Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies

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Theses and Dissertations

1994-04-01

Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies

Kristina Handy Brigham Young University - Provo

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BYU ScholarsArchive Citation BYU ScholarsArchive Citation Handy, Kristina, "Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies" (1994). Theses and Dissertations. 4749. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/4749

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tacit cooperation between enemies

two case studies

thesis

presented

david M kennedy center international area studies

brigham young university

partial fulfillment

requirements degree

master arts

kristina handy

april 1994

thesis kristina handy accepted present form david M

kennedy center international area studies brigham young university

satisfying thesis requirement degree master arts

7 1

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valerie M 144sonhunson committee ah6hchair

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CHAPTER 1

TACIT cooperation

introduction

research follows I1 attempt form

framework contextualcontextualizeize two case studies cooperation

born situations conflict like war

seems studying war conflict competition players

uniformly team opposing sides intricatealliances axis allied powers world war II11

elegant black white chess board

considering complexities human motivation what

happen black suited pawn saw eye eye

white counterpart did own king queen

leader uniforms still same colordynamics game how played changed

these changes particularly context war

international conflict where my interests begin

war tool conquest liberation defense

means promoting ideologies way gain economic

strength show national honor politician war

both opportunity doom poet eternal

2

reciprocity tears 1 1985 john stoessinger compared

war nietzschesNietz sches great abyss life own

war subject volumes works politicalscientists philosophers painters poets

far common thread studies internationalpolitics

rules weapons war change case studiesincrease each passing year while predictionprescriptions too often elude students nationalinternational conflict find our peace controllingvariables our own war studies

my research I1 assert cooperation spring

conflict war specifically I1 propose

international conflictualconflictual relationship occurs

resembles iterated prisoners dilemma meets

certain conditions cooperation emerge cooperation

conflict variables research project

parameters cooperation

while I1 wait until next sectionchapter define cooperation detail I1 want explain

I1 looking incidents lower levelbureaucratic cooperation I1 do question

authority question controlling

taken final line wilfred owens poeminsensibility owen british poet killed action during world

war I1

3

policies propelling two statessituation conflict war maintaining

conflict I1 avoid very large tangent selectinglower level bureaucrat actorinstigatoractor instigator

cooperation lower level bureaucrats positionagents national policy make policies

themselves

conflict hand originates higher

source maintained levels includingpawns field words national authority

creates maintains conflict cooperation emerges

illicitly lower ranks why I1 use

term tacit cooperation cooperation mostly

unsanctioned emerges source

authoritative command

stated above conflictualconflictual situationcooperation emerges resemble iterated prisonersdilemma I1 using game describe

conflict I1 borrow game theory literatureinitial idea use game theory comes robert axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrodsevolution cooperation evolution cooperation

major source development definition what I1

term tacit cooperation book where I1 am

introduced tony ashworthsAshworths research world war I1 trench

warfare my first case study tacit cooperation

second case study I1 use relationship

4

developed between paul nitze yuli kvitsinskyKvit sinsky during

intermediate nuclear forces INF talks 198119831981 1983 1I

utilize strobe talbottsTalbotts many chronicles talkspiece together events led tacit cooperation

between two negotiatorsnegotiatory

though world seems far removed war likeworld war I1 superpower cold war conflictspassed away soviet communist rule berlin wall

conflict war nevertheless incessant parthuman experience introduction work war

change world politics robert gilpin notes although

evolved through centuries technologicaldevelopments those developments altered relationsamong states war continuing unsolved problem 7

ergo fundamental change world politics taken

place 213 james rosenau takes gilpin task saying

neglects possibility similar outcomes iewar may result vastly different structuresprocesses 73 whether structures internationalrelations changed whether war

conflict inevitable outcomes human relationsworld system historically currently filledincidents conflict war until changes

topics cooperation conflict high many

peoples agendas study understand

5

definitions

tacit cooperation lower level bureaucrat how

defined terms game theory

robert keohane defines cooperation mutual

adjustment state policies another 1984 31

another scholar jerome bernstein disagrees arguing

cooperation forced cooperation much

result decisive policy realizationlimits power politics policies strategies

ensue therefrom 1989 97

these definitions discounting many

others attributed political literaturepart involved cooperation among political

ideological allies therefore how does define

collaborative association between hostile rivals enemies

mentioned above cooperation I1 seek

case study analysis I1 develop framework

contextualizecontextualize occurs among lower level bureaucrats

lack power form implement policieschange structure conflictualconflictual relationship

involved words privatesarmy cannot make decision either end escalatebattle participating tacit cooperation

therefore unsanctioned even illicit act form

6

agreement sometimes spoken sometimes symbolized known

developed agreeing parties involved

tacit cooperation does necessarily demand

altruistic reasons taking place reasonableassume cooperation occurs two individuals

groups see benefit involved collaborativeprocess result cooperate reason

gaining personal benefit nature payoffs

strategies described field game theory

classic fights games debates rapoport

delineates difference between fight game stating

essential difference seefight idealized devoidrationality opponents while gamecontrary idealized strugglecomplete rationality opponents assumedrapoport 1960 10

I1 emphasize rationality indispensable game

theorist body research relations between

opposing entities two nations war

analyzed game fight furthermore

rapoport states game opponents cooperate

follow rules game absolutely 11

community between opponents opponent

speaks same language seen nuisance

mirror image self whose interests may

7

diametrically opposed nevertheless existrational being 1960 9

certain games prisoners dilemma stag

hunt cooperation may primary choice

considered highest payoff strategy time

point make cooperation rational choice

cooperation therefore strategy yieldhighest mutual payoff definition based

prisonersprisonerI1 dilemma2dilemmadilemmas2 fframeworkramework f my case

study analysis next chapter contain descriptionuse research

conflict conflictualConflictual relationships

conflict defined terms game

research important begin understanding how payoffs

motivate define players interactions I1 mentioned

conflict begins authoritative level nationsgovernment game policymakerspolicy makers involves zero

sum pay off system win10 loseolose0boseo lower level

bureaucrat involved heat conflict I1 submit

2belowabelowelow payoff matrix prisoners dilemma

Bj cooperate defect

cooperate 33 05

defect 50 11

table I1

8

game resemble prisoners dilemma payoffpay off matrix

yield positive payoffspay offs those wish

cooperate refer footnote 2 therefore conflictdilemma prisoners dilemma broken

proper conditional strategy

focus & scope research

robert axelrod developed theory evolution

cooperation describes emergence cooperation

among contending entities theory I1

create specific framework reference

collusion among political rivals andor enemies axelrodargues iterated prisoners dilemma game called

tit tat fit promote cooperation

cooperation occur under given set necessary

conditionspieces cooperation literature

provide fundamental theoretical background material form

tacit cooperation framework michael taylorspossibility cooperation describes emergence

cooperation similarly axelrod yet delineatesstrategies just tit tat being able support

cooperation equilibrium3equilibriumequilibriums3 contribution

3anaan equilibrium saddle point place payoff matrixboth players strategies rationally fall prisoners

dilemma equilibrium strategy DD see footnote 2 seeprisoners dilemma payoff structure DD 11 shows

equilibrium strategy

9

taylor makes specifically notion altruism

defines altruism being zero sum based payoffs

interdependent 111

further scholarly input kenneth oyescooperation under anarchy contributionenhance widen necessary conditions emergent

cooperation important point oye makes

conditional strategy effective easilyrecognized playing game black white choices

cooperation defect make strategiestransparent furthermore oye discusses number game

players how size affect outcome game

methodology

I1 explicate two historical episodes using game

theoretic framework cooperation I1 use case study

approach show least twice internationalsetting tacit cooperation emerged theory tacitcooperation drafted chapters 2 3 followed

case studies set necessary conditions

extracted describe what sorts structurestheory promote possibly eventuate cooperation among

players game information case studiestaken primarily secondary sources

explication each depend upon inescapably

subjective interpretation events however

10

framework I1 am attempting examine explicitfactor interpretation description events

these sources sort check balanceusing these materials small portion my researchcome primary sources mostly memoirs

literature review

steven brams superpower games applying games

superpower conflict states conditional game theoryinvolve following implicit conversation you

cooperate I1 certainty you do my

response without saying what appropriate1985 141414 14 conditional strategy described

research tit tat break prisonersdilemma axelrod states tittifctifttitttiac tat policycooperation first move then doing whatever

player did previous move 1981 308 axelrod

cited repeatedly game theory cooperation

literature testing durability success

strategies like tit tat lead cooperation

axelrod become my window field game theory

without going too much detail study games

received widespread attention 1944 publicationvon neumann morgensternsMorgensterns theory games

economic behavior robert leonard notes editedbook toward history game theory though game theory

11

now plays central role economic theory ideas1944 primarily appropriated developed

mathematicians weintraub 1992 29 now game theorybecome interdisciplinary british biologistrichard dawkins devote entire chapter selfishgene 1989 describing ways robert axelrodamerican political scientist taken mathematical

theory exciting new directions 202

what does game theory do political scientistjames schellenberg 1982 wrote science

conflict game theory created especially analyze

situations involving conflicts interest 167

continues explaining social scientistmathematical approach games usefulconstructing theories clear titlesbig two soviet american perception foreign policyrapoport 1971 superpower games applying game theory

superpower conflict brams 1985 many politicalscientists found niche theorygame theory almost exclusively examines conflictcooperation international political pundit much

gain elegance robert axelrod exception

my research I1 start axelrod school

evolutionary cooperation apply conditional strategy

tit tat explain two very different internationalsituations where cooperation develops thrust my

