T5 B63 IG Materials 3 of 3 Fdr- Dec 02 Discussion Draft- Review of Non Immigrant Visa Issuance...

8/14/2019 T5 B63 IG Materials 3 of 3 Fdr- Dec 02 Discussion Draft- Review of Non Immigrant Visa Issuance Policy and Proced

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DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive but UnclassifiedReview of Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance Policy and Procedures

Memorandum Report No. 02 - XXXXDecember 2002

IntroductionThe Of fice of the Inspector General (DIG) reviewed U i e procedures and processesinvolved in ths issuance of nonimmigrant visas (NTVs) at U.S. missions worldwide at therequest of Senator Charles Grassley. The objectives of the review w are to determinewrx :her: 1 ) visa policies adequately satisfy ihu requirements of national security, 2)procedures in place, particularly concerning t h e ? waiver of peroonal appearances and rh*

invx Ivemcm of dive) agencies in the process, are appropriate. 3) consular ofSccra and staffare iroperly trained to adjud icate visa ap plications to maintain national security, utid 4 .1resc urccs are adequate T O meet the demands of visa processing.

This study was co.ndiicl.erl prior tn the passage of the Homeland Security Act ';how ever, the recomm endation! were made taking the^ct into consideration an d with the;liif that they are consistent with its provisions.

k g round and Sum m ary : Visa Processing, a Svstem Currently Inadequate to the

The events of September 11, 2001, Aotably changed our perspective on the admissionof ; liens to the Uniied Suuea. Li i-etrospeet., the previous emphasis on immigraLiun left theU n ted States vulnerable to the threat of aliens intent not on rema ining in the country 15irru liin-iinis;. but in harming American citizens and institutions. The NTV issuance process asit a::isted before September 11 was inadequate to jneei that threat. Since September 11 stepshave been token to address this problemlthough existing policies find resources remaininadequate. This report addresses several elements of this issue including policy, staffing,secure workspace, and training. A classified annex addresses findings concerning th e VisasV i j r e r Program established in 1993 to identify potential terrorists an d make t h i r n a m e savai lable in chc Consular L ooko ut and Support System (CLASS).


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DISCUSSION D RAF fSensitive b ut U nclassified

Pressures to increase immigration to the United States have gro^-n in periods of economicprosp cnty in our country and hardship iliroad. The "pull" factor of American prosperity andthe ";ju.sh" factor* of economic hardship and political and social unrest abroad have focusedr.oDjjessional aeiion and Department policy on immigration. A s a result of this emphasis,stating, training, an d procedures were nil directed at deteiwining whether visa applicantsW C T : "intending immigrants." Other considerations, including identifying potential terrorist,raidvsd less attention. TheDepartment's major security consideration was the safer/ of theem t assies and consulates and their employees rather lhan wiih I l i fc visa process. To that end,effo us were made lo reduc e the num ber of visitors to consular sections.

Th e immigration and Nationality A ct (INA). as amended" considers all aliensup p ying fo r a nonimmigrant visa perm itting entry to the U nited States to be intendingimmigrants , unless they can prove otherwise to the officer adjudicating the NTV application.Tht burden ol 'proofis on the applicant, and a finding that the applicant ha s nu i m f c i theburlen und^r section 214b4 is the basic and most frequent reason T o r an NTV denial. TheIN.'!. also contains a list of specific categories of applicants who arc automatically ineligible,inclading convicted felons and terrorists. Th e prim ary tool a vailable lo th e aUjudiesiinjseojiiul_a/ officer in preventing N IV issuance to these categories of applicants is CL A SS.

9/11 Closed by Statute

All applicants for A NIV are required by law and'reguTaUon (DMA sec. 222 , 22 Qr'K.'.02 :9FAM4U01 N3 and 9 FAM 41.102 N2/3)Tb appear for a personal]cr, the LN A provides for a waiver of this personal appeiirance rRqvircme^t-rf'it is Jdf.?.:ned T O be in the national interest. The rapidly U K leasing volume ofjpplications v^beginning in. the 1970s, coupled with crioiis staffing, led to policy-decisions that encouragedconsular officers to waive personal appearances far ever larûrômbers of NIV -applicants.passage of visa waiver legislation ft! some cDuatrii.? u#i$& automation of the M T Vpic ;ss5 in th a 199Us made the visa process more secure, but significantly m i ne t ime-consuming due to more requited steps in the process. This increased pressures nn visit

ssc.ion* to "work smarter" and seek any efficiencies possible ia the NTV process.All of these changes occurred in an environment that sought to m aximize Iftgitimatst ravel to *h United States, w hile identifying illegal immigrants and preventing them &omira\. Indeed, in 1998 the GeneralAccounting Office was asked to study the ttiusca of/is:i delays at posts around the world îth an eye towards speeding up the N IV process

(Tourist Visas Processing Backlogs Persist a t U.S . Consulates T.eltcr Report , 0 3 / 1 3 / 9 S ,Despite the firsi ailack on Ibe World Trade Center,

'P;it>. L No X2-H4. js amended (1952); 8 U-S.C. 1101.* S IJ.S.C. 1 1 2 4 ( 2 0 0 2 ) .5 1 .t;i ui' Vi s a v.'r.ivcr Couiim'es: Andorra. AusTia.îwtrAiy, BaljiunJ, Bmni, Denmark, Jrinlanci, France,y, Tcelind, Irclafld. Italy. Jipan. LiwhiccsteuarruTeiDbours, M onaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand.. Poncsal. Sa n M arino, Smjapo;1*, Sluv*uia, Spaia. Sweden, Su-iteerland, Umtcd Tiicgdom, ondUruguay.


