Tactical intelligence support in Somalia.pdf

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TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN SOMALIA:LESSONS LEARNED

thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY RT AND SCIENCE

JAMES M. STUTEVILLE MAJ USAB.S. United States Military AcademyWest Point New York 1981

~ o r t eavenworth Kansas1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART ND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: M J James M. StutevilleThesis Title: Tactical Intelligence Support in Somalia: LessonsLearned

Approved by:

Thesis Committee ChairmanLeS W Grau, M.A.

MemberGraham H. Turbiville, Jr. Ph.D. V

MemberilyAn D. Gregory d 9 ~ Y/

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the studentauthor and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACTTACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN SOMALIA: LESSONS LEARNED by MAJ JamesM. Stuteville, USA, T p a g e s .

7This study examines the tactical intelligence effort for OperationsRESTORE: ROPE and CONTINUE ROPE in Somalia from December 1992 to 31 March1994 The doctrinal principles for intelligence support to forceprojection operations provide the framework for the examination oftactical intelligence support in Somalia. The doctrinal principles ofintelligence support for force projection operations are: thecommander drives intelligence; intelligence synchronization; split-based operations; tactical tailoring; and broadcast dissemination.By analyzing the application of these principles in Somalia, insight wasgained on the lessons learned and tactics, techniques and proceduresdeveloped.The principles proved valid for intelligence support to Operations OtherThan War (OOTW). Analysis of lessons learned revealed that changes arenecessary for improved application of these principles in OOTW. Bettercommunications equipment and more efficient use of counterintelligencepersonnel represent two areas of potential change. The study concludeswith a series of recommendations to improve tactical intelligencesupport in oow.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the efforts of my thesis committee in thecompletion of this thesis. My committee Mr. Les Grau Dr. GrahamTurbiville and Lieutenant Colonel Jeri Gregory guided me through thisproject with great skill and patience. I thank them sincerely for theirefforts.

I owe the inspiration for this thesis to Sergeant Rich Hamiltonwho served in Somalia with the Joint Task Force. His descriptions oflife on the streets df Mogadishu as a counterintelligence agentmotivated me to conduct the research and write this thesis.

Last I wish to thank my wife Mary for her support andencouragement during the months it took to complete this thesis. Herlove and words of encouragement kept me going when I encounteredobstacles.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSp GE

PPROVAL PAGE iiABSTRACT iiiCKNOWLEDGEMENTS ivLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS viINDEX OF MILITARY OPERATIONS viiiCHAPTER

INTRODUCTION 1Historical PerspectiveImportance To Doctrine 3Research Question and Problem Statement 4Key Definitions 5Assumptions 6Limitations 7Delimitations 7Significance of the Study 8

LITERATURE REVIEW 13 RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY 164 DOCTRINE 215 LESSONS LEARNED 46 RECOMMENDATIONS 63

BIBLIOGRAPHY 68INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 4 i j i


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACEARFORBOSCCALLc31CCIRCICINCCISECOSCOMDIADISEDODFA0FMHFHUMINTINTSUMIPB

After Action ReviewAnalysis and Control elementArmy ForceBattlefield Operating SystemCivil AffairsCenter for Army Lessons LearnedCommand, Control, Communications, and IntelligenceCommander s Critical Information RequirementsCounterintelligenceCommander in ChiefCENTCOM Intelligence Support ElementCorps Support CommandDefense Intelligence AgencyDeployable Intelligence Support ElementDepartment of DefenseForeign Area OfficerField ManualHigh FrequencyHuman IntelligenceIntelligence SummaryIntelligence Preparation of the Battlefield


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JCSJDISSJRTCJTFJULLSMARFORMETT-TMIMSEMTOENGONISTNMJICOOTWPIRSALUTESIGINTTACSATTPFDDTTPUAVUHFUNOSOM I1USCENTCOM

Joint Chiefs of staffJoint Defense Intelligence Support SystemJoint Readiness Training Center

Joint Task ForceJoint Universal Lessons Learned SystemMarine ForceMission Enemy Time Terrain and TroopsMilitary IntelligenceMobile Subscriber EquipmentModified Table of Organization and EquipmentNongovernmental OrganizationNational Intelligence Support TeamNational Military Joint Intelligence CenterOperations Other Than WarPriority Intelligence RequirementSize Activity Location Unit Time and EquipmentSignals IntelligenceTactical SatelliteTime-Phased Force and Deployment DataTactics Techniques and ProceduresUnmanned Aerial VehicleUltra High FrequencyUnited Nations Operations in Somalia I1U.S. Central Command

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The end of the Cc

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

d d War and the collapse of the Soviet Unionprecipitated significant changes throughout the world. The dissolutionof the Warsaw Pact, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the resurgence of oldethnic and tribal conflicts in various countries have created anunstable environment in many regions of the world. President Clinton,in the Preface of A National Security Strategy of Engagement andEnlargement published in February 1995 states:

The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America s securityimperatives. The central security challenge of the past centurythe threat of communist expansion is gone. The dangers weface today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreadingand rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability inmany corners of the globe.

The U.S. Army clearly will play a major role in the United Statesefforts to prevent conflict and restore order in this new securityenvironment.

The U.S. Army, no longer focused primarily on the threat posed bythe former Soviet Union, now faces many new threats in a multipolarworld. The Army has turned its attention to various regional conflictsand troubled countries around the world. The Army s leadership workedto develop new missions and functions in accordance with its new rolefor the immediate future. As the process of developing new missions and


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functions unfolded, army planners coined the term Operations Other ThanWar to describe military operations, such as peacekeeping andhumanitarian actions. Operations Other Than War are defined in FieldManual (FM) 100-5 as military activities during peacetime and conflictthat do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organizedforces.

Historical PersuectiveOperations Other Than War (OOTW) are not a recent phenomenon for

the United States Army. One can find specific examples of OOTWinvolvement by the Army throughout its history. The first exampleoccurred shortly after the American Revolution, when militias werecalled out to put down Shays' Rebellion in New England in 1786 and 1787.The Army's campaigns to move the various Indian tribes to theirdesignated reservations in the late 1860s and 1870s were OOTW efforts,as were U.S. efforts to pacify the Philippines from 1899-1902. The U.S.decision to provide assistance to the Republic of Vietnam's Army in theearly 1960s was another OOTW effort. These examples meet the definitionof FM 100-5 for OOTW and serve as historical examples of the Army'sinvolvement in this area.

Among the Army's most recent experiences in OOTW are those inEastern Turkey, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. General Gordon Sullivan, asthe U.S. Army Chief of Staff, stated:

Three years ago, we had hardly heard of Rwanda, of Kigali, ofMogadishu. . But I will tell you, American soldiers havebeen there and faced the reality of what is going on in thestreets of Port-Au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and Guantanamo.3Today, other OOTW situations loom on the horizon for the Army. The Army


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must plan for future OOTW missions while analyzing the missions it hascompleted or turned over to the United Nations for resolution.

ImDortance To DoctrineThe Army's development of doctrine for OOTW paralleled its

increasing involvement with OOTW. In 1993, the Army updated M 100-5,its keystone doctrinal manual for operations, to include chapter onOOTw. FM 100-5 describes doctrine as the statement of how America'sArmy, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operationsother than war. 4 Doctrine evolves from the experience gained andlessons learned in previous conflicts, and is illustrated in the currentFM 100-5 by historic examples which teach essential points.

Doctrine also provides a set of guidelines on how the commanderuses the combat functions of intelligence, maneuver, fire support, airdefense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command todevelop and retain combat power. These combat functions at the tacticallevel are known as battlefield operating systems (BOSS). There aredistinct field manuals for each BOS that describe the principles andprocedures for its application on the battlefield. These doctrinalprinciples and procedures continue to evolve, and they also apply toOOTW environments. For example, the capstone manual for theintelligence BOS FM 34-1, Intelliaence and Electronic WarfareO~erations, iscusses the use of the intelligence BOS during OOTW:

During force projection operations, MI uses Intelligence OSprocedures and architecture, established during peacetime, toinsure that the force commander is supported with accurate andresponsive intelligence from predeployment through redeployment.5


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Army doctrine now provides guidance on the use of the BOSS for war andOOTW.

