T2 B4 Kevin Scheid Misc Fdr- 5-8-03 Email From Zelikow to Commissioners Re Review of Joint Inquiry-...

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Mail:: INBOX: Action Request: Draft Com mission Determination Authorizing Further I... Page 1 of 2^ ^ ~ \ / s x \x >~ % it- v fstm

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INBOX: Action Request: Draft Commission M o v e | c o P y this m e s s a g e toi|Determination Au...(2 of 127) CoDelete |Reply |Reply to All | Forward | Redirect |Blacklist |Message Source |Resume |Save as |Print Back toINBOX "3&Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 22:52:07 -0400

From: Philip Zelikow ^To: commissioners@9-11 commission.gov


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Mail:: INBOX: Action Request: Draft Commission Determination Authorizing Further I... Page 1 of 2

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INBOX: Action Request: Draft Commission M o v e | c o P y T h i s m e s s a g e toi|Determination Au... (2 of 127) fieDelete | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Redirect | Blacklist | Message Source | Resume | Save as | Print Back to INBOX *< 3 *Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 22:52:07 -0400

From: Philip Zelikow ^To: commissioners@9-11 commission.gov


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THOMAS H Page 1 of 3

Thomas H. KeanCHAIRLee H. HamiltonVICE CHAIRRichard Ben-Veniste

DETERMINATIONHaving reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions,and recom m endations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to theIntelligence Community, the Co m m ission hereby determines that:

a. The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the follow ing areas of inquiryrelating to the Intelligence Com m unity: The organization and operational methods of Al Qa'ida; The character of Al Qa'ida1s relationships with fo reign governments,especially Iraq and Iran; The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida,whether from organizations directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or fromother organizations, such as Hizbollah; The imm ediate response of the United States to the attacks; Lessons learned and the counterterrorism policies, program s, andprocedures instituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacksof September 11, 2001; Assessment of national vulnerabilities and means of attack (beyond theJI's investigation of pre-9/11 analyses of aircraft as weapons); The role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the collection,analysis, and use o f intelligence inside the United States; and Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community'scounterterrorism policies an d programs.

b. The Joint Inquiry investigated the following areas of inquiry relating tothe Intelligence C om m unity, some of them extensively, but did notcomplete its investigation into: The reconstruction of the September 11, 2001 plot, including thehigher-level direction of the conspiracy and the activities of theHamburg cell; The activities of the conspirators and their support network insid e theUnited States; The global financing network of Al Qa'ida, including the financing ofthe September 11, 2001 plot; Controversies over the policy guidance provided by the ExecutiveBranch for the Intelligence Community's international counterterrorismefforts, including the context and details of the debates over covertaction and alternative options;

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=126&id=... 5/9/2003


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THOMAS H Page 2 of 3

Max ClelandFred F. FieldingJamie S. GorelickSlade GortonJohn LehmanTimothy J. RoemerJames R. ThompsonPhilip D. ZelikowEXECUTIVEDIRECTOR

The relative priority of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorismmission as compared to other Intelligence Co mm unity missions; National organization andmanagement of the Intelligence Co mm unityin performance of its counterterrorism mission; Local o rganization andmanagement of the Intelligence Com mu nitycounterterrorism efforts both overseas and in communities of theUnited States; Collection, processing, analysis, anddissemination ofcounterterrorismintelligence, inclu ding policies, standards, an alytic metho ds, andpractices fo r gathering and pooling of foreign and domesticinformation against a transnational foe; Legal authorities for counterterrorism intelligence w ork inside andoutside the United States; Liaison with foreign governments in counterterrorism efforts,

including the character of cooperation with Germany, Saudi Arabia,and Pakistan both before and after the attacks; Strategic and tactical warning concerning terrorism against the UnitedStates, inclu ding the sharing of ap propriate warning inform ation withthe private sector; and Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congressand Executive Branch for the counterterrorism mission.

(c) The Joint Inquiry concluded its research and investigative work alongvarious tracks at different times during 2002. New inform ation not reviewedby the Joint Inquiry has becom e available with respect to the facts an d(circumstances of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the imm ediaterespon se of the United States to the attacks, and the lesson s learned from theattacks.The Com mission may supplement the categories above as the Com mission'sinvestigation progresses or as new information comes to the Commission'sattention.ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. KeanChair

Lee H. Ham iltonVice Chair

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php?thismailbox-INBOX &index=126 &id= ::.. . 5/9/2003


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THOMASH Page 3 of 3

Philip D. ZelikowExecutive DirectorDate:

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TEL (202) 331-4060FAX (202) 296-5545

www.9-1 commission.gov

ht tp: / /kinesis .swishmai l .com/webmai l / imp/view.php?thismai lbox=INBOX&index=126&id=.. . 5/9/2003


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DETERMINATION it/f/./Having reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions, andrecommendations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to the IntelligenceCommunity, th e Com m ission hereby determines that:(a ) The Join t Inquiry did not investigate the fo llowing areas of inquiry relating to theIntelligence Co m m unity:

The organization andoperational methods of Al Qa'ida; The character of Al Qa'ida's relationships w ith foreign governm ents,especially Iraq and Iran;

The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida, whetherfrom orga nization s directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or from otherorganizations, such as Hizbollah;The imm ediate response of the United States to the attacks;Lessons learned and the counter-terrorism policies, programs,/tituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacks of/September

1;e of state and local law enforcem ent agencies in the:elligence inside the United States; andCong ressional ov ersight of the Intelligence Co m m unity'spolicies and programs.

