Revitalizing the Concept of Sociotechnical Systems in Social Studies of Technology

M. Pilar Opazo! Columbia University

Running head: Sociotechnical Systems

[Word count, including references: 10,635]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I am deeply indebted to Dario Rodriguez and Diane Vaughan for their careful comments and continuous support in the process of writing this article. Special thanks to David Stark for his constructive suggestions. The personal support and intellectual contribution of Jose Zubizarreta and Maite Breton was invaluable for this work. Direct correspondence to M. Pilar Opazo, Columbia University, Department of Sociology – 606 West 122nd Street, 506 Knox Hall, New York, NY 10027. Email: mpo2110@columbia.edu

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Revitalizing the Concept of Sociotechnical Systems in Social Studies of Technology

Abstract The concept of sociotechnical systems concerns the complex associations between humans and instruments. This concept has been widely used to examine the construction of technology and the effect technologies have on our social practices, the organization of work and society. In this article, I draw on prior conceptualizations and a number of contemporary studies on technology to develop a novel theoretical model for the study of sociotechnical systems. This model reexamines the significance of this concept focusing on a set of characteristics that describe the sociotechnical systems’ operation: these systems’ collective behavior, distributed cognition, processing of information, meaning structure configuration and coupling patterns. The contributions of the concept of sociotechnical systems to the growing field of science and technology, and the theoretical implications and potential research extensions of my proposed analytical model are explored and discussed.

Key words Sociotechnical Systems, technology, social studies of technology, system theory.

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Revitalizing the Concept of Sociotechnical Systems in Social Studies of Technology

Sociological studies have found that technology is both a socially constructed product

and an agent capable of triggering changes in society. We create material artifacts that, in turn,

shape our social practices, working conditions and organizational forms by proposing new ways

of doing things. Accordingly, scholars in the field of science and technology studies have

advocated the need for descriptions of technologies that remain rooted in their material nature yet

account for their capacity for agency.

The concept of sociotechnical systems or large technological systems, as proposed by

Tomas P. Hughes, has been widely used to examine this complex and dual nature of

technological artifacts and their effects on social relationships and relationships between people

and organizations. However, when we look closely at how this concept has been employed in

social studies of technology we find that there is a lack of theorization within the literature.

Repeatedly the concept of sociotechnical systems appears to be taken for granted – “black-

boxed” – which leads it to be used either in ambiguous ways or indistinct from other more

loosely defined terms such as sociotechnical “configurations”, “arrangements” or “associations.”

This present state of vagueness, I argue, limits this concept’s potential to formulate relevant

research questions and to orient empirical investigations. Most importantly, it hinders this

concept’s capacity to offer explanation of our social world and the role that technologies play in

that world (Blumer 1954).

As a consequence, what we mean by sociotechnical systems needs to be reconsidered. In

this article I review the significance and usefulness of the concept of sociotechnical systems in

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its examination of technology. This review lays the groundwork for revitalizing this concept

which I undertake by developing a new analytical model for the study of sociotechnical systems.

Drawing on insights provided by prior conceptualizations and a number of empirical studies, my

proposed model re-examines sociotechnical systems focused on a set of characteristics that

describe their functioning; specifically, these systems’ emergent collective behavior, processes of

cognition, processing of information, meaning structure configuration and coupling patterns.

Overall, the analysis presented here aims to make two general contributions: first, to

provide insights into the role of systems theory in the study of technology and second, to clarify

the distinction between systems-oriented and other contending theoretical approaches in science

and technology studies, in particular, network-oriented approaches such as the Actor-Network

Theory originally developed by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon.

This article is structured as follows: the first section examines prior conceptualizations

that contribute to our understanding of the concept of sociotechnical systems. The second section

introduces two central elements, the inclusion of which underlie the novelty of my theoretical

proposal: (i) an alternative description of technology based on system theory principles and (ii)

key concepts of Niklas Luhmann’s modern system theory that until now have not been

incorporated into social studies of technology. The third section outlines a new analytical model

for the study of sociotechnical systems. This article concludes with a discussion of theoretical

and practical implications and potential research extensions of my proposed model. The ways in

which insights from this theoretical model can benefit the growing field of science and

technology are explored.

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I. REVIEWING EARLIER CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

In the interest of conceptual examination and elaboration, I review two prior systems

analytic perspectives concerning sociotechnical systems: Hughes’ “large technological systems”

and the Tavistock Institute’s theory of “sociotechnical systems.” In particular, I examine the

contributions of these two theories for the study of technologies and the effect technologies have

in our daily practices, the organization of work and society as a whole. The contributions of these

two perspectives outlined next will be included in my proposed theoretical model for the study of

sociotechnical systems.

(i) The Large Technological Systems Perspective

Hughes’s studies, developed from a historical perspective, represent one of the first

attempts to introduce a systems theoretical approach to the study of technology (e.g. Hughes

1979, 1983, 1985, 1989). Hughes defined large technological systems (LTS) as systems that are

both socially assembled and society shaping (Hughes 1989). An important aspect of Hughes

characterization of large technological systems is his understanding of the “technical” aspects as

merely the physical artifacts that constitute a technological system. A main property of large

technological systems is therefore that they do not correspond only to the technical artifacts –

such as an electrical grid or power system – but that they also include economic, political,

scientific, cultural and legislative components. Together, these compose what Hughes calls a

“seamless web”; a messy, complex and troubled network of interactive elements that contribute

to the process of “system building.”

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For the purposes of this article, three main contributions of Hughes’ LTS perspective are

valuable to point out. First, with his concept of large technological systems Hughes introduces

the environment as an essential part of the analysis. From a systems theoretic approach, a system

cannot be understood without its environment; moreover, the interaction between the system and

its environment is critical for the system's evolution. As Hughes suggests, throughout time,

technological systems manage to incorporate environment into the system so as to reduce

uncertainty.

Second, Hughes notion of “system building” leaves aside the idea that the evolution of

technologies is a straightforward process, inevitably leading to progress and stability. In line with

Bloor’s (1991) principle of impartiality in science and technology studies, Hughes describes the

development of technologies as being highly contingent, leading either to order or chaos, success

or failure. Hughes’s concept of “reverse salient” refers precisely to this characteristic of

technological systems – if a system is not able to cope with problems that arise during its

evolution, or to identify them and define ways to solve them, its very existence will be at stake.

