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Prepared by: Kate BrentzelDate: 2/12/02Job Code: 320087

C D 1 1 |ndex.Typebundle ndexhereDOC Library: Type library name here

DOC Number: Type document number hereSpecial Visa CasesObserved During FieldWork in CanadaRecord of AnalysisAnalysis TopicSource

GAO observed embassy and consulate staff as they processed several visaapplicants with security concernsGAO observations in the U.S. embassy in Ottawa and the consulate inMontreal

Analysis/Summary

9/11 Closed by Statute

"Omid"This visa case occurred on Friday, January 25,three days before theG A Oteam arrived at the embassy in Ottawa, Leslie Gerson, the Consul Generalin Ottawa, gave us details of the case.Ms. Gerson said that some intelligence source had discovered through useof a wiretap that! I

I \She surmised that Omid had probably applied for a visain Toronto. Ms. Gerson ran Omid's name through a CLASS namecheck butdid not get any hits on him. She then had Aurelio Camera, an FSN whoworks on anti-fraud cases, call Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)to get Omid's passport number. Officials at CIC said that they were veryinterested in Omid because ofsecurity concerns.Mr. Carriera thencontacted the INS attache' at the embassy and discovered that INS had putOmid through secondary inspection and found information on him in IBIS,INS'automated lookout database.Once Mr. Carrierahad Omid'spassport number,he checked the CLASSsystem again, inserting the passport number along with the name "Omid."This time he got several hits and discovered that Omid's name wasactually "Omeda." He also discovered that the U.S. embassy in Ankara haddenied Omid a visa and that he was refused in Toronto as a "22 lg"(refusals under Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Naturalization A ctare made when the applicant does not have a specific document requiredto process the visa). Ms.Gerson said that the old-fashioned visa windowsat the Toronto consulate are too small to hold computer screens and thatthe officer performing the CLASS namecheck on Omid back at his deskmay not have associated the CLASS hits with the applicant. Fortunately,Omid was denied a visa anywaybut as a 221gcase, not as a potentialterrorist.

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. Preparedby:Kate BrentzelDate: 2/12/02Job Code: 3200879/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive Index:TypeDOC Library: Type

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Importance of GoingBeyond the CLASSSystem

9/11 Personal Privacy

Coordination

The exampleof Omi

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-Prepared by: Kate BrentzelDate: 2/12/02Job Code: 3200879/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

9/11 Personal Privacy

Index: TypeDOC Library: TypeDOC Number: Typei possible terrorist links. After the imam returned to the embassy, Juliej Stinehart, one of the consular officers, interviewed him. She spoke with\ m f o r a t least ten minutes, as she was told to stall himuntil the RCMP

I could arrive to talk to him. Ms. Stinehart determined that the imam's! application was not fraudulent because he was still employedat his| mosque; the letter sent to the embassy hadbeen sent maliciously.

1 Despite the fact that M s. Stinehart planned to renew the imam's visa, shei had to put a 20-day hold on his application and send in a request for ani SAO to headquarters. Moreover, that very same day Statehad sent a

i classified cable to Ottawa stating that a 30-day security requirementwould be required of applicants from|.'scase]

\/

In the imam's i[necessitated a oU-oay clearance ana a visaCondor (see classified cable 02State 15702 for more detail on thisadditional SAO requirement and the visa condor).Ms. Stinehart informed the imam that he could not get his visa until 30days had passed. As Ms.Gerson had cancelled his last visa and removedthe 1-94 from his passport, he technically could not re-enter the UnitedStates. As he left the embassy, the Canadian police met and questionedhim. We later learned that the police did not have any negativeinformation on him. Mr.Camera told us that the "00" hit in CLASS was foranother! land not for the imam.TheRCMP dropped theimam off at a local mosque in Ottawa.TheEgyptianWhile most of the consular staff was involved with the imamon themorning of January 29, one of the foreign service national (FSN) staffmembers was pre-screening anEgyptian walk-in applicant. Since he hadnot scheduled an appointment, there was no way for him to know aboutthe required 20-daywaiting period. He was told about the 20-daywaitingperiod and told that he could not enter the U.S. until this time had passed.Apparently he ended up going to the same local mosque as the imam had.(Does anyone have more details on the Egyptian?!)The Tunisians inMontrealPrior to the GAO team's arrival in Montreal, the FBI identifiedsix Al-Queda members on a video inwhich they discuss their intention tobecome martyrs in the holy war against the U.S.The FBIclaimed that twoof these men had Canadian citizenship and were living in Montreal.Onewas the Tunisian-born Al Rauf bin al Habibbin Yousef akTiddi. BernadetteAllen, the Consular Section Chief in Montreal, ran a CLASS namecheck onAl Jiddi using the subject's name, country of birth (COB), and anestimated date of birth (1965). Despite having these three piecesofinformation, she did not get a CLASS hit on AlJiddi. She then re-enteredAl Jiddi's name with XXX as the COB and XXX as nationality and she got a"00" hit. Ms.Allen sent a VisaViper to headquarters on AlJiddi, noting that

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- Prepared by: Kate BrentzelDate: 2/12/02Job Code: 320087

CLASS Failure

Index: TypeDOC Library: TypeDOC Number: Typethe CLASS failure to produce a hit during her first entry "raises concern,as under normal circumstances, post enters names for CLASS checksunder the known COB and known nationality in lieu of XXX for those datafields" [source: cable Montreal 0096].In this visa viper, Ms. Allen also noted that the same Montreal news articlethat mentioned Al Jiddi also includedAhmad Said A l Khadar and RamziBinalshibh as possible terrorists or sympathizers from Tunisia. M s.Allenran CLASS checks on both of these names and did not get a hit. [auditor'snote: the failure of Ms. Allen to get CLASS hits on these Tunisians is,important, especially in the case of Ramzi Binalshibh, who was supposedto have been the twentieth hyacker for September 11].In light of the video with A lJiddi, the Canadians appeared to becomesensitive to the issue of Tunisians in Canada who had overstayed theirvisas. According to an article in the Montreal Gazette, the Royal CanadianMounted Police issued arrest warrants for 20 Tunisians who disappearedafter entering Canada on a student exchange program in the summer of2000. The article claims that the Canadian government "covered up" thisincident until a former Canadian immigrationofficer blew the whistle.A sthis story unfolded while the GA O team was in Ottawa, Ms. Gerson told usthat this former immigration officer ha d also contacted the consulate inMontreal to express his concerns over the Tunisian students. In the Montreal Gazettearticle, the whistle blower is stated as saving thatCanadian immigration allowedthe Tunisians to enter the country despite"ample evidence that they intended to stay in Canada illegally" [source:"'Student Visitors' Sought" in the Montreal Gazette, Feb. 2].

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