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16 . Ashcroft told us that he established a "hold until cleared" policy because of thehigh rate of flight from deportation proceedings. John Ashcroft testimony, April13 , 2004; for closure of hearings, see Mich ael Creppy, Chief Im m igration Judge,M em o, "Cases requiring special procedures," September 21, 2001. This policyhas been challenged in two United States Courts of Appeals. The Sixth Circuitheld th at there is a constitutional right of public access to these hear ings; theThird C ircuit reached th e opposite result. The Supreme Court did not resolve this"circuit split"; fo r length of clearance process, see Office of the InspectorGeneral, U.S. Departm ent of Justice. The September 11 Detainees: A Review ofthe Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with theInvestigation of the September 11 , 2001 A ttacks (2003), p. 51.

17. "CRU Special Interest Cases", Sept. 16,2003. Some of those remanded to theMarshals Service were held as m aterial witnesses, and individuals were onlyreleased "on bond" after the y were "cleared" by the FBI of connection to 9/11,Sarah Ke ndall interview (Mar. 15 , 2004), p. 20; DHS attorneys told us there wereIslam ic extrem ists who w ere on the l ist , but could not say how m any. NaderBaroukh an d David L andau interview, April 16, 2004, p. 10; DO J DocumentRequest, No. 9, question 10(d), October 20 , 2003; fo r detainee reporting, see TD-31526859-03, May 10, 2003. (S); O IG report, see above, footnote 22 (findingone instance of a September 11 detainee who was held for a short time "despiteth e fact that there was no valid immigration charge"); see also testimony ofKhaled Abou El Fadl before the Commission, December 8,2003.

21. During th e morning of September 11, the FAA suspended all non-emergency airactivity in the national airspace. FA A Response to QFRNo. 1 (June 8, 2004).While the natio nal airspace was closed, decisions to allow aircraft to fly werem ade by the FAA wo rking with the Department of Defense, D epartment of State,U.S. Secret Service, and the FBI. FAA Respo nse to Q FR No . 1 (June 8, 2004).The Departm ent of T ransportation reopened the national airspace effective 11:00a.m. on September 13, 2001, for flights out of or into airports that hadimplem ented the F A A ' s ne w security requirem ents. FA A Response to QFR No. 1(June 8, 2004).

22 . After the airspace reopened, nine chartered flights with 160 people, m ostly SaudiArabian nationals, departed from th e United States between September 14 an d24. In addition, one Saudi governm ent flight, containing the Saudi DefenseMinister an d other m embers of an official Saudi delegation, departed New arkairport on September 14. Eve ry airport involved in these Saudi flights was openwhen th e flight departed, and no inappropriate actions were taken to allow thoseflights to depart. See Lambert-St Louis International A irport, Response to QFR(May 27, 2004); Los Angeles International Airport, Response to QFR (June 2,2004); Orlando International Airport, Response to QFR (June 8, 2004);W ashington-D ulles A irport, Respo nse to QFR (June 8, 2004); Po rt Autho rity ofNew Yo rk and New Jersey, Response to Q FR (June 4, 2004); Responses of theMassachusetts Port Authority to the Logan International Airpo rt Questions fo r

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the Record (June 17, 2004); McCarran International Airport, Response toQuestions for the Record (June 22, 2004).Ano ther particular allegation is that a flight carrying Saudi nationals from Tampa,Florida to Lexington, K entucky was allowed to fly while airspace was closed withspecial approval by senior U.S. government officials. On September 13 , Tampapolice brought three yo ung Saudis they were protecting on an off-duty securitydetail to the airport so they could get on a plane to Lexington. Tam pa p olicearranged for two private investigators to provide security on the flight. Theyboarded a chartered Lear Jet. Dan Grossi, Manuel Perez, John Solomon, an dMichael Fendle interviews. The plane took off at 4:37 p.m ., after nationalairspace was open, m ore than five hours after Tampa airport had reopened, an dafter other flights had arrived at and departed from that airport. Tam paInternational Airport, Responses to Questions for the Record (June 7, 2004). Theplane's pilot told us there was "nothing unusual whatsoever" about the flight. Thecompany's owner an d director of operations agreed, saying, "It was just a routinelittle trip for us" and that he would have heard if there had been anything unusualabout it. The pilot said he followed standard procedures an d filed his flight planwith the FAA prior to the flight, "I was nev er questioned about it." ChristopherSteele an d Barry Ellis interviews, June 14 , 2004. FAA records confirm thisaccount. FAA , S upplem ental Response to Q F R N o . 1 (June 16,2004).When th eplane arrived at Lexing ton-Blu e Grass Airpo rt, that airport had also been open form ore than five hours. Lexington Blue Grass Airport Response to Questions fo rthe Record (June 8, 2004). The three Saudi nationals debarked from the plane an dwere m et by local police. Th eir private security guards were paid and the policethen escorted the three Saudi passengers to a hotel w here they joined relativesalready in Lexingto n. Mark B arnard interview, June 7, 2004. The FBI is allegedto have had no record of the flight, and denied that it occurred, hence contributingto the story of a so-called "phantom flight." This is another misunderstanding.The FBI was initially misinformed about how the Saudis got to Lexington by alocal police officer in Lexington who did not have firsthand knowledge of thematter . The Bureau sub sequently learned about theflight.James Ml |interview, June 18, 2004. ...

