T. M. Scanlon

For other people named Thomas Scanlon, see ThomasScanlon (disambiguation).

Thomas Michael "Tim" Scanlon (/ˈskænlən/; born1940), usually cited as T. M. Scanlon, is an Americanphilosopher. He was the Alford Professor of NaturalReligion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity in HarvardUniversity’s Department of Philosophy until his retire-ment at the end of the 2015-16 academic year.[1]

1 Life and Career

Scanlon grew up in Indianapolis, Indiana; obtained hisundergraduate degree from Princeton University in 1962;earned his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard underBurton Dreben; studied for a year at Oxford University ona Fulbright Scholarship; and returned to Princeton Uni-versity, where he taught from 1966 until 1984.[2]

His dissertation and some of his first papers were inmathematical logic, where his main concern was inproof theory, but he soon made his name in ethicsand political philosophy, where he developed a versionof contractualism in the line of John Rawls, ImmanuelKant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Scanlon has also pub-lished important work on freedom of speech, equality,tolerance, foundations of contract law, human rights, con-ceptions of welfare, theories of justice, as well as on foun-dational questions in moral theory.His teaching in the department has included courses ontheories of justice, equality, and recent ethical theory.His book, What We Owe to Each Other, was publishedby Harvard University Press in 1998; a collection of pa-pers on political theory, The Difficulty of Tolerance, waspublished by Cambridge University Press in 2003.Scanlon is the father-in-law of philosopher and scholar ofAfrican American studies Tommie Shelby.

2 Contractualism

Contractualism is an attempt at providing a unified ac-count of the subject matter of a central part of moralitywhich Scanlon calls ‘what we owe to each other’. The nor-mative domain of what we owe to each other is meant toencompass those duties to other people which we bear invirtue of their standing as rational creatures. A broaderconception of morality includes whatever else we may

owe to specific people, such as the special obligationswe bear in relations with friends and family, or whateverelse morality may require of us, such as the way in whichwe treat ourselves or nature. Scanlon believes that whatwe owe to each other, or what we could loosely call ‘themorality of right and wrong’, is distinct from this broaderconception of morality in that contractualism provides aunified account of its content [3]

We can begin our description of Scanlon’s contractual-ism by noting that judgements about right and wrong,unlike empirical judgements, are not theoretical claimsabout the nature of the spatiotemporal world but ratherpractical claims about what we have reason to do.[4] Fur-ther, they are a particularly important class of practicalclaims in that the judgement that an action is wrong istaken to provide reasons to not do that action which aremost often considered to be decisive against competingreasons.[5] Following this point, Scanlon takes questionsabout the reason-giving force of moral judgements to beprior to questions about the subject matter of the moral-ity of right and wrong.[6]More explicitly, he thinks that ifwe provide an account of the extraordinary reason-givingforce of moral judgements then this account could largelyform the basis for a characterisation of the subject matterof what we owe to each other.Scanlon grounds the reason-giving force of judgementsabout right and wrong in ‘the positive value of a way ofliving with others’.[7] Away of living with others which istypified by an ideal of mutual recognition between ratio-nal agents, where mutual recognition demands that moralagents acknowledge the value of human life and respondto this value in the right ways.How ought we to value human, or rational, life? Scanlonargues persuasively that different valuable things requiredifferent ways of valuing. In contrast to teleological ac-counts of value, often to take something to be of value isnot only to see reason to bring about a maximal amountof that thing.[8] This is especially true when we come toconsider the value of human life. When we value hu-man life we do not see this as a reason to create as muchhuman life as we can. Rather, we tend to see reason torespect other human beings, to protect them from deathand other forms of harm and, in general, to want theirlives to go well. More important for Scanlon, to value ra-tional life is to recognise the features which distinguishrational life from other valuable things, specifically, theability of rational creatures to assess reasons and judge-ments, and to govern their lives in accordance with theseassessments. Scanlon asserts that the proper response to

1

2 3 SELECTED WORKS

the recognition of these distinctive features is to treat ra-tional creatures in terms of principles which they couldnot reasonably reject.[9]