Third, Hughes’s definition of technological systems constitutes a reaction against

technological deterministic and anthropomorphic assumptions in the study of technologies. If we

consider technology to be a complex process of production, management and development in

which diverse elements interact oriented towards a common goal, then we cannot think of

technical artifacts as exogenous forces endowed with the capacity of shaping social relationships

or inevitably transforming society. In addition, although Hughes’s early work places great

attention on human-“system builders” such as inventors-entrepreneurs, engineers, managers and

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scientists,1 his understanding of non-social elements as central agents in the system building

process shifts the attention from the social components that constitute the system to the system

itself.

Following Hughes’s work, other science and technology scholars have undertaken a

systems-oriented approach in their analysis of technology. For example, building on Hughes’s

LTS perspective, MacKenzie (1989) examines the missile as a technological system and claims

that the development of this technology cannot be studied in isolation from organizational,

political and economic factors. This is particularly interesting considering that, as the author

mentions, the missile technology is usually regarded as self-contained. In line with a systems-

theoretical approach, MacKenzie includes the environment into his analysis by describing the

system’s constant search for adaptation and by exploring the ways in which it manages to

incorporate complexity into the system. The system's stability, thus, is presented as a precarious

achievement obtained by a continuous redrawing of the systems’ boundaries.

(ii) The Sociotechnical Systems Perspective

The development of sociotechnical systems theory dates back to the 1950s and derives

from the research conducted by the Tavistock Institute of Humans Relations in London. Two

scholars, Eric L. Trist and Fred E. Emery, appear among the main figures of this research group.

This perspective emerged as a resistance to the organization of work that prevailed after the

Second World War, which tended to exacerbate the mechanization of work (Trist 1981, Scott

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Later, Hughes included into his notion of “system builders” larger social entities such as groups or institutions.!

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and Davis 2003). From a social-psychological perspective, the Tavistock conceptual framing

regards technical systems (hard and soft equipment) and social systems (work-groups,

organizations or macro-social arrangements)2 as the substantive elements that constitute a

sociotechnical system (Trist 1981). Unlike Hughes LTS theory, this perspective remains largely

underexplored and underexploited within the field of science and technology studies. Again, I

highlight three main contributions of this theoretical proposal that are relevant for my analysis of

sociotechnical systems.

First, the Tavistock researchers identify a key characteristic of sociotechnical systems:

the interdependency between its social and technical components. To be precise, sociotechnical

systems differentiate from other social systems because of being primarily dependent on their

material means and resources in order to achieve certain outputs. This description therefore

suggests that sociotechnical systems will vary according to the characteristics of each of the

systems that constitute them, and also according to the types of associations between them.

Second, the Tavistock group’s theory deviates from simplistic accounts that regard

machines as mere extensions of humans. Instead, it proposes material artifacts as complementary

to humans in the organization of work. Following this line of reasoning, this perspective suggests

that the redundancy in sociotechnical systems is of functions, not of parts. Workers are not

conceived as merely pieces of a machine but as part of a system that functions organically.

Furthermore, this analytical perspective suggests that the more autonomous the workers that

participate in sociotechnical systems – and thus the functions to be controlled by them – the

higher their level of satisfaction.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 The initial work of the Tavistock Institute proposed unitary work-groups as central unit of analysis. However, their subsequent work considers broader levels of analysis such as the examples mentioned above (Baburoglu 1992). !

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Third, the Tavistock Institute’s theory emphasizes the fact that sociotechnical systems are

autonomous, self-regulated entities in their operation. Since sociotechnical systems operate by

"variety-increasing” procedures rather than "variety-decreasing" procedures, each system has the

capacity to manage its relationship with the environment by incorporating elements that it

considers relevant into its own operation. This resonates with Hughes’ description of a large

technological system as being capable of building itself through increasing its own complexity.

Although not comprehensive, the Tavistock Institute’s social-psychological perspective

and Hughes’ historical perspective help us to better understand the concept of sociotechnical

system and its conceptual and practical implications. While the Tavistock researchers propose a

more precise definition of sociotechnical systems and its characteristics, Hughes’s approach

presents a more developed understanding of the role of additional factors – namely political,

economic, and scientific factors – that are also at play in the evolution of large technological

systems. A common and crucial aspect of these two perspectives is that both seek for a

description of technologies capable of accounting for their material nature as well as their

capacities for agency. For now, it is also worthwhile noting that both of these perspectives

support their analysis in an open systems paradigm. This will be discussed in more detailed in

the next section.

II. ELEMENTS OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL PROPOSED

Before reexamining the concept of sociotechnical systems, I will lay out two main

components that will be part of my proposed theoretical model. First, I develop a description of

technology that suggests new ways in which system theory – as used to describe systems of

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many interacting components – can illuminate the social study of technology. Next, I introduce

key principles and concepts of Niklas Luhmann’s theory that provide significant insights into the

systems-oriented perspectives (Hughes and Tavistock) already explored.

Describing Technology based on System Theory Principles

Exploring sociotechnical systems requires a clear description of technology. System

theory, I propose, is especially well-suited for the study of the social construction and evolution

of technology and its implications, as it understands the material and social components of

technology as different types of systems, characterized by different levels of complexity and

ways of operating.

From a systems-theoretical approach, such as that proposed by Boulding (1956), the

material aspects of technology can be identified as two types of systems: (i) “dynamic systems”,

which correspond to simple machines, tools or instruments with predetermined motions (e.g. the

steam engine, a light bulb or a clock), and (ii) “control systems” or “self-regulated systems”,

capable of maintaining any given state of equilibrium by the transmission and interpretation of

information within the system. The complexity of this latter kind of system is higher than that of

the former, since these systems have negative feedback mechanisms, that is, they operate based

on the distinction between observed and ideal values and are capable of comparing these two

values so as to correct the deviations and approximate to an ideal state. The missile technology

studied by MacKenzie (1989), for example, corresponds to a “control system” as it is capable of

changing its outputs depending on the inputs obtained from its environment. It is important to

point out that the systems described so far are closed systems.

