveanything to feed to my children.

It has been five years since my husband died and since then I have never

tasted meat again.

What you I tell you, what should I complain about to you?Anything that you can provide would be appreciated


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2. A burned gir l

Bost Hospital, Lashkar Gah24 January 2007

An eight year old girl was admitted to the hospitals paediatric ward

The only pain-killer available in this hospital is Paracetamol. The patients dont haveaccess to essential pain medicines such as codeine and morphine

I n rich countries, the extreme pain caused by burns is properly managed wit hmorphine as this is the only effective treatment

The soft tissues of her nose and throat were slowly swelling in response to the burns.The standard procedure in this case would be to place a tube down the throat in thewindpipe before the swelling closes the airway. Such a procedure requires sedation sothat the patient does not have a choking sensation and therefore struggle against thetube

Such a procedure is carried out by paramedics, emergency physicians and

anaesthesiologists many times a day around the world. But neither the tubes nor thesedation are available in either Kandahar or Lashkar Gah hospitals

The little girl died later that night. She died a horrible slow death of asphyxiation.While her breathing became more and more difficult her pain stayed the same,unbearable

The pain was avoidable as was her suffocating death. Yet the total cost of providingsufficient pain-killers and a breathing tube, to safe her life, would have been just, $40,-


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3. Refugee Camps as a recruitment area for Taliban

We escaped from the bombing and fighting in Sangin

I have lost six members of my family

Those of us remaining cant go back and we cant stay here either because we

havent had help from anyone at all.

We havent received anything, not even a tent.

The government and others should come here and see our houses, talk to usand see how we live.


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4. The result s of Crop Eradicat ion

When they came with their tractors yesterday, I told them to run over me too

because I cant afford to feed my family anymore.

I wonder what choice the government gives us now that they have eradicatedour fields.

Are they supposed to just come here and destroy everything?Do you see my hands; I have worked hard all my life.

It were the foreigners who did the eradication but I dont know from wherethey came.

When they came, they pushed us away and they didnt let us come near

Some Afghans eradicated when the foreigners commanded them

We have spent all our money on our crops and worked with no help fromanyone and now its all gone.

What are we supposed to do now?

Look at my heads, I have worked hard all my life!


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5. Charsoo Labour Market

What is your name?Qazi Mohammad

What is your age?I am 42 years old

How much money do you earn per day?I can earn around 400 Afghanis per day

How many days do you work per month?Over the last 40 days, I have only worked 18. The rest of the time there was no

work at all

I am always anxious about feeding my family, I worry all the time.

When there is no work I SHOULD be worried

Do you support Karzais government?Yes, why not. When the Taliban were in power we supported them and right nowwe are supporting this government. We are worried about feeding our familiesand finding work. We dont have time to worry about the government or theTaliban. We only care about our families, our children are dying of hunger.

Who will win the war between the government and the Taliban?God knows, we dont know who will win the war. We are not interested in politicsWe are just poor people minding our own business


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Appendix 2. NATO-I SAF Attacks result ing in Civil ian Casualt ies,2007

Date Place Description CivilianDeaths

Jan 10 Paktika,Urgun Dist rict

NATO-led troops shot and killed an Afghanemployed at one of their bases after heapproached a military vehicle at high speed anddid not heed warnings to stop, the force said.

1

Jan 12 Kandahar Police reports that 16 civilians and 13 rebels werekilled in a NATO air strike again Talibanheadquarters. NATO says no civi l ians were ki ll ed.

16

Feb 14 Helmand,Musa QalaDistrict

Residents say dozens of civilians, including womenand children, were killed in an air strike by NATOforces; NATO denies any civilian casualties.

18

Feb 16 Helmand,SanginDistrict

Local reported the death of four civilians in an airstrike. NATO denies any civilian death.

0-4

Feb 17 KandaharCity, militaryairfield

NATO-led troops shot to death an Afghan man ashe ran between the vehicles of a military convoy.

1

Feb 17 Kandahar,12km west ofthe city

NATO-led forces in southern Afghanistan admit tedthey had shot to death an Afghan civi lian t heymistook for a suicide bomber.

1

Feb 27 Kandahar A civilian driver was gunned down as heapproached a broken-down Canadian armouredvehicle.

1

March 4 Nangarhar American marines opened f ire in a panicindi scriminately f ollowing a suicide bomb att ackon their convoy

16

March 4 Kapisa Mili tants f i red on a NATO base just north of Kabul.A fighter aircraft returning fire hit a civilian home,kil li ng six adults and four chil dren.

