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Date: October 10, 2003For: Chris HealyCompany: 9-11 CommissionFrom: Jamie Gorelick

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Questions for Deutch Testimony1. What are the impediments or downsides with working with

what we've got? What, in your view and experience, are thelimitations of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,wVH nb "i a eiiTM^' "'' * -.n - i - -hch on enewhich is supposed to fully integrate all information,whether gathered at home or abroad?

2"whit we* thS i pediments or downsides with working with3. At our very first hearing, I examined the chairs and

ranking members of the intelligence committees on a subjectthat you address, which is whether they did,or evenwhether in the current construct, they could performeffective oversight over - t h e intelligence community. Theirresponse roughly, was that they can review budgets line-by-line, but have few effective means to look across theintelligence community at the requirements and the abilityto meet them. You note the difficulty in getting changesuch as you propose through Congress because of the shiftin budget, etc. from one oversight body (e.g., Defense,Judiciary) to another (Intelligence) - having beenoverseen by two of those three, what are the upsides of thesnitt you propose from an oversight point of view? willprogrammatic review be easier or harder?

4. You were, when you were at Defense, part of efforts inwhich the Secretary of Defense had to concur in theexercise of authority by another agency -- which is whatyou propose here. Isn't it the case that the.SecDefbecause of his powerful position in th Cabinet, in-. ter,msof resources, stature, etc., is and wotLld ;be in a pcssi'tronto frustrate the exerciee of budget fciithofrlfcy--which' is ' - ' a i f " .the core of your proposals? ;

5. Why wait to separate out the DCI and:CIA jobs? Won't theDIS feel that it is appealing decisions -- substantive,resource, etc. - - t o someone who has, by virtue of "his orher CIA hat, another loyalty? Same question with."regard,"~io~the Defense agencies who would have tfc^CQmpfie,,fojE-dolla -and missions with the CIA. ' -6. One of the complaints one hears from fce_fil& is that the

military is able to undermine efforts-'to- q rry aut- covertactions by creating military support[requirements that areso substantial that they render covert actions -not coverjt- -or too expensive, or to costly in terms of our relations'with other countries. Do you think tjhat this is a problem?"How do your proposals address the pro-blent?

7. Quite apart from your organizational 'proposals, you'note aseries of problems that need to be adldres'sed "otherwise if- .,., - - /

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your organizational proposals are not adopted -- that wehave multiple agencies with their own bilateralrelationships with agencies abroad; that our informationoperations are without coordination; that we do not haveclear lines with regard to what is and who hasresponsibility for covert actions; we lack a coordinatedapproach to the development of technology, etc. Are yourorganizational proposals the only way to address theseproblems?

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Thomas H. KcanC H A I R

Lee H. HamiltonV ICE CHA IR

Richard Ben-VenisteMax C lclandFred F. FieldingJamie S . GorelickSlade GortonJ oh n LehmanTimothy J . RocmerJames R. Thompson

Philip D. ZelikowE X E C U T I V E D I R E C T O R

FAX TRANSMISSIONTwo (2)pages, including this coversheet

TO: Commissioner Fred FieldingFROM: Chris Healey and Gordon Lederman

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon th e United StatesDATE: October 10, 2003RE: The Commission's hearing on October 14, 2003

Please find attached suggested questions for Dr. Deutch. These questions for themost part focus on the issues related to the Department of Defense.W e have spoken to Commissioner Gorelick. She will mainly focus on questionsconcerning th e domestic intelligence service and oversight.The Commission's email system is currently down. If you need to reach us, pleasecontact us as follows:

> On Saturday and Sunday: Chris Healey, home9/11 personal pr ivacyI 9/11 Personal Privacy I

On Monday: Gordon Ledermanl 9/11 personal pr ivacy II 9/11 Personal Privacy ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

W e look forward to seeing you at the October 14 th hearing. Thank you.

TI:I. (202) 331-4060F A X (202) 296-5545

www.9-11 commission.gov

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Suggested questions based on testimony submitted by Dr. Deutch

1. Do you believe the attacks of 9/11 are evidence of a systemic organizational problemwithin the Intelligence Community?2. Do you believe the changes within the Intelligence Community since 9/11 have beensufficient to prevent future terrorist attacks?3. You recommend that the DCI should have authority and responsibility for the JointMilitary Intelligence Program (JMIP) and part of the Tactical Intelligence and Related

Activities (TIARA) of the Department of Defense. Aren't these programs so closelylinked to the warfighting mission that they should remain under the purview of theSecretary of Defense?