The doctrine for the application of intelligence in a tacticalenvironment has changed considerably since the Vietnam period. One ofthe lessons learned from Vietnam was that the tactical commanders didnot receive timely intelligence reports. In response, the my createda single Military Intelligence organization designed to support thetactical commander by merging the Army Security Agency and theCounterintelligence Corps. The Army eliminated the old intelligencepractice of stovepiping intelligence and now provides timelyintelligence to tactical commanders at various levels. Today,intelligence doctrine is changing again in response to the requirementsof the OOTW environment. Army planners accept new doctrinal principlesas they expand their operational focus and incorporate experience fromthe many missions conducted. An analysis of the Army's experiences inSomalia, Rwanda, and Haiti is critical to its future success in OOTW andto the development of new doctrine.

The Research Ouestion and Problem StatementThis study examines the intelligence BOS in Somalia during

Operation RESTORE HOPE and beyond. Specifically, it examines U.S. Armytactical intelligence during RESTORE HOPE and the subsequent UnitedNations Operation, to assess what tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) the U.S. Army developed. These TTP are analyzed for lessonslearned, and how they are compared with current doctrine regardingtactical intelligence support in an OOTW environment.


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This thesis addresses the following questions:1. what are the primary lessons learned for tactical intelligence

support to the OOTW in Somalia? 2. Should they be incorporated intointelligence doctrine?The following secondary questions are addressed in order to answer theprimary questions:

1. What are the doctrinal principles for providing tacticalintelligence support to OOTW?

2. Were these doctrinal principles applied to tacticalintelligence support to the OOTW in Somalia?

3 What were the problems regarding the application of thesedoctrinal principles in the OOTW of Somalia?

4 What were the TTP developed during this OOTW to coverdoctrinal failings or gaps?An analysis of the answers to these questions allows either a reasonablejudgement that the doctrinal principles for tactical intelligencesupport in OOTW are sound or that specific TTP were developed to improvethe application of those principles. Either result will prove usefulfor the application of tactical intelligence support for future OOTW.

Kev DefinitionsThe following definitions for certain key terms are provided for

reference. The following definitions of tactics, techniques andprocedures are taken from FM 100-5 the Army s primary doctrinal manualon operations.

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. Techniques arethe detailed methods for accomplishing a task. They are not theonly way to do a task or the way a task must be done. A


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procedure is a standard and detailed mode or course of actionthat describes how to perform a certain task.5This thesis uses a slightly different definition of tactics for OOTW.Tactics is the employment of units in the specific environment posed bythe OOTW. This definition is necessary due to the diverse nature ofOOTW. The official definitions for techniques and procedures aresuitable for this study. The definitions for operational intelligenceand tactical intelligence are taken from FM 34-1 the Army s capstonemanual for intelligence.

Operational intelligence supports the planning and execution ofcampaigns and major operations, and reflects the nature of thetheater of war itself. Intelligence at this level serves as abridge between strategic and tactical levels. Tacticalintelligence supports the execution of battles and engagements. Itprovides the tactical commander with the intelligence he needs toemploy combat elements against enemy forces and achieve theobjectives of the operational commander.

No other definitions are required for this thesis.

Assum~tionsCertain assumptions are made in this study. First is that the

U.S. Army used certain doctrinal principles while providing intelligencesupport during Operation RESTORE HOPE and in the intelligence supportprovided to the United Nations Coalition Forces. These principles formthe basis for the research framework, as explained in chapter 3 Thesecond assumption is that the deployed forces developed TTP to coverdoctrinal gaps for intelligence support during RESTORE HOPE.


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jsmThere is one limitation. A study of this type is limited by

time. There is a wealth of unit histories operational plans andafter-action reviews available. Many U.S. Army personnel who deployedto Somalia can be located and interviewed. However due to timeconstraints the author kept the number of official documents reviewedand soldiers interviewed to a manageable number.

DelimitationsThree research constraints made the task more manageable.

First the doctrinal principles for intelligence support in a forceprojection environment served as a reference framework for this study.This focused the research enough to answer the research questions andcomplete the project on time. discussion of these doctrinalprinciples occurs in chapter 4. Second the research for this projectis limited to official documents and personal interviews. Third theonly research material used is that which is unclassified or that can bedeclassified for use in this study. There are no other constraints onresearch for this thesis.

A review of all the relevant material available at the CombinedArms Research Library Command and General Staff College includingother theses and monographs revealed that no other study has beenconducted on this topic. There are other studies covering such topics

as decision making in OOTW doctrinal functions of intelligence inpeacekeeping and peace enforcement and operational elements of designin OOTw Some of these related works are discussed in the literature


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review in chapter 2. However no other studies covering the topic andthe associated research question chosen are known.

Sianificance of the StudyThe purpose of this study is to conduct a comprehensive

examination of the tactical intelligence support provided to the OOTW inSomalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE and the subsequent United Nationsoperation CONTINUE HOPE. The study conducts an assessment of thelessons learned and an analysis of these lessons and in additioncompares them to current doctrinal principles for tactical intelligence

support. The analysis and conclusions provide Military Intelligenceofficers with lessons learned concerning tactical intelligence supportin an OOTW environment. The goal is to provide a quality product thatothers may use to avoid the pitfalls encountered by those who have gonebefore.


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Endnotesl ~ h e hite House, A National Securitv Strateav of Enaaaement andEnlaraement (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1995), i.2 ~ ~ rmy, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department ofthe Army, June 1993), glossary-6.3 ~ ~ rmy, United States Armv Posture Statement FY96(Washington, DC Department of the Army, February 1995), 110.

511.5. m y , M 34-1, Intelliaence and Electronic warfareO~erations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 27 September 1994),1-11.

.s. Army, FM 7-20, The Infantrv Battalion (Washington, DC:Department of the Army, April 1992), 2-6.


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CHAPTER 2LITERATURE REVIEW

As noted, there are no known research projects that analyzed thelevel of intelligence support for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUEHOPE. As expected, the majority of the research conducted on theoperations in Somalia has dealt either with the decisions made duringthe operations or with the interaction between U.S. Forces and theUnited Nations. However, there are several sources of information ontactical intelligence support in Somalia.

Four sources discuss the level of tactical intelligence supportprovided by the U.S. Army in Somalia. The first of these was preparedby the Center For Army Lessons Learned CALL), located at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, which published the O~eration ESTORE HOPE LessonsLearned ReDOrt. The report provides very specific but concisesummations of the observations made by subject matter experts SUES) andunit participants. The CALL Team collected these observations fromJanuary to April 1993 Facets of the operation presented in this reportinclude tactical intelligence. However, this report provides onlyconclusions, not the actual observations and analysis of theseobservations. Some of the material used by the CALL team, such as unitafter action reports, is available through the Fort Leavenwortharchives. This material is discussed later in this chapter. The second


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source, also published by CALL, is the U.S. Armv Owerations In Suwoortof UNOSOM I1 Lessons Learned Reoort. This report provides the lessonslearned from the second phase in Somalia, Operation CONTINUE HOPE, whichlasted from 4 May 1993 to 31 March 1994. The report contains severalobservations on tactical intelligence support. However, as in the firstCALL report, only conclusions are presented, not actual observations andanalysis. The third source, published by the National DefenseUniversity Press, isSomaliaODeraritten byColonel Kenneth Allard of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.It provides a concise summary of the reports on file in the JointUniversal Lessons Learned (JULL) database for Operations RESTORE HOPEand CONTINUE HOPE. However, Colonel Allard s Study focused on theoperational aspects versus the tactical aspects. The fourth and finalsource is Ooeration RESTORE HOPE: A Communications and IntelliaenceAssessment, written by the Intelligence and Communications Architecture(INCA) Project Office. The INCA Project Office is an organizationchartered by Congress to assess the Command, Control, Communications,and Intelligence (c~I) ommunity s efforts in improving the intelligenceflow to the commanders in the fie1d.l This assessment providesexcellent material on the intelligence architecture for OperationRESTORE HOPE. It also contains the most comprehensive assessment ofintelligence support for Operation RESTORE HOPE of any documentreviewed. Each of these primary sources provided information useful forthis project. However, none of them used a coherent doctrinal frameworkas the basis of their analysis, and the conclusions are simply stated ina matter of fact manner.


