Table of Contents

Heideggers Being and Time and National Socialism Johannes Fritsche

255

Being Just Just Being Heideggers Just Thinking

S 1ontgomery Ewegen 285

Husserls Somatology and Life Sciences Juan Manuel Ganido

295

The Mechanism of Cultural Evolution in Nietzsches Genealogical Writings Sven Gellens and Benjamin Biebuyck

309

Constraints on Manipulations of Emotions by Music A Critique of Tom Cochranes Assumptions

Vladimir J Konelni

327

Biological Imagery in Fear and Trembling David Seltzer

333

Kierkegaard and Intentionally Fictional Authors Joseph Westfall

343

Witlgenstein and World Religions Jerry H Gill

355

Marion and Negative Certainty Epistemological Dimensions of the Phenomenology of Givenness

Christina M Gschwandtner

363

New Books Received 371

bull Volume 56 Number 3 Fall 2012

253

Kirche bewiesen eine der Geistlichkeit (wie zu runer den Glauben an das

-Und diess Ergebniss il und Feinheit in der

iSI und Aufgabe ware mit auch zu Grabe getragen

tJ nicht erreichen nicht gturpassing beauty and reshy

If the church has always th of the church a temposhy

iesthood (as in the time of II with it a belief in the opshy

1Il beauty and refinement harmony between figure

o the grave when the relishyIcan nothing higher be atshybull ~ 60) Particularly from

Ii on he will refer to the e institute (cf FW 358)

ongerens conclusion that

be evolution of humanity Ifself-overcoming albeit Jreting Modem Culture

Herman Siemens for his ~lier draft of this essay

00 Gent Belgium

CONSTRAINTS ON MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

ACRITIQUE OF TOM COCHRANES ASSUMPTIONS

In a chapter that compared the respective roles of emotion and reason in art-music composers creative process I suggested that emotivism was the currently dominant position in the study of and talk about music l 1 defined it informally as a general proclivity for excessive insertion ofemoshytion and feeling into both scientific and lay acshycounts of mental life needs and motivation in daily behavior in matters artistic--especially musical-and non-artistic2 I begin this brief artishycle with a mention of emotivism because it is an insufficiently recognized backdrop for a number of contemporary debates in the philosophy of music Somewhat paradoxically it seems to be a cognitive stance taken by many philosophers and experimental psychologists of music one that reshytlects their (I would claim) unwarranted accepshytance of a quasi-ideological cultural context that has been characterized by many as deeply antishyintellectual3

The preceding comments are offered as an oblique introduction to my critical analysis of an important recent article that can be regarded as the epitome of one aspect of emotivism-the near-arbitrary blurring of boundaries of the hushyman emotional system in its interaction with the environment and more specifically the musical environment Having been published with high visibility in the lead position in an issue ofa preshymier journal of philosophical aesthetics unshydoubtedly contributed to the attention the article has received-as have its provocative assumpshytions about the nature of human emotions and their relationship to music expression music lisshytening and music production The character of the various assumptions and the manner in which they are combined-implying an almost comshypletely unconstrained plasticity of the human emotional life with regard to its manipUlation by music-turn my critique into a case study of a

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

Vladimir J Kone~ni

telling example of emotivism applied and in action

In the following critical observations I adshydress a variety of theoretical issues in relation to (the validity ot) assumptions made by Tom Cochrane in his article Expression and extended cognition4 My remarks are limited-as are Cochranes-to expression and experience of emotion (and do not refer to other affective states such as moods) Furthermore as is the case with Cochranes discussion mine is limited to music The latter decision on my part was necessitated by the specific or idiosyncratic features that the ideas of extended cognition acquire when apshyplied to the domain of music by Cochrane In short in this article I question the additional asshysumptions that Cochrane appears to have had to make in order to apply the notion of extended mind to music rather than the notions of exshytended cognition (or of active externalism) themsel ves 5

The critique is divided into nine brief sections all addressing Cochranes assumptions and in several instances generalizations One problem with the assumptions is the manner in which ideas from the philosophical as well as the bioshyand socio-psychological theories of emotion are treated Another concerns Cochranes interpretashytion and application of philosophical theories of music expression And the third is Cochranes rather uncritical reliance on an unconventional highly speculative neuroscientific account by Istvan Molnar-Szakacs and Katie Overy of the mirror-neuron system-applied by them to hushymans and to music-for the purpose of developshying with the additional aid from the concepts of empathy and contagion a view ofhuman emoshytions as an improbable system of essentially unconstrained plasticity and permeability by music

FALL 2012

327

I

1

328

The article concludes on a note of moderate encouragement Because the musician the inshystrument and the improvisedcomposed music are characteristically and interestingly intershytwined in jazz improvisation this may be the only fertile ground for extended cognition in mushysic the cost being however that any claims to generality are sharply curtailed There is also a parting shot at the narrative means by which exshycessive emotivism oversimplifies and distorts the issues of expression in music

To begin with Cochrane states I will assume that emotions are essentially constituted by patshyterns of bodily changes These patterns of bodily changes are registered in the brain which then generates the felt experience ofthe emotion6 An important question needs to be raised here How do bodily changes manage to occur (or more precisely to be instilled) before they are regisshytered in the brain To the extent that most human emotions with evolutionary significance arise in response to an external-often social-stimulus of some sort (or to a cognitive representation of such a stimulus) and that moreover the stimulus needs to be perceived and at least perfunctorily interpreted before any bodily changes can possishybly occur (on both physiological and logical grounds) it is obvious that a major (even if exshytremely rapid) cognitive step of interpretation and appraisal is missing from Cochranes acshycount-without his acknowledging or commentshying on the issue But this is in fact a problem of long standing for those non-cognitive theories of emotion in philosophy and psychology that conshytain the attribute of automaticity in the temporal sequence of components of emotion episodes There is a kinship between some of these posishytions and the one originally endorsed by William James7 Arguments advanced here regarding the necessary sequence of events in the generation of emotion are analogous to those that are used to support the Prototypical Emotion-Episode Model (PEEM)8

