. .

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCEIN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Tactical Airlift

by

RAY L. BOWERS

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORYUNITED STATES AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON. D.C.. 1983

Paperback Imprint. 1999.

AIR

!/i,~~E.t o .";/ ry

~, useumsPROGRAM

1Jb~ of Coagress CataloliDllD I'ubIkatIoD Data

BowelS,Ray LTacIical Airlift.

(The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia)BibYography

.Includes index.1. Vietnamese Conflic:t. 1961-1975-Aerial operations, American. 2. United States.

Air Forco-lf'lStory-VictDamcse Conftict. 1961-1975. 3. Airlift, MilitarY. L TItle..It Series.

DS558.8.B68 1982 959.704'348 82-14256

Papelback Imprint 1999

For sale by the Superintendent' of Documents, U.s. Govemment Printing Office.Washington, D.C. 20402

I

The Author

Ray BowerswrotetfUshistoryduring1969-1977wbiIeassignedtothe OJIiceof Air ForceHistory.Washington.D.C., whoRlhe servedassupervisoryhistorian of the Special Historics Bnmch. He holds a B.S.degree from the U.S. Naval Academy (1950) and an M.A. in historyfrom the Universityof Wisconsin,Madison (1960). From 1960 to 1967,be was a member of the history department, U.S. Air FoICCAcademy,where he directed iDstmction in the military history program. His AirForce :flyingcareer includedduty as chief navigator,34Sth Tactical AirliftSquadron (C-130) in 1967-1968, where he participated in major South-east Asianoperationssuch as the iCheSanh and the Tet Offensiveresupplyefforts. He has written or edited many pubJications in military history,and he presented "Air Power in Southeast Asia, A Tentative Appraisal"at the 1978 military history symposiumat the Air Force Academy. Heretired from active duty as a colonel in 1977, and now serves as publica-tions officerwith the CarnegieInstitutionof Washington.

iii

Contents

TheAuthor.Foreword .PrefaCe. .PhotojraphsMaps and Charts .

Part One: The CounterinsurgencyYears,1946-1964

L The French War in Indochina. . . . . .H. The Troop Carrier Idea, 1954-1961. . . .

HI. Farm Gate and the Air CommandoTradition.IV. TheDirty Thitty and theVietnameseAir Force

TransportArm. . . . . .V. MuleTrain-The F'mt Year. .

VI. Tho Airlift System, 1963-1964 .vn. Air Supplyof SpecialForces. .

VIII.IX.X

XI..XU.xm.XIV.

Part Two: The Yearsof the Offensive,1965-1968

The Entry of the C-130, 1965-1966. .SearchandDestroy. . . . . . . .The Airlift System in Growth, 1966-1967 .Junction City and the Battles of 1967 .The Khe Sanh Campaign .Tet and the Battlesof 1968: . . . .TheAirForceCan'bous. . . . . .

. . Part Three: Other Applications

XV. -The'AUXiliaryRoles. . . - .XVI. AirliftinIrregularWarfare. . . . .

xvn. The War for Laos. . .. .

Part Four: The Years of Withdrawal.1969-1975

xvm. The AirliftSystem,1969-191i. - .XIX. TheCampaignsof 1969-1971,Cambodia

and the Panhandle.' . . . . .

xiii

Pageiiiv

viixv

.xxiii

32547

6783

. 115. 149

. 169

.203

. 241

. 269

.295

. 317. 353

.

\}

t

I,1~,i

.379. 417. 439

_467

. 493

,

xx.XXI.

XXll.xxm.

XXIV.XXV.

XXVI.

TheCan'bouFon:e.1969-1972. . . . . . .Tbe Easter Offeusivo-The Battle of An Lac. . .The Easter Offensivo- The CountrywideResponse .The AdvisoryRole and the Vietnamese:Air Force

Airlift Arm. '" .....Return to Cold War in Southeast Asia.The 1975 Denouement .Reflections..........

Page. 521.539.559

. 581

.605

. 631

.649

Appendices

1. 2d AirDMsionOrganization,July 1963. . . . .2. 315thAirDivisionOrganization,June1964. . . .3. PacificAirJiftOrgauization,March1968. . . . .4. Peak Theater Airlift Fon:e Posture. March 31, 1968 .S. Theater Airlift Force Posture,March 31, 1972. . .6, AgreementbetweenChiefof Staft.U.s. Armyand Chief of

Staff, U.s. Air Force, 6 Apri11966. . . . . .7. Workload,USAF AirliftForces in Vietnam. . . . .8. Workload.CombinedForcesin Viebtam,1965-1972

(Cargo Only, Monthly AverageTonnages). . . .9. Workload, PACAF Forces in Western Pacific, 1969-1972.

10. Workload. 315th Air Division, 1965-1968. . . . . .11. USAF Transports Lost in SEA (ExcludesRescue Aircraft) .12. Historic Theater Airlifts (Passengexsand Cargo) .Notes. . .Glossary..BibliographicNote

.lndex. " .

. .

.,

xiv

.663

.665

.667.669.671

.673

.675

.683

.685

.687

.689

.691

.693

.807

.829

.835

I

xv. The AuxiliaryRoles

Versatility made the transport airplanes useful in numerous auxiliaryrotes in Southeast Asia. Some of these were specialized airlifts, medicalevacua'1ion. civic action hauling, overwater transport, and air logistics serv-ico'in 'Thailand. Others, which required only slight changes to the basicplaces. included ftareship work, leaflet operations, and explosive, in-cendiary, or chemical drops. Ships and crews of the 315th and 83~th AirDivisions flew these missions as part of the theatet airlift effort. Otherapplications of transport planes included gunshiP, spray, command andcontrol, rescue, and reconnaiSsance roles, all of wlricb required major air-craft modifications and were performed by special units dedicateCito theSepurposes. These activities are not included in this study. Auxiliary applica-tions, including the use of uansports and helicopters in irregular warfareactivities, reduced the number of ships, crews, and dying hours availablefor the primary mission of tactical airlift in South Vietnam.

The four-engine transports of the 315th Air Division continued toperform the overwater airlift role which had been their principal activitybefore 1965. The ability of the C-130 Hercules and C-124 Globemasterto carry fifteen-tonpayloads weDover fifteenhundred ttlilcs nonstop, al-lowed rapid deliveriesfrom the Philippines,Okinawa, and Japan to themajor b~ iri Vietnam. Cargo feU into five principal categories: ( 1)offshore-procureditems, such as jungle boots from Korea and electricalgear from Japan and Taiwan, (2) U.S. Anny and Marine equipmentfromOkinawa, (3) support materiel for Air Force units, (4) explosiveordnance moyedby air from the Philippinesbecauseof seaport and storagelimitationsin VIetnam, and (5) items trarisloadedfrom offshorestrategicairliftbecause of airfieldlimitationsin Vietnam.Airlift thus supplementedsurface shipping,helped overcome severe seaport bottlenecks during theAmerican buildup, and cut down deliveryand handling time for essentialparts and eqwpment. Although responsibiJitieswithin Vietnamrapidly in-creased for the offshore transports. the overwater workload (cargo. andpassengers) alsoincreaseduntillate 1966:1 .

319

(!.tM~~ ~~~c.- t ~~-(O ~

~~"J 7016.

~ O\IWJf"WJer

C-l~O ~f5f><'r'"..f.-OM 1""8- l~' 2(1)~~ .crY'Q..~.

AUXlUARY ROLES

. .

SntaUin comparison with that of Military Airlift Command.. By 1963MAC IQilitaryand contract transports WCIC.hauling 150.000 passengersand :45,000tons of cargo monthly to and from Southeast Asia. At firstMAC transports to VietnamIandedregularlyonly pt Tan SonNhnt. Dec:t!S-sitating considerabletpnssbipment within Vietnam by the CoJJUJ1OnServ-ice Airtift System. New airports opcried at Da Nq and Cam.Raub inJanuary 1966, and latm"at PJeiku,Bien Hoa. and Phu Cat. reducing theneed for redistn"bution.Major unit mOvementsby MAC aii-craft~ theUnited States usually required further airlifts to operatiilg areas by in-COUftUytransports. Intro4uction of the C-5 Galaxy transport in tbesummer of 1970 created new problems of in-c:o~try ~bution, si~C-S deliverieswere massive an4 initially the planes could land only atCam Raub Bay. Eventually,how~. C-5s could upload at Tan SoDNb1Uand etSewhe.re.9

