Taiwan and the U.S. Pivot to Asia

7/28/2019 Taiwan and the U.S. Pivot to Asia

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EditEd by

Shihoko Goto

taiwan and thE U.S. Pivot to aSia:New Realities in the Region?


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www.wilsoncenter.org

Taiwan and The U.S. PivoT To aSia:

New Realities in the Region?

Report o the Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars

Conerence on U.S.-Taiwan Relations

FebrUary 26, 2013

ediTed by

Shihoko Goto


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Available rom :

Asia Program

Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars

One Woodrow Wilson Plaza

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20004-3027


ISBN: 978-1-938027-19-2


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Contents

1 introduction

Shihoko Goto

Northeast Asia Associate, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson

International Center or Scholars

5 what does the u.s. focus on asia Mean

for taiwan?

June euel Dreyer

Proessor, Department o Political Science, University o Miami

13 the u.s. Pivot to the asia-Pacific:

iMPlications for taiwan

Dennis Van Vranken Hickey

Proessor o Political Science and Director o the Graduate Program

in Global Studies, Missouri State University

25 Partner in the Pivot?

James Holmes

Proessor o Strategy, U.S. Naval War College.

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shihoko goto is the Northeast Asia

associate at the Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter for Scholars Asia Program.


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Introduction

shihoko goto

Change is aoot across Northeast Asia. Japan, South Korea, and China are

all under new leaderships rom early 2013, while aiwan introduced yet

another cabinet reshue earlier in the year.

Change is under way on the other side o the Pacic too, as the

United States moves orward with its military as well as political and

economic pivot towards Asia. Chinas rapid military modernization has

led Washington to step up eorts to increase its presence in the region.Developments in recent years have only heightened wariness in the United

States about potential risks in Asia.

Certainly, there is no shortage o tensions and disturbing rhetoric in the

region. China and Japan remain at loggerheads over ownership o a handul

o islands in the East China Sea, while Japan has other territorial disputes

with South Korea as well as Russia. Meanwhile, all Asian nations remain

wary o North Koreas nuclear aspirations, and possibilities o a resolution

with Pyongyang remain murky at best.

evolving u.s.-taiwan relations

But where does aiwan t into this new order o Northeast Asian con-

icts and competing interests? In decades past, tensions between aipei and

Beijing were regarded as one o the biggest risks threatening the regionsstability. In recent years, however, even the most bearish o cross-Strait

analysts would hardly make that case. In act, some argue that relations

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between aiwan and China have so greatly improved that the greater risk is

that o urther integration o the two sides, rather than conict.

For the United States, the question is where aiwan ts in its rebalanc-ing strategy towards Asia. o date, aiwan has been a beneciary o the

U.S. presence in the region. Yet as aipei leans more toward the mainland

both economically and politically, should the United States reconsider its

partnership with aiwan? Can and should aiwan do more to enhance its

sel-deense capabilities? How will aipeis closer ties with Beijing aect its

relations with Washington?

At a Woodrow Wilson Center conerence held in late February, three ac-

ademics and a senior sta member o the House Foreign Aairs Committeecame together to discuss aiwans role in the U.S. military, political, and

economic pivot to the Asia-Pacic.

Nien Su, the senior director or Asia-Pacic o the House Committee on

Foreign Aairs, stressed the need or the United States to continue nurtur-

ing its relations with aiwan, noting the robust ties between the two that

go beyond security interests. He emphasized the strong investment links

between aiwan and the United States in particular, adding that urthering

bilateral relations across the board would be in the best interest o both.

Te University o Miamis June Teufel Dreyer, however, argued that

as aiwans relations with China deepen urther, it would not be in the

United States interest to expect aipei, as a matter o sel-interest, to play

an active role in the U.S. pivot to Asia. She called or aipei to placate both

Washington and Beijing, while keeping as low a prole as possible.

Dennis Hickeyo Missouri State University, on the other hand, said

that aipei could aspire to play a key role in countering Beijings militarygrowth and be an even more important U.S. military ally. At the same

time, he cautioned that aiwan could be adversely aected by growing hos-

tilities between the United States and China.

As or the Naval War CollegesJames Holmes, he stressed the need or

aiwan to augment its own deense capabilities, rather than depending

heavily on U.S. support. By increasing its deense spending, aipei would

be able to play a crucial role in completing the U.S. pivot, he said.

How the United States will move orward with its pivot to Asia remainsin question. Yet it is clear that Washingtons relations with aiwan are

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Introduction


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evolving as economic and security realities in the region change. aiwan

continues to play a key role in dening those realities, and the ollowing

three essays should act as a starting point in examining where U.S.-aiwanrelations may be heading.

March 2013

Washington DC

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Shihoko Goto


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June teufel dreyer is a professor

at the University of Miamis department of

political science.


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What Does the U.S.Focus on Asia Mean

for Taiwan?June teufel dreyer

In a November 2011 address to the Australian parliament, President Barack

Obama announced his intention to expand the U.S. role in Asia. Soon tobecome known as the pivot toward Asia, the shit in emphasis was de-

scribed in innocuous language. Te United States wished to play a larger

role in shaping the region and its uture by helping to ensure that inter-

national law and norms were respected, that commerce and reedom o

navigation would not be impeded, that emerging powers could build trust

with their neighbors, and that disagreements would be resolved peaceully

without threats or coercion.

Tough avowedly not directed against any third country, the pivot waswidely interpreted, including in Beijing, as being aimed at balancing China.

Te Chinese media have already objected to one maniestation o the pivot,

and its associated military acet, the Air Sea battle: the dispatch o U.S. ma-

rines to Darwin, southern Australia. Nor is Beijing pleased with the rans-

Pacic Partnership, a ree trade agreement that would add eight or more

states1 to the three members o the North American Free rade Agreement

(NAFA) as well as broadening the scope o the matters included therein,

since it concerns not only trade matters but sets binding regulations, on theservice sector, investments, patents, copyrights, government procurement,

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nancial regulation, and labor and environmental standards. Te pact is

aimed at strengthening the United States economic role in the region.

China, already the dominant economic power in the area, is conspicuousby its absence.