10

March 5 Kandahar The driver of a car following an ISAF convoy wasshot by anxious soldiers.

1

March 10 Chinar Three youngsters were killed by an ISAF air strike. 3

March 14 Kandahar NATO forces fired at a truck that came too close totheir convoy and killed the driver.

1

April 17 Kabul A U.S.-led coalition convoy hit and killed a boy in 1


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Kabul.

April 28 Heart,

Zerkoh Valley

Aerial bombing of a valley by the American

mil it ary kil led at least 42 civil ians. Later enquiriesbrought the figure to 49 or 51 deaths.

50

May 10

(count upto May 8)

Afghanistan According to an Associated Press tally based onreports from Afghan and Western officials, 238civilians had been killed by violence in 2007 at thatpoint, including at least 102 blamed on NATO or theU.S.-led coalit ion ( The Senlis Council count up tothis point is: 124)

-

May 8 Helmand,Sangin

District

Air strikes called in by U.S. Special Forces killed atleast 21 civilians.

21

May 27 Helmand,Nahri SarrajDistrict

During counter-insurgency operations in thedistrict air support was called upon; it is reportedthat four villagers were killed and others injuredby the air stri ke; no further details.

4

June 3 Khost, MatunDistrict

A young girl has died of a bullet wound sustainedwhen CF opened fired on a suspicious vehiclewhich failed to stop when ordered to do so.

1

June 7 Wardak,SayedabadDistrict

A CF vehicle was involved in a traffic accident witha civilian vehicle traveling in the oppositedirection; three civilians were killed and severalothers were seriously injured; The injured weretransferred to the hospital at the Bagram Air-base.

3

June 11 Kunar, PechDist

In the late afternoon soldiers manning a CF checkpoint opened fire on a civili an motor vehiclewhich fai led to obey directi ons given; as a resultthree youths were killed and three others wereinjured.

3

June 13 Kunar

province

ISAF soldiers opened fire on a vehicle that tried to

run a roadblock.

3

June 14 Kabul City A youth pushing a hand cart stepped out into theroad in front of a CF convoy; The youth wasknocked down and injured. He died later of hisinjuries; The situation was reported calm andunder control.

1

June 16 Kabul City A suicide/ VBIED att ack on a mil i tary convoy in thewestern part of the city, media reports that sixcivilians were killed and eleven injured; one ISAFsoldier reported killed and another injured; as the

1


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convoy recommenced its journey it is believed thatan ISAF member opened fire on a group ofcivilians who had gathered at the scene; onecivil ian kil led and t hree others injured.

June 17 Paktika,ZarghunDistrict

Media reports that NATO forces announced thatduring the evening an operation was mountedagainst suspected Al Qaeda terrorists who werehidi ng in a reli gious t raini ng establishmentadjacent to a Mosque; air strikes were called in tooust the group; NATO regrets to announce that anumber of children were killed in the attack aswere an undisclosed number of insurgents.

?

June 18 Zarghun Shahdistrict,Paktikaprovince

A U.S.-led coalition airstrike, targeting suspectedal-Qaida mil i tants, was launched on a compoundthat also contained a mosque and a madrassa.

7

June 18 Uruzgan,Chora District

A dispute is reported to have arisen betweenvil lage elders and Taliban forces in t he dist rict ; asa result the Taliban were told to leave the area;thereaft er a fi re-fi ght ensued which left aroundsixteen v il lagers dead; police responded whichresulted in four policemen being killed also; ISAFresponded and a number of ai r-strikes on t he

Taliban posi t ions were made; signif icant numberof Taliban said to have been killed; however, asthe Taliban were taking shelter in amongst thevillagers it is also reported that a large number ofcivilians were killed and injured; The number ofcasualt ies was not confi rmed.

?

June 22 Helmand,Nahr-e-SarajDistrict

Some 25 civi lians have died during aerial bombingby foreign forces in the southern Afghan provinceof Helmand, local residents and senior police say.

25

June 24 Uruzgan and

elsewhere

President Karzai claims that in the past week at

least 90 civilians were killed, 52 in Chora Districtin Uruzgan.

over 52

TOTAL CASUALTI ES AS OF JUNE 24, 2007 At least245


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Appendix 3. Taliban Attacks result ing in Civilian Casualt ies, 2007

Date Place Description CivilianDeaths

Jan 7 Khost A bomb planted on the side of a road killednewborn twins, their mother and grandmother.