12

research describing cooperation amidst conflictwhile cooperation literature existed politicalstudies particularly exclusively use

game theory study tacit cooperation defined

research axelrod given me theory

strategy reference cooperation develops during

conflict left open levelcooperation occur further research use

two political scientists game theoretic approaches

oye taylor I1 am able select I1 want study

agents cooperation lower level bureaucrat

international political studies cooperation

never wholly involved individual actor unless actorauthority symbolically representing state

studies cooperation between rivals enemies involve

wartime alliances state centric approaches

studying why soviets signed aggressionnonaggressionnon pact

nazis 1939 course systemic approach

commonly used look how bipolarbi polar political world

form US soviet cooperation many utilizesystemic approach view US soviet rivalry two

nations identical fates yanov 1989 several scholars

note superpowerssuperpowers used rivalry gain

international superiority especially lesser developed

nations bernstein 1989 metz 1989 scholars view

cold war politics cooperation hot war between

13

united states soviet union never broke craig1990 kremenyukKremenyuk midlarsky et al 1994

game theory often utilized describing coldwar superpower relations rapoport did 1971

big two soviet american perception foreign policy

recently manus midlarsky uses axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tit tatexplain part why great powers did learncooperate prior 1914 appear done during

cold war era midlarsky et al 1994 26 researchinvolving cooperation among individuals receivedmuch attention international studies many cases

however level cooperation analyzed

ambiguous left reader determine axelrod1984 robert kuenne 1988 1989 outcomes

cooperation readily studied causes

group scholars notes 1962 important question

antecedent cooperative relationships receive

relatively little consideration compared

consequences kelly et al 1 particularly studiesinternational politics statement remains somewhat

true however onset post cold war era

taking everyone surprise many scholars rosenau

1990 suggesting radical new approaches describewhat happening world today

research does lofty goal

attempts simply funnel international situation

14

conflict down individual level see what happen

given set circumstances accounting

small personal choices big picture internationalexchange

CHAPTER 2

FRAMEWORK TACIT cooperation

understanding conditions allow cooperationemerge appropriate actions taken foster development

cooperation specific setting

axelrod 1984 6

introductionunder what conditions cooperation emerge

world egoistsegotists without central authority axelrod 1981

306 question robert axelrod studiesbook evolution cooperation through

answering question theory tacit cooperation

part begin take shape evolutioncooperation axelrod uses game theory builds upon

assumptions explains why utilizes game theory

developing ideas cooperation

way needed represent what commonsituations without becoming bogged down

details unique each fortunatelyrepresentation available famous prisoners dilemmagame 1984 7 1

axelrod uses game theorystheodysorys prisoners dilemma createpithy explanation study cooperation though

1 game prisoners dilemma created early1950s merrill flood melvin dresher

16

clear details specific cooperative relationshipslost process simplification strength comes

ability identify common factors differentinstances emerging cooperation

study cooperation solelydeliberation social sciences I1 must therefore borrow

various fields already establishedmathematical philosophical theoretical proofs

utility cooperation theories literature stands

study cooperation multi disciplinary inquiry

axelrod taylor being two few political scientistsquoted body literature following section

consist rather generic explanation game theory

application here research

game theory prisoners dilemma

game theory mathematical origins statedpreviously theory games formalized untillate 1940s early 1950s2 von neumann morgenstern

smith 1982 1 though originating mathematical

concept game theorystheodysorys progeny quickly became usefuleconomists today used mathematicians

2 II gameiigame theory generally attributed von neumannpapers 1928 1937 although recently frechet raised question

priority suggesting several papers borel 195311953early 20s120s really laid foundations game theory luce raiffa1957 2

17

economists political social scientistshard scientists microbiologistsmicrobiologists geneticists

luce raiffa stated mans

written record preoccupation conflictinterest possibly topics god love inner

struggle received comparable attention 1957 1

luce raiffa note further study conflictinterest vast diverse must attempt

abstract certain large classesmathematical system 2 abstracting two theoristswarn important details lost limiting utility

theory games specific fields researchscholar notes

decades followed von neumannmorgensternsMorgensterns creation mathematical theorymatured applications multiplied you need

look under heading game theoryprisoners dilemma abstracts psychology

sociology political science journals seeproliferation davis 1983 xiii xvi

study game theory expanded dramatically since

50s luce raiffa wrote classic games

decisions game theory offered many scientists tersedescription oft confusing decision making process

study game theory concerned

interaction decisions these interactions what

define game theory considers how should make

decisions lesser extent how does make them

18

davis 1983 3 decisions may depend course upon

game being played strategiesselected number players entering specifiedgame3gamec

game theodystheorysorys major goal according andrew colman

find solution game hand states

solution specification decisionsmade outcome therefore

reached decision makers rational accordingcriteria laid down theory 1982 5

using game theory framework research

interactions participants under given setcircumstances colman states behavior decisionmakers accordance normative

prescriptions theory problem empirical

research theory merely tells outcomes game

interactions strategies played

under given set conditions does attempt

guess why player players behave certain ways

tangential line reasoning discussiongame theorystheodysorys elemental assumption notion

rationality bertrand russell states reason

perfectly clear precise meaning signifieschoice right means end you wish

achieve 1954 8 according many game theory scholars

3 use game theory research limited twoparty opposed n person games

19

however term rational far precise

certainly means different things different theoriesdeveloped luce raiffa 1957 5

nonetheless concept rationality used here

persons playing game use strategycoincide desires fears needs every

player minimize potential maximum lossprisoners dilemma game axelrod adheres

assumption rationality 1984 18

prisoners dilemma game defines

rationality essence very positivisticallyscenario game gleans title presented

thusly

imagine you your accomplice chargedhaving committed crime now prisoners

sitting separate cells unable communicateawaiting trial enough circumstantialevidence convict both you even you bothremain silent you both convicted locked

year you admit your guilt helpconvict your silent partner you free

put away ten years reverse happenscourse confesses you remain silentyou both confess then unfortunately you both

get nine years campbell 1985 4

rules you want minimal amount years jailpossible you dont care how many years your

accomplice gets you both know knows scenario

neither you know how decide

choices according prisoners dilemma either

20

confess guilt defined non cooperation

defecting D silent defined

cooperation C you confess D your partnerremains silent C you receive highest payoff

go free you dont confess your partner does you

get lowest payoff 10 years prison second

highest payoff both you remain silent CC

year prison dilemma derivedsuspense uncertainty though better take

risk unilaterally defecting remain cooperativemay leave you suckers payoff case 10

years prison 11

book prisoners dilemma study conflictcooperation rapoport chammah add insight

problem rationality game theory note how

definition rationality specifically affectsinterpretation prisoners dilemma state

prisoners dilemma rational choicestrategy both players leads outcomeworse both chosen strategiesirrationally paradox remains unresolved long

insist adhering concept rationalitymakes perfect sense zero sum games

makes questionable sense non zero sum games 196513

result rapoport chammah deriveexperimentation prisoners dilemma

rationality changes game played long

period time iterated prisoners dilemma

21

rational choice becomes predominantly cooperate

opposed defectthrough looking prisoners dilemma based

game theory tacit cooperation constructedlower level bureaucratic interaction seen

representing prisoners dilemma game showing how

paradox game broken theory 4 framework

fabricated understand emergence tacitcooperation

robert axelrod evolution cooperation

book evolution cooperation robertaxelrod explores notion breaking rationalityparadox prisoners dilemma game argumentation

based particular strategy tit tat how

use strategy prisoners dilemma bringsemergence evolution cooperation

axelrod notes four areas inquiryprisoners dilemma used analytical tool

first study social psychology used

understand examine human behavior axelrod states

4 idea paradox works together definitionrationality according prisoners dilemma gamerational strategy defect case payoffcomparatively low low compared mutual cooperation lowunrequited cooperation paradox best strategy

rational strategy until paradox brokenbest strategy becomes yields highest payoff bestdefined here noticeably strategy highest mutualpayoff

22

iterated prisoners dilemma become E colicollcolfcoifsocial psychology 1980 565 6 second use

prisoners dilemma purpose

conceptualizing social processes many bestdeveloped models important political social economic

processes prisoners dilemma foundation

1980 6 third body literature discusses how

prisoners dilemma abstract game aids scholaranalyze characteristics elemental universal issuesspecifically related field like psychology

economics why people do do cooperate

what rationality luce raiffa discuss etc

finally fourth body literature concentrates how

eliminate dilemma writers rapoport axelrod

discussed issue length realm

my research focus although axelrod states none

these fields reveal very much how play

prisoners dilemma very well 1980 6

axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods thesis new approach needed

allow players learn choosing strategyway dilemma broken

proposes new strategy strategy comes testperformed way tournament

second chapter evolution cooperation

axelrod describes tournament arranged find

fit strategy break prisoners dilemma

23

support emergence well maintaincooperation tournament designed form

round robin sixty people many disciplinescountries ages participated overall winner

tournament strategy name tit tatcreated anatol rapoport

tit tat strategy defined axelrod thuslyTIT TAT starts cooperative choice

thereafter does what player did previousmove 31 success tit tat dependent upon

following proposition axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods first discountparameter w sufficiently high beststrategy independent strategy used

player 15 discount parameter refers weight

Ww future moves particularly next move relativecurrent move therefore w refers percentage

payoff lost each consecutive move

constitutes rate discount assuming example

1 current status payoff being 100 percentw number greater 0 less 1

subtracted 1 giving discount parameter 5 point

axelrod makes future important enough

5 discount parameter part mathematical formulaetest viability theory games use hereresearch purely metaphorical words discountparameter used mathematical formulaquantitative research used abstracted senseaxelrod does describing certain instances conflict whether

discount parameter high low

24

cast shadow back upon present thereby affectcurrent strategic situation 12

according axelrod discount parameter must

high order tit tat scenario functionterminology discount parameter substituted

poetic words shadow future oye questionshow does shadow future affect likelihood

cooperation oye 1986 13 according firstproposition noted above better strategy

your opponent shadow futurerelationship relatively high consequently partialanswer oye cooperation emerge future play

either important course futureplay 6 single play prisoners I1 dilemma obvious

situation D defect emerge

expectation ability predict subsequent

trust yet learned each player therefore

first condition noted shadow future must

high

martin shubik states indirectly showing

infinite games supergamessupergames iterated games

6 single play game each player makes movelead agreement absence sovereign oye 1986

12 sufficient time moves playersutilize conditional strategy cooperation emerge

forced sort authority having powerplayers involved

25

equilibrium fall another category justdefect states

suppose game repeated endlessly thenpayoffs become unboundedly large howeveraverage payoff per period remain bounded

argued reasonable assumeplayers consider payoffs per period

take account manage achievetemporary stationary state better 00

defect enforced equilibrium pointsuppose each player chosen

first move initial subgamesubgapesubgame then each thoughtswitch second move

forever retaliation violation statusquo enough run joint maximum

equilibrium

course stationary state better defect 1111either cooperate 33 perfect exploitation

5 0 however according shubiksskubiksShubiks reasoning perfectexploitation equilibrium entails

worse stationary state 11 players

therefore equilibrium state betterdefect DD 11 cooperate CC 33 7

problem how do know shadow

future high logically two parties come togethervery sublime purpose discount parameter

high empirically however matter complex

two bureaucrats players representing rationalitiesconflicting entities interact say

understanding shadow future same

7 see chapter 1 footnote 2 example payoff matrix

26

even present shadow future high

personalities involved situationmeaning interacted long period

time knowledge makes mutual behavior patternseasily predictable iee trust ambiance

situation makes decisions portentous namely

threat nuclear war death etcdiscount parameter argued ratherempirically tested though analysis should present strong

case way

merely egoistsegotists recognize factfutures interactive does mean cooperation

emerge high discount parameter necessary

condition means does constitute sufficientcondition nevertheless essential conclusion

cooperation emerges evolutionary process

spontaneously argument cooperation

ability emerge world dominated conditions

unconditional defection small clustersindividuals able interact cooperatively axelrod1986 14550145 50 furthermore way cooperation

emerge conditional words echoing

axelrod interaction based reciprocity herein

lies second necessary condition

effectiveness strategies based reciprocityargued context axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods tournament where tit