Obamas initiative was prompted by the increasing assertiveness o the

Peoples Republic o China (PRC). In the previous year, Chinese oreign

minister Yang Jiechi had taken umbrage at U.S. Secretary o State Hillary

Clintons remark at a meeting o the oreign ministers o the Association

o Southeast States (ASEAN) that territorial disputes should be settled

through peaceul negotiation. 2 Yang ollowed this up by inorming the

members that they must ace reality: China was a large state, and otherstates were small, reportedly looking straight at Singaporean oreign min-

ister George Yeo as he said it.3 Ofcial media accused the United States o

meddling in an area that it was not part o. 4

A ew months later, when okyo arrested a Chinese shing boat captain

whose vessel had rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels, Beijing levied

painul economic sanctions on Japan until he was released, and ollowed

this up with regular maritime patrols in areas Japan considers part o its

territorial waters. Tere were standos with the Philippines in 2012 over

Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and, in 1994 and 1999, at Mischie Ree, as well

as several incidents involving Vietnam. Also in 2012, Indian naval vessels

bound or Seoul were greeted by a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

ship that escorted them through Chinese waters.5 Te collective intent

o these endeavors appears to be to establish the international legitimacy o

their control over the East China and South China seas.

Further, the annual U.S. Department o Deense report on the PRCs mil-itary power catalogue a growing inventory o impressive capabilities includ-

ing cyber attacks, stealthy planes, cruise and ballistic missiles, new classes o

nuclear submarines, and an aircrat carrier. Beijing seems intent on establish-

ing an anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) capability to support Chinese claims

in the South China and East China seas. Since ensuring reedom o naviga-

tion along the sea lanes o communication (SLOCs) is a core mission o the

United States Navy, this worries American deense planners.6

aiwans geographic position makes it an important part o any strat-egy aimed at constraining the expansion o the PRCs territorial claims.

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What Does the U.S. Focus on Asia Mean for Taiwan?


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Absorption o the island into Chinas territorial waters would mean those

waters stretched close to the shores o Japanthe southern Japanese island

o Yonaguni is a scant 67 miles rom the coast o aiwan, and strategicallyimportant submarine as well as surace shipping passages would be im-

pacted should the surrounding waters all under the PRCs control. Hence,

any eort to operationalize the pivot must consider what part the aiwan

could play in the exercise thereo.

aiwan is part o the PRCs rst island chain and has been described by

Chinese analysts as a crucial link in its plans to break out o what they see

as the encirclement o their country by an American-led coalition aimed

at containing the rise o China. One analyst sees aiwan, the center o theisland chain arc, as a shackle or the PLAN. Its incorporation into the PRC

would sever the chain at mid-point as well as providing the PLA with bases,

harbors, and radar emplacements useul or outward power projection. He

describes the Chinese coast plus aiwan as orming a -shaped position

thus acilitating access to the second island chain and ultimately breaking

out into the open ocean o the Pacic.7

Hence it would seem that the implementation o the pivot would be se-

verely constrained were aiwan to be subsumed into the PRC, whether or-

mally or inormally. Assuming that it is not, any consideration o aiwans

role must consider two intertwined questions: whether Washington is will-

ing to include aiwan in the pivot, and whether aipei is willing to be in-

cluded. For the past decade, the United States has, while criticizing eorts

by either side to change the status quo, seemed to many citizens o aiwan

to be more critical o anything that aiwan does that could be construed

as changing the status quo than it has when China does. Perhaps the mostsalient example o this occurred in December 2003 when, with Chinese

Premier Wen Jiabao at his side, U.S. President George W. Bush, announced

we oppose any unilateral decision, by either China or aiwan, to change

the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader o aiwan

indicated that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change

the status quo, which we oppose.8

While one may disagree on whether the administration was being even-

handed or not, there is little disagreement about how it was received inaiwan. According to the islands minority Democratic Progressive Party

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June Teufel Dreyer


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(DPP), this and other more subtle displays o annoyance by the Bush

administration played a major role in tipping the 2008 election toward uni-

cation-oriented Ma Ying-jeou, who was born in Hong Kong to Chineseparents.9 Since then, Mas Kuomintang (KM) administration has pursued

a policy o accommodation to the PRC with ofcial Washington comment-

ing with evident approval that it welcomed the trend o amicable cross-

strait relations. Te cost o this, however, was to move aiwan ever closer

into the PRCs ambit. Among other steps the Ma government has taken to

do so have been:

signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, apreerential trade arrangement with China that reduces taris and

commercial barriers between the two sides as well as providing or

mutual investment and banking arrangements

acilitating arrangements or the entry o Chinese tourists to aiwan

rejecting the application or license renewal or new licensing or

independent media10 outlets while supporting the sale o our

outlets o the Next Media Group to a consortium in which a

pro-Chinese businessman has a controlling interest.11

easing the opportunities or Chinese to study at aiwans educational

institutions and making them eligible or scholarships thereto

While Ma deends these policies as economic rather than political, they

have greatly increased aiwans dependence on China. Te PRCs share o

aiwans exports exceeded 40 percent in 2011, with the problems in the

countrys economy caused by a slight decline, to 38.1 percent in the rst halo 2012, showing how vulnerable to the PRCs policies aiwan had become:

Te decrease was not the result o a change in attitude by Mas administra-

tion but by a Beijing restructuring known as vacating the cage or new

birds that aims to replace imports with domestically produced goods.12

Ma must also be aware that, prior to the normalization o Sino-Japanese

relations in 1972, okyo also tried to ollow a policy o separating econom-

ics rom politics, seikei bunriwhich Beijing atly rejected. Eventually, with

the strong encouragement o major Japanese businesses which saw big pro-its in Chinas then-new industrialization drive, the Japanese government

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abandoned seikei bunri and opened negotiations on mutual recognition.

Only in abstract theory are economics and politics separable.

Te narrowing o viewpoints in the mass media has also caused conster-nation, culminating in a January 2013 mass rally, in which an estimated

hundred thousand or more people protested in ront o the presidential o-

ces, to no avail.13 Tose members o the opposition party who served in

the previous administration have been indicted on various grounds. While

many have been acquitted, the prosecutions have taken a nancial and psy-

chological toll that many consider aimed at intimidation. Te large number

o tourists who enter are thought to have included some who are intelligence

operatives. Critics remark rueully that the country has a bipartisan govern-ment: its indigenous KM and the PRCs Chinese Communist Party.