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There are several additional sources that provide substantialbackground information. The Doctrinal Functions of Intelliaence: AreThev Aoplicable To Peacekee~ina nd Peace Enforcement Ooerations? a

monograph written by Major Jonathan Hunter, provides doctrinal analysisof the intelligence functions. He examines the six doctrinal functionsof intelligence: indications and warning, intelligence preparation ofthe battlefield, situation development, force protection, targetdevelopment/target acquisition, and battle damage assessment. MajorHunter evaluates the merits of these doctrinal functions of intelligencein OOTW type missions. His monograph also contains several case studiescomparing these functions to specific OOTW, to include Somalia. MajorHunter's conclusions regarding the doctrinal intelligence functionsprovide insight on the unique challenges posed by OOTW. His monographis a must read for intelligence professionals and contains informationuseful to this study. Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements ofO~erational esian, a monograph written by Major Carol Clair, examinesjoint warfighting doctrine and its applicability to humanitarianassistance operations. It provides information on the operationalintelligence goals for Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The U S Marine Corps prepared several lessons learned documentsand journal articles concerning its participation in Somalia. The majorMarine Corps document is the Ooeration RESTORE HOPE Collection andLessons Learned Proiect Report, prepared by its Combat DevelopmentCommand. It is similar in specificity and scope to the lessons learneddocuments prepared by CALL for the Army. This document is useful incomparing and contrasting the intelligence efforts of the Marine Corps


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with the Army. Two articles from the Marine Cor m Gazette,Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation RESTORE HOPE

Somalia and Intelligence Support During a Humanitarian Mission,provide more depth on tactical intelligence support. These articlesprovide good insight into Marine Corps tactical intelligence support forOperation RESTORE HOPE, offering more details than the lessons learneddocument. They contain information confirming some of the Army lessonslearned and are useful when comparing and contrasting intelligencesupport provided by the individual services.

The reports contained in the JULL database for Operations RESTOREHOPE and CONTINUE HOPE are good sources of information. The ULLdatabase is a DOD repository for lessons learned during jointoperations, such as RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The reports providemore detailed observations on certain facets of tactical intelligencesupport for operations. Many of the sources discussed in previousparagraphs used these JULL reports to support conclusions. However,there are certain research limitations to these ULL reports. ColonelAllard, in an article for the Joint Force Ouarterly that discussed theuse of lessons learned in the formulation of joint doctrine, writesthat:

Individual JULLS reports range from the trivial to theprofound; but because they lack specific context information 1other corroborating data, it is often hard to judge theirvalidity. Worse, normal personnel turbulence and lengthyprocessing times often make it impossible to track down thosewho originally submitted them.*

Therefore, if a person uses these JULLS reports, he must be prepared toconduct additional research to corroborate their validity.


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There were no other sources of literature that discuss the levelof tactical intelligence support for operations RESTORE HOPE andCONTINUE HOPE


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Endnotesl ~ h e ntelligence and Communications Architecture (INCA) ProjectOffice,

ssessment (Washington, DC: INCA, November 1994)' 4.

2 ~ . enneth Allard, Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and JointDoctrine, Joint Force Ouarterlv n.s. 9 (Autumn 1995): 107-108.


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CHAPTER 3RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapters 1 and focused on the purpose of the study and previousresearch. This chapter provides the research methodology or analyticalroadmap used for this study. This chapter focuses on the process usedrather than the outcomes of the research which are addressed in laterchapters.

There were four distinct phases of research during this study.Each of these phases corresponds to one of the secondary researchquestions discussed in chapter 1. Each question and phase was addressedin sequence. Evidence gathered during each phase and the subsequentanalysis of that evidence led to certain conclusions. These conclusionsare the basis of the answer to the primary research question.

The first phase of research defined and discussed the doctrinalprinciples for providing intelligence support at the tactical level forOOTW. The doctrinal principles for intelligence support to forceprojection operations as outlined in FM 34-1 Intelliaence andElectronic Warfare O~erations et out a framework for illustrating howtactical intelligence support is provided to an operation. Theseprinciples represent the foundation for providing intelligence supportto any conflict or operation other than war. M 34-1 is the capstonemanual for the Military Intelligence field and was written at the same


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time as the most recent version of M 100-5. FM 34-1 provides examplesthat illustrate how these doctrinal principles are applied in atheoretical OOTW environment. The written product of this phase is adefinition and discussion of these principles and is contained inchapter 4

The second phase of the research examined the application ofthese doctrinal principles. No analysis of tactical intelligencesupport during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE would becomplete without showing how doctrine was applied in these operations.This analysis provided the starting point for the examination of thelessons learned from these operations and a foundation for conclusionsreached concerning these lessons. This phase of the research is roughlyanalogous to the conduct of intelligence preparation of tDe battlefield.A planner must understand enemy doctrine before using other situationalfactors to develop a template showing the enemy s probable courses ofaction. This project essentially followed the same process. Doctrine isdefined in phase one, and the application of doctrine in a situationalenvironment (i.e., Somalia) is reviewed in phase two. After-actionreports and other assessments of the intelligence effort in Somaliaprovided the source material for this phase. Completion of this phaseresulted in an appreciation of the actual application of the doctrinalprinciples for tactical intelligence support in Operations RESTORE HOPEand CONTINUE HOPE. These results are documented in the second half ofchapter 4

The third phase of this thesis is a comprehensive examination ofintelligence support mistakes and the lessons learned for OperationsRESTORE ROPE and CONTINUE XOPE. various after action reports, lessons-

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learned documents JULLS reports and other assessments provided thebasis for a compilation of these mistakes and lessons learned. If therewere apparent information gaps in the material a check of additionalsources insured that these gaps were not due to an omission ofinformation in the original source material. Following the collectionof all the material relevant to this phase an analysis determined whythe mistakes were made and what corrective actions were needed toprevent their occurrence in future OOTW The conclusions led to therecommendations concerning which tactics techniques and proceduresneed to be modified and incorporated into doctrine. The documentationof the analysis and the recommended TTPs are contained in chapter 5 ofthis paper.

A subjective evaluation of the evidence determined its relevanceand validity to the research question. Any information or evidence thatdid not fit the parameters of this thesis was discarded. Criteria mustbe established for evaluating evidence. There is difficulty in definingthese criteria because the evidence to be evaluated was subjectiverather than objective. No quantitative methods for evaluating evidencecan be used because the evidence does not involve numbers. Each pieceof evidence has to be evaluated on its own merit. Therefore thefollowing criteria were used to evaluate evidence. First the evidencewas checked to see if it met the parameters of the doctrinal principles.

If it had any connection to the doctrinal principles it was retained.Second each piece of evidence was assessed on its applicability as atactic technique or procedure and if so if the specific TTPrepresented a solution to a specific problem identified during the


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research. The final phase of evaluation compared each piece of evidenceto an established TTP used in the tactical intelligence arena. Theseestablished TTPs are those commonly used by intelligence units. The

goal was to screen out those TTP used in Somalia that were alreadyincorporated in intelligence doctrine. If specific T CP were used duringthese operations that represent common practices for intelligencesupport, then the U S Army's failure to use the established TTP wasdocumented. No further recommendation of these TTP was needed as theywere already included in doctrine. Once these criteria were applied toth@ evidence, the results of the evaluation were the recommendations ofwhich TTP should be incorporated into doctrine. The bottomline was thatfor a specific TTP to be recommended at the conclusion of this project,it had to represent an improved way to do business. These criteriaallowed for a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence collected.

All research has potential problems that need to be understoodand avoided or dealt with. The first potential problem is the bias thatthe author might have as a Military Intelligence professional. Negativeobservations regarding tactical intelligence support should notinterfere with objectivity and analysis of the evidence. The way toavoid this bias is to conduct thorough research and let the overwhelmingfacts speak for themselves.

A second potential problem is centered on how the conclusions aredeveloped. That is, conclusions drawn must be derived from a freshanalysis of facts, rather than official positions and recommendations.While lessons learned reports may contain much pertinent information,


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they must be considered in light of additional sources. Comprehensiveresearch helped to reach this goal.

Two major techniques were used to gather evidence in accordancewith the phases discussed earlier in this chapter. The first techniqueconsisted of document collection and review. As discussed in chapter 2there are a variety of sources that contain information relating to thetopic. The majority of the documentation was from official sourcessuch as the Center for Army Lessons Learned or CALL. While thisinformation provided a good starting point additional material camefrom other documents from several different agencies. The secondtechnique the conduct of personal and telephonic interviews providedadditional information to fill a gap or clarify collected information.The people interviewed had served in Somalia. The combination ofdocument collection and selected personal interviews supported acomprehensive research effort.