27

tat won tit tat strategy conditional play

should naturally emerge under first necessary conditionlarge shadow future becomes clear

these two necessary conditions intrinsicallylinked

further condition axelrod noted talliedtournament scores strategy compete well

nice being first defectbeing willing forgive limited defectionplayer major reasons these nice strategiesdid well axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods tournament eight top ranking

strategies nice strategies scored

extremely well playing each true teststrength then see how well nice strategies did

against meanies11meaniesmealiesmeanies 1188 tournament tit tatprosperous axelrod warns against strategiesconsidered nice defining nice

strategy three points discusses

first strategy should allow player

defect early game without provocation

probably lead mutual defection secondly

fit strategies tournament

forgiving axelrod states forgiveness rulepropensity cooperate moves player

8theathe8 term imeaniesImemeanies defined here does forgivebegins play defection cooperation

28

defected 1980 14 words once provoked

nice strategy allow provoker make amends

cooperation still therefore possible axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrodstournament showed certain strategies did do well

forgiving strategy nalforgiving then impossible cooperation develop

first defection thirdly strategy should

overly pessimistic prospects opponent

defecting initial move strategies trycreate probabilistic model opponents strategy

strategy like tit tat does care

likelihood opponent defecting fact very

optimistic opponents initial moves

unconditionally cooperates first move sum

nice strategies must employed order cooperation

evolve third necessary condition

rather implicit assumption becomes

fourth necessary condition emerging cooperation

system entities interact anarchic

hierarchy authority present forcing cooperation

defection then logically cooperation defection does

naturally emerge naturally sustained two

nations entities conflicting war

central authority 9 however lower level

9 argue united nations powercentral authority figure while may case between national

29

bureaucratic activity may determined hierarchicalauthority discussed chapter 1

lesser bureaucrats disobey authority become

own central authority even sub levelactivity authority overseeing both sides

conflict god notwithstanding

central authority head stategoverning body thwart emergence cooperation

sees cooperative effort undermining sanctitypower idea directly opposing traditional

hobbesian thought state statenecessary humans naturally exist stateprisoners dilemma cooperation emerge

must coerced 10 UN developed type

analysis however axelrod breaking canon

stating central authority non existentnecessary cases detrimental

natural cooperative interaction emerge

axelrod notes variety ways resolvedilemma prisoners dilemma developed

1981 308 states further these various

solutions strategy allow additional activity

entities UN little do tacit negotiating definedpaper tacit negotiations do involve third parties

10 see taylor1987for further insight theoreticalfundamentals hobbes hume theoretical relationsprisoners dilemma

30

alter strategic interaction between among

players initial problem needs solved

longer exists very nature problem

changed fundamentally under normal conditionsprisoners dilemma exist however these types

remedies available axelrod 1981 307 8

these normal conditions constituted four partsaccording axelrod firstmechanism available players make enforceable

threats commitments 1981 308 then players must

know every possibility open themselves

opponents order receive optimal payoffs

conditions anarchy central authorityway threats commitments ensured

player power guarantee move makes

course making move axelrod state words

backed actions cheap meaningless

1981 308

second condition virtually impossible

predict opponents strategy particularly each

subsequent move means player must make

move according move already made

according move made second guessing

opponent axelrod notes concerning

existence condition eliminates possibilityreliable reputations might based watching

31

player interact third parties 1981 308

result strict attention must paid each player

interpret moves player moves must made

claritythird condition players cannot get rid

opponents nor run away interactionaxelrod 1984 11 player cannot decide

opponent reason strategy based

personality type interaction type

game players behave accordingly

finally way change opponents

payoffs once payoffs changed game changes

example prisoners dilemma defined payoff

matrix even slight change payoff structure may

change game chicken something else

utilities payoffs already include whatever

consideration each player interestsaxelrod 1981 308

these four conditions occurring naturallyprisoners dilemma axelrod presents theory

evolutionary cooperation conditions necessary

cooperation emerge

32

axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods critics

hirshleiflerHirshleifler collcoilcoll11

according these authors unless axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods exact

assumptions present prisoners dilemma situationthen theory evolutionary cooperation using tittat strategy does function stateshirshleiflerHirshleifler coll claim axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournament

analysis idiosyncratic features ought

make analysts cautious drawing very sweeping

conclusions 370 first note assuming

prisoners dilemma corresponds very many real lifesettings hazardous statehost significant classes mixed motive

interaction patterns chicken battle sexes

forth damaging criticism here whether

assume prisoners dilemma actuallycoincides physical real life situation

while forms conflict may real lifeprisoners dilemmas I1 argue case studies developed

chapters 4 5 do resemble prisoners dilemmas

trenches world war I1 two sides given

choice 1 kill D 2 shoot miss avoid

dispensing damage C play game IDD

11 hirshleiflerHirshleifler coilscollscolis critique axelrod takenarticle journal conflict resolution june 1988

33

rational choice axelrod states weakening

enemy important value promote survivalmajor battle ordered sector 1984 75

prisoners dilemma payoff equation setchoices ordered thusly 1111 represents greater

1 shooting kill while your enemy does

DC

2 neither side shoots kill CC

3 both sides shooting kill each DD

4 your enemy shoots kill you do CD

intermediate nuclear forces talks choices

negotiatorsnegotiatory 1 make concessions D 2

compromise make arms control deal setchoices ordered like

1 your negotiating counterpart makesconcessions while you make none you pleaseyourself your bosses DC

2 both sides make concession you both do yourjob well your bosses pleased CC

3 neither side makes concessions you both dojob you assigned do DD

4 you make concessions look like poornegotiator you may lose your job yourcounterpart makes concessions

these two cases neatly fit prisoners dilemma scenario

true game does explain human

interactions hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll state

34

arguably explain situations two identifiedhere

second argument hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll make

axelrod impetuously assumes interactionrandom words did allow social

stratification perhaps under certain circumstances

men example interact men doctors

doctors etc according criticschange nature model axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournament

randomly tested every strategy played every

strategy hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll arguing under

interactive situations certain strategy combinations

always play way tit tatstrategy invade these strategy combinations thereforeevolution possible article however

hirshleiflerHirsh leifler coll never prove point factrun experimentation using same assumption

axelrod uses namely populations interact randomly

state

our analysis conducted solely withinunderlying prisoners dilemma payoff environment

assuming homogeneous unstructuredpopulation individuals 371

whether criticism sound authors do

validate own claim point do even

address point once made two cases I1

research here point becomes moot anyway

35

players interacting arbitrarily assigned each

words must interact either defectcooperate

third cogent argument make

results tournament dependent upon structuretournament itself axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournament

conducted round robin allowed strategiesplay each hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll show

elimination tournament round robin then

results quite different state

tit tat does poorly elimination contests

essentially never able defeat competing strategyencounter 1988 370 difficult

argument deflect interactive situationwhere axelrod claims cooperation evolve does

assembly participants resemble round robin

elimination tournament neither while may

little bearing given interactive situationargument stands paper

finally hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll argue

strategies presented tournament

representative limited number experts even

basic strategies cooperate defectoverlooked state

two strategies enteredcontests simpler still thesearchetypical prisoners dilemma options always play

36COOPERATE always play DEFECT turns

important circumstances thesearchetype strategies defeat TIT TAT

displace evolutionary competition 371

axelrod readily admits strategies limitedeven describes strategy beat tit tatnamely tit two tats defectsopponent defects twice 1984 38 40 tit two tats

forgiving strategy axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods assumptions based

how certain strategies fared tournaments derived

general principles tournament results absoluteanswers tit tat strategy point

show how under what conditions cooperation evolve

why tit tat should used prisoners

dilemma situationsrapoport responds hirshleifers coilscollscoilscolis argument

stating futile conclude

TITFORTATTIT TAT performed best contests

simulations eye eye policy works

effective eliciting cooperation 1988 399

continues point noting important

lesson learn prisoners dilemma strategywhat happen even what likely happen

what logically happen consequential factlook axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods tournament according rapoport

tit tat while doing very poorly toonecontest excelled round robin thus general notion

logically reached tit tat

37

nice strategies played everyone better offrapoport 1988 400 fact tit tat

thwarted another nice strategy defends axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrodsevolutionary theory adds hirshleiferscoilscolls critique

michael taylortaylor book possibility cooperation

1987 critiques axelrod point interaction taylorstates

even where real world interactionstruly pairwise unlikely takestrange form assumed axelrod analysishinges assumption individualplay whole infinite supergamesupergame

player 1987 70

while may case general real life situationsiterated prisoners dilemma precisely axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods

perspective explain least partinteraction between lower level bureaucrats tacitinstitutions cooperation develop long-

standing andor sublime interaction tournaments go

axelrod socialization examined takes place

pairs according taylor limit

itself stated above very well

misinterpretation real life interactions tend

flexible axelrod asserts evolutioncooperation actual critique results

38

tournament 12 assumptions made

practical use these results fact remains under

these conditions pairwise interactions resultsaxelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournaments show general substantialtheoretical matter theoretical matter

substance thesis relevance actualoccurrences tacit cooperation nevertheless response

taylor I1 use axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods theory describe pairwise

interactions

conclusion

axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods assumptions become point referenceframework notion tacit cooperation

conditions among conditions focus

chapters 2 3 begin index phenomenon

tacit cooperation though proofs axelrodmakes book various articles may may

test theory according critics sketch

provides emergence cooperation very usefulnoted used here research laid

several conditions place may lead

cooperation these conditions briefly reiteration1 large shadow future high discount

parameter 2 reciprocal conditional relationship 3

12 taylors calculations actually coincide axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods seetaylor 1987 69

