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M 0300131

H. KeanCHAIRH. HamikonVICE CHAIR

F. FieldingS. G orelickGorton

LehmanJ. Roemer

R Thompson

D. ZeliWDIRECTOR

Date:Qt /TO: TEAN^T ) / +FRO M : Dianna Campagna

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Thomas H. K e a nC H A I RLee H. H a m i l t o nV I C E C H A I RRichard Ben-VenisteM a x ClelandFrederick F. FieldingJ a m i e S. GorelickSlade GortonJohn F. LehmanTimothy J . RoemerJames R. Thompson

Ph i l i p D . Zel ikowE X E C U T I V E D I R E C T O R

October 2, 2003

M r. David R. Bovaiian9/11 Personal Privacy

Dear M r. Boyajian:Thank you for the letter and the enclosed documents that you sent to the Na tionalCommission onTerrorist Attacks Upon theUnited States. We greatly appreciateyour interest and willingness to provide information to the Commission. Yourspecific concerns will be given consideration by Commission staff membersresponsible for the study of terrorist organizations and terrorist financing during thecourse of their investigative work.You and many fellow citizens have been forthco ming with information and arehelping the C ommission to carry out the task the nation has set for it. Moreinformation on the Comm ission's work may be found at www .9-1 lcommission.gov.W e thank you for your dedication, an d please feel free to contact us via theCommission website.Sincerely,

Dianna CampagnaManager of Operations

301 7' h Street SW , Room 5125W as h ing ton , DC 20407T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545www.9-1 lcommission.gov

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July 22, 2003Dear Mr. Kean:

I am sending this letter and the two enclosed documents to the commissioners an d severalstaff members of your distinguished Commission.The f i rst document, a 1999 report authored by the director of the Congressional TaskForce on Terrorism an d Unconventional Warfare, details the direct support that thegovernment of Azerbaijan has long given to al Qaeda and related terrorist groups. I havetaken the liberty of highlighting certain portions of it.The second document cites various instances of Azerbaijani-supported terrorism directedagainst US interests. I particularly wish to draw your attention to the fact that the FBIdetermined that the fatal bombings of the US embassies in Kenya an d Tanzania in 1998were ordered through bin Laden operatives in Baku.Tragically, the US has long ignored or underplayedAzerbaijan as a major source of anti-American terrorism. This is due, most likely, to its considerable oil and gas reserves.Shortsighted tolerance of Azeri terrorism undoubtedly led, in part, to the horror of 9/11.Indeed, Azerbaijan's support ofal Qaeda undoubtedly surpasses that of some largercountries that have been publicly accused of supporting that terrorist network.Azerbaijan may be a prime example of our government's tragic failure to act on known alQaeda bases and activity for the decade leading up to 9/11.I respectfully ask that th e Commission look more deeply into Azerbaijan's support for alQaeda and that it hold hearings on this matter. I trust that the relationship among toplevels of the Commission, the Amerada/Delta-Hess petroleum companies, an d Azerbaijan- as well as certain political interests - do not hinder a full inquiry. I have every reason tobelieve that the American people will become cognizant of the facts about Azerbaijan.Like other Americans, I appreciate th e patriotic diligence of you and the commissioners.I would be pleased to hear from you on the issues discussed in this letter.

Sincerely,

M r. David B. Rnva i i an

9/11 Personal Privacy

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The New Azerbaijan Hub: HowIslamist operations are targetingRussia, Armenia and Nagorno-KarabaghDefense and Foreign Affairs' Strategic PolicyOctober 1999By Yossef Bodansky, senior editor(YossefBodansky is the director of th e U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism an dUnconventional Warfare. He recently published the book "Bin Laden: The Man W hoDeclared W ar on America".)An ongoing study by Defense & Foreign Affairs has cited a significant number of highly-placed sources in Russia and the Caucasus who advise that radical Islamist forces areexpanding their infrastructure in Azerbaijan in preparation for a sustained escalation, bothin the Caucasus and at the heart of Russia. Planned terrorist "spectaculars" include theuse of suicide bombers.Significantly, these developments are based on long-standing relationships andunderstandings between Azeri officials and the Islamist leaders involved inChechnya, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The escalation began in 1997 when the Islamistsbasically agreed with the Azerbaijan Government of Gaydar Aliyev that they would -- in exchange for allowing a free flow of people, weapons and ordnance throughAzerbaijan not interfere with or overthrow the Aliyev Government. As well, theycommitted to providing outside mujahedin to undertake operations against Arm enia andNagorno-Karabakh which could be credibly denied by the Aliyev Government.This Azerbaijan-based infrastructure is aimed at both push ing arriving m ujahedin to theforward training and operational bases in Chechnya, as w ell as launching operationsagainst Russia and Armenia (including Nagorno-Karabakh) in the event of Russianbombing and raids on the Islamist bases in Chechn ya.At present, the most important function of the infrastructure in Azerbaijan is theabsorption, handlin g an d initial acclimatization an d indoctrination of foreign volunteers,mainly Arabs and A fghans/Pakistanis, as well as growing num bers of Central A sians,before being sent forward to terrorism andmilitary training bases in central Chechnya,mainly the Saudi-born Islamist leader Khattab's main rear-area base near Urus-Martan, Chechnya. Among the mujahedin presently handled in Azerbaijan are numerouswould-be shahids (suicide terrorists) who had been trained in Osama bin Laden'scamps in Afghanistan. The Islamist infrastructure in Azerbaijan is built on theexperience of bin Laden, Khattab and their companions in not only absorbingvolunteers for Afghan jihad during the 1980s, but of transforming them into a cohesiveelite corps (which is still cohesive an d most active more than a decade after the Afghan