The research methodology outlined the different phases to beconducted and provided the endstates for each phase. Once the research wascompleted it provided criteria for evaluation of the evidence. Evidencewas evaluated and analyzed leading to development of conclusions andrecommendations. Finally areas of additional study identified during theproject were summarized and presented. The results of the research aredocumented in the following chapters. Chapter contains an examination ofdoctrine and the application of the doctrine. Chapter 5 contains theanalysis of mistakes made and lessons learned. Chapter 6 presentsrecommendations and conclusions.


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CIIAPTER 4DOCTRINE

Evaluation of the lessons learned regarding tactical intelligencesupport during Operations RESTORE ROPE and CONTINUE HOPE is based on anunderstanding of the doctrinal principles for intelligence support. Asstated in chapter 3 the doctrinal principles are taken from FM 34-1,Ehese principles are:the commander drives intelligence, intelligence synchronization, split-based operations, tactical tailoring, and broadcast dissemination. Thediagram in figure 1 on the next page, illustrates them. The MIcomponent in the diagram is the military intelligence assets of the U.S.Army. Each of the principles illustrated in figure 1 is examined indetail.

The most important of these principles is the commander drivesintelligence. This principle states that the commander's participationin the intelligence process is crucial for the success of the mission.The commander must focus his intelligence assets for the mission. Eemust understand the intelligence battlefield operating system BOS), itscapabilities and limitations, and exploit it to the maximum extentpossible. The commander must also ensure that the intelligence systemfocuses on the intelligence requirements he deems crucial to themission. Be should also ensure that the intelligence system supportshis subordinate units' intelligence requirements, and he must adjudicate


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RIVES

INTELLIGENCE BRO DC ST

Figure 1. Principles of Force Projection Intelligence Operations.Source: U S Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic warfareoperations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 27 September 1994 ,1-4.

when conflicts arise. l General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commander ofthe VII Corps during Operation DESERT STORM, writes that:

Commanders must focus intelligence. They must decide what theyneed to know for the operation to succeed. This includesestablishing clear priorities for intelligence and targets. Mygoal was to limit my questions to six.=The other four doctrinal principles for force projection operationssupport the principle that the commander drives intelligence, theimportance of which cannot be overstated.

The second doctrinal principle, intelligence synchronization,is closely tied to the first. Intelligence synchronization means


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linking the intelligence system to the commander's Concept of theoperation. It requires coordinating the intelligence effort to providethe intelligence the commander needs to make decisions and directoperations. Intelligence .synchronization requires that all collectionefforts be tied to the commander's intelligence requirements and notwasted on less important requirements. It is a continuous processdesigned t keep the commander aware of the enemy battlefield~ituation.~ n example of the application of the principle ofintelligence synchronization is the deployment of a collection system toobserve a specific enemy avenue of approach. If the collection systemdetects significant enemy movement, then the commander would have thenecessary information to commit forces to defeat the enemy. Thesynchronization of intelligence systems to the commander's requirementsprovides him with the maximum information about the enemy. The greatChinese warrior and philosopher Sun-Tzu distilled the principle in thisway: If you know the enemy and know yourself; you need not fear theresult of a hundred battles. l Successful intelligence synchronizationprovides the commander with the knowledge of the enemy.

The third doctrinal principle, split-based operations, isclosely related to the principle of war known as economy of force.Economy of force, as defined in M 100-5, Operations, requires acommander to employ all combat power available in the most effectiveway pos~ ible . ~ he principle of split-based operations-+** calls forthe most effective use of all intelligence assets to support themission. Following this principle, the commander deploys a small,tailored intelligence element with the initial combat elements into a


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theater of operations. The deployed intelligence element is supportedby the intelligence personnel and assets from its home station. Thehome station intelligence element requests that national intelligencesystems collect intelligence to support the specific contingency, andthen provides that intelligence to its deployed element. This principlerelies on good communications and dissemination systems to push theintelligence to the deployed element in the theater of operations. Thedeployed intelligence element, after receiving the intelligence, usescomputer systems to fuse the intelligence into products that support thecommander. As a contingency develops, additional intelligence assetsdeploy to the theater, thus reducing the level of intelligence supportprovided from the home s t a t i ~ n . ~ertain national level intelligence isstill provided to the deployed element by the home station intelligenceelement, but operational and tactical level intelligence come fromassets on the ground.

The Army intelligence community created the deployableintelligence support element DISE) to support the principle of split-based operations. The purpose of the DISE is to provide commanders witha small, tactically tailored, highly mobile intelligence support elementthat could deploy quickly with the initial entry force. The DISE hasthe communications, automated processing systems and broadcast downlinksnecessary to receive and fuse intelligence to support the theatercommander.' The DISE, being tactically tailored, can support any typeof mission, making it an ideal organization for the TW environment.This concept of tailoring the force to the specific contingency hasother applications.


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The fourth doctrinal principle is tactical tailoring. Thisprinciple is based on the premise that each contingency is different,requiring specific capabilities in the deployed force structure. Theforce required for Rwanda differed from the force required in Somaliadue to the differences in mission. Prior to the end of the Cold War,this principle was not as important because U.S. forces were primarilystructured to fight against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.Today, the Army must e prepared to react to a number of diversecontingencies. As a result, the principle of tactical tailoring isnow more important.

To use tactical tailoring, the commander must consider thefactors of the mission assigned, the enemy threat, the troops available,the terrain and weather in the theater, and the time available (METT-T).He uses these elements to assess the mission requirements, including theintelligence assets he will need. Re also considers the possibility ofcollecting certain intelligence information from outside the theater, asthis will reduce the size of the deployable intelligence element. Tofurther tailor his intelligence force, the commander must insure thatthe deployable intelligence element will be able to provide accurate andresponsive intelligence. The commander must also insure that thedeployable package is mobile, sustainable and that it is integrated intothe deployment flow early enough to get it to the theater in a timelymanner.8 To accomplish the analysis needed for tactical tailoring, thecommander and his staff must develop the plans and identify therequisite force structure for all assigned contingencies ahead of time.This insures that they have a foundation established for each mission,


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and then they adjust accordingly when the contingencies occur. Theprinciple of tactical tailoring flows down to the subordinateintelligence units in the form of the plans and the time-phased forceand deployment data (TPFDD). This principle provides the maximum amountof flexibility and efficiency for every mission assigned to a unit.

The fifth doctrinal principle of intelligence operations isbroadcast dissemination. This principle insures that commanders at

multiple echelons receive a common intelligence picture of thebattlefield. To do this, planners discarded the old method ofintelligence flowing down the pipeline from one echelon to the nextechelon. Now, using improved communications technology and automationsystems, intelligence is pushed simultaneously to the commanders at manyechelons. Broadcast dissemination eliminates the bottlenecks that usedto exist within point-to-point intelligence dissemination channels. Italso reduces the number of personnel and intelligence collection systemsneeded to support commanders at different echelons. Intelligence fromeach of the disciplines, such as signals, imagery and humanintelligence, can be disseminated using this principle.9 To supportthis principle, the army intelligence community developed the analysisand control element (ACE), and integrated it into the force structurefrom brigade to the theater army level. The ACE is the intelligenceelement responsible for collecting all the intelligence flowing into thevarious terminals as a result of broadcast dissemination. Itsynthesizes the intelligence to provide commanders with the intelligencepicture of the battlefield.1 Because the ACE is located at variousechelons, each commander at the respective echelon receives the current


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picture of the enemy situation for his area of operations. This is anapplication of the principle of broadcast dissemination.

The examination of these doctrinal principles for intelligence iscrucial to the evaluation of tactical intelligence support forOperations RESTORE ROPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The first question is, Whatare the fundamental doctrinal principles for intelligence support in anOOTW environment? The doctrinal principles for intelligence support toforce projection operations were selected because they answer thisquestion. Force projection, as defined in FM 100-5 O~erations, s

the movement of [military] forces from CONUS or a theater inresponse to requirements of war or operations other than war.Force-projection operations extend from mobilization anddeployment of forces, to redeployment to CONUS or home theater,to subsequent demobilization.llForce projection operations represent the majority of the OOTW that theArmy will encounter in the future. The operations in Somalia, Rwanda,and Haiti were representative of force projection operations.Therefore, it is logical to select the doctrinal principles forintelligence support to force projection operations from FM 34-1Intelliaence and Electronic Warfare Operations. These principlesprovide a good framework with which to evaluate the level of tacticalintelligence support to the operations in Somalia.