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Conversely, from a systems analytic approach, the social aspects of technology – such as

a human being or social systems – are open systems (or self-referential systems, as we will see

next). These systems’ level of complexity is higher than that of closed systems since they are

capable of self-maintenance and, furthermore, they posses self-consciousness. They are not only

“aware” of their environment but they are also self-reflexive – ‘they not only know, but they

know that they know’ (Boulding 1956). More precisely, the reflexive capacity of human beings

(psychic systems) is based on thoughts, and the awareness of those thoughts is what we call

conscience. Our ability to extract information from mere signs (for instance, from an

arrangement of alphabetical words) and endow them with meaning is linked with this reflexive

capacity. Social systems, on the other hand, consist of two or more individuals who interact in

various ways and their reflexive capacity is based on communications (Luhmann 1995).

Interactions, organizations, macro-social arrangements and society fall under this category. As

we shall see, social systems are particularly relevant for the purposes of my theoretical model as

they constitute the social component of sociotechnical systems.

The analytical distinction between material artifacts (hard and soft equipment), human

beings and social systems proposed in system theory is crucial since it stresses the fact that a

machine’s operation is not based on contingency as is the operation of an open system. Although

some sophisticated machines are able to incorporate information into their own operation, they

do not function based on “self-awareness” as humans and social systems do. They may be able to

transmit and interpret information but they are incapable of "understanding" in the same way as

self-referential systems. This unique faculty of open systems was emphasized early on in science

and technology studies by Collins; in his words, “the establishment of novelty is a

quintessentially social activity” (Collins 1985: 23). As Collins reminds us, we can design a

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machine to have a myriad of ways of responding to different situations, even imagine ourselves

raising it and socializing it in the way a human socializes other humans, but its possibilities for

action and interpretation will still be finite. The complete “social script” that humans and social

systems have will still remain impenetrable to a machine (Collins 1985). Put differently,

machines lack what Schutz and Luckmann (1979: 25-28) describe as “life-world” – that

intersubjective, pre-reflexive and implicit source of knowledge that is shared by “adults persons”

and, in being shared, serves as a platform to generate common meaning and enable

understanding (Schutz and Luckmann 1979: 25-28). Therefore, despite the fact that technology is

a social construction and a social outcome, its technical and social components are indeed a

duality; this explains why Giddens theory of “duality of structure” (1984) has proven to be so

enlightening in social studies of technology (e.g. Orlikowski 1992, Gieryn 2002).

Similarly to Giddens’ theory, I suggest that the principles of system theory pointed out

above provide a novel opportunity for describing technologies in a way that takes into account

their dual and complex nature. Although, in practice, all the systems that are part of this

classification scheme are intermingled – i.e., one type of system may be included in another

system of a higher level of complexity, as is the case of machines and organizations or humans

and organizations – their theoretical distinction provided by system theory opens the possibility

for uncoupling the material aspects of technology from its social aspects for the later

examination of their coupling; the effects that one has on the other and the particularities of their

interactions.3

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 The importance of sustaining an analytical distinction between the material and social aspects of technology and its theoretical implications was pointed out earlier by Orlikowski (1992).

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From a systems-theoretical point of view, therefore, the “agency and structure” of

technologies cannot be considered a property of either technical artifacts or a mere extension of

human actions but of the coupling between a human (psychic system) and artifacts4 or social

systems and artifacts. Our concern is with the second type, what we call “sociotechnical

systems.” It is important to add to my proposed description of technology that when humans or

social systems attempt to enact, appropriate and employ technical systems, they do not encounter

them in a vacuum or as inert and powerless entities. On the contrary, these open systems are

aware of the cultural and social circumstances in which they and the technical systems are

embedded and they have certain expectations and knowledge regarding the technologies’ history

and capacities. As Heidegger points out in his essay concerning technology, technology is a

“challenging revealing.” Technologies do not just “stand there” as passive objects, they provoke

us, they set-upon immediately at-hand, calling us for the ordering of the orderable (Heidegger

1977).

As we can notice, my proposed description of technology is in line with Hughes’s

distinction between “technical artifacts” and “technological systems” in which the former are

merely the material component of the latter. It is also aligned with the Tavistock group’s

proposal to examine sociotechnical systems as the interdependence between two kinds of

systems: technical systems and social systems.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!The coupling between a human (psychic system) and a technical system, I propose, refers to a different kind of system, which we might call a "psycho-technical system". This system’s operation and complexity differs from that of sociotechnical systems.!

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Modern system theory of Niklas Luhmann – a sociological perspective

Although system theory appears to have played a significant role in the social study of

technology, the modern systems approach developed by Niklas Luhmann, has not yet been

employed within this literature. It is not difficult to guess why: this systemic perspective

identifies organisms, human beings, machines and social systems as different types of systems;

yet it has centered its analysis on the latter, i.e., social systems (Luhmann 1995). Accordingly,

though this theory discusses the role of technology at some length, it does not examine the

possibilities of coupling between machines and social systems, what we refer to as sociotechnical

systems. Nevertheless, the principles and concepts of Luhmann’s social systems theory have

much to offer to the next generation of sociotechnical systems theorization. In this regard, three

main concepts of Luhmann’s account are particularly relevant: (i) self-referential (or autopoietic)

systems, (ii) meaning boundaries, and (iii) self-referential and hetero-referential attribution

processes, all of which will be included in my proposed analytical model for the study of

sociotechnical systems.

(i) Self-referential Systems

In contrast to Hughes and the Tavistock group, Luhmann substitutes an open system

paradigm with one of self-referential systems,5 which describes the process of “system building”

as a combination of closure and openness in the evolution of systems. The theory of

environmentally open systems, Luhmann argues, characterizes the relationship between system

and environment by an input/output relation that overemphasizes the system’s external

conditions. This takes for granted the variable and difficult-to-predict system behavior by

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 Although contrary to a functionalist perspective, Giddens structuration theory (1984), which has been used extensively in social studies of technology, is also based on the notion of self-reference.!!

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assuming the system structure to be invariant (Luhmann 1995). The theory of self-referential

systems instead, starts with the fact that the difference from the environment is not a problem of

transaction processes, rather, a condition for the systems self-identification and reproduction.

This shift from an open system paradigm to one of self-referential systems will be crucial in the

analytical model of sociotechnical systems that I develop in the next section. Additionally, it is

relevant to note that contrary to the Tavistock group, Luhmann’s account of the evolution of self-

referential systems is not based on the premise of optimization but instead on conservation and

adaptation of the systems.