39

strategy used playing game must nice 4

lack central authority degree anarchy

speculated these place time

2 party conflict then definition both conceptual

tangible made tacit cooperation chapters 4

5 contain two different historical incidents resemble

cases cooperation I1 abstract both cases using

framework identify emergence tacit cooperation

CHAPTER 3

FRAMEWORK II11 ADDITIONS AXELROD

introduction

section examine two theoristscontributed cooperation literature both theoristsmichael taylor kenneth oye use principles game

theory prisoners dilemma two person games

framework just axelrod does contributionresearch show conditions

allow cooperation emerge prisoners

dilemma these conditions including

axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods present interactive situationsnaturally come interaction cooperationemerge axelrod say evolve must noted

formula made decide how many these

conditions necessary cooperation emerge

conditions high discount parameter hold

importance others however same reasoning

personalities how interact may do

resulting cooperation present condition

interactive situation taylor oye add insight lesstangible conditions altruism might allow

cooperation emerge

41

michael taylors possibility coopeCoppecoodecooperationcationrationcatlonmichael taylor book possibility

cooperationlcooperation1Cooperationcooperations1 attempts inspect how well prisoners

dilemma correctly represents public goods interactionsclaims prisoners dilemma does accuratelyrepresent these interactions then wants examine

prospects voluntary cooperation game 1987

ix examination shed lightpotential cooperation settings enmity mutual

mistrust probable defection

taylor critiques liberal justificationstate asserts human nature diversenumber people planet socialstructure state must set order forcepeople cooperation taylor utilizes issues

collective action externalizesexternal izes andor problem

public goods case studies research though

critique hobbes humes liberal thoughts

state very stimulating research taylorsdiscussion cooperation definition altruism

illustrativedeliberations cooperation similar

axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods presents set proofs show

ithe possibility cooperation second revised editionanarchy cooperation 1976

42

certain conditions promote cooperation largeshadow future yet describes strategiesjust tit tat defect being able

reach equilibrium 2 another strategy reaches

equilibrium tit tat called B plays mutated

tit tat called BIB mutated tat tat exactlysame except does unconditionally cooperate

first move unconditionally defects resultstrategy brings alternating cooperate defectcooperate defect etc course idealcooperative situation yet axelrod argue

adheres principles being nice

strategy however B does follow rule 3

axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods nice strategy guidelines cooperate does

emerge sense taylor manufactures convenient

proof axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods proposition nice strategiesseems however real dog eat dog world nice

strategy likely yet individualsconfronted enemys face resembling own nice

strategies common case studiesdemonstrate

taylors major contribution notion altruism

altruism defined him following

2anaan equilibrium saddle point placepayoff matrix both players strategies rationally fall

simple prisoners dilemma equilibrium strategy DDsee table I1 reference chapter 1 footnote 2

43

altruism considered here takes very simple formeach player assumed maximize additive function

own payoff playerspayoffs just long weight attached

players payoff nonzeronon zero I1 shall sayindividual acts altruistically I1 shall considerbriefly what I1 call sophisticated altruismwhere players utility depends uponplayers utilities might incorporate form

altruism well payoffs 111

altruism difficult phenomenon trace occurs

two players realize future payoffs dependent

upon each words players strive

best payoff default end helping opponent

reach best payoff taylor continues

light noting assumed individuals

altruistic expense being egoistic pure

altruism denotes player wishes maximize

persons payoff 115 cares little nothing

own simply does happen relationships

among states frankly seldom happens setting

nevertheless possibility under conditional

circumstances shall see later tony ashworthsAshworths

research INF negotiations case study

altruist prisoners dilemma looks like

44

Bcooperate defect

cooperate 11 12

defect 2 1 00

table II11

though prisoners dilemma payoffpay off matrix

shows how altruists react given prisoners

dilemma altruists cooperate realizebeneficial do want

exploit player 3 accordingly strategycooperate emerge equilibrium satisfying

both players consciencesprisoners dilemma between conflicting players

actors pure altruism present however altruismdefined here taylor may play important part

lower level bureaucratic decision making negotiationimportance perhaps found concept

altruistic attitude help initiate cooperation

nothing else altruism allows rivals enemies break

through zero sum philosophy allow them understand

3seeasee3 see taylor 1987 page 119 full explanationdifferent altruist matrices

45

mutual cooperation yield higher payoffs

mutual defection

taylor makes point defining playersprisoners dilemma being pure egoistsegotists

concerned maximizing own payoff

costs probably clear approximation

reality 109 people situations tend

mix altruist egoist4 taylor statesway altruism make difference typicalprisoners dilemma setting setting where

rational defect declares

individuals contribute sufficientlyaltruistic then might thereby provide starteraround conditional cooperation others

rational egoistsegotists develop 110 words

altruism condition present nourishes

seeds cooperation sprouting once two people began

understand futures even slightlyinterdependent then cooperation see first signs

spring next chapter tony ashworthsAshworths case study

emergent sustainable cooperation world war I1

trench warfare develops concept altruism lessabstractly

41t4jt must noted analyzing national conflictsafer assume people pure egoistsegotists courseproblem prisoners dilemma you must assume peopledefect rationally altruism coexists egoism though fear

pure egoism creates prisoners dilemma

46

kenneth oyes corpeCoppecooperationkationration under anarchanarchyoye states

nations dwell perpetual anarchy centralauthority imposes limits pursuit sovereigninterests times absence centralizedinternational authority precludes attainment commongoals possibility breach promiseimpede cooperation even cooperation leave

better off yet times states dorealize common goals through cooperation under anarchy

1986 1

again words kenneth oye sense

paradox common discussions cooperation

emerging prisoners dilemma states even

possibility defection promise enough

impede cooperation oye states cooperation

necessarily forced through sort hobbesian statenature lockeanlockbeanLockean civil society cooperation

possibility where chaos disorder ruleanalysis oye makes three points calls

circumstantial dimensions explain cooperation

exists how promoted long term

first notes changing payoff structuregame cooperation enhanced question

stated thusly how does payoff structure determine

significance cooperation simplified answer

payoff high enough boost mutual

cooperative outcome then players want

47

cooperate prisoners dilemma payoff

structure changed easier cooperate

unrequited cooperation does become suckerspayoff then cooperation emerge same

time game change conversely mutual

cooperation C receives lower payoff mutual

defection D then probability game

yield cooperative outcome though oyes first point

somewhat off mark research I1 am

describing prisoners dilemma configuration does

become useful describing point

cooperation strategy abandoned defection strategysecond section oye discusses shadow

future axelrod taylor many scholars

addressed conclusions course same

under iterated prisoners dilemma potentialdefector compares immediate gain squealing

possible sacrifice future gains mayresult squealing single play stag hunt eachhunter tempted defect order defend himselfagainst possibility defection othersreputation reliability resisting temptationreduces likelihood defection 14

sense reliability comes mutual realizationfuture hold present decisions

made every move every game qualifiedshadow eventuality present futureinterdependent notion reiterated reinforced

48

cooperation literature point conviction

while large shadow future does constitutesufficient condition emergent cooperation represents

condition logically lend itself perhaps

condition lessening mutual

defection even logically cooperative

conditions present iterative interactive event

likely cooperation emerge oyes third point

adds another dimension likelihood evolving

cooperative

states number players prisoners

dilemma game affects trend towards cooperation

defection oyes thesis number player

diminishes likely cooperation emerge

begins assumption altruism statingcooperation requires recognition opportunities

advancement mutual interests 19 smaller

number players easier recognition comes

interaction varied familiar trustcome easilysecondly number players increases

likely player defect predictability becomes

harder haphazard strategylikely default defect thirdly number

players increases feasibility sanctioning defectorsdetectorsdefectors

diminishes 19 system free riding take place

49

many circumstances break down cooperative

efforts smaller number easier team

players focus punishment defectorplayers difficult retaliate without destroyingforms cooperation

while small number players does particularlyconstitute necessary condition trendwatched various case studies see factorleading cooperation

additional point oye makes

conditional strategy effective easilyrecognized playing game states black

white choices cooperation defect make

strategies transparent further necessary conditionstrategies employed each player must

recognized words player cooperates

player 13 thinks opposite then player may well

defected first place cooperation

emerge under these conditions misinterpretationside note may enlightening note how communication

defection cooperation correctly determined

ones foe again ashworth enlighten us

point

50

conclusionoye while reinforcing fundamental components

theory tacit cooperation adds new dimensions

number game players well transparency

strategy these ingredients come togetherfollowing two sections tony ashworthsAshworths look

trench warfare study INF talks realtoreallife situations represented these case studiesthese abstract cooperation conditions viewed

concrete

CHAPTER 4

WORLD WAR I1 TRENCH TRUCES FORMS cooperation

jn trench war structure ritualisedritualized aggression ceremonywhere antagonists participated regular reciprocal discharges

missiles bombs bullets forthsymbolized strengthened same time bothsentiments fellow feelings beliefs enemyfellow sufferer

ashworth 1980 144

introduction

ashworthsAshworths study world war I1 trench warfare

subject section book represents case

study tacit cooperation defined him

analysis describing awakening cooperation

provides theoretical insight how cooperation began

sustained

robert axelrod devotes whole chapter ashworthsAshworthsbook evolution cooperation axelrod asks four

pertinent questions explicates ashworthsAshworths findings 1

how possible live let live system ever

started 2 how did continue 3 why towards end

war did break down 4 why live letlive system common world war I1 uncommon

trench wars 74 these questions answered

ashworthsAshworths research might substantiate axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods

52

assumptions evolution cooperation thesequestions discussed further detailsection

axelrod continues point although ashworth

himself never quite states situation trenchfighting world war I1 iterated prisoners dilemma

short term much logical destroyenemy far trench wait see whether

kill first logic typicalprisoners dilemma language war statedkill killed though zero sum game

prisoners dilemma initially pushes players opine

highest possible payoff assuring opponents defeat

doesnt necessarily occur players same

time both win both lose through

realization cooperation begin

axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods questions how does cooperation get startedespecially situation war ashworthsAshworths explanation

follows

tony ashworthsAshworths trench warfare

ashworth illustrates title book

live let live truce where enemies stoppedfighting agreement period time britishlet germans live provided germans let them live

return essentially term live let livedenoted process reciprocal exchange amongantagonists where each diminished others risk

53death discomfort injury deliberaterestriction aggressive activitycondition requited restraint 198019

terms used denote same mutual behavior

laissez faire rest let rest let sleeping dogs lietacit trucescruces mutual obligation element many others 1

continuing description these implicit agreements

ashworth states while trucescruces always tacitthough usually tacit always

unofficial illicit states

agreement between antagonists unspokenexpressed certain actions non actions

meaningful front fighters alwaysothers trucescruces illegal timesneither creakedcreated nor legitimated authorityexplicitly forbidden unofficial policy live

let live antithesis official killkilled 19 emphasis added

ashworth continues description further define

tacit cooperation setting trucescruces occur among

few many troops states trucescruces occur

between just two people between two direct adversarieschatting dinner mans land occur

among hundreds troops infinite number ways

investigation begins question how did cooperation

begin ashworth states

lthesehese terms coined ashworth himself actualsoldiers officers whose records ashworth studied research

example term principle laissez faire comes warmemoirs siegfried sassoon

54outset study must distinguish

between problems origins cruces problemspersistence through time concerning origins

want know where tacit understandingsfirst occurred how happened duringbattle where each antagonist ostensibly intentupon killing 24

history told occurrences christmas trucescruces

according ashworth cooperation existed before

first christmas truce 1914 form many types

detailed cooperation overshadow christmas trucescruces

significance historians great war generallyaware christmas trucescruces tend state

beginning end war cooperation ashworth

shows cooperation existed before christmas 1914

extended isolated settings until end

war event 1914 christmas likenedsudden surfacing whole iceberg visibleincluding non combatants war

remained largely submerged invisible save

participants ashworth 1980 24

seems first sign tacit cooperation began

meals early november 1914 food deliveredtrenches same time each evening both sides

hungry stop fighting eat under

circumstances inclement weather conditions trenchestend mirror each others behavior british

combatant explains situation thusly

55childs play shell road behind

enemys trenches crowded mustration wagons water carts bloodstainedwilderness wholesilence you prevent your enemy

drawing rations remedy simpleprevent you drawing yours beith2beitha 1916

224

ashworth notes normal fronts where fightingconstant first targets supply line behind

trench 26 reciprocal avoidance these

targets becomes newly formed temporary perhaps by-

law unspoken agreement emerges agreement createdhierarchical authority soldiers concert

themselves these laws resemble tittilfor tat behavior

rapoport axelrod examine ashworth triesexplain below

point empathic process where eachantagonist learned shared needspriorities overt fraternisationfraternization rather coverttrucing always possible outcome examplewhere fraternisationfraternization might necessary satisfyshared need

line reasoning denotes same sortaltruism taylor discusses analysis

reiterate taylor states players utility depends upon

players utilities might incorporate

form altruism well payoffs 111

words payoff british received trying

2beitheith wrote under pseudonym lanian hay ashworthbook refers beith entirely lanian hay