The U.S. Army s involvement in Operations RESTORE HOPE andCONTINUE HOPE provides a test of how these principles were applied.U.S. Army involvement in Somalia began when President Bush ordered U.S.Forces to Somalia to support the U.N. humanitarian relief operations.The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a warning order to the Commanderof the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) directing him to execute


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Operation RESTORE HOPE. Operation RESTORE HOPE commenced on 4 December1992, when Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia published the operations plan.The JTF consisted of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), the 10thMountain Division, and the 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM). TheCommander IMEF, Lieutenant General (LTG) Johnston, was the Commander ofJTF Somalia. The JTF s mission was to secure the area of operations forhumanitarian relief operations and return control of the humanitarianrelief operations to the United Nations forces.12

The Army F O ~ ~ SARFOR), primarily from the 10th Mountain~ivision, ere alerted on 1 December 1992 and deployed to Somalia inlate December 1992, as part of JT Somalia. A Marine Expeditionary Unitsecured the Mogadishu, Somalia, air and sea ports on 9 December 1992,providing a secure area for the ARFOR to deploy into. Major GeneralMG) Arnold, Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division and

Commander of the ARFOR, arrived in Mogadishu on 22 December 1992. By 10January 1993, the 10th Mountain Division completed its deployment intosomalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE ^^

Operation RESTORE HOPE ended on 4 May 1993, when JTF Somalia cameunder the command of the United Nations and Lieutenant General Bir, aTurkish Officer. The new operation CONTINUE HOPE began on the sameday.14 Elements of the 10th Mountain Division, in reinforced brigadestrength, along with combat service support units, constituted the ARFORduring Operation CONTINUE HOPE. A task force of Army Rangers and amechanized task force from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) alsowere stationed in Somalia during this operation. The 10th MountainDivision had elements assigned to JTF Somalia and to the United Nations


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forces, named United Nations Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11), for the duration ofboth operations. Operation CONTINUE HOPE ended on 31 March 1994, withthe complete withdrawal of all United Nations forces.

Turning to the application of the principles for intelligencesupport to force projection, it is apparent that the first principle,the coiraiander drives intelligence, was crucial to the success of both

operations. The commander must insure that the intelligence collectionsystems are focused to provide him the intelligence he needs for missionaccomplishment. The first element to examine is the command structureand the intelligence requirements of its commander. As noted, the firstJTF Commander was the Commander, IMEF, LTG Johnston while the ARFORCommander was MG Arnold, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division. Theinitial commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) weredesignated by the JTF Commander and disseminated to the forces by theJT J-3. CCIRs, as defined by M 34-1 Intelliaence and ElectronicWarfare O~erations, re the information the commander needs tovisualize the outcome of current operations. . . CCIRs includeinformation on both friendly and threat forces. 15 The CCIRs forOperation RESTORE HOPE were: (1) Locating the heavy weapons of all thefactions in the area of responsibility; (2) determining the probablecourses of action for key military/political leaders involved in theregion; (3) discovering potential threats to coalition members bothinternal and external to Somalia actors; and (4 locating minef ields .I6The CCIRs were disseminated to the lowest level so that any informationcould be collected and forwarded through channels to the JT 5-2. TheseCCIRs remained in place throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE. Subordinate


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commanders also developed CCIRs that complemented the JTF Commander'sCCIRs or were necessary for other specified missions. Several of theseCCIRs are provided in chapter 5.

While the command structure remained unchanged and relativelyuncomplicated during operation RESTORE HOPE, the same could not be saidabout Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Operation RESTORE HOPE was a U.S. ledeffort while Operation CONTINUE HOPE was a United Nations undertaking.LTG Bir, as discussed earlier, was the Commander, United NationsOperations in Somalia (UNOSOM 11 from 4 May 1993 to 31 March 1994. His

deputy was a U.S. officer MG Montgomery, who also functioned as theCommander, U.S. Forces, Somalia, during UNOSOM 11. This commandstructure caused some major problems regarding the application of theprinciple that the commander drives intelligence. U.S. federal lawprohibits the control of intelligence assets by other than U.S.personnel and prohibits the dissemination of intelligence through anyintelligence channel that is not U.S. controlled. Therefore, theCENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE), which provided the bulk ofthe intelligence support during Operation CONTINUE HOPE, could notdirectly support the Commander, UNOSOM I1 or his deputy, MG Montgomery.The CISE functioned in a general support role for the entire theater,rather than specifically for the commander.17 Several methods weredeveloped to address this problem, ensuring that intelligence supportfor the Commander, UNOSOM 11, was provided. These methods and the prosand cons of each will be discussed in chapter 5. However, it is clearthat the Commander for Operation CONTINUE HOPE was not able to apply the


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principle of the commander drives intelligence, as he was prohibitedfrom focusing the intelligence effort.

The second doctrinal principle, intelligence synchronization,is closely tied to the first. Intelligence synchronization, as notedabove, means linking the intelligence system t the commander's conceptof the operation. The CCIRs developed by the JTF Commander forOperation RESTORE HOPE were the requirements that the JTF 5-2 had tofulfill. During Operation RESTORE HOPE, the JTF 5-2 served as thecoordinator for all intelligence efforts. The intelligence structuredeveloped by the CENTCOM 5-2 during deployment planning included fourintelligence groups which provided intelligence from the tactical levelto the national level. The first was a National Intelligence SupportTeam, or NIST, which accompanied the JTF into Somalia. The NIST teamprovided national-level intelligence to the JTF. The second group wasthe CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE), which providedtheater-level intelligence to the JTF J-2. The third group was the JTF3-2 section, which synthesized the intelligence received from the NIST,the CISE and tactical level intelligence into a comprehensiveintelligence picture of the situation for the JTF Commander. The fourthgroup contained army and marine corps intelligence units, which providedtactical-level intelligence to the JTF 5-2. The JTF 5-2 was responsiblefor synchronizing these assets to provide timely intelligence thatsupported the commander's concept of operations.18 The 5-2 responsiblefor intelligence synchronization for the JTF ensured that allintelligence support focused on the CCIRs. These levels of intelligencesupport remained the same during CONTINUE HOPE except that army tactical


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intelligence units provided the tactical intelligence after the MarineCorps units departed. While the overall plan for intelligence supportwas sound, there were problems with the intelligence support provided bythe different groups. These problems are discussed chapter 5

Adequate communications are crucial when implementing theprinciple of split-based operations. During a deployment, a small,tailored intelligence element accompanies the initial combat elementsinto a theater of operations. The intelligence personnel and assetsfrom its home station support the deployed intelligence element.Split-based operations allows for the most effective use of intelligenceassets to support the mission. The ARFOR G-2 employed this principleduring the initial phases of Operation RESTORE HOPE and continued to doso for the duration of Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Initially he deployedonly 5 members of his 67 member 6-2 staff from Fort Drum, New York tosomalia.19 The remaining 42 soldiers on his G-2 staff functionedeffectively as a research and analysis element at Fort Drum for thedeployed element in Mogadishu. To do this, the two elements had to beable to communicate quickly using the Trojan SPIRIT, a dedicatedintelligence communications system. The deployed element transferredand received information, data and secondary imagery over Trojan SPIRIT.It also has a secure voice and data link capability using the STU-111, aclassified telephone network. The ARFOR'S Trojan SPIRIT also had the

Joint Defense Intelligence Support System (JDISS) emulation software,allowing JDISS transmissions of intelligence data and imagery productsvia commercial satellite. JDISS provided the deployed ARFOR 6-2 elementwith the ability to communicate with their home station, the Defense


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Intelligence Agency DIA) and the National Military Joint IntelligenceCenter NMJIC), and with the JTF, which was not collocated with theRFOR ~ - 2 . ~ ~he Trojan SPIRIT was also a backup communications systemfor the JTF. Trojan SPIRIT has its own transportation, satellitecommunications system and power generator and needs no external support.Implementing the split-based operations principle depends on a reliablecommunications system. The Trojan SPIRIT system filled this need verywell.