It is worth noting that in the quoted statement Cochrane seems to acknowledge both the imporshytance of subjective experience in emotion and the

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

role ofcognition in generating it I will show later that these acknowledgements contradict Cochranes main thesis

2

Cochrane continues I will assume a version of the resemblance theory of musical expression similar to that offered by Malcolm Budd This position is summarized by the slogan the music sounds the way emotion feels Most emotion theorists would probably agree that any slogan is likely to underestimate or misrepresent the complexities in the domain of the relationship between music and emotion In fact Cochrane himself-by writing elsewhere in the article I also accept many of the claims of resemblance between music and expressive behavior made by Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy--clearly testishyfies to the obvious limitations of the above-menshytioned slogan9 In effect in what seems to have been an afterthought another slogan the music sounds the way emotion looks was added to the already long list of Cochranes assumptions without being carefully assimilated into the argument

In any case to someone paying heed to parsishymony in theorizing it is unclear how Cochranes endorsement of the resemblance theory contribshyutes anything valuable to his thesis-beyond what Carroll Pratt Susanne Langer and Peter Kivy had previously hypothesized about the role of iconicity iconography and physiogshynomy of musical expression with regard to the feels and looks slogans 10

3

Cochrane proceeds in this manner A third assumption is that these resemblances are tracked by the same mechanism in the brain that registers bodily changes in emotions In support of this claim a connection has been made beshytween the perception of musical expression and the empathic simulation of the emotions of othshyers11 These statements are highly speculative In fact one finds them unwarranted after careshyfully examining the evidence and the argumentashytion for the alleged implications of the human

mirror-neuron s) tween music and e processes incIudi contagion) that i~ Molnar-Szakacs a (see his Note 3) scientific support

It is essential II controversial) cIa and Overy Acco nism implementC1 system a similar engaged by some ming as the motor singerdrummer ments of differenl ments of differem istic and implausj in and ofitselflog to predict ration~ duced by music probably high de postulated-auto watching a drum own motor s1sl seem to imply tIi musics effectsshybeen found unsat ture Cochrane n fore embraces ~ unconscious en below)

Cochrane spe emotional actiit anisms in the brI ing both our 01

others As a rest seem to perceive is actually very Ii the use of we imposing the w mate method of retically conten empirical suppo of unanimity of more important1

I

rlg it I will show later men ts contradict

~ill assume a version f musical expression ~alcolm Budd This he slogan the music els Most emotion ree that any slogan or misrepresent the

of the relationship n In fact Cochrane lere in the article I urns of resemblance e behavior made by Ciyy-clearly testishyIS of the above-menshywhat seems to have

r slogan the music Ics was added to the ranes assumptions ssimilated into the

gtaying heed to parsishylear how Cochranes ance theory contribshyhis thesis-beyond Langer and Peter esized about the role hy and physiogshyn with regard to the

is manner A third resemblances are ~sm in the brain that motions In support has been made beshy

iical expression and he emotions of othshyhighly specUlative

arran ted after careshy and the argumentashy11ions of the human

mirror-neuron system in the relationship beshytween music and emotion (implicating numerous processes including simulation empathy and contagion) that is presented in the article by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy in which Cochrane (see his Note 3) seeks conceptual and neuroshyscientific support 12

It is essential to keep in mind the main (itself controversial) claim made by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy According to the simulation mechashynism implemented by the human mirror neuron system a similar or equivalent motor network is engaged by someone listening to singingdrumshyming as the motor network engaged by the actual singerdrummer from the large-scale moveshyments of different notes to the tiny subtle moveshyments of different timbres13 This seems unrealshyistic and implausible Moreover the contention is in and ofitselflogically insufficient to enable one to predict rationally that emotion would be inshyduced by music in this situation unless an imshyprobably high degree of automaticity were also postulated-automaticity that is of the effect of watching a drummers activity on the observers own motor system Such automaticity would seem to imply the virus or drug notions of musics effects-medical metaphors that have been found unsatisfactory in the aesthetics literashyture Cochrane must be aware of this and thereshyfore embraces another highly speculative idea unconscious emotions (please see section 6 below)

4

Cochrane speculates further By resembling emotional activity music can hijack the mechshyanisms in the brain that are responsible for trackshying both our own emotions and the emotions of others As a result when we listen to music we seem to perceive emotion in the music14 There is actually very little reason for us to place trust in the use of we in the above quotation because imposing the we on the reader is hardly a legitishymate method of argumentation in an area alt theoshyretically contentious as this one--unless some empirical support can be recruited for the claim of unanimity of the reference population IS Far more importantly proposing the idea that music

can hijack the mechanisms in the brain again inshydicates Cochranes insistence on (cognitionshyexcluding) automaticity-implying a frequent absence of ones correct judgment about the true cause (another persons behavior versus the mushysic as the source) of ones own physiological fluctuations or about the nature of ones internal response (mere biologically insignificant physishyological fluctuations versus genuine emotions) or both

In other words Cochrane seems to assumeshyin normally functioning human adults (that is in people unaffected by drugs or misleading inshystructions from psychologists-experimenters)shyan implausible absence of appraisal introspecshytion and self-awareness as well as of the ability to make simple correct causal attributions 16 In contrast to Cochranes assumption I am conshyscious of my bodily sensations and their source(s) and of the temporal and causal relashytions between them and what is happening in my environment On a large proportion ofoccasions if I am so inclined I can report my emotions acshycurately (and there are objective laboratory means to measure my accuracy) I am also aware for example that a couple of minutes ago it was the sudden loud percussion in the piece to which I was listening that temporarily raised my heart and respiration rates via the brain-stem reflex And I did not need the interoceptive and proprioceptive information from my body and face to label the emotion of which the music I heard was expressive-I could readily do that by careful listening and analysis alone

