Syrian Opposition

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T h e S y r i a n O p p o s i t i o n

IntroductionThe Syrian Opposition is a broad term used torefer to political and armed military groups, exileddissidents and grassroots activists seeking to oustthe Assad regime in Syria, according to BBC.Some analysts suggest that Syrias opposition isdivided, fragmented, and inefficient which theyassert, would not translate to a coherent alternativegovernance system in a post-Assad Syria. Incontrast to this depiction, foreignjournalists inSyria report a mature and sophisticated opposition

leadership. Over the 18-month old uprising,opposition leadership working within the countryhave developed a remarkable unanimity andconsensus in their views on the struggle, the futureand what is needed, according to journalist NirRosen. Disorganized Like a Fox, an article byElizabeth OBagy, asserts that the international community has failed to understand the difference betweendecentralised leadership and fragmented or absent leadership. Access to Arabic satellite networks, theInternet, opposition websites and especially Facebook have allowed for savvy local leadership, capable of thinkingand acting strategically to lead the Syrian revolution.

This CFC report outlines the main opposition components, both political and military, comprising the SyrianOpposition, highlighting the decentralised-interconnectedness. The list of groups covered in this report is by nomeans exhaustive, as opposition members and activists continue to create new organisations and committees tomeet the challenges of this complex conflict.

Political Opposition

In Syrias Political Opposition, Elizabeth OBagy of the Institute of War claims that Syrias opposition takesmany formsand is composed of diverse groupings and coalitions working towards the ousting of President BasharAssad. Expatriate groups working from outside the county as well as grassroots protest movements within thecountry share the common goal of toppling the Syrian regime, but often differ in modes of operation and theirvision of what a post-Assad Syria would look like.

Syrian National Council (SNC)

The Syrian National Council wascreatedin September 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey. The organisation is led by Syrianexiles based primarily inTurkey and France and is a coalition of several groups that seek to offer a crediblegovernance alternativeto the current regime, according to theBBC. The SNC membership includes theDamascusDeclaration for Democratic Change, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, select members of the Local CoordinationCommittees (LCC), Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC), National Bloc, the Assyrian DemocraticOrganisation and Kurdish factions. The goal of the organisation is to create ademocratic, pluralistic, and civilstate; a parliamentary republic with sovereignty of the people based on the principles of equal citizenship withseparation of powers, smooth transfer of power, the rule of law, and the protection and guarantee of the rights ofminorities. Ranging from Marxist intellectuals to conservative Islamists, the spectrum of ideologies has made fordisunity and infightingamong member organisations and the SNC has struggled to receive support from Christianand Alawite minorities in Syria, as it is a largely Sunni Muslim organisation. The current SNC president,Abdulbaset Sayda, is a Kurd and a founding member of the organisation. His election into the position was seen

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The Syrian Opposition

C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E

M E D I T E R R A N E A N B A S I N T E A M P R E S E N T S

Figure 1: Syrian Opposition


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by many outsiders as an intentional move to garner support from ethnic-Kurds within Syria who have been waryof the organisation that is dominated by Sunni-Arabs.

Organisationally, the SNC is made up of aGeneral Assembly composed of 310 members

from various member groups, according to theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace(CEIP) (see Figure 2.). A General Secretariatcomprising 26 representatives of the membergroups elects an Executive Committee of eightmembers including a chairman who is electedfor a renewable term every three months.However, divided by rivalries, agendas anddiffering tactics, the SNC has yet to fullyestablish itself as the government in waiting.

There are many within the internationalcommunity that doubt the SNC could form an

interim government if Assads regime falls,according to theGuardian.