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DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive but Unclassifiedsec nity W C T C perceived as problemsprimarily for U.S. missions abroad where large numbersof \ appiiCiinis queuing in Jiyul uf the chancery were perceived as a. threat. llipJouiaucsec'.iriiy officers continued to work with consular officers to limit and control access touo um l a r sections.

Also adding to the complexity of managing N 1V operations worldwide are th e vastdisi: M I lies amon^ the over 200 visa-issuing posls. The majority of N T V s are issued ai ahandful of posts, including Mexico Cityand Seoul, staffed hy dozens of officers and directedby i cntor consular officers. Many more posts issue a few thousand NIVs annually and arestaffed by a few officers of lesser rank and experience. Some missions issue even fewerNTVs and also experience a low demand for other consular services. These posts are usuallystaffed by one officer, who may perform consular operations in conjunction with othermw s i on responsibilities.

As NTV' demand grow steadily from the 1970s through the 1990s, consular managers,encouraged hy Washington, have addressed th e lack of officers with a variety of approaches,oftnQ referred to under the term "customer service." The-se approaches have included"in:;rview by exception" and a variety of other means of limiting the number of applicantsaci .ally visiting consular sections. At the same time, the Bureau or Consular Affairs (CA)spent millions of dollars on modem computer-based processing equipment designed toimprove the security of the system. Although providing tools that, properly used,siglifitcinllv enhanced the: security of U je U.S. visa aud the adjtJclication process, rlmiedevelopments have slowed the process and required more hurnan resources. Visa sections\ ( & \ " ; ha d ro m ak e hard decisions about how to allocate their limited rcsouj'ces to manage thewoflcload.


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DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive but Unclassified

p igu r i 3: g / n n i viAppMest 'anj; Issuances, n a Wtt i ing ,rueaimar* laso-iaxtii-c


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DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive but Unclassif iedDepartment of State BureausBureau of Consular AffairsExecut ive OfficeV i s a OfficeBureau of Intelligence and ResearchBureau of Human ResfturccsForeign Service .InstituteOth s tCentral Intelligence AgencyFederal Bureau of InvestigationImmigration and Naturalization ServiceNational Security AgencyD rug EaforccrrieuiL.S. Customs ServiceGeneral Accounting OfficeU . S . Secretf v f a j o r contributors to this report were C harles A nderson (issue area manager), RobriM u ;tain (project manager), and inspectors, Douglas Elliee, Norbort Kriejj, Joe T.ihnste in ,K..n: Lutz . John Pinker, Marlene Schw artz, and M ichele Truirt. T he portion of this reportwiih th e Visas Viper Program is classified.

P o l i c y Is sy. /a i v R r ^ pf Parsorial Appearance

Each visa issuing post establishes its own policy and conditions for a waiver ofcer.onul appearance. Policies differ wi dely based on local co nditions and the perceived riski. f Irani! or security threat. At some posts T h e policy is not clearly articulated and widedifferences exists in ho*' restrictive or expansive individual policies are. (.'.A and thei cgional bureaus have not evaluated or approved these policies in the past. Tn general, postsH-ith lo w refusal raies and a lower incidence of fraud in the context of 2M b have had the;no;;t libe ral waivers of personal appearance. Posts with, higher incidence oi'Iravirf usually:'sq;iirii i . r i U i r v i c v . ' s of a much hichei percentage of applicants. After September .1 1 most of:H c posts visited as part of ihis survey told the inspectors thai they had sharply restrictedivai vers of personal appearance and now interview virtuaUy all appHcanls. Othr postsspscinlly Jiigh volume posts, contiuue to interview a lower percentage of applicants put havenevertheless significantly increased i . h t s percentage of intavfews. A lmost all posts reponedsonie wa iv ers of personal appearance, especially for the lowest risk categories of foreigndip omats an d U .S. government-sponsored travelers.


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DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive but Imclnssified

Personal appearance waiver programs utilize a variety of tools that have beento minagr workload and reduce the security threat to overseas missions.Applications ar c accepted by mail in many countries. In others, applications ar c submit tedt l i rn i ih a drop box, ii courier agency, or a travel agency. At a few posts app lications a r irec- :ivcd from airlines, banks, O T other companies approved by posts. Government ministr iesan t agencies have also been allowed to submit applications directly. Although Ihc waiver ofihe personal appearanc* requ i rement s viewed by the applicant as a . benefit, th e variousprograms serve l o limit crowds an d allow fo r efficient scheduling of applicants who arerequired to appear. On e consular manager noted, "I walva th e personal appearance wheneveri l c-;r.elits yu r visa operation, not to accommodate th e applicant, regardless of percept ions."Th;5 w as said in the context of th e officer just having waived the personal appcaiaiicc o .f aniui 'ii ' i iationally V u o w n entertainer whose appearance wo uld e&'ia inly have disrupted normaloperat ions.

