8/14/2019 T3 B18 Jenkins DOD Reports 1 of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin and Simon- Military 021

1/6

07/23/04

Benjamin and Simon - MilitaryWeeks before the Embassy bombings and based on intell UBL acquiring WMD,"targeteers" from the intelligence agencies and the Pentagon were ordered to draw up alist of potential targets for a US military strike and made recommendations

1. forwarded to Principals2. A group of six terrorist camps was selected3. Reno concerned if the strikes were proportional and met the

requirements of self-defense under Article 514. Others know US not normally pursue a strategy of preempting threatsmilitarily5. Concern be/ decision to attack another country rarely made based on

clandestine intelligence6. Reno did not vote but the rest recommended destroy al-Shifa7. August 20 chosen be/ reports UBL and senior leadership of al-Qaedawould be meeting that day [B&S, p. 259-260]

Following the strike1. press picked apart the administration's case for striking al-Shifa andcontroversy erupted over whether Clinton was trying to "wag the dog"2. the principals realized after the strike that they had to be prepared touse force again, no matter how relentless the criticisms over al-Shifa had been

3. WH ordered Navy vessels armed with CM to remain on station in theArabian Sea ready to fire if credible intelligence arrived concerning binLaden's whereabouts

4. The military did not like this mission: disrupted scheduled cruises andtraining and left ships in the middle of nowhere

5. Los Angeles class attack subs remained on duty off the Pakistani coastthe remainder of the Clinton administrationCruise Missiles

1. before Block III Tomahawk CM can be fired, it needs to spin ingyroscopes and set its guidance system2. over 15 months after the embassy attacks, the NAC geared up for anattack on UBL three times and missiles were actually spun twice3. Clinton was ready to pull the trigger

4. First time missiles were spun: 1C received work about an elaboratecamp pitched in the desert. Collective feeling: Bingo! Had to be UBL!However, one more box had to be checked. Needed a second confirmation tobe certain who owned the camp. After al-Shifa, no one could face a real miss.The order to spin was held, while CIA tried frantically to find out more. Word:the camp was not UBLs. The subs were told to stand down.5. Second time missiles were spun: information arrived that put UBL inone of his compounds in an eastern Afghan city. Again presence notconfirmed. No way to know how long he'd be there. He rarely spent moe than

B.Jenkins

8/14/2019 T3 B18 Jenkins DOD Reports 1 of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin and Simon- Military 021

2/6

8/14/2019 T3 B18 Jenkins DOD Reports 1 of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin and Simon- Military 021

3/6

07/23/04

opposed. Berger not happy with where the military came out. There w as nocreativity and enthusiasm.Pentagon position1. Civilian leaders (except Secretary of Defen se Bill Cohen) felt thePentagon was blow ing them off when they badly needed a solution2. Shelton annoyed be/ he felt the administration's political leadershipwas look ing to the military to solve a problem of diplomacy and intell;unrealistic expectations w ere being heaped on the unifor ms3. Shelton, "it was frustrating for us, and frustrating for everyone. W enever had the intell."4. The Pentagon was reluctant because they did not see CT as theirmission. T hat was a matter of police, FBI, intelligence and diplomacy5. M ilitary believed NSC and State wanted to correct every problem w iththem as cannon fodder. [B&S, p. 295]Military differences1. W ithin the Pentagon, less unanimity2. Some experienced officers in JCS believed a mission was fea sible andnecessary, thou gh not without risks

3. Knew a large package with a major deployment was a politicalnonstarter and would forfeit the element of surprise4. They sketched ou t options that wou ld have been sm all, stealthy andlethal and could have been staged from a US base in the region5. Shelton said to believe idea had merit bu t wanted force protectionpackage w hich would increase the no. of troops involved but not to the pointimpractical6. The immovable roadblock came when the notion was put to theCentral Command7. Zinni made man y objections to the proposal, arguing an attack onAfghanistan would rock the region, especially Pakistan8. CINCs very powerful; it would be hard for Shelton to turn Zinniaround9. The trial balloon sank fast; no formal planning for a mission to captureal-Qaeda leadership wascarried out - whatever thePrincipals mayhavethought.

Rekindled desire for military plans [B&S. p. 318]1. In 2000, a new desire for military options to end the UBLproblem began2 Clinton approached Shelton about "a bunch of black ninjas rappelled outof helicopters into the middle of their camp."3. NSC followed up w ith a request for a new m ilitary plan that did not requ ireusing the entire 101 st Airborne Division (a sm all plan)4. Cohen and Meyers later went to the WH and briefed Berger and Kerrick

8/14/2019 T3 B18 Jenkins DOD Reports 1 of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin and Simon- Military 021

4/6

07/23/04

5. Military wanted help - Cohen andMeyers were also eager to act but theanswer to the request for a small operation was that it would be Desert One -the 1980 attempt to liberate American hostages in Tehran, resulting inincineration of two helicopters and deaths of eight servicemen6 Military doctrine called for special operations forces to be usedin support of other units7. Reluctant to use Special Forces in risky operations that are prone to disaster,embarrassment and casualtiesSpecial Forces1. after Desert One, military improved its special forces capacities2. 1990's - military theorists turned their attention to asymmetricwarfare, large sums of money poured into SOCO M3. Delta Force and Navy Seals developed into highly skilled,unconventional fighting forces and trained for a variety of terrorism-related contingencies