The deployable intelligence support element was a part of thesplit-based intelligence support to Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUEHOPE. While the ARFOR 6-2 deployed a small deployable intelligenceelement to support the ARFOR, CENTCOM also deployed the CENTCOMintelligence support element CISE). The CISE is a small, tacticallytailored, highly mobile intelligence support element that deploysquickly with the initial entry force. It has the communications,automated processing systems and broadcast downlinks, necessary toreceive and synthesize intelligence to support the theater commander.The Trojan SPIRIT and JDISS systems were key to the CISE being able toreceive and transfer information worldwide. The national intelligencesupport team NIST) was also part of the CISE and assisted with thetransmission of national level intelligence. The CENTCOM 5-2 staff inFlorida supported the CISE much like the ARFOR G-2 supported its

deployed element. While there were some lessons learned regardingsplit-based operations, the principle was upheld during OperationsRESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE.


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Tactical tailoring, as applied during Operations RESTORE ROPEand CONTINUE HOPE, was a rather complex issue due to the situation inSomalia. This principle is based on the premise that each contingencyis different, requiring specific capabilities in the deployed forcestructure. The commander uses the factors of HETT-T to determine theideal mix of forces for the contingency. The ARFOR 6-2 also used thisprinciple to select the proper mix of intelligence personnel for thedeployable 6-2 section and other division intelligence assets. Hedesigned an effective personnel mix which allowed for collection,dissemination, information management and human intelligence (RUMINT)operations during the initial stages of the operation.21 The 6-2 facedseveral restrictions which affected his choices concerning personnel andequipment. Besides the factors of METT-T, there was also a restrictionon the number of personnel and associated equipment that could bedeployed. The restriction was imposed by the amount of infrastructureneeded in Somalia, as there was very little infrastructure on theground. The number of personnel and types of equipment were restrictedto that which could be supported by the logistic support elements.22The G-2 tailored his deploying intelligence element based on the METT-Tfactors and the restrictions. As a result, the mix of personnel andequipment deployed to Somalia was initially insufficient to supportOperation RESTORE HOPE. Most of the problems were corrected by thecommencement of CONTINUE HOPE. The majority of the problems withtactical tailoring can be traced to a lack of accurate information onthe factors of METT-T. This lack of accurate information was due to thedeteriorating situation in Somalia and the fact that Somalia was not a


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high priority country for intelligence collection. The informationsupporting METT-T must be accurate and timely in order to apply theprinciple of tactical tailoring correctly.

The principle of broadcast dissemination is as dependent oncommunication systems as the principle of split-based operations.Broadcast dissemination insures that commanders at multiple echelonsreceive a common intelligence picture of the situation for their area ofoperations. Using improved technology for communications and automationsystems, intelligence is now pushed to the commanders at many echelonsin the field simultaneously. Nowhere was this principle more importantthan during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. There weredifferent echelons of command as well as coalition forces in thetheater. Broadcast dissemination also depended on the Trojan SPIRITsystem. The JDISS terminals and Trojan SPIRIT systems using JDIsSemulation software were the backbone of the intelligence disseminationnetwork. There were JDISS terminals at the U.S. Mission to the UnitedNations, at the JT Headquarters in Mogadishu, and at each of the MARFORand ARFOR Brigades. These elements could receive intelligence,including imagery, via these terminals from national and theater levelintelligence agencies. The U.S. Mission to the U.N. sanitized thedisseminated intelligence and then passed it to the designated U.N.Representative in Somalia.23 Other communications systems disseminatedintelligence including tactical satellite communications systems andmobile subscriber equipment (MSE). Broadcast dissemination depends onthe amount and capabilities of the various communication systemsavailable. Several problems occurred as a result of the distances


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projection operations. However mistakes were made in the applicationof these principles. The important aspect of mistakes is the lessonslearned from them and the application of these lessons learned to

future operations. The next chapter examines the lessons learned fromOperations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE and what tactics techniquesand procedures were developed in Somalia.


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2u.s. w M 34-8, Combat commander's Handbook On Intelliaence(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 September 1992), 1-4.

4 ~ u n zu, The Art of War (Oxford, NY Oxford University Press),84; trans. Samuel B Griffith in U.S. Army, FM 34-8, Combat Commander'sHandbook On Intelliaence (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28September 1992), 1-5.

7 ~ . ~ .rmy Intelligence Center, Directorate of CombatDevelopments, Concepts Division, Deployable Intelligence SupportElement (DISE) Functional Concept (Draft) (Fort Huachuca, AZ U.S. ArmyIntelligence Center, 19 Hay 1995), 10.

12center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), O~eration ESTORE HOPELessons Learned ReDort, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command,15 November 1993), 1-3.

l6I4arine corps Combat Development Command MCCDC) o~erationRESTORE HOPE Collection and Lessons Learned Proiect Report, (Quantico,VA: MCCDC, 27 April 1993), 2-B-42.


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17~enneth llard, Somalia O~erations: essons Learned, (FortMcNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, January1995), 75; and Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. ArmyOoerations In S u ~ ~ o r tf UNOSOM I1 Lessons Learned ReDort, (FortLeavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command, undated), 1-2-8.

~%NCA, O~eration ESTORE HOPE: Communications andrntelliaence Assessment 4-3.

21~-2, 0th Mountain Division, ARFOR StaffOrganization/Intelligence, Joint Universal Lessons Learned System(JULLS) report no. 10771-60367.

I INCA O~eration ESTORE HOPE: A comnications and IntelliaenceAssessment 4-6.


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CHAF'TER 5LESSONS LEARNED

Having reviewed the doctrinal principles for intelligence supportto force projection operations and how they were applied in Somalia, thestudy now addresses the lessons learned. The first issue is: How welldid the various commanders focus the intelligence effort? The JTFCommander for Operation RESTORE HOPE, LTG Johnston, established hiscommander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) quickly anddisseminated them throughout the JTF. The service component commandersused these CCIRs as well as their perception of the situation to developtheir priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). These PIRs were usedto focus their intelligence collection assets to support the JTF. Anexample of these PIRs is the one developed by the Commander, 507th CorpsSupport Group, the major logistical command during Operation CONTINUEHOPE. It read: What is the threat to UNOSOM I1 fixed sitesznl ThisPIR supported JTF CCIR no. 3 discovering potential threats tocoalition members both internal and external to Somalia actors,discussed in chapter 4. The end result of commanders' CCIRs and PIRswas that as the intelligence collection effort increased, theinformation received helped focus the conduct of the JTF operation. TheMARFOR Commander, Major General C.E. Wilhelm stated that: It'srefreshing to see things in their proper order--intelligence driving


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operations instead of operations driving operations. * Overall,the intelligence effort was well focused by the JT Commander duringOperation RESTORE HOPE.

The same statement could not be made during Operation CONTINUEHOPE. S discussed above, LTG Bir, a Turkish national, was the UNOSOMI Commander, which created restrictions on the level of intelligencedissemination and support for a non-U.S. commander. LTG Bir could notfocus the intelligence effort. Rather he could only request thatcertain information be collected and passed to the UNOSOM I1 staff. ByU.N. rules, U.N. forces are prohibited from collecting intelligence, butrealize that forces cannot function without knowing the enemy;therefore, U.N. forces collect information. UNOSOM I1 personnelcollected information vital to the success of CONTINUE HOPE. However,because the whole coalition structure was based on cooperation ratherthan command, LTG Bir could not focus the intelligence effort as LTGJohnston had for Operation RESTORE HOPE. The partial solution to theproblem was that the U.S. forces under UNOSOM 11 focused theircollection efforts much like the ARFOR had during Operation RESTOREHOPE. They passed timely intelligence that related to UNOSOM 11operations through U.S. liaison officers on the UNOSOM I1 staff, thuskeeping LTG Bir apprised of the situation in his area of operations.3This comparison of the respective commanders' roles in focusing theintelligence effort shows that these problems in a coalition command doexist.

The second problem regarding the commander driving intelligenceduring Operation CONTINUE HOPE was one created bu U.S. law. The CENTCOM


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Intelligence Support Element (CISE) was deployed to Somalia to providethe bulk of the intelligence analysis and fusion for the U.S. forces.It supported the U.S. JTF with intelligence support during OperationCONTINUE HOPE, but did not work directly for the JTF Commander since theCommander, U.S. Forces Somalia (COMFORSOM), was Major GeneralMontgomery, LTG Birrs deputy. MG Montgomeryls connection with UNOSOM I1prevented placement of the CISE under his command, due to the U.S. lawprohibiting intelligence assets being placed under a non-U.S. chain ofcommand. Therefore, the CISE remained under the control of CENTCOMHeadquarters in MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JTF did not havean adequate intelligence analysis and production capability, so itrelied on the CISE. On those specific occasions when CENTCOM determinedCISE priorities rather than the JTF, the JTF lost intelligence analysisand production.