In addition I would not on the occasion when the percussion raised my heart rate label my inshyternal state as one of say anger just because it happened to me in the past that my heart rate went up when I was rudely treated on the teleshyphone by a person at some customer serviceshyin part because on the latter occasion other difshyferentiating manifestations had occurred concurshyrently In sum it is patently clear that I can-most of the time-easily distinguish among cause-efshyfect sequences and correctly link causes to conseshyquences Intuitively music seems to be a very unshylikely stimulus to produce drastic causal misattributions

MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

329

Kirche bewiesen eine der Geistlichkeit (wie zu runer den Glauben an das

-Und diess Ergebniss il und Feinheit in der

iSI und Aufgabe ware mit auch zu Grabe getragen

tJ nicht erreichen nicht gturpassing beauty and reshy

If the church has always th of the church a temposhy

iesthood (as in the time of II with it a belief in the opshy

1Il beauty and refinement harmony between figure

o the grave when the relishyIcan nothing higher be atshybull ~ 60) Particularly from

Ii on he will refer to the e institute (cf FW 358)

ongerens conclusion that

be evolution of humanity Ifself-overcoming albeit Jreting Modem Culture

Herman Siemens for his ~lier draft of this essay

00 Gent Belgium

CONSTRAINTS ON MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

ACRITIQUE OF TOM COCHRANES ASSUMPTIONS

In a chapter that compared the respective roles of emotion and reason in art-music composers creative process I suggested that emotivism was the currently dominant position in the study of and talk about music l 1 defined it informally as a general proclivity for excessive insertion ofemoshytion and feeling into both scientific and lay acshycounts of mental life needs and motivation in daily behavior in matters artistic--especially musical-and non-artistic2 I begin this brief artishycle with a mention of emotivism because it is an insufficiently recognized backdrop for a number of contemporary debates in the philosophy of music Somewhat paradoxically it seems to be a cognitive stance taken by many philosophers and experimental psychologists of music one that reshytlects their (I would claim) unwarranted accepshytance of a quasi-ideological cultural context that has been characterized by many as deeply antishyintellectual3

The preceding comments are offered as an oblique introduction to my critical analysis of an important recent article that can be regarded as the epitome of one aspect of emotivism-the near-arbitrary blurring of boundaries of the hushyman emotional system in its interaction with the environment and more specifically the musical environment Having been published with high visibility in the lead position in an issue ofa preshymier journal of philosophical aesthetics unshydoubtedly contributed to the attention the article has received-as have its provocative assumpshytions about the nature of human emotions and their relationship to music expression music lisshytening and music production The character of the various assumptions and the manner in which they are combined-implying an almost comshypletely unconstrained plasticity of the human emotional life with regard to its manipUlation by music-turn my critique into a case study of a

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

Vladimir J Kone~ni

telling example of emotivism applied and in action

In the following critical observations I adshydress a variety of theoretical issues in relation to (the validity ot) assumptions made by Tom Cochrane in his article Expression and extended cognition4 My remarks are limited-as are Cochranes-to expression and experience of emotion (and do not refer to other affective states such as moods) Furthermore as is the case with Cochranes discussion mine is limited to music The latter decision on my part was necessitated by the specific or idiosyncratic features that the ideas of extended cognition acquire when apshyplied to the domain of music by Cochrane In short in this article I question the additional asshysumptions that Cochrane appears to have had to make in order to apply the notion of extended mind to music rather than the notions of exshytended cognition (or of active externalism) themsel ves 5

The critique is divided into nine brief sections all addressing Cochranes assumptions and in several instances generalizations One problem with the assumptions is the manner in which ideas from the philosophical as well as the bioshyand socio-psychological theories of emotion are treated Another concerns Cochranes interpretashytion and application of philosophical theories of music expression And the third is Cochranes rather uncritical reliance on an unconventional highly speculative neuroscientific account by Istvan Molnar-Szakacs and Katie Overy of the mirror-neuron system-applied by them to hushymans and to music-for the purpose of developshying with the additional aid from the concepts of empathy and contagion a view ofhuman emoshytions as an improbable system of essentially unconstrained plasticity and permeability by music

FALL 2012

327

I

1

328

The article concludes on a note of moderate encouragement Because the musician the inshystrument and the improvisedcomposed music are characteristically and interestingly intershytwined in jazz improvisation this may be the only fertile ground for extended cognition in mushysic the cost being however that any claims to generality are sharply curtailed There is also a parting shot at the narrative means by which exshycessive emotivism oversimplifies and distorts the issues of expression in music

To begin with Cochrane states I will assume that emotions are essentially constituted by patshyterns of bodily changes These patterns of bodily changes are registered in the brain which then generates the felt experience ofthe emotion6 An important question needs to be raised here How do bodily changes manage to occur (or more precisely to be instilled) before they are regisshytered in the brain To the extent that most human emotions with evolutionary significance arise in response to an external-often social-stimulus of some sort (or to a cognitive representation of such a stimulus) and that moreover the stimulus needs to be perceived and at least perfunctorily interpreted before any bodily changes can possishybly occur (on both physiological and logical grounds) it is obvious that a major (even if exshytremely rapid) cognitive step of interpretation and appraisal is missing from Cochranes acshycount-without his acknowledging or commentshying on the issue But this is in fact a problem of long standing for those non-cognitive theories of emotion in philosophy and psychology that conshytain the attribute of automaticity in the temporal sequence of components of emotion episodes There is a kinship between some of these posishytions and the one originally endorsed by William James7 Arguments advanced here regarding the necessary sequence of events in the generation of emotion are analogous to those that are used to support the Prototypical Emotion-Episode Model (PEEM)8

It is worth noting that in the quoted statement Cochrane seems to acknowledge both the imporshytance of subjective experience in emotion and the

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

role ofcognition in generating it I will show later that these acknowledgements contradict Cochranes main thesis