4. You propose that the DCI be given planning and budgeting authority over the JMIPand parts of TIARA, but the Secretary of Defense should keep day-to-daymanagement of these programs. How would this work in practice? Doesn't havingan entity serve two masters muddle the chain of command and precludeaccountability?

5. You recommend that the DCI should give up day-to-day management over theNational Reconnaissance Office (NRO) but you also argue that the DCI should havegreater authority over the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and theNational Security Agency (NSA). Doesn't the NRO have such an integral role in thesuccess of NIMA and NSA that the DCI should retain his current role over NRO?

6. An Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence was recently created within theDepartment of Defense. Was the creation of this office a good idea, and what wouldbe this office's responsibilities if your proposal were enacted?

7. You state that there is no overall budget or multi-year program for intelligenceactivities. Doesn't the DCI have authority to prepare a multi-year budget for theNational Foreign Intelligence Program now? What specifically prevents the DCI fromestablishing program performance milestones, costs and schedules now for the NFIP?

8. How would you answer the critics who might argue that placing a domesticintelligence service under the DCI would allow the CIA to get too close to spying onAmericans and ultimately threaten civil liberties?

9. What is the difference between your proposal and other proposals that have beenmade to strengthen the DCI?

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Suggested questions based on testimon y subm itted by Dr. Deutch^ X\ 1. Do you believe th e attacks of 9/11 are evidence of a systemic or ganizational problemwithin the Intelligence Com mu nity?jT\ 2. Do you believe th e changes within th e Intelligence Com munity since 9/11 have beensufficient to defend against th e next possible major terrorist attack?U(l ^ou donotexplicitly ooll fordie uuiliuu ufdDinUui uf N aliuiidl LiidligClkV

l CTW'); although yon advocate changing tin balance u f authority between the D C Ia n H th p Sprreti^y nf D p f e n g f ? What is the difference between your proposal an dD Croposals that have been made to aroato a DMI? streMtU A H< D C I ?"4. An Undersecretary of Defense pr Intelligence was recently created within theDepartment of Defense. What^vould be the responsibilities of the Undersecretary ofDefense fo r Intelligence if your proposal were enacted?5. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is described by the Executive Branch

rC J ) as a joint venture of the five principal departments an d agencies with counterterrorismresponsibilities (i.e., CIA and the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice,Defense and State.) W hat in your view are the strengths and weaknesses of a jointventure model?6. Under your proposal, a new Dom estic Intelligence Service (DIS) w ould be created fo r

intelligence activities undertaken in the U.S. and for collection of intelligence whereU.S. persons may be involved.\1^ If** \ How would you answer critics who might argue that a dom estic intelligenceservice created u nder the D CI wo uld allow CIA to get too^hos to spying onAmericans?

Do you envision D IS being created out of the FBI's national security division? How effective would be Department of Justice oversight mechanisms if theniif^nf V newdomestic intelligence service were entirely outside the Department?^

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f / p 7 . ' 7. Why do youbelieve the positions of head of the Intelligence Community andhead ofL f j K J > ) the CIA should not be separated under today's division of responsibilities?

8. You recommend that the DCI should have/authority o r responsibility for the JointM ilitary Intelligence Program (JMIP) and*the Tactical Intelligence an d RelatedActivities (TIARA) of the Department of Defense. Aren't these programs socloselylinked to the warfighting mission that they should remain under th e purview of theSecretary of Defense?

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9. You recommend that the DCI should give up day-to-day management over theNational Reconnaissance Office (NRO) but you also argue that the DCI should havegreater autho rity over the Na tional Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA ) and theNational Security Agency (NSA). Doesn't the NRO have such an integral role in thesuccess of N IM A and NSA that the DCI should retain his current role over N RO ?10. You argue that your proposal w ould improve the operation of four importantfunctions: covert action, information operations, intelligence coordination with othercountries, and science and technology capabilities. What specifically limits the DCI

from addressing these functions und er current law?' 1V DCI