Blunt facts of war: Liwa Tahrir al-Sham rebels carry away the bodyof a comrade from the Jobar frontline in the suburbs of Damascus

COVER STORY

The Syrian atrocities

President Obama’s non-intervention strategy is in ruins and the west is paying the price of having

its bluff called in the Middle EastBy John Bew

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President Obama’s thinking aboutforeign affairs is deep, reflective andnuanced, and not without a moralcompass. But it has been severelytested by events in Egypt, and ulti-

mately exhausted by Syria. His attempt toreconcile a broadly liberal world-view with arealist understanding of the limits of Ameri-can power has been admirable but has lefthim with an increasingly frayed and incoher-ent strategy in the Middle East – perhaps nostrategy at all.

In 2007 Barack Obama told the New YorkTimes that one of his favourite philosopherswas Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian and sub-tle commentator on foreign policy who ad-vocated US intervention against the evil of Nazism. He later became known as a sup-porter of “containment” during the cold war.

“God grant me the serenity to accept thethings I cannot change,” Niebuhr wrote in1943, “the courage to change the things I canand the wisdom to know the difference.”

What Obama claims to have learned fromNiebuhr are two core notions that might betaken as bookends to his present approach tothe war in Syria – beginning with his stronglyheld position of non-intervention and cul-minating in the military response that theUS looks likely to pursue in the course of thecoming weeks.

On the one hand, Obama argued, Niebuhrrecognised “the compelling idea that there’sserious evil in the world, and hardship andpain” but thought that “we should be hum-ble and modest in our belief we can eliminatethose things”. Humility in the exercise ofpower has been the keynote of Obama’spost-Bush approach to foreign affairs; as hereiterated in an interview on CNN, the UScannot solve the conditions that have causedthe Syrian civil war.

On the other hand, however, he also statedhis conviction that “we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I takeaway [from Niebuhr] . . . the sense we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard,and not swinging from naive idealism to bitter realism.”

As every legal and philosophical red linehas been transgressed in Syria, it will be in-teresting to see what this sophisticated doc-trine looks like in practice. The answer is thatit is likely to be messy. Yet the uncomfortabletruth is that, with more than 100,000 peopledead and most of the Middle East moredestabilised than it was by the Iraq war, non-intervention has also proved to be muchmessier than its advocates, including Presi-dent Obama, hoped.

Obama has been right about one aspect of the crisis all along: the conflict there is diz -zyingly complex, utterly brutal, grounded incenturies of history and fuelled by sectarian

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and regional divisions, and it cannot besolved by external intervention. Crucially, inthis view, he has had the full backing of Gen-eral Martin Dempsey, the chairman of theUS Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Yet something else was made crushinglyobvious by the deaths of hundreds of peoplein the suburbs of Damascus on 21 August, allegedly as a result of a chemical weapons attack ordered by Bashar al-Assad’s govern-ment. It was not simply that Assad is pre-pared to win the civil war at any cost; thatmuch has been obvious since the start of theconflict. It was that the Syrian regime – andperhaps more importantly its allies in Russiaand Iran – seemed to want America to bewatching as it did so.

One of the most vexed questions when it comes to Syria has been which outcome to the civil war looks worse from a westernperspective. There is no shortage of advisers

and experts in Washington, DC who calcu-late that an Assad victory would not be theworst-case scenario, in a country where ji-hadist groups are increasingly defining thecharacter of the opposition. Until the 21 Au-gust chemical attack, they were winning theargument. The Syrian regime’s forces havebeen growing stronger since April, and withevery month that has passed, the chances ofwestern intervention have receded. Like theUS military hierarchy, most Americans havesupported the non-interventionist stance,giving the president a solid political basis forhis position.

Now, however, Assad has denied Obamaeven the luxury of averting his gaze. In onemove, he has done more to put the US presi-dent’s Syria policy under the spotlight than

ten visits to rebel-held areas by Senator JohnMcCain could ever do. The message that heseems to have sent is that he is not contentwith winning quietly, as Obama appearedprepared to let him do. He intends to makehis victory also a defeat for America’s stand-ing in the region.

Underlining America’s impotence is partof the prize, a premium on which Assad has been set by his sponsors in Tehran and, to a lesser extent, Moscow. Obama’s concernwill be that what is happening in Syria is in-dicative of a trend emerging across the regionand that the dynamics of it are already in playwith regard to Egypt and Iran.

The timing of the attack was highlysignificant – so much so, that itwould give credence to the theorythat it might have been a rebel“false flag” operation, if all the evi-

dence did not point to the regime. It tookplace two years after Obama said that Assad“must go” and almost a year to the day that hedeclared: “We have been very clear to the As-sad regime . . . that a red line for us is if we startseeing a whole bunch of chemical weaponsmoving around or being utilised.” By “we” –as hawkish commentators in Washingtonare reminding the president – he meant notthe United Nations, but the United States.