(ii) Meaning Boundaries

With the notion of self-referential systems Luhmann includes the drawing of boundaries

as an essential part of the system’s operation. The self-maintenance of this kind of systems

presupposes the systems’ capacity to sustain its boundaries. In addition, Luhmann’s suggests that

the boundaries of self-referential systems are composed of three dimensions of meaning: factual,

social and temporal. Given their self-awareness, self-referential systems understand themselves

and their environment by identifying and making use of the material objects that are part of them

(factual dimension), by the social actors that constitute them (social dimension) and by

considering their temporal and spatial circumstances (temporal dimension). For example, an

organization that fails to evaluate the adequacy of its technological devices or compare them

with the ones used by the organizations with which it must compete (factual dimension), that

loses its capacity to recognize its members (social dimension), or that is not able to elaborate an

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adequate image of its "space" and "time" (temporal dimension) is most likely an organization

that is doomed to dissolve.

(iii) Self-referential and Hetero-referential Processes of Attribution

Finally, Luhmann’s theory states that self-referential systems operate based on processes

of self-reference and hetero-reference in which the system attributes certain phenomena to itself

or to its environment. By doing this, the system establishes what belongs to it and what does not.

As we will see, both of these processes of attribution are crucial for the self-referential systems’

reproduction as they are part of the adaptive behavior of the systems as a whole; they allow them

to select among alternatives and, consequently, to incorporate (or exclude) external and internal

information into the system’s own operation.

III. A NEW THEORETICAL MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS

Let’s return to our original question: what do we mean by sociotechnical systems? From

a systems analytic perspective, this question shifts to: what characterizes the operation of a

sociotechnical system? Drawing on evidence provided by a manifold of social studies of

technology, I develop a theoretical model that extends Luhmman’s systems theory to the study of

sociotechnical systems and builds on the contributions offered by Hughes and the Tavistock

group’s perspectives. Altogether, the model proposed constitutes a novel system-oriented

approach for the study of sociotechnical systems.

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Sociotechnical Systems as an Emergent Phenomenon

As stated previously, technical systems are closed systems. Social systems – e.g.

interactions, organizations, macro-social arrangements or society – instead, have self-

reproducing, extendable boundaries. Combining my proposed systemic description of technology

with the Tavistock Institute conceptual proposal, I suggest we examine sociotechnical systems as

the coupling of two kinds of systems of different levels of complexity: technical systems and

social systems. Here, I use the word “coupling” following Weick's (1976) definition of the term.

Contrary to other terms such as “connections”, “configurations”, “associations” or

“interdependencies”, Weick’s notion of “coupling” opens the possibility to “specify clearly the

identity, separateness and boundaries of the elements that are coupled” (Weick 1976: 4). This is

crucial for my understanding of sociotechnical systems: the technical system remains material in

nature and the social system must preserve its self-reproducing character based on

communications. It is only because each system is able to maintain its identity that, in their

coupling, they allow for the emergence of a third system – a sociotechnical system.

The technical system and the social system trigger changes in one another and as a

consequence transform one another. The coupling between the technical and social components

generate a new system characterized by its own level of complexity and way of operating that is

different from that of the social system and that of the technical system. They need one another

in order to promote the system’s self-reproduction. Again, following the Tavistock group, I

suggest that this new system’s operation is characterized by interdependencies between the

technical and the social system that constitute it, exhibiting an emergent and difficult-to-predict

collective behavior. Consequently, not every social system is a sociotechnical system. Only those

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social systems in which technical artifacts play a crucial role in their functioning are

sociotechnical systems.

In contrast to a technical system with closed boundaries, I use Luhmann’s

conceptualization to propose that the boundaries of this new sociotechnical system are self-

reproducing and, again, different from either the boundaries of the social system or the technical

system alone. It is in this third system then where spontaneity and novel outcomes never

anticipated by the designers of the technologies may take place. Furthermore, I suggest that the

negotiated and contested character of the use of technologies is part of the sociotechnical

system’s continual struggle to adapt and reproduce. From my approach, therefore, concepts

largely used in social studies of technology such as “interpretative flexibility” (Pinch and Bijker

1989) or “heterogeneous engineering” (Law 1989), can be understood as part of the system’s

complex process of adaptation. The sociotechnical system is in itself a "trading zone" (Galison

1999).

[Figure 1 about here]

To name an example, viewed from the standpoint of my theoretical model, Barley’s

(1996) known study of the introduction of CT scanners into different Radiology Departments can

be understood as the examination of the coupling between the same technical system (CT

scanners) into dissimilar social systems (Radiology Departments). Given that each case

corresponds to different coupling processes, the changes occasioned by these technical artifacts

also differed across sites. As Barley concludes in his study, one department became more

centralized than the other. The sociotechnical system that emerged from each coupling triggered

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different social dynamics in each organization, in turn resulting in consistently distinct

sociotechnical systems. In Barley’s words, “complexity and uncertainty are functions of how the

machine merged with the social system; they are not attributes of the machine itself” (Barley

1986:106).

Luhmann’s notion of self-referential systems provides significant insights into prior

conceptualizations of sociotechnical systems. From this viewpoint, boundaries are conceived as

essential for the sociotechnical system’s reproduction. In fact, they are a condition of possibility

of the system’s existence. From this approach, thus, Hughes’s “seamless webs” exist within

defined boundaries. Technical, cultural, economic, scientific and political elements are likely to

flow within sociotechnical systems, but this does not mean that the systems are boundless.

Sociotechnical systems are both open to their exterior and closed in their operation. The role that

system boundaries play is crucial for their functioning. They allow the system to differentiate

from its environment and define its identity.

The systems’ boundaries may remain highly flexible or become rigid – as when a

technological system gains “momentum” (Hughes 1989). They can also be redrawn, as Gieryn’s

(2002) suggests by examining a biotechnology building at Cornell University which, after being

socially designed and shaping social practices, underwent several material and discursive

reconfigurations. From the approach developed here, therefore, the interpretative flexibility of

technologies occurs within the continuous efforts of the systems to draw their boundaries.

If we understand sociotechnical systems as self-referential systems capable of

constructing their identity, then it is important to examine the phenomenon of knowing in these

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systems. What characterizes the processes of cognition of sociotechnical systems? How do they

“get to know” about their environment and therefore about themselves?

Distributed Cognition

The environment that the sociotechnical system perceives, and consequently the picture

of the environment that it is able to elaborate, differ from those of the social system and those of

the technical system that compose the sociotechnical system. This is because, as suggested in

previous social studies of technology, the cognition that operates within a sociotechnical system

is distributed among humans and instruments. It involves the interaction of humans with humans

(social systems), instruments with instruments (technical system), and humans with instruments.

