SWS Greece2

7/29/2019 SWS Greece2

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THE AM'I-BANDIT liARB,y Col J .C. ~

PAm' n I


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the Anti-Bndit WrBy Col 1. C. "Iurray


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Under Papagos the Anny was made to do whal il wascapable of doing-no more was needed to gain victory

Synop.iI:Th e camjJaign u ~ g r m with th r. murder 0/ isolatedo{ficia/s and the bf.'ali/lg or fh ea teniug of righi-wing

ciliu1ZS 01 prominence, N ex t came allacks on smalluillages (. Int i on larg('r Gendarmerie deta chments,Then , ill lY '17, t i l l: l}aTldils began. to try to hold certainareas to -proted l h ~ i r supply rou.tes and they playedtheir tnwlp card- th e l a b l i s h m e r H 01 th e " Provi.shma l Dem ocmtic Government,"

Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastlydiU e,'rn Llorce. f, Tlte G)'uk Government tronp.f, nu.mbni,lg 265,000 by th e end of [hI' t l ' l lT, received m.a teria laid and mililn.ry advice fm m th e United States andBritain, and in th e final campaigns wrre able fo makeuse of supporting, arms. The gll l'nd/as. on the otherhand, never stronger than 20,000, opemit'd solely aslight mfantry wllh little su.pport }rom artillery andmorla.rs.

Bul th l: CQlllf'Sl tl irH 1101 as one-sid"l as It appears.It took tim e lor' the C reek GOVl:nmHml to orKaniu itsonl1Y into a cohesive fighting fora. Th l! gUl!rrillas,li{!.hlly ~ q u i p " f : d and u11II1Ipeded by ser.Jiu fll/its (J rterritorial responsibility, had good mobility in a tacti

C i t ~ sense and a high degree 01 (luibilit)" Every ma nUltM a fighter and bands had nO solt rCtll".

As long as th e g u ~ r r j l l a s tailored 'hl!ir tn.ctic.{ /.0 theforces and arms at th eir disposal, 'h ey hrfd the l()hiphand. Bu t when t h ~ y I r i ~ d to hold ground find pn)/ec /their supply rOfl.tes they were ;dQ9rred 10 failure .

Field Marshal ,4.l.exaMer Papago.,Com mandu .in-chieJ Greek Army

Part IIICOMBAT EFFICIENCY

THE .[ t:I(M " co ) '1 EJ-' . ' lCtf.:,\C"r"(IS used h l:,re embraces suth facwl"sas lraining, ron lma.nd an d staff functioning, d iscipli.ne an d morale,Any judglllel1l. un the training ofthe "Democratic Army" depends up-on th e frame of rderence. By onho-do x standards it W; IS deficient in al-most every respect. Obviously, however. such standards are n(lt appro-pri


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to Bulgar policy . Tilo 's "iew thalthe exploilalion of th e Macl'donianproblem ~ h u l i i d be un d ertaken byhis p:lny di d Hal find illllllc.:diateI:l\"or with the Comintern. Thathod), fell tha I this al": .} or th e BlIlgOlrs, ;tud \'il;wedthei l' (o lJ" crsiol1 to the l O c e,,' illl t r u s t . '"Va !) a COllllllunist

Y u ~ u .. I;l\ Im peria lism an y bc tter forG"eect' than Rulg;tr Fa S


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Influence of peace offensives of USSRThe policy problems of tht: guerrilla 1 ( ~ ; J ( l l s h i p were not exdusi\'elylocal in charancl'. Greece \ \ " ~ s amicrocosm in ",hirh were clupllcared

to some eXlCIll the de"c1opment s inthe macrocosm ot East-West relations.Thu s, on occasion, the guerrilla lillewas brought into h


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lies in the strict discipline of theCommuni!'>t leaders and the fa n th a lthe "fighlers" were kept in ignoranceof developments.

Fo r example. the removal of :\Iarlos, whic:h signalized the elimi.nalion of Yugoslav influence in (heguerrilla movement, arouseu only anun dercurr-elll of dissatisfaction withou t troublesome activity on the panof ~ o f a r l o s ' adherents. The greatmass of the guerrillas was carriedalong by the leaders and by a delugeof propaganda concealing adversedevelopments or rationalizing themin the light of the party line.

There were two orders of moraleamong the guerrillas. The first wasthe morale of Ihe hard-core Conllnunist. Initi;llly, a high proportion ofthe guerrilla.s were o( this cast. bu twith the increase of forced recruiting there arose a morale problem.The morale of the (orced recruit,while not necessarily low, was of adifferent onler. I t df:pended uponlhe amount of his po'litical indonrination_ \Vhen p o ~ i b l e the new reocruit was st nl across the borders forindoctrination. -When this couldlno t be done, his indoCtrination wascarried ou t in Greec.e. This trainingbeing incomplete, continuous propaganda had to be carried on withinthe bands in order to leep upmorale. :\lore time was spent in thistype of activit), than in militarytraining. A good percentage offorced recruits I ' e ~ p o n d e d favorablyto indoctrination, bu t few becamezealots.

Beginning early in 1949 the opportunities for the j n d o ~ t r i n a t i o n ofrecruits decreased sharply because ofthe increasing aggressiveness of theArmy whic:h lept guerrilla units onthe move. The new, limited miningwas scarcely adequate to convert aforced recruit into a hardened guerrilla who could endure the rigors o(guerrilla life without complaim. As1949 ,,'ore on the leaders had moreand more diffic:ully in maintainingmorale. By July, probably the majority of the 18,500 guerrillas wouldhave surrendered if given a chance;and