4

Jan 7 Helmand,ChanjirDistrict

Armed men killed a school principal. 1

Jan 23 Khost A suicide bomber killed himself outside a U.S.

military base, killing 10 people and wounding 14others, said Jamal Arsalah, the province governor.

10

Jan 24 Kandahar City In the aftermath of an attack on a policecheckpoint, angry policemen accusing residents ofhelping the Taliban opened fire, eventually killinga civilian bystander.

1

Feb 16 Helmand,GreshkDistrict

Residents of the Mirmandi area reported that theTaliban had executed five people on charges ofspying for foreigners.

5

Feb 17 Helmand,

Sangin &Greshk

The Taliban claimed to have hanged two Afghans

they accused of cooperating with foreigners.

2

Feb 27 Bagram,North ofKaboul

A suicide bomb attack later said to have targetedD. Cheney made 23 deaths at Bagram base.

23

Feb 28 Helmand An Afghan doctor was kidnapped and shot byTaliban fighters.

1

March 1 Farah A road side bomb targeting passing police vehicleexploded.

3

March 14 Khost A suicide attack aimed at a police vehicle killed sixcivilians, among them a mullah.

6

March 14 Kaboul A blast in an ammunit ion shop kill s 6 civi lians. 6

March 17 Kandahar A Taliban Attack on a NATO Military Convoy kills achild.

1

March 19 Helmand The driver of kidnapped Italian journalist DanieleMastrogiacomo was beheaded by the kidnappers.

1

March 24 Lashkargah A female government employee accused of spying 1


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Helmand was kidnapped and kill ed by the Taliban.

March 28 Kabul A Taliban suicide bomber on a motorcycle

detonated a blast near the car of a senior Afghanint ell igence offi cial.

4

April 1 Mihtarlam inLaghman

A suici de bomber kil led himself near an Afghanarmy convoy (3 children killed).

5

April 1 Musa QalaHelmand

Taliban militants hanged three men yesterday afteraccusing them of spying for British troops.

3

April 5 Khost Taliban rebels shot dead an Afghan interpreter. 1

April 6 Kabul A suicide bomb car exploded near the parliament. 5

April 8 Unknown Ajmal Naqshbandi was beheaded by the Taliban

after the Afghan government refused to freeseveral insurgents, although it swapped five twoweeks before for the Italian reporter he wasworking for.

1

April 15 Gorboz(Khost)

A school headmaster was shot by the Taliban. 1

April 16 Khost A suicide bomber killed himself next to severalAfghan border pol icemen.

1

April 16 Kandahar A suicide bomber targeted a private US securityfi rm in southern Afghanistan yesterday, kil li ng upto four Afghans working for the company.

4

April 17 Herat A bomb attack killed four pupils and injured fourothers in a school.

4

April 17 Khost Taliban militants shot dead the headmaster of agirl s' school.

1

April 22 Khost A suicide bomber killed himself. 6

April 22 Mehtar Lam(Laghmaneasternprovince)

Bomb attack on intelligence service officers killsthe driver.

1

April 23 Khost A suici de bomber kil led himself whil e chased bypolice, metres away from a previous explosion.

3

April 27 Ghazni,

Giro district

The district mayor and four policemen were killedin a battle against Taliban fighters.

1

April 27 Khost A policeman and one of his relatives were killed bygunfire.

1

May 2 Kabul Abdul Saboor Farid, a Parliament Member and 1


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former Prime Minister has been assassinated.

May 7 Kabul A rocket att ack in t he Pul-e-Padsha area kil led one

civilian and wounded five others.

1

May 10

(count upto May 8)

Afghanistan According to an Associated Press tally based onreports from Afghan and Western officials, 238civilians had been killed by violence in 2007 atthat point of which about 136 by the Taliban orfighting with the Taliban.

-

May 10 Paktika,BarmalDistrict

A suicide bomber failing to reach a US basedetonated himself.

3

May 20 Paktia, Gardez A suici de bomber walked into a crowded and kil ledhimself, missing a military convoy.

14

May 22 Herat,ShindandDistrict

The decapitated body of a local national who wasemployed by the Coalition Forces was discovered;beside the body was a note which warned othersthey could expect the same fate if they too are inthis form of employment.

1

May 23 Faryab,Maimana Cit y

During t he course of t he morning an ISAF/ PRT uni twas on patrol a short distance from their basewhen they were subjected to an RCIED strike; onesoldier is reported killed and two others injured;one civi lian was also kil led and another personinjured; no further details.

1

May 26 Uruzgan,Chora District

Insurgents hanged a local civilian whom theyaccused of passing information to the securityforces.