Consider the following and the Syrianleader’s brazenness takes on a broader sig -nificance. The chemical attacks took place a20-minute drive from the UN inspectors whohad arrived in Damascus a few days earlier in order to investigate allegations of previouschemical weapons attacks by the regime.This in itself was the tail end of the diplo-matic process, rather than a ratcheting up ofpressure from the US and its allies.

Just two days before the attack, a WhiteHouse intelligence official briefed ForeignPolicy magazine to the effect that: “As long as they keep body count at a certain level, wewon’t do anything.”

Remember, too, that this is not the first timethat Obama’s “red line” has been crossed; the US, the UK and the French governmentsalready believed that chemical weapons hadbeen deployed by the regime in the previousfew months. Assad’s willingness to danceback over the line again – in the mostgrotesquely sensational way he could – canonly be taken as a calculated escalation of thediplomatic game.

Rather than take advantage of US quietism,Assad and his allies took a gamble on floutingit, and in a manner that would cause long-term damage to American credibility in theregion. Such risk-taking may seem counter-productive and irrational to external actors,but it was based on the fact that Obama’sbluff had been called. O

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The message Assad sentis that he is not contentwith winning quietly

“I’d shave it, but you’d hate the tattoo it’s hiding even more”

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of secular, liberal, democratic revolutions –has come and gone. However, vacillation by Washington about what constitutes theleast bad endgame, particularly in Syria andEgypt, has opened the door for others to en-force their vision and interests.

As the moral urgency of the Syria crisis intensifies, even the selfish strategic justifi-cations for non-intervention do not lookconvincing. The least persuasive objectionhas been Defence Secretary Hagel’s sugges-tion that military intervention “could hinderhumanitarian relief operations”. GeneralDempsey’s line that “the use of US militaryforce can change the military balance, but itcannot resolve the underlying and historicethnic, religious and tribal issues that are fu-elling this conflict” was more to the point.

Equally, the prospect of handing a victoryto some of America’s most ardent sworn en-emies – who increasingly dominate the ranks

of the Syrian opposition – provokes an un-derstandable neurosis. American involve-ment, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, thenational security adviser under PresidentJimmy Carter, “would simply mobilise themost extreme elements . . . against the US andpose the danger that the conflict would spillover into the neighbourhood and set Jordan,Iraq and Lebanon on fire”.

Yet this opinion is in danger of looking likea self-fulfilling prophecy. All of these thingsare already happening. It is hard to know howSyria could get any worse but it keeps on do-ing just that.

Increased pressure has come from Amer-ica’s two chief allies on Syria: France and the UK. “If it is proven, France’s position isthat there must be a reaction,” said LaurentFabius, the French foreign minister, after theattacks. Although a ground invasion is still offthe table, Fabius made it clear that the actionwould entail military “force” of some kind.

William Hague’s change of tone since thechemical attack seems to indicate a willing-ness to take up the gauntlet thrown down by Assad. “We, he United States, many othercountries including France, are clear that wecan’t allow the idea in the 21st century thatchemical weapons can be used with impun -ity,” he told the Today programme on 26 Au-gust. Diplomacy had failed.

For the first time, the Foreign Secretaryand the Prime Minister think they might beable to gain sufficient support for substantiveinternational action on Syria. Both have longwanted to do more; this is the pretext that

might also allow them to win a vote in parlia-ment for a limited military option such asprecision air strikes.

It was American oversight, scrutiny andleverage that prevented the Egyptianarmy from using excessive force againstthe civilian protesters who broughtdown Hosni Mubarak in 2011. It was

partly American dithering about the army’scounter-revolution that led the Egyptianmilitary command to calculate this summerthat it could get away with massacring Mus-lim Brotherhood supporters of the oustedpresident Mohammed Morsi.

Meanwhile, others are filling the void andplaying idiosyncratic geopolitical games in a way that defies western logic. Saudi Arabiaoffers financial backing to extreme jihadistelements of the Syrian opposition while sup-porting the crushing by the Egyptian mili-tary of the comparatively moderate MuslimBrotherhood (about which the Saudis aredeeply neurotic). Within Syria, Iran and eachof the Gulf states – whose interests do notalign – are engaged in their own version of the“Great Game”, which is likely to have long-term effects on the region.

Worst still, the chaos in the Middle East is creating ideal conditions for terrorism toflourish in Syria and elsewhere. Islamist griev-ance narratives against the west have beengiven their greatest boost since the decisionto invade Iraq. The attempt to smother the

The first time that Assad crossed a red line,the US response was tentative and cosmeticand had no impact on events on the ground.It came in the form of an announcement thatlogistical support would be offered to the in-creasingly rudderless Syrian National Coun-cil. The muted nature of the response fromWashington caused the rebel leadership togive up on the prospect of serious interven-tion from the west, creating more divisionsin the opposition and leaving the door openfor Assad to intensify his campaign.