A study that gives explanation on this characteristic of sociotechnical systems is Hutchins (1995)

analysis on how a cockpit is able to establish a memory so as to remember its speed – a memory,

he argues, that is different from that of the crew members and that provided by the internal and

external devices involved in this task.

In their study of biological systems, Maturana and Varela claim that “every act of

knowing brings forth a world” (Maturana and Varela 1998:26). Applied to the study of

sociotechnical systems, the “world” that a sociotechnical system brings forth is unique in the

sense that the act of knowing is performed by complex interactions between humans and

technical artifacts. In these systems the processes of perception are accomplished through the

mediation of technologies. However, instruments do not represent the things themselves but

abstractions of the things that may be more or less accurate depending on the internal

conditioning of the instruments (Heider 1959). In sociotechnical systems hence instruments are

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not only intermediaries that transmit the information without altering it, but mediators of

meaning (Latour 1987, 2005). Awareness, thus, is always imperfect. Through their mediation of

representations, instruments allow the sociotechnical system to perceive certain forms, but only

in ways that are meaningful to the system. This is why every act of cognition involves

uncertainty. Studies of technology regarding “boundary objects”6 – described as artifacts that are

internally heterogeneous yet robust enough to bridge different perspectives – could be seen from

my approach as devices used to cope with uncertainty.

One study that examines the idea of distributed cognition is Beunza and Stark’s (2004)

ethnography of a trading room in Wall Street. In this study, the authors explain how the “situated

awareness” about the market is achieved by multiple sensors that are present in the room, both

human and instrumental. The perception of the market and the recognition of opportunities,

which is crucial in trades, are created collectively by the traders and their instruments. As a

result, the profit obtained in the trades does not derive from the instruments and the results they

convey, but from the complex interactions among persons and technologies and the creative

recombinations that emerge from their assemblages. From this, Beunza and Stark’s conclude that

“a trader’s tools are sociotechnical.” To be more precise, from my proposed analytical model we

could say that it is not the tools themselves but the whole system that is sociotechnical. The

“world” that the trading room, as a sociotechnical system, brings forth cannot be reduced to the

one that is pictured by the tools or to the one that is elaborated by the traders. As the authors

claim, “the instruments of representation that make up the technology of finance retain their

value only so long as they remain entangled in social relations that spawned them” (Beunza and

Stark 2004: 395). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 Some examples of social studies of technology concerning boundary objects are Star and Griesemer 1989; Bowker and Star 1999; Bechy 2003.

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Now that we have an idea of how these systems get to know about their internal and

external environment, it is useful to consider in more detail the ways in which sociotechnical

systems are capable of incorporating this knowledge into their own operation.

Processing of Information

What flows within sociotechnical systems and promotes their development is

information. To develop, the system selects elements from its environment and incorporates

them into its own operation in the form of information. It is important to bear in mind, however,

that for the elements of the exterior to become part of the system they must be integrated by the

system itself. Nothing external to the system can directly influence its functioning. Only the

system can inform itself in regard to its environment and, in so doing, define its identity and

autonomy. This is consistent with Hughes and the Tavistock Institute’s description of

sociotechnical systems as autonomous, self-regulated entities that operate based on “variety-

increasing” procedures.

The processing of information done by sociotechnical systems is illustrated, for instance,

in Law’s (1989: 122-126) study of the navigation technologies during the Portuguese expansion.

In this analysis, Law describes how problems became more acute when the Portuguese sought to

sail longer distances and, therefore, needed to determine their position when they were far from

land. For achieving successful journeys, the system – which included diverse elements such as

the ship (e.g. voltas), wind, current, the sailors and their skills – increased its complexity by

incorporating the “stars” into its operation. Nevertheless, by themselves, the “stars” could not

22!!

become part of the system. A previous process of conversion – or “translation” as Hutchins

(1995) suggests – of this external factor needed to be made. In this case, the incorporation of new

artifacts such as the quadrant or the astrolabe into the system’s operation, combined with the

skills of the navigators, made the calculation of the altura and point of destination possible. In

short, what were previously insignificant “points of light in the night sky” were transformed

through this conversion process into meaningful information that allowed the system to function

smoothly.

In fact, a sociotechnical system needs to increase its complexity in order to promote its

development. The system, however, cannot incorporate all the elements from its environment as

these would imply its complete fusion with it and its dissolution. This is why the system is forced

to choose, which again highlights the fact that every process of selection involves uncertainty

and that, by selecting, systems transform uncertainty into risk. An investigation that provides

evidence on the complexity involved in the selection processes performed by a system –and the

risks associated with these processes – is Vaughan’s (1996; 1999) analysis on the decision taken

by the NASA organization regarding the launch of “The Challenger” space shuttle. From the

standpoint of my proposed theoretical model, Vaughan’s study can be seen as the examination of

a sociotechnical system consisting of the coupling between a formal organization (NASA) and a

highly sophisticated technical system (hard and soft equipment). In her analysis, Vaughan

describes how complex, uncertain and messy evidence was systematically reduced and

transformed by – we could say – the sociotechnical system as a whole so as to allow agreement

to take place within the system. And as she explains, these processes of selection of information

had major consequences for the system as they resulted, in this case, in the failed decision to

accept the risk and launch the space shuttle.

23!!

I use Luhmann’s (1995) conceptualization to suggest that the recursive operation of a

sociotechnical system consists of self-referential and hetero-referential processes in which the

system recognize certain phenomena as part of itself or as part of its environment. This is very

important for the theoretical approach developed here, as it helps us to explain the ways in which

economic, scientific, political or other factors are incorporated into a system’s operation,

encouraging the system’s variable collective behavior, its success or failure. Once more, these

factors do not directly affect the system; rather the system selects them and includes them into its

own operation accordingly. This is how it combines diverse elements into a unique “seamless

web”, as proposed by Hughes.

Stories of success and failure in the evolution of sociotechnical systems can be found in

the literature. For instance, Schwartz Cowan (1985) and Callon (1989) both study the introduction

of an invention into markets: the former, of the electric refrigerator in the U.S. market and, the

latter, of the electric car (VEL) in France. Like in my theoretical model, these studies propose the

incorporation of additional factors as critical in determining these inventions’ success or failure.