2

Cochrane continues I will assume a version of the resemblance theory of musical expression similar to that offered by Malcolm Budd This position is summarized by the slogan the music sounds the way emotion feels Most emotion theorists would probably agree that any slogan is likely to underestimate or misrepresent the complexities in the domain of the relationship between music and emotion In fact Cochrane himself-by writing elsewhere in the article I also accept many of the claims of resemblance between music and expressive behavior made by Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy--clearly testishyfies to the obvious limitations of the above-menshytioned slogan9 In effect in what seems to have been an afterthought another slogan the music sounds the way emotion looks was added to the already long list of Cochranes assumptions without being carefully assimilated into the argument

In any case to someone paying heed to parsishymony in theorizing it is unclear how Cochranes endorsement of the resemblance theory contribshyutes anything valuable to his thesis-beyond what Carroll Pratt Susanne Langer and Peter Kivy had previously hypothesized about the role of iconicity iconography and physiogshynomy of musical expression with regard to the feels and looks slogans 10

3

Cochrane proceeds in this manner A third assumption is that these resemblances are tracked by the same mechanism in the brain that registers bodily changes in emotions In support of this claim a connection has been made beshytween the perception of musical expression and the empathic simulation of the emotions of othshyers11 These statements are highly speculative In fact one finds them unwarranted after careshyfully examining the evidence and the argumentashytion for the alleged implications of the human

mirror-neuron s) tween music and e processes incIudi contagion) that i~ Molnar-Szakacs a (see his Note 3) scientific support

It is essential II controversial) cIa and Overy Acco nism implementC1 system a similar engaged by some ming as the motor singerdrummer ments of differenl ments of differem istic and implausj in and ofitselflog to predict ration~ duced by music probably high de postulated-auto watching a drum own motor s1sl seem to imply tIi musics effectsshybeen found unsat ture Cochrane n fore embraces ~ unconscious en below)

Cochrane spe emotional actiit anisms in the brI ing both our 01

others As a rest seem to perceive is actually very Ii the use of we imposing the w mate method of retically conten empirical suppo of unanimity of more important1

I

rlg it I will show later men ts contradict

~ill assume a version f musical expression ~alcolm Budd This he slogan the music els Most emotion ree that any slogan or misrepresent the

of the relationship n In fact Cochrane lere in the article I urns of resemblance e behavior made by Ciyy-clearly testishyIS of the above-menshywhat seems to have

r slogan the music Ics was added to the ranes assumptions ssimilated into the

gtaying heed to parsishylear how Cochranes ance theory contribshyhis thesis-beyond Langer and Peter esized about the role hy and physiogshyn with regard to the

is manner A third resemblances are ~sm in the brain that motions In support has been made beshy

iical expression and he emotions of othshyhighly specUlative

arran ted after careshy and the argumentashy11ions of the human

mirror-neuron system in the relationship beshytween music and emotion (implicating numerous processes including simulation empathy and contagion) that is presented in the article by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy in which Cochrane (see his Note 3) seeks conceptual and neuroshyscientific support 12

It is essential to keep in mind the main (itself controversial) claim made by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy According to the simulation mechashynism implemented by the human mirror neuron system a similar or equivalent motor network is engaged by someone listening to singingdrumshyming as the motor network engaged by the actual singerdrummer from the large-scale moveshyments of different notes to the tiny subtle moveshyments of different timbres13 This seems unrealshyistic and implausible Moreover the contention is in and ofitselflogically insufficient to enable one to predict rationally that emotion would be inshyduced by music in this situation unless an imshyprobably high degree of automaticity were also postulated-automaticity that is of the effect of watching a drummers activity on the observers own motor system Such automaticity would seem to imply the virus or drug notions of musics effects-medical metaphors that have been found unsatisfactory in the aesthetics literashyture Cochrane must be aware of this and thereshyfore embraces another highly speculative idea unconscious emotions (please see section 6 below)

4

Cochrane speculates further By resembling emotional activity music can hijack the mechshyanisms in the brain that are responsible for trackshying both our own emotions and the emotions of others As a result when we listen to music we seem to perceive emotion in the music14 There is actually very little reason for us to place trust in the use of we in the above quotation because imposing the we on the reader is hardly a legitishymate method of argumentation in an area alt theoshyretically contentious as this one--unless some empirical support can be recruited for the claim of unanimity of the reference population IS Far more importantly proposing the idea that music

can hijack the mechanisms in the brain again inshydicates Cochranes insistence on (cognitionshyexcluding) automaticity-implying a frequent absence of ones correct judgment about the true cause (another persons behavior versus the mushysic as the source) of ones own physiological fluctuations or about the nature of ones internal response (mere biologically insignificant physishyological fluctuations versus genuine emotions) or both

In other words Cochrane seems to assumeshyin normally functioning human adults (that is in people unaffected by drugs or misleading inshystructions from psychologists-experimenters)shyan implausible absence of appraisal introspecshytion and self-awareness as well as of the ability to make simple correct causal attributions 16 In contrast to Cochranes assumption I am conshyscious of my bodily sensations and their source(s) and of the temporal and causal relashytions between them and what is happening in my environment On a large proportion ofoccasions if I am so inclined I can report my emotions acshycurately (and there are objective laboratory means to measure my accuracy) I am also aware for example that a couple of minutes ago it was the sudden loud percussion in the piece to which I was listening that temporarily raised my heart and respiration rates via the brain-stem reflex And I did not need the interoceptive and proprioceptive information from my body and face to label the emotion of which the music I heard was expressive-I could readily do that by careful listening and analysis alone

In addition I would not on the occasion when the percussion raised my heart rate label my inshyternal state as one of say anger just because it happened to me in the past that my heart rate went up when I was rudely treated on the teleshyphone by a person at some customer serviceshyin part because on the latter occasion other difshyferentiating manifestations had occurred concurshyrently In sum it is patently clear that I can-most of the time-easily distinguish among cause-efshyfect sequences and correctly link causes to conseshyquences Intuitively music seems to be a very unshylikely stimulus to produce drastic causal misattributions

MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

329

I

1

328

The article concludes on a note of moderate encouragement Because the musician the inshystrument and the improvisedcomposed music are characteristically and interestingly intershytwined in jazz improvisation this may be the only fertile ground for extended cognition in mushysic the cost being however that any claims to generality are sharply curtailed There is also a parting shot at the narrative means by which exshycessive emotivism oversimplifies and distorts the issues of expression in music

To begin with Cochrane states I will assume that emotions are essentially constituted by patshyterns of bodily changes These patterns of bodily changes are registered in the brain which then generates the felt experience ofthe emotion6 An important question needs to be raised here How do bodily changes manage to occur (or more precisely to be instilled) before they are regisshytered in the brain To the extent that most human emotions with evolutionary significance arise in response to an external-often social-stimulus of some sort (or to a cognitive representation of such a stimulus) and that moreover the stimulus needs to be perceived and at least perfunctorily interpreted before any bodily changes can possishybly occur (on both physiological and logical grounds) it is obvious that a major (even if exshytremely rapid) cognitive step of interpretation and appraisal is missing from Cochranes acshycount-without his acknowledging or commentshying on the issue But this is in fact a problem of long standing for those non-cognitive theories of emotion in philosophy and psychology that conshytain the attribute of automaticity in the temporal sequence of components of emotion episodes There is a kinship between some of these posishytions and the one originally endorsed by William James7 Arguments advanced here regarding the necessary sequence of events in the generation of emotion are analogous to those that are used to support the Prototypical Emotion-Episode Model (PEEM)8

It is worth noting that in the quoted statement Cochrane seems to acknowledge both the imporshytance of subjective experience in emotion and the

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

role ofcognition in generating it I will show later that these acknowledgements contradict Cochranes main thesis

2

Cochrane continues I will assume a version of the resemblance theory of musical expression similar to that offered by Malcolm Budd This position is summarized by the slogan the music sounds the way emotion feels Most emotion theorists would probably agree that any slogan is likely to underestimate or misrepresent the complexities in the domain of the relationship between music and emotion In fact Cochrane himself-by writing elsewhere in the article I also accept many of the claims of resemblance between music and expressive behavior made by Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy--clearly testishyfies to the obvious limitations of the above-menshytioned slogan9 In effect in what seems to have been an afterthought another slogan the music sounds the way emotion looks was added to the already long list of Cochranes assumptions without being carefully assimilated into the argument

In any case to someone paying heed to parsishymony in theorizing it is unclear how Cochranes endorsement of the resemblance theory contribshyutes anything valuable to his thesis-beyond what Carroll Pratt Susanne Langer and Peter Kivy had previously hypothesized about the role of iconicity iconography and physiogshynomy of musical expression with regard to the feels and looks slogans 10

3

Cochrane proceeds in this manner A third assumption is that these resemblances are tracked by the same mechanism in the brain that registers bodily changes in emotions In support of this claim a connection has been made beshytween the perception of musical expression and the empathic simulation of the emotions of othshyers11 These statements are highly speculative In fact one finds them unwarranted after careshyfully examining the evidence and the argumentashytion for the alleged implications of the human

mirror-neuron s) tween music and e processes incIudi contagion) that i~ Molnar-Szakacs a (see his Note 3) scientific support

It is essential II controversial) cIa and Overy Acco nism implementC1 system a similar engaged by some ming as the motor singerdrummer ments of differenl ments of differem istic and implausj in and ofitselflog to predict ration~ duced by music probably high de postulated-auto watching a drum own motor s1sl seem to imply tIi musics effectsshybeen found unsat ture Cochrane n fore embraces ~ unconscious en below)

Cochrane spe emotional actiit anisms in the brI ing both our 01

others As a rest seem to perceive is actually very Ii the use of we imposing the w mate method of retically conten empirical suppo of unanimity of more important1

I

rlg it I will show later men ts contradict

~ill assume a version f musical expression ~alcolm Budd This he slogan the music els Most emotion ree that any slogan or misrepresent the

of the relationship n In fact Cochrane lere in the article I urns of resemblance e behavior made by Ciyy-clearly testishyIS of the above-menshywhat seems to have

r slogan the music Ics was added to the ranes assumptions ssimilated into the

gtaying heed to parsishylear how Cochranes ance theory contribshyhis thesis-beyond Langer and Peter esized about the role hy and physiogshyn with regard to the

is manner A third resemblances are ~sm in the brain that motions In support has been made beshy

iical expression and he emotions of othshyhighly specUlative

arran ted after careshy and the argumentashy11ions of the human

mirror-neuron system in the relationship beshytween music and emotion (implicating numerous processes including simulation empathy and contagion) that is presented in the article by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy in which Cochrane (see his Note 3) seeks conceptual and neuroshyscientific support 12

It is essential to keep in mind the main (itself controversial) claim made by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy According to the simulation mechashynism implemented by the human mirror neuron system a similar or equivalent motor network is engaged by someone listening to singingdrumshyming as the motor network engaged by the actual singerdrummer from the large-scale moveshyments of different notes to the tiny subtle moveshyments of different timbres13 This seems unrealshyistic and implausible Moreover the contention is in and ofitselflogically insufficient to enable one to predict rationally that emotion would be inshyduced by music in this situation unless an imshyprobably high degree of automaticity were also postulated-automaticity that is of the effect of watching a drummers activity on the observers own motor system Such automaticity would seem to imply the virus or drug notions of musics effects-medical metaphors that have been found unsatisfactory in the aesthetics literashyture Cochrane must be aware of this and thereshyfore embraces another highly speculative idea unconscious emotions (please see section 6 below)