There are two major lessons learned from this analysis of thecommanders' effort to drive intelligence during Operations RESTORE HOPEand CONTINUE HOPE. First, regardless of the command structure, u.S.commanders must focus the intelligence effort in OOTW situations. Thetactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for focusing intelligencesupport are different for a U.S.-led operations versus a coalition-ledoperation. The development of good CCIRs early in the operation allowssubordinate commanders to focus all their intelligence assets oncollecting against these CCIRs. However, in a coalition which worksthrough cooperation rather than command, liaison teams ensure thesuccessful coordination of intelligence or information collectionefforts among all coalition partners. One TTP the CISE developed was to


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maintain an intelligence liaison team in the UNOSOM I1 U-2 section toassist in the communication of intelligence requirements andintelligence dissemination. The mission of the team was to insure thatLTG Bir s intelligence requirements were passed to the JT 5-2 and theCISE; the team also received intelligence information from the CISE andthe JTF J-2, sanitized it, and passed it to the U-2 staff 5 The use ofliaison teams to coordinate the collecting and sharing of intelligenceand information needs to become a required procedure during coalitionoperations such as Operation CONTINUE ROPE.

The second lesson learned from the analysis of the commanders

role in focusing the intelligence effort is that all intelligenceagencies in a theater must work for the theater commander. The factthat the CISE provided general support to the JT Commander but actuallytook its orders from the CENTCOM Commander is a violation of theprinciple of unity of effort. The result was that all intelligenceassets were not always focused on answering the intelligencerequirements for the JTF Commander in Somalia. unity of effort is aprinciple of Operations Other Than War, and requires that all resourceswork toward a common purpose.6 To prevent this dilution of effort infuture force projection operations, all intelligence assets in thetheater must be controlled by the theater commander. When theCommander, U.S. Forces is also a senior member of the coalition command,as M Montgomery was, then a designated service component commandershould control the intelligence assets in theater. This would allow theintelligence effort to proceed without violating federal law. Forfuture force projection operations, the senior commander must focus theintelligence effort and the operational intelligence assets that collect

4


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the intelligence to meet his requirements. The commander who focuseshis intelligence effort at the operational level allows his tacticallevel commanders to accomplish the same.

The second principle of intelligence synchronization linksintelligence collection to the commander s intelligence requirements anddelivers intelligence in time to support his decision cycle. Asdiscussed in chapter 4 the JT 5 2 was the person responsible forsynchronizing the intelligence operation throughout the JTF. Re and hisstaff, given the CCIRs, utilized all intelligence assets to collect anddeliver the intelligence to the commander in a timely manner.

Several mistakes were made during the intelligencesynchronization process due to the unique situation in Somalia. Thethreat environment in Somalia was unique because there were no standingarmies. Instead, there were a number of diverse elements fighting eachother armed with a variety of weaponry. U.S. intelligence personnelfaced a threat for which they were not prepared. They had to establisha baseline intelligence estimate of the situation prior to startingintelligence collection. They used the intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB) process to establish an initial estimate of the threatand possible threat courses of action. The IPB process, designed forconventional war, was a fairly rigid process which produced probableenemy dispositions and courses of action. It used these probable enemycourses of action, combined with factors, such as enemy commandpersonalities, to produce conclusions about probable enemy intentions.However, the unique threat environment in Somalia dictated adjustmentsto the IPB process. Rather than relying on prepared order of battle


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products and established signal intelligence profiles, analysts workedwith political questions, such as what group or faction was mostinfluential; how can the people be made to support the operation? ' Toanswer these types of questions, analysts adjusted and adopted theanalytical techniques normally associated with counterintelligence (CI)and human intelligence (HVMINT). The analytical techniques included theuse of association matrices and time-event charting. Analysts madethese adjustments once they gained a working knowledge of thesedifferent techniques.

The second mistake made during the intelligence synchronizationprocess was that intelligence personnel did not always use allintelligence collection assets fully and efficiently. They also failedto recognize potential collection assets due to their ignorance of thesituation in Somalia. Many potential sources of information in Somaliadid not fit the conventional definition of intelligence sources. Theseincluded such sources as the nongovernment organizations (NGOs) thatwere in Somalia providing humanitarian relief 8 Analysts eventuallytasked the CI/HUMINT teams in the ARFOR to build rapport with the N Osin order to elicit information from them. However, implementing thisprocess was slow because intelligence collectors and analysts did notinitially realize that the NGOs had information that would prove useful.The same lack of critical thinking caused intelligence collectors andanalysts initially to overlook the use of the infantryman on patrol as acollection asset. To correct this thinking analysts must understandthat unconventional environments like Somalia require differentintelligence collection methods. All potential sources of information


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should be considered and the appropriate intelligence assets tasked tocollect this information.

The ARFOR developed three TTP as possible solutions for theseproblems. The first was t o use the CI personnel in the ARFOR to assistin the IPB process. The use of CI personnel prior to Operations RESTOREHOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in the IPB process was minimal. The IPB processas taught at the Intelligence Center and School at Fort AuachucaArizona worked only for conventional war. There is no formal course atFort Huachuca for counterintelligence analysis. The only analyticaltechniques course that could be applied to counterintelligence analysiswas the counterterrorism course. Using CI personnel in the IPB processallowed them to introduce the analytical tools of link analysisassociation matrices and time event charting which the majority of CIpersonnel know from their counterterrorism t ~aining.~ he use of CIpersonnel to assist in the analysis during the IPB phase proved aninnovative technique that contributed immeasurably to the intelligence

effort.The second TTP that the ARFOR developed to improve the

intelligence synchronization process was to combine the CI teams withthe civil affairs CA) teams to improve their intelligence collectionpotential. The CA teams were the teams that interacted with the Somalipeople the NGOs and other volunteer organizations that were working thehumanitarian assistance mission. The CI teams conducted severalcollection activities in Somalia. They conducted low-level sourceoperations which involved recruiting Somalis to observe and reportsuspicious activity. The CI teams talked to Somalis and N O personnel


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was not sufficient as the standard procedure for reporting intelligenceinformation. The SALUTE report was not suitable for much of theinformation that was being reported. Information like the demographicsof Somalia clans the availability of food and water and the presenceof criminal elements was hard to report using a format that wasdesigned for conventional warfare. The intelligence personnel in theARFOR at the S 2 levels and the G 2 levels determined that a series ofstandardized checklists should be developed that provide a better meansof reporting the information gathered by the tactical units.

The ARFOR primarily the 10th Mountain Division developed TTP toimprove the collection of intelligence information at the tactical unitlevel. This TTP consisted of a series of standardized checklists forthe Somalia environment including checklists for airfield securityoperations roadblocks convoy debriefs patrols and area assessments.They disseminated these standardized checklists to all ARFOR units:combat combat support and combat service support. The checklistsprovided small unit leaders with a resource to use to focus theirefforts when conducting patrols. They also provided immediateintelligence information for the 5 2 staff for current operations andlocal conditions. An example of these checklists the roadblockchecklist is shown below:

a. Report number and type of vehicles stopped. Reportidentifying markings and license plate numbers.b. Report number of passengers on the vehicle. Report age andsex of passengers.c. Report type and quantity of cargo.d. Report stated points of origin and destination of vehicle.


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e. Report stated reason for travel by passengers.f. Report any weapons found on vehicles.g. Report any sightings by passengers of weapons, technicals, orbandits during their travel.h. Report condition of passengers general health, dress,attitudes).i Report anything unusual reported by passengers.12

The information requested in these checklists was quite extensive. Theuse of these checklists by all units improved the accuracy andtimeliness of intelligence information in the ARFOR.

The third principle, split-based operations, provided thecommander on the ground in Somalia a means to synthesize national,operational and tactical level intelligence. The ARFOR 6 2 section inSomalia, communicating over the Trojan SPIRIT system, received nationallevel intelligence needed to complement its tactical intelligenceassessment. It also received operational or theater level intelligencefrom other intelligence elements like the CISE or coalition elementsduring CONTINUE HOPE. The key to split-based operations is that thetactical commander can receive intelligence from other sources tofulfill his requirements when it is not available at his level. The JTFand the ARFOR made mistakes concerning the application of split-basedoperations, but the principle proved sound.

