Chapter 4

TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONAND COORDINATION

This chapter addresses key factors in planning and executingan HA mission—from forming the JTF through terminating it.Phases of the operation include predeployment planning,deployment, employment, redeployment, and transition and/ortermination. This chapter identifies unique or criticalconsiderations for HA operations that differ from standardmilitary operations. Lessons learned from recent operationsprovide the basis for this chapter. Appendix A provides a list ofpast humanitarian assistance JTFs.

JOINT TASK FORCE TAILORING

In addition to the JTF headquartersdiscussed in the previous chapter, special staffelements and functional commands mold theforce to the particular nature of each HAmission. The JTF is tailored during the unifiedcommand’s predeployment planning phase;therefore, all of these organizations are notrequired for a given situation.

The nature of HA may require a JTF to betailored so that combat support (CS) and CSSforces (CA, engineer, medical, logistics) may

have an equal or greater role than otherassigned units. JTF organization andcomposition specific to HA are addressed interms of special staff sections, consolidatedfunctions, and areas of operations. Figure 4-1presents a model of notional JTF organizationfor HA.

Coordinating and managing specialfunctions in a unified manner may be ofbenefit to the JTF and the mission. Throughproper integration of support methods, the

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JTF can eliminate duplication of effort andconserve scarce resources. Examples of unifiedfunctions may include-

A joint task force support command(JTFSC).A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB).A joint movement center (JMC).A coalition forces support team (CFST).

JOINT TASK FORCESUPPORT COMMAND

During Operation Restore Hope (Somalia1992-1993), the JTF organized a JTFSC. TheJTFSC was a functional component commandof the JTF. The mission of the JTFSC was to“provide logistics and medical support for USforces and as directed/required coalition forcesdeployed in support of Operation RestoreHope. . . provide common item support,interservice support, inland distribution of POLand dry cargo, and common used portoperations as directed by the commander of thejoint task force (CJTF).”

As a separate JTF component and coequalto other JTF service components, the JTFSCserves as an honest broker for setting theater

logistics priorities and allowing certainefficiencies and economies of scale to beachieved in logistics operations. Additionally,the Army CSS units in the JTFSC contributeto the theater’s line haul and water productionrequirements.

JOINT FACILITIESUTILIZATION BOARD

The J4 forms the JFUB. In a situationwhere a large number of coalition forces existor US military forces operate within the samegeographic area, allocation of facilities toaccommodate all parties is necessary. TheJFUB acts as the executive agent to deconflictreal estate issues arising from multiple-userdemands on limited facilities and recommendscourses of action on unresolved issues. TheJFUB can address coalition forceaccommodations, ammunition storage points,joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transitfacilities, and so forth.

JOINT MOVEMENT CENTERThe combatant commander establishes the

JMC to provide support to HA operations. TheJMC coordinates strategic movements with

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USTRANSCOM. In addition, it oversees theexecution of transportation priorities. TheJMC is responsible for planning movementoperations and for monitoring the overallperformance of the transportation system. Itexpedites action and coordination forimmediate movements requirements to ensureeffective and efficient use of transportationresources. The JMC is normally under thestaff supervision of the senior logistics staffofficer.

COALITION FORCESSUPPORT TEAM

In a multinational HA operation, a CFSTcoordinates actions with coalition units. Dutiesof the CFST may include—

Welcoming and orienting arriving forces.

Providing initial staging sites, water,rations, and other support.Assessing the capabilities of coalitionforces and their potential for prospectiveJTF missions and employment.Determining political sensitivities (historichostilities or assistance) between coalitioncountries and the area of HA operations.Receiving, processing, and providingintelligence to arriving coalition forces.Briefing ROE to arriving coalition forces.Conducting ongoing assessments ofcoalition capabilities and recommendingappropriate missions.

Briefing C2 relationships and relationshipswith NGOs, PVOs, and UN agencies.

PREDEPLOYMENTThe supported CINC commences formal

planning on receipt of the CJCS warningorder. Initial planning might begin earlier,based on intelligence reports that alert theCINC of a possible HA support mission.Normally, the CINC’s J2 or J3 has the lead oninterpreting warning signals (such asstarvation patterns, seismic or volcanicactivity, civil war, or weather trends).Contingency plans for the affected area mayalready exist to support a HA-type operation.

The CINC determines whether the HAoperation is a supporting operation or themain operation. The CINC’s intent and thedesired end state form the foundation for themission. In many situations, the CINC willhave plans or predesignated JTFs to conductan HA-type mission. However, the CINCmight use a standing JTF, a predesignatedcontingency JTF, or a newly designated JTFtask-organized for the specific HA mission.The CINC organizes the JTF according to jointdoctrine and established standing operatingprocedures (SOPs). Joint Pub 5-00.21 providesspecific guidance for the JTF.1 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,

September 1991.

During planning, the JTF organizationand staff must be tailored to meet therequirements of the HA mission. Plannersdetermine whether military units will operateunder neutral humanitarian aid authoritiesand, where possible, from neutral bases.Clarity of command, control, andcommunications (C3) relationships among theJTF, DOS, USAID/OFDA, the UN, ICRC, thehost nation, and NGOs and PVOs reducesorganizational conflicts and duplicative reliefefforts.

The eventual transition of HA operationsmust be an integral part of predeploymentplanning. Transition activities must begin assoon as the JTF arrives in theater. To ensurethat everyone understands and agrees to thetransition plan, it should be part of theoperations order (OPORD). Transition isdiscussed in detail later in this chapter.

Readiness—often the success ofhumanitarian missions to reduce suffering andsave lives-hinges on the timeliness ofresponding units. Predeployment plans shouldaccount for streamlined deployment proceduresthat may be critical in disaster scenarios wheretime is crucial. Plans should also provide forrapid deployment joint readiness exercises so

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that coordination and interagency relationshipscan be tested and refined.

As discussed in Chapter 1, HA operationsmight involve coalition forces. In such a case,the JTF might form the core of a larger CTF.2

JTF planners should consider coalitionoperations. The new draft Joint Pub 3-163provides additional considerations. A keyquestion of the JTF is what role the militaryforce will provide to the relief effort. Will theJTF provide the actual relief (food, logistics,medicine, transport relief supplies) andprovide security for the UN, ICRC, and NGOsand PVOs?