From this point, Scanlon’s account of the value of ratio-nal life provides a locus around which his account of thereason-giving force of moral judgements dovetails quiteneatly with a characterisation of the method of reasoningwhich we use to arrive at judgements of right and wrong,a method, moreover, which seems to be phenomenologi-cally plausible. The reason-giving force of moral judge-ments is grounded in an ideal of mutual recognition whichrequires treating others in accordance with principles thatthey could not reasonably reject. Because mutual recog-nition requires that these other people are also appro-priately motivated, this entails Scanlon’s formulation ofwrongness: ‘An act is wrong if and only if any principlethat permitted it would be one that could reasonably be re-jected by people moved to find principles for the generalregulation of behaviour that others, similarly motivated,could not reasonably reject’.[10] I will call this the con-tractualist formulation. An act is right, quite simply, if aprinciple permitting it could not reasonably be rejectedin terms of the aforementioned formulation.A few, rather discordant, summary comments are neededregarding how moral principles are derived from thecontractualist formulation. When considering whethera principle can be rejected we must take into accountthe consequences, in general, of its being accepted, notonly the consequences of the particular actions that itallows.[11] Because we cannot be sure about who will beaffected by a principle, and how they will be affected,we must draw on our experience of life and considerthe ‘generic reasons’ which individuals are likely to have,as a result of their general circumstances, to reject aprinciple.[12] In order to determine whether a principleis reasonably rejectable, we must impartially weigh thesegeneric reasons against each other,[13] and exercising ourjudgement, draw a conclusion about what the weight ofreasons support.[14] Given the motivation of finding prin-ciples for the general regulation of society that no-onecould reasonably reject, if the weight of reasons supporta certain conclusion then it would be unreasonable to re-ject that conclusion.[15] Importantly, principles can onlybe rejected by individuals; aggregation of reasons acrossindividuals is not allowed.[16] So if the generic reasons ofan individual carry more weight then any other individ-ual’s generic reasons then his generic reasons are (for themost part)decisive in determining principles.The generic reasons which are open to consideration un-der the contractualist formulation are any reasons whichwe judge as relevant to reasonable rejectability. Thisrequires that we exercise our judgement in determin-ing whether such reasons would be suitable grounds formutual recognition.[17] Therefore, that a principle wouldnegatively affect a person’s well-being is not the only kindof reasonwhichmay be brought against a principle. Otherconsiderations, such as how a burden would be imposed

by a principle, can serve as reasonable grounds for rejec-tion.Finally, while contractualism only provides an account ofthat central part ofmorality which deals with what we oweto each other, Scanlon observes that this part of moral-ity is related to the broader realm of morality in com-plex ways. There is pressure for the morality of what weowe to each other to acknowledge the values included inthe broader realm of morality insofar as principles whichdon’t make room for these values could be reasonably re-jected. In turn, these values must accommodate the dic-tates of what we owe to each other to the extent that theyinvolve relations with others, who have separate moralstanding.[18]

3 Selected works

3.1 Books

• Scanlon, T.M. (1998). What we owe to each other.Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Har-vard University Press. ISBN 9780674950894.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2003). The difficulty of toler-ance: essays in political philosophy. CambridgeNew York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780511615153.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2008). Moral dimensions: permissi-bility, meaning, blame. Cambridge, Massachusetts:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN9780674043145.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2014). Being realistic about rea-sons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN9780199678488.

3.2 Chapters in books

• Scanlon, T.M. (1977), “Due process”, in Pennock,J. Roland; Chapman, John W., Due process, NomosSeries no. 18, New York: New York Univer-sity Press, pp. 93–125, ISBN 9780814765692.Preview.

• Scanlon, ThomasM. (1977), “Liberty, contract, andcontribution”, in Dworkin, Gerald; Bermant, Gor-don; Brown, Peter G., Markets and morals, Wash-ington New York: Hemisphere Pub. Corp. Dis-tributed solely by Halsted Press, pp. 43–67, ISBN9780470991695.

• Scanlon, Thomas M. (1979), “Human rights asa neutral concern”, in Brown, Peter; McLean,Douglas, Human rights and U.S. foreign pol-icy: principles and applications, Lexington, Mas-sachusetts: Lexington Books, pp. 83–92, ISBN9780669028072.

3.3 Articles 3

• Scanlon, Thomas M. (1981), “Ethics and the con-trol of research”, in Gaylin, Willard; Macklin, Ruth;Powledge, Tabitha M., Violence and the politics ofresearch, New York: Plenum Press, pp. 225–256,ISBN 9780306407895.

• Scanlon, T.M. (1982), “Contractualism and utilitar-ianism”, in Sen, Amartya; Williams, Bernard, Utili-tarianism and beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, pp. 103–128, ISBN 9780511611964.

• Scanlon, T.M. (1988), “The significance of choice”,in Sen, Amartya; McMurrin, Sterling M., The Tan-ner lectures on human values VIII, Salt Lake City:University of Utah Press, pp. 149–216, ISBN9780874803020. Pdf.

• Scanlon, T.M. (1991), “The moral basis of interper-sonal comparisons”, in Elster, Jon; Roemer, JohnE., Interpersonal comparisons of well-being, Cam-bridge England New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, pp. 17–44, ISBN 9780521457224.

• Scanlon, T.M. (1997). The diversity of objections toinequality. The Lindley Lecture, 1996. Lawrence,Kansas: Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas.Pdf.

Reprinted as: Scanlon, T.M.(2000), “The diversity of objec-tions to inequality”, in Clayton,Matthew; Williams, Andrew,The ideal of equality, Hound-mills, Basingstoke, HampshireNew York: Macmillan Press St.Martin’s Press, pp. 41–59, ISBN9780333686980.