The SNC has numerous obstacles to overcome in order to achieve unity, according to OBagy. As noted earlier,the SNC is largely Sunni in composition with the inclusion of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and a secondIslamist bloc consisting of the Group of 74, an off shoot of businessmen from the Brotherhood. Many Syrians,even some of the SNCs own members, have accused the council of being a front for the Brotherhood and aredistrustful of the Brotherhoods intentions. Additionally, theKurdish issuehas proved to be particularly difficultto overcome. Both the SNC and the Muslim Brotherhood have resisted Syrian-Kurds demands for federalism inSyria, similar to the autonomy enjoyed within Kurdish Iraq. Kurdish opposition groups accuse the SNC ofacquiescing toTurkish pressureto prevent political decentralisation in Kurdish Syria, reports the CEIP. Thepublishing of theNational Charter: the Kurdish Issue, on 02 April was a failed attempt by the SNC to overcomethe autonomy issue, but the document fell short of meeting the needs of the Kurdish leadership as it failed to

address the unique issues facing the Kurdish people and their rights but instead stressed the need to preserveSyrias territorial integrity. As a result, the Kurdish National Council chose to break from with the SNC.Additionally theSNCs cohesion has been tested by disagreements over how to respond to the regimes increasedviolence, as the SNC was initially reluctant to support armed resistance. From its inception, the SNC hasmaintained it will not negotiate with the Assad regime and has rejected countless opportunities to engage indialogue throughout the 18-month-long conflict. However, by 12 March 2012, al Arabiya reported that the SNCdemanded military support through theestablishment and protection of humanitarian corridors and a no-fly zoneover Syria. Additionally, the SNC said it would begin to coordinate the channelling of weapons to the Free SyrianArmy (FSA). The SNC has sought to keep the uprising peaceful and at times has had difficulty working with theFree Syrian Army (FSA) which seeks to topple the Assad regime through military force.

According to theBBC, theperceived ineffectivenessof the SNC by other Syrian opposition groups has resulted ina challenge to the organisations legitimacy by a rival organisation, the National Coordination Committee (NCC).Nevertheless, in April 2012, the Friends of Syria, an international working group focused on resolving the Syrianconflict, recognised the SNC as a legitimate representative of all Syrians. The group is now seen as the mainopposition interlocutor with the international community.

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB)Holding thelargest numberof seats in the SNC, theSyrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), also referred to asIkhwan,is the historical nemesis of the ruling Baath party of President Assad. Of all the opposition groups within Syria,

analysts believe Ikhwan is the best-organised and has the largestand most coherent group within the SNC,enjoying almost 25% of the councils 310 seats, according to CEIP. Under the leadership of Mohammed RiadShaqfa, the Syrian MB had remained a tightly knit group of exiles rather than a mass political party. This reality isdue to the fact that membership in the MB under Assad was a capital offence. The MB appeals to mostly moderate

Figure 2: Syrian National Council Organisational Chart

Source: Institute for the Study of War


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Members of the NCC are committed to three principles knows asthethree Nosx No to a foreign military interventionx No to sectarian and communal incitementx No to violence and militarising the uprising

In light of the political differences with the SNC and support by outside countries in the conflict, the NCCrefrained from attending gatherings such as the Friends of Syria conferences held in Tunis, Istanbul and Paris. TheNCC members were also reluctant to associate with the SNC, as members saw SNC as a front group for theUnited States and were concerned by the influence the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys in the SNC, according to

Foreign Policy. Recently, however, the NCC joined the SNC and representatives from other groups and coalitionson 02 July at a conference convened in Cairo under the auspices of the Arab League. The meeting produced twodocuments that set out a National Pact and a Joint Political Plan for the countrys Transitional Phase as well asagreement in general terms to support the FSA.

Grassroots Opposition

The grassroots opposition differs from the political opposition in that its primaryobjective is to overthrow the regime. Few grassroots activists have articulatedwhat would come after the fall of the Assad regime. According to OBagy, thegrassroots opposition displays a level of organization and coordination that couldprove invaluable to future unification efforts and some experts see these activistsas the nucleus of the future government.