The interisland use of MAC transports in the western PadIU; ~the issueof possibleduplicationof effort.~ Martin, in 19~, judgedthat activitiesof tbe Pacific transport forces and )fAC were ~1eJnf;n-tary and that coordination was g~ The ov~rlapping~tings. Martioconcluded,gave a useful fkJtibBityin apportioningtasks. To ~t ~use of theater C-130s in Vietnam,MAC ~ September 1966 in~ jtsinterisl~ndlIauUngin the westernPacificby an amount equal to the workof two C-130 squadrons. Shortly afterwards, CIN(::PACdirecte.daU sub-ordinate conunands 19 ~ making xCquestsdim:t1y~ MAC, ~stCad tofprward all airlift requirements to WTO for apportionment of tasks be-tweenMAC and the theate~transports. Also m 1966. contract transportstook over airliftsof American ~ps from Vii:tnamto offshorecities for~ rest and recuperation visits. This R.&Rprogram, first authorized jnApril 1962, ~ad been exclusivelyserved by 31Sth Air Division C-J3~and Air ForceC-S4s and C-118s.10

The eritical .need for C-130 lift in Vietn3IDduring 1968 brQughtfurther Ip~ to reduce use. of these plaacs in ovcnrater work. OnFebmary 13 ClNCPAC directed suboralDatecoJipnands to limit airliftrequeststo Qirectsupportfor operations in Korea and Vietnam.On April Sthe Deputy $ecretary of Def~se orde~ ~e use of C-13OSfor cwerwalerftigbu dtscOniinUed.MAC graduallyundertook this woikIoad and openednumerous pew routes in ~e western Pacific:during the neXt twelvomonths.ll . .

The possibleuse of MAC transports for shipments~tween points inVietnam was studied by the ~th Air Force in ~y 1968. The Joint

-The Military Air Tnmsport Service became the Military Air~ Command011January I, J966. At the same time, the ~ Troop Carrier Squadron became t11e22d Militaly Airlift Squadron aDd iu parent I5!J3d' Trabspon Group became ~65th MiUwy Airlift Group. ".

383

TACfJCAL AIRLIFf

. .

The allied air and ground forces of Joirit Task Force 116 that enteredupcountry Thailand in May 1962 depended heavily upon air traDsport as alogistics ,lint to the principal Sea and airport at Bangkok. ~ting inThailand during the deployment were two AUStralian C-130s, several Brit-ish transports, three Bristol freighters of the New Zealand Air Force. andfour U.S. Air Force C-123s. Tbe-C-J23 detaclunont was part of a squad-ron.from TAC, which arrived in Thailand on June Ii. The 1238 wereex~ed to remain, at least until arrival of a Can'bou company recentlyordered to Thailand from the United States. JI$

. The C-1238 operated from Bangkok's Don Muang Ah-port undermiSsion control of the joint task force headquarters and its Air Forcecomponent command. Most niissions were between Don Muang and theprincipal upcountty~ (Takhli, Korat. Chiang Mai, Ubon,lind Udom),eacb with ample runways of at least seven thousand feet. Only Don Muanghad ground controJled approach, VHF omnirange. and tacai1 equipment,but each of the other fields possessed at least a control tower with VHFradio and a low frequency radii> beacon. The Jnain operating problemswere the tra1Iic and parking congestion at Don Muang and the limited fuelsuppliesat theupcountrybases.69 , .

The diplomatic settlement at Geneva in july paved the.way for with-drawal of ,the aUieiI force. Looking to the possibility of futUre buildups innorthern Thailand. however. and seeking to reduce dependence on airlift.the Americans acted to improve roads and nul lines across Thailand andincrease stocks of military equipment. At NaklionPbanom, in extremenortheast. Thailand, a six thousand-foot airfield was constructed capableof rec:eiving major troop units. Planners realized that another and largerbwldup would require use of Air Force four-engine transports for cross-Thailand lift.80

The Air Force transports remained at Don Muang despite the with-.drawal of the.joint task force. Their number was rednced to two 1235 byearly 1963 but increased to five in July 1964. Aircraft and crews wererotated from units in Vietnam for two-week tours. Ground crewmen foundthe routine difficult since most maintenance work was done at night toprepare tbe ships for moming nnssions, and flight-line noise made daytimerest difficult..For the aircrews, howeyer, d~ in Thailand was a pleasure.Most tIying was done in the daytime, and the long runways, Bat terrain, andabsence of enemy fire made the misSions easy. The 1235 made daily runs tothe American depot at Korat and regularly visited some eight other up-country fields. Crews particularly enjoyed the custom of hauling ice creamback from Korat to treat the Thai children waiting in line at Bangkok forthe retUrn of the "Good Humor" ship. E~tions to" ~ ~ed effortwere missions into the tempoary strip at Nakhon Phanom ihSUpport'ofthelarge construction effort. One shjp was de$troyed while attempting a land-ing at an upcountry strip, mistaken for Roi Et. Thai scheduling and m.is-

408

'tJrftf., ~

Kt,fll-t (depO{)-bus ~50t

AUXILIARY ROLES

sian control at Doll Muang were entirely separate from activities In SouthVietnam.-1

The expansion of U.8. Air Force strike aircraft in Thailand duringand after 1965 greatly increased cross-Thailand transportation require-ments. Tbe C-123 detachment at Don Muang. now grown to six aircraftwas,'in September 1965, replaced by four C-130Bs from Mactan IsleAirfield in the Philippines. C-130As took over in early 1966 and were inturn replaced by C-I3OEs flom Ching Cbuan Kang in September 1967.CQmparcdto a daByftyingrate of 4.4 hours daily per plane for the A- andB-modets, the six C-130Es in June 1968 logged 7.8 hour$ daily perplane. Monthly airlifted tonnage rose from sixtten hundred tons (inc1udingthree thonsand passengers) in late 1965 to more than five thousand tonsper IIIOntbthree years later. C-124s passing through Thailand sometimesmade one or two in-country flights to hauJ cargo too big for the C-130s.Improvements in road, rail. II1'Idpipeline communications meanwhile madean increase in air transport unnc:cessary,and the airlift role became pri-marily to move men, mail, spare parts, and emergency munitions, wherespeed was important.U

Reorganized in April 1965, the Don Muang Transport movementcontrol was reestablished as Detachment 4, 31Stb Air Division, and in-cluded a maintenance staff as well as control personnel. Aircraft itinerariesgencraUyfollowed the monthly sdmduJes set up by the 315th Air Division,with movement control publishing supplementary daily orders as necessary.Since the heavy ftyini rate made it difficult to cope with emergencies,additional C-130s were sometim,esbrought in for temporary needs. TheC-130 operation in Thailand was thtrefore a ptoject of the 315tb AirDivision, wholly distinct from the control or surveillance of the 834th AirDivision in Vietnam.8I

A new aerial port squadron was established in Thailand in April 1965.and was ~~ the 6th Aerial Port Squadron in July. It replaced theformer detachment of the 8th SquadrOn.The port workload at Don Muangwas mainly to ~ cargo and passengers newly arrived in Bangkok forfurther airlift to upcountry destinations. Detachments of the parent unitfunctioned upcountry. The busiest (in order of activity) were the detach-mmIs at KQrat, Udom, Ubon, TakhH, and Nathan Phanom. Growingpains in the ThaiiIandport system tesembled".thoseexperienced in Vietnamand were caused by the inexperience of newly assigned personnel, frequentbreakdown of materiel-handlina equipment"shortages of protected storage$pace, and unreliable radios which made exchange of traffic informationdifficult By mid-1966. however, the worst of these headacbes had beenmrmoulltJ!d. Of

Like the C-123 crewmen earlier, 0.-130 aircmvs found the Bangkokshuttle a welcome mange from the more difficuh iying in Vietnam.Nearly all loadings were passeng.ersor palleti%edcargo, relatively easy

TACfICAL AIRLIFT

work for the loadmasters. The rigors of field or tactical operationswere seldom experienced. Passenger missions were usually round-robincircuits linking Don Muang and the upcountry bases. An aircrew'sseventeen-day cycle at Don Muang usually involved morc flying than did aduty cycle in Vietnam. However, most crewmen felt more than compen-sated by the opportunities for sightseeing and shopping in Bangkok, theexcellent arrangements for hotel billeting, transportation, and the rogWarityof missionsflow. .

A detachment of U.S. Army aircraft. mostly U-21s, also operatedfrom Don Muang managed by the airiift support branch of the MiJitaIyAssistance Command, Thailand. Two Army Canoous bcga'n working withthe detachment in 1964, rotating from companies in Vietnam. When the AirForce took over the Can1>ousin 1967, it continued the Don Muang shuttle.Canoou missions usually flew one of three preplanned routes to U.S. Spe-cial Forces detachments that were inaccessiblc to the C-130s. Afteri areorganization in 1971, the Army flight detachment included seven U-21sand two UH-l helicopters, now managed by the Army Support 'Com-mand, Thailand. Given the small scale of the Army detachment'sc-capability(less than tcn percent of the C-130 tonnage workload), tbe separation ofthe Army and the Caribou transports from activities was in practice. aharmless deviation from the principle of centralized management."