Upon being assigned a mission, the CINCorganizes the appropriate JTF or a singlecomponent command to accomplish themission. As in all military operations, a JTFrequires a clear mission statement. The CJTFmay have to develop and submit his ownmission criteria up the chain of command. Forexample, the mission statement for OperationProvide Comfort (Northern Iraq) included:

Provide medical care.Provide clothing and shelter.Move into the refugee camps.Provide assistance for the aerial supplyeffort.Organize the refugee camps.Build a distribution system.Provide transportation and/or supervisethe distribution of food and water.Improve sanitation.Provide site and convoy security.Planners dictate the JTF’s composition,

which depends on the mission, initialestimates of the situation, and guidance fromhigher headquarters. As in all operations,major mission areas, such as force security,sustainment, and HA requirements, competefor limited time and assets. Planners shouldconsider the possible need to augment HAJTFs with expertise not typically resident inmost commands.

synonymously.2 Throughout this chapter, JTF and CTF are used

3 Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

The CJTF should realize that the JTF willencounter NGOs, PVOs, and IOs in theoperation. Often, these organizations are in thearea before the force arrives, remain while theforce accomplishes its mission, and stay in placeonce the force departs. These organizations arestaffed with competent and knowledgeablepeople who are fully cognizant of the politicaland cultural traditions of the area. Coordinationand cooperation with these organizations can beparamount to the success of the HA operation.

COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANDuring planning, the JTF develops a

subordinate campaign plan in order to outlinethe commander’s intent. The phases of theplan for Operation Restore Hope are shown inFigure 4-2.

AREA ASSESSMENTSArea estimates or studies are key elements

during planning. Current or complete areaassessments or studies may or may not existfor the country or area in which the missiontakes place. The CA direct support team iscapable of updating area assessments. Thesestudies should provide political, cultural,economic, military, geographic, PA, weather,and other information on the area.

HA mission assessments should focus onthe factors that led to the HA mission andcurrent situation. These assessments shouldidentify the causes of the HA crisis and notjust the symptoms. Tasking may involve thecauses or may only address relief of thesymptoms of the crisis. The military forcemust understand that its support to the HAmission may not solve the underlying causesrequiring the HA.

Studies also assist planners in identifyinginformation gaps for further intelligence-gathering such as on—

Infrastructure.Host nation capability.Food capacity.Security risks.Support assets.Storage facilities and requirements.

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Roads, air, and port capabilities.Numbers of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs on theground.

Assessments can answer some of thesequestions. IPB is tailored and expanded inscope to deal with the ambiguities of HAoperations and is critical for planning, forcedesign, and time-phased force deploymentdata (TPFDD) development. Additionally,USAID/OFDA and NGOs, PVOs, and IOs inthe area have experience and knowledge thatcan supplement traditional informationsources.

LOGISTICSHA missions require integrated logistics

assessments. Assessments should includehost nation and theater support capabilities.Remote and austere sites place a high priorityon early deployment of materials handlingequipment and pre-positioned stocks. Detailedlogistics planning should include—

sources for all classes of supply must bedefined.Identification of support methods andprocedures required to meet the air, land,and sea lines of communication.Provisions for coordinating and controllingmovements in the HA area of operations toadjust the materiel flow commensuratewith the throughput capability.A description of the interrelationshipbetween theater and strategic LOCs, toinclude the need for airfields capable ofsupporting strategic and theater airliftaircraft.Development of a country or theaterconcept of support.Development of a plan to provide food,equipment, and medical supplies to relievethe suffering in the absence of NGOs,PVOs, and IOs.The J4 should consider contracting for

Identification of time-phased materiel support capabilities to augment criticalsupplies, services,requirements, facilities, and real estate concerns.and other Contracting support can come from within theresources necessary to support the current host nation or from outside the country. Ifoperation. support is contracted from inside the country,

Determination of logistics planning factors the country logistical resources should be ableto be used for this operation and to support the country first and then thedevelopment of logistics requirements. military requirements. Contracted supplies,Additionally, the method to determine transportation, labor, and services can aid the

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host nation’s economy and facilitate thetransfer of responsibilities back to the nationor NGOs and PVOs. Contracting customs varyby country or region, and contracted servicesand goods from one country may not beacceptable in the host country for a variety oflegitimate reasons.

Logistics support to coalition countries canbecome a critical issue. Such support burdensUS logistics forces but may help bring aboutthe participation of other countries in the HAeffort and hasten the departure of US forces.The JTF must establish movement prioritiesamong JTF support requirements, USGovernment-furnished HA materiel, coalitionor UN requirements, and possible NGO andPVO HA materiel. The JTF must work withcoalition or UN forces and NGOs and PVOs toensure their movement requirements areknown. The primary means for originating andvalidating movement requests is the JointOperations Planning and Execution System(JOPES). The effective movement of materielrequires close coordination among the JTFservice components, UN or coalition forces,NGOs and PVOs, the regional CINC, andUSTRANSCOM.

Some JTF commanders have successfullydeveloped a multinational logistics commandto coordinate the vast array of logisticalresponsibilities that support a coalitionmission. This useful and viable option can beconsidered but should be focused towardcertain common-use consumables such as fuelor rations. Other areas, such as medical andhealth service support, may require a morenarrow national perspective when planning—for example, the provision of blood supply. ForUN operations, the JTF commander shouldobtain specific guidance regarding proceduresto be followed for seeking possiblereimbursement for supplies and equipmentassociated with the operation.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENTThe supported CINC establishes ROE,

which are critical for force protection, for HAoperations. Based on the CINC’s guidance andthe evolving situation on scene, the CJTFshould be prepared to request changes to the

ROE and forward them up the chain ofcommand for approval.

All units in the theater must disseminate,understand, and rehearse ROE. Coalitionforces must understand the ROE and reduceany discrepancies between the ROE andinstructions from their military headquarters.Not all countries have the same ROE orinterpret them the same. The CJTF shouldcommunicate ROE to other participants, suchas NGOs and PVOs, as much as possiblewithout compromising security.

Once the JTF finalizes the ROE, unitcommanders must train the force to reinforcethe rules. In a perfect situation, trainingwould commence before deployment. Since HAoperations may be time-sensitive, training inROE is continuous. It may be beneficial tocondense ROE into ROE cards and rehearselikely situations through HA exercises.Appendix B provides sample ROE for HAoperations.

