T8 B2 FAA NY Center Martin Fournier Fdr- Handwritten Notes

8/14/2019 T8 B2 FAA NY Center Martin Fournier Fdr- Handwritten Notes

1/13


2/13


3/13

^ C

n

C0 d.vw


4/13

-tilt U C H J & S U ^

C9A>- -

AT

_


5/13

-U40$

cDvuc Jk-\fl ^-_ -C> J tcrv xvwjuu j

ctA"w_.-60 jCOUu_5 tfjiAjJL*

C J

X V>jy^VsXex^s OO i


6/13

UAL_

J1

Lkj O" 3.7

U A=fO=>* vO


7/13

*no

on

ArsvA

cv\-V-o

$V*


8/13

X


9/13

[Classification]MEM ORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation A dministration (FAA) New York Air Route CenterType of event: InterviewDate: Tuesday, September , 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FAA New Yo rk Air Route Center, Rokonkom o, New YorkParticipants - Non -Comm ission: Alfred , FAA G eneral ConsulParticipants - Comm ission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.Marty Fourn ier QA support specialist802011 accident package experience preparation.Currently op sup area c ZNY for almost a year assigned position in November 2002.Prior to that was one of the Q&A support specialist. Several duties main focus to insurequality of air traffic at facility. Minim um requirements maintained provided briefings tospecific ai r craft functions. Air craft accidents pilot error, preparing incident file an dpackage. Held that position at ZNY January 1999. Used to ATC and last four years thereas tm specialist at O akland center since 1986. First with FAA June 24, 1986.9/11 serving as Q&A support specialist. Office on second floor at the training wingadjacent to Q&A, east side of building. No access to radar scopes there. Jobresponsibilities vividly remembers in tape room investigating a pilot incident. Listeningto voice tapes. Terry K irk (?) office assistant told him Kevin Delaney wanted him to goan d watch CNN since an aircraft had hit the towers. Un der impre ssion it was a smallaircraft. Not sure what wording was. Started watching CNN live in cafeteria. Startedfilling up. More people down there than norma l. Showing building that had already beenhit. Wa tching second aircraft go behind. It looked fake fo r some reason. Speed of aircraft5 or 600 mph - they just don't fly that fast under 10k. Had hand held phone with him andin comm unication with boss De laney. Called down to conference room an d realized therewas a serious problem. U ntil second hit still thought 1st was a small airplane. Don't havelive data upstairs.


10/13

At time saw second impa ct live still believed first impact small aircraft. Heard thatdirectly from terry Kurk (?) she said C NN, some aircraft. News wasn' t sure what it was.Just speculation. Things started rolling.After second impact Kevin at air traffic managers conference room. Knew first mode asQ&A specialist w as to start pulling tapes. People being pu lled off area b. trying to gatherinformation. Many of those people just wanted to leave. W ent down to conf room and atelcon w as ongoing. Open microphone with maybe com mand center maybe headquarters.Reports of possible missing airplanes, doesn' t know where that information came from.Definitely mike McC ormack and K evin Delaney down there.Just assisting where could. Grounding airplanes but reports of planes missing.Area b gathering. Paul Thumser, supervisor. CIC on duty at time though not sure w ho.Paul was concerned for there well being. Approached him to find out what happened.What they knew. Jim B r, ATC area b. several, with concurrence from unionpresident, got old ops manager room to talk to them to find out what happened. Bob Ott.Possibly one of the support man agers, mark Depalm a. George Tracy (QA). Mark M erced,controller area b. D ave B itinglia. Anthony Paulmiera. Nam es in support package. EvannaDow is. Christopher tucker. Lorraine Barret. List in "BOX", accident file.Lear ned: tried to put them at ease best as could. Difficult situation. They were repeatingthe event. Went through the process. Advised that personal statements would be required.Don ' t reme mber if everyone in that room did provide statement. W ould be people w hotalked to aircraft or were operationally involved, "worked the airplane".AA11 - learned first of, not sure without looking at package. Conversation from huntress,OMIC. Don ' t know w hich sector was called first, could be area b. don' t know whopicked up call. Knows there was a call from Boston to area b but not sure if that was firstwithout looking at timeline.Situational awareness regarding A A 11 impact: knows coordination Boston to New York.Know s huntress and OMIC. K nows call sign A A 11 came up. Knows B oston saidbelieved possible.. . .hijack or not knows . . . .but informed of lost beacon and primar ytarget only. Thought maybe still at f l 290. Tape may indicate they aren't aware if that'shim or not. Know area b asked U A L 175 to id AA1 1 on type and altitude. Didn't confirmwhether or not Am erican. Didn ' t seem to be 100% as it crossed the bou ndary .After second impact and leave c afeteria any discussion on what type of aircraft createdimpact 1? Not know n spec ifically. D iscussion to decide what it was? Can't remember.After second impact discussion on what type of aircraft hit south tower? Peoplerecounted what saw on scope and filling in wholes. Thing reme mbe r Jim Bouliber sayinghe observed second going down and concluding probably heading towards Manhattanan d as it was descending. Know mem ory that people identified U A L 175 as impact 2.