Transportation patterns shifted away from Don Muang in .1970, ."..ducing irritation at d1e American presence at Bangkok and easingair traffic congestion. The C-130s moved to U-Tapao on the Gulf.-ofThailaDd'in May 1970, and the main terminal of the 6th" Aerial PortSquadron folJowed in JqJy..1iuiog'0DIya-port detachment/at J)iOn;<Muang.MAC began airlifting.diiCdly toU-Tapiw, and by year's end most oHhedepot storage activities fOrmerly at Bangkok had been moved.' Schedwingof the C-130s was tbereafterdoae by the airtiftcontrol cemer at.U~Tapao.

-functioning under the PACAF airlift directorate. A Thai decisfon:tO"allowdirect entxy of Americ:anpersonnel into the upcountry bases in late .1~71

ised to ~.the C-130 trans-ThaiJand.,wor]doad and l'C!!!!it with-the C-130 detachment from U-Tapao. For the itQt

months. two C-130s ftew.cdally in Thailand. taJdng off each .morningfrom Tan Sod Nhut. Several130s retUrnedto U-Ta ao . .

"res ~.. .~bombing'ofietoam. And in 1 3 the enlargedU-Tapao forcebecame tbeso1e

C-;l30airJift contingentin SoutheastAsia, with missionresponsibilitics'inThaUand,Cambodia,andSouthVietnam.. __

e Air Force trans-Thailand effort was only a side endeavor"to themuch larger and more challenging operation in Vietnam. Thailand mis-sions, mainly to major airfields with no threat of enemy fire, resembled theoperations of a civilian airUne. :rhe crews from the Pacific adapted 'easily.and attained impressive flying hour and workload statistics. The:rotational

410

XIX. The Campaigns of1969-1971,

Cambodiaand the Panhandle

. Combat airlift operations during and after 1969 were largely episodic,lacking the sustained and sometimes desperate character of 19~8. Theseveral emergency and forward area lifts, however, were valued contribu-tions to the allied war effort and demonstrated the Air Force's continuingability to undertake tacti!:8l missions.

Two major cross-border campaigns highlighted the ground war: the1970incursion into Cambodia and the 1"971venture into Laos. In both theAir Force airlifters sustained a high-volume effort. primarily hauling toairstrips in the border regions of South Vietnam. Puring the Cambodiancampaign the transports landed at a number of forward fields, hauling introops, equipment, and supplies. Further movement into Cambodia wasprimarily by belicopter. In 1971 the C-130s landed at the old Khe Sanhbase, although disappointing delays in runway rehabilitation limited theextent of tbe Air Force contribution. Cargo drops and extractions were foremergency use only, because they involved too ~uch cargo-handling effortat the rcceivmg end for routine 1JSein mobile ground operations.

Modest-scale airlift operations continued into Cambodia after thewithdrawal of American troops from that country in mid-1970. Aidandeddeliveries into Phnom Penh supplemented surface lines of communications,while airdrops intermittently supplied isolated units in the eastern half oft!te country. Dp~estic American opposition to participation in Cambodiaaccounted for the dominant Vietnamese role in the Cambodian lifts, andgave urgency to programs to strengthen the small Cambodian Air Forceairlift arm.

Widespt:,eadcommunist attacks on the night of February 22123, 1969,recalled"the 1968 Tet offensive. Several emergency airlifts helped stop theenemy's bid, including 8 series of C-130 LAPES deliveries at the TienPhuoc dirt airstrip south of Da Nang. The war's first C-130 night droptook place on the third night when an A-modcl crew under Capt. Curtis L.Messex released fifteen cargo bundles over the runway at besieged Ben Hetwest of Dak To.1 Meanwhile, Air Force and Marine C-130 drops sup-ported renewed ground operati~)Dsin the A Shau Valley, and Air ForceC-7s landed on the valley's fifteen qunared-(oot clay runway at Ta Bat,opened by U.S. Army engineers on June 13, 1969.' Two months later, theC-130s spearheaded a new campaign sbiftiDg fOrces quickly ioto Du Dop.

493

CAMPAIGNSOF 1969-1971

border airstrips. A reminder of past search.and-destroy applications tookplace in the summer of 1910 wheo the allies returned to the historic KhamDuc airstrip. The object of this multibrigade operation was to interdictenemy eommunications Bod destroy (orces in the mountainous border re-gion. Allied heliborne w1its seized the airfield and nearby terrain on July12, meeting no significant opposition. The airfield appeared untouchedsince~e May 1968evacuation,and someitems of ordnance and construe-tiODequipment were found in salvageable condition. Runway rebabilitationbegan promptly, and on July 17, C-123s made tWenty-seven landings onthe ~v8Jlable twenty.five hundred feet bringing in troops. equipment, andsupplies. The strip meanwliile was lengthened to thirty-five hundred feet,permitting twelve C-130 landings the following day. The C-123s andC-130s thereafter continued daily deliveries of rations, ammunitioo, andlarge quantities of hel~copter fuel. On the ground at Kbam Duc were an AirForce mission conmiander, a combat control team, and a team from the15th Aerial Port Squadron.

Crews landing at Kham Due made steep, circling approaches anddepartures which minimized exposure to ground fire. Communist shelling!occasionaUy delayed or prevented landings. Other traffic delays resultedfrom bunched arrivals, disabled aircraft on the runway, and the necessity ofsharing airspace with helicopters and active artillery-conditiops typical offorw~ area operations. The airstrip closed down on August 26 afterwithdrawal of most materiel, but the withdrawal was marred by the loss toenemy fire of a Chinook with thirty-one persons. In all, Air Force airliftersmade 648 landings at Kham Duc--243 by C-130. 402 by C-123. and 3I)y Caribou, bringing in over forty-three hundred troops and twenty..sixhundred t(jJJsof cargo. mainly from Chu Lai. Overall results of the opera-tion were intangible since allied ground troops made few major contactswiththe enemy.. .

. The general. decline in tactical activity was unmistakable. Most unit.nioVen1entswere routine, in 1J1aDYcaSes entailing troop and equipment liftsto major terminals for departUre from Vietnam. Every six months theC-130s made some oDe hundred round trips between Saigon and Bang-kot, rotating units of the Royal Thai volunteer force. Although a standing

. . Seventh.Air Force operation plan p~~d procedures for airborne as-sault operations, there were DOactual paratroop operations. Frequentpracticemissions,bowever,assistedin trainingVIetnamesetroopers. Blad-derbird aerial tanker missionsdid not declineuntil 1971, the usefulneSsofthe C-130 in the fuel..deliveryrole having won acceptance.Reducing theaircraft's wing tank fuel raised C-130 payloads by as much as ten thou-sand pounds 9ver the previous.standard twenty-sixthousand-poundload-ing. The bladderbird missions were aiso vaiuable in aIiowingpilotS topracticeshortfield,heavyweightl~ding skil{s.1

Responsibilitiesfor emergencysupply drops generallyshifted to the

495

::XXII. The EasterOffensive-The Countrywide Response

.. The spring offensive in Binh Long Province was one of three maincosnpninist drives calculated to destroy South Vietnamese forces and to-ge~er to bring down the Saigon government. The heaviest blows came inthe far north where two North Vietnamese divisions began attacking south-ward from the demilitarized 2'Oneon the night of March 30; 1972. Anotherdivision moved against Hue trom the A Shau Valtey. In the central high-lands, two communist divisions opened attacks on March 31 and soonswept over the old battlegrounds of Dak To, Kontuin, and Pleiku. M~-while, in other regions, smaller forces stepped up guerrilla-like operations,menacing towns, bases, and lines of communications. Communist officerswere told that Saigon "must be defeated while the U.S. is preoccupied withthe electionsand domesticproblems."1

In their 1972 spring offensive the communists in part abandoned theircustomary tactics of camouflage and dispersion. Something resembliDgcOnventional ground warfare ensued, particularly in the northern region.Soviet and Chinese weapons were used in South Vietnam for the first rime.These included the SA-7 antiaircraft missile, wire-guided missiles, biggerand more mobiJe artillery weapons, and new rockets (possibly up to2SO-mm). Some 350 enemy tanks were in South Vietnam at the outset ofthe o1fensive and were backed by two hundred others in close reserve. NoAmericaninfantryunitswereiDactivecombatduringthe campaign.2

Allied air power, including a substantial air transport contribution,was unquestionably decisive in turning back the communist drives. A pro-lODgedairlift to battered Kontum rivaled in significance and drama the An1..ocresupply. Demanding night-landing techniques, airdrop methods latelyworked $)ut at Ap Loc:, and adverse-weather aerial delivery system' equip-ment were all used at Kontum. ThrOughOut South Vietnam during thespring and early summer, allied au-Hftersmade a maximum effort, movmgcolintless units, hauling supplies, and lifting refugees. As the iDtensity offighting eased in July, the airliftcrs gradually returned to former levels ofactivity, and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam resumed.