Although the overwhelming majority o citizens have in poll ater poll

expressed a desire not to uniy with China14, the absorption o aiwan into

China may be reaching a de acto i not a de jure tipping point past which

reversal is impossible. I this is the case, it is difcult to see how the United

States could gain any advantage rom incorporating aiwan into a pivot

that is aimed at constraining China. For decades, and in spite o the aiwan

Relations Acts stipulation that the United States will make available to

aiwan such deense articles and deense services in such quantity as may

be necessary to enable aiwan to maintain a sufcient sel-deense capabil-

ity15, Washington has been unwilling to sell items o comparable quality

to those being acquired by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Part o the

reason is to avoid angering China, another is the inltration o aiwans

military and intelligence bureaucracies by Chinese operatives. It does not

make sense to sell advanced weaponry to a country that would transer it tothe United States most likely adversary.

Tere are ways in which a aiwan government that is willing to par-

ticipate in the pivotwhich so ar the Ma government, anxious to keep

amicable cross-strait relations, has notcould be useul. Military ana-

lysts have pointed out that peacetime air surveillance could be used with

other sources o inormation to orm a more accurate assessment o PLA

doctrine and tactics. And i aiwan had the capacity to interdict single

points in the PLAs A2/AD, the U.S. militarys operational burden wouldbe reduced concomitantly.16

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For both the United States and aiwan, the risks o participating in the

pivot are substantial. aiwans current government seems to avor gradual

incorporation into the PRC, whether ormally or inormally, which wouldbe disadvantageous to the United States. aiwan ears, with good reason,

incurring the anger o a heavily armed close neighbor that has over 1500

missiles pointed at it, no strategic depth rom which to deend itsel, and a

United States government that seems ckle about its relationship with the

island. Te administration has reused to sell F-16 C/Ds to aiwan, which

would in any case be no match or the new ghters being deployed by the

PLA Air Force. It has not suggested that aiwan join the PP.17

Moreover, Washington already has difculties in trying to better rela-tions with Beijing while vowing that it will pursue a pivot policy clearly

intended to balance it, and requently states that no major world problem

can be solved without the PRCs assent. It is well understood that the PRC

attempts to use aiwan as a bargaining chip in these negotiations. Clearly,

aiwan cannot count on the United States to guarantee its security, and the

United States is loath to guarantee the security o a aiwan whose adminis-

tration seems to be encouraging its incorporation into China.

Should the two sides agree that cooperation is in their best interests,

condence-building measures are a crucial prerequisite. Te aiwan gov-

ernment must halt and, to the extent possible, reverse its eorts to integrate

with China, demonstrate that it is capable o protecting military technol-

ogy rom the PRCs intelligence operatives, and show that it is willing to

deend itsel rom invasion. Te United States must show itsel willing to

transer its military technology and expertise, and to include aiwan in the

PP negotiations. Under current circumstances, both sides seem to lack themotivation to undertake these measures.

As matters stand, to the extent that aiwans security is aected by the

pivot, its position is more, not less, precarious. In these circumstances,

aipeis best strategy would seem to be to try to placate both Washington

and Beijing, while keeping as low a prole as possible. Te response o

aiwans oreign ministry to a query on what part, i any, the nation could

play in the pivot reinorces this hypothesis. Averring that it does not believe

the pivot is aimed at containment o China, the ministry states that in order to guarantee our national

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security while we are improving the cross-strait relationship, we also need

to strengthen relations with the USA and other riendly countries, and to

constantly enhance our national deense so that the sovereignty o the ROCand aiwans security can be maintained. Te security commitment rom

the United States is vital to peace and stability over the aiwan Strait, and

to bring us more condence when making peace with mainland China. Te

above meets the interest o all parties concerned in the region.18

notes

1. Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam

as well as the NAFA group o Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. Te Japan, the

Philippines, , South Korea, and Tailand have also expressed interest in joining.

For details, see, e.g, Ofce o the United States rade Representative http://

www.ustr.gov/tpp; Daniel en Kate and Margaret alev, Obama Eyes $108

Billion Annual Asia Prize Vying With China rade, Bloomberg Business

Week, December 27, 2012 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-12-27/

obama-eyes-108-billion-annual-asia-prize-vying-with-china-trade.

2. China: U.S. Comments On South China Sea Are an Attack, Associated Press,July 25, 2010.

3. John Pomret, U.S. akes a ougher Line with China, Washington Post,

July30, 2010.

4. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Reutes Fallacies On the South China Sea Issue,

Ministry o Foreign Aairs o the Peoples Republic o China, July 26, 2010

,South China Sea Issue Should Only Be Resolved By Concerned Parties, Vice

FM Says, Renmin Ribao, August 6, 2012.

5. Ananth Krishnan, In South China Sea, a Surprise Escort or Indian Ships, Te

Hindu, June 14, 2012. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3524965.

ece?css=print

6. Te latest report can be accessed at http://www.deense.gov/pubs/pds/2012_

CMPR_Final.pd

7. (Jiang Yu, Te Island Chain

and Far Seas Development o the Chinese Navy, Naval Weapons, No. 12,pp.

3031. oshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacic and the

Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010)

pp. 5354, interpret this essay in Mahanian control o the sea terms.

8. http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLIICS/12/09/bush.china.taiwan/index/html.

9. Other issues included the Kuomintangs promise to improve economic growth,and concerns about corruption.

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June Teufel Dreyer


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10. Jimmy Lai, aiwans Less-Free Media: Te Government o President Ma

Ying-jeou is ightening Controls on aiwans Free Press, Wall Street Journal,

December 28, 2010.

11. William Lowther, FAPA Calls On Government o Stop Sale o Media Group,aipei imes, December 2, 2012.

12. Focus aiwan, July 11, 2012. http://ocustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_

Detail.aspx?ID=201207110042&ype=aOD

13. Tere is a large discrepancy between numbers reported by the government and

those claimed by the marchers, ranging rom 60,000 to 100,000.

14. see, e.g. http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/tvbs2011/pch/tvbs_poll_center.aspx

15. Te aiwan Relations Act, Public Law 968, 96th Congress, April 10, 1979,

Section 3 (a)

16. Mark Stokes and I.C. Russell Hsiao, aiwans Role in the Air Sea Battle,AsianEye, Project 2049, April 16, 2012. http://blog.project 2049.net/2012/04/taiwans-

role-in-air-sea-battle.html.

17 Although Washington is hesitant to anger Beijing by including aiwan in

the PP, it has argued that there must be a sequence: the U.S.-aiwan rade

and Investment Framework (IFA) must be concluded beore it is willing to

discuss the PP. For well over a decade, U.S. negotiators have reported a lack

o genuine commitment by aiwan even to thrashing out a IFA, given the

political clout o aiwans agricultural, pharmaceuticals, and sotware sectors,

each o which believes its interests would be adversely impacted by an agreement

with the U.S. In part because o its own recognition o the strength o domestic

resistance, aiwans political leaders, Ma included, have typically said that they

envisage readiness to join PP in about ten years.