Whereas in the case of the electric refrigerator the inclusion of the economic interests of the

electricity companies was key for the success of this technology, the outcome of the VEL system

turned out to be the exact reverse – the incapacity of the system to integrate the economic

interests, social aspirations and political considerations of the “world” in which the electric car

would function led to the technology’s failure. Both of these studies serve as a good example of

the self-referential and hetero-referential attributions that are needed by a sociotechnical system

in order to survive and endure.

I have stated that sociotechnical systems process information by choosing among

alternatives and that these processes of selection are crucial in assuring the systems’

24!!

development. But, how do the systems distinguish between what to include and what to exclude

from their operation? Phrased differently, what enables the systems to select among infinite

alternatives?

Meaning Structure Configuration

The information that is incorporated by the system is the result of a process of selection

by which the system decides what would be considered meaningful and what would be

discarded. Meaning, then, is what allows the system to select among multiple alternatives and

consequently, to reduce and maintain its complexity. I employ Luhmann’s conceptual framing to

propose that the boundaries of sociotechnical systems are boundaries of meaning defined by

specific factual, social and temporal circumstances that will vary from system to system.

Although these three dimensions of meaning may be examined separately, they always appear

together in every intended meaning constitution (Luhmann 1995).

The distinction of three dimensions of meaning proposed by Luhmann brings new light to

the examination of the sociotechnical systems’ meaning structure configuration. This analytical

distinction can orient our analysis on how meaning is generated, distributed and shaped within

and by sociotechnical systems. Let’s look at one example of how this could be so. Instead of

exploring the coupling of an organization and a technical system as Barley and Vaughan did,

Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger’s (2002) study the operation of a macro-social system (i.e., the

financial market of foreign transactions) mediated by technologies (i.e., computer screens). By

examining the conversations among traders – conversations carried out through “on-screen”

codes and signals – Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger explain how micro-level patterns of integration

25!!

are capable of stabilizing the macro-behavior of the market. Based on their analysis, the authors

suggest that the accomplishment of intersubjective coordination in this market is achieved by the

participants actions towards one another (social dimension) and by the screens and the content

transmitted through the screens (factual dimension) in real time (temporal dimension). This case

exemplifies how the separate analysis of the dimensions of meaning could deepen our

understanding of the mechanisms by which a sociotechnical system is able to provide sustained

shared-meaning to its members and, as a consequence, to make the systems’ collective behavior

possible.

Moreover, the fact that Luhmann’s conceptualization gives equal weight to the three

dimensions of meaning (fact, social and temporal) in the configuration of a system’s meaning

structure is particularly illuminating for the study of sociotechnical systems as it distances us

from the risk of reifying the material artifacts that compose these systems and – what has been

less emphasized by contending approaches in social studies of technology – from the risk of

humanizing them.

From the analytical model proposed here, one could say that objects are mediating forces

within a sociotechnical system (or “actants” as Latour suggests); still, we must always bear in

mind that there are still objects. In other words, the point is not to assign characteristics that are

properly human to material artifacts but to understand that it is precisely because of their quality

as objects that they are crucial to the sociotechnical systems’ operation as they provide a distinct

meaning to the system as a whole. As pointed out before, unlike humans, artifacts do not operate

based on contingency. One could say “this software changed my life”, “a mathematical formula

triggered the financial market’s collapse”, “the electrons acted within the network”, “the results

obtained say that it is safe to fly”, while being aware that none of these things happen in reality.

26!!

All these utterances are simple self-referential or hetero-referential attributions made from the

factual dimension of meaning accounting for all these nonhuman agents as if they were part of

the social dimension of meaning. We tend to humanize our environment because it seems easier

for us to understand it in this way from our human condition.

Saying that humans as well as nonhumans have the capacity “to act” does not mean that

material artifacts can select among infinite alternatives and attach meaning to their decisions as

humans do: I choose to use the software, the software does not intentionally change my life; a

mathematical formula cannot ponder its relationship to the financial market, let alone “make its

mind up” to occasion changes in that market; the electrons do not decide to coordinate in

network form in order to become a mediating force; and “results” cannot talk and much less

know what “safe flight” means. All these artifacts, and nonhumans in general, can and do have

an impact on the operation of sociotechnical systems, but it is only in their interaction – coupling

– with a group of humans (social dimension) in a given time and space (temporal dimension) that

they contribute in the configuration of a sociotechnical system’s meaning structure.

This is not to say that humans’ actions are privileged or that nonhumans are passive

entities in the sociotechnical systems’ operation, but simply to account for the differences

between humans and nonhumans in the definition of their meaning structures. Whereas technical

artifacts cannot apply intentional meaning to their behavior, self-referential systems dispose of

contingency and hence are endowed with the capacity to choose how to appropriate, use and

reconfigure technical artifacts. This has been pointed out previously in social studies of

technology. For example, Mackenzie and Millo (2006) examine the Black & Scholes and

Merton’s model and its effect in the financial market. In their analysis, these scholars suggest

that a financial market that sustains its decision-making in quantitative formulas would certainly

27!!

be different from one that does not. But, as they also carefully explain, it was the joint action of

humans and models what made the financial market of derivative exchange work.

Considering the ways in which meaning is generated and structured within sociotechnical

systems suggests other fundamental questions: What characterizes the interdependencies

between the social and technical components that constitute sociotechnical systems? What role

do these coupling patterns play in the evolution of sociotechnical systems?

Coupling Patterns

Similarly to the Tavistock researchers, I suggest that coupling patterns between social

and technical systems characterize the operation of sociotechnical systems and allow for

organized complexity to take place within them. However, my approach deviates from the

Tavistock group in a fundamental aspect. What matters for the sociotechnical system’s evolution

is not the “optimization” of the joint interaction between the social system and the technical

system, but only the self-reproduction of the system. The premise of optimization considered by

the Tavistock group assumes the satisfaction or productivity of workers will follow from

achieving the best possible fit between technical and social systems which, I argue, understates

the inherent variability of a sociotechnical system’s structure. My approach leaves aside this

normative conception by substituting optimization for satisfaction. Multiple combinations

between technical and social systems are capable of assuring the sociotechnical systems’

development in a satisfactory manner, in which both human and artifacts are equally important

participants. Therefore, the goodness of fit between the technical and social systems is relevant

28!!

only insofar as it promotes the sociotechnical system’s recursive operation, bringing about order

or disorder, anticipated and unanticipated outcomes.