As consulates were closed i n many countries and communicat ions were improv ed , thel umbe r of visa- issuing posts was reduc ed. Ac NIV operations v v e r e consolidated, th epressu re to waive personal appearances incre el imi ta t ions on t h e N!V interview, even with better t ra ining fo r the interview ers and more t imef o r ' .hurouali quest ioning, there is no guarantee thai terrorists will be I d e i u i f i e r J . Th em , t f r v ' i w is no l a subsritule fo r good intelligence information avai lable to visa adjudicatorsth rough CLASS. /-&+ *.A/rtatt er halaTice is needed btJrvieen interviews, waivers of personal appearance, anddoc 'ancnt review and analysis Th e interview iyi fundamental information collect ion tool thaioUen improves th e consular officer 's a b i l i t y to/wsess an appliciail's credibility.'. It enables thevisa a d j u d i c a t o r to look behind pat or evasivc/answers on an application form and it addsir.ic.jrity to the adjudication process. Information can be verified and applicants held

personal ly responsible fo r their statements. ' Waivers u f personal appearance gre somet imesb u r m i K i be carefu l ly managedj9/11 Closed by Statute

" A r^feml is 3 r t commCDdar ioD by ilic cbief of auo tb c r section o/ihe miisior. that ihe cnn.ular q e L - r i o n issueAN I V w i t h u u l au i n i u rv i cw . This procers, intended in part as nwnagenwat control t o p r o v i d e a cvu n n t a b i l i ^ , is& d in


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Recommeudation 1: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, O f fi c e of Visa Services, shoulddewlor) and fmplemem ii polky requiring each mission w create a personal appearancewar'cr program that is based on local conditions and approved by the chief of mission.Projiam requirements should be in writing and available to the entire mission. Bachproj yarn s h o u l d he reviewed and approved by t"c O ffice of Visa Services anJ th e irs^i >nal bpt&it^ Anvchanges should be submitted for review and approval pnor to b&ng

: CA/VO)

/Tra- - e l A g e n c y Referral Program/ Travel agents have played a role in thevisa process since at Jeasi theearly 1.9\0s.

Son.A posrs find that agencies are helpful in collecting applications from clients and 'J-^==-~^ sob;nirt ing them for NIV processing. In countries where NJVs or e not ofr.cn r e qui r e d , sv.

. / " 1 i hclc explain th e process to applicants. Travel agents often provide a first revje-.v an d r -nsure^/Vv* Vir" / Ti::it ct f " U n n biuiic r e qui r e m e nts are metbefore applications arc- sent to the visa section. These.-N-tr / i n c l u d e a valid passpoii an d a coin,[.'l*d application. Improved technology fesulr^d in someappiovcd travel cjent?perfonni.ng initial data entry, taking the burden of that task fromco m ular scaiuu employees. Having the applications in ha/)d also allows jjosis io prescrceti

thcjii and schedule necessary interviews, while specifying any additional inforniatioii ord o c u m e n t a t i o n required. Travel ajencics have proved to be useful at a limited number ofpos:;. Tn>: majority of visa issuing posts, however, have found travel agents eitheru ni V tcr csr cd m the ex tra work or unreliable. A t present travel agent referral programs exist at3S j.-osts Uiai arc listed in Aypuidix C.

There arc wide variations in how travel agency referral programs (TARPs) areusr, ' . ' jlished ajid arimiru'stertd. There are no standard criteriaand no guidance to recru i t an ds c J c ^ . - t crave! agent?. Training varies from e.slensivc to almost nonexistent. Some posts meet

k ' i t h txavel agents to review regulations an d discuss problems. Others rely onte lephone contacts. Sonic posts tgudyct validation studies ro identiri' the sou rcesof kid eiiies, including those from travel agents. Others had never done so, and CA guidanceoj i conducting ^-alidatioi) studies is not widely known or followed' Some posts haveremoved travel age/Us from the program, while others have not. Some posts include their1 ' A K P in the Chief of Mission a n n u a l certification and risk assessment review.* Others don o t . E>;ix-pi where all applications were channeled through travel agents, mere is uo evidencet h a : travel i'.iis were: being used to submit visa applications fov terrorist suspects. VTicrcera"-:! agents had been dropped lirom a program, or pro-ams stopped entirely,, th e problemsofl;:i related to illegal immigration cases.

All applications submitted through travel agents must be processed through th eC L A S S n a m e check system and adjudicated by an officer. In most cases these applications,ire f .u hjscwd io th e same scru t iny as a! ) other appJicarionS- However, there ar e incidences

7 T i u ; guicLuiie ii contained in 93 Stale 046225aad svailable oa the CA/fPP' 2 - AM 022.5. IE compliance with the Federal M anagers' financial Integrity A ct (31 U.S. C. 35 12 ) , requiresd u Y f ; of mission is rtpori y e a r l y on die atui ofmanajcment coawols aad financial systems.