18. Ministry o Foreign Aairs, Republic o China, communication to the author,

January 22, 2013.

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The U.S. Pivot tothe Asia-Pacific:

Implications for Taiwandennis van vranken hickey

An important shit in U.S. oreign policy is underway. Te United States

is placing a higher priority on its economic, political and security relation-ships with the Asia-Pacic region. Tis study outlines the central eatures o

the U.S. pivot to Asia. It also shows how the Republic o China on aiwan

(ROC or aiwan) could stand to benet rom this strategic shit in U.S.

policy. In conclusion, the paper suggests that, while aiwan might gain

in some meaningul ways rom the pivot, the rebalancing might also pose

some risks or aipei and other U.S. riends and allies in the Western Pacic.

the u.s. Pivot to asia

In recent years, U.S. decision-makers came to the realization that the Asia-

Pacic region is critically important to US interests, and that it will only in-

crease in importance in uture years. Tis perception was emphasized recently

in a U.S. Department o Deense report which declared that we will o neces-

sity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacic region (italics in original document).1

A number o considerations serve as drivers or the adjustment in U.S.policy. With respect to economics, the Asia-Pacic (which includes India)

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dennis van vranken hickeyis a

professor of political science and director

of the graduate program in global studies

at Missouri State University. His work was

supported with a research grant from the

Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.


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is now United States largest source or imports and its second largest ex-

port region ater North America. Te pivot is intended to support the

United States central economic role in the region as the country continuesits eorts to recover rom the worldwide economic tsunami. For example,

Washington is ramping up its campaign to establish the rans-Pacic

Partnership (PP), a high-standard multilateral ree trade agreement.

In terms o political considerations, several Asia-Pacic countries

are emerging as major players in global politics. Tese states include the

Peoples Republic o China (PRC or China), India, the Republic o Korea

(ROK) and Japan. Others are increasingly important on a regional level.

Consequently, the United States is accelerating eorts to more intenselyengage these governments in bilateral and multilateral dialogues, exchanges

and orums. Tis reects what Hillary Clinton, then U.S. Secretary o

State, described as a sustained commitment to orward-deployed diplo-

macy in the region.2

It is clear that economic and political actors have helped shape the

transormation o U.S. policy. But many analysts contend that strategic

considerationsparticularly the rise o Chinaare chiey responsible or

the pivot to Asia.

U.S. security analysts contend that actual deense spending is understated

by Beijing, and that the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA) budget has been

trending upward or decades. Te U.S. Deense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

estimates that Chinas military budget could have been as high as $183 billion

in 2011double the stated budget.3 Te PLA is unding weapons systems de-

signed to boost its ability to conduct asymmetrical warare in a conict with

the United States or other countries. For example, U.S. military reports thatChina conrmed it is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile intended

to provide the PLA the capacity to attack large ships, particularly aircrat

carriers, in the Western Pacic Ocean.4 U.S. ofcials have also warned that,

while cross-strait relations have improved, Chinas military shows no sign o

slowing its eorts to prepare or aiwan Strait contingencies.5 Perhaps most

worrisome or U.S. deense planners, however, is what some view as a recent

pattern o belligerent PRC oreign policy behavior. Since 2010, Chinas asser-

tiveness in the South China Sea and the East China Sea has set o alarm bellsin many Asian capitals and Washington, DC.

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the u.s. Pivot and taiwan

What does the pivot mean or aiwan? How might aipei benet romthe shit in U.S. policy? Will aiwan play any role in Washingtons re-

balancing strategy? As with any oreign policy initiative, many questions

have been raised.

Tere are some who ear that, while Washington bolsters it linkages with

other regional governments, aipei is being ignored. During an interview

with the author, Dr. Joseph Wu, the Democratic Progressive Partys (DPP)

representative to the US, voiced such concerns.

Te security relations between the US and Japan have been streamlinedand Japan has been urged to invest more [in deense]. And i you look at the

security cooperation between the US and Korea, they are joining in mili-

tary exercises on a larger and larger scale. Look at US-Australia relations,

US-Philippine relation, US-Singapore relations, US-India relationsthey

are all strengtheningeven US-Vietnam relations. But look at aiwan. Te

US administrations reaction to aiwan seems that oh, youre doing just

ne with China, go ahead and do more. And I dont know i that is in line

with the US pivot or US redeployment in the Asia-Pacic, he said.6

Domestic critics o the Barrack Obama administration are harsher.

Some accuse the president o appeasement and make claims that, while

China is on the march in Asia, Obama is cozying up to Beijing with a

wink and a nod.7

o be sure, aiwan is not playing a high-prole role in the execution o

the strategic shit in U.S. policy. But aipei has not been orgotten.

For a start, U.S. ofcials at the highest levels o government have re-peatedly reiterated Washingtons support or aipei. During Congressional

hearings, Kurt M. Campbell, then U.S. Assistant Secretary o State or East

Asian and Pacic Aairs, testied that an important part o this turn to

Asia is maintaining a robust and multidimensional unofcial relationship

with aiwan and consistent with this interest is the U.S. strong and en-

during commitment to the maintenance o peace and stability across the

aiwan Strait.8 In November 2011, Secretary Clinton declared that we

have a strong relationship with aiwan, an important security and eco-nomic partner.9 In March 2012, she boasted that weve strengthened

16

The U.S. Pivot to the Asia-Pacif ic: Implications for Taiwan


24/42

our unofcial relationship with aiwan.10 Te discussion below explains

how the pivot contributes to political, economic and security ties between

Washington and aipei.

Ptc T

With respect to political ties, the United States is working to elevate un-

ofcial linkages with aiwan. As Secretary Campbell explained, we are

actively exploring ways to raise the level o our meetings with aiwan.11

Te eort is beginning to yield some dividends. In September 2011, Suresh

Kumar, U.S. Assistant Secretary o Commerce, journeyed to aiwan to dis-cuss trade and political issues, the most senior American ofcial to visit

aipei in more than ve years. In 2012, the U.S. military released a pho-

tograph o Dr. Andrew Yang, ROC Deputy Minister o Deense, making

an unofcial visit to the Pentagon. During an interview with the author,

Deputy Minister Yang revealed that during this year (2012) Ive made at

least nineteen trips to Washington and have conducted very high level dis-

cussions with my counterparts. 12

In addition to raising the level o bilateral contacts, the United States

continues to support aiwans meaningul participation in international

organizationsparticularly the International Civil Aviation Organization

and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changeand

protests any moves by the UN to identiy the island as a province o China

or otherwise determine its political status. It is also noteworthy that in

September 2012, the US announced that visitors rom aiwan would enjoy

visa ree status under the countrys Visa Waiver Program (VWP).

ecmc T

Te United States maintains a robust economic relationship with aiwan.