4. But Chief very cautious about using them (reluctance to usethem in Bosnia to capture war criminals irritated policymakers). [B&S, p.319]White H ouse Reaction1. reluctant to make the military undertake a mission it saw assuicidalMilitary Reluctant?1. military establishments almost always conservative2. military leaders un likely to drastically revise their special

forces doctrine3. according to one former senior political appointee at thePentagon, the military w as particularly unwilling to go out on a limb forClinton4. decision to end discrimination against gays in the military andkilling of Army servicemen in Somalia still in the memory of the military5. Shelton and Powell believed C linton did not have the guts tofight a war

6. "I think the Pentagon became more nervous and timid becausethey thought Clinton was - and so they would not put forward risky plansin a serious way. By the end, they just didn't believe." They wrote him offas taking strong action.

Submarine Deployments1. Rotation of submarines in Arabian Sea continued waiting forintelligence2. Once more in 2000 a report arrived that detailed bin Laden'swhereabouts

8/14/2019 T3 B18 Jenkins DOD Reports 1 of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin and Simon- Military 021

5/6

07/23/04

3. Tenet said to Berger, "we don't have it."4. JCS decided to see about subm arine deploym ents be/ believedthe intell needed for a CM was not going to materialize5. Believed submarine deployments an exercise in futility6. W ithout better intell, the vessels should be brought home7. M ilitary ordered to draw a list of possibilities8. W hat emerged included the unfeas ible to the absurd9. One appealed to Clarke: use a forty-nine-foot unmanned flyingdrone called the Predator10. (See Predator sheet)USS Cole 1. Showed how lightly the US military had been taking the threatof terrorist violence2. Nav y disregarded prior adm onitions and know threatconditions in Yemen (second only to Afghanistan on the list of states

infested with terrorists)3. Comm ander of naval forces in ME, Comm ander Kirk Lippold,failed to deliberately plan, deliberately implement and actively supervise aforce protection plan." [B&S, p. 324].4. Nav y had virtually all the entire body of intell on al-Qaeda anddisregarded it5. Zinni also responsible. Regional commander and approved thedecision to refuel in Yemen6. No response: to launch a military strike against targets inAfghanistan on the basis of nothing more than a strong intuition wo uldhave gone well beyond any US military precedent7. Any military action w ould have constrained the nextPresident's room for maneuver and committed him to a policy he had notchosen8. No one believed it was right to encumber the new Presidentwith u nfinished m ilitary business in Afghanistan (lesson from Bosnia andSomalia)9. On February 9, 2001 , intelligence briefers told Cheney that theCIA concluded that al-Qaeda was responsible for bombing the Cole.

Bush Adm in vs. Clinton Adm in1. Unspoken rule.. .its policies should contrast sharply with those

of the previous administration, which was spoken of with contempt. Allhad to be changed.2. Clinton admin came into office with strong views - about theneed for US to act in a world with multilateral backing, about the role ofIL, about using force only when sanctioned by the UN.3. M ilitary leaders who remained in office say terrorism movingfarther to the back burner (Shelton) [B& S, p. 332, 335 )

8/14/2019 T3 B18 Jenkins DOD Reports 1 of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin and Simon- Military 021

6/6

07/23/04

Under Shelton1. Under Shelton, the JCS did not come up with more militaryoptions2. Still a strong belief al-Qaeda was first and foremost anintelligence problem3. Chiefs were frustrated by the lack of CIA informationoperations - disinformation operations - tocreate dissent am ong Taliban.4. Last year of Clinton adm inistration the JCS started developinga project of their ow n, they planned to launch in 2001. However, whenthey were briefed, the Pentagon's new leaders killed the project.5. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were against the Joint Staff havingthe lead (says Shelton)6. They have taken away tasks that the armed forces had taken onin recent years, but they did not consider being m ilitary missions, and thisincluded disinformation projects.7. Missile defense and military restructuring were the key issues8. Rumsfeld's attention w as on m ilitary doctrine, includingexisting guidelines that US forces needed to be able to fight two w ars.

Clarke's options (military) FB&S. 33811 . Predator2. Proxy force into the field against UB L (the CIA not enthusiastic abouttoo close a relationship)3. Arm the Northern Alliance. Nothing short of a commitment of US airand possibly ground support could make the difference for the NorthernAlliance. F ew wanted to bind the US to an unpredictable bunch. A slippery

slope to full-scale war in Asia. No one could image presenting the US w ith awar over a threat they knew so little about and did not view a critical4. After the Em bassy bom bing, Clarke accepted this. As time passed, hebegan to lobby harder for support to the NA, believing that if Masssoud'sforces could tie down m ore Taliban an al-Qaeda fighters, that could onlybenefit the US5. He remained in the minority und er Clinton.