56

destroy germans depended upon payoff germans

received same action utilities derived

futures both combatants players

interdependent quote captain liddell hart explains

significance trench fighters future

remains our battalioneight hundred strong outset set off back across

mans land three small parties lessseventy men four officers wearysix nights scarcely sleep movedstupor stumbling along painfully until reachedhappy valleyvailey sheltered hollow filled dumps

where later our dead buried 23

captain hart noted these memoirs smell

bacon morning gained conquest stench

lime covered corpses much time

brought tacit truce battle front well

preventing insanity troops

these breakfast mealtime bad weather cruces began

each side saw whatever kind punishment

given side returned equally

sometimes even heavily punishment britishexample causing even allowing travail

enemy participating behavior akin selfpersecution definition altruism however does

fully allow understanding why cooperation emerged

between trench enemies axelrod say

issue

57

shadow futureaxelrod notes book cooperation emerges much

readily time does spontaneously under

these conditions trench fighting shadow

future largeaccording axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods interpretation trench

troops rotated average every eight days

leave soldiers very little time experiment

cooperation important factor overcomes

time constraint process socializationashworth discusses

trucescrucesTruces maintained britishsanctioning germans germans sanctioning british

british sanctioning british germanssanctioning germans former interarmyprocess among antagonists latter intraarmyintraarmyprocess among compatriots 153

kind intraarmyintraarmy communication occurred two

different levels ashworth discusses 1interpersonallevel 2 relationships among different weapons groups

during combat aggression trench fighterendangered enemy compatriots

especially members own section ashworth 153

avoid inciting enemy aggressive behavior

soldiers attempted promote anti hostile behavior among

comrades these practices carriedtroop troop example troops leaving

trenches talk incoming men tacit

58

accordance existed enemy ashworth

notes particularly british soldierssuggest try promote enforce

cooperation fellow soldiers soldierdefect defect sense game theory

sense going AWOL then ofttimes receivepunishment own friends fellow soldierfurthermore aggressive soldier type

socialized group wished obey

tacit rules live let livesocialization battalion battalion within

battalions well ashworth describes follows

consider B C D E each every pointtime simultaneously rewards B C D E giving

aggression B simultaneously rewards C D

E C simultaneously rewards B D E

forth moreover these exchangessynchronic successive setexchanges follows another immediately consecutivepoints time both frequency intensityexchange extremely high promote strong feelings

fellowship among group members since certaintyeach rely every harm

rash action grows passage time 154

note here passage time allows reliancegrow emphasized thus larger shadow

future reliance grows

concerning relationships among different weapons

groups ashworth notes groups greater

interests maintaining cruces others 159

59

example infantry lose live let livedeteriorated kill killed ashworth 1980 159

weapons groups interest maintaining live letlive system depended inversely capability secure

itself harm ashworth notes

infantryIlnfantryInfantry high commitment heavy artillerylow commitment live let live describe

process negative sanctions intergroup levellargely show how weapon groups highvulnerability low capability discouraged groupslow vulnerability high capability agressionegressionagression

160

training trench soldiers taught

ideology kill killed mind

decisions made present great effectfuture decision makers decision makers being

troops choosing what type aggression unleash

live let live system just convenient

alternative allow encouraging

future 3 stream thought gently merges next

question axelrod asks

how cooperation sustained

ashworthsAshworths analysis trench fighting shows how

axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods oyes taylors conditions promote

endurance tacitillicittacit illicit cooperation

3theathe shadow future logically large decisionmade present participate aggression war lead

either personal harm death future alternativepromoting cooperation seemed quite reasonable preference

60

ashworth notes while evolution cooperationmay complex issue perplexing questionhow conditional cooperation sustained seeks

answer looking inter intraarmyintraarmy communication

question stated how did everyone understand tacitrules rules never recorded never spoken

stated above plenty intraarmyintraarmy

communication new troops come war

front old troops tell common peace

held between two sides new troops come

replace parts front line divisionwords ashworth often instructed art

peace well war 29 british soldier statedincoming soldier bosche aint bad feller you

leave imlimrim alone ell leave you alone macgill 1916 84

many similar manuscripts show quiet trenches4trenches4

these sorts dialogues common way

tacit trucescruces sustained through modificationimage war experienced front line

itself however while shows how sustainedintraarmyintraarmy communications does make

adequate statement how cooperation sustained among

antagonists themselves how did communicate

each side tell enemy cooperating

4theathe term quiet describe trench used ashworthcharacterize trenches carrying tacit cooperation

61

communication

ashworth states direct indirect trucescruces

interarmy setting direct communication involved

use either verbal written symbols

spoken word overt fraternisationfraternization ashworth 1980 32

these kinds trucescruces almost immediately spoiledhigh command punishment include arrest andortransfer very active front line battaliongenerally troops troop commanders merely warned

headquarters discontinue trucescruces common

these christmas trucescruces where both sides agree

verbally put war rest strict period time

order celebrate holiday whatever occasion

besides exchanges peaceful cooperation trenchfighters exchange news war sometimes food

occasionally polite conversation even once soccergame mans land each cooperative scenario

described tit tat game plan almost memoirs

soldiers state actions dependent upon

reciprocal interaction did snipe them

left us alone raimes 1931 798079 80

indirect communication entails inertiainertial andorritualization 11 type communication less

vulnerable high command easilyrecognized outsiders including outside troops inertia

defined ashworth

62

suspension hostilities happenedconscious decision specific agreement merely

each side seemed disinclinedinclineddis aggressantagonists sometimes shared vague general

passive attitude mind 40

just firing mortar sniping enemy very

overt act soldier communication abstaining these

characteristic expected actions conversely

communication non aggression again inertia based

strict reciprocity

british pacivitypacivity unconditionalgermans knew responded inertiaaggression british retaliate kind

hand germans knewreciprocate british inertia establish set

mutually contingent exchanges where neither sideexercised choice aggress ashworth41

lack fighting course obvious high

command response action enforce

offensive spirit trenches ashworth notes

early part war circa 1915 raid orders high

command possible due poor communication lateryears show however increased communication

technology high command ordered raidsquotas numbers dead numbers captured thesetypes orders above made inertia difficult stance

maintain

ritualization communication quite differentritualization made appearance war seem real high

63

command according ashworth allowed soldiersfollow letter law without adhering spirit

ritualization fascinating trucingprocess became important trench fighters

willing deceive top command sake

cooperating called enemy during these trucescruces

enemy sense became friendly high

command

ritualization either routinization bombing

sniping raids perfunctory tactic weapon

use haphazard use weapons signal

side heart wasnt words

british soldier aim high miss targetsignaling german soldier did want

kill german soldier realizing adversary

across trench ability aggress hittarget reciprocates action mode

perfunctory weapon use axelrod notes analysisashworth germans demonstrate excellentability hit target shooting designs

smiley face parapet thus telling britishgermans kill them inclined

instead refrainedroutinization aggression equally

fascinating routinization included larger weapons

mortars larger bombs routine develop

64

where bombs sent side specifictimes specific places schedules did vary

while cooperative routine lasted memoir

demonstrates etiquette

hadnt single show merely fewunexciting patrols led old hand way

war carried champagne reallyludicrous 7.22722 am half dozen coal boxes

six inch variety landed bunch our frontline 7.25725 six ours returned complimentpromptly noon each side sent heavy mortarshell way evening blessingmutual exchange coal boxes beginning precisely7.22722 exchange compliments dueretired our famous concrete shelters

side mans land things presumablyjust same very comfortable bucher1932 1367136 7

ashworth states both germans french

meticulous observance live let livecourse tacit cooperation form ended side

whatever reasons broke truce again silverrule eye eye tit tat bylawlaw

cooperation sustained these overt well

deceptive mutual arrangements communication seemed

key maintaining positive tit tat outcome

large shadow future cooperation

emerged withstood feeling reciprocal

altruism helped ignite desire cooperation

axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods question still remains why did cooperation breakdown towards end war

65

how whose hand cooperation terminated

ashworth notes second phase trench warfare

violent aggressive firststates

personal regimental control aggression typicaltrench war first phase replacedsecond phase impersonal control change

local central regulation where producersviolence longer directed disposition 96

usually central command able force trench fighteraggressive demanding raids battalion commander

know whether unauthorized cooperation

taking place noted above number own

dead counted significant numbers number

enemy prisoners taken point under centralcommand live let live system broke down quickly

axelrod comments necessary condition cooperation

emerge interaction take place where

central authority inhibiting players develop

natural communication lead kind

cooperation axelrod again notes proverbial straw

broke peaceful camels back institutiontype incessant aggression headquarters

monitor 82 ashworth defines type incessantaggression raiding 177 continuous raiding put end

tacit cooperation ashworth states

66raids ended cruces creating backgroundassumptions uncertainty thus indirectly promotingaggression generated self sustainingdirect motives aggression 200

end trucescruces triggered negative reciprocityopposes tacit cooperation negative tit

tat eye eye tooth toothashworth notes these raids provoked rule retaliation

counter aggression escalatoryescalatory nature

evolution cooperation then reversed become

evolution confrontation hostility deterioratingdegrees according established necessary conditions

cooperation strategy must nice allow

cooperation continue once strategy becomes

unforgiving longer considered nice

retaliatory stance trenches break trustopposing trench unforgiving strategies ensue

apparently unfortunately fortunatelyfate world war I1 trench fighting

french example however

demonstrates persistence cooperation even face

adverse authority event occurring 1917

know french mutinies why did cooperation prevailfrench point mutiny

french mutinies

according historian incident french

mutinies just mere trifle allied forces

67

crisis due mutinies french armiesspring early summer 1917 brought allied

cause within nodding distance defeatresulted millions lives having

sacrificed vain spears 1966 11

ashworth notes these mutinies neither isolated nor

ephemeral widespread persistent involving

half total number divisions french army

224 mutinies mainly consisted french troops

refusing fire enemy unless being fired upon

even greater extreme these troops left battle fieldwords went AWOL according general

pepetainsdetainsPetains memoirs mutinies rebellion caused

part exhaustion troops stateshopelessness pessimism spread army

interior swamping did mood superficialenthusiasm whipped above never reallytaken root 86

during times these mutinies tacit trucescruces

occurring germans germans aware

french rebelling against superiors

participating french live letlive scenario ashworth portrays being common

among british front lines according severalsources5sources 5 half french troops

participated these mutinies 151 recorded incidents

5jc kings first world war macmillan E spears twomen saved france stein day quoted references