559

TACfJCAL AJRLIFf

Vietmun. where Vietnamese Air Force helicopteIS and transports laboredin difficult weather to overcome the region's ~ronic transportation prob-lems. Communist road interdiction intermittetitly isolated the region fromDa Nang, intensifying the urgency of the airlift effort. The Vietnamese AirForce during April attempted airdrops at several fire support bases south--west of Hue and at Quang Tri city. The smaIl size of the drop zones,difficult weather, and enemy fire, aU contributed to disappointing results.Serious shortages of food, munitions, and fuel set the stage for tbe May 1Jan"of Quang Tri and the disorganized retreat toward Hue.1'. American and Vietnamese transports joined in supply drops to aSouth Vietnamese blocldng force at Kompong Trach, in Cambodia, west ofTay Ninh. Vietnamese C-123s in late April achieved a bundle recoveryrate of eighty percent although enemy ground fire steadily increased. Aninitial U.S. Air Force C-130 drop on April 24 was successful using day-light container-drop techniques. The ship however received eighty-six hits.·Enemy gunners were apparently concentrated along the highway used as arun-in guide by the drop crews. The Americans shifted to night drops, stillusing the normal container-drop altitude of six hundred feet, but five of theeight C-130s dropping at Kompong Trach during April received battledamage. Soon afterwards tbe South Vietnamese force withdrew, but itsspirited action may have reduced enemy pressure in the delta provinces ofSouth Vietnam.lz

The few Air Force C-123s, C-7s, and C-130Bs still in the Far Bastmade modest contributions to the action. The ten C-123s at Tan Son

Nbut flew seventeen hundred airlift sorties during April, including numer-ous supply and refugee evacuation missions into and out of Song Be. Thefinal Air Force Caribou squadron made 811 airlift sorties in April beforebeing deactivated on May 1. Several C-7s and crews flew around-the-clock radio relay orbits out of Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut, linldng tactical

, air control party personnel on the. ground with direct air support centers.Meanwhile, the C-130Bs and crews of the Clark-based 774th Squadronundertook tasks within Thailand from a reopened operating location atU-Tapao. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in April approved a CJNCPAC Ie-quest to extend the tenure of the 174th in the-FarEastintotbe sommer.1ft

Mother. asset was the Military AirJift Command's C-141 force, ac-customed to operating in and out of Vietnam from off shore. The C-141sbad been successfully used for shipments entirely within Vietnam duringLam Son 719 and procedures for such emergency usage subsequently hadbeen codified. Beginning ODApril 21, 1972, MAC C-14ls agin. beganshuttling passeDgetSand cargo between Tan SODNhut and the other main

in-country bases, principally 1>&Nan~, B~ Hoa. and Pleiku. Planes and

·The crew hit on April 24 over Kompong Trach waS the one shot down thenext night at An Lac.

564

-.

THE COUNTRYWIDERESPONSE

crews were based for one or more nights at Tan Son Nbut and performedtwo or more days of in-country work before departing for offshore destina-tions. This C-141 eftort permitted the C-130s to concentrate on drops,unit hauls, and deliveries to forward locations. During the week beginningApril 28, for example, the MAC transports flew 193 in-country sorties,Ufting thirty.five hundred passengers and 1,630 toos of cargo, equal totwenty.fi.ve percent of the total Air Force in-country workload. The projectla.sui~four weeks. Usually four C-141s worked in Vietnam daily althoughthe eftort expanded briefly to eight planes in latc April. A highlight ofthe operation was the evacuation of 394 refugees in a single C-141 sortiefrom Pleiku to Saigon on April30.IT

Despite such help the steppc<t.up effort in Vietnam seriously strainedthe mcn of the 374th Wmg. Many aircrewmen found themselves exceedingthe thirty-day limitation of 12() flying hours. When not flying, crews foundrest difficult in the severely crowded billets at Tan Son Nhut. Some slept inhallways, some enlisted aircrews and ground crews slept in the airplanes.Tbe conditions prompted concern among ffigbt surgeons of the Seventh AirForce and the 374th Wing. To meet the rising maintenance workload,men were sent to Ching Chuan Kang on temporary duty from other Pacificbases and individuals finishing Far East tours were invited to volunteer forextensions. The maintenance supervisors, Colonel 10sue felt, were espe-cially overworked.18

The critical situations at An Loc, Kontum, and Quang Tri at the endof April made it apparent that the countrywide demand for more and moreairlift would continue. Select TAC C-130 units in late April receivedpreliminary notice to prepare for possible deployment to the Pacific. Upondirection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, TAC in early May sent ten C-130sto the Pacific to replace aircraft out of service because of battle damage. Inrecommending further augmentations the Joint Chicfs on May 10 informed

.the ~tacy of .Defense that the Pacific force was already "committed atnear-maximum level." and that the Use of C-J41s in Vietnam had strainedMAC's capabilities elsewhere, forcing cancellation of most training. TwoTAC C-130 squadrons during May 13-IS. under Constant Guard IV,left for.I79-day. temporary duty tours. with..the 374tb Wing at Ching ChuanKang. One squadron was from the 316th Wing whicb sent fourteen planesto join two already in the Far East with Constant Guard III. The otber wasprimarily from the 314th Wing at Little Rock. augmented from the 317thWing at Pope to make up a sixteeu.plane unit capable of all-weather cargodelivery. Each squadron included support personnel and forty aircrews. Allaircraft flew the familiar transpacific route, and the last arrived on Taiwanon May 19. Two days later the.first TAC planes and crews flew to Tan SonNhut. Thereafter, the TAC force shar~ in all in-country work, includingthe critical effort at Kontum, and eventually took exclusive responsibilityfor all in-country drops. Iii . .

565

. . .

XXIV. Return to Cold Wariri Southeast Asia

Most. Aineiicaos welcomed the Paris ~ts iliat resUl~ in acease-fire hi Vietnam. Although the ceaSe-fire.was short of f1dI victory, itseeme~febougb that the killing bad ended and tbat.sevend boodled Aineri-caDs impriSoned.in North Vietnam would soon be free. The, Air Forc:Oairiifters generSny shared these feelings a.nd were proud of, their roles inattainingwhat.appcatcdto be ~acc withiionor. .

, For the ,airliftersthe furieswere busy and exhilarating.Q-43() crewson January 2~, 1973, ~ade the Air Fofce'S tint pea~i l8udings in NorthVietnam in newy two decades. In the weeks that followed, Her:cu1esciew-men took part in th~ erDotional prisotier-releIisC CereJIioDicsin HanOi~Meanwhile,'other C-130 misSions in South Vietnam sped th~ telease ofcommunist personnel held by the allies. helping to assure thlit repatriationSbythe~emy wouldcontinue. ' ' ,

. After tJ1ecease...Jirethe Pacific C-130 force continued its routineovcrwater airlifts atui .flights in. Thailand. :Most ~hallenging was the airsupply effort to Cambodia where'inumse fighting ,contiJiueI:J.C-130 ctewseach ,day I8nded with munitions and .rice .at the PIniom Penh aiiport andmade drops to Cambodiab garrisons isolatCd at other pointS. Americantiombing ceaSed in Cambodia in August 1973,. but the airlift went, onwithout Ii break. The survival Of the Phnom Penh regiine wltJlouc ques,iiondePendecl orithe Surface and air lines Of communications thrOugh ~chAmetican. materiel. ftowed. Meanwhile, in Widespread regions of SouthVietnam the North Vaetnamese army gained st1't\ngth, now supplied andreinforced ~tho11f:interferen~ by allied interdiction trom the air.

FoiiOwing the defeat of tbe communist ~sp~g inVasion, the Americansreturn,ed to the policy of eocouraimg theSoUth Vietnamese to rely as uiucbas pOssible on their own transports: The' 374th Wing in the early $u~rof- 1972 briefly operated a ten-plane C-130 detachment from NakhonPbanom. main)' to transport units from, Vietnam to Thailand. and soonafterwards reduced the Tan So~ Nhut C-130 fOfte 10 twenty aircraft. Afinal tragedy tooJc place on August 1.2wlien ~nemy fire claimed a C-130taking off from sac Trang. Its fortY-three passengerS and Crewmen becamethe war's last fatalities in Air Force C-130 oi?erations.1 .