Also available as: Scan-lon, T.M. (1996). “Lavarietà delle obiezionialla disegualianza”.Filosofia e QuestioniPubbliche (Philosophyand Public Issues) (inItalian) (Roma LuissManagement) 2 (2):3–19.

• Scanlon, T.M. (1999), “Punishment and the rule oflaw”, in Koh, Harold Hongju; Slye, Ronald, Delib-erative democracy and human rights, New Haven,Connecticut: Yale University Press, pp. 257–271,ISBN 9780300081671.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2001), “Promises and contracts”,in Benson, Peter, The theory of contract law:new essays, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy andLaw Series, Cambridge England New York: Cam-bridge University Press, pp. 86–117, ISBN9780521041324.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2002), “Reasons and passions”, inBuss, Sarah; Overton, Lee, Contours of agency: es-says on themes from Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge,Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 165–188, ISBN9780262025133.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2004), “Reasons: a puzzling dual-ity?", in Wallace, R. Jay; Pettit, Philip; Scheffler,Samuel; Smith, Michael, Reason and value: themesfrom the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, NewYork:Oxford University Press, pp. 231–246, OCLC648260069.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2006), “Justice, responsibility, andthe demands of equality”, in Sypnowich, Christine,The egalitarian conscience: essays in honour of G.A.Cohen, NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press, pp. 70–87, ISBN 9780199281688.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2009), “Rights and interests”, inKanbur, Ravi; Basu, Kaushik, Arguments for a bet-ter world: essays in honor of Amartya Sen | VolumeI: Ethics, welfare, and measurement, Oxford NewYork: Oxford University Press, pp. 68–79, ISBN9780199239115.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2011), “How I am not a Kantian”,in Parfit, Derek; Scheffler, Samuel, On what matters(volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.116–139, ISBN 9781283160179.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2012), “The appeal and limitsof constructivism”, in Lenman, James; Shemmer,Yonatan, Constructivism in practical philosophy, Ox-ford: Oxford University Press, pp. 226–242, ISBN9780191631191.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2013), “Interpreting blame”, inCoates, D. Justin; Tognazzini, Neal A., Blame: itsnature and norms, Oxford New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press, pp. 84–100, ISBN 9780199860821.

3.3 Articles• Scanlon, Thomas (Winter 1972). “A theory of free-dom of expression”. Philosophy & Public Affairs(Wiley) 1 (2): 204–226. JSTOR 2264971.

• Scanlon, Thomas (Summer 1975). “Thomson onprivacy”. Philosophy & Public Affairs (Wiley) 4 (4):315–322. JSTOR 2265076.

• Scanlon, T.M. (November 1975). “Preferenceand urgency”. The Journal of Philosophy, spe-cial issue: Seventy-Second Annual Meeting AmericanPhilosophical Association, Eastern Division (Jour-nal of Philosophy, Inc.) 72 (19): 655–669.doi:10.2307/2024630.

• Scanlon, Thomas (Autumn 1976). “Nozick onrights, liberty, and property”. Philosophy & PublicAffairs (Wiley) 6 (2): 3–25. JSTOR 2265059.

4 3 SELECTED WORKS

• Scanlon, T.M. (1977). “Due process”. Nomos(American Society for Political and Legal Philos-ophy, special issue: Due Process) 18: 93–125.JSTOR 24219202.

• Scanlon, T.M. (May 1977). “Rights, goals,and fairness”. Erkenntnis, special issue: So-cial Ethics, Part 1 (Springer) 11 (1): 81–95.doi:10.1007/BF00169845. JSTOR 20010534.

• Scanlon, T.M. (October 1986). “Equality of re-sources and equality of welfare: a forced mar-riage?". Ethics, special issue: Symposium on Expla-nation and Justification in Social Theory (ChicagoJournals) 97 (1): 111–118. doi:10.1086/292820.JSTOR 2381409. Pdf.

• Scanlon, Thomas (Summer 1990). “Promises andpractices”. Philosophy & Public Affairs (Wiley) 19(3): 199–226. JSTOR 2265394.

• Scanlon, T.M. (Spring 1992). “The aims andauthority of moral theory”. Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies (Oxford Journals) 12 (1): 1–23.doi:10.1093/ojls/12.1.1. JSTOR 764567.

• Scanlon, T.M. (June 1995). “Moral theory: un-derstanding and disagreement: Reviewed work:The Viability of Moral Theory by Allan Gib-bard, Alasdair MacIntyre”. Philosophy and Phe-nomenological Research (Wiley) 55 (2): 343–356.doi:10.2307/2108551. JSTOR 2108551.