68

above mutinies show cooperation sustainedeven expense lawfulness many

courtmarshalledcourtmarshalled many 23 executed crimes

pertaining mutinies themselves

conclusion

cooperation began emerge among opposing troops

clear nice strategies initially being used

clarify troops cooperative intentionsaxelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods oyes taylors conditionsrecognizable elements emergent cooperation ashworthsAshworthsstudy axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods amended framework cooperation even

during war does seem impossible framework

gives us ability understand how cooperation

thwarted seems rationality prisonersdilemma broken these soldiers found saddle point

interaction CC until directlyordered raid study does particularlydemonstrate cooperation productsbyproducts war

concurrently human aggression necessarily

result wartime interaction game theoristssay world defect where tacit

cooperation conditions exist war then thwarted

peace

CHAPTER 5

WALK WOODS FORMULA cooperationINF negotiations

arms control proposal arms control processappears reagan administrations feeling make goodoffer head home holidays good offer howeverenough must underwrittenunderwritten bureaucratic willingness dohard work hammering political climategood faith negotiation believed

new republic dec 19 1983

july 16 1982 paul nitze chief US intermediate

nuclear forces INF negotiator met soviet counterpart

yuli kvitsinskyKvit sinsky front step soviet mission

clad rough walking clothes hopped

kvitsinskys car drove 20 kilometers north geneva

hike jura mountains dividing switzerland france

kvitsinskyKvit sinsky led me logging road appearedlead down through woods right said

wintertime membersdelegation gone time time crosscountry ski planned our informal conversation

weeks nitze 1989 367

though negotiatorsnegotiatory dressed suitsdid begin publicized opening statements

discussion took place crest juramountains day perhaps earnest attempt

during geneva talks procure arms control deal

nitze prepared 4 papers through D extended

70

kvitsinskyKvitsinsky major concessions sanctioned

prescribed formal US stand kvitsinskyKvitsinsky made deal

joint venture wrote alterations while readingpapers rain storm subverted negotiations

moved partnership soviets car where

kvitsinskyKvitsinsky copied everything down pad paper two

half hours amenable INFINP arms control agreement

later parties broke prepared trips home

where meet harsher less negotiable opposition

did wooded mountains outside geneva

episode nicknamed walk woods

focus my next discussion tacit cooperation

walk itself though poetically provoprovokingkingi1 played

relatively minor role cooperative process whole

actual moment clear identifiable cooperation

found proposal nitze presented

kvitsinskyKvitsinsky authored hike I1 reiterate both

parties made difficult concessions sanctioned

governments back home actual informal walk

woods sanctioned stepping

both kvitsinskyKvitsinsky nitze outside respective

official negotiating positions constitutes mutual

tacit cooperation

ileelleeee blessing created award winning play same title1986 play opened broadway february 28 1988

71

chapter I1 show how new reagan

administration interested deploying missileseurope catch russianscontrolling reducing arms unless arms controlnegotiations meant US win public opinion war

having politically appealing position europe

I1 show although governments

odds cooperative relationship developed between

kvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze concerning euromissilesEuromissiles factunique relationship evolved cold war environment

makes another worthy case study tacit cooperation

I1 begin explanation policiesprocedures both place developing

time INF talks began then I1 use framework

developed chapters 2 3 analyze interactionskvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze I1 include discussion centralauthority part played both walk

woods deal eventual soviet walkout talkslate 1983

birth defects INF

INF negotiations began november 1 1981 lessyear reagans oath office new

administration branded hawkish wanted createpositive image arms control arena while

disassociatingassociatingdis itself SALT II11 blunders under

72

carter many policies carter administration came

haunt reagans defense department important case

being dual track initiative europe dual trackcompromise policy coupled US deployment

pershing tomahawk missiles europe arms control

talks limit those same missiles exchange equal

levels andor reductions soviet SS 4s 5s

particularly newest members soviet arsenalmirvedmidved SS 20s

reagans defense secretary casper weinberger

weinbergersWeinbergers advisers fred ikle richard perle feltdual track mistake talbott 1984 43

however attempts repudiate dual tracksquelched alexander haig state department haig

right hand man lawrence eagleburger undersecretarypolitical affairs felt continuity between

administrations regarding dual track vitalmaintaining good relations NATO constituency

particularly britain france germany

I1 use dual track both example perpetual

conflict among national security council NSC statedefense departments well illustration how

conflicts usually resolved bureaucratic in-

fighting common procedure agency able

gain upper hand reagan agency

controlled policy case dual track agencies

73

reached impasse settled eagleburger

padded reagans first address margaret thatcherendorsement moment presidential statement

made publicly dual track became US policyatmosphere nitze selected chief

negotiator INF talks

enter diplomat

naive mendacious say paul henry

nitze considered lower level bureaucrat

past deputy secretary defense chief SALT negotiator

united states oldest distinguisheddiplomats time dec 14 1981 45 nitze enjoyed

power came prestige longevity 2 though

certainly leadership credentials superior

several circumstances mitigated power

bargaining tables geneva

begin nitze 74 year old democrat albeithawkish few allies new reagan government

nitzesnifczesbitzes biggest confederate however directorarms control disarmament agency eugene rostow

2nitzeitze served 7 administrations advised every USpresident truman bush helped implement marshall planeurope coestablishedestablished NATO supervised NSC 68 main actor

cuban missile crisis negotiated SALT I1 INF START blocked SALT

II11 attempted compromise SDI quoted december 211987 time article 78 saying number occasions my careerI1 quit jobs I1 disagreed policy im just interested

being part government im interested government beingright

74

rostowsstowsrostoksRo boss richard alienallenailen director NSC actedrostowsstowsrostoksRo recommendation give nitze job spiteprotests eagleburger boss secretarystate nitze disliked state department

mistrusted defense particularlysecretary international security affairs richard perle

weinbergersWeinbergers closest aides talbott describes

conflict

nitze seemed destined respected hawksdoves alike always strong reservationshawks never entirely forgive him rolebringing SALT I1 doves never entirelyforgive him role bringing down SALT II11

talbott 1984 p 55

nevertheless NSC prevailed bid name

INF negotiator paul nitze appointed

neither pentagon nor state department

wholeheartedly wanted him job nitzesbitzes abilitynegotiate amount flexibility compromised

lack support home lack support became

increasingly apparent talks geneva continued

fateful walk kvitsinskyKvitsinsky almost everyone

washington came down hard nitze ally again

seemed rostow long january 12

1983 rostow made appointment george shultz3shultzz go

bat nitze issue flexibilitymeeting shultz informed rostow president

3georgecgeorgegeorge shultz replaced aleandermeander haig secretary state

75

longer confidence him Rosrostowtowl wanted

resignation talbott 1984 167168167 168 rostow case

showed how february 7 1983 new republic articlestates 7 white house scolded hawks acting

like doves rostowsstowsrostoksRo dismissal nitze leftwithout advocate DC

once rostow left office spoke publiclycontent nitzesbitzes kvitsinskys mountain walk

wanted show how nitzesbitzes efforts being thwartedreagans bickering advisors instead winning publicopinion walks outcome americans saw nitzedelinquent negotiator reprimanded restricted

president point US negotiator lostconsiderable ground though feared

discharged well nitze contrary asked

reagan continue post geneva during 2 years

talks nitze constantly frustrated lack

control policies framing negotiating position

sovietsunited states seasoned career

politicians nitze initially accepted position chiefINF negotiator condition freedom

barter arms control deal however while nitzedoing job geneva NSC state defense

department bureaucrats arguing policiesaffecting negotiations what became difficult

76

seemingly impossible policy nitze work

zero option pursuit policyhighest level US government demonstrates

complete lack negotiability US side

ways count nil zero options

nitze begins chapter memoirs 1989 421

games structure gainside must balanced equal loss

side sum losses sidegains side always zeroarms control negotiation objective shouldarrive nonzeronon zero sum outcome where both sides gain

neither side loses

I1 choose quote nitze antitheticalpolicy came direct him INF

negotiations zero option policy unveiledreagan november 18 1981 promised europe

US negotiate geneva eliminate medium range

missiles europe meant US abrogate

pershing II11 tomahawk deployment scheduled

late fall 1983 soviets destroySS 4s 5s 20s 4

according talbott policy originated zerosolution chancellor schmidts social democratic party schmidt

responding upsurgentsurgent peace movement among rival partiesnumerous vociferous voters germany clear USadoption zero solution among many reasons chosen wooeurope fact did short time