The mistakes, when examined, appear to have affected operationallevel intelligence activities more than tactical level. However, inforce projection operations, the line between operational and tacticallevel intelligence is thin. The first mistake the ARFOR made involvedTrojan SPIRIT. This system relies on satellite communications,


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primarily leased commercial satellites, to communicate. ARFOR initiallyexperienced lack of adequate satellite coverage over Somalia in RESTOREHOPE. Because Somalia was an undeveloped country, it was not a highpriority for commercial satellite coverage.13 The 10th MountainDivision did not conduct contingency planning for Somalia until lateNovember 1992. As a result, there was no agreement with the commercialsatellite contractor to get the necessary coverage. This lack ofcoverage affected the ARFOR commander during the initial stages ofRESTORE HOPE, when he was dependent on national level intelligence toanswer his requirements while the tactical level intelligence assetswere getting oriented.

The ARFOR did not make the second mistake, but rather was avictim of their higher headquarters. The ARFOR's 6 2 section easilycommunicated with Fort Drum when the satellite coverage was finallyavailable. They were supposed to request information and analysis fromtheir home station to fill their intelligence collection gaps. However,their ability to request this information also meant they could provideinformation. As RESTORE HOPE and later, CONTINUE HOPE, progressed, theARFOR G 2 provided more information to their home station than theyreceived. Other ARFOR units reported the same problem. An intelligenceofficer with the 24th Infantry Division Task Force that deployed toSomalia in October 1993 said that the 24th Division 0 2 wanted a dailyintelligence summary (INTSUM), and a weekly telephonic briefing. Hestated that: We fed the 24th rather than the 24th feeding us. 14 Therequirement to send INTSUMs to a higher headquarters in the U.S. causedadded work for a spartan intelligence structure. Split-based operations


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advanced communication systems is a double-edged sword. Thesecommunication systems provide a transmission pipeline between thetactical commander on the ground and his support element at homestation. The purpose is to support the tactical commander withintelligence until his organic collection assets are functioning in thetheater. While commanders at higher levels need information concerningthe situation on the ground they must ensure that the passing of thisinformation does not interfere with the original purpose of providingintelligence to the tactical commanders. Commanders must achieve abalance for the flow of information to and from the tactical commanderson the ground. The successful application of the split-based operationsconcept depends on this balance.

The fourth principle tactical tailoring provided the ARFORCommander and his 6 2 the means to match the deployed intelligenceassets and personnel to the requirements of the mission. It is a simpleprinciple in theory but complex in application. The CENTCOM Staffencountered a serious problem during the planning stage that causedproblems for the tactical intelligence effort in Somalia.

The problem involved the collection of intelligence to supportthe planning at the strategic and operational levels. The CENTCOMCommander required information on the situation in Somalia to conductmission planning including information on the political military and

economic situation in Somalia. He also needed information on theattitude of the Somali populace--and specific elements of it--toward theU S His logistics planners needed information on the infrastructureand port facilities in Mogadishu and other Somali cities. Ais J 2


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needed information on the clans, their organization and equipment, andtheir intentions. The ARFOR G 2 needed the information on the clans sohe could recommend which collection assets to deploy to Somalia.Failure to deploy the proper collection assets would affect the tacticalintelligence collection effort. The CENTCOM Commander needed all this.information to tailor his forces so they could accomplish their mission.This issue was summed up in the following statement from the RESTOREKOPE AAR

The Strategic and Operational Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield IPB) process failed to to provide CENTCOM/JTF andARCENT commanders the lens through which the factors of METT-T couldbe focused during the early stages of deployment planning.17

The failure to provide the strategic and operational intelligenceon Somalia was the result of several factors. The first was the factthat intelligence collection for Somalia was low priority before thedisaster relief operations began. This observation was noted in anassessment of RESTORE KOPE:

Somalia was ranked 18th out of nineteen countries on the collectionpriority list for USCENTCOM. As a result, intelligence analysts hadto scramble to gather the intelligence to fill the existing gap.18Second was the lack of a U.S. presence in country, to include the normalcontingent of Defense Attaches. The U.S. Embassy was vacated in January1991, when Marine helicopters evacuated all the personnel. They leftbecause of the escalating violence in Mogadishu caused by a civil warbetween the Somali Government and several opposition groups.19 The lackof Defense Attaches collecting data in country contributed to theintelligence gaps.


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The end result of the flawed strategic and operationalintelligence preparation of the battlefield was an inaccurate picture ofthe Somali Theater. A memorandum from The Center for Army LessonsLearned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to Brigadier General Maggartconcerning RESTORE HOPE contained an eloquent summation of this problem.

A more accurate IPB of the AOR last fall may have profiled thesocietal and political environment as less hostile towards themilitary than originally projected--which could have changed thetroop structure/force building calculus and perhaps the way theforce flowed into this theater. A significant portion of the forcedeployed was subsequently not used or needed.20The pioblems discussed in the passage above caused the ARFOR to leavesome equipment behind and deploy other personnel and equipment behindschedule. Some intelligence collection assets were not deployed andother personnel and equipment did not arrive in country for severalweeks. This caused serious problems for the tactical intelligenceeffort.

The first of these problems was the ARFOR s failure to deploysignals intelligence (SIGINT) collection assets. The ARFOR intelligenceunits, the 110th MI Battalion - and the 2Olst MI Battalion did notdeploy their ground-based SIGINT collection systems. These units hadorganic man-portable and vehicle-mounted tactical SIGINT collectionsystems. However, the ARFOR G-2 believed, based on the limitedinformation he had for the threat in Somalia, that there was no need forSIGINT assets. There was limited space available for additionalequipment due to the faulty force structure for the JTF. The Center forArmy Lessons Learned (CALL) made the following observation about thisdecision:


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tactical ground-based SIGINT was almost nonexistent. TheMarines had limited assets in Mogadishu and the Army had none atall. Since Somalia had no fixed communications capability, radiowas the only means of rapid, long-range communications available towarring factions, and it was a lucrative target that was not fullyexploited because of the lack of tactical SIGINT collectioncapability in country.21

This shortcoming meant that the ARFOR would only receive limited SIGINTfrom the Marines, and had no control over the tasking of the MarineSIGINT assets.

The second problem experienced by the ARFOR involved thecounterintelligence (CI) teams from the 10th Mountain Division. Theydid not arrive in Somalia until January 1993, approximately threeweeks after the G-2 s collection management and dissemination cellarrived.22 Their deployment was delayed due to lack of airlift assets.They also arrived ahead of their equipment, including their vehicles,which caused further delay of their intelligence collectiona c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~he CI teams also experienced problems concerninglanguage. There were few Somali linguists available in the Army, so theCI teams were hindered initially in their collection efforts. TheARFOR s failure to get the CI teams in country earlier impacted on thetactical intelligence collection effort.

The third problem was the lack of a tactical level imagerycollection system. The Army and Marines both have unmanned aerialvehicles (UAV) that are capable of conducting near real time tacticalimagery collection, day or night. However, these UAVs were not deployedto Somalia due to limited airlift assets and airspace deconflictionproblems. The ARFOR s helicopter pilots were concerned that the UAVs


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were a safety hazard and that they would cause problems with airspacemanagement. The objections of the helicopter pilots was justificationenough to leave the UAVs back in the U.S.24

There were several TTP developed to solve a few of these problemswhile others remained unsolved throughout RESTORE AOPB and CONTINUEHOPE. The first problem concerned the failure to deploy SIGINT assetsand remained a problem throughout the operations. The TTP to solve theproblem is to tailor the deploying intelligence assets tactically toprovide all-source collection capability. This TTP is not new. Rather,it represents the proper application of tactical tailoring. The ARFOR6-2 should have deployed his man-portable SIGINT collection systems withthe initial force. SIGINT collection assets are a valuable tool fortactical intelligence collection in OOTW environments.

The shortage of Somali linguists impeded the effectiveness of theCI teams. The U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligencedeveloped a contractual arrangement to screen, evaluate and hirelinguists to support the operations in Somalia. Armycounterintelligence personnel in the U S helped screen and evaluatelinguists prior to their hiring and deployment to Somalia. Theselinguists worked with the CI teams for the duration of both operations,translating and providing country expertise. They did an excellent job,and one linguist lost his life in a fire fight, The author has personalknowledge of this program and the assessment of its success.

A second problem was the failure to deploy CI teams with theinitial force into Somalia. This problem was due to the ARFOR s failureto recognize that human intelligence (HUMINT) information collected by

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