4

Cochrane speculates further By resembling emotional activity music can hijack the mechshyanisms in the brain that are responsible for trackshying both our own emotions and the emotions of others As a result when we listen to music we seem to perceive emotion in the music14 There is actually very little reason for us to place trust in the use of we in the above quotation because imposing the we on the reader is hardly a legitishymate method of argumentation in an area alt theoshyretically contentious as this one--unless some empirical support can be recruited for the claim of unanimity of the reference population IS Far more importantly proposing the idea that music

can hijack the mechanisms in the brain again inshydicates Cochranes insistence on (cognitionshyexcluding) automaticity-implying a frequent absence of ones correct judgment about the true cause (another persons behavior versus the mushysic as the source) of ones own physiological fluctuations or about the nature of ones internal response (mere biologically insignificant physishyological fluctuations versus genuine emotions) or both

In other words Cochrane seems to assumeshyin normally functioning human adults (that is in people unaffected by drugs or misleading inshystructions from psychologists-experimenters)shyan implausible absence of appraisal introspecshytion and self-awareness as well as of the ability to make simple correct causal attributions 16 In contrast to Cochranes assumption I am conshyscious of my bodily sensations and their source(s) and of the temporal and causal relashytions between them and what is happening in my environment On a large proportion ofoccasions if I am so inclined I can report my emotions acshycurately (and there are objective laboratory means to measure my accuracy) I am also aware for example that a couple of minutes ago it was the sudden loud percussion in the piece to which I was listening that temporarily raised my heart and respiration rates via the brain-stem reflex And I did not need the interoceptive and proprioceptive information from my body and face to label the emotion of which the music I heard was expressive-I could readily do that by careful listening and analysis alone

In addition I would not on the occasion when the percussion raised my heart rate label my inshyternal state as one of say anger just because it happened to me in the past that my heart rate went up when I was rudely treated on the teleshyphone by a person at some customer serviceshyin part because on the latter occasion other difshyferentiating manifestations had occurred concurshyrently In sum it is patently clear that I can-most of the time-easily distinguish among cause-efshyfect sequences and correctly link causes to conseshyquences Intuitively music seems to be a very unshylikely stimulus to produce drastic causal misattributions

MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

329

I

rlg it I will show later men ts contradict

~ill assume a version f musical expression ~alcolm Budd This he slogan the music els Most emotion ree that any slogan or misrepresent the

of the relationship n In fact Cochrane lere in the article I urns of resemblance e behavior made by Ciyy-clearly testishyIS of the above-menshywhat seems to have

r slogan the music Ics was added to the ranes assumptions ssimilated into the

gtaying heed to parsishylear how Cochranes ance theory contribshyhis thesis-beyond Langer and Peter esized about the role hy and physiogshyn with regard to the

is manner A third resemblances are ~sm in the brain that motions In support has been made beshy

iical expression and he emotions of othshyhighly specUlative

arran ted after careshy and the argumentashy11ions of the human

mirror-neuron system in the relationship beshytween music and emotion (implicating numerous processes including simulation empathy and contagion) that is presented in the article by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy in which Cochrane (see his Note 3) seeks conceptual and neuroshyscientific support 12

It is essential to keep in mind the main (itself controversial) claim made by Molnar-Szakacs and Overy According to the simulation mechashynism implemented by the human mirror neuron system a similar or equivalent motor network is engaged by someone listening to singingdrumshyming as the motor network engaged by the actual singerdrummer from the large-scale moveshyments of different notes to the tiny subtle moveshyments of different timbres13 This seems unrealshyistic and implausible Moreover the contention is in and ofitselflogically insufficient to enable one to predict rationally that emotion would be inshyduced by music in this situation unless an imshyprobably high degree of automaticity were also postulated-automaticity that is of the effect of watching a drummers activity on the observers own motor system Such automaticity would seem to imply the virus or drug notions of musics effects-medical metaphors that have been found unsatisfactory in the aesthetics literashyture Cochrane must be aware of this and thereshyfore embraces another highly speculative idea unconscious emotions (please see section 6 below)

4

Cochrane speculates further By resembling emotional activity music can hijack the mechshyanisms in the brain that are responsible for trackshying both our own emotions and the emotions of others As a result when we listen to music we seem to perceive emotion in the music14 There is actually very little reason for us to place trust in the use of we in the above quotation because imposing the we on the reader is hardly a legitishymate method of argumentation in an area alt theoshyretically contentious as this one--unless some empirical support can be recruited for the claim of unanimity of the reference population IS Far more importantly proposing the idea that music

can hijack the mechanisms in the brain again inshydicates Cochranes insistence on (cognitionshyexcluding) automaticity-implying a frequent absence of ones correct judgment about the true cause (another persons behavior versus the mushysic as the source) of ones own physiological fluctuations or about the nature of ones internal response (mere biologically insignificant physishyological fluctuations versus genuine emotions) or both

In other words Cochrane seems to assumeshyin normally functioning human adults (that is in people unaffected by drugs or misleading inshystructions from psychologists-experimenters)shyan implausible absence of appraisal introspecshytion and self-awareness as well as of the ability to make simple correct causal attributions 16 In contrast to Cochranes assumption I am conshyscious of my bodily sensations and their source(s) and of the temporal and causal relashytions between them and what is happening in my environment On a large proportion ofoccasions if I am so inclined I can report my emotions acshycurately (and there are objective laboratory means to measure my accuracy) I am also aware for example that a couple of minutes ago it was the sudden loud percussion in the piece to which I was listening that temporarily raised my heart and respiration rates via the brain-stem reflex And I did not need the interoceptive and proprioceptive information from my body and face to label the emotion of which the music I heard was expressive-I could readily do that by careful listening and analysis alone

In addition I would not on the occasion when the percussion raised my heart rate label my inshyternal state as one of say anger just because it happened to me in the past that my heart rate went up when I was rudely treated on the teleshyphone by a person at some customer serviceshyin part because on the latter occasion other difshyferentiating manifestations had occurred concurshyrently In sum it is patently clear that I can-most of the time-easily distinguish among cause-efshyfect sequences and correctly link causes to conseshyquences Intuitively music seems to be a very unshylikely stimulus to produce drastic causal misattributions

MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

329

5

330

But Cochrane continues [My] large assumpshytions allow us to argue that music can potenshytially play the same role as bodily changes in realshyizing the musicians emotional state and that the physical constitution of some mental states exshytends beyond the brain of the subject -the latter being according to Cochrane the main argument that follows from the theory of extended cognishytion 17 As I mentioned in the introduction a crishytique of extended cognition deserves a separate article which would include a detailed analysis of the implications of the two just-quoted stateshyments However all I have space for here is to reshyquest that the reader apply the criticisms that have been presented so far in this article to the above two statements of Cochranes-the conshytroversial gist of which I take to be the following (1) The music itself with its expressive features becomes the performers emotional state byshypassing his or her bodily changes-provided that the performer fully controls all details of the mushysic and (2) The performers emotion can find its way beyond the brain (and presumably conshysciousness) of that person and leak into his or her performance on a musical instrument notashybly during jazz improvisation Cochrane states the latter contention thus Playing the music cognitively extends the musicians emotion18

In brief Cochranes various claims taken toshygether would involve multiple improbable misattributions (or a misattribution feedback loop) via the empathic or contagion-prone capashybility of the mirror-neuron system all of which is so speculative that Cochrane must find refuge in a relatively tiny harbor of music-jazz improvishysation Moreover it is important to note that the early rather fanciful assertions regarding human empathy and contagion in the mirror-neuron litshyerature-on which Cochranes claims are largely based-have in the meantime been forced by emshypirical work into a more realistic and circumshyscribed account Household-object metaphors of mirror and sponge have been gradually disshyposed of and the view that has emerged recogshynizes that people cognitively evaluate the status (in all the ramitications of this term) of the stim-

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

ulus person and engage in a complex causal (attributional) analysis in the process of experishyencing or not experiencing empathy with that person19 A more reserved attitude toward the possibility of contagious influence of musics expressive features has also begun to emerge20

6

Cochrane states Note that I [do not] idenshytify the emotion with the conscious experience of the emotion21 In contradiction to the view that he explicitly expressed in the quotation in Secshytion I above Cochrane here ignores the process of appraisal and the key significance of emoshytional experience-which includes conscious acshycess to numerous distinguishing features of the felt emotion instead he seems yet again to enshydorse automaticity which is a necessary composhynent of the Molnar-Szakacs and Overy hypotheshysis For these reasons Cochrane is essentially forced to subscribe to the (small-) minority view of the possibility of unconscious emotions (citshying Jesse Prinz and Peter Goldie as his sources) which excludes appraisal and emotion-Iabelshying-the latter being a process that relies on the cognitive operations of monitoring ones internal physiological symptoms integrating them and interpreting them22

7

In the opening paragraph of his article on p 329 and in the first sentence under the heading The Musicians Emotion on p 330 Cochrane implicates composers in the narrative In light of the present discussion it might appear that this represents additional overreaching because Cochranes hypotheses laconic and opaquely worded as they sometimes are nevertheless genshyerally seem restricted to situations removed from the music composing process After all the probshylem of the role of emotions in music composition is highly complex and multifaceted23 On the other hand it is indeed the case that Cochrane is concerned with jazz improvisation and that to classify improvisation as a form of composition is generally considered justifiable Therefore since the relationship among the musician his or

her instrument and tt (or composed) is I

may be a reasonable ( the development of music

Cochranes thesis most music perform were to accept as COl

Szakacs and Overy (

formers-while ind~ listeners to other perf tral and jazz setting execute either some their eo-performers ~

bers of a string qUari same thing that the oLl without a temporal quired by Cochrane and physiological gn

9 Conclll

Perhaps Cochrane extent the special cas even in this case it 1

one were to accept tJ unconscious emotior vite other concepti Cochranes is only ( counts of how emoti provisation-which tions presented here musical activity 1

theoretical attention Cochranes positil

blurring of boundari

I Vladimir J KOfletn The Role of Life-E Musical Imaginar

tives 011 Crearili~ David J Hargrea- mond A R MacD 2012) Note that m only tangentially I

in a complex causal the process of experishyIg empathy with that d attitude toward the influence of musics

0 begun to emerge20

that I [do not] idenshy)nscious experience of iction to the view that the quotation in Secshy

re ignores the process significance of emoshy

includes conscious acshylishing features of the eems yet again to enshyis a necessary composhys and Overy hypotheshyxhrane is essentially small-) minority view lscious emotions (citshyJoldie as his sources)

and emotion-Iabelshyxess that relies on the nitoring ones internal integrating them and

~ph of his article on nce under the heading on p 330 Cochrane Ie narrative In light of might appear that this erreaching because aconic and opaquely are nevertheless genshyuations removed from ~ss After all the probshyin music composition

lUltifaceted23 On the case that Cochrane is

ovisation and that to I form of composition ustifiable Therefore 19 the musician his or

her instrument and the music that is improvised (or composed) is rather unique in jazz this may be a reasonable or indeed the only place for the development of extended mind ideas in music

8 Cochranes thesis would not be applicable to

most music performers because even if one were to accept as correet the claim by MolnarshySzakacs and Overy (see Section 3 above) pershyformers-while indeed also being in the role of listeners to other performers in chamber orchesshytral and jazz settings-are usually required to execute either something quite different than their co-performers are (for example as memshybers of a string quartet) or to do for a time the same thing that the others are doing but (usually) without a temporal lag-whereas a lag is reshyquired by Cochranes hypothesis on perceptual and physiological grounds

9 Concluding Remarks

Perhaps Cochranes view does fit to a certain extent the special case of jazz improvisation but even in this case it would be applicable only if one were to accept the (small-minority) view of unconscious emotions this would however inshyvite other conceptual problems Moreover Cochranes is only one of several possible acshycounts of how emotion may be involved in imshyprovisation-which is apart from the reservashytions presented here an undoubtedly fascinating musical activity well worth research and theoretical attention