60S

TACTICAL AIRLIFT

A potentially seriouS situation developed at Tan Son Nnut where theVietnamese Air Force's newly acqUired C-130s sat unprotected. Con-cerned by the possibility of shelling attacks, G.en. 10hn W. Vogt, Jr.,commander of the Sevetith Air Force, on November 13 direc:kd the 374ihWmg detachment to give up its protected area. Despite the complete laCkof forewarning, the detachplent promptly fleW out its aircraft and ~and within tWeive hours aU but tWo of the Vietnamese planes were pro-tccicd. The American 1305 thereafter operated from Nakpon Pb~om.contirlbing to fly missiol'lSin South Vietnam, A foutteeD-maa..maiDtemmce~. aDd severai aircmVs temained at Tan SOn Nbut. Shortages of. spare,ptirts and work faci1itiCsatNakhon,Phanom, Jiowever; soon forced a dtt inthe number of. dany .ons, compounding the loss of work capacityrepresented by tbe.-ata;fiyiog..time to and from Nathon Pbahom. Mean~~ile the Vietnamese Air f:orce's temporary preoccupation with JCtraiDiilgfor the C-130s furtherClecreaSed ov~ran 1iftcapability.2

To meet the rising backlogs, MDitary Airlift Command 0-1415 againundertook hauls betWeen the mJljor South Viett1amese aidif;lds. TheC-141 missions usually originated at Clark, landed and reloaded atSaigon, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and a~ain at Saigon before ~ingtodark. The C-141s lifted tWeniJ..D.vehundred ions of cargo.and seven~seven hundred passengers in 250 such Sorties during November and IJe.cembe.r;JI

Airdrops remainedtbe exclusive responsibility of AWADS ships aildcrews from TAC, now called the Easter Bunny force. All releases werefrom high altitude, rigged for either HALO or high-velocity descent; theincidence of parachute malfunctions (streamers and high-openers) {Coomamed troublesome-one bundle in six for HALO, one in ten for highvelocity. AWADS releases gradual1y became more numeroUs than GRADSin piepaiation for closing the ground radar sites. An Lot remained a toeusfor drop activi.ties along with several familiar highlands camps including:Ben Het, "DaleSCang, Duc Co, and" Ba To, aU of which yielded to theenemy during the faU: Extremely small drop zones, enemy pressure ODcamp perimeters, and parachute malfunctions aU cut the effectiveness ofthe drops. After only 51 of 340 bundles released at Minh Thanh wererecovered, tlIe MACV logistics section wrote, ''we appear to be supplyidgthe besiegers rather than the besieged." ~Ititough results were unimpressivethe airlifters in late-year operations refined the know-bow in high altitudedrops acquired in the difficult spring campaign. The Easter Bunny shipsand crews left Tan Son Nhut with the other C-130s in November, * there-after continuing the drops out of Talehli and later U-Tapao.4

· One of the two TAC C-130 ~uadrons retUrned to tho United States In Sep-tember 1972; the remaining unit rotated- its personnel periodi~lly from Lan8lcYand Pope. C-130Es of the 374th Wing replaced the B-models in the KJong rotationin July 1972. .'

, .

aETQRN TO COlJ) WAR

SOIfl1lEASTASiA.1m.~ .""'.~' J .-.o !Jh'" 100NM r / r.,..' < CHINA

( .. ........VIETNAM

~, '", NORTH, , - .-......I! { .

BURMA .r' 'v'",. (, HANOI..JJ '\.-'V") ,'0 1 ."

' f ..r' ~v' l_. ,,-..i

, ," } \" j """'"".. . l

! V'~TlANE~ "

1 ,..r"'~"""\ ......\.. UDORN. . ~ '. _

NAKHON' '1. .QUA!'IG tltlPHANqM~ EVANS.~. DA !'IANG" \~~,..l" '

iQUANG~ '.NGAI . .

.i /!. OAKTO,.-'-'-'-'-~.:, \ t.. PLEIKU

. BANGKOKI '~. ~ .) ,, CAMBODIA ....

~ ...;. DA LAT, / '.',. .,,'PHNOM PENH _.l8I.OC NINH. r. TONLEOfAM

. TAN- SON1''''' / '. NHUT

'iJ' '~INH THUY'.-/.AN THO!1 ·

(PHU Q

"\-..-'

)

) T~KHLI.

"

'.\1\\1

II"

.j .i

(,

The NQkhonPbanoman4 tho EasterBunnyC-130s ~ to~,im~ the scbcd\WDgaaad~tJO~ol the TQD~ Nbut airlift con-~l center.AnQ...ther~troI -ceqterat U-Tapao managedthe C-13Qs'(caU«fKIong)PrimarilyUsedfor lifts within'Thailand.As ~ the past,airc~s and groundC(eWSwe~~rotatedfrom Taiwanand re~ailtedinThailandfor cyclesof up to tWerityqays.!' ". . ,

A fin~ incident of wai, one reP1in~ of c::o~tless~ in th~

past, ~arked ~ final Jaours'before tQe ce~e..firc, ~$t1t on tb~ gro~d ~t

607

Appendix 7*.-

·Opa Rep-5 files at USAF wmd cen: rprts, 315th AD. Airlift ACIX)mp~~,CY 65 and CY 66; rprts, Mat Analys Of1', 834th AD, Tactical Airlift PerformanceAnIIlY8i:s,SEA, Dee 66, Dee 61, Dee 68, Dee; 69, Dee 70, Dee 71; Summary of 4;,.OperllliDm, SDMthetlStAsia (Hickam AFB, Ha.waii, 1969-71): tabulations in 6492dCombat CarlO Gp, History of Airlift in SVN, Dee 6t-Oc:t 62, Dee 17, 1962:monthly hist data rprts, TAFTS-P2, Oct-Dcc 62: Donald F. Martin, History of theWar in Vietnam, October 1961-Decembe,. 1963 (Project CHOCO, Hickam AFB,Hawaii, 1964): rprt, PACAF coDlpttOlJer,FY 64-65, in B. A. Whitaker aod L E.PatenoD, Auault Airlift OperatlDtU(Project CHECO, Bictam AFB. Hawaii, 194'U:tmIs, 3J5th TAW, 1969-72, 314th TAW. 1971-72, USSAOnth AFt 1973; rprts,Airlift See, MACV (1-3), 1?72: CqmmQIU/StIIlll8Book, 7th AF, Jun 72; Canqoudata for late 1966 from USARV: l'ACAF Tactical Airlift Summsry, Dee 69, Dee 70.

.675

Workload, USA.F Airli,t Forces in Vietnam

Ahtfft C-1238 iDVIetJuma.Flying CaTg",

SOI'liu Hours PllRengers toM

1962Jan 296 493 1,638 428Pcb 418 '96 2,m 514Milt 508 125 2,878 688Apr 545 750 2,943 96SMay 751 1,214 4,495 1,224JUD 1,102 1.947 9.393 1,364Jul 1,132 1,841 10.349 1;438Aua 1.454 1,865 1S668 1,787Sep 1,473 1,930 15,500 2,115Oct 1.295 2,019 11,256 2,401Nov 1,439 1.838 13.233 2,573Dee 1,278 1,750 9,785 2,198

1963Ian 1,401 1,819 11,624 2,027Pcb 1,336 J.611 9,218 2,27-1Mar 1,567 ],727 14,012 2,179Apr 1.627 1,823 ] 1,040 2,299May 2,159 2,691 1$,337 3,321Iun 1,996 2.424 12,417 2,816Jul 2,216 2,998 16,373 2,884Aug 2,088 2,'82 13,766 3,098

'Scp.

. 2,343 ?,707 13,707 3,328Oct 2,290 2,679 13,794 3,34Nov 2,572 2,852 14.004 3,8.50Dee 2,686 3,153 16.047 4,478

'J'Iuat~ C-130 ~Mi81oI!8" ~ ~... 884'I1a8I1aDd1912Nov 2,219 2.900Pee 2,825 4.046

1913JailPebMarAprMayJun"IulAugSepOct

3.0853.0733,0141,8242,0291,0481,(i192.~701.8252,479

4.1994.1754,4182,~S2.0181.0311,5963.0812.4932,963

<:-130 Caqo DeI1Yeries80C8IIIbodia

AirlondSonia

1973JulyAugSepOctNov

. Dee

1974IanFebMarApr-Jun totalIuJ-Sep to~ .