11/13

Pentagon hit: doesn't remember . UA93: knows they were looking for a "missing" Delta.W as mention of aircraft missing or off course. Nothing specific in memory on ua93.Aftermath of second crash uncertainty over which aircraft had impacted north or southtowers? Don' t again remember. Only remembers his investigation.After investigation conclusion on awareness of impacts (which aircraft hi t which)?Looking a from of mind of ATCs working aircraft. Desire at ZN Y to distinguish oneairplane from another?Telcon was with nationwide facilities and mo nitoring to insure that they were remainingon course etc. but spec ifically with AA11 and U AL 175 right after not sure whendetermined they specifically were gone. Effort to figure out what aircraft hit towers?UAL 175 had code change but w as on course. E xtreme am ount of attention on AA11.Upsets the system. Doesn' t know all the other distractions in the areas as trying to w orkother traffic. Problem with code changing, target went to coast, Dave Bittiglia realizedU AL 175 had strange course. Some question of whether or not it might have beenUAL 175 headed far off course. Are steps to verify planes that have headed off course.AA11 did learn after that Boston called to coordinate with ZNY. Told them primarytarget only and f!290. Doesn' t know if ATC or OM IC known yet. W ent into mode of whowas at f!290. Assumption that it was American 11. Not on frequen cy, etc.Doesn't remem ber comm unication with company. But thinks there was since companywas going to call ZNY with information. Effort to see if airborne, crash or on ground?AA11 - ju s t doesn't know what exact steps taken. Doesn't recall if there was an effort tofind out what happened. Who responsible for finding out about AA11? Not sure. Not sureif it 's a requirement. Determined/confirmed that company missing aircraft quickly. Butdoesn't know what steps made to validate that.Efforts to determine what happened to UAL 175? Doesn' t remember.Efforts to determine what hit the towers? Coordination between TMU unit and at leastNewark tower. That discussion of aircraft and problem s. Believes call signs stated. Inconjunction with those conversations the second aircraft hit building.After seeing second aircraft live. W as safe to assume com mercial aircraft - probably not.Just considered a large target. Agrees that when second plane co uld say definitely a fastmoving commercial jet. Replied in slow motion. Once figured commercial jet, an d tradecenter in ZNY - would have been normal procedure to figure that out.Stepping back even further from picture. In history of hijacks there are set procedures.100% of air traffic workers would say a hijack is not a terrorist suicide mission. 8000 inair right now. Very vigila nt watching for that. But two years of hindsight. Problem with911 was Boston center having a possible problem A A 11, think this is him - planted seedof uncertainty. ATCs NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE MISTAKES. UAL 175 heard