The opposition is a mixture of junior and senior activists led by doctors, lawyers,clerics and other community leaders. They are from the poor and middle classes,which the Assad regime marginalised both politically and economically in hisgovernment. Most grassroots activists are not motivated by ideology, but simplyby a desire for freedom, dignity and basic human rights unlike their counterpartsin the SNC or NCC who are associated with ideological political parties, suggests

OBagy. Their secret members meet in basements or homes and often onlycommunicate via Skype. Despite communication challenges, grassroots organisersare often able to coordinate their activities with the SNC and also attempt to givedirection to the operations of the FSA. International media have focusedpredominately on the SNC as the representative of the Syrian people, mistakingthe grassroots protest movement as a mass of youthful demonstrators; however,a closer look reveals a mature and capable leadership driving the uprising ascapable organisers and leaders have emerged over the course of the past 18-months, according to the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Not onlyhave these grassroots activists organised the opposition on a local level they havemanaged to create more formal structures, called Revolutionary Councils, tocoordinate the activities of the opposition.

Revolutionary Councils (Majilis Thawar) have committees for organisingdemonstrations, media outreach, security and armed operations, medical teamsand humanitarian aid. Some of the more sophisticated councils have becomestates within a state with elected leadership overseeing a variety of operationalcapabilities, reports CNN. Activists report that currently there are more than 50 councils throughout the country,which are primarily located in or close to urban areas. The most well-known councils are located around Homs,Hama, Aleppo, Deraa, Idlib, Deir al Zor, Damascus and al Raqqa. Councils serve as the primary points of contactfor Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) (Tansiqiyyat), which have become the organisational backbone for the

Figure 3:

Grassroots Hierarchy

Adapted from: Institute for the Study of War


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Syrian revolution. There are approximately 400 different LCCs operating throughout Syrias cities and suburbs.Figure 2 above reveals the loose hierarchy of the grassrootsoppositions organisation

2.

The Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC)The SRGC is the largest grassroots coalition, representing approximately 70% of the Revolutionary Councils and

the majority of the LCCs, according to theGuardian. SRGC is highly organised and coordinates closely with theLCCs under its care through secret networks of communication. The mission of the SRGC is straightforward:help express [the oppositions] one voice.The groups operations are also clear: mobilisation and organisation,press and media and diplomatic advocacy.

The relationship between the SNC and grassroots organisations has been called ambiguous. OBagy suggeststhat the generation gap between the grassroots groups and the SNC creates a disconnect. The more youthfulgrassroots opposition is distrustful of an established opposition like the SNC that has been politically active, butseen as largely ineffective, since the early 1980s. Grassroots opposition groups have commented on theirconnection with members of the armed opposition within the country. One Revolutionary Council member sharedthat his group often worked with armed rebels in coordinating demonstrations in order to ensure a certain level ofprotection for civilian demonstrators. OBagy shared that often the groups overlapped. Some members of the

LCCs were activists by day, but armed rebels by night. Both the grassroots opposition and the armed oppositionenjoy popularity among civilians as they are largely seen as the popular resistance juxtaposed with the SNC andthe NCC which advocate on their behalf but remain isolated from the realities of the conflict.

Civilian Protection Commission (CPC)Formed in February 2012 by a former Shabiha

3member, the CPC is an example of local organisation that has a

high level of cooperation with the FSA and grassroots political activists as well as having the ability to connectwith a broader network of activists and opposition leaders, according to OBagy. The CPC was created inresponse to the ongoing bombardment and siege in Homs when it became clear that Homs required a joint efforton behalf of all military and civilian disciplines. The formation of the CPC received anoverwhelming responsefrom both armed opposition groups and civilian activists and within days, numerous battalions formed aroundHoms to support the CPC. So respected is the CPC, they sent representatives to the Friends of Syria meeting in

Tunis.

OBagy suggests that the formation of the CPC is an excellent example of the grassroots organising abilitieswithin Syria. With a need identified, it was addressed innovatively and quickly in addition to uniting armed andpolitical elements of the opposition.

Military Opposition

According to Joseph Holliday of the Institute for the Study of War, the armed Syrian opposition is identifiable,

organized and capable, even if it is not unified. The rebels resiliency will make the Assad regimes endurancedifficult; however, most experts state that the predicted, imminent fall of the Assad regime is premature. The FreeSyrian Army (FSA) functions more as an umbrella organisation in the uprising rather than a more traditionalmilitary chain of command, asserts Holliday

4.