326666441772353440

3142323111563

UA AnDfCarIbou(1"') ... C-1. of 4831dWillI

FlylnfHOllrs(J.s. Army

I~IanFobMarApeMay

680

6,0589.559

11.94912,54511,170

3.76110287,0667.7767,600

36,81848,543

66,15936,89039.3569,1709,1341,jOt1/1.757,4401,CTrl7,637

AlrdropSorties

t38116116543350

946193

833288

24,37656,04069.12678,43869.414

6,3415.800

7,1328,9447,9337,5318,6012,0318.129

13.so19,Oli

14,627

Totlll.tons

6,66111,7867,4388,0925,5587,064

6,6094,0231,392

11,7374,180

CtUtlO.Ions

2,4216,3797,5377,802"6,302

TACflCAL AIRLIFT

Flying CtUtlO,Sortia ROlin P(l#etgt!1'6 tons

Aug 2,4 2.820 47,167 8,513Sep 2,399 2.861 56.080 7,062Oc:t 1.899 2.180 44.051 5,g1.7Nov (TSN 879 1.075 17.084 2,850det only)

I

TACTICAL AIRLIFT

n,~ 3rd Qtr, CY 68, Oct IS, 1968;!DIP 21321, 28099, and 30501, MACVCOC to CJCS, 1609HZ, 230656Z Sep,and 140124Z Oct 68; hist, MACV, I,113-174.'$0. Msg 68-3, 834111AD to Dir/Opl

Rcqmtl, Hq tJSAP (for Moore fromMcLaushlin), sub;: C-7A Aircraft inSEA, Ian 19, 1968.

SI. 'Study, Brig Om Burl W. Me-Laugblin, Cdr 834111AD, and Maj GenRobert R. Williams, USA, USARV. IUbj:Review of Air Force C-7A Operationsin Support of the Army, Apr 18, 1968;11f, Lt Qea Bruce Palmer, USA, DepCO USARV, to Cdr 7th AF, subj: Re.quiremeats for Additional STOL Tactical

Aircraft, Jun 10, 1968; Itr, Gea WilliamW. MOmyer, Cdr 11h AF, to COMUS-MACV, sub}: Re4uirementl for Addi-tional STOL Tactical Airlift, Jon IS,1968; memo, Lt Oen James V. Edmund-son, Vice Cdr, 7th, AP, to Celr 7th AF,subj: Reqmt for Additional STOL Tac-tical Airlift, Sep 25, 1968; bac:ksrOlindpaper, Dir/Plans. Hq USAF, aubj: TIm:cAirlift CV-2 Sqdns, 'Jul 66; ProgramBudget Decision no 421. OR/See Def.sub}: CV-2 Aircraft, Dee 22, 1966; mas.ICS to' CINCPAC. 072224Z Aua 68;IDS8. Cdr 7th AP, to Cdr PACAF.1~210Z AIlS 68; rprt, AFXOP stUdyGp, Dlr/Opns. Hq USAF. Tactical Air.lift Problems, 1966.

Chapter XV

The Auxiliary Roles

I. Msa DOP 5i048. PACAF 10 7th Iioo. Airlift Orpnization i1\the PACOMAP. 17000$Z lu) 66; rpn, PACAF, Air- ~,Oct 1'. 1%6; memo, CoJ Charleslift Rprt for May 66. RCS: AF-J-~8; W. Lcafe8t, Aat Dep Dir/Plans for WarBorden intvw, Nov 4. 1970; rpns. 315m Plans, Dir/Plans. Hq USAF, to AFX-AD. Commander's Review. jun 30 and Poo, mbj: PACAF Aiitift OrganiZationDee 31.1966; rprt, Joint LoJistics Review Structure, Sep 2. 1966; msg XPD 91625.Board. Monograpb no 2 (Ammunition). Dir/PJans,. Hq USAF, to PACAF (for1970, pp ID-I<41. Gea VOSt), 242232Z May 66: rprt. Air-

2. CINCPAC Jnstruction 4600.38, Apr lift StaB Gp. Visit to pACOM Area, 113, 1967; hist, 31Stb AD, JAIl-Iun 68, 1. Oct-tO Nov 65; telecon. Lt CoJ Stouapr$~2: study. 31Sth AD, PACAF C- to Col Umpleby, CHWI'O. 141013ZNov1.30 ~ ~ Ape 67; atudy. 65; mil VC $1124, TAC to Hq ti'SAFHq PACAP and Hq MAC, Theater Air- - (XOP arid XPD). 211940Z Sep 65.tift Study CY 67. Ian 31. J967. 6. Rprt, Lt GeD Glen W, Martin, 10

3. Hist. 463rd TCW, lan-JUII 67. pp USAF. VISitto PACOM to Evaluate Air-11-'2; hiat, 314tb. TCWr, Jm...Jun 67. lift, 27 Feb-12 Mar 66: study. Dirlp 5; hist, 374th TCW, Jan-Jun 61. PI Plans,:t:J'q~ACAF;Organizat(on of 3J5tb18-19. . Air Division, DPLM 7S1S3, May 16,

4. Rprt, Joint LogisticsReviewBoard. . 196i~ '.

Monograph no 18 (Transportation and 7. PACAF PAD 69-2, sub;: PACOMMovement Contro!), 1970, pp 145-150;, Airlift Or,ani%ation. Scp 24. 1968; Itr.3I51h AD Manual 20-3. Mission and Re- Col Charles W. Howe, Cdr 315th AD, tosponsibiJitjes,May I, 1~; _, Lt CINCPACAP,sub;: ar. of PACAFCol Bruce G. Gilbreth. Cb, Comm-Eledr, Airlift System, Jun 12. 1967; msg 00403.3tStb AD. to oc-so. 315m AD. subj: 7th AF to PACAF. sub$: Or, of PACAFAirlift Mission Monitorina System, Feb Airlift System. Iun IS, 1967; ms.. CSAF25. 1965, . to PAC;AF (for Ryan from McConnell).

5. Msg DOP Q2080. 3I5tb AD to. 042251Z Mar 67; IDS8. DirIPIans, HqPACAF. 2306SSZ May 66; memo, Lt PACAF, to 315tk AD. et ai, 110431ZOen Hewitt T. Wheless, Asst Vice CSAP May '68; hilt, 315th AD, Jao-Jon 61,to Air Staft ascm:ies, subj: CSAF Deci. pp 10-26, Jui-Dee 67, pp 14-15. Jan-

760

I

NOI'BS

Jun 68. pp 10-36. 241-242, Jut 68-Apt.pp 176-177; hUt, 315th AD. Jul 68-69. pp 1-2. 17-23. . Apr 69. p 10; lb' 0311-68. Ch. wro to

8. Hilt. ClNCPAC, 1969. I. 179, 1971, CINCPAC J-4, IUb); PACON TheaterI. 305; lUst, 315th AD, TiJI 68-JS" ~JiF-Tactical 0at8ize Airlift Capabilily, 1968;69. 'vol I. pp xxii; n~ ~i1'IJft~, (3IStA- study, PACAF aDd MAC, Theata' AIrliftAD). Jan 1S, 1969; Armd Forcn }o"r- Study CY 67, Ian 31. 1967.MI. May 31. 1969, P 30. --'- --- 15. Hist, 31Sth AD. Jut 68-1$ Apr

9. JCSM-593-66, MaDO for See Def, 69, I, 9-10; ltr. Cot John R. Geyer, 4O.5thtubj: Deployment of Troop Carrier Ptr We. to 13th AF. subj; NominationUniti. Sep 17. 1966:rpns. Dir/~ . for.the USAF FIt Safety Plaque. Jan 12,ment~.. Hq USAF. USAF Mm. 19'12;hilt. CINCPAC, 1969, I. 180-181,asement SIII.1IIDaI'Y,SEA, Oct 12, 1970 1970. I. 210-211; rprt, DirlTransp, 7thaft4 Apr 20, 1972; hist, 2nd Ac-r -POrt AF. Hist Data Record. Oct-Dee 71;GP. Apr-Jun 71, tIP IS-16: rprt, Co! biIt, 20th Opas Sq, lan-Mar 70 throuahRaymond Gaylor, Cdr 2nd Aer Port Ian-Mar 71; hilt, 463rd TAWS, Apr-GP. Jut 72, pp 34-36; hilt. MACV, -1966. JUII 71, pp 8-10, Jld-Dee 71, tIP 3, 21,pp 292-294,1967, pp 771-712, 1968, lIP 24,27.669-670; rprt. Jomf I..osiIdcs Review 16. Ltr. Philip P. Hi1bert. Dep U/Sec:yBel. Mooosrapb 18, J.osiItic Support in (IA), Dept AP, for CSAP. subj: Tac:dcalthe Vietuam Era; Tf8DII)OI1atioo aJfd Airlift, Jan 11, 1972; tpItS, PACAP, Tal>Movement ControJ, pp 93:-,99: rprt. tical Airlift Summary, Dee 69. Dee 70,MACV 1-4, Losi8dcal HbtOrica1 A<:tiv. Peb 71; hilt, CINCPAC, 1969, IV, 89-itiCa,Oct 21,1967. .. 9t, 1971, I, 314-31.5; hist, 374tb TAW"