CODE OF BEHAVIORThe international community has

developed a proposed Code of Behavior forMilitary and Civil Defense Personnel inInternational Humanitarian Aid; however,this code is not approved. The JTFcommander should know that—

The code exists.The code has not been endorsed by anyinternational organization and is not binding.Some countries with forces and personnelinvolved in HA may use the code as aguide to behavior.A copy of the code and other military andcivil defense assets (MCDA) documentsmay be available through the UN or someother international organization involvedin a large-scale HA operation.If available, appropriate JTF staff personnelshould review the code.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESSDuring HA operations commanders face

the difficult challenge of determining whetheror not the force is meeting mission objectives.

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Commanders need to understand the progressof the mission to make informed decisionsabout resource allocations and develop ormodify military operations. The JTF maydevelop various MOEs, whether quantitativeor qualitative. No single, all-encompassingMOE checklist exists for HA operations. MOEschange with different missions. MOEs cannotcover every aspect of a mission; therefore,commanders should resist heavy reliance onthem. A discussion of MOEs for domesticresponses is presented in Chapter 5.

Commanders need some means to evaluateoperations. Based on past experience, staffsshould keep several factors in mind whiledeveloping and using MOEs in HA operations.Commanders should ensure that MOEs areappropriate, mission-related, measurable,reasonable in number, sensitive, and useful.

AppropriateThe MOEs should be appropriate to the

objective of the MOE effort. If the objective isto present information to those outside thecommand, MOEs should be broad and few innumber; if the objective is to assist on-scenecommanders in making decisions, MOEsshould be more specific and detailed.

Mission-RelatedMOEs should relate to the mission. If the

mission is security, for example, MOEs shouldhelp commanders judge improvements in or

problems in improving security. If the missionis relief, MOEs should help commanders judgeimprovements in living standards. If themission expands, so should the MOEs.

MeasurableMOEs should vary with changes in the

command’s performance in relation to the missionand opponents. Quantitative MOEs are likely to bemeasured more consistently than nonquantitativeones and thus, when appropriate, are preferable.When using nonquantitative MOEs, the commandshould establish clear criteria for theirmeasurement and disseminate the criteria toprevent accidental mismeasurement ormisinterpretation of the results.

Reasonable in NumberThe number of MOEs should be neither so

few that they are insufficient to fully portraythe situation nor so numerous that theybecome unmanageable or not worth the effortexpended.

SensitiveMOEs should change when the

performance of the command or actions ofopponents change; extraneous factors shouldnot greatly influence them.

UsefulMOEs should respond to changes in the

situation soon enough for a command to detectand act on them. Commanders should meet,

Security and Level of Violence

Percentage of relief supplies (in tons) reachingdistribution centersDistribution centers to distribution pointsDistribution points to feeding centersSource: NGOs, PVOs, HAST, OFDA DARTNumber of violent acts against JTF forcesIndividual ActsOrganized ActsSource: JTF (J2)Number of violent acts against NGOs andPVOs

Individual Acts.Organized Acts.Source: NGOs and PVOsCheckpoints and roadblocks manned byfactions or banditsNumber and locationNumber of overt acts where tolls are extortedSource: NGOs, PVOs, JTF (J2)Decreasing NGO convoy security requirementsNumber of security guards usedSource: NGOs and PVOs

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but not be limited to, the above criteria.Accurate and measurable MOEs cancontribute to mission effectiveness in manyways. MOEs can help the CJTF answer thefollowing questions:

InfrastructureAirfield capacity:

Number of airfields evaluated astransport aircraft-capableDay-night capability

Source: Joint special operations taskforce (JSOTF), JTF (J3)

Water sources: number of gallons of potablewater per day.

Source: JTF (J4), NGOs, and PVOsMain supply routes (MSRs): Percenttrafficability for key MSR lines ofcommunication to relief sites

Source: JTF (J4), NGOs, and PVOs

Medical and Public HealthCrude mortality ratesUnder-five mortality ratesCause-specific mortality rates

MalnutritionDiarrheaAcute respiratory infectionsOther diseases

Severe malnutrition measurements (lessthan 70 percent of height and weightmeasurements).

Source: NGOs and PVOs

AgricultureMarket price of foodsMarket price of animalsHousehold surveys (for example, how muchfood is available in the home?)Food production (cultivation) and animalherds

Source: NGOs and PVOs, JTF

What tactics and/or strategies are or arenot working?Should the CJTF shift the missionemphasis or shift resource allocations?Can the operation shift from one missionphase to another?When is the mission complete?Involvement of IOs, NGOs, and PVOs is

critical in the development of MOEs. Suchinvolvement encourages communication amongthe major participants, assists in data collection,clarifies mission priorities, and expeditestransition and redeployment of military forces.To develop appropriate MOEs, the JTF shouldcoordinate with military commanders anddecision makers representing IO, NGO, andPVO activities. As they are identified, MOEs canthen be organized into four main categories.

Security and level of violence.Infrastructure.Medical and public health.Agriculture.For each category, a graphic identifies

specific measures and potential informationsources. The JTF assigns the section thatcoordinates these inputs and measures trendsover time. Because these trends affect futureplans, the J5 should coordinate this analysis.The frequency with which this data is collectedand measured may vary by campaign phase.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONSProvisions should be made for CJTF input

to the Worldwide Military Command andControl System Intercomputer Network (WIN)and the JOPES data base. The HA missionrequires constant monitoring and updating toensure timely decisions and allocation of assetsto meet the emergency. See Joint Pubs 5-00.24

and 5-03.1.5 During predeployment planning,countless questions require answers.4. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Appendix

A, September 1991.5. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I,

4 August 1993.

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Predeployment Planning Considerations