Free Syrian Army (FSA)Led by former military officer Colonel Riyad al Asaad, the Free Syrian Army was formed in August 2011 byarmy deserters and was initially created to protect innocent civilians when protesters were increasingly targetedbySyrian forces and paramilitary members called Shabiha, reports the online Fikra Forum. The FSA is based in

Turkey and is a proponent of foreign military intervention, according to Andrew Cordesman of the Center for

2The illustration represents the rough hierarchy of political activists in Syria. In many cases the Revolutionary Councils and the Revolution

Command Councils are indistinguishable, but according to OBagy this is the most important level of political organisation and military oppositionintegration. Additionally the SRGC has demonstrated the ability to influence and work with the local groups, but does not directly control them.3Shabihaare civilian-army militias that fight alongsideAssad forcesin the uprising. Their brutality has been linked to a number of massacres in

Syria.4 See Annex A at the end of the report for a sampling of the battalions operating within the context of the FSA.


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Strategic & International Studies. Colonel Asaad claims to have 100,000 fighters in the FSA, according to theVoice of Russia. In recent weeks, the ranks of FSA have swelled by thousands ofcivilian activists, according totheFinancial Times. Former activists make up as much as 70% of some FSA units and activist groups are clearlybeginning to coordinate their activities with the FSA. The line between activists and fighters is often blurred, assome activists are protestors by day, but take up arms at night.The New Republic reports that there are upwards of

100 semi-autonomousbattalions operating under the FSA. The FSA acknowledges that up to this point, it has notbeen capable of confronting the 200,000-strong Syrian army. Instead, the FSA has adopted guerilla tacticscarrying out a war of harassing the regime army until it is exhausted. According to Colonel Malik a l Kurdi, aspokesman for the FSA command, [w]e cant keep control of an area, so this is a circular operation, moving from

one place to another, one city to another.

Observers of the Syrian conflict suggest that the FSA is playing an increasingly important role in the uprising,according toWorld Affairs J ournal. Holliday suggests that the armed opposition has demonstrateda propensity fororganisation at the local level and the rebels across Syria have shown willingness to share in the brand-name ofthe Free Syrian Army (FSA). One journalist who has met many armed opposition fighters states that the rebelsare not armed gangs but found them to be a popular armed struggle or insurgency, [who] use the term

muaqwama, or resistance to describe themselves with a majority of members drawing from the civilian

population. Defectors have constituted an important organising force within the opposition and Colonel Asaadstates that the FSA has 1,500 officers who have defected from the Syrian army. In comparison to the Libyanrebels, another journalist remarked that the FSA is much more organised indicating that the defectors providedstability and capabilities. Nevertheless, the FSA is an organically developing entity that continues to modify itstactics to meet needs in the uprising. As the uprising continues into its eighteenth month, some splits haveemerged in the national leadership of the FSA as General Mustafa al Sheikh, a recent defector from the SyrianArmy, has emerged as a potential rival to Riyad al Asaad, reportsWorld Affairs Journal.

The armed opposition is overwhelmingly Sunni, raising concerns within the international community that thegroup is potentially sectarian and radical. While the Assad regime seeks to portray the opposition as Salafists,

J ihadists, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, al-Qaeda and terrorists, a journalist on the ground indicated that thiswas not the case stating instead that, they [opposition] are not fighting for Islam but they are inspired by it. Theonline Fikra Forum concurs with this statement, as activists and people connected with the FSA believe that a

small percentage,5-10% of the FSA, could be comprised of Salafis or Muslim Brotherhood.

The FSA has shown significant advances in recent weeks, according to The Commentator. Following thesuccessful bombing that killed four top inner-circle officials in July 2012, the FSA loosely controls most of theborder crossing between Turkey, Syria and Iraq and as the humanitarian crisis deepens within the country, theFSA has continued to help the wounded by transporting them to clandestine hospitals or across the border,according to President Michael Gabaudan from Refugees International. Also, the FSA has taken a lead role inproviding humanitarian aid including drinking water and cooking gas to those remaining in Syria, notes theFinancial Times.