Despite the recent shits in global economic trends, aiwan is Americas

tenth largest trading partner with $67 billion in total (two way) goods

trade during 2011.13 Tat same year, aiwan was the United States 15th

largest goods export market (and sixth largest agriculture export market)and aiwan was the nations 10th largest supplier o goods.

17



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In February, 2013, the two sides agreed to resume stalled talks under the

rade and Investment Framework Agreement (IFA) ater a six year hiatus.

Negotiations had been delayed due to a quarrel over US bee exports contain-ing ractopamine (aiwan eased the ban on U.S. bee in July 2012). aipei

hopes that the discussions will pave the way or membership in the PP.

Securing PP membership is one o aipeis top oreign policy goals as it

is seen as a means to avoid being marginalized in the global marketplace.14

Tus, resumption o the IFA talks represents a breakthrough or aipei.

scuty T

U.S. security ties with aiwan are guided by the aiwan Relations Act

(RA), the so-called Six Assurances, the Tree Communiqus and a series

o statements, proclamations and secret promises. oo much ink already has

been spilled analyzing the nuances o these documents. Sufce it to say that

they oten appear contradictory and conusing.

In 2011, aiwan was the largest purchaser o U.S. deense articles and

services in the world.15 Although U.S. ofcials do not draw a clear linkage

between the pivot and the massive arms transers to aiwan, the pivot is

oten mentioned during briengs justiying the arms transers.16

Te 2010 and 2011 arms sales are comparable or greater than at any

other period in the history o U.S.-aiwan unofcial relations since the en-

actment o the aiwan Relations Act.17 Te ormer sale included helicop-

ters and PAC-3 Patriot missiles or aiwans air deenses, while the most

notable portion o the latter package was its provision or an upgrade or

aiwans F-16 A/B ghter eet.

U.S. ofcials will not rule out uture arms sales. On April 26, 2012,

Robert Nabors, White House director o legislative aairs, wrote that a sale

o additional warplanes warrants serious consideration given the growing

military threat to aiwan.18 He added that the administration, will soon

decide on a near-term course o action on how to address aiwans ghter

gap, including through the sale to aiwan o an undetermined number o

new US-made ghter aircrat.19 During interviews with the author, aiwan

authoritiesirrespective o political party afliationvoiced an interest innew vertical and short take-o and landing (V/SOL) combat aircrat.

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Secretary Campbell has suggested that U.S. security ties with aiwan

are perhaps the most high-prole element o the US-aiwan relationship.20

However, critical elements o this relationship remain low-prole. For ex-ample, the two sides appear to have long enjoyed a cooperative intelli-

gence-sharing agreement whereby the U.S. National Security Agency and

the ROC National Security Bureau monitor PRC military communications

rom a acility that was jointly constructed on Yangmingshan Mountain

north o aipei.21 Some speculate that the pivot may have led to an increase

in intelligence cooperation. According to media reports, aiwan may share

data acquired through its new US$1.3 billion long-range early-warning

radar (EWR) system in Hsinchu with the US military.22

On July 12, 2012, Raymond Burghardt, AI Chairman, outlined some

discrete ways in which Washington and aipei are moving closer.

We now have regular consultations at senior levels between both civilian

and military representatives, but you dont read about this. Part o the price

we pay or conducting the relationship with aiwan discreetly is that you give

people a reason to write that you are abandoning them. Te act is that we are

having high-level meetings with aiwan leaders. [Military relations are] very

strong and very good. Tere is intelligence exchange; there are mutual assess-

ments o deense needs; there is training that goes on. We dont talk about

this stu. Again, discretion is our biggest enemy. Maybe we should talk about

it more. Te military relationship is so much more than arms sales Its a good

relationship and it has been strengthened a lot with more channels, more is-

sues to work on, and more plans or collaboration, he said.23

Despite such sentiments, Burghardt oten remains tight-lipped about the

murky security relationship with aipei. During his February, 2013, visit toaiwan, the director would say only that his meetings ocused on security

issues and that his visit to a Patriot missile site and the aipei Regional

Control Center symbolized my reasons or being here.24 Commenting on

the reluctance o U.S. and ROC ofcials to openly discuss growing security

linkages, Deputy Minister Yang explained, we are not hiding rom the

media, but, you know, its based on the need to know.25 He warned that

trumpeting recent progress in security ties would antagonize Beijing.

In addition to an increase in bilateral security ties, aiwan stands to gainindirectly rom the pivot. Te ROC Ministry o National Deense (MND)

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welcomes plans to reallocate US naval orces rom a roughly 50/50 percent

split between the Pacic and Atlantic Oceans to a 60/40 percent split avor-

ing the Pacic. A MND spokesperson explained that the MND welcomesany measure conducive to peace and stability in the region.26 Te new real-

location might benet aiwan during an emergency. Moreover, aiwans

security could be bolstered by an eort to ramp up missile deenses. Te

United States will deploy two additional sophisticated X-Band radar sys-

tems in the Western Pacicone in southern Japan and the other in

Southeast Asia (probably the Philippines). Although ofcials claim the new

systems reect concerns about Pyongyang, they may also track develop-

ments around aiwan (Beijing has deployed over 1,200 ballistic missiles di-rectly opposite aiwan). As Jerey Lewis, director o the Monterey Institute

o International Studies East Asia non-prolieration program, observed, i

youre putting one (X-band radar system) in southern Japan and one in the

Philippines, youre sort o bracketing aiwan. So it does look like youre

making sure that you can put a missile deense cap over the aiwanese.27

In addition to the radar systems, the Pentagon has taken note o Chinas

carrier killing missile systems and pledged that the U.S. military will

invest as required to ensure its ability to operate efectively in anti-access and

area denial (A2/AD) environments [italics in original document].28 Te

U.S. military also plans to counter PRC advances in cyber warare and will

invest in advanced capabilities to deend its networks, operational capability,

and resiliency in cyberspace and space(italics in original document).29 Tese

commitments will help ensure that the United States can respond to an

emergency in the aiwan Strait and thereby enhance deterrence.