Moreover, I propose that what is most crucial in determining the operation of

sociotechnical systems are the interactive coupling of the technical system and social system

rather than the technical characteristics of the machines per se. As suggested earlier, the

properties of the artifacts that compose a sociotechnical system may vary widely: they can be

simple or sophisticated, highly sensitive to their environment or not at all, largely intuitive or

require special training from their users. All these technical characteristics are not as important

as the characteristics of the interactive relations between humans and machines. The “space” that

is given to humans for interpreting and deciding the ways in which material artifacts will be

enacted or, put differently, the “space” given to machines in defining the system’s outputs, seems

to have a greater effect on the operation of sociotechnical systems.

For instance, the automated assembly-line of Henry Ford can be seen as a sociotechnical

system in which the relations between the social system and the instruments are highly

mechanistic. The workers tasks are decomposed in such a way that the entire system provides

little or no space for the individuals’ interpretative work, regardless of the level of sophistication

or flexibility of the technical artifacts. Even though the technologies employed for the tasks may

allow for multiple configurations, the fact that human agency is reduced to a minimum makes the

whole sociotechnical system function as if it were a machine itself, like a clock composed of

pieces.

A different example would be that of the “Panopticon” as described by Jeremy Bentham

(1979) and further examined by Foucault (1995). The architectural design of this prison provides

29!!

for continued and intensive surveillance and, most importantly, self-control and self-discipline

among its prisoners. Similarly to Gieryn’s (2002) study of a biotechnology building mentioned

earlier, the building plays a crucial role in constraining and enabling certain social practices and

power relationships. The humans’ agency and the building’s agency are both at play in the

evolution of this sociotechnical system.

Finally, another interesting case is that examined by Suchman (2009) in which a social

system compose of two individuals interact with the technical system of a Xerox machine in

order to achieve very specific goals (e.g. to photocopy). Although this machine was designed not

only on mechanical principles but also on social ones (so as to be self-explanatory), Suchman

finds that the encounters with users were highly troublesome and tended to result in failure. As

she points out, the fact that the users needed to understand and attach significance to the

technical system's behavior made every interaction – and, we could say, the operation of the

sociotechnical system as a whole – highly contingent. In contrast to the assembly-line example,

the interpretative work of humans interacting with the Xerox machine was crucial for this

sociotechnical system’s endurance.

These three examples – the assembly-line, the Panopticon and the interaction with a

Xerox machine – illustrate the importance of coupling patterns among material and social

components of sociotechnical systems in shaping these systems’ collective behavior.

The centrality of the coupling patterns in explaining the sociotechnical systems’

operation posited here contributes to our understanding of the notions of tightly and loosely

coupled systems. Tightly coupled systems consist of highly interdependent components. Loosely

coupled systems, on the contrary, are characterized by weakly connected components permitting

30!!

various kinds of arrangements. These later kind of systems are also described as having a high

degree of redundancy (Simon 1962). This resonates with one of the properties of sociotechnical

systems identified by the Tavistock researchers: their structure is redundant in its functions, not

in its parts. The literature have suggested that errors are more likely to occur in tightly coupled

systems as every “wrong step” has repercussions on the entire system, while the opposite tends

to occur in loosely coupled structuration of systems (Perrow 1999). Scholars have also pointed

out that loose coupling makes a system more sensitive to its environment as it allows for a more

accurate perception of things (Weick 1976). In his article “Thing and Medium” (1959) Heider

exemplifies this with the image of a footprint infused in sand. Due to its fragile structure, the

sand (medium) allows for a better perception of a footprint (thing) rather than firmly connected

mediums such as glass or cement.

Several social studies of technology have provided evidence regarding the advantages of

loosely coupled structures of – what we call – sociotechnical systems. For example, the study

conducted by Beunza and Stark’s (2004) of a trading room aforementioned, describes

maintaining weak connections between humans and nonhuman elements as a mechanism

through which a trading room preserves diversity in calculation. More precisely, the authors find

that the spatial layout of the room (i.e., the combination of proximity and distance between

robots and traders) plays a critical role in “organizing diversity”, or in other words, in sustaining

the system's loosely coupled structure. Likewise, the Hutchins’s (1995) study of an aircraft’s

cockpit describes the organization of people and technological devices within the system as a

fluid and loose network in which some devices play the role of providing redundant information,

making the network more resistant to possible mistakes. Redundancy in functions, Hutchins

31!!

points out, was crucial for this system’s operation as it provides “consistency checks” within the

system's distributed representational devices, supporting the system's accurate performance.

Investigations on the impact of technology within organizations or larger units of analysis

(such as markets) have also suggested that failures are more likely to occur when sociotechnical

systems stop seeking diversity and allow their elements to become more and more

interdependent. Two studies that call attention to this phenomenon are, for instance, Vaughan’s

(1996; 1999) study of the NASA organization (discussed above) and Poon’s (2009) study of the

U.S mortgage market. As mentioned before, Vaughan’s analysis explains how the systematic

generation of fact hardening mechanisms within NASA led diverse and conflicting elements to

become more and more internally entrenched. Poon’s study, on the other hand, describes how the

U.S mortgage market was transformed when a consumer risk score (FICO) was implemented and

became hardwired and distributed within the system. Seen from the point of view of the

analytical model proposed in this article, we could say that these studies explain processes of

conversion from loosely couple structuration of systems to tightly coupled structurations.

Interestingly, these two studies reveal how the shift from a system that initially allows for

multiple ways of doing things into one that relies on only a few elements for decision-making

processes results in systemic failures or system collapse.

Discussion

By pointing out the distinctiveness of systems-theoretical analysis and its potential

contributions to the study of technology, the model that I develop reveals several advantages the

revitalized concept of “sociotechnical systems” has over more vaguely defined terms such as

32!!

sociotechnical “configurations”, “arrangements” or “associations.” First, the notion of system

necessarily incorporates the analysis of the system’s environment. Since the system is defined by

its difference from and relationship with its environment, we need to study both and the relations

between them so as to understand the system’s operation. Systems, thus, cannot be understood

without considering the cultural and historical context in which they are rooted and defined as

systems.

Second, the notion of self-referential systems is inherently dynamic in operation. Using

this terminology, then, avoids building on a static notion of technology or sociotechnical system.