• Scanlon, Thomas (Spring 1997). “The status ofwell-being”. Michigan Quarterly Review (Universityof Michigan). XXXVI (2): 290–310. See alsoTanner lecture pdf.

• Scanlon, T.M. (July 2000). “Intention and per-missibility: T. M. Scanlon”. Aristotelian So-ciety, Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 301–317.doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00073. Pdf.

See also: Dancy, Jonathan (July2000). “Intention and permissibil-ity: Jonathan Dancy”. AristotelianSociety, Supplementary Volume 74(1): 319–338. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00074.

• Scanlon, T.M. (2003). “Individualism, equality, andrights”. University ofMiami LawReview (Universityof Miami School of Law) 58 (1): 359–368. Pdf.

• Scanlon, T.M. (January 2003). “Reply to Gau-thier and Gibbard: Précis ofWhat We Owe to EachOther". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research(Wiley) 66 (1): 176–189. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00249.x. JSTOR 20140523.

See also: Gauthier, David (January2003). “Are we moral debtors?:Reviewed work: What We Oweto Each Other by T. M. Scanlon”.Philosophy and Phenomenolog-ical Research (Wiley) 66 (1):162–168. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00250.x. JSTOR20140521.See also: Gibbard, Allan (January2003). “Reasons to reject allowing:Reviewed work: What We Oweto Each Other by T. M. Scanlon”.Philosophy and Phenomenolog-ical Research (Wiley) 66 (1):169–175. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00251.x. JSTOR20140522.

• Scanlon, T.M. (November 2003). “Metaphysics andmorals”. Proceedings and Addresses of the AmericanPhilosophical Association (American PhilosophicalAssociation) 77 (2): 7–22. doi:10.2307/3219738.JSTOR 3219738.

• Scanlon, T.M. (December 2003). “Replies”. Ratio(Wiley) 16 (4): 424–439. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00231.x.

See also: O'Neill, Onora (Decem-ber 2003). “Constructivism vs.contractualism”. Ratio (Wiley) 16(4): 319–331. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00226.x.See also: Wolff, Jonathan (De-cember 2003). “Scanlon onwell-being”. Ratio (Wiley) 16 (4):332–345. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00227.x.See also: Raz, Joseph (De-cember 2003). “Numbers,with and without contractual-ism”. Ratio (Wiley) 16 (4):346–367. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00228.x.See also: Parfit, Derek (December2003). “Justifiability to eachperson”. Ratio (Wiley) 16 (4):368–390. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00229.x.See also: Timmons, Mark (Decem-ber 2003). “The limits of moralconstructivism”. Ratio (Wiley) 16(4): 391–423. doi:10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00230.x.

• Scanlon, T.M. (May 2011). “Why not base freespeech on autonomy or democracy?". Virginia Law

5

Review (The Virginia Law Review Association viaJSTOR) 97 (3): 541–548. JSTOR 41261520. Pdf.

• Scanlon, T.M. (October 2011). “Forum: libertari-anism and liberty”. Boston Review (Boston Critic,Inc.).

• Scanlon, T.M. (June 2012). “Provocation: every-one is a philosopher!". Harvard Law Review Forum(The Harvard Law Review Association) 125: 228–235.

• Scanlon, T.M. (Spring 2013). “Responsibility andthe value of choice”. Think (Cambridge Journals)12 (33): 9–16. doi:10.1017/S1477175612000280.

• Scanlon, Thomas M. (June 2013). “Givingdesert its due”. Philosophical Explorations, spe-cial issue: Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes andFree Will (Taylor and Francis) 16 (2): 101–116.doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.787437.

• Scanlon, T.M. (June 2015). “Kamm on the disvalueof death”. Journal of Medical Ethics (BMJ Group)41 (6): 490. doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102037.

See also: Kamm, Frances (June2015). “Summary of BioethicalPrescriptions". Journal of MedicalEthics (BMJ Group) 41 (6): 488–489. doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102018.

4 References[1] http://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/event/

celebration-philosophy-and-teaching-tm-scanlon

[2] http://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/people/thomas-m-scanlon

[3] Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, pp.6-7

[4] Scanlon 2

[5] Scanlon 1

[6] Scanlon 3

[7] Scanlon 162

[8] Scanlon 78-100

[9] Scanlon 105-106

[10] Scanlon 4

[11] Scanlon 203-204

[12] Scanlon 204-205

[13] Scanlon 195

[14] Scanlon 218

[15] Scanlon 192

[16] Scanlon 229-230

[17] Scanlon 194

[18] Scanlon 174

5 SourcesInterviews with Scanlon

• 'The Kingdom of Ends on the Cheap' in AlexVoorhoeve Conversations on Ethics. Oxford Univer-sity Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-921537-9

• “Ethics of Blame”

• An Interview with T. M. Scanlon by YaschaMounk,2012-07-07.

6 External links• The Department of Philosophy at Harvard

6 7 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

7 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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