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www.aaainc.org/press/azerbaiian.pdfArmenian Assembly of America ISSUE BRIEF

=/ Research & Information Office September 10, 2001AZERBAIJAN AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM

According to the Associated Press, the Congressional Research Services (CRS, 911012001) issued areport noting that individuals and groups affiliated with the international terrorist Osama Bin Laden andhis Al Qaeda organization used Azerbaijan as one of the bases in its elaborate terrorist network. Somereports suggest that various radical Islamist groups had operated in Azerbaijan even before its 1991independence. H owever, the real increase in their presence took place after the 1993military coup, whenth e government of Heydar Aliyev approved a large-scale deployment of mujaheddin fighters fromAfghanistan and other countries to join in the fighting against the Nagorno Karabagh Armenians.Azerbaijan has used the Karabagh conflict, characterizing it as a religious war, to cultivate ties in theIslamic world. These ties, including overtures to radical Jihad-oriented organizations, have been aimedat diplomatically isolating Armenia and raising financial and military assistance for a new militarycampaign against Karabagh. Since 1998, in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya andTanzania, th e Azerbaijani government came under pressure from Washington to clamp down on radicalIslamist groups that operate in Azerbaijan. But as recent reports show, radical Islamist groups areentrenched in Azerbaijan and will be very difficult to eradicate. The information below refers to the mainstages of development of Islamist terrorism in Azerbaijan in the past decade: Azerbaijan experienced a wave of "Islamic Revival" in the late 1980s - early 1990s that led the way to thecreation of many indigenous Islamist groups espousing violent ideology and establishment of relations withsimilar organizations abroad. The most overt expressions of Islamic solidarity byAzeris were made in 1990and 1991, when residents of districts bordering Iran destroyed most of the frontier installations to fraternizewith Iranians, just as several newly-established Azeri Islamist groups offered to provide volunteers to fight inthe Gulf War on the side of Saddam Hussein. A member of Al Qaeda, Jamal Ahmed el-Fadl, arrested bythe FBI for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings, claimed his organization became active in Azerbaijan asearly as 1989. (Trans-Caspian Project 10/3/00, Ekho 9/1/01) In the summer of 1993, President Heydar Aliyev deployed over 1,000 Islamist mercenaries in the waragainst Karabagh Armenians. They were flown on civilian aircraft from Afghanistan to Azerbaijan. Themercenaries, which also included Arab veterans of the Afghan war (1979-89), took an active role in theKarabagh conflict. (Moscow News 9/13/00) A Bin Laden associate claimed that Bin Laden himself ledmujaheddin in at least two Karabagh battles. (Associated Press 11/14/99) Following the armistice that took hold in Karabagh in May 1994, most of the mujaheddin left Azerbaijan tofight in other hot spots, such as the North Caucasus and Balkans. Others, however, remained to establishwhat was soon described as "the new hub" for Islamist radicals that involved a network of training camps,mosques, charitable organizations and underground cells. Ibrahim Eidarous, later arrested in Europe by theFBI for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings, headed the Azerbaijani branch of Al Qaeda between 1995and 1997. In 1997, radical Islamist groups with branches in Azerbaijan reportedly pledged their support forPresident Heydar Aliyev against Armenians, in exchange for a safe haven in Azerbaijan. (Strategic Policy10/99; Ekho 9/1/01) In August 1998, the Azerbaijani branch of the "Islamic Jihad" organization, which by then had merged withOsama BinLaden's Al Qaeda, reportedly coordinated the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania that killed 224 people and wounded nearly 4,600. The FBI was able to trace about 60 phone callsmade from the satellite phone used by Bin Laden to his associates in Baku and from them to operatives inEast Africa. The U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan also feared an attack, but as a local radical claimed, they didnot attack the Embassy so as "not to spoil their good relations in Azerbaijan." (Zerkalo 7/22/00; Bill ofIndictment in U.S.A. vs. Bin Laden et. a l. 4/01; Washington Post 5/3/01; Ekho 8/28/01) Following the 1998 embassy bombings, Azerbaijan came under increased U.S. pressure to curtail radicalIslamist activity on its territory. However, Azerbaijan refused to hand over suspected terrorists to the U.S., soas not to "earn the ire of Islamist fundamentalists", extraditing them instead to their native countries. One ofthe extradited terrorism suspects, Ahmad Salam Mabrouk, who at the time headed the local branch of Al

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