77

soviet side zero solution rigorously

disregarded propaganda french britishnuclear arsenal 162 missiles worth remain

continent rendering USSR soviets saiddefenseless intolerable soviet position

match nonnatonon NATO arsenal SS 20s

destroying outdated SS 4s 5s then agree

US forgo pershing tomahawk deployments

course intolerable west tri mirvedmidved

SS 20s having superiority speed accuracy throw

weight french british bombs

thus stalemate seemed inevitable even before talksbegan however policy washington regarding zero

option completely decided yet statedepartment especially haig ill disposed accept

zero option unconditionally while pithy easilydefined verifiable position certainly lacked

realistic negotiating terms europeans quickly became

aware word zero became tenacious partimpending INF talks US state defense

departments argued whether zero end

just beginning US soviet accord

defense headed weinberger perle endorsed

zero option according talbott 1984 60 perle

saw great political advantages coming down zero

staying american commitment achieving zero

78

acceptable outcome put sovietsdefensive keep them february 7 1983

new republic article concurs sentiment

negative connotation zero option attractiveour planners least failnothing our excuse 8 even burt haigs arms

control deputy chronicled time article concerning

zero option saying purpose exercisemaximum political advantage arms controlengaged alliance management dec 5 1983 19

even state did want get shut zero

option left room compromise negotiationeurope well help soviets come

realize zero ethically morally

motivated first seemed

despite opposition defense made voice heard

through perle november 30 before senate armed

services committee less 2 weeks presidentsformal proposal said middle ground between

full deployment zero perles became

reagans voice reason

dual track zero option interagency

polemics foundation INF nitze able maneuver

between fissures stated policy beginning

tenure geneva both US sovietpolicies came clearly focus became less easy

79

ignore nitze became aware did kvitsinskyKvitsinsky rostow

europe liberal press INF failureimminent these conditions led walk

woods

INF table across ocean woods

nitze elegant urbane glintmischievous humor eye slightly pudgy kvitsinskyKvit sinsky

dour outspoken openly ambitious december 14

1981 time article 45 describes first meeting between

yankee germanist chief INF negotiatorsnegotiatory

nitze considered many experienced US

bargainer soviets time december 17 1984 48

met kvitsinskyKvit sinsky informally hour half before

negotiations began late november 1981 nitzesbitzes firstimpressions favorable 1 I found him easy get along

sense humor 1989 370 kvitsinskyKvit sinsky 30

years younger much less negotiating experience

chosen expertise german studies 5 before

long press trumpeted two being friendsnegotiations began US tabling

position soviet delegation less direct holding

back until round 2 before presenting comprehensive formal

5kvitsinskykvitsinskyKvit sinsky spoke german before speaking russian parentspolish immigrants kvitsinskyKvitsinsky spent years both east

west germany official capacity soviet union chose himchief INFINP negotiator prove sensitivity germanysgermanasGermanys concerns

80

position figure 2 indicates6indicates6 initial missile count

proposed reductions both sides including french

british count

US USSR french & british

balance pershingpershingllsils 108 SS 20s europe 245

time tomahawks 464 SS 20s asia 100 missilesSS 4s 5s 291 162negotiation

total missiles 572total warheads 572 total missiles 636

total warheads 1326

US pershing Us 0 SS 20s total 0zero option tomahawks 0 SS 4s 5s5s00 missiles

162total missiles 0 total missiles 0

total warheads 0 total warheads 0

soviet pershing Uslis 0 SS 20s europe 162

zero option tomahawks 0 SS 4s 5s5s00 missiles162

total missiles 0 total euro missiles 162total warheads 0 total euro warheads 486

based november 1983 scheduled deployment

number does include 100 SS 20s permanently stationedasia soviets did count these US did

figure 2

these figures sum almost impossible conflictexisted between US soviet zero option positions

january 31 1983 time article states sovietposition

6theathe6 idea figure 2 taken USets news world reportarticle january 31 1983 31 revised usechptercapter

81

SS 20 pride sovietstrategic rocket forces kremlin sunk billions

rubles developing training crewsgetting place way moscow

agree dismantle every these missilesexchange paper reductions missilesUS deployed might abledeploy 18 .1818

conflict however primarily played

rhetorical wars highest levels important

element study tacit cooperation note

while INF negotiations going US

soviet heads state open conflicttelling note few months before INF talksbegan reagan proposed 1.31313 trillion dollar defense budget

end what reagan saw extreme soviet militarysuperiority US too clear reagan

primarily interested solving nuclear militaryproblem building reducing arms controlsecurity matter public relations opportunity

side soviets attempted persuade europe

accept forthcoming tomahawks pershing IIsUsilslisconvince europeans allow government

house US missiles soviets maintain nuclearsuperiority very minor sacrifices clearlyzero sum situation leadership both sides

82

european war battles rhetoric bad press

prior reagans november 18th announcement zero

sum president brezhnev announced 5 year plan budget

adjustment november 17 1981 washington post cover storysuggests soviets diverting 42 billiondollars infrastructure planning defense meet

american challenge soviets threatened match

each new US weapon appropriate counterbalance

tone US soviet exchange reagan gave

first major foreign policy speech national press

club november 18 1981 just 12 days before first INF

round begin

vintage speech reagan took moral high

ground explicated US foreign policy during coldwar noted gos 70s US

decreased reduced military spite sovietbuildupbuild american zero option reagan said

giant step mankind surprising tass response

recorded same front page new york times articlenovember 19 1981 states US president made

groundless allegations came absolutely

fantastic figures article describes reagans speech

ploy hobble geneva talks present

american course escalating arms race insuring

military superiority peace initiative

83

comparable first footsteps moon

brezhnevs own response zero option recorded

interview german magazine der spiegel

those united states advance kindproposal apparently do minute expect

soviet union might agree them probablyauthors proposals do really want

talks let alone successful talks what needbreakdown talks use sortjustification continuing planned arms race 7

though brezhnevs response perhaps far offreagans apparent intent US presidents speech

rhetorically much softer soviets just few

months earlier significant shift evilempire rhetoric first few months officeexample reagans first presidential news conference

january 29 1981 called soviets immoral

reserved right commit crime lie cheat

nevertheless posturing november woo

USSR convince europe seriousarms control

two days later soviet government releasedpublication threat europe blamed united

states nuclear proliferation like reagans speech

publication intended western european

7 quoted new york times article nov 19 1981algaig

84

audience november 22 2 days pamphlets

release 4 days reagans speech brezhnev visitedbonn proposed unilateral reduction hundreds

medium range bombs good gesture european

neighbors 8 attempted persuade west german

leaders success put moratorium 1983

scheduled deployment tomahawks new pershingsPersh ingsmany schmidts social democratic party sympathetic

considered delay deployment bombs

arrive arrive indefinite time dual

track leverage US negotiating side losttalbott chronicles american officials aghast

1984 94

these very cool political posturing battles raged

intermittently during time INF negotiationsprocess european opinion american zero option

shifted sanguine skeptical many policy makers feltnecessity add credibility US arms control

policy may 2 1982 new york times article reports

state department analyst stated zero option

proposal serious january following

year typical news conference blunder reagan retortedselling zero sum europe propaganda

public relations reagans plan attack

8 course bombs destroyed obsolete SS 4s5s crafty ploy won respect europeans

85

visit europe early following summer course

rhetorical war continued unsurprising fashion

soviets blamed US escalating falklandsFalk lands war

giving carte blanche approval britain US

vehemently denounced soviet based military crackdown

poland 1982 while kvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze making

concessions soviet US leaders heightening

cold war

1983 worse march reagan calls sovietunion evil empire star wars SDI conceived

may US congress allottsalliotts 625 million develop

MX andropovantropovAndropov tells germans decrease

number europe targeted SS 20s july KGB

accused being behind assassination pope

september soviets shoot down KAL 007 reagan callsmassacre later september gromyko does attend

UN aeroflotAeroflot allowed land

US october US invades grenada november

december soviets walk INF suspend both

START vienna talks conventional arms

first time 14 years kind arms control andorlimitation negotiation progress

following january two consecutive weeks

new york times opinion page first kvitsinskyKvitsinsky then nitzerecounted own versions walk woods

86

reasons soviet walkout time

failed negotiations public animosity between two

cooperation ended

walkwaik woods

though negotiatorsnegotiatory cooperation sustainedworsening US soviet relations important

speculate how why cooperation ever startedfirst place how stopped section use

rationale chapters 2 3 explicate emergence

cooperation between nitze kvitsinskyKvit sinsky

talbott notes nitze aware rolegeneva limited

nitze see what might very well finalappointment government service turning

exercise problem solvingdiversion smokescreen othersmake sure problem managing militarycompetition between superpowerssuperpowers solvedarms control 1988 173

yet nitze subverted wishes government

proposing walk woods compromise kvitsinskyKvit sinsky

shadow futureshadow future high assumption behind

question whether future futuredecisions cooperate defect relativelyimportant present very nature

87

kind US soviet relations time

substantial shadow future historydangerous animosity future potentially destructiveclashes decision affecting relationship whether

made presently future considered weighty

while may consideration both

negotiatorsnegotiatory matters certainly part

rhetoric repertoire perhaps important considerationhow successful job9joba negotiate

arms control agreement nitze doggedly optimistic

nitze asked whether chancesoviets accept US proposal reply

hard conceive theyd accept fastthats appropriate criterion judgingproposal appropriate criterion should

solid basis continuing negotiationsanswer yes spoke negotiations

dialectical process hinting eventual synthesisunited states scale back INF

deployment soviets scale down SS 20force just NATO ministers intended 1979talbott 1988 170

nitze good negotiator preconditions

accepting geneva post given

flexibility negotiate negotiating strategieshope future hold compromise eventualagreement

9forifor9 part information comingamerican side inferences made soviet reaction

negotiating strategy questions intentionanswered answered predominantly nitzekvitsinskyKvitsinsky

88

kvitsinskyKvit sinsky scenario complex

intentions harder infer nitzesmitzesbitzes memoirs

talbotstalboysTalbots notes kvitsinskyKvit sinsky described very politicalanimal difficult determine whether

cooperation nitze negotiator cooperation

soviet policy young political appointee played

greater role perhaps additional factor priorwalk spent work time together

social time enlarged shadow future nitzenotes

start tried expand informal contactsbetween two delegations muchkvitsinskiy I1 frequently met my

wife phyllis I1 invite kvitsinskiywife inga dinner manner socialgatherings outings lake picnicsformal receptions period time cameknow kvitsinskiys well possibleknow senior soviet official 1989 37071370 71

even defensive january 19 1984 letter new

york times opinion page nitze claimed period

time I1 came think I1 generally sort true

false what kvitsinskykvitsinskylKvit sinsky said intimating

knew kvitsinskys personality rather well

sublimeness international nuclear situationnegotiating time spent together makes strong case

existing large shadow future

89

strategy nice

nice strategy reminder defectunilaterally forgiving pessimistic

perhaps difficult concept check

perhaps impossible context study yet

couple points made firstnitze made clear firstdefect defect mean choose conditionsagreement benefit own position expense

counterparts position nitzesbitzes philosophy arms

control nonzeronon zero sum statesmemoirs where both sides gain neither side loses

1989 421 apparently allow zero option

keep him being able fully negotiate deal

constantly fought administration point

secondly each negotiator demonstrated forgiving attitudecounterparts hard line governmental stance nitze

proposed plan enable each negotiator blame

walk proposal nitze states you

blame me your people kvitsinskyKvit sinsky understood

ill tell them your scheme you tell them

mine said talbottTalbotfc 1984 129 tacit agreement

meant undermine authority without fearreprisals responsibility ownership entail

90

furthermore nitze constantly siftinglooking past kvitsinskys rhetoric statesformal statements kvitsinskykvitsinskylKvit sinsky hesitation puttingforward continuous stream sided propaganda

arguments knew advance lacking factualbasis logic 11 nitze continues privatediscussion away ears associatesappeared surprisingly frank discussionmoscow politics speculative possibilities 1989