10. Rprt. Lt Gen Glen W. Martin. IG Ian-Mar 69, p 92; hista, 463rd TAW,.USAF, Visit to PACOM to EV8Iuate 1969 throu8h 1971; hists, 314th TAW,.AidJft, 27 Peb-12 Mal 66; study. PACA'P 1969 tbrouah 1970.aDd MAC, 'IbeateE.,AirlifLStudy._CY 67. 17. Rprt, Maj William W. Burnett,Jan 31,15161;bist, MAC, Py 66. pp.531- &lei of Tour, May 3, 1965; KimbaI1533; hilt, Dir/Opua Hq USAF, Jan-JUa jotvw, Nov 4, 1970; Borden intvw, Nov66. pp 20-22. 4. 1970; hilt, 3l.5tb TCGp, 1101-31 Dee

n. Memo, Paul B. NiUe, See Def, 63, P 3; Kennedy intvw, Peb 4. 1964;for See AF, SICS. RIb;: Jntta..theafer Afr. Hawkes," Ap in Vietnam Operation,"lift Opus. Apr 5, 1968; msg..AECVc, AmuicmJ Aviation, (Apr 64), pp 16-Geft 101m D. R,an, Va CSAP: t~ 21; Air Force Times (ltrs to editor).PACAP, 301501Z Oct 68; hisr. D1i'/ Mar 3. 1971.Opas, Hq USAF, Jan-JUD 68. pp.141-1L .Rprts, MACV, Monthly Bva1ua-142, Jul-Dec 68. pp 185-186; hist, 3tlth tion, Pcb through Jul 66; hr, MACV J-4,AD, lul 68, AIK IS, 1969, I. 71-75; to Cdr 2nd AD. subj: C-123 Flare Sup-hist. ClNCPAC, I96&, -IV, l~. pGa..-Commitmenll, Pcb 11, 1966: lb',

.131-]4]; kilt. MAC, Py 69, pp )74-1.1. MACV J-4, to Cdr 7th AP, subj; C-12. Rprt, Co) R. H. Goodell, USA, )23 Flare Support Commitments, Apr 5,

Cdr TMAs MACV, Debriefing Rprt .-l966;-rprt, Lt Col Hugh L Bayues, Cdr(BOTR). Jut I. 1968, p 27; hilt, 7th Ap, 311th ACSq. Debriefing Report, Jut "Ian-Iun 68, I, 79; McLaughlin intvw. 1966; lb', Col Georae L Hannah, CdrApr 20.1970. .. USth ACGp, to 315th AD, subj: UMD. 13. JIist. 374th TCWg. Aug.-Dee 66, Change Request, New 16, 1965; Ib',

pp 29-)0; hilt, 314th TCWS, Ian-Jun 66; CO! WlJliam A Mc:Laushlio, Dir/Opna,P 51; memo, Col Oliver C. Doan. Asst ,,3Uth ACW,. to 7th AP. Dir/Alrlift,DCSIPen, PACAP, to CIS PACAP, subj: July MONEVAL Rprt, Aui 5,sub'; my Credit for C-130 Airaewa, 1966; rprt, 3l.5th AD, SignikaDt AirliftDee 8, 1966; CIarIt intvw, Nov 4, -me,..- Accomplilbments for )965; rprt, 315th. 14. Rprt, OpRS Analysis Oft Hq ACWg. 3JSth ACWg Aixomplisbmentl,

USAP, :Aualyais of seA Airlift OpM, Jul 19. 1966.Sep 66; IUCIDO.Eugene M. ~ SAF;- . 19. Maj Victor B. ADtbony, The AF illto See: Del, subj: Inactivation of C-124 'SoU/Mast AM TGClic6and TechnlquaSqdn at Hunter APB, AuS 3, 1965; msa of Nisht OpemtioM, 1961-1970 (Offl AP00'23, DCS/Opns, 31Sth AD to P~'--HiIj; Mar 73), pp 36-43. mss DOP061435Z Apr 65; hist, IS03td Att Tr SOO2J. PACAP to 31Sth AD, et 4d.Op; qtrl)', 1965; bist, ClNCPAC. 196B, U21S6Z Ian 65; IIISgDO 02M)'. DeSI

761

.

I

rtrt. Laurerice E. Lynii, Qit/Ec:onOlDi"and Mobility 'Pon:es, Off See De! (SysAnaly.~).. aubj: Trip R.P.rt,AIlJ 67; ppIO-If; .lit, Bria. Gen William E. Bryan.De, CIS MACV, to CG USARV, subj:Aviation Support of Am Loaistics Com-mand Advisors, Nov 14, 1967: IDCIIIO,Cdr Marinc Refuel~ Transp Sq 152, toCO IslMAWg, subj: Command Cbfo-nololY, Nov 16, 1?65; rprt, MACV J-3to Hist ')Jr,. MACVi sub;: Jul 68 HiltS~, AIlS 21. I~; rp(I, MACV1-4, .LOOSUM 9-68 'for Alia 68: Sep22, 1968; rprtI, MACV, i:2trIy Evalua.tion; Dee 67 and t:eti 68: Vice AdmEdwin B. HooPer, Mobility, Support,EridIlrance: .d Story of Naval OpeN.tfD1UJlLogutic$ in. the. YieflUlm War,1965-1968 (J9aval Hill Diy, Dept/Navy,(972), pp 146-141; fact sheet, USMarineFoR:es in Vietnam, Historic-.l Summary,Mar 65-Sep 61, 1961, vol IT. .

51..}tact 8&_ 1-45 MACV, 81Ibj:LoJiltie.AirIift AetivltY in RVN, Oct 21,1968: brief, Dir/OPns, Hq USAF. mbj:PCPIR:N-7-OO5, RaPid. Responic Air-lift for SEA; May I, 1967.

58. Ltr, Lt Gen J. L Richardson, USA,Cdr, JTP-II6; to ClNCPAC, et al,subj: AAR. Dee.8, 1962; rprt, AP ComPCd, JTF-!16, Hist of the APCC, JTP-116, New 2$. 1962; mt8 21S53A, 13thAP to PACAP, 150850Z lun 62: Itr,Col William T. baty, Cdr'464th TCW..to OOAWalter SWeeneY.Cdr TAC. sub;:Trill Rprt, SBA,Aq 15, 1?61; bact-pound. ,.per, DirIPlaIll, Hq USAF,Mibj: US., 8ftCI .ADiccI Military Forc:c8Tb,ai1ancf.,Jurt 8, 1'62.

. '.5'. MIa A-cmr, MCC. JTF-1t6. to13th AP, 211515Z May 62; maa 19SB,2nd ADVON to DJrIOpns, 13th AP,May 13, 1962: msr J1S5B. 2nd ADVONto .13th AP, 290MSZ May 62; mq6~1647~ UtJl AP. to JTP-116, 14093SZlun 62; 62A1669, Utlt AF to 31SthAir Div and. 1503111AN.. 160734 10ft62; lU', IG 13th AF, to.601oth Tact Gp.aubj: Accident Pmrcntion Survey, 6010thTact Gp. NoY 23, 1962: PACAF reriew,:Mar62. .

60. DiriMii ~ OASD/ISA,/~ ot ~ ~e, hut 62,P 154, Sop 62, p H4. Mar 63, p 174;hilt, Dir/Plans, Hq. USAF, Jul-Dec 6~PP. 133. 18i-1SS, Jan-Jun 63, p 177;bist, CJNCPAC, 1963, P. 107. .

61. M8&. 1-257G, Znd ADVON toPACAP (pen from Anthis to Moorman),

NOTES

27080SZ JUt 62; _8 ISO. 2nd AD to DqUSAF, et lIl, 021002Z Oct 65: .Clarkintvw, NoV 4, 1910; Peiry intvw, Nov 3.1970; West intVW,May 5, 1970: BordersintVW,Nov 4,1970: Blake intvw. May~,1970.

62. RpJt,' Airiift Staff Gp, Rprt orUSAF 1t.irlift Staft Visit to .PACOMArea, 11 Oct-tO Noy 65: stUdy, HistDiy, 13th AF, subj: The USAF Buildupin Thaitand. I, 27-28: memo, HaroldBrown, ~ AP, to ~ Det; subj: 'I'b&land ConstnJdi~ Prosram. Jul U, I~;~ C-043. PACAF to CSAP (pen' forMcConnell .from Harril). l0062SZ Jut66; tDSJ, PACAF to Dir/Plans, HqUSAF, 13204SZ Jut 66: commander'srmew, 31Sth AD, Sep 68, p A-4; hiat,374th TCWg, Ju1-Sep 67. pp 8-9; biSt,31Sth AD. 1966, I. 49, mag, DirlTactOpns. 3tSth AD, to PACAP, 13th AF;060238Z Dee 67.' .