Islamist BrigadesAnother armed opposition element operatingwithin Syria is the hardcore Islamist brigades claiming to be waginga jihad against the infidel Assad and his Shiite supporters [Iran and Hezbollah], reportsThe New Republic. Theindependent jihadists are largely comprised of an expanding pool of domestic youth who feel abandoned by theinternational community. Several Syrian opposition groups have expressed concern over the recent growth in

jihadistmilitias joining the FSA to fight against the regime, according to theVoice of America.

Foreign Fighters in SyriaThe flow of foreign fighters into the country with the intention of supporting Syrian rebels seems to be closelyrelated to the flow of weapons, suggests Holliday. While experts acknowledge that foreign-fighters have theability to bring additional capabilities to the opposition, they may also import a more radical ideology that couldpotentially hurt opposition efforts. Iraqis represent the bulk of foreign- fighters but it is believed that they mayactually be Syrians just now returning to Syria after fighting with Sunni Arab insurgents during Iraqs unrest.Also, Iraqi Kurds may cross the border into Syria in order to strengthen ties with their Syrian-Kurd neighbours.


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Other foreign fighters include the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group which has ties to al Qaeda, while other fightersare joining from Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and the United Kingdom.

Al Qaedas primary foot soldiers in the Syrian conflict are theJ abhat al Nusrah li-Ahli al Sham(Front for theProtection of the Levantine People), according to Ed Husain of the Council on Foreign Relations. The group is

composed of foreign and Syrian. Husain suggests that their growing strength and acceptance among FSA isdemonstrated by their increasing activity on the ground. In March 2012al Nusrahclaimed responsibility for sevenattacks in Syria as compared to 66 attacks in June 2012.Al Nusrahs operations have been primarily within thecities of Aleppo and Damascus with the aim of creating an Islamist state in all, or part of the country.

Foreign fighters in Syria are not strictly supporting the combat efforts of the opposition. According to severalaccounts by FSA fighters, as early as May 2012, Iranian troops and Hezbollah fighters have been fightingopposition forces alongside Assads troops. Men with Lebanese accents have been reported to be fighting with theSyrian army. Also one defected lieutenant described working with a non-Arab-speaking Iranian whoaccompanied his unit when it was ordered to suppress demonstrations in Deraa in the summer of 2011. Mostrecently, on 27 August, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran openly acknowledged it had sent IranianRevolutionary Guardsto assist the Syrian government in putting down the uprising.

Planning for TransitionSyrias opposition groups have already laid groundwork to take control of security and administration after whatthey consider will be the inevitable end to the Assad regime, according to theFinancial Times. Described by oneactivist as flawed and murky plans, most experts anticipate a period of chaos. However, Rami Khouris articleAn Orderly Post-Assad Transition challenges the notion of a gloomy Syrian future pointing to an indigenousstructurefor governance that is already in place. Khorui maintains that the protracted conflict has allowed for thecreation of hundreds of activist groups and committees with immense legitimacy, authority and logisticalcapability in governing at the local level. Upon Assads ousting, many are concerned about the possibility ofreprisal attacks against the ruling minority sect of Alawites; however, Khouri asserts that the Syrian people are toointelligent and sophisticated to allow themselves to sink into a dark pit of sectarian warfare. The growingcomplexities of the 18-month-long conflict, with the addition of a number of outside actors seeking to influencethe outcome of the uprising, have only added to the uncertainties in a post-Assad Syria. For now, of primary

concern to the international community is the potential spill-over violence that a civil war could generate withinneighbouring countries. Hamzeh Al-Moustafa, Syrian researcher at the Doha-based Arab Center for Research andPolicy Studies said in order to provide stability and deter sectarian fighting, it becomes clear the preservation ofthe Syrian army as an entity is a necessity if any political transition of power is to succeed in Syria.


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Annex A: Armed Rebel Groups within the Free Syrian Army

Syrian Opposition

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