12/13

questionable communications of "everyone remain seated" from ground, or fromdeparture - with hijacks you clear airspace and "let them do whatever they want - blockhis way from everyone else." never heard of such a scenario. Easter airlines was always ahijack target. W orked a hijack out there.Any hijack exercises? R eceived brie fings and refresher training - requirements andprocedures with handling hijack and what to do if they need to be intercepted. Did anintercept out west years ago. Procedures in place prior to 911. It's in the books. It givesthe procedures. In the event of hijack military fighter intercepts on a different frequency.Never would have expected 911 events.W as there a reluctance to think that it was a commercial aircraft that hit towers. Did thatunderstanding of hijacks have an effect on the mental processes on accepting that it wascommercial aircraft that impacted W TC . Certainly.Don' t think there's anything that can be done from A TC pe rspective to stop an aircraftfrom hitting som ething. In my opinion, doesn't think things could have been handleddifferently even if awareness w as different. Higher aw areness today, but doesn't know ifanything could be done.Prior to 91 1 an off course aircraft is always going to get special attention. People did allthey could and gave attention because of being drastically off course. Traditionallyhijacked aircraft land.At some point is was accepted that it was UAL175 and A A 1 1 by common sense.Conversations with companies etc.In conference room with area b controllers. W ere they trying to figure it out? Yeahprobably. Not sure. Wh en the aircraft veers of course certain procedures followed. N otknowing what a target w as going to do. V ery leery of trusting what's not known. Go w ithbest information at time. And make judgm ents based off that. W hen not talking toairplane in different mode. Altitude was questionable. Prim ary only, going off last knownaltitude.Where to go after reports of WTC hits for best information? OMIC.Recommendations:Vault cockpit. Make it impenetrable. F A M trips - vault it up even b efore 911. 99.9% ofpilots territorial about cockpit. Thin door up to 911. Common sense. Familiarization triptraining tool for ATCs to observe flight control from pilot end.OMIC -1 didn't go to OMIC person - went to OMIC area to track down call signs ofsuspected p roblem aircrafts. Everyone in mode of ascertaining what w as going on.


13/13

Controller in charge (CIC) can't consul an employee. Terms are interchangeable. Eitherca n be in charge of area. It's labor relations law . Area supervisor is official supervisoran d is excluded from bargaining unit. Every supervisor takes two week course.U A L 175 and code change. W hen aircraft on assigned beacon code correlated - won't se ecode. When not in sync. Will see four digit code, and tag w ill stop tracking. Visua llyknow when aircraft not on right code. If got one airplane in comm unication will pick upquicker than multiple planes. What is seen is another code. But shouldn't see a separatetarget. Depe nds on altitude. Dep ends on filters selected. Times w hen have "bad mod e c" -beacon may broadcast wrong altitude.If shuts of transponder: aircraft above 18k everybody required to have one, so when altfilters limits set do not press primary only. In case of generic aircraft at flight level thatshut off transponder would not detect anything.If beacon code changes in same environment - computer would not recognize associateddata tag with that aircraft the beacon would continue but the data tag itself would go into(CST) coast mode. Limited data block would change and beacon code that was originalcontinues it comes up in a different code, but coast m ode c ontinue to track with limiteddata clock th e says alt. Data tag associated with target, when it changes, data tag stops inspot where no longer picks up tag but actually beacon continues - - net result is oneunknown w ith two different pieces of data. S till associated w ith proper aircraft,immediately ask why code change. Steps would be taken by controller of attempting toreestablish and verify contact. Would call U A L 175 "reset transponder squawk "-couldn't do that part with UA L 175.Full Data block gives aircraft call sign, alt, varies-gives c om puter id, airspeed, whetheraircraft in hand off status- after beacon changes, freezes in coast mode -airspeed willchange to coast mode. W hen loose mode c info looses alt.

T8 B2 FAA NY Center Martin Fournier Fdr- Handwritten Notes

Documents

Transcript of T8 B2 FAA NY Center Martin Fournier Fdr- Handwritten Notes