Obama is not a naive liberal inter-nationalist. His thinking on for-eign affairs is hard-headed and he has demonstrated – in thehuge expansion of drone warfare

under his leadership – his willingness to takepre-emptive and lethal action in the name of US national security. He is acutely awarethat the American public shares his reluc-tance to assume once again the role of theworld’s policeman.

It was only recently that Obama commen -ted that Vladimir Putin behaves like “thebored kid in the back of the classroom”. Butwhat does Assad’s boldest stunt yet, whichhas been followed by the usual choreographedobfuscation from Russia, make Obama looklike? The kid in the front of the classroom whowants to avert his gaze from the bad boys at theback but keeps getting ink flicked in his hair?

The criticism that is increasingly levelledagainst the president, from both the left andthe right of the US foreign policymaking es-tablishment, is that his approach to interna-tional affairs is reactive, dependent on coun-terpunching, and has no strategic vision. His“big-tent” approach to the making of foreignpolicy – housing an eclectic range of views,from the staunchly realist secretary of de-fence, Chuck Hagel, to his liberal interven-tionist ambassador to the UN, SamanthaPower – has clogged the decision-makingprocess and prevented the emergence of co-herent policies.

Each important decision – to extricate theUS from Iraq, the “surge” in Afghanistan,the intervention in Libya, the response to thefall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the pro-crastination over Syria – has been played outthrough a series of struggles inside his ad-ministration, characterised by leaks, person-ality clashes and long delays. In all of this, thepresident has never shirked responsibilityfor making the final decision, but neither hashe “led from the front” or set the agenda witha clear world-view.

Moreover, when it comes to the powerstruggles engulfing the Middle East, the UShas been torn between a set of undesirableoutcomes for the past three years. A glimpseof the most desirable scenario – the success

He knows Americansshare his reluctance toplay world policeman

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Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt particularlyrisks forcing more elements of political Islamunderground and into violence as the mutedUS response fuels a perception that the westis complicit in the process.

If there is one thing the west has learned, it is that prolonged and sustained conflictsthat attract international jihadis have long-lasting consequences. The emergence of newungoverned spaces has given such groupsthe space to train, mobilise and act.

The fear of “blowback” is much more acutein European capitals such as London andParis because of the relative proximity of theconflict and the flow of European citizens to fight on behalf of the rebels in the MiddleEast. But given that the Americans are en-gaged in open-ended drone warfare inAfghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Yemenand parts of East Africa, they would be loathto have to extend such a campaign to rebel-held Syria or Sinai.

It is not these broader concerns that havechanged the calculus in Washington, how-ever. Rather, it is a single ghastly event thatseems to have sucked Obama into the “inter-vention trap”, against his better instincts.

The likelihood is that any military actionwill be limited – probably Tomahawk missilestrikes supported by cyber attacks, but with

24 | NEW STATESMAN | 30 AUGUST – 5 SEPTEMBER 2013

no incursions into Syrian airspace. It will beled by the United States, alongside Franceand Britain, and will probably take placewithout UN sanction. There is no prospect of putting troops on the ground. Strikes arelikely to be directed at chemical and biologi-cal weapons installations over a relativelyshort period.

Significantly, they are not likely to be in-tended to destroy the Assad regime and openthe door for a rebel victory. In other words,while the official position of the US, Franceand Britain is to support “regime change”,there is little prospect that they will makethis the aim of any military campaign as theydid in Libya. How the Syrian regime and itsallies respond is difficult to predict.

And so, in effect, the implication of such acampaign is that its parameters have been setby the Syrian regime, even if unintentionally,and the Syrians will know what to expect.

The truth remains that Obama’s“red lines” in themselves wereconceived in the absence of a strat-egy for how to respond to the warin Syria. They were unscripted and

speculative and reflected a desire to stay out.Another lesson from the Syrian conflict

is that non-intervention does not work in a

strategic vacuum. To be successful, the policyneeds to be more than a checklist of argu-ments against intervention. Counterintu-itively, as Britain’s most anti-interventionistforeign secretary, Lord Castlereagh, recog-nised, it requires a credible threat of force.

As Castlereagh told the House of Com-mons in 1821, he “should deem it most pus -illanimous conduct on our part, if, after interfering on a question of this nature, welimited our interference to the mere deliveryof a scroll of paper, and did not follow it upwith some more effectual measures. Werewe to turn itinerant preachers of morality . . .and to follow up the doctrines which wepreached by nothing else but what was con-tained in our state papers?”

With deep reluctance, Barack Obama hasbeen forced to reach the same conclusion, buthis reticence and equivocation over a longperiod have left him at the mercy of events. It is hard to lead from behind when you don’teven want to look.lJohn Bew is reader in history and foreignpolicy in the war studies department of King’s College London. From October, he will take up the Henry A Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and InternationalRelations at the Library of Congress inWashington, DC

Cornered: Barack Obama is finding that a non-interventionist policy doesn’t work without a credible threat of force

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