63. .Rprt, Airlift Staff Gp, RepOrt ofUSAF. Airlift StaIf Visit to PACOMArea, 11 Oct:"10Noy 65; biat, CINCPAC.1961, pp 862-863: bist, 31Sth AD. Jan-JUD 65, P. 7. Jul-Dec 65, I. ~7; hist.315th TCGp, Jan-Jun 65, pp 3-5; rprt,Li Gen Glen W. Martin, tG USAF,Visit. to. PACOM to Evaluate Airlift,Feb 27-Mar t~ 1966. .

64. H~, 631Sth Aerial Port Sq, Apr-AIlJ 65; f!ist, 6th Aerial Port Sq, Jan-Jwi66; hist, 13th AP. 1965, II, 134;PACAF sb 0-27, Apr 6. 1965: hill,315th TCGp, Jan-IUD 63, pp 3S-4Z.

65. Staft summ sbeeI, Col A. L Hil.pert, DCS/Plans, 7th AF, subj: ~7ASupport fOr MACTHAI, Nov 6, 1966;

-ltr, Col Louis P. Lindsay,. Dir/Opris,834th AD, to 7th AF, Dir/Plan.. sub;:MACTHAI C-7A SupPort, Apr 25, 1967;~ 0143. CINCPAC to Cdr MACV,subj: JUSMAO Thailand Acfl keqmts,Mar ;J, 1964; bist, 458th TASq, luJ.;.sep

'68;)tr, Cot John I. Daniel, DCO/483rdTCWS, to Dir/Ops, 377th ABW" subj:C-7 ()pns, Fet> 29, 1972: ms, LG,7IJ3th AF to 13th AF. 131100z Mar72: bist, MACTHAI, 1969, pp 31-32,1970;pp 12-14. 1971, p 12: 483rd TCWgOPORD 70-5,. Dee 1" 1970.

66.. Bist; MACi1:tAI. 1970.,pp 66-72;hilt, CINCPAC, 1970. pp 347-349, 1971,pp' 315-311; bist, 3J4th TAW..' APr-

. Jun 10~ pp 48-49. Oct-Dec70. pp 26-27,35, Jan-Mar 71, ~ 14-15, 42-44, Apr-:May 11, p 20; intvw, author with MajWilliam T. Po8ey, Hq USAF; Mar 29,

765

I

TACfJCAL AIRLIFT

1974; intYw. author with Ma; B. J. Clark.Hq USAF, Mar 29, 1964; hiM. :r74thTAWs. Jun-Sep 71, pp 34-35: msg,PACAF to 13th AF. OS0222Z May 72.

67. Hilt, MACV, 1!)65; P 354; msgJCS 002919. Joint $taft"J-3, to CINC,PAC. n al. lS020IZ Dee 64; Itatf paper,Atch to JCSM 847-64. 8Ubj: .Thai andFilipino Contributions to the War Effonin SVN. Oct 3. 1964; DOD Pt!ntagonPap«".. vol IV. pt Iv-c-1-(~). p xvi.

68. Ms&62-339J. 2nd AD to I>ACAP.13th AF (pen from Anthis for Moormanand Milton). 2223S0Z Oct 62; iusg,CINCPAC to JCS. 230609Z Ian 63; insg6300101.. 2nd AD to 13th AF. PACAF(to Martin and Milton from Anthis).101S30Z lap 63: IDSa63-0037; P,ACAPto Dir/Plan" Hq USAF. 221845Z Jan63; msg 131. Ch, MAG China, to ctNc-PAC, 040731Z Jan 66; msg 01180. CISMACV to CINCPAC, 130334Z Jan 66;msg. ClNCPAC to Jcs. 29064SZ Dee66; daily staff journal, G-3 Advisory Sect,n CTZ, Oct 26 through Oct 28, 1967:hlst, MACV. 1965, pp 73. 37(J 371. 1966.pp71J..-87.

69. Pad sbect, MACV. Third CountryAssistance to GVN. May 8. 1964; IDSa,US Embusy. Manila to See State,30103SZ Oct 64; atch to ICSM 847-64.IUbj: Thai and Filipino Contributionsto the War Effort in SVN. Oct 3, 1964:memo. ICS to See Def (JCS 2343/484).subj: Philippine Assiatan~ to SVN. Nov3, 1964; hist, NACV. 1%7. pp 277-280;IDSg4193. US EmbaSl)' (Wilson) to SeeState, 061035Z Nov 67; hlst, 463rdTAW.. Jan-Mar 68, pp 12-13.

70. James T. Bear, The BmplO)'lfUnIofAIr l1y the' Thah 4UUlKoretJIU III SEA.CHq PACAF. Proj CHECO, Oct 30,1970). pp 4-7; bilt, NACV. 1965, P372; fact Ibeets. MACFWMAO, HqMACV, sub;: Thai Military AssIsianee toRVN. Mar 7 and JUD 6. 1966; msg2CCR-00542,-2nd AD to CSAF, PACAP.13th AF (peR fot Huris and MadduJl'from Moore). 300SS7Z Oct 64.

7.1. Hist, 19th ACSq. 19th Sp Ops Sq.19th TASq, Jul 66 throup May 71; factsheets. Free Worfd Mil Assistance Off,MACV, subj: Thai Mil Assistana: toRVN, Jail J t. Mar 7, and IUD 6. J967:memos, PwMAO. MACV to SJS MACV,Iubj: Hist Summ (or Apr-Jun 66 andJul-Sep 66; bac:1aroulid paper, MAC-'THAI, subj: RTAF VICtory Plight, lea1970J; fact sheet. MACV 1-5, subj:

766

RTAP Victory Fiipt, Dee. 8, 1971: bid,U4th AD, Ian-Iun 71. pp 70-71; I!ist.MACV; 1966, pp 98-99. 1970. pp VI-IS to VI-16. 1971, pp VI-5. ~17,G-18; hist, USMACTHAI, ARnex B.HinCINCPAC, 1966. pp 152-153: Bear.Employmt!tlt of Air. pp 4-12-

72. Ltr. Hq USAF ~DR (Yuclkin)to APXPD. subj: AasiaDineDt of SbiAustralian Can'bou "eft to .SVN, )ul 2,1~; IDS, PPLQC 32G6-64, PACAP toAFXPD, Hq USAF. subj! AuatralianAid to RVN, JUD2.5,1964; mil PFLOC.PACAP to CSAF (APOD), 020446ZApt-64; msr. CINCPAC to JCS, 27203SZ100 63.

73. Borders intvw, Nov 4, 1970; rpn,Lt Col Harry G. Howton. Cdf 311thTCSq, EOTR, Sep 6. 1965; JoJll'NJl ofMiIikuy Auistanct!, Dee 64, P .l79; hilt,~ Air Div. 1 Jan-30 100 65, I, 94;110, Cdr 2Dd Air Div, to MACV 1-3,subj: MONBVAL, Oct 2, Nov 3, 1964,and Ian 4, 1965.

74. HJst, 3JSth TCGp, Jan-Jun .65.pp 14-16; Mil, I.t CoI.F. Ackerson, AatSee, Joint Statr MACV. sub;: J-3 Briefinr:to COMUSMACV, subj: .~\l8traJianBripde; Mar 12, 1966; 834th ADOPLAN 520-67, Utilization of RAAF no35 Sqdn. Vietnam, Ian 1. .1967; mnb!)'workin,a.-t, COMUSMACVandCh, CIS Committee Aastralla. Nov 30,1967; lames T. Bear, Tlrt R..4AF ErrSolliheat AM. (Hq PACAP. ProlCHECO, $ep 30, 1970). pp 29-40.

75. A1"&le, "Roy8I AuatraJian AirPon::e caribous in VietAam-t964 to1972," The Royal Air F_ Quarterly.summer 1972, pp 133-J36; Bear, RAAF,pp 29-43; rprt. Australian Fon:e Viet.nam, Monthly Rpn for Nov 71. Dee I.,1971; msa. Dir/Oph. 834tb AD toPACAP DOAL. 270237Z Dee 69i lUst.MACV, 1971. p VI-5; mI, 00-02310,7th AF to AFXOPFH,.. Hq USAF,09tJ26Z I~ 67; rpi"t, Opns Analysis,Vte:CCSAP. Hq USAF, Analysia of SEAAirlift Opus, Sep 66.

76. Rpns, ExcbanllOO~ Tour Re-ports, Maj Glen A. Bentz, Dee: 18. J968,Capt William M. Harley. Dee 12, 1969,Capt Jack L Tmius, Apr 70. Capt JameaC. Bobick. Bep 70; hilt, MACV, I~O.vol I, pp VI-14 to VI-U; Bear, R~..4F.rip 40-43.

77. Ms. XPD 84083, Dlr/P18ns. HqUSAF. to PACAF, 30213SZ JUD65; mI,XPDO 78704, A8StDep Dir/PoJiey, Dirl

I