conclusions

Te pivot to Asia could yield dividends or aiwan. Te rebalancing might

help aipei nd a way to avoid economic marginalization in the global mar-

ketplace. I aiwan continues to liberalize its economy, the multi-party de-

mocracy will be a prime candidate or PP membership. Te pivot may also

help aiwan elevate its diplomatic prole. I the United States boosts politicalties with aiwan, it is likely that other states will ollow its lead.30 Finally, a

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robust commitment to aipeis deense along with a determination to coun-

ter Beijings military build-up may enhance deterrence and thereby boost

aiwans security. It could also increase aiwans bargaining position duringdiscussions with the Chinese mainland and enable the island to negotiate

rom a position o strength. As Dr. Andrew Yang, ROC Deputy Minister o

Deense, explained, U.S. military support or aiwan is vitally important to

acilitate peaceul engagement between the two sides.31

o be sure, it appears that aiwan stands to benet in some ways rom

the pivot. But the change in policy may also represent challenges or the

ROC. Te new U.S. strategy could generate unintended consequences.

Paradoxical as it may seem, some warn that the pivotan initiative in-tended to promote stabilitymight increase the likelihood or conict and

turmoil in the Western Pacic.

As Robert S. Ross observed, the current administration has junked long-

standing policy and directly inserted the U.S. into legally complex dis-

putes over a number o inconsequential islands located in South China

Sea.32 Washington is also leaning toward okyo in a row over uninhabited

islands in the East China Sea. At the same time, the United States has

unnecessarily challenged Beijing by boosting its military presence on the

East Asian mainland and by inking numerous military agreements with

Chinas neighbors.33

Not surprisingly, China has pushed back against U.S. policies, and

could reuse to cooperate on crucial issues rom trade to global economic

stability.34 Tis may represent a worrisome problem or the global com-

munity. Moreover, an overt or highly visible increase in U.S. support or

aiwan might also lead Beijing to push back against both Washingtonand aipei. Ater all, the Chinese mainland is watching developments

closely. As one editorial in a PRC newspaper opined, we should be alert to

any change in the U.S. policy toward aiwan.35

In the nal analysis, it would be difcult to predict how the U.S. pivot

to the Asia-Pacic plays out. It could conceivably benet aiwan. On the

other hand, like other Asian governments, aipei might suer some col-

lateral damage i present trends in U.S.-China relations continue. It is

possible that the U.S. pivot might prove to be yet another problemnot asolution to regional difculties.

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notes

1. See US Department o Deense,Sustaining US Global Leadership: Prioritiesor the 21st Century Deense, (Washington, DC: US Department o Deense,

January 2012).

2. See Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacic Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011,

on the world wide web at http://www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/

americas_pacic_century

3. See Shirley A. Kan, aiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990, (Washington DC:

Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2012), p.32.

4. Ofce o the Secretary o Deense,Annual Report to Congress: Military and

Security Developments involving the Peoples Republic o China, (Washington, DC:

US Department o Deense, May 2012), pp.2224.5. William Lowther, aiwan Focus o Chinese Military Modernization,

aipei imes, May 20, 2012, p.1, on the world wide web at at http://www.

taipeitimes.com.

6. Authors interview with Dr. Joseph Wu, Democratic Progressive Party

Headquarters, aipei, aiwan, Republic o China, December 24, 2012. ape

recording.

7. See Opening Statement o Representative Ros-Lehtinen (R.FL), beore the US

House Foreign Aairs Committee in Why aiwan Matters, Part II, October 4,

2011,p.10, on the world wide web at http://www.oreignaairs.house.gov/, p.2.8. See testimony o Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau o East Asian

and Pacic Aairs, US Department o State, in Ibid.

9. Hillary Rodham Clinton,Americas Pacic Century, Remarks, East-West Center,

Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011, US Department o State, on the world wide

web at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm.

10. William Lowther, US has strengthened relationship with aiwan: Clinton,

aipei imes, March 9, 2012, on the world wide web at www.taipeitimes.com.

11. See testimony o Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau o East Asian

and Pacic Aairs, US Department o State, in Why aiwan Matters, Part II.

12. Authors interview with Dr. Andrew Yang, ROC Deputy Minister o

National Deense, aipei, aiwan, Republic o China, December 24, 2012.

ape recording.

13. See US-aiwan rade Facts, Ofce o the US rade Representative, on the world

wide web at http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china/taiwan.

14. See Helen Ku, US, aiwan to Resume IFA alks, aipei imes, February 2,

2013, p.1, on the world wide web at http://www.taipeitimes.com.

15. See William Lowther, aiwan Still a op Buyer o US Arms, aipei imes,

December 22, 2011, p.2, on the world wide webat http://www.aipeitimes.com.

16. For example, see Background Brieng: Notication to Congress on the Sale o Armsto aiwan, US Department o State, September 21, 2011, on the world wide web

at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/172936.htm.

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17. See Ibid.

18. See Viola Gienger, aiwan Weighed or US Jet Sale at Risk o Riling China,

Bloomberg, April 27, 2012 on the world wide web at http://www.bloomberg.com.

19. Ibid.20. See estimony o Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary o the US Department

o States Bureau o East Asian and Pacic Aairs in Why aiwan Matters, Part II

21. See Wendell Minnick, Spook Mountain: How the US Spies on China,Asia

imes, March 6, 2003 on the www at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/

EC06Ad03.html.

22. See J. Michael Cole, New Radar racks North Korea Rocket: MND, aipei

imes, December 13, 2012, on the world wide web at http://www.taipeitimes.

com/News/ront/archives/2012/12/13/2003550023/1.

23. See William Lowther, US-aiwan Relations Remain Robust: Burghardt, aipeiimes, July 14, 2012, on the world wide web at http://ns2.taipeitimes.net/News/

ront/archives/2012/07/14/2003537694/1.

24. See Shih Hsiu-chuan, Visit Related to Security: AI Chairman, aipei imes,

February 2, 2013, on the world wide web at http://www.taipeitimes.com.

25. Authors interview with Dr. Andrew Yang, ROC Deputy Minister o National

Deense, aipei, aiwan, Republic o China, December 24, 2012. ape

recording.

26. Govt Welcomes US Plan or More Warships in Asia, China Post, June 4, 2012,

on the world wide web at http://www.chinapost.com.tw.