1

May 26 Gazni, AndarDistrict

During the course of the morning a group ofchildren discovered an IED on a track near thevil lage; the device exploded when they wereexamini ng it ; fi ve children were kil led and others

were seriously injured.

5

May 24 Kapisa,KohbandDistrict

Late in the evening unidentified armed men shotand killed a woman; the woman is said to havebeen an Iranian national married to a local man;motive for the killing is not known.

1

May 26 Kandahar,Dand District

A civili an was shot and ki lled by unidenti fi edgunmen; no further details.

1

May 26 Nangarhar An unidenti fi ed group of gunman shot and killedtwo local civi li ans (male and female); mot ive

2


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unknown.

May 28 Bamyan,

BamyanDistrict

Three children were killed when a UXO with which

they were playing, detonated; a fourth child wasinjured.

3

May 28 Heratt, HeratCity

A teacher was shot and killed by gunmen riding amotor cycle.

1

May 28 Kunduz,Kunduz City

Early this morning a three-vehicle convoybelonging to a US private security organizationwas targeted by a pedestrian suicide bomber whowas wearing an explosives-rigged garment;bomber threw himself at the second vehicle;bomber was killed as were two civilian passers-by;

some damage to one vehicle; at least one othercivil ian believed to be inj ured; no further details.

2

May 30 Helmand,Nahri SarrajDistict

During the late afternoon a vehicle belonging to aprivate security company providing security forroad construction in the area was subjected to anIED strike; the casualties were transferred to asecond vehicle which shortly afterwards wassimilarly targeted by a second device; in all, twosecurity staff killed and three injured.

2

May 31 Balkh,Dihdadi

District

In the early evening an anti-tank mine exploded

in close proximity to a local school killing twoschool-boys and injuring others.

2

May 31 Kunar,SirkanayDistrict

Late in t he evening fi ve missi les (t ype unknown)were fi red towards the district HQ; one missi lestruck a residential dwelling which resulted in twofemales being killed and five other family membersbeing i njured, some cri ti cally.

2

June 1 Paktika,SharanDistrict

A local man who had previously been employed asprovincial coordinator during the presidenti alelections in 2004, was shot and killed.

1

June 1 Kunar,ChawkayDistrict

A combined ISAF/ ANSF base was subjected to arocket attack; one civilian was killed and twoothers were inj ured.

1

June 1 Kabul City During the night a female television newspresenter was shot and killed at her residence; onesuspect has been arrested.

1

June 2 Paktya,ZurmatDistrict

A school teacher was shot and killed byunidentified gunmen.

1


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June 2 Gazni,Qarabagh

District

In the early hours of the morning suspected anti-government elements attacked the residence of

serving police officer; the officer was not at homebut five members of his family were killed; policeresponded and it is reported that they killed ten ofthe attackers.

5

June 3 Khost, SabariDistrict

During the course of the morning two childrendied when an IED exploded near where they wereplaying.

2

June 3 Nangarhar,Kama District

During t he course of t he morning uni dent if iedgunmen shot dead a male villager; motive notknown.

1

June 3 Wardak,SaydabadDistrict

Policeman opened fire on a taxi when the driverfailed to obey his instruction to stop; it isunderstood that the policeman thereafterabsconded.

1

June 4 Helmand,

Nahri SarrajDistrict

Three children died as a result of playing with aUXO which exploded when they were playing withi t .

3

June 6 Parwan,JabulsarajDistrict

In the early hours of the morning unidentifiedgunmen forced their way into the home of afemale journalist and media personality, and shother dead in front of her children.

1

June 9 Kabul City A child who was out collecting scrap metal waskilled when a hand grenade exploded.

1

June 9 Logar, PuliAlam District

Late in t he evening t he house of a serving memberof the national security agency was attacked byunidenti fi ed gunmen; one of the offi cers malerelatives was killed and his daughter injured.

1

June 7 Kunar,Asadabad

District

During the course of the afternoon four missileswere fired in the general direction of the PRT

base; two of them struck civilian residences; fivecivilians injured.

5

June 7 Nangarhar,ChaparharDistrict

In the early hours of the morning a hand grenadewas thrown at a private dwelli ng; one inhabit antkil led and one injured.

1

June 8 Kunar, ChapaDara District

A female villager was murdered by unidentifiedgunmen in the early hours of the morning; moti venot known.

1

June 10 Pat ika, Sar Around midnight the residence of a tribal elder 1


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Hawza Distri ct was attacked and the elder was killed; thedeceaseds son was abducted; the dead man is saidto have been a staunch government supporter.