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D I S C U S S I O N D R A F TSensitive but Unclassified

w h e r e , m lâst in the past, applications ^rtJrm ttcd thio^î travel agents were n o t r e v i e w e d ,rigorously as those from o t h e r iource/R e c o m m e n d a t i o n 2: The DepaTUQGin should create a m odel travel a g e n t referral pr ogr amthat iieludes r e g u l a r r eviaw ofparticipating navel agencies and .regiilsu- v a l i d a t i o n studies.Th e D e p a r t m e n t should thctf scnd this m o d e l to all visa issuing posts requiring each toest.vlish its own written travel agency referral pr ogr am policy consistent with lotajconoiiions an d send a copy of the resulting policy, and any subsequent m o d i f i c a t i o n s . 10 ih eO f f i c e of Visa S e r v i c e s / p r i o r to im plem entation^ (Action: CA/VO, in coordination w i t hr e g i o n a l b u r e a u s . ) ^^CA O v e r & i g h r and P^rocetlural Gu i d an c e

C A has a l low ed posts to develop their ow n procedures and. to some degree, policiesco n :=rning ih e visa processj as long as they were consistent w ilh law and reg ulations. Postsar e f squired to use approved forms ar

bee: uneven, and, as local conditionsw i t h o u t nolii* to am i approval from

d to clear post-spe cific form s with CA. In recentCA d e v e l o p e d standardized signage J 3r consular sections.-, an d the Bureau of OverseasB u i l d i n g O pers i inn); dftvdoperi standards fo r interviewing booths. H o w e v e r , o v e r s i g h t liascha nge and olticers rotate, posts often m a k e changesWashin gton . CA frequently learns of these c h a n g e sonly w h e n pr oblems develop. S ome of these pr ocedur es are w e l l conceived and could beadopted elsewhere, but there is no central clearing procedure. At least three systems ofcradling Visas Cyndw clearances'1 have been developed by posts w i th h i g h n u m b e r s ofclecirance cases to track, but none was in general use and none had been subm itted toVVa:hini4ion. O th i-r posts that hove no t developed a system arc struggling to keep track ofthe;;': casss.

Va rious posts a r c initiating new m ethods of handling visa applications and applicantsto s i m p l i f y th e process and free up m o r e staff lime fix critical, security related functions.O nu post no longer uses officers to reinterview Section 221(g) cases that h^ve been, but sim ply has a F o r e i g n S ervice national (FSN) determine that d o c u m e n t ssubt.iiued are adequat* to m e e t the requirem ents for issuance. AooTlier is ccsnrracting with acollier 5cr- ' icc, avoiding the need fo r visa applicants to collect their passports and i m m i g r a n tv i s ; i ;i i in e iii'insular section. A third puî is coiiiracikig out the N T V 7 r em ote data en tr yfun: lion to it s appoin tm en t system contractor to pr eclude th e n*


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DISCUSSION DRA>TSensitive bu t U nclassifiednoi . : f f cc i ivdv coordinated or integrated into the visa systems technology. CA's Off i ce of"Frai'.i Prevention Programs similarly lacks ful l integration into ihe visa process. The resultsof fi lu d investigations are not systematically collated or stored in ihe Coneular Consol idatedDjit: ibitse that could be l inked with other information on pertinent applicants. Visa officerscom n ue lo vvork with link, information or training when examining app l i cant s ' documen ts orrii'vi;wing their travel history. T he current database is incomplete and no t linked to otherus tJ 'u l domestic databases. Posts that process large volumes unem ploymen t related visas arcnot l inked with U.S. databases thai could b e used to verify financial and credit da t a or jobhisi.ry.


Recommenda t ion 3 : The Bureau of Consular Affairs, O f f i c e of Visa Services shouldd tv ; lop standard operating procedures^ covering all aspects of die visa application, processappropriate to different sue missions. Evciy visa-issuing post should be required to proposew j i i V O T , posr-spftdfic modifications lo these standard opera U n ig procedures and submit themfor T s v j e w an d approval by CA'VU. Changes in the procedures should b* e u b T n . i n v i n ' toC.VVO f o r approval prior to implementation. (Action: CA/VO)In the months after September 11, CA has struggled to rev ise or establish policies and

pro:edures lo iuklress the new awarenessof the threat of potential terrorists. This e f f o r t hasincji:ded n e v v clearance procedures and clunge.? in extsiing procediues. Previously, fore x a m p l e , jnost vVashingion clearances had an established time period, 20 or 30 days, afterwhich, if no dero^iory inforniatlonwas received at post, a visa could be issued. Thisprorcdure has been tightened@how^equire an affirmative clearance from Washington- An c v , - clearance procedure, "V isas C ondor." was required for certain aliens from a classitiedlist n .f countries. These insIruclious have been modified several limes, and some wc r i x - iisucdand remain in classified cables. Officers in die field have 6 t r v > g g J e d to apply these regulations1:01 -;cr]y and J c e e p currrat w i t h clianges as they appear. Tc^v consular sections are approvedto i'.ere classified infonnation. As a result, (hesf.i; e most effective if one database check wcic used and thai be made as comprehensivea r - ])?ssible. I fCLA SS conta inedan up-tQadatc list of known or^Juspfiaed terrorists it wouldprcr-i'de the best defense against terroris"obtaining a visa.Re.commendation 4: The D epartment should review the o/earance procedures is in :s September 11 and determine which clearance requirements are providin g improved


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sec jrity. Such a . review should, inter ajia, address Ihe development of a single databasechs ; lr for all v i . s u . application? After this review, clearance procedures should be revised an dnc v instructions issued- (Action: D/HS, ID coord hiatioo with CA/YO)Keommendf l t iou 5: Al l NTV processing instructions should be issued in unclassified fomiso that they can be readily available in the visa section of every post. If it is inipossiblf: iodeclassify all the itiiUijciions, the Department should create classified storage areas in eachconsular section to allow for storage o f material classified up to the secret level. (Action:OJJO in coordination with DS)