27. See William Lowther, aiwan Stands to Gain rom US Military Plans, aipei

imes, August 25, 2012, on the world wide web at http://www.taipeitimes.com.

28. See US Department o Deense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities or the

21st Century Deense.

29. Ibid.

30. For example, when the US allowed aiwan to upgrade the names o its

unofcial representative ofces in the US during the 1990s, other states quickly

ollowed. On the other hand, when Washington downgrades relations, other

states also downgrade ties.

31. Authors interview with Dr. Andrew Yang, ROC Deputy Minister o NationalDeense, aipei, aiwan, Republic o China, December 24, 2012. ape

Recording.

32. See Robert S. Ross, Te Problem with the Pivot: Obamas New Asia Policy

is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, China US Focus, December 6, 2012,

on the world wide web at http://www.chinausocus.com/print/?id+21980. Also

see Michael D. Swaine, Americas Asia Pivot Treatens Regional Stability,

Te National Interest, December 7, 2011, on the world wide web at http://

nationalinterest.org.

33. Ibid34. Ibid.

35. Zhou Zhongei, Washington Ready to Step Deeper in Straits, Global

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imes(China), July 30, 2012, on the www at http://www.globaltimes.cn/

content/724206.shtml

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Partner in the Pivot?

JaMes r. holMes

Apathy kills. Te Obama administrations pivot to Asiaa politico-mil-

itary endeavor that combines strategic mass, strategic maneuver, and ge-

ography in intensely competitive surroundingsmay well bolster aiwans

security vis--vis the mainland. Yet the pivots capacity to dissuade or deeat

China hinges on whether U.S. Navy relie orces can reach the islands vi-

cinity, do battle, and prevail at a cost acceptable to the American state and

society. Tis is an open questionbut one that aiwans armed orces can,and must, help answer in the afrmative. Te island must bear a vigorous

hand in its deense rather than passively awaiting rescue. Otherwise it may

stand alone in its hour o need.

get serious

aiwan, then, must think o itsel as a partner in as well as a beneciary o

the United States strategic pirouette. Why? Because the remorseless logic

o sel-help, whereby nation-states bear primary responsibility or their own

deense, still rules international aairs. And because appearances count in

alliance politics. A lesser ally that covets help rom a stronger one must

demonstrate that it merits the eort, lest the strong stand aside during a cri-

sis. aipeis perormance is suspect in both military and diplomatic terms.

Deense budgets, a rough gauge o political resolve, have dwindled romalready meager levels. Military spending stood at 2.2 percent o GDP in

2012, down rom 3.8 percent in 1994.1

25


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JaMes holMes is professor of strategy at

the U.S. Naval War College.


34/42

For comparisons sake, 2 percent o GDP constitutes NAOs bench-

mark or deense expenditures.2 aiwan barely meets the standard xed by

an alliance whose members ace no threat. Tis is not the behavior o anally serious about its deense.

aipei thus remains on a peacetime ooting even as the cross-strait mili-

tary balance tilts more and more lopsidedly toward the mainland. Its armed

orces capacity to withstand assailants long enough or U.S. orces to reach

the theater is increasingly doubtul. Only by conspicuously upgrading its

deenses can the islands leadership help a U.S. president justiy the costs

and hazards o ordering increasingly scarce, and thus increasingly precious,

orces into battle against a peer competitor. Otherwise the American peopleand their elected ofcials may ask why they should risk vital interests or the

sake o an ally that appears unwilling to help itsel.

Granted, this is a dark picture to paint at a time when knowledgeable

observers proclaim that peace has broken out in the aiwan Strait. But think

about it. Te United States superpower statusamong the most vital o vital

interestshinges on sea power. Losing a major part o the U.S. Pacic Fleet

in an aternoon would set back the republics standing in the world. Even in

victory, a costly encounter could carry dire consequences or both the United

States and the global order over which its sea services preside.

In short, U.S. presidents can no longer blithely send orces into combat

in the Western Pacic. It is no longer 19951996, when the Clinton admin-

istration dispatched two aircrat-carrier task orces to the islands vicinity

to deter Chinese aggression during presidential elections. Te prospective

adversary is ar more capable, the costs o battle mounting in relative terms.

Ater all, each ship or aircrat lost in combat constitutes a bigger propor-tion o a smaller orce. Beijing is counting on the increasing lumpiness o

U.S. military capital to help dissuade Washington rom involving itsel in

a cross-strait war.

Te decision will be doubly difcult i aiwan seems indierent to its

own securityindeed, to its own political survival. Te island must help

America pivot to the region rather than assume help will automatically

arrive during times o strie.

27

James R. Holmes


35/42

coMPeting to Mold washingtons cost/

Benefit calculus

Teory helps clariy such matters. Strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz urges

statesmen and commanders to impose rationality on international striean

arena or chance, riction, and dark passionsas best they may. Te value

o the political object, writes Clausewitz, should govern the magnitude and

duration o the eort a belligerent puts orth to gain that object. In other

words, how much importance a combatant attaches to its goals determines

how many resourceslives, weaponry, treasureit should expend on the

undertaking, and or how long.3 It is the price a belligerent is willing to pay.Should the costs come to exceed the likely gains, adds Clausewitz, the

leadership should write o its losses and exit the conict as graceully as

possible.4 Such hardscrabble logic should trouble aipei, raising the pros-

pect o American abandonment. And it gets worse. No enthusiast or alli-

ances, Clausewitz adds laconically that One country may support anothers

cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own. A moderately-

sized orce will be sent to its help; but i things go wrong the operation is

pretty well written o, and one tries to withdraw at the smallest cost.5

Allied commitments, that is, are typically tepid. Harvard proessor Steve

Walt maintains that common interests and threats, cultural and social a-

nities, and incentives or coercion urnished by the leading partner can

bind together alliances and coalitions.6 I so, his taxonomy oers scant

comort or aipei.

Consider. Te same things are not at stake or aiwan and the United

States in East Asia. Washington must uphold regionwide and global inter-ests while keeping the peace in the Strait. aipei concerns itsel mainly with

cross-strait relations. aipei clearly cannot pay o or compel Washington

to ght on its behal. Tat leaves sympathy or a ellow democracy under

threat as the chie motive impelling the United States to intervene. Yet Walt

declares that social and cultural afnities are relatively weak adhesives.7

Doubtless Clausewitz would agree.

o bias a stronger patrons cost/benet calculus in avor o military inter-

vention, accordingly, a lesser ally like aiwan must shoulder as much o theburden as it can, demonstrating it remains a going concern while keeping

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down the costs to its ally. o help the United States pivot to its deense,

aiwan must demonstrate that the ght will not be too costly or take too

long. Showing the American people and their leaders that they can advancea worthy but secondaryor themcause at an acceptable price will ease

Washingtons decision to intervene.

In eect aipei must counter a reciprocal Chinese eort to shape U.S.

calculations. Beijing hopes to persuade Washington it will take a protracted,

bloody struggle to keep aiwan independent, and that the island isnt worth

the costs and dangers. In Clausewitzian terms, Beijings anti-access/area-

denial strategy will drive up the magnitude and duration o any eort to

intervene across the Pacic Ocean. o see how this strategy works, considerwhat the military pivot is. It is a oreign-policy enterprise by which U.S.

joint orces concentrate or action in remote theaters. Te military must

mass strategically signicant quantities o manpower and armaments in

a contested theater like the Far East, surmounting both transoceanic dis-

tances and regional antagonists attempts to veto intervention.

Tat it can do so is hardly a oregone conclusion, notwithstanding hope-

ul claims that U.S. orces remain overwhelmingly superior at sea and alot,

and that Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) trails ar behind in num-

bers, technological sophistication, and human prowess.8

Respect or prospective oes is a healthier attitude. Clausewitz warns

statesmen and commanders not to assume the red team is some inert object

on which the blue team can work its will. Te opponent is a living, think-

ing agent determined to thwart the blue teams strategy. It means to prevail

in the collision o two living orces, or continual grappling or strategic

advantage, that impels competition and conict among nations.9

rue to Clausewitzian logic, China has ashioned a maritime strategy

meant to erect a contested zone in the Western Pacic, raising the costs

o orcible entry into the region.10 Indeed, the Chinese Communist way

o war is premised precisely on wearing out and turning the tables on a

superior adversary ghting ar rom home. Maoist strategy envisioned lur-

ing an enemy in deep, letting him overextend and exhaust himselmuch

as a savvy boxer gave ground at the outset o a bout while readying a

devastating counterpunch.11 Picking o hard-to-replace ships, aircrat, andarmaments as the U.S. Pacic Fleet lumbered toward Asia would compel

29

James R. Holmes


37/42

Washington to consider the larger repercussions o ghting or a second-

ary object like aiwan. Te rational cost/benet calculus could well bias

Washington against undertaking such a campaign.Te PLA, then, need not deeat U.S. expeditionary orces outright to

exact unbearable costs. Clausewitz observes that there are two routes to

victory apart rom the obvious one, namely overthrowing the enemy on the

battleeld or unseating his regime. One antagonist can convince the other

he cannot win, or that the price o winning is too steep.12 Anti-ship mis-

siles, diesel submarines, shore-based tactical aircrat, and ast patrol crat

are some implements by which Beijing can impose heavy losses on U.S.

Navy reinorcements steaming to the relie o Asian alliesand thus inatethe price o victory.13 Tese implements are already in the PLA inventory.

Teir numbers are swelling by the day.

Grasping the perils posed by anti-access strategy, a U.S. president might

hesitate beore committing orces to combator orego the venture alto-

gether. I so, the PLA will have delayed or interrupted the pivot, isolating

aiwan militarily or long enough to ulll its purposes.

a strategic Pivot for taiwan

What to do? In a sense aipei needs to undertake a pivot o its own, aimed

at ensuring that its chie protector can, and will, come to its aid in war-

time. wo general recommendations: aiwan needs to spend more, and it

needs to spend wisely. Spending more on deense is about more than amass-

ing capabilities to help right the cross-strait military balance, importantthough that is. Demonstrating ortitude is as important as backing strategy

with steel. GDP gures oer a simple, readily intelligible index or aiwans

commitment to its independence. A U.S. president could use such indica-

tors to persuade American constituents the island merits the expense, loss o

lie, and hazards o war. Islanders who show pluck look like a good cause.

Americans would rally to aiwans deense, just as they rallied to Great

Britains deense seventy years ago.

Spending wisely means devising strategy whereby aiwans armedorces hold out long enough or U.S. orces to pierce Chinese anti-access

30



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deenses. aipei long thought in oensive terms, assuming its navy and air

orce could command the seas and skies, outmatching a large but backward

PLA. Command is no longer tenable. Nevertheless, all is not lost. Executedsmartly, a strategically deensive posture would harden aiwan against as-

sault while turning the logic o anti-access to its advantage. I China can

ratchet up the costs and hardships or a superior U.S. military surging into

its nautical environs, aiwan can replicate its approach on the micro level

punishing superior PLA orces along its shorelines. On land, dug-in anti-

ship and anti-air missile sites could take a high toll rom an amphibious

assault orce. Swarms o light combatants could wage guerrilla warare at

sea, rendering nearby waters and skies a no-go zone or invaders.Such active deense measures would grant the island and its protector a

precious commodity, time. Furthermore, commanders could deploy such re-

sidual oensive air and sea assets as the armed orces retained to the islands

east. Clearing a corridor o PLA anti-access orces would lighten the burden

on the U.S. Pacic Fleetreducing American combat losses while holding

down the magnitude o the eort required simply to reach the theater. In

short, boosting the means available or aiwans deense while aligning these

means with strategy betting the weak would turn cost/benet logic in avor

o allied solidarity. And the allies joint pivot would be complete.

notes

1. Shirley Kan, aiwan: Major Arms Sales since 1990(Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, November29, 2012), esp. pp. 3335.

2. NAO Chie to Warn Deense Cuts Could Endanger Alliances Power,Reuters, January 30, 2013, .

3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 92.

4. Clausewitz, On War, p. 92.


6. Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance o World Power,

International Security9, no. 4 (spring 1985): pp. 343.

7. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance o World Power, pp. 343.8. Robert S. Ross, Te Problem with the Pivot, Foreign Afairs, November/

December 2012,


39/42

the-problem-with-the-pivot>.


10. Barry Posen, Command o the Commons: Te Military Foundation o U.S.

Hegemony, International Security28, no. 1 (summer 2003): pp. 546.11. Mao Zedong, Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, in Selected Military

Writings o Mao se-ung, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp.

220, 234.


13. Ronald ORourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications or U.S.

Navy CapabilitiesBackground and Issues or Congress(Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, December 10, 2012).

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AsiA ProgrAm

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

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Taiwan and the U.S. Pivot to Asia

Documents

Transcript of Taiwan and the U.S. Pivot to Asia