June 11 Ghazni,Qarabagh Dist

During the course of the afternoon a farmer on atractor activated an anti-tank mine resulting inthe death of t he farmer.

1

June 11 Badakhshan,Shuhada Dist

During the night a local member of an Afghan aidgroup was murdered at his residence byunidentified gunmen.

1

June 11 Zabul, QalatDist

A local person was hanged by insurgents forallegedly passing information to the securityforces.

1

June 11 Paktika,Barmal

In the early evening a number of rockets impactedon/ amongst civi li an housing adjacent t o a CFbase; three children were killed and a woman wasinjured.

3

June 12 Logar,MihtarlamDistrict

Around noon today two gunmen on motor cyclesopened fire on a group of school girls; six girlsreported to have been killed and at least threeothers injured; motive unknown; attackersabsconded on foot after abandoning their motorcycles.

6

June 13 BadghisGurmachDistrict

During the night a serving member of the BorderPolice and his father were shot dead at their homeby unidenti fi ed gunmen.

1

June 13 Paktika,Tarwe Dist rict

During the early evening an engineer (no details)working for a construction company was shot andkilled by suspected anti-government elements;motive not confirmed.

1

June 14 Farah, BalaBuluk District

During the course of the morning a vehiclebelonging to a local vehicle repair company was

ambushed on t he main Herat/ Kandahar highway;two persons were killed; no further details.

2

June 14 Farah, BalaBuluk District

Two bodies were located thought to be those oftwo local drivers who were abducted recent ly;insurgents suspected them of assisting thesecurity forces in some way.

2

June 15 Tirin Kot,Uruzganprovince

A suicide car bomber targeted a NATO convoy. 9


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June 15 Kabul A suicide bomber killed over 35 people, thirteen ofwhich were civilians, in Kabuls busiest

intersection.

13

June 15 Kandahar City A suicide bomber wearing a garment rigged withexplosives detonated his device near a CF convoy;one civil ian kil led, one civi lian i njured; bomberkilled.

1

June 15 Kandahar,PanjwayiDistrict

During the course of the morning a police vehiclewas subjected to an RCIED strike; five policemeninjured; vehicle extensively damaged.

1

June 16 Kabul, KabulCity

A suicide/ VBIED att ack on a mil i tary convoy in thewestern part of the city, media reports that six

civilians were killed and eleven injured; one ISAFsoldier reported killed and another injured; as theconvoy recommenced its journey it is believed thatan ISAF member opened fire on a group ofcivilians who had gathered at the scene; onecivil ian kil led and t hree others injured.

6

June 16 Herat,ShindandDistrict

In the late afternoon a Border Police checkpointwas att acked by insurgents (40/ 50); t hose kil ledincluded two BP, two Customs guards, twocivilians and six insurgents; one policeman, one

Customs guard and three civilians were injured;reinforcements were deployed.

2

June 17 Balkh, MazarCity

With reference to yesterdays report of a VBIEDatt ack near the Blue Mosque in District 2 of thecity, media reports that the attack was carried outby a bomber on a motor cycle who was targetingan ISAF convoy; appears that one civi li an waskil led and several others were inj ured; thebomber was also killed.

1

June 18 Uruzgan,

Chora District

A dispute is reported to have arisen between

vil lage elders and Taliban forces in t he dist rict ; asa result the Taliban were told to leave the area;thereaft er a fi re-fi ght ensued which left aroundsixteen v il lagers dead; police responded whichresulted in four policemen being killed also; ISAFresponded and a number of ai r-strikes on t heTaliban positions were made; significant numberof Taliban said to have been killed; however, asthe Taliban were taking shelter in amongst thevillagers it is also reported that a large number of

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civi lians were kil led and injured; numbers ofcasualties to be confirmed.

June 20 HelmandProvince,SanginDistrict(HyderababArea)

A convoy of seven civilian haulage vehicles whichwere transporting building materials for thesecurit y forces were stopped by Tali ban; the sevendrivers were shot dead; vehicles set on fire.

7

June 23 Zabul, SuriDistrict(Kateri MandaArea)

During the course of the morning a mini-bustransporting around 20 civilian passengersact ivated an ant i- tank mine; all the occupantswere killed or injured.

10

TOTAL CASUALTI ES AS OF June 18, 2007 At least244

Taliban Politics and Afghan Legitimate Grievances (Senilis Council document)

Documents

Transcript of Taliban Politics and Afghan Legitimate Grievances (Senilis Council document)