Cochranes position involves a near-arbitrary blurring of boundaries of the human emotional

system in its interaction with the musical envishyronment In this view there are virtually no conshystraints on the manipulations of emotions by mushysic (at least in some musical activities) suggesting a view of human emotions as an imshyprobably plastie and permeable system These conjectures borrow neuroscientific claims of dushybious reliability generally deny the role ofcognishytion in human emotional life (instead invoking emotion-processing automaticity and unconshyscious emotions) and exploit to an excessive deshygree the concepts of empathy and contagion However the numerous assumptions necessary to develop Cochranes implausible position do not bear close scrutiny welL This is not surprising because to put it bluntly human emotions are a serious evolutionary business not a plaything There are constraints on the extent to which these metabolically costly states with enormous mental-health and behavioral consequences can be manipulated by listening to music or by producing it

For a concluding example of a conceptualizashytion influenced by emotivism I quote Cochrane once more The artist clarifies and develops his emotional state by expressing it24 To this posishytion that treats the creative process as an exercise in emoting-while significantly neglecting to specify how the emotional state arose in the mushysician or visual artist in the first place and to disshycuss the possible emergence of a feedback loop between the fluctuations of the artists emotional states and the developing artwork-one can conshytrast the view that great music like all great art exists at a necessary distance from its creator and that a calm contemplative analytical mastery is cruciaL

NOTES

1 Vladimir J Kone~ni Composers Creative Process tivist dichotomy described by musical formalists The Role of Life-Events Emotion and Reason in especially Peter Kivy Musical Imaginations MlIllidisciplinary Perspecshy 2 In opposition to the attitude of cmotivism 1 docushytives on Creativity Perfonnance and Perception ed mented in the same chapter on the basis of many difshyDavid J Hargreaves Dorothy E Miell and Rayshy ferent sources the paramount importance of art-mushymond A R MacDonald (Oxford University Press sic composers contemplation analytical and 2012) Note that my use of the term emotivism is technical skills and problem-solving-in short reashyonly tangentially related to the emotivist-cognishy son

MANIPULATIONS OF EMOTIONS BY MUSIC

331

332

3 A semi-popular but closely reasoned overview of anti-intellectualism in the socio-cultural status of music is provided in Joseph Bollum The Soundtracking of America The Atlantic Magazine 285 (2000) 56-70

4 Tom Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognishylion The Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (2008) 329-40

5 Andy Clark and David Chalmers The Extended Mind Analysis 58 (1998) 7-19

6 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition 329

7 William James What Is an EmotionT Mind 9 (1884) 188-205

8 Vladimir J Kone1ni Does Music Induce Emotion A Theoretical and Methodological Analysis Psyshychology of Aesthetics Creativity alld the Arts 2 (2008) 115-129 see Figure 1 1I7

9 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition Note 2 339 italics added

O Carroll C Pratt The Meaning of Music A Study ill Psychological Aesthetics (New York McGraw-Hill 1931)203 Susanne K Langer Philosophy in a New Key A Study in the Symbolism ofReason Rite and Art (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1942)244-245 Peter Kivy The Corded Shell Reshyflections on Musical Expression (Princeton Princeshyton University Press 1980) chapters V and VI

12 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition 329

12 Istvan Molnar-Szakacs and Katie Overy Music and Mirror Neurons From Motion to Emotion Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience I (2006) 235-41 This is an overview that includes challenge-able leaps of inference which are based on an over-interpretation of correlational brain-imaging data as well as a highly selective reading of the empirical music-emotion literature With regard to empathy (and sympathy) the dominant view in philosophy (and also in this case in contemporary psychology) has been succinctly presented by Alessandro Giovannelli In Sympathy With Narrative Characshyters Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

67 (2009) 83-95 see 83-84 Cf Kone~ni Does Music Induce Emotion 116

13 Molnar-Szakacs and Overy Music and Mirror Neushyrons 236

14 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition 329 (italics in the original)

15 This listener for one does not perceive emotion as being located in the music and believes that he has not done so since about the age of seven when he conducted imaginary orchestras in front of a large mirror and faux-emoted in tandem with emotional music However although he has ever since been fully cognizant of musics status as a non-sentient being he is aware that many pieces of music (includshying absolute music) are expressive of various emoshytions Cf Vladimir J Kone1ni A Skeptical Position on Musical Emotions and an Alternative Proposal Behavioral mul Brain Sciences 31 (2008) 582-84 and also Peter Kivy Mood and Music Some Reshyflections for Noel Carroll Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (2006) 271-81

16 See Kivy Mood and Music and also Vladimir J Konetni Amber Brown and Rebekah A Wanic Comparative Effects of Music and Recalled Life-Events on Emotional State Psychology ()f Music 36 (2008) 289-308

17 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition 329

18 Ibid 19 For a non-technical overview see Eric Jaffe Mirror

Neurons How We Reflect on Behavior Association for Psychological Science Observer 20 (2007) 20-25

20 Konetni A Skeptical Position on Musical Emoshytions

21 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition 330

22 See for example Konetni Does Music Induce Emotion 117-118 and Koneini Brown and Wanic Comparative Effects of Music

23 For example see Sections 93-95 in Kone~ni Composers Creative Process

24 Cochrane Expression and Extended Cognition 329

Department of Psychology University of California San Diego La Jolla California 92093

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

--~-~ -~~~-----------~~-----

BIOLOG

In Fear and Tn the pseudonymou ages drawn from ages of generatiol ment and familia wife and parent-d that Silentio uses tI lustrate the life 0 Preface by equa logical lifetime H in detail beginninl the Exordium a marriage and pare process of biologi adult parallels the spiritual childh~ the parallelism be life to present his c individual and tmiddot account which he his age generally

Silentios critiG surroundings inn) conception of the Hegel the church dividual as pan ot an individual the within the contex1 in history and so c amemnon sacrific Troy VVe theret Iphigenia by refer to Agamemnons which makes him needs The entity vidual resides is tI individual is sima self Agamemnol1 its end the polis I

himsele This lint the conclusion th being any conten

PHILOSOPHY