23. Clarke Interview (January 12, 2004)(p. 9). .,24 . [delete this endnote. It is duplicative.]25. Clarke Interview (January 12, 2004)(p. 9) .26 . Interviews with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Card, Rice, Clarke, an dBandar, Clarke testimony, M ar. 24, 2004 ("I wo uld love to be able to tell you who didit, who brought this proposal to m e, but I don't know."). Instead, the matter washandled as fbllows. W ithin days of Septem ber 11, fearing reprisals against Saudinationals, Rihab M assoud, the deputy chief of m ission at the Saudi Em bassy inWashington, DC, called D ale Watson, th e FBI's assistant director of counterterrorism

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an d asked for help in g etting some of its citizens o ut of the co untry. Rihab Massoudinterview, May 11, 2004. At about the same time, Michael Rolince, chief of theFBI's international terrorism operations section, also heard form an FBI official inNewark about a proposed flight of Saudis out of the coun try. Mich ael Rolinceinterview, June 9,2004. We believe this was the Saudi Defense Minister's flight.Rolince says he told the New ark official that the Saudis should not be allowed toleave without having the n ame s on their passports matched to their faces, and theirnames run through FBI case records to see wh ether they ha d surfaced before. Rolincean d Watson briefed Robert M ueller, the director of the FBI, a bout the issue and howthey were handling it. The State Department played a role as well in flights involvinggovernment officials or members of the royal family. State coordin ated with the FBIan d FAA to allow screening by the FBI of flights with Saudi nationals on board.There is no ev idence that S tate tried to limit the screening. DOS Record of TerroristAttack Task Force, S ept. 13,2001; Jack S i linterview. June 14, 2004. The FBIeffectively approved the Saudi flights at the level of a section chief. Having anopportunity to check the Saudis was useful to the FBI. This w as because the U.S.government did not, an d does not, routinely run checks on foreigners who are leavingthe United States. This procedure was convenient, as the Saudis who wished to leavein this way would gather an d present themselves for record ch ecks an d interviews, anopportunity that w ould not be available if they simply left on regularly scheduledcomm ercial flights.27. These flights were screened by law enforcement officials, primarily the FBI. Forexample, one flight, theso-called Bin Ladin flight, departed the United States onSeptember 20 with 2 < S passengers, most of them relatives of Usama Bin Ladin.Screening of this flight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field Officewho was also a pilot. This agen t, coordinating with FBI headqua rters, sent anelectronic communication to each of the field offices through which the Bin Ladinflight was scheduled to pass including the proposed flight manifest an d directing whatscreening should occur. He also m onitored the flight as it moved around the country -from St. Louis to Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington-Dulles, and to Boston-Logan - correcting for any changes in itinerary to ma ke sure there was no lapse inFB I screening at these locations. Again , each of the a irports through which the BinLadin flight passed was open and no special restrictions were lifted to accommodateits passage. James Q ~ ^ \ , J u n e 3,2004.The Bin Ladip flight and o ther flights we examined were screened in accordance withpolicies set-by FBI headquarters and coordinated through working-level interagencyprocesses. Rolince interview, June 9,2004. Although most of the passengers w ereno t interviewed, 22 of the 26 people on the B in Ladin flight were interviewed by theFBI. Many were asked detailed questions. None of the passengers stated that they hadan y recent contact w ith Usam a Bin L adin or knew any thing about terrorist activity.FBI report, "All Interview Reports for Any Passengers on the Flights Mentioned inDocument Request 30-1 a through f." (undated)(RFBI04017299). As Richard Clarkenoted, long before 9/11 the FBI was following me mb ers of the Bin Ladin family inthe United States closely. Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004. Two of the passengers on

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this flight had been the subjects of preliminary investigations by the FBI, but boththeir cases had been closed, in 1999 and March 2001, respectively, because the FBIhad uncovered no derogatory information on either person liking them to terroristactivity. Their cases remained closed as of September 11, 2001, and were notreopened before they departed the country on this flight, and have no t been reopenedsince. RFBI04018348, bates 3777-3778.28 . Rolince interview; Massoud corroborates this account. He said the FBI required

the names and personal information of all departing passengers sponsored fordeparture by the Saudi Embassy. Massoud interview.29. Jack fl {interview (June 14, 2004).30. [delete this endnote. It isduplicative.]31. The FBI checked a variety of databases fo r information on the Bui Ladin flightpassengers and searched the aircraft. Because it was no t clear to the Commissionwhether the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist was checked by the FBI, at our requestprior to our hearing in April 2004, the Terrorist Screening Center checked thenames of individuals on the flight manifests of six Saudi flights against thecurrent TIPOFF watchlist. There were no matches. At our request, the TerroristScreening Center in June and July 2004, rechecked all the names of individualsbelieved to be on these six flights, the names of individuals on three more charterflights, the names of individuals on the flight containing the Saudi DefenseMinister, and the names of Saudi nationals on commercial flights that journalistshave alleged are suspect. There were no matches. Tim U "[interviews, April12, June 30, 2004; [see additional documents enclosed with materials]

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