The Jo int Inquiry inve stigated the follo wing areas of inquiry relating to theIntelligence Communi ty , som e of them extensively, but did no t complete itsinvestigation into :

inside the UnitedThe reconstruction of the Septemb er 11, 2001 plot, including the higher-leveldirection of the conspiracy and the activities of the Hamburg cell;The activities of the conspiratorâliJ theiFsT:States;The global f inancing ijefwork of al Qa'ida, including the financing of theSeptember 11 ,2001Controversies over m e policy guidance -beiftg provided/forîn ternationalcounter-terrorism efforts JajObe Intelligence Com m unity, including th econtext an d details of the debates over covert action and alternatiye-eptlons;The relative priority oYtheÎntelligence Coniniujdtyls-eoTmteMerrorisrnm ission as com pared to otherTnlellig^rlcTCwnmunity missions;Nat ionaLmanagement of the Intelligence C om m unity in performance of its

. c A

counter-terrorism mission;Local organization and management of the Intelligence Com m unity counter-terrorism efforts bo th overseas and in communities of the United States;Collect ion, processing, a4analysis.of counter-terrorism intelligence,including standards for gathering anojjooling of foreign an d domesticinformation againsi a t ransnat ional targ

J


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Legal author i t ies fo r cou nter-terro rism intelligence wo rk inside and outside ofthe United States;Liaison with foreign governments in counter-terrorism efforts, including th echaracter of cooperatio n with G ermany, Saudi Arabiajmd Pakistan bothbefore and after th e attacks;Strategic and tactical warn ing concerning terrorism against) th e7United States. I'1 * jResource allocation to the Intelligence Comm unity by the Congress an dExecut ive Branch for the counter-terrorism ijussior/TT-*

ew information no t reviewed by the Joint Inquiry hxavbecome>^vailablellwlth respectto the facts an d circumstances of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, th eimmediate response of the Unitedjtates to the attackst^and the lessons learnedth e attacks

- //"^

The Commission may supplement the categories above as the Commission's investigationprogresses or as new information comes to the Commission's attention.ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

/t-*

Thomas H. KeanChair

Lee H. Hamil tonVice Chair

Philip D. ZelikowExecut ive Director

Date:


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DETERMINATIONHaving reviewed the information compiled by, and the finding s, conclusions, an drecom m endations o f, the Joint Inquiry of the Co ngress relating to the IntelligenceCom m unity, the Com m ission hereby determines that:(a) The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the follow ing areas o f inquiry relating to theIntelligence Co m m unity:

The organization andoperational methods of Al Qa'ida; The character of Al Qa'ida's relationships with foreign governments,especially Iraq and Iran; The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida, whetherfrom organizations directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or from otherorganizations, such as Hizbollah; The imm ediate response of the United States to the attacks; Lessons learned and the counter-terrorism policies, programs, and procedures

instituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacks of September 11,2001; Role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the collection and use ofintelligence inside the United States; and Con gressional oversight of the Intelligence Community 's counter-terrorismpolicies an d programs.

(b ) The Joint In quiry investigated the follow ing areas of inquiry relating to theIntelligence Communi ty , som e of them extensively, but did not com plete itsinvestigation into: The reconstructionof the September 11, 2001 plot, including the higher-leveldirection of the conspiracy and the activities of the Ham burg cell; The activities of the conspirators and their support network inside th e UnitedStates; The global financing network of al Qa'ida, including th e financing of theSeptember 11, 2001 plot; Co ntroversies over the policy guidance being provided for internationalcounter-terrorism efforts by the Intelligence Community, including thecontext an d details of the debates over covert action and alternative options; The relative priority of the Intelligence Community 's counter-terrorismmission as com pared to other Intelligence C om m unity m issions; Nat iona l m anagemen tof the Intelligence C om m unity in performance of itscounter-terrorism mission; Local organization and management of the Intelligence Community counter-terrorism efforts bo th overseas and in communities of the United States; Co llection, processing, and analysis of counter-terrorism intelligence,including standards fo r gathering an d pooling of foreign an d domesticinformation against a transnational target;


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Legal authoritiesfor counter-terrorism intelligence work inside and outside ofth e United States; Liaison with foreign governments in counter-terrorism efforts, including th echaracter of cooperation with Germany, Saud i Arabia, and Pakistan bothbefore an d after the attacks; Strategic and tactical warn ing concerning terrorism against the United States. Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congress andExecutive Branch for the counter-terrorism mission;

(c) New information no t reviewed by the Joint Inquiry ha s become available with respectto the facts and circ um stanc es of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, theimmediate response of the United States to the attacks, and the lessons learned sincethe attacks since the Joint Inqu iry concluded its research efforts in December 2002.The Comm ission m ay supp lem en t the categories above as the Commission's investigationprogresses or as new information comes to the Com mission's attention.ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. KeanChair

Lee H . Ham iltonVice Chair

Philip D. ZelikowExecutive Director

Date:

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