Executive Oversightsrfto and atv supcivlsed by theam i isssador and DCM, collectively referred to , L S the executive office. The IpCM is tliarevj ?wjng officer for all junior officer efficianc f rcpons. Consular manager!are directlysupervised by the DC M and reviewed by the ambassador. Altho ugh by la\ aii officer cannotbe crdcrcd to issue- a NIV, the executive office oVrhc mission etui influence individual cassoverall visa policy. Othev sections ot'ilie mission often appeal to the executive office fo rissuance of certain visis - for example, the commercial section may appeal fo r favorablefor Travelers seeking to visit the Unilw,Stat as pan of a trade mission.local iigures often appeal directly to the rt Jautivp affiee fo r rcconsicltration of th e

th e

vs:anil

I D 4CCM.1

refusal of a relative or friend. General NlV p i M i c y can also be influenced when the-assador believes refusal rales are loo highoor personal appearance policies a r f t loo strict.A. tl>cicsccive-&S:tcc o f t e n has a . more direct role to play i n NTV

All visa, refusa ls vwd a percentage of issuances must be reviewed by an officer1:rn/isor. In a large section, this review is performed by the senior, an d experienced,.iular manager.!


JRecentinstmctions (2002 State 111 136 and 2002 State 147564) provided guidelines forpoj is with only one consular officer on how oversight of th* visa function should bepcrlyrmctl The problem of executive office i n f l u e n c e over t l n> adjudmaiion of visas iscoc-mon in missions with s m a l . 1 consular sections.Re rorn me nda tioii 6: The Department regulations requiring Ui* review of all NIV refusalsanc. a percentage of NIV issuances shnuld set forth procedures fo r doing so at posts where th eextcui ivc office is directly responsible fo r such reviews. Procedures should also be put intoeffi: :t when tlie deputy chief of missio.a or aziibassiidyi is not trained to perform an adequatercvi iw . (Action: CA/VO, in coordioatiOD with HR)

The NI\ ref*n-al system is designed io facilitate the issuance of visas to those foreignnationals whose travel is deemed to be clearly in U. S. government's interest. It is a formal.


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DISCUSSION D R A F TSensitive but Unclassifiedp o l i c y and procedure (described in Appendix K of Vo l ume 9 o f the Foreign Affa irs) -.vhoie purpose is to record mission requests to expedite certain NlVs. Whenp ro j w f l y adminis tered, i t is a useful method to facilitate visa i ssuance in cases that in v o lv e

U . S . go ver nment interests o r promote U.S. p u b l i c diplomacy efforts. Class "A" referralsf i r o r r . o t h er embas s y sect ions and agencies almost invariably lead th e visa off icer to waive ih epersonal appearance, because the applicant is personallyk nown to the. referring officer whoclair . iSythdr p r o p o s e d t ravel wil l promote U.S . nat ional interests. The benef ic iar ies can also ,and ir e l ikely to, be excused f rom a nc*' security advisory opinion requirement (VisasCo/ i ' lor ) mid are also likely to be exempted from th e ne w Depar tment o f J us l i ce "Na t i o na lf inny E xH R egist ra t ion S ystem" (NSEERS)."/

individuals wha o therwise w ould not have mmMed f o r an NT V h ave somet imesm is us e d t h e refer ra l system.!

9/11 Closed by Statute \W iti , aga; ist a Drug Enforcement Adminis t ra t ion employee in A f r i ca , arid a. Department o,. , . .^ Corumerce employee in Mex i co . / L s t-J *- .-1

The Depar tment has attempted to address th e problem ofjmprepef-iwssion i n f l u e n c eon \. officer* by issuing clearer policies o n N T V referrals intended to pu t responsibility fo rCli z "A " referrals with th e referring agency head or scchoivthief (7.002 S t A t f t 096111).T he ;e inst ruct ions have helped clari fy referral system pol icy and niakejtw o r id , ida.': Addi t ional improvements need to li e implemented (rcsp onsibil iry- and a c c ou n t a b i lit)' to r these requests ou tc s th e actual refcrrcrs. M.-my r t fen 'a l scire icrually initiated and prom oted by FSNs in the rraamng o t f t c e r ' s s e c t ion or a^t- icy. T hei n t l i v j O i i a l FS N i s no t men t i o ned o n th e referral forp&JMily ihe (American) section chieft r a n s m i t t i n g ih; form. Signature responsibi l i ty fo r sypminin?, th e Class "A" form ciuicrntly isl i m i t e d o n l y to sec t ion /agency heads. {Although die chief o f inlsr- ion is ul i i rnalc ly responsiblefo r enforcing th* referral system and ensuring that i idjudicating off icers are free 10 f o l l o wthei . - judgment in al l N T V ' cases, chiefs of mission m a y also submit Class "A " referrals.) Thercitf Tin.si officers fo r Class " A " N T V referrals do not specif ical ly spell out their accountabi l i tyon t n e form. K n . r ex am p le , a certification could read as fol low s: "I cert ify that , to t ic best o fm y uiou- iedge . this alien does tot pose a threat to the safety or n a t i o n a l s ecu r i ty o f ths U . S . "'On! a chief of mission should he authorized 10 w a i v e Class "A " referral beneficiaries fromr h s v i s a s Condor secur i ty c learance requirements.