More specifically, the description of sociotechnical systems as self-referential systems

necessarily implies that they are in a continual state of flux, incessantly changing towards self-

maintenance or self-transformation, success or failure. As stated, what matters for system

conservation and development is coordination and not optimization. Hence, the contested and

negotiated character of sociotechnical systems is seen from this approach as a necessary part of

their operation.

Third, a systems-theoretical approach allows for a better understanding of the distinction

between humans and nonhumans as it considers them to be different types of systems with

particular levels of complexity and ways of functioning. From a systems perspective, humans

and nonhumans cannot be simply merged or seen as the same, because each has intrinsic

properties that must be preserved for making their coupling possible. Following Suchman’s

proposal, this system analytic approach may provide insights into building “a story that can tie

humans and non humans together without erasing the culturally and historically constituted

differences among them” (Suchman 2009:270).

33!!

The new model that I outline also clarifies a common distinction made between two

contending approaches commonly used in social studies of technology: systems-oriented and

network-oriented approaches. Network-oriented approaches, such as that developed by Latour

and Callon, do not distinguish between the animate and the inanimate or between individuals,

organizations or larger social units of analysis. In addition, they do not necessarily differentiate

between the inside and the outside of the network (Hughes 1986:288). From this kind of

approach anything and everything can become part of a network. Even though networks are not

thought of as existing in a vacuum, their description and examination does not presuppose the

network’s environment. While this may lead to theoretical shortcomings, it could also be seen as

an advantage. As Callon (1989) points out, the actor-network concept avoids many of the

difficult methodological questions that the incorporation of the environment raises.

Another advantage of a network approach is its emphasis on the associations, that is, on

the ties among network components, which are difficult to account for from the more abstract

metaphor of a system. In this sense, a network perspective proposes an easier and more concrete

way to grasp the connections among heterogeneous elements and, more interestingly, the

multiplex relationships and the quality or "strength" of the ties between them.

Both systems and networks perspectives consider the elements that compose them as

constantly interacting and changing. In this sense, these two approaches advance the idea of

dynamic boundaries, constantly drawn and redrawn in the evolution of the system or network.

Systems-oriented and networks-oriented approaches thus have different properties,

advantages and drawbacks in examining technology. Yet this does not imply that these two

approaches are inherently contradictory. Although the terms “systems” and “networks” have

34!!

different meanings, they can be used interchangeably insofar as every system can be examined

as a network. For this reason, considering systems and networks approaches as complementary

can significantly contribute to the study of sociotechnical systems in particular, and to social

studies of technology in general, as have been showed previously by various scholars that

employ concepts deriving from both approaches in their analyses (e.g. Law 1989; Graham and

Marvin, 2001). These theoretical perspectives can benefit each other insofar as they offer and

illuminate particular and distinct ways of grasping the complex and ever-changing "seamless

webs" of technology, science, etcetera, etcetera (Hughes 1986).

Conclusion

This article draws on selected theoretical and empirical work on technology to develop a

theoretical framework for the study of sociotechnical systems. The objective is not to provide an

exhaustive description of sociotechnical systems, but to present an analytical exploration of the

significance and usefulness of this concept in the social study of technology. More broadly, this

discussion distinguishes systems-theoretical analysis from alternative theoretical approaches and

sheds light on both the role and contributions of systems theory in examining technology.

My analytical model has several implications for the study of sociotechnical systems.

First, this model proposes the prior examination of the characteristics of the technical systems

and of the social systems (i.e., interactions, organizations, macro-social arrangements or society)

that compose sociotechnical systems in order to lay the groundwork for the subsequent

examination of their complex associations. By doing this, my model suggests a sequential

35!!

method to orient empirical investigations of sociotechnical systems. This sequential method can

help to identify new research sites that could further encourage this line of analysis.

Moreover, by suggesting that each sociotechnical system will vary according to the

subsystems that constitute them, my proposed model can facilitate comparative analysis across

diverse sociotechnical systems as it opens the possibility for analyzing multiple combinations of

social systems and technical systems. Some examples of research questions this model

illuminates are: What is the effect of employing different kind of instruments (e.g. highly rigid

versus highly flexible) across organizations of the same type? Why are some technical artifacts

with relatively specific functionalities used widely differently and why does their impact vary

across organizations? Why do similar organizations using the same kind of equipment fail while

others prevail under similar external circumstances? Based on the model outlined, the same

questions could be asked in regards to interaction-systems or macro-social arrangements (such as

markets or societies) and their diverse connections with technical systems.

Considering its emphasis on the associations that characterize sociotechnical systems, my

proposed analytical model encourages investigations of the coupling patterns of sociotechnical

systems and the practical effects these coupling patterns have on the systems’ functioning. This

line of analysis could extend our understanding of how failures (such as mistakes or

wrongdoings) occur in sociotechnical systems and how different kinds of coupling patterns make

their occurrence more (or less) likely. The emphasis on the associations characterizing

sociotechnical systems also opens avenues for inquiry into how collective behavior emerges in

sociotechnical systems and how adaptive processes make their endurance possible.

36!!

Finally, my analytical model provides insights into the “agency and structure” dilemma

of technology by expanding our understanding of the boundaries and connections between the

animate and the inanimate. In this vein, this model can inform future investigations on how

“agency” is distributed among the animate and inanimate components of sociotechnical systems

as well as the ways in which each of these components contribute to the decision-making

processes that promote the sociotechnical systems’ operation.

I hope that the model outlined will be employed as a basis for a research agenda that

generates more theoretical and empirical work on sociotechnical systems. This review proposes

unexplored avenues of inquiry and redirects latent areas of inquiry in the social study of

technology. Without this reexamination of the concept of sociotechnical systems, scholars in the

field of science and technology are likely to continue to use this concept in vague ways, without

problematizing its intended meaning; thus, restricting this concept’s potential applications and

capacity to illuminate the study of human-machines interactions.

37!!

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Figure 1: Sociotechnical Systems as an Emergent Phenomenon

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SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEM

SOCIALSYSTEM

TECHNICALSYSTEM

Note: In contrast to the technical system which boundaries are closed, social systems have self-reproducing boundaries. The coupling between a technical and a social system triggers the emergence of a sociotechnical system, with a new level of operation and complexity. This third system, as the social system that constitutes it, is also characterized by having self-reproducing, extendable boundaries.