37172371 72 nitze quick understand kvitsinskyspropaganda statements inserted moscowsMos cows demand

confidential conversation both used forgiving strategieslooked past rhetorically antagonistic statements

made publicly

question altruismaccording taylor altruism phenomenon

exists two people two opposing sides realizedecisions subsequent payoffs made

players decided effect upon own payoffs

futures linked sort identifyingeach shown following conversation

how confident you asked nitzeforced humor everything saying isntbeing overheard

91

playing along nitze replied pretty confidentsomebody may put listening device

gestured rolled awningright said kvitsinskyKvit sinsky better meet

woods schukin nitze done during SALT I1 10

fact both negotiatorsnegotiatory felt need keep

talks quiet chiefs shows

understood similar fates particularly tellingsoviet side why developed you blame

me ill blame you rule altruisticdevice agreement able take place woods

day

clarity paucityoye speculates number players game

decreases incidence players choosing defectdecrease evident above conversation

between two negotiatorsnegotiatory feltcandid private nitze writes kvitsinskyKvit sinsky

felt much freer stray moscowsMoscows hard lineaway associates case oyes theory

cooperation emerge readily number

players smaller useful walk woods

scenario number players increasednumber choices defect increased thus resulting

eventual soviet walkout

losee10 see talbott 1984 pages 121 detailed conversation

92

further point oyes decisions made

parties recognizable during walk nitze spelledagreement paper kvitsinskyKvit sinsky responded kind

amending agreement own pen walk

made very extemporaneous environment problem

clarity came months following both negotiatorsnegotiatoryrespective countries having way notify

each success failure proposal

soviets heard rumors US disapproved

nitzesbitzes proposal decision reject well

intentions each negotiator inferredcounterpart private spoken word

taken face value apparent informal

candor between two deteriorated did success

negotiations

anarchy authorityvery clear hierarchical authority inhibited

negotiatorsnegotiatory efforts make negotiationscompletely cooperative enterprise play authoritygoverned strongly before negotiations

during walk two alone free parleyonce walk woods deal made

involvement authority became problematic talbott stateswalk woods formula what called

93

diplomatic parlance non paper easilydisavowed higher authority 1988 175

disavowed both negotiatorsnegotiatory reprimanded

parts played agreement talbott states

kvitsinskyKvit sinsky claimed bosses given himhard time part walk woods

shultz put nitze noticeback channel dealings advance furthernitze speaking secretarystate shultz well himselfwalks woods unless youre underinstructions too 1988 177

kvitsinskyKvit sinsky similarly chastised clearly authoritypresent policy decision making cooperative moves

hampered defection became likely

conclusion

paul nitze yuli kvitsinskyKvit sinsky cooperated extent

themselves came accord how reduce

euromissilesEuromissiles while governments open

opposition respect INF terms two chiefnegotiatorsnegotiatory stepped made game yield equal

payoffs both sides bureaucracy unavoidably

regained control cooperative actions two men

surpassed negotiations failedaxelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods theory cooperation additions

taylor oye presents least tool describe

conditions may evoked relationship

94

kvitsinskyKvitsinsky nitze developed just livelet live system world war I1 trenches unlikely theme

cooperation place discussed lightwalk woods may seen less circumstance

chance fair game good intentions

CHAPTER 6

conclusion

according thomas hobbes leviathan humankind

exists natural state equality another

continues equality abilityarisetharideth equality hope attainment our ends

87 our hopes desires clash naturallyevolve state war todays vernacular hobbes

describing tragedy commons problem

aptly explained prisoners dilemma hobbes solutionprisoners dilemma remove dilemma

altogether establishing despot absolute power

extort cooperation case individual freedoms

lost scholar notes however modern liberalstate designed responsive

governed guarantee individual rights question

however whether arrangements liberal statework solve our prisoners dilemma martin 1992

179 two case studies I1 just explicatedprisoners dilemma did exist structuredenvironment both cases existed anarchic realm

authority each opposing side subverting individualchoices lower lever actors making decisions

96

break own prisoners dilemma what hobbes did

consider did find own societyindividuals may break dilemma without coercion

INF trench war cases show

my research I1 chose address issuecooperation among lower level bureaucrats even though

axelrod ambiguous level cooperation might

emerge I1 do believe completely absurd

suggest same tit tat strategy cause

cooperation evolve levels ie organizational

state etc group cooperation scholars note

intergroup conflict cooperation research

finding valid generalization reached topic

level analysis contradicted factgains support valid generalizations reached another

level sherif et al 1961 3 I1 noted chapter 1

many international studies scholars used prisoners

dilemma explain 1944 1989 bipolar world

these scholars midlarsky midlarsky et al1994 353635 36 uses axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tit tat strategy explain

three types cooperation develops

continuum continuum begins primitive

cooperation merely absence conflictadvanced level reactive cooperation like tit tat

advanced type proactivepreactiveproactive cooperation

protagonists seek cooperation cases without

97

expectation gain I1 list midlarskys continuum

purpose contrasting two case studies my

research

before I1 begin however I1 argue

continuum both primitive reactive cooperation

based conditional strategies midlarsky gives

example mutual assured destruction philosophy

type primitive cooperation primitiveprotagonists do actively seek participatepositive cooperative act merely abstain non

cooperative behavior signified conflict what

defines cooperation instance hand

absence action I1 agree

primitive type cooperation two types

yet I1 note does fall outside limitconditional strategy break prisoners

dilemma

primitive cooperation clearly resembles livelet live system discussed chapter 4 according

ashworthsAshworths study meal time ration trucescruces

beginning signs cooperation active fronts rationsupply line primary target either side

cooperators however supply line area

reciprocal abstinence aggression even cooperation

evolved advanced forms conditional exchange

ritualization involved avoidance direct

98

confrontation alliance against common foe

treaty trench trucescruces real life example mutual

assured destructionoccasionally primitive cooperation showed signs

advanced communication friendliness story

told british officer rutter noted ashworth 146

german grenade going off during these tacit trucescruces

though hurt both sides readied retaliationuntil german soldier bravely stood parapet

apologize english troops damned prussian

artillery hoping injured personal

exchanges these others seemed even

primitive cooperation room evolve

nitze kvitsinskyKvit sinsky actively engaged

activities fostered cooperation interactionresembles second form cooperation midlarsky

defines reactive 35 friendly candid exchange

returned another until each negotiator stepped

proverbial limb agree upon proposal

priori unacceptable both US soviet rhetoricalstances nitze initiated proposal kvitsinskyKvit sinsky okayedoklyed

making additions changes just before sovietwalkout cooperation noticeably broke down tit

tat defection swapped leaving negotiatorsnegotiatorydiscouraged unfriendly nitze walk

park episode came known mysterious

99

byzantine ended my feeling bitterness toward

kvitsinskiy 1989 389 though defection between two

reached sort point return nitze admits latermemoirs kvitsinskys behavior probably

motivated partly save face preserve

fiction masters moscow gone pains

invent 397 even embittered nitze showed limitedforgiveness important point here

through reciprocal cooperative effort private agreement

made while kvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze broke

prisoners dilemma

limitationsresearch use game theory understand

how tacit cooperation emerge several fundamental

limitations first game theory concerned

narrow range decision making outcomes truedescriptive strength comes abstracting

process details personalities how decisions

arrived lost may critical flaw

discussion lower level bureaucratic interactions where

personality variables relevant example INF

case evident nitze negotiated similarlyschukin soviet delegate during SALT I1

secondly researchsresearches outcomes limited furtherlack additional case studies even INF

100

trench war cases cooperation sustainedadd strength research include case study where

cooperation completely disrupted

thirdly facts both case studies rathersided particularly case INF I1

do infer intent kvitsinskys camp

ashworthsAshworths study memoirs world war I1 trenchexperience almost exclusively british french biased

while several limitations resultsanalysis show additional research taken

direction further case study showing same conditionspresent conflictualconflictual exchange where cooperation does

emerge may shed light whether these conditions

tacit cooperation merely necessary

sufficient study unsuccessful emergent cooperationmay give insight what behaviors attitudesreadily elicit dad1D rather C 1

trench war case study ashworth indicatestrucescruces particularly rule trenches

live let live system endemic trench

warfare22warfare 22 trucescruces occurred during small scaleordinary every day trench fights among certaintroops words these cruces did occur during

large battles somme passchendaele etc trucescruces

never occurred among elite fighting units among

defensive units ashworth suggests cases many

101

soldiers involved trucescruces less aggressive

instinctuallyinstinctual ly tended shoot return fire never

offensively perhaps michael taylors notion altruismmake sense attitudes

INF case cooperation deterioratedincreasing defection US soviet decision makers well

unwillingness negotiatorsnegotiatory particularlysoviet side withstand boss pressures make

uncooperative moves certainly see nitzekvitsinskyKvit sinsky under good conditions tacit cooperation

emerged then perished bureaucracy became

involved how game played speculatedtwo negotiatorsnegotiatory left alone implement

INF accord walk woods proposal

come early 80s almost identicalform several years later

conclusions

I1 processed my own interests study

cooperation through conflict I1 often concerned

justifying research my analysis

underlying notion cooperation desirable outcome

yet both cases cooperation punished authoritycooperative act against national policy

use game theory jargon actors chose defectagainst authority moment chose cooperate

102

adversary certainly policy makers particularlyduring war want subordinates undermine

security authority state sake

individualmy interest find sort cooperation

develop unlikely situations situationswhere irrational agree environments

conflict war animosity prisoners dilemma trenchwar unlikely environment yet I1 like

see same inquiry extended ethnic prejudicialconflicts wars where seems cooperation

even less chance develop

nevertheless research does show under

given conditions cooperation emerge cases

merely shows tacit cooperation emerged during

INF negotiations limited amount during world war I1

trench fighting clear many instancesmay reasons discussed here cooperation emerge

fact remains tacit cooperation

emerged among lower level bureaucrats whose nationsopen conflict war

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tacit cooperation between enemies

two case studies

kristina handy

david M kennedy center international area studies

MA degree april 1994

ABSTRACT

research details point reference understand two case studiescooperation developed among lower level non policymakingpolicy making bureaucratsduring times conflict war using components game theory I1 propose

international conflictualconflictual relationship occurs resembles iteratedprisoners dilemma meets certain conditions tacit cooperation emergetacit cooperation consists illicit implied cooperation sanctionednational policy level

research I1 develop framework tacit cooperation relying heavilyupon robert axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods theory evolutionary cooperation frameworkplace I1 then explicate two international case studies world war I1 trench warfarecooperation INF walk woods between kvitsinskyKvitsinsky nitze showhow theory used describe ways cooperation occur hostileconflictconflictualual environment

COMMITTEE APPROVALvalerie hudsbuds0 cmmitteecamittee chair

gy v

stan taylor conumttee member

yu ivalerievalene M hudson gradmtegradate program coordinator

Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies

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