R ec o m m e n d a t i o n 7 ; T he Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office o f Visa Seivicesi s h o u l di\irt ier strengthen th e MV refeaa! system by adding an acco un t ab i l i t y cer t i f icar io t i to Class"A * referral forms. If a Foreign Service nat ional is recommending a Class "A" referral to his. ?ec i io n c h i e f , that Foreign Service nat iona l ' s nam e should be included on rhe form. (Actiou:CAVO)

X s \* ^*j< * v > {414 ^jT u C'i 'nsi i iar ofn:*r: rriaia th e ducrcuoa 10 requir* personal appoarauce snct n am e checl in al l cases:VT . ''* SI. .K 0961.'. of M a y IS , 2 U 0 1 . ''Ncv/Guidauor oji Visa Referral Systems." sts ih e s tanclards for rcfcnnls i'or'' \) L ill niLsioa '.kmcms and defines executive responsibility. .


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12/16/0:: J O : 04 202 647 7660 O I G / F U

,1DISCUSSJON DRAFT v fSens i t ive butUnclassified V " 1 \ v\

X-m m e n d a t i o n 8: The Departm ent should requi re that only up on the specific \vritten \nof th e chilion ihe Visas Cond or clearance 'requi rement . (Action: C A ) ^Consular sect ions , responsible for the visa function and providing services lo t - ^ j , - ^Am er ican c i t i z ens abroad , are s t a f f e d by consular cony 13 officers and by j un io r off icer s fromall i ones w ho Traditioaally serve at least one year in a/consular position during their first f o u ryea - s in the Fo reign Serv ice. Tllis "rite of passage" for most officers an t i c ipa t ing careers int h e . i d i n i m s t r a n i v c ; , economic , publ i c n f f n i r s , of poli t ical conca is of ten considered a per iod tob e . v i t l i C A). . , _ .. _ .

C < nels ihe D e p a r t m e n t tf.rm forlgenera l i se o f f i c e r ' s f u n c t i o n a l specialty, Tbfi i 'e are five:c. p o l i r i c a l . economic, andp u b l i c

1: 22U.S.C. 3949 f200').

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1210131 2 / 1 B . - 0 2 :.0:0l ;02 6 4 7 7 6 C O O I C / F O I g j O U

DISCUSSION DRAFTSensit ive but Unclassified

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n 10: The B ureau of Humsm Resources should utilize all alternate stiffingpioj. iams tha t are available, including Wring languugtf-HualiJlcd employes on limited nou-carssr appointments , to staiT consular sections. (Action; HR)C on sula r positions typically areclassified using criteria that emphasizeworkloadstatistics an d superv isory responsibilities. B efore .September 11, position classification didnot jocus primarily on the political ramifications, complexity, or scope of decisions tha tcon:; aim y flVers w^re required to make. Virtually all one officer consular sections weregraced as j u n io r officer positions, even though, incumbent*; had to respond to and makedecisions on the g amut of consular respons ibilities.Two-of f ice r consular sections are typically supervised by an FS-03 tenured consularoffv;:r. Jun io r o fficws, as noted above, often fill positions at this level because there arcmar y m o r e FS-03 positions available iliau officers at grade- to fill them. For some officers,the*:: arc their first assignm ents in th e Foreign Service. T he D epartm ent ha s at tempted to

militate this problem byassigning seasoned officers asregional consular officers ^ho can- ; e and me n to r their more junior colleagues. Som e regional officers supervise their ownsections along with their mentor ing responsibilities; others hava no post specific?Li j rnments . Regional officers are assigned up to 15 posts. They have no supervisoryres; oneibiht ies for these post.1? and arc l imited to advising the consular officers and posi

. They visit posts as best they can, often less than once a year.In the smallest sections, the designated consu lar officer tradit ionally is nsr,ignd many

por ."ulios. Nonconsular rcsponsibih'ties often are givwi precedenceover consular duties an dd t l i M d from th e officer 's responsibilily to be current on regulations, procedures, an ds, part icularly in today 's security conscious post-September 1 1 environment.

11: TU e Bureau of Human Resources, in conjunction with th e Bureau ofCoi .sular Attairs , should review al l consular positiori-5 to detennine appropriate positionclas sifi tai ions 2nd grade in light o f ne w complexities in consular work, security concerns,ant i ierronst in i t ia t ives . (Act ion: HR , in coordina t ion wi th C A / V O )

12: Tlic Department should establish procedu res lo ensure that onlyofficer* who h.we completed at leiisl one consular assignmein'are assigned to a one-personconsular section. (Ac t ion : H'R in coordination with C A )Re.i 'om me ndf tf ion 13: The D epartm Jt should iwsess an d reallocate consular workloads\voj Id wide, and. where missions do not have sufficient consular work to justify,.* f u l l rimeco n s u l i i r pos i t ion , t r > the extern possible, the work should be performed regionally. A nydut . e s that mu s t be performed in country should be assigned to a tenured officer. ( A c t i o n :

, i coordination with HR )R ei o m m en d n r i o n 14: The Department should conduct a worldwide review to determinewh -.re reg ional consular positions, vested with supervisory responsibilities and mandated tov i $ ; i each post quarterly, are appropriate and create the appropriate positions. (Action: C.\,1 0 oordin:uion with H R )


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RESOURCESThe review found that data concerning the number of consular officers assigned toad j jdicate requests for NTV is nut readily available. The present assignment processprcj ier ly assigns consular officers to consular posilions. not to functions within tht positions.It f jrther assigns consular cone ofllccrs to other, noncorcsular positions and does not calculateth e ;:ime spent by nonconsularjunior officers doing consular work or officers on rotational

assi/jnmenis. Given all the variable, it is not possible to estimate staff hours devoled to NIVprocessing within the rime paiod of this review. Theresource assumptions made throughoutih i > report arebased nil the collective experience of the leaijo members.Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in conjunction with the HR, shouldsun ly the ut i l i zat ion nf staff hours assigned to the various consular functions lo create abasoliiie for the number of hours needftd to perform the consular work. (Action: CA, inc o o ' d i n a t i o u with HR)

Workspace ProblemsMany consular sections have inadequateworkspace. Access i.s sometimes poorly

controlled and often difficult due to security concerns. Interview-- windows arc frequentlytc ta l ly inartequatfi with little or no privacy an d arrangements that male* speakinsj or hearingalmost impossible. Many booths are outdated and do not have space fo r terminals that woulda. low the officer to do name checks or make online cose notes. Line of sight for supervision

not avail.-i.bk, even in recently renovatedsections.

The Balanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 200215 requires thai, "allconsular officers responsible fo r adjudicating visa applications, before undertaking topcronu consular responsibilities, receive specialized training in the effective screening ofvisa applicants who pose a jifitential threat to the safely or security of the United States. SucKofncs rs sha l l be specially and extensively trained in the identification of aliens in^Jmi^ible

section 212(aJ(3) (A) tuid (D ) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. interagency andional inlclli^ence shar.it.ig regarding terrorist and terrorism, aud cultural sensitivii.vvisa applicants."Visa adjudicators sawu be nblc tn interview applicants in their native language andbefaniiliar with local culture a& A conditions, but theyare often sent to post without languagetraining or area studies. The/Department intentionally restricts language training for first-

;\nO second-tour officers, because it is reluctant tu invest much time and money in anur.;b. L . N o. 107-173(2002).

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>/12'-lli'02 10:05 S202 647 7 6 6 0 C U C i / l - U

DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive but Unclassifiedof f ice r /ho ni i^h t nol make the Foreign Service a ca ree r . In a d d i t i o n , t raining it :hard " languages is necessarily leugthy, requiring up to two years Q long t ime fo r acandidate t iviny to establish profess ional com petence an d gain t e n u i f .

T he Department considers a speaking and reading level of 3 on a 5-point scale (S -3 / 'A -3 ) lo be a pro fcssiwial competency. Average students reach lu 3/3 l eve l after fuur o rf ive m o n t h s o f concent ra t ed full- time training, if they are learning one o f the "easy"languages sucb as French o r Spanish. T o reach Ihc same level in a "hard" language, such asC liiif .se or A rabic, no rm ally takes tw o years of full-t ime study. The second year is taughtoverseas in a c o u n t r y w h e r e that language is spolcen.M a n y language-trained consular off i cers have reported that the training was no lt n ik . r cd to t h e i r needs , par t i cu lar ly inte rv iewing. Li t tle o r no t ra in in g i s given in mak i pp ,

e(Tb:.;ivc use of an interpTCtcT, although K SN viti clerks of ten translate o n th e % ' is a l ine.


"Aica srudies" coui'ses. wlu'ch familiaiize students w ith the social and pul i t ica lc u l l ires c f a region, generally d o nol provide Ih e information visa yflkers must nseu. Put i -s pec i lie language insights and inten'iswing techniques, acquired during a t w o - o r three-yearass i . jmncni , arc rarely gassed on to succcssoi-s bec ause o f pervasive staf f ing gaps.K c c o m m e n d a t i o i L 16: The D epar tment shouid require language training fo r consularp ' O b i t i u n i , and all cousu la r ufJ icers should be required to be able to coirixiiuiiic-aie at least ait h e '?asc l evel (S-2/R-2 ' ) . (Ac t i o n : K R)R e c o m m e n d a t i o n 1 7: language t raining should be adapted to serve better the n e e ds o fo f f i c e r s r . n H .^houlii include int=;rvie*-ing techniques. ( A c t i o n : M/FSI)J i e c o w n i e n nation 18: T he D cparonent should assign off i cers v.'i th appro pr iate M idd le East' ani .nages an d area know ledge to m ajo r vi.processing posts outside th e M i d d l e Rasf .( A c t i o n ; HR)

Visa o f f i ce r s ' interview skills ar e sometimes weal;./



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12.'16'02 i O : O i ' J T 2 0 2 6 4 " " 6 6 0 O l G / F O i g ) 016

DISCUSSION DRAFTSensitive b u t Unclassified

K e c n mn i e n d a tk m 1 V : T he Department should.ftBxtfhe development of interview Trainingmannals designed to^tisfyvjsa officers' ncofiSmd dkpand the basic consular course toinclude this additional training.

CLASS and the VisasThe; Departm ent created th e visas vipt^ program i;i Augus t 1993 in response lo th e;ecl to improve informat ion sharing among foreign policy, intelligence and law enforcem enta;zenci of ih e U.S. government. Current Viper instructions are contained in 2002 Sta le

1 .57:520. T he program is designed to increase lemaian reporting from Foreign Service postsabrc ad by providing a consular channel fo r "watch listing" suspected terrorists who .may il lsome future tim e apply for a visa to the United States. It is important that th e list isprospective;. T o qua l i fy fo r wiUehlistin^ there must be information that would provide"reasonable suspicion" that the individual has or might engage in terrorism against HieIMued States or its interests., but it docs not req uire that th e indivi dual have ever applied orattempted T O apply for a visa in the past.

; viper information is collected at each visa issuing post by terrorist lookoutS K S (fbnncrly Visas Viper Comm ittees). These committees included a broad rang eoj'nu'ssion elements. T he committee is chaired by the DCM and a consular sectionreprrseniative acts d$ coordinator. Names and biographic information on persons believed

e 1 i e : b l < ? fo r watch-listing are submitted by cable to Washington, and a decision i. s made bythe ]3ure3.u of Information an d Research as to their inclus ion.T h* names of those idantified as poteatiaJ terrorists are added to CLASS. CLASS J sthe s ing le watch l ist available to consular officers adjudicating visas, and every visa applicenrm u s t be name checked patu lo adjudication and issuance. CLASS is the best too l lo consularoifii;ers to prevent visa issuance to terrorists.OT G conducted a review of the visas viper process as part of this survey of visais;;u m ce procedures. The findings and recommendations are contained in a classified portionof this report. For the purposes of this unclassified portion the findings can be summarizedas fuj]y w s. The visas vipcx program is a valuable luol in ihe war on terrorism and the effortto s t rengthen Am erican security. More resources shou ld be devoted to the program,hcv-cvcr. and the guidance should be clearer. The headquarters of the participating age/iciessh D u l d have a larger role in the prog ram and giv e it a high er priority.

Si m m a r yUnti l lie events of September 1 i, the visa process was seldom considered a major

cement of national security. This is so despite th e fact that after th e first attack on the WorldT r u i c Cciitcr, Congress mandated the issuance o f m ach ine readable visas and CLASS nam ech xks worldwide, whi le authorizine a visa application fee to provide fundins to rnalce this


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DISCUSSION DRAFISensitive but Unclassified

possible. The Visas Viper Program w^ also created. The post-September 1 1 era shouldh i i V t ! witnessed immediale an d dramatic changes in CA's direction of tbt: visa process. Thish:.s ac t happened. A fundamental readjustment by Department leadership regarding visais ;iiince u n t i l i t e m ' & l ha s nor raten place. The Department still dots not fully appreciate thecc n;;ular function as pan_pj.'a coordinated national effort to manage border security i u i c limplement the FNA, (fiTbothfcrevent the iravcl of those who might present risks to i h t - s UnitedStar;? an d it s citizens an d also to facilitaie legitimate travel. CA continues to experiencesl:oiTcom.inss that include;

Lack of uniformity in visa processing from post 10 post, and Lack of a planning staff to develop and pnxfapt options fo r consular inputinly border security initiative an d directioIf th e visa process is to be made inort secure, ii raySt be considered as a part of a

lavgsv process beginning wiih Ihe vis? process and continuing through the admission of aliensto th e United States and tracking them while they remain in this country. A s f:ongre


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December 11,2002MEMORANDUM

/9/11 Personal PrivacyTO: OIG - Clark Kenl ErvinFROM: FSI - {Catherine H. Peterson

oSUBJECT: Prafl Inspection Memorandum Report orfVisa Issuance Po licy and P roceduresBelow, please find FSI's comments on recommendations 1,7 and 19 in the draft inspectionm e m o r a n d u m report. If you have an v questions, please pontnct Ms. Catherine J. Russell,Executive Director for Management alj |

KS1 Response to OIG Drafl Inspection Memorandum Report onVisa Issuance Policy and Procedures

Recomir.endaiion 17: Language training should be adapted to serve better the needs of consularofflcecs ;m d should in c l ude interviewing techniques. (Action: M/'FSI)FSI concurs with the recommendation. Currently in most language curricula, there arespecialized modules developed in coordination with postS!=and FSI's Consu lar Training Division.Language students assigned to consularpositions are given the opportunity to work withconsular modules in rh e laller stages of their scheduled training. The topics inc lude interviewpractice on the topics of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas as well a* arrests, deaths, welfare-and-whereabouts of U.S. citizens, and telephone inquiries. There is also work with documentssuch as birthan d marriagecertificates, government forms, etc. FSI isjjurrenlly updatingconsular badecraft materials in Arabic jn_gonsultalion with posts and CA, andjplajjgjLojacpandconsular tradecraft training throughoutthe languagc'school. These materials will increase theemphasis on interviewing skills.Recommendation 19: The Department should fund the development of interview trainingmaterials designed to satisfy visa officers' needs and expand the basic consular course lo includethis addit ional training. (Action M/FSI) /~FSI concurs with this recommendation. A s noted bythe OIG^jluaConsular Training Division

already augmented the training previously provided on.inLcrvicwtng in ConGen. In addition,/ we have developed a plan to use the expertise of an outside expert on interviewing, which is/ intended 10give ConGen s tuden ts additional, substantial help in identifying illegitimate- travelers/

I applicant'.. We hope to give our students the benefit, of the knowledge of the best interviewingexperts in the U.S.

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T5 B63 IG Materials 3 of 3 Fdr- Dec 02 Discussion Draft- Review of Non Immigrant Visa Issuance...

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Transcript of T5 B63 IG Materials 3 of 3 Fdr- Dec 02 Discussion Draft- Review of Non Immigrant Visa Issuance...