What is the mission?What is the status of hostile military/paramilitary forces in the area?Who are the key civilian leaders, community elders, and their supporters?What is the status of existing public services, such as water, electricity, communications, sewagecollection, transportation systems and assets, and relief agencies already in place?What is the status of doctors, firemen, and police and their availability and levels of expertise?What is the medical and nutritional condition of civilian personnel and the physical locations ofmedical facilities?What are the unique shelter/food needs and host nation support availability (construction assets,food storage, materials handling equipment, and transportation capacity)?What is the status of sanitation conditions within the AO?What operational facilities and host nation resources are available to support HA forces?What unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the operation?What relief organizations are present and what functions are they performing?What is the international community’s goal and plan for addressing the humanitarian crisis?What is the communications security plan regarding communicating with NGOs, PVOs, UNagencies, and coalition forces? Do these agencies or forces require equipment augmentation?What are the information-gathering and dissemination requirements? What information can beobtained from host nation, UN/coalition forces, and NGOs and PVOs?What is the legal authority for the mission? What agreements or mandates apply to this operation?Are SJA personnel and assets planned for?Have the appropriate ROE been prepared and published prior to deployment?Has the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) been alerted and a request for amedical intelligence report on the area identified?What is the priority of HA capability for the mission: medical, logistics, command and control, forcesecurity, and so forth?What, if any, coordination systems are in place among PVOs, NGOs, and IOs in the host nation?What coordination is required with the ClNC, supporting CINCs, subordinate JTF commands, NGOsand PVOs based in the US, UN organizations, and DOS?What are the liaison requirements?Are interpreters available from the JTF, ClNC, US agencies?What are weather and terrain limiting factors?What is the media presence and the public interest (global visibility) of the HA mission and situation?What is the health service support (HSS) mission? Is it clearly stated in the operationalcommander’s mission statement?What medical intelligence is available for the AO? AFMIC provides information on factors that affecthuman performance capability and well-being such as infectious diseases, sanitation, venomousinsects and animals, toxic plants, the environment, and military and civilian health care capabilities.What is the mission’s target patient population? Military only or are civilians also treated?What is the local standard of care? Can it be continued after forces redeploy?How do HSS systems receive logistics support? HSS logistics planning is an essential element ofthe overall planning process for a successful health care delivery system and should includesupplies, equipment, medical equipment maintenance and repair, optical fabrication, bloodmanagement, transportation, and contracting.Who provides medical laboratory support during assessments and the initial phases of theoperation?

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The employment of the joint forward laboratory (JFL) in Somalia during OperationRestore Hope was invaluable to the JTF surgeons in directing preventive medicineefforts, and the laboratory’s contributions were directly credited with helping minimizemorbidity due to infectious diseases among US personnel.

Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned

DEPLOYMENTDeployment of the JTF is based on the

severity of the situation, political considerations,and mobility assets. Requirements and decisionsmade during planning affect deployment. TheJTF should be structured to deploy in forcepackages. Rapid response, austere conditions,and lack of infrastructure often place uniquedemands on the JTF. Initial phases ofdeployment require only the critical command,control, communications, security, and logisticscapabilities. Follow-on forces deploy ascapabilities expand to support the forces andconduct the HA mission.

PLANNINGDeployment planning and execution

considerations for HA missions arefundamentally the same as in any militaryoperation. Close coordination between the staffsections of the JTF is critical.

COORDINATIONCoordination during the deployment phase

is based on guidance developed during theplanning phase and conditions as they changeregarding the situation. The CJTF mustcontinue to keep the lines of communicationopen with higher headquarters (CINC); servicecomponents of the CINC; subordinate andsupporting commands; NGOs, PVOs, and IOs;the UN; and OFDA DART.

USTRANSCOM consists of the MilitaryTraffic Management Command of the Air MobilityCommand and the Military Sealift Command.These components provide movement schedulesfor requirements in the sequence requested by theCJTF. The JTF needs to update subordinatecommands on changes to the deployment scheduleor changes in the mission. Changes in the mission,such as HA to peace enforcement, may require ashift in force deployment. NGOs, PVOs, IOs, andUN agencies may require JTF support during

Deployment Planning Considerations

Are command and control assets more crucialthan immediate provisions of HA supplies?Are the requirements of the JTF componentsbeing met?Are these requirements complementary orcontradictory to the mission?Do the units being airlifted match up with theequipment (for example, is the JTF sendingengineers to the area when their heavyequipment and construction material are notscheduled to arrive by ship for another twoweeks)?What are the NGO and PVO requirements fortransportation, and has the military committed totransporting their supplies (funding andauthority)?Have preventive medicine units been scheduledfor early deployment?Will media coverage of the initial deploymentfocus on the JTF’s first actions that alleviate theconditions requiring HA?Will conflicting interests for mobility assetsstrain the JTF’s deployment?Will command and control assets, food andmedical supplies, security forces, equipmentassets, and foreign government restrictionsaffect the deployment?How do planners ensure the CJTF'S guidanceand focus of effort is followed?How will accurate and timely submission ofinformation into WWMCCS and JOPES bemaintained to schedule movements and keephigher and lower commands abreast of thedeployment schedule, particularly deploymentcoordination of coalition forces?How will the JTF account for personnel in orderto report casualties, provide essential servicessuch as mail, and determine the total numbersof personnel for the purpose of national/servicereimbursement?

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Two disparate types of operations werebeing conducted simultaneously duringOperation Provide Comfort. One was thehumanitarian effort and the other thesecurity operation. In many ways theycompeted and conflicted with one another.The staff ran these as concurrentoperations and often had to set asidespecific times to focus totally on oneoperation or the other. Because ofconflictng priorities, movement of reliefsupplies and humanitarian forcescompeted with the movement of securityequipment, ammunition, materiel, andforces. Security operations had to precedehumanitarian operations to dear areas ofmines and potential hostile forces. Whilemost civilian relief agendas grew morecomfortable working alongside militaryforces performing humanitarian tasks, theywere not comfortable around gun-totingsecurity forces.

Operation Provide ComfortAfter-Action Report

deployment not already identified duringpredeployment planning.

LIAISON

Liaison teams or personnel (military andcivilian) assigned up and down the chain ofcommand ensure the JTF can identify concernsand issues. These teams are critical during thedeployment phase. Liaison teams in the missionarea are critical to keeping the JTF informed ofchanging conditions and events. They assist theJTF in determining how the HA operation isprogressing and whether emphasis needs to shiftto avoid further human suffering. The HAST(previously discussed in Chapter 3) canaccomplish this critical liaison function ifassigned to support or augment the JTF. Liaisonprocedures extracted from Joint Pub 5-00.22 areprovided in Appendix H.

Liaison personnel should be exchangedamong major contributors to the force. Theirfunctions include the identification of political andlegal constraints, transportation capabilities,logistics requirements, and other factors affectingthe employment of coalition units.

EMPLOYMENTCJTF responsibilities during employment

include force and resource monitoring andmanagement, planning for current and futureoperations, execution, and reporting. Theemployment of a JTF for HA missions hassome unique considerations.

EXECUTIONHA is something most military forces have

not normally trained to accomplish. Securityconcerns, global visibility, politicalconsiderations, acceptance, logistics, healthfactors, and unknown length of mission canaffect the force and the mission. Integratingthe coalition forces impacts on how the JTFassigns missions and organizes the area.

The mission of the JTF, althoughconsistent in its overall direction to relieve theplight of the populace, may undergo major

Employment ConsiderationsWhat is the JTF’s actual role in the HAmission?Does the JTF provide support to the UN,ICRC, NGOs, PVOs, the actual HA?Does the JTF conduct HA and thentransition functions to the UN, ICRC, NGOs,and PVOs?What is the relationship with an OFDADART?Is the HA operation part of a largermission?What are the force objectives?How will the objectives of the mission beevaluated to determine success(quantitative or nonquantitative)?What is the personal code of conduct forthe HA operation?

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evolutions in its specific taskings during theearly stages of the operation. This can be apositive development in that each newestimate of the situation leads to a necessaryrefinement or modification of the mission andtasks. Continuing on-scene estimates of thesituation and rapid adjustment of the missionand tasks are appropriate. This is sometimesreferred to as mission creep.

Military coordination with the UN; NGOs,PVOs, and IOs; and OFDA DART and its on-scene representative is critical during theexecution of the mission. In some cases, 50 ormore NGOs and PVOs may be working in theAOR. These NGOs and PVOs may coordinatetheir efforts, but in some cases, they mayoperate independently of one another. Militaryconcerns may not be compatible with theconcerns of the NGOs and PVOs (security,mission priorities, support requirements,expectations).

Early in the operation, the JTF shouldestablish a dialogue with OFDA DART, NGOs,PVOs, and IOs to ascertain capabilities andlimitations and to facilitate future cooperation.This dialogue can be accomplished with a clearmission statement involving OFDA DART andNGOs and PVOs in mission planning—disseminating the view that OFDA DART andNGOs and PVOs are allies and partners.

Employment considerations and factorsaffecting the outcome of the HA missiondepend on decisions made during planningand deployment. These factors include—

Getting minimum equipment on theground to provide the basic servicerequired.Having sufficient equipment on hand foraustere jump capabilities responsive tonew missions and critical outages.Transitioning key staff positionsdepending on the emphasis of the phase ofthe operation (air-to-ground operations).Having each staff establish a continuityfile.Providing interpreters for PSYOP and CAteams when dealing with large crowds.

Preparing specialized briefing formats todeal with civil-military operations;briefings should emphasize the condition,activities, and especially the needs of thesupported population; briefing UN, ICRC,NGOs and PVOs, and OFDA.Establishing preventive medicine strategiesto take precedence over therapeuticmedicine in the initial stages of an HAsituation; emphasizing sanitation andvaccinations.Deploying PA elements early.Avoiding basing mission success on US orwestern standards; working towardbuilding back the local infrastructure andhealth care system to the level in placebefore the disaster.Encouraging civilian groups to stepforward and coordinate their valuableexpertise and assistance.Coordinating use of transportation assetsto ensure that urgent needs are met.Ensuring coordination is conductedbetween transportation elements and themilitary police who may provide securityand traffic control.Developing plans for recovery operations oftransportation assets, including contingencyplans for replacement of vehicles.Avoiding black market activity bycontrolling distribution of food by rationcards; using local trucks and drivers fordistribution (to stimulate the economy)and monitoring frequently.Determining requirements to repairMSRs.Determining legal and fiscal authority toconduct civic action projects.One consideration for organizing the AO is

to designate HRSs. Geographic boundaries forsuch sectors should include ethnic or tribalboundaries, political affiliation, relief agencyAO, political acceptance of certain coalitioncountries, and contiguous sectors with forcesassigned (components assigned multiplesectors are connected).

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SECURITYSecurity is the CJTF's responsibility. JTF

planners must specifically address security forNGOs and PVOs in ROE, the missionstatement, or both. Depending on theenvironment, security forces may be necessary.ROE should contain guidance regarding whichpeople JTF forces may protect. Hostile crowds,starving people, armed resistors, or banditsrequire appropriate responses. It may benecessary to first establish the environment forHA operations to commence peace enforcement.This requirement can adversely affect the speedand effectiveness with which assistance isprovided to the area. Security of the JTF is aprimary concern. Some concerns include—

Ports and airfields.NGO and PVO requests.US Government activities such as OFDADART.Host nation agencies.HA recipients.HA supplies, convoys, and MSRs.HA distribution centers.Convoy security for HA follows the same

set of tactics for any military convoy operation.If the JTF is tasked to provide convoy securityor security for the NGOs and PVOs, then itshould plan such with input from all forcesand agencies involved. The organization of theAO into component or HRS can causeproblems for convoy operations. A movementcontrol center (MCC) established to coordinatetransportation coordinates all cross-boundarytravel and security responsibilities for convoyoperations.

In a hostile environment the JTF mayhave the added responsibility of weaponsconfiscation. JTF planners must developspecific plans and procedures and disseminatethem to all forces. In addition, the ROE shouldaddress the use of force during weaponsconfiscation operations. Special considerationmust be given to the security forces employedby the NGOs and PVOs.

INTELLIGENCEHA operations require intelligence

information because they are politicallysensitive, conducted in the midst of civilianpopulations during times of crisis, and employforces with substantial capabilities. Thecommander must continuously and clearlyidentify information requirements to providethe necessary resources to conduct intelligenceoperations.

Even more than with other types ofmilitary operations, successful HA operationsare dependent upon timely and actionableintelligence. As in other MOOTW, intelligencein HA operations must deal with all aspects ofthe AO, to include personnel and organizationstherein. In this environment, militaryintelligence requirements include suchsubjects as political, ethnic, religious, andeconomic factors. Some supporting intelligencepublications are listed in the Referencessection.

Host nation populations hold the key as towhether an HA mission succeeds. While USand/or friendly armed forces are tasked tosupport humanitarian goals, each and everything has a potential political, economic,military, social, or religious impact on thepopulation or segments of the population. Theprimary intelligence effort should be to assessthe agenda of every faction and determine howit may affect friendly operations. Open sourcesare employed to determine patterns ormethods of operation, factional-associatedgeography, and factional-associated agendas.The resulting analysis is employed to-

Avoid obvious hostilities.Prepare for nonobvious hostilities(ambushes and deliberate attacks on theHA force).Employ appropriate force in order toaccomplish the mission.Human intelligence (people talking to or

about people) is a significant portion of any HAintelligence support program. However, itmust be accomplished properly. Formalcontact with NGOs and PVOs should bedirected through CMOC personnel. The result

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of increased focus on intelligence is units andmilitary personnel with a greater situationalawareness. This enhances the ability of USforces to make informed judgments aboutwhich areas to avoid, where to take extraprecautions, and so forth, based upon theirspecific mission and the overall HA mission.

COMMUNICATIONSThe ability to communicate with all of the

military forces, NGO, PVOs, UN agencies, hostnation agencies, and other organizationsinvolved in the HA operation is imperative.See Figure 4-3. Communications with coalitionforces, OFDA DART; NGOs, PVOs, and IOs;and other agencies should be established earlyin the operation.

Most likely, nonmilitary agencies will havecommunications networks established for theirown uses. These networks may includecommercially leased circuits (from the hostnation communications agencies andcompanies), commercially leased satelliteservices (such as INMARSAT), and high-frequency (ham, long distance) and very highfrequency (intravehicular convoy control type)radios. As robust military communications mostlikely will not be available, close cooperationbetween nonmilitary agencies and militaryforces will be required to maximize efficient use

of available commercial and host nationcommunications net works. As militarycommunications assets are phased in for theoperation, NGOs, PVOs, and others can beexpected to increasingly request access to thosecommunications. Any supporting plans mustinitially allow for very limited militarycommunications and emphasize reliance oncommercial and host nation communicationsassets. In addition, these plans must closelyaddress needs for secure communications andrequirements to control cryptographic materials(secure telephones, keymat, and so forth) andreleasability of cryptographic and/or classifiedinformation to others.

JTF planners must identify and planfrequency management for the operation.Regulations and orders for integrating coalitionforces into the frequency management programhave to be deconflicted with securityrequirements. The use of nonmilitary radios andcommunications equipment by OFDA DART,NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC can createdeconfliction problems. Planners must alsoconsider host nation requirements andrestrictions.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATIONSPA considerations are important for

several reasons. First, the public and the

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media have an intense level of interest in JTFoperations; second, the members of the JTFneed PA services; third, commanders andsoldiers of the JTF must be able tocommunicate their intentions and actions tointerested audiences. These considerations canbe met through planning for establishment ofradio and television broadcast stations and aJIB in the theater.

MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONSMedical considerations for the JTF in an

HA environment are significant. The two areasto consider are medical care for the JTF andcoalition forces and medical care for the localpopulace. In general, JTF medical assetssupport JTF personnel, while host nationfacilities, NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRChealth organizations support themselves andthe civilian population. In most cases the AO isaustere and environmentally hostile. This cancause the JTF to suffer many medical andsanitation problems. Good medical estimatesand preventive medicine planned early in theoperation can pay significant dividends. Theseinclude immunizations for all personnel,prevention of insect-borne diseases, andprevention of fly, water, and food-borneillnesses.

The JTF should use its preventive medicineassets. Intensive epidemiological monitoring,coupled with sophisticated diagnostic capabilities(serology, bacteriology, parasitology) can helpprevent development of epidemics amongdeployed forces.

Title 10, US Code, prohibits use of militarymedical assets for treatment of civilians exceptwhen specially authorized by the appropriateauthority. This can cause problems for the JTFregarding the perception that the US cannotand will not assist the area with medical care.The highly visible nature of US cantonmentareas naturally leads civilians to seek medicaltreatment from these facilities. Because thisissue is above CJTF level, he must plan earlyin the operation how to deal with civilianmedical requests.

Medical planners should attempt tocoordinate with NGO, PVO, UN, and ICRCmedical facilities immediately upon commencing

the operation. The JTF should create some typeof central point or organization for coordinatingmedical requirements. However, the differingpolicies and positions of individual NGOs, PVOs,and IOs; military capabilities and policies; andhost nation requirements can create friction. Amedical coordination agency formed at the HOCor CMOC can provide a viable solution formedical requirements. Formation of thiscoordination agency by the JTF and earlycooperation by the parties involved in theoperation increases efficiency and reducesredundancy. The JTF must establish policies fortreating civilians injured by JTF actions andprovide air search and rescue and/or medicalevacuation assets for civilians.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCEThe military often provides technical

assistance in the form of advice, assessments,manpower, and equipment to host nations orcivilian agencies. NGOs, PVOs, and IOs mayseek the advice of military personnel toconduct projects necessary to accomplish theirmission. Early in the operation, the CJTFshould determine policy regarding technicalassistance to be provided to NGOs, PVOs, andIOs. Use of military equipment and supplies toconduct civil action-type missions may belimited or forbidden. Early in the operation,the CJTF should establish criteria to providetechnical assistance to NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.The JTF may conduct projects to build orimprove infrastructure needed to complete themilitary portion of the HA mission, onceapproved and funded.

NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC normallydistribute food and other supplies by usingtheir own or contract transportation assets.Use of military assets to conduct the actualdelivery of supplies is usually discouragedunless the situation is life threatening. Plansto overcome problems or obstacles should besolicited from NGOs, PVOs, IOs, indigenouspersonnel, and the military.

AIRSPACE COORDINATIONCoordination for air operations follow

normal airspace coordination procedures forany joint or coalition operation. The additional

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A good example of technical assistanceoccurred during Operation Restore Hopeduring the flooding of the lower ShabelleRiver. Through the CMOC, a PVOproposed a solution to contain theShabelle river. The CMOC referred thePVO to the JTF engineer officer foradvice. Following consultation, the PVOrequested technical assistance in theform of equipment and operators toassist in building dikes. The CMOC andOFDA dispatched a team to the floodregion, conducted an assessment, andvalidated the requirement for JTFsupport. Based on a need identified bythe PVO, technical assistance in theform of advice, assessment, equipment,and personnel was provided by the JTF.

Operation Restore HopeCMOC Operations Officer

burden on coordination involves the HA cargoflights conducted by NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.During a large relief operation, increasednumbers of arriving and departing flights mayoverwhelm the host nation airspace controlsystem. In cases where no airspace controlfacilities exist, the JTF may have to establishan interim airspace coordination system, toinclude—

Broad policies and procedures.Strategic and theater airlift requirements.Airspace management procedures.Procedures to coordinate both military andcivilian sorties.The JTF may or may not have air control

authority over incoming NGO, PVO, and IOflights. Close coordination and agreementswith NGOs and PVOs over control of NGO,PVO, and IO cargo flights reduce airspacesafety concerns and add to the efficiency ofdelivering HA supplies.

COORDINATIONWITH RELIEF AGENCIES

Coordination with the host nation and awide variety of relief organizations lies at

the core of HA operations. Mission successdepends on the US military turnover of HAresponsibilities, including security, to thehost nation or relief organization. Closecoordination improves this process.Figure 4-3 does not attempt to illustrate alllevels of liaison and coordination amongparticipating agencies. It does, however,illustrate the many sources of input to theJTF in HA situations. CJTF options for thiscoordination use the HAST, the HOC, andthe CMOC, which fall under the cognizanceof the J3 and J5 staff sections.

Humanitarian Operations CenterTo coordinate military operations with

the requirements of the host nation orNGOs, PVOs, and IOs, the CJTF can requestthat a HOC be created. The HOC, if created,is usually collocated with the appropriateheadquarters, such as the UN, conductingthe operation. HOC functions include—

Developing an overall relief strategy.Identifying and prioritizing HA needs tothe JTF.Identifying logistics requirements forNGOs, PVOs, and IOs.The HOC is not as much a location or

cell as it is a policy-making and governingbody. In the military sense, the HOC doesnot command and control but attempts tobuild a consensus for team-building andunity of effort.

The HOC should consist of decisionmakers from the military forces command(JTF), UN agencies, DOS (USAID [OFDADART]), regional NGO and PVOrepresentatives, ICRC, and host nationauthorities. The HOC coordinates activitiesand does not necessarily control. Theorganization of the HOC appears inFigure 4-4.

The HOC normally has a UN directorand deputy directors from the JTF andOFDA DART. Within the HOC the policy-making body is the standing liaisoncommittee, which is comprised of UN, JTF,OFDA DART, and NGO and PVOrepresentatives. HOC core groups and

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During Exercise Emerald Expressconducted in January 1994, the1st Marine Division used personnel andequipment from its artillery regiment tocoordinate HA operations. Thisinnovative concept was explored firstbecause the mission-essential task list(METL) paralleled the requirements forHA coordination (for example, the skillsmatched); second, the artillery regimentwas under-utilized during previous HAmissions; and third, much of the artilleryunit equipment (transportation andcommunications) was extremely usefulduring HA operations.

The liaison and coordination skillsessential to fire support teams applieddirectly to HA. At the same time thesupporting perspective possessed byevery artillery officer, transferred directlyto a military role in support of NGO andPVO food distribution. Additionally, itwas unnecessary to establish ad hocteams to meet coordination and liaisonrequirements because these unitsalready existed.

Based on discussions with

committees meet to discuss and resolveissues related to topics such as medicalsupport, agriculture, water, health, andeducation.

Civil-Military Operations CenterAt the tactical level, the CJTF can form

a CMOC as the action team to carry out theguidance and decisions of the HOC. TheCMOC is a group of service members thatserve as the military’s presence at the HOC,as well as the military liaison to thecommunity of relief organizations.Normally, the CMOC director is also theHOC’s military deputy director. Figure 4-5chows the organization of a CMOC.

The CMOC performs the liaison andcoordination among the military supportcapabilities and the needs of the HAorganizations. The CMOC, in coordinationwith OFDA DART, receives, validates, andcoordinates requests from NGOs, PVOs, andIOs. The CMOC usually consists of 8 to 12persons; however, its size is mission-dependent. The commander may addelements as appropriate.

A proposed layout for an effectivelyorganized CMOC is included as Figure 4-6.This configuration is based on lessons learnedfrom previous large-scale HA operations andcan be modified as the situation requires.Communications capabilities are an essentialcomponent of the CMOC and should becarefully prioritized. The CMOC supportsNGOs, PVOs, and IOs by responding tovalidated logistical and security supportrequirements. During CMOC meetings(usually daily), the CMOC identifies JTF

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components that are capable of fulfilling therequests to support the NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.Validated requests go to the JTF operationscell and then to the component or coalitionforce LNO for action. The CMOC may—

Validate the support request in theabsence of the OFDA DARTrepresentative.Coordinate military requests for militarysupport with various military componentsand NGOs and PVOs.Convene and host ad hoc mission planninggroups involving complicated militarysupport, numerous military units, andnumerous NGOs and PVOs.Promulgate and explain JTF policies toNGOs and PVOs.Provide information on JTF operationsand general security operations.Serve as a focal point for weapons policies.Administer and issue NGO and PVOidentification cards.Validate NGO, PVO, UN, and ICRCpersonnel required for JTF aircraft tarmacspace, space availability (seats on militaryaircraft), and access-related issues.Coordinate medical requirements.Chair port, rail, and airfield committeemeetings for space and access-relatedissues.Maintain 24-hour operations.Maintain contact with regional and sectorCMOCs.Support CA teams, as required.Facilitate creation and organization of afood logistics system for food relief efforts.Normally, NGO and PVO requests come to

the CMOC for action. The proposed NGO andPVO support request flow is based onoperational lessons learned.

DISPLACED PERSONSAND REFUGEES

During many HA scenarios, shelter orhousing may need to be provided to displacedindividuals. A good reference for administration

Support Request FlowNGOs and PVOs—

Prepare complete support requestSubmit request to DART/CMOCMonitor

DART—Validates requestsSubmits requests to the CMOC

CMOC—Logs requestsAssigns project numberPrioritizesPrepares project folderSubmits project folder to joint operations center(JOC)Monitors

JTF JOC—Receives project folder and logs requestApproves request (uses the attached CA teamto analyze the project and apportion theresources to complete the project)Prepares detailed tasking order (file in folder)Publishes detailed tasking orderRetains folder and monitor

Individual unit providing support—Receives missionAnalyzes the requirementsCommits the resourcesAnnotates resources expendedCompletes the missionPrepares after-action reports with allinformationSubmits after-action reports to the JOC

JOC—Receives after-action report from the unit andfiles in folderCloses out folderReturns folder to CMOC

CMOC—Receives folderSends completed report to the NGO or PVOthat requested the project. The forms used inthe CMOC may include DA 1594 (Staff DutyJournal, Conversation Record) and the locallyproduced NGO/PVO Support Request Form.

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of camps is found in the UN HCR Handbook forEmergencies. The UN designates severalcategories of affected and displaced personprograms. These include externally displacedrefugees, displaced populations within a country,and affected populations within a country. CApersonnel are trained to establish andadminister displaced person and refugee camps.

The requirements for dealing with refugeesand displaced persons are extensive. The keyUN agency, when dealing with agencies, is theUNHCR. Cultural and religious requirements,acceptable food, medical support, properregistration, categories of refugees and displacedpersons, security, camp locations, sanitation,and funding sources constitute some of theconcerns. The ultimate goal is to return therefugee population to its home.

POLITICAL-MILITARY ADVISORSThe JTF should work closely with embassies

of coalition nations as well as with US embassiesin the region. In multinational operations,coalition forces may provide political advisors totheir national headquarters. US forces may havea foreign service officer assigned to supportoperations. The assignment of political advisorsprovides a direct link to US embassies, DOS, andthe political representatives of coalition nations.

LIAISONLiaison requires extensive personnel and

equipment assets in an HA operation. Liaisonpersonnel and teams must be able tocommunicate with their parent command as wellas make certain decisions or commit to carryingout assigned tasks. Liaison personnel shouldhave direct access to their parent command, bekept informed of events and intentions, and beable to brief capabilities and limitations of theircommands.

In coalition operations, liaison personnelshould be exchanged with the larger contingentsof military forces assisting in the operation. TheCMOC provides the primary liaison for the JTFwith NGOs and PVOs, the UN, and ICRC;although liaison throughout the AO is critical.Due to the presence of ICRC and NGOs andPVOs, liaison may be established with selectedNGOs and PVOs, ICRC, and UN agencies. Areference chart of the US military rank structureand insignia is provided in Appendix I.

The need to provide quality personnel onliaison teams cannot be overemphasized.This lesson learned echoed at every levelof the CTF. It is critical in joint andcombined [multinational] operations toensure an effective liaison system is inplace. Liaison personnel must be highlycompetent, have direct access to theirparent command, and be kept informed ofevents and intentions.

The teams with initiative; the trust andconfidence of their commands; solidaccess and communications; andknowledgeable, bright personnel greatlyenhanced the functioning of the entireorganization. Extensive positioning ofliaison personnel throughout Turkey andin the provinces along the lraq-Turkeyborder permitted the CTF to coordinateefforts, which made for more efficientoperations and a closer sense ofcooperation, especially on a number ofpolitically sensitive issues. Quality liaisonpersonnel paid dividends in this role.

Report on Operation Provide Comfort

REDEPLOYMENTRedeployment decisions are based on political Simultaneous to JTF deployment, the CJTF

and military considerations. The JTF provides should begin planning redeployment.assessments for the military. The DOS Redeployment considerations depend on whetherrepresentative provides the political considerations. the JTF has accomplished all or some of itsThe CINC uses this information to recommend objectives. Redeployment of JTF forces begins asredeployment plans to the JCS and NCA soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for

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military forces diminishes. Forces not needed to accomplished, forces are freed to redeploy. Asaccomplish certain objectives should be the operation progresses, political and militaryredeployed as soon as possible. For extended guidance will identify functions and units thatoperations, the CJTF should establish a rotation need to remain in order to accomplishpolicy. objectives not achieved. The requirement for

The JTF should transfer its HA functions the JTF to continue supporting HA operationsto host nation NGOs and PVOs, the UN, and/ must be identified earlier. This identificationor ICRC as soon as possible. As this is affects how the JTF plans for redeployment.

TRANSITION AND/OR TERMINATIONTransition in HA operations involves the

transfer of responsibilities and functions toanother organization. Transition can occurbetween service components within the JTF orfrom the JTF to the UN or host nation.Transition and/or termination is initiated onceobjectives have been met and authority hasbeen received from national decision makers.

In HA operations, transition presentscomplex problems. If forces within the JTF aretransitioning functions between servicecomponents, then the requirements followstandard military handover. If transitioninvolves the JTF transitioning functions orareas back to the host nation, coalition forces,or a UN command, then the requirements maybecome less clear.

A transition plan is useful. It helps the staffidentify transition issues. It is especially

Military operations end wham theobjectives have been attained. The NCAdefine conflict termination objectives anddirect the cessation of operations.Termination plans are designed to securethe major policy objectives that may beattained as the result of militaryoperations. Termination plans must coverthe transition to postconflict activities andconditions as well as disposition ofmilitary forces. Operation plans andtermination plans should normally beprepared together, with the terminationplan included as a supporting plan to theoperation plan.

Extract from Joint Pub 5-0

important to identify those parties or agenciesthat will receive functional responsibilities fromthe JTF. Considerations include which staffsections will write annexes, based on what theUN or transitioning organization will do. Thetransition plan should identify task forceorganization, operating procedures, andtransition recommendations and considerations.In implementing the transition plan, thetransitioning parties should discuss criteria fortransferring operations. The plan should beunclassified, clear, and concise, without militaryjargon.

One method of transitioning is by function.Another method is by locale. If possible, thetransition process should be event-driven andnot tied to calendar dates. Functions or areaswould transfer only when a similar capabilitybecomes available or is no longer needed.Procedures for transfer of equipment orsupplies, either between components of theJTF or with the UN or host nation, must bedetermined.

JTF planners must identify fiscal guidance,reconstitution of assets, and availability anduse of operations and maintenance funds.Several functional areas identified fortransition include logistics, medical services,communications, local security, and engineerservices. The JTF should develop a series ofcriteria on transition to be able to track theprogress being made. This process may bemeasured by a statistical analysis of trends; forexample, a reduction in infant mortality rates.Figure 4-7 is an example of transitioncategories and indicators from OperationRestore Hope.

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The important part of choosing indicators ischoosing the right ones and having a consistentmethod of measuring them. Some indicatorsmay be weighted more than others, and theirimportance may shift due to political, military,or HA considerations. The transition planphases are shown in Figure 4-8.

After conducting a major HA mission, the HAteam should address two areas: documentation oflessons learned and what can be termed after-operation follow-up. Lessons learned should becollected in whatever format applies for thespecific operation. That may mean collectionunder the joint system through the JointUniversal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) orthrough individual service systems such as theArmy’s Center for Army Lessons Learned(CALL). Whenever possible, commanders shouldspecify which system is to be used early in theoperation, so that data can be collected in therequired format. Appendix J provides lessonslearned from four HA operations compiled by

USAID/OFDA from the perspective ofparticipating civilian agencies.

The after-operation follow-up wouldinclude any action by US military forces thatreturn to the affected area to measure thelong-term successes of the mission. Forexample, three to six months after a largequantity of medical supplies and equipmenthad been transferred to host nationals in adisaster area, the geographic CINC mightdirect a medical survey team to return to thearea. The team could determine the extent ofthe usefulness of particular medicines, theappropriateness of the training provided onparticular pieces of equipment, and therequirement for additional actions. JTFplanners should incorporate lessons learnedduring the after-operation follow-up in thesame lessons-learned system that was usedfor the original HA mission.

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