Taking Turns or Not? Children’s Approach to Limited Resource Problemsin Three Different Cultures

Henriette Zeidler and Esther HerrmannMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

Daniel B. M. HaunMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropologyand Leipzig University and Max Planck Institute for

Psycholinguistics

Michael TomaselloMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

Some problems of resource distribution can be solved on equal terms only by taking turns. We presented sucha problem to 168 pairs of 5- to 10-year-old children from one Western and two non-Western societies (Ger-man, Samburu, Kikuyu). Almost all German pairs solved the problem by taking turns immediately, resultingin an equal distribution of resources throughout the game. In the other groups, one child usually monopolizedthe resource in Trial 1 and sometimes let the partner monopolize it in Trial 2, resulting in an equal distribu-tion in only half the dyads. These results suggest that turn-taking is not a natural strategy uniformly acrosshuman cultures, but rather that different cultures use it to different degrees and in different contexts.

School-age children have a strong bias toward dis-tributing resources equally. For example, in studieswith children from Western industrialized popula-tions, Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008) foundthat children from the age of 7 or 8 years prefer toshare a windfall resource between themselves andanother child equally, and other researchers foundthat 8-year-old children will even sacrifice ordestroy resources to make sure that there is anequal division (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw &Olson, 2012). In a large cross-cultural study involv-ing both Western and non-Western children,however, House et al. (2013) found that after about

8 or 9 years of age differences emerged that werealigned with the social norms of the respectivecultures. How children distribute resources thusseems to be influenced—at least by 8 or 9 years—by their social and cultural environments (e.g.,Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007).

An interesting situation arises when childrenare confronted with a resource that is not spatiallydivisible, and can be accessed by only one personat a time. A natural solution to the adult Westernmind in such situations is for the interested partiesto take turns on an equal basis. However, it ispossible that this is a solution that has beeninvented in some cultures by adults, and childrenlearn it as a social norm. There are two experi-mental paradigms that have been widely used forstudying dyadic interactions of children in suchcontexts. First are studies of children’s conflictswith peers over access to a toy. In these studies,typically, one child monopolizes a toy but thenyields to another after some time (with or withoutencouragement; e.g., Hay & Ross, 1982; Putallaz &Sheppard, 1990; see also Green & Rechis, 2006, for

Esther Herrmann, Daniel B. M. Haun, and Michael Tomasellocontributed equally to this article.

We thank the District Education Offices of Laikipia Centraland Samburu and the local Kenyan and German schools for sup-porting our research, Colleen Stephens for statistical advice, andElena Rossi, Melissa Cherouny, and Monique Horstmann forhelp with data collection and coding. Many thanks also to ourreviewers, whose thoughtful suggestions have been of great helpthroughout the revision process. And last but definitely not least,special thanks to all the children who participated in our studiesand to our Kenyan friends and assistants who made this workpossible. Funding for this research was provided by the MaxPlanck Society and the Jacobs Foundation.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed toHenriette Zeidler, Department of Developmental and Compara-tive Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthro-pology, Deutscher Platz 6, D-04103, Leipzig, Germany. Electronicmail may be sent to zeidler@eva.mpg.de.

© 2016 The AuthorsChild Development © 2016 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2016/8703-0005DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12505

Child Development, May/June 2016, Volume 87, Number 3, Pages 677–688

a review). This paradigm has also been usedcross-culturally and significant differences in howchildren negotiate access have been found(Sparkes, 1991). But although letting someone elseuse the toy may in some sense be thought of asturn-taking, it is unclear if the children are aimingfor an equal distribution—or else just yieldingwhen either they are forced to or when they havetired of playing with the toy. The secondparadigm is represented by a series of studies byMadsen (1971) and others (e.g., Madsen & Lancy,1981; Madsen & Yi, 1975; Shapira, 1976). Here, theparadigm is an apparatus in which either of twochildren (on opposite sides) can pull in resourcesfor themselves. The trick is that if they both pullat the same time no one gets anything. Across sev-eral different cultures children in this situationcome to use a turn-taking strategy. But here theturn-taking strategy is almost forced as there isthe risk of complete failure for both if they do notwork out some cooperative arrangement.

In the current study, therefore, we wanted toassess children’s preference for a turn-taking strat-egy in a situation in which it was clear from thebeginning that the resource could be accessed mul-tiple times and that one individual could poten-tially monopolize it for the entire game. In contrastto previous work, we created a situation in whichthe pair was able to keep track of the distribution,allowing them to adjust their strategy throughoutthe game. We tested same-age, same-sex peer dyadsof 5- to 10-year-old children in a limited resourceproblem in which turn-taking would seem to be anobvious strategy for achieving equality. Specifically,children played a fishing game in which they couldretrieve rewards with a single hook, such that onechild could dominate it totally across time or theycould take turns using the hook (either within oracross trials). However, since immediate balancingseems more important for individuals who typicallyengage in ephemeral interactions with anonymousothers (Henrich et al., 2010), turn-taking might be astrategy that is unique to large-scale, Western soci-eties. Children growing up in small, non-Westerncommunities surrounded by kin might take acompletely different approach.

In addition to our sample from a Western indus-trialized society (Germany), we thus tested Sam-buru children from Northern Kenya, who grow upin traditional, extended families in a remote part ofthe country. To reduce the likelihood of our resultsbeing due to a specific aspect of Samburu culture,we also tested children from another, very differentKenyan group, the Kikuyu. Children from both

groups came from small, rural communities, inwhich neighbors are typically family members (seeSupporting Information for a description of theethnographic backgrounds).

We also ran two follow-up studies to determinewhether children would judge that taking turnswas the “right thing to do” for third parties inter-acting in similar situations, and whether theywould be more likely to take turns if others werewatching or subsequently choosing them as part-ners (and so there were potentially reputationalbenefits to cooperation).

Study 1

Method

Participants

A total of 218 children from Kenya (100 Samburuand 118 Kikuyu) and 118 children from Germanywere included in Study 1. All participants werebetween 5 and 10 years old. We did not record ageto the level of months since this is not reliablyknown for most children in the two Kenyan com-munities. To account for the lack of more accurateinformation, we also used a wider age window forpairing our German dyads, so the age differencebetween partners varied between 0 and 364 days.Even though we made sure not to pair siblings, it ispossible that some of the Kenyan children whoplayed together were as closely related as cousins—which would have very rarely been the case in ourGerman dyads. In Germany, we tested 60 girls(Mage = 7.5) and 58 boys (Mage = 7.0). Another 2German 9-year-old boys were tested but excludedbecause they had not followed the game rulesduring the test. Among the Kikuyu, 46 girls(Mage = 7.0) and 72 boys (Mage = 8.0) participatedin our study, and in Samburu, we tested 48 girls(Mage = 7.5) and 52 boys (Mage = 7.5). Another 4Samburu girls (2 aged 6, and 2 aged 10 years) weretested but excluded because they had not followedthe game rules during the test. German childrencame from middle-class families in a medium-sizedtown in the eastern part of the country. Samburuchildren came from several small homesteads about1 hr from Wamba, the nearest town, and Kikuyuchildren lived in small villages near the Kenyantown of Nanyuki. Children who were in therequired age range were randomly chosen from theclass lists and asked to join the experimenters for agame after school. Participation was fully voluntary,and children were usually eager to play.

678 Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, and Tomasello

Materials

The setup consisted of two long plexiglass tubeswith small plastic containers inside and a short,empty plexiglass tube (two during training). Onelong tube was filled with 10 blue containers, andthe other one with 10 red containers (see Figure 1).Each of the containers had a small bead inside,which could be used to make a bracelet. In order toobtain the beads, children had to fish the containersfrom the long tubes and place them in the shortone using a hook. The short tube held a maximumof eight containers, thus limiting the number ofbeads to be obtained in each game. For training,each of the children was given their own hook anda separate short tube, which were replaced by a sin-gle hook and one short tube during the actual test.

Procedure

Data collection for all studies took place betweenOctober 2012 and September 2014. Instructions forall children were videotaped and played back usinga laptop computer. In Kenya, all instructions weretranslated from English to the local language bynative Kikuyu or Samburu speakers. Back transla-tions were obtained in order to ensure correctness

before recording the instructions. In Germany,instructions were written and recorded by a nativeGerman speaker. All studies took place in a sepa-rate room of the local school which the participantsattended. Sessions were videotaped and tookbetween 20 and 30 min.

Children were randomly paired into same-age,same-sex dyads, and then went through the follow-ing three steps.

Video instructions. Each session started with avideo introducing the participants to the game. Thevideo showed the training setup with two childrenfishing several containers and placing them in theirrespective short tubes. At the end of the game, thecontainers were emptied by the experimenter andeach child was given the rewards inside. A narratorexplained the game in the local language andemphasized that the children would only be able tokeep the rewards that they had placed inside theshort tube. The child assigned to the blue sidecould keep the rewards inside the blue containers,and the child on the red side would be able to keepthe rewards inside the red containers placed in theshort tube.

Training. After watching the instruction video,children simultaneously played the first round ofthe game with the experimenter present. Once bothchildren had filled their short tubes with eight con-tainers each, the experimenter reminded them thatthe game was now over and emptied the fishedcontainers. Each child was given the eight beads heor she had fished and asked to string them into abracelet. The experimenter then refilled the contain-ers and put them back into the long tubes. Aftertelling the children that they could play anotherround, the experimenter left the room and waitedoutside until the short tubes had been filled again.As before, the fished containers were later emptiedand each child got to keep the eight beads that heor she had fished. The complete training sessionlasted between 20 and 30 min.

Test phase. While the children were stringingtheir beads, the experimenter removed the twohooks and both of the short tubes, one of whichwas later returned to the game. She then refilledthe containers with beads, placed them back in thetwo long tubes, and placed a short tube at equidis-tance from the children’s long tubes. After bothchildren had finished stringing their beads, theexperimenter then told them that they could nowplay again. When the children were standing nextto their long tubes, the experimenter placed a singlehook between the children, told them to start, andleft the room. Once the children had fished a totalFigure 1. Experimental setup (Study 1).

Taking Turns or Not 679

of eight containers, the experimenter re-entered theroom, emptied the containers, and asked the chil-dren to string their beads. If the children hadagreed to take turns fishing, each of them wouldadd a certain number of beads to their bracelets. Ifone child had monopolized the hook throughoutthe game, the other child would remain withoutadditional beads. After again refilling the emptycontainers and long tubes, the children wereinformed that they could now play one last roundof the game. The experimenter then again placedthe hook between the two children, told them tostart, and left the room. After the short tube hadbeen filled, the fished containers were emptied oncemore. The children got to string their additionalbeads, and the experimenter then closed the brace-lets for them, ending the game.

Coding

The number of rewards obtained by each childwas recorded at the end of each test round.Inequality was measured as the absolute differencebetween the numbers of rewards each child hadobtained. Since there was a total of eight rewardsavailable per trial, inequality ranged from 0 to 8within trials, and from 0 to 16 across trials.

Behaviors were later coded from video materialusing Interact software. Initial actions (ways of firstobtaining the hook at the beginning of each trial)were coded as seizes, grabs, or takes. If there was atug-of-war over the hook, with both children strug-gling to keep it, the action was coded as seizes,indicating that the user had obtained possession ofthe hook by force. If both children reached for thehook but the faster child got to use it withoutphysical interference, the action was coded as grabs,with speed deciding the first use of the hook. Andif only one child reached for the hook and got touse it without her partner’s interference, the actionwas coded as takes, suggesting that there was anagreement over the use of the hook. Turn-takingwithin trials was coded either with hands over (usergives up hook without being physically forced) orloses (nonuser forces hook out of user’s hand). Inaddition, we coded for protest (both verbal andnonverbal) at the beginning of the second trial.Reliability was obtained by having an independentobserver code 20% of the video material. Intercoderreliability across categories was very good (Ken-dall’s tau-b coefficient = .899, p < .001). Due to cor-rupted video files, we were not able to obtainbehavioral measures for three German dyads (two7-year-old and four 10-year-old boys), who were

thus excluded from all analyses involving behav-ioral data.

Results

Our main questions in Study 1 were whetherculture, age, or their interaction would have aneffect on children’s turn-taking behavior and anequal distribution of resources. In order to addressthese questions, we analyzed the data using gener-alized linear models (GLMs) with Poisson errorstructure and log link function (turn-taking) orbinomial error structure and logit link function (re-source distribution). Gender was included as a con-trol variable in all models. To account for multipletesting, overall significance of all test variables wasestablished by comparing the full model to that of areduced model only comprising gender. All modelswere fitted in R (version 3.0.2; R Core Team 2013)using the function glm. Assumptions were vali-dated and met in each case (see SupportingInformation for details).

Turn-Taking

Our main question was whether turn-taking as away of sharing access to resources within trials wascommon across cultures, and whether it had beeninitiated by agreement or force. The number ofdyads who took turns within trials differed signifi-cantly between cultures (Pearson’s chi-square test:v2 = 60.95, df = 2, p < .001). Subsequent pairwisecomparisons revealed that German children tookturns significantly more often than Samburu orKikuyu (Fisher’s exact test: p < .001 in each case),whereas the number of turn-taking dyads did notdiffer significantly between the two Kenyan com-munities (Fisher’s exact test: p = .093).

Due to the vast differences in the total numberof turns and the low frequency of forced turnswithin trials (Germans: 0%, Kikuyu: 6%, Samburu:21% of all turns) we were not able to compare theproportion of forced versus agreed turns betweenthe three cultures. Subsequent analyses thereforefocused on agreed turns. In order to investigate theeffects of culture, age, or their interaction on the fre-quency of agreed turns in each trial, we analyzedthe data using GLMs with Poisson error structure.Overall the full models for Trials 1 and 2 werehighly significant as compared to the null modelscontaining only gender (likelihood ratio tests: Trial1: v2 = 359.28, df = 5, p < .001; Trial 2: v2 = 286.93,df = 5, p < .001). We found an interaction betweenculture and age, which had an effect on the

680 Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, and Tomasello

frequency of agreed turns in both trials (likelihoodratio tests comparing full and reduced models: Trial1: v2 = 5.94, df = 2, p = .051; Trial 2: v2 = 7.58,df = 2, p = .023). The effect of age on the frequencyof agreed turns was significantly different betweenGermans and Kikuyu (Trial 1: z = �2.39, p = .017;Trial 2: z = �2.16, p = .031), with German childrentaking more agreed turns as they got older. How-ever, the effect of age on the number of agreedturns was not significantly different between Ger-mans and Samburu (Trial 1: z = �0.13, p = .896;Trial 2: z = 0.07, p = .942) or between Kikuyu andSamburu (Trial 1: z = 1.65, p = .099; Trial 2:z = 1.63, p = .103; see Figures S1 and S2).

Having looked at turn-taking within trials, wealso wanted to know what happened between tri-als. Would children agree on using the hook beforethe second trial? If one of the children waited forher partner to take the hook, we assumed that therewas an implicit agreement about whose turn it was.If both children reached for the hook and the fasteror stronger child ended up using it, we did notassume any prior plans. Across cultures, childrenseemed to agree a lot on who would get to use thehook, and only very few children gained access byforce (see Table 1 for an overview of initial actionsin Trial 2). Overall we found no significant correla-tions between culture and the type of initial actionat the beginning of the second trial (Pearson’s chi-square: v2 = 7.33, df = 6, p = .291).

While the initial actions mattered less if childrenwere taking turns within trials, it was crucial todetermine how children had come to use the hookwhen they were taking turns between trials only. Ifboth children reached for the hook and the otherone happened to be faster, equal distributionsacross trials might simply be due to chance. How-ever, if the children who had monopolized theresources in Trial 1 did not reach for the hook, weassumed that they were prepared to remainwithout rewards in Trial 2. Most of the cases in

which children took turns between trials onlyshowed the second pattern; that is, the child whohad previously fished all rewards did not reach forthe hook at the beginning of the second trial. InGermany that was true for 4 of the 7 cases, Kikuyuchildren let their partners take the hook in 13 of the19 cases, and in Samburu, 14 of the 17 dyadsshowed this behavior (see Table 2 for an overviewof turn-taking behaviors).

Resource Distribution

Our next question was how resources would bedistributed both within and across trials. Since mostdyads had either shared equally or not at all withinthe first trial, the response we used for our modelwas whether the distribution was unequal (differ-ence score = 8) or not (difference score = 0; see alsoTables S1 and S2). Overall the full model washighly significant as compared to the null model(v2 = 100.24, df = 5, p < .001). There was no signifi-cant interaction between culture and age (v2 = 4.16,df = 2, p = .125), and both culture and age had aneffect on the inequality of distribution within thefirst trial (likelihood ratio test for culture:v2 = 93.60, df = 2, p < .001; likelihood ratio test forage: v2 = 4.99, df = 1, p = .025). Samburu andKikuyu children distributed resources significantlymore often in an unequal way than did theirGerman peers (Germans vs. Samburu: z = 6.00,p < .001; Germans vs. Kikuyu: z = 6.52, p < .001).In all cultures, inequality within Trial 1 decreasedwith age.

The initial pattern continued across trials, withchildren sharing either equally or not at all. There-fore, the response we used for the model was againwhether or not the distribution was unequal.Again, the full model was highly significant ascompared to the null model (v2 = 47.24, df = 5,p < .001), and we found no interaction between cul-ture and age (v2 = 3.13, df = 2, p = .209). Across tri-als, culture continued to have a clear effect on theinequality of distribution (v2 = 44.09, df = 2,p < .001). As in Trial 1, children from the two Ken-yan populations ended up with an unequal distri-bution of resources more often than their Germanpeers (see Figure 2).

The age effect also disappeared when lookingacross trials (v2 = 0.001, df = 1, p = .974).

Occurrence and Influence of Protest in Trial 2

Following the results of our previous analyses,we were interested to find out whether children

Table 1Initial Actions in Trial 2

Initial actions (%)

Takes Grabs Seizes

German 75.0 17.9 7.1Samburu 58.0 22.0 20.0Kikuyu 67.8 25.4 6.8

Note. Takes = hook obtained without partner’s interference;grabs = hook obtained through speed; seizes = hook obtained byforce.

Taking Turns or Not 681

who had obtained fewer rewards in Trial 1 wouldprotest at the beginning of the second trial if thepartner continued using the hook. Specifically, wewanted to see whether protest would lead to anincrease in rewards obtained in the second trial. Wethus used a logistic GLM analyzing the effects ofculture, age, the interaction of culture and age, andprotest on the amount of rewards obtained in Trial2. Overall the full model was significant as com-pared to the null model (likelihood ratio test:v2 = 15.46, df = 6, p = .017). A likelihood ratio testcomparing the full and the reduced model revealedno significant interactions (v2 = 0.05, df = 2,p = .975). The reduced model revealed an effect ofprotest (v2 = 11.03, df = 1, p < .001), indicating thatthe number of cases in which protest was followedby an increase in resources was significantly lowerthan the number of cases in which protest wasignored (see Figure 3). Age did not seem to haveany effect (age: v2 = 0.01, df = 1, p = .931), andthere were no significant differences betweencultures (v2 = 4.87, df = 2, p = .088).

Discussion

The vast majority of German children solved thetask by taking turns and carefully distributingresources between the two partners, which resultedin a high level of equality both within and acrosstrials. Samburu and Kikuyu children, on the otherhand, seemed to be much less concerned about (atleast temporary) inequalities. When aiming for anequal distribution at all, they mostly did so bytaking turns between trials rather than within. Andeven if the dominant child continued to monopolizethe resources, there was very little protest—andmost of it remained unheard.

Study 2

Were the rewards perhaps too attractive for thetwo Kenyan groups to interrupt the game oncethey had started fishing? Or did the Kenyan chil-dren simply think that distributing resources on a

Table 2Turn-Taking Patterns Across Cultures

Dyads withvoluntary turnswithin trial

Dyads with voluntaryturns betweentrials only

Dyads with involuntaryturns between trials only

Dyads withoutturn-taking Total dyads

German 46 4 3 3 56Samburu 12 14 3 21 50Kikuyu 9 13 6 31 59

0.

25.

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75.

100.

German Samburu Kikuyu

Perc

enta

ge O

f Dya

ds W

ith E

qual

Dis

tribu

tion

TRIAL 1 Across Trials

Figure 2. Percentage of dyads with equal distribution of resources.

682 Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, and Tomasello

first-come, first-served basis was the right thing todo? And did the German children just take turns inorder to avoid complaints from their partners orwould they also prefer that strategy if they werenot involved in the game? In order to address thesequestions, we added a third-party context to seewhether or not children would think that takingturns was the right thing to do if they were notdirectly concerned.

Method

Participants

A total of 24 Kikuyu, 37 Samburu, and 42 Germanchildren between the ages of 7 and 11 who had par-ticipated in Study 1 in the previous year were testedin Study 2, Kikuyu: 7 girls (Mage = 8.0), 17 boys(Mage = 9.5); Samburu: 20 girls (Mage = 9.5), 17boys (Mage = 8.5); Germans: 17 girls (Mage = 8.6), 25boys (Mage = 9.2). Another three Kikuyu and sixSamburu children (Kikuyu: one 7-year-old boy, two10-year-old girls; Samburu: two 8-year-old girls,three 10-year-old boys, and one 11-year-old boy)were tested but excluded because they had answeredthe recapitulation questions incorrectly.

Materials and Procedure

Children were shown various pictures andvideos on a laptop and asked to answer questionseither verbally or by pointing to the correct solutionon the screen (see Supporting Information for

details). Having correctly answered all warm-upquestions, children then proceeded to the actualtest. In the test video, children were reminded ofthe fishing game that they had played some timeago. Subsequently, they were introduced to a fic-tional boy called Anthony (or a girl called Anne)who would be playing the game with a partner.After watching Anthony and his partner play oneround of the fishing game, children were asked tocount the number of containers each child hadfished and the amount of rewards they would get.Anthony had taken turns playing with the otherchild, so each of the two partners received fourrewards. Next, a boy called David (or a girl calledDiana) was introduced, and children again watchedhim play one round of the game, followed bycounting containers and rewards. David had not letthe other child fish, so he received eight rewardsand his partner none. The order of the two gameversions was counterbalanced. Male participantssaw David and Anthony playing; female partici-pants watched Diana and Anne. After a short sum-mary of what they had just seen, children wereshown pictures of the two main actors and asked torecapitulate: Which child let the other one play,too? And which child got more rewards? Havingpassed the memory test, children were then askedto point to the actor who had played the game theway it should be played. Children who had failedthe memory test also proceeded to the last questionbut were not included in the analysis. After answer-ing the last question, children received a smallreward and the test session ended.

0.

25.

50.

75.

100.

German Samburu Kikuyu

Per

cent

age

of C

ases

IncreaseNo Increase

Figure 3. Percentage of cases with or without increase in resources following protest.

Taking Turns or Not 683

Coding

All answers were recorded live by the experi-menter. Reliability was obtained by having an inde-pendent observer code 20% of the relevantvideotaped material of the sessions (recapitulationand test questions). Intercoder reliability was verygood (Kendall’s tau-b coefficient = 1.000, p < .001).

Results

About 75% of our Kenyan children thought thatthe actors who had not taken turns had played thegame the way it should be played. German childrenunanimously said that taking turns was the rightthing to do (see Figure 4).

In order to investigate the effects of culture, age,and their interaction on the children’s reply, we ana-lyzed the data using a GLM with binomial errorstructure (see Study 1 for details). As a response forour model we used whether children had answered“take turns” or not. Overall the full model washighly significant as compared to the null modelcontaining only gender (likelihood ratio test:v2 = 82.15, df = 5, p < .001). There was no signifi-cant interaction between culture and age (v2 = 0.15,df = 2, p = .926), and both culture and age had aneffect on the children’s reply (likelihood ratio testfor culture: v2 = 79.50, df = 2, p < .001; likelihoodratio test for age: v2 = 5.28, df = 1, p = .022).

Discussion

Consistent with our previous findings, most chil-dren from our two Kenyan groups thought thatpeers who had monopolized the resources hadplayed the game the way it should be played, whileGerman children insisted that taking turns was theright thing to do.

Study 3

Unlike their German peers who had solved all pre-vious tasks in a very uniform way, there had beenquite a bit of variation among the Kenyan dyads.In order to see whether the Kenyan children wouldconverge to a more uniform strategy if the benefitsof taking turns were higher, we introduced twonew conditions in which the players would beobserved by a peer or have the chance to be chosenas partners for another round with even higherpayoffs.

Method

Participants

A total of 132 Kenyan children (80 Kikuyu and52 Samburu) between the ages of 5 and 10 yearswho had previously participated in Study 1 wererandomly chosen for Study 3. Children were recom-bined into new same-age, same-sex dyads andassigned to one of the three conditions.

In the control condition, we tested 26 Kikuyuand 16 Samburu children, Kikuyu: 10 girls(Mage = 7.6), 16 boys (Mage = 7.1); Samburu: 8 girls(Mage = 7.5), 8 boys (Mage = 7.5). Another 26Kikuyu and 16 Samburu children were tested in theobserver condition, Kikuyu: 10 girls (Mage = 7.6), 16boys (Mage = 7.1); Samburu: (8 girls (Mage = 7.5), 8boys (Mage = 8.5). In the knowledge condition, wetested 28 Kikuyu and 22 Samburu children, Kikuyu:12 girls (Mage = 6.7), 16 boys (Mage = 8.5); Sam-buru: 10 girls (Mage = 8.0), 12 boys (Mage = 7.5).Another two 5-year-old Kikuyu and two 8-year-oldSamburu boys were tested but excluded becausethe Kikuyu observer had given instructions, andthe Samburu children had not followed the gamerules. In addition, another 13 children agedbetween 11 and 15 years took part as observers inthe observer and knowledge conditions, Kikuyu:N = 7, 2 girls (Mage = 13.0), 5 boys (Mage = 13.0);Samburu: N = 6, 3 girls (Mage = 13.0), 3 boys(Mage = 13.0).

Materials

Materials consisted of the basic setup describedin Study 1, and an additional setup includingtwo long tubes, which were filled with 10 greenor yellow containers each. As opposed to the blueand red containers (which were again filled withone small bead), the green and yellow containerswere filled with two large beads each. All

0.

25.

50.

75.

100.

German Samburu Kikuyu

Per

cent

age

of A

nsw

ers

Child Who Took Turns

Child Who Did Not Take Turns

Figure 4. Answers chosen in reply to test question.

684 Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, and Tomasello

rewards were clearly visible from the outside. Onthe yellow side, there was a clear box containinga single hook. Another two long, but opaqueboxes (only one containing a hook) were placednext to the basic setup at the beginning of thegame.

Procedure

Again all sessions started with a short video.Since all participants had played the fishing gamebefore, they were familiar with the basic proce-dure. The instruction video therefore only gave abrief reintroduction to the game and then contin-ued depending on the condition. There were threeconditions: In the control condition, the narratorbriefly mentioned that there was another gamewith even more and bigger rewards, which thechildren could perhaps play later. In the observercondition, the narrator added that there would beanother child watching; and in the knowledgecondition, he also mentioned that the observerwould later choose one of the two players to behis partner in the other game. In the observerand knowledge conditions, an older child wasseated next to the second setup, on the side thatdid not have a hook (see Figure S3). Prior to thetest, the observer had been instructed to remainsilent throughout the game. In order to predeter-mine which child would get the hook in the firstround, it was placed in one of the two opaqueboxes next to the first game setup. The childrendid not know that there was only one hook avail-able and only discovered who had it after thestart of the game. After watching the instructionvideo, the experimenter told the children to startplaying and left the room. When the children hadfilled the first short tube, the experimenterentered the room, emptied the fished containers,and distributed the beads accordingly. In the con-trol and observer conditions, she then thankedthe children for playing and ended the test. Inthe knowledge condition, the experimenter askedthe observer to pick a partner for the high-rewardgame. The child who had not been selected wasgiven a small reward (in addition to any beadsshe might have fished) and left the room. Theother two were then told to start playing thehigh-reward game. As stated earlier, the experi-menter left the room while the children were fish-ing and only re-entered after the short tube hadbeen filled with a total of eight containers. Shethen emptied the fished containers, distributed thebeads, and ended the test.

Coding

The number of rewards obtained by each childwas recorded life at the end of each round. In theknowledge condition, the observer’s choice wasrecorded as well. Inequality measures were againobtained by calculating the absolute differencebetween the numbers of rewards each child hadfished. Reliability was obtained by having an inde-pendent observer code 20% of the video material.Intercoder reliability was very good across cate-gories (Kendall’s tau-b coefficient = .899, p < .001).

Results

In order to investigate the effects of culture, age,and condition on the probability of having anunequal distribution, we analyzed the data using aGLM with binomial error structure (see Study 1 fordetails). Overall the full model was not significantas compared to the null model containing only gen-der (likelihood ratio test: v2 = 5.58, df = 5, p = .349),indicating that culture, age, and condition had noeffect on the inequality of distribution. Figure 5 pre-sents the percentage of equal and unequal distribu-tions obtained in each condition. To complete thepicture, we analyzed whether the observer in theknowledge condition would choose the child whohad previously obtained less rewards or the onewho had obtained more. Neither Kikuyu nor Sam-buru observers showed a clear preference for eitherone of the two options (binomial test: Kikuyu:p = .791; Samburu: p = .549; see Figure S4).

Discussion

Children in both cultures continued using themix of strategies we had seen in the original study,irrespective of being observed or having the chanceto play in a more lucrative game later. The obser-ver’s subsequent choice did not seem to follow aparticular pattern either, suggesting that childrendid not apply a general distribution strategy to thegame.

General Discussion

Turn-taking could easily be viewed as a naturalsolution to a problem of individuals with equalpower facing a resource that can be accessed byonly one of them at a time. Children from variouscultures have been shown to use turn-taking strate-gies to solve such problems from early on (Hay &

Taking Turns or Not 685

Ross, 1982; Madsen, 1971; Putallaz & Sheppard,1990; Shapira, 1976; Sparkes, 1991). The results ofthe current cross-cultural studies may be inter-preted as broadly consistent with this general ideain the sense that there were some peer pairs in allcultures who took turns in one way or another.

However, the overwhelming finding of the cur-rent studies is cross-cultural differences. In the vastmajority of cases, the German children took turnsaccessing the resource, one by one, within each ofthe two trials. In contrast, this happened very infre-quently with children from the two Kenyan popula-tions—irrespective of their particular culturalbackground. Did the Kenyan children perhapschoose not to take turns because it was a new strat-egy that they had not been shown before? Kenyanteachers often require children to memorize andrepeat what they have heard and rarely encourageinnovation (Ngware, Oketch, & Mutisya, 2014).However, if children thought that resources shouldbe shared equally without breaking the originalpattern, they still had a chance to take turnsbetween trials—which only half of them did. Oneother explanation could have been that the Kenyanchildren thought that taking turns was the rightthing to do, but in this novel situation with fairlyvaluable prizes, this judgment was overcome byselfish interests. But after having observed otherchildren in the same task, most of our Kenyan par-ticipants said that the child monopolizing theresources, not the one taking turns, had played thegame the way it should be played. Again, Kikuyuand Samburu children responded in a very similarway—and very differently from their German

peers. And when we tried to make it even morerewarding for Kenyan children to take turns in thethird study—if they assumed that an observerwould prefer a cooperative partner in the future—most of them still did not do so. It therefore seemsunlikely that the Kenyan children were somehowmore motivated for the prizes.

From the beginning most German childrenseemed to think that the point of the game was toagree on a strategy and share equally right away,whereas the majority of Samburu and Kikuyu chil-dren started out with a first-come, first-servedapproach. Nevertheless, it should be noted thatclose to half of the Kenyan children took turnsacross trials; that is, one of them monopolized theresources in Trial 1 and the other did so in Trial2. This pattern was not set up by explicit agree-ment in any way that we could tell, but it wasnot the case that the second child had to fight toget a turn in the second trial. In the vast majorityof cases, the child who had monopolized theresources in Trial 1 simply allowed the disadvan-taged child to monopolize them in Trial 2. Thissuggests that the first child in some sense felt lessentitled to the resources in the second trial afterhaving monopolized them in Trial 1 (or felt thatthe other child, having been disadvantaged before,would be insistent if he or she did not now get aturn). Perhaps the German children simply antici-pated this situation and began taking turns imme-diately within the first trial. Needless to say, thekind of constant reminders from parents to taketurns with toys and other resources, characteristicof parents in Western societies, might have helped

0.

25.

50.

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Unequal Equal

Figure 5. Percentage of equal versus unequal distributions for each condition.

686 Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, and Tomasello

the German children to make this anticipation.When asked about their teaching strategies, thevast majority of our German parents stated thatthey would not only tell their children to taketurns, but also try to make them understand whyit is important to do so—which might help thechildren to internalize it as their own rule andapply it widely (Baumrind, 1971). Kenyan parents,on the other hand, tend to rely more on externalmechanisms for regulating their children’s behav-ior. Less than half of the Samburu parents weinterviewed said they would teach their childrento take turns, and the majority would solve con-flicts between children by removing the toy.Kikuyu parents did tell their children to taketurns, but then mostly relied on external measuresto enforce it (see Supporting Information fordetails). Nevertheless, both Samburu and Kikuyuthought that it was important to share and taketurns—and they also do so on a regular basis.Children often play hopscotch, rope jumping, orpebble games that involve turn-taking, and adultstake turns using utensils or tools. Other items suchas tobacco, tea leaves, or charcoal are widelyshared among adults as well, but not so much ina context of direct exchange or equal distribution.Often, family members or neighbors will simplyask for things that they are lacking and receivewhatever the owner can spare. In addition, fami-lies are expected to supply food for the commu-nity on certain occasions such as initiationceremonies or weddings, but again, the focus isnot on an immediate exchange or equal divisionof resources. Children are usually present in mostof these situations, but they rarely get to distributeresources themselves. But in a place where every-one knows everyone and local institutions willensure that resources are commonly shared atsome point, avoiding or immediately removinginequalities—and teaching their children to do thesame—also seems less important. Long-term bal-ancing might simply be a better option in placeswhere people know each other and interact repeat-edly in specific contexts, while large-scale societiesmight have developed norms for immediatelyresolving resource problems in order to sustaincooperation among strangers (Chudek & Henrich,2011).

Taking turns to access limited resources mightthus be a generic approach in some cultures, butapplied less widely and across different time scalesin others. As Michael Cole put it, “[C]ultural differ-ences in cognition reside more in the situation towhich particular cognitive processes are applied

than in the existence of a process in one culturalgroup and its absence in another” (Cole, Gay, Glick,& Sharp, 1971, p. 233).

The current study is a first step in determininghow children in different cultural settings shareresources that can be accessed by only one individ-ual at a time, but there are still a number of impor-tant questions to be answered. For example, itwould be interesting to see whether children gener-alize their behavior across situations or whetherthere might be context-specific differences. In addi-tion, it would be important to know the degree towhich children were simply following an adult ruleversus making a spontaneous judgment about theappropriate distribution.

Overall the current results have demonstratedrather strong differences in the way in whichchildren from different cultural backgroundsapproached a limited resource problem. These dif-ferences are presumably due to variations in thechildren’s sociocultural environments, though theprecise mechanisms involved are still to be deter-mined.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found inthe online version of this article at the publisher’swebsite:

Figure S1. Number of Agreed Turns in Trial 1Figure S2. Number of Agreed Turns in Trial 2Figure S3. Experimental Setup for Study 3Figure S4. Percentage of Observers Choosing

Children With Less, Equal, or More Resources inRound 1

Table S1. Number of Dyads With DifferenceScores of 8 (Complete Inequality), 0 (CompleteEquality), or Any Other Difference Score in Trial 1

Table S2. Number of Dyads With DifferenceScores of 16 (Complete Inequality), 0 (CompleteEquality), or Any Other Difference Score AcrossTrials

Table S3. Neighbors: Parents’ Answers andNumber of Times They Were Given

Table S4. Socialization: Parents’ Answers (Sum-marized Into Categories) and Number of TimesThey Were Given

Appendix S1. Ethnographic Background

688 Zeidler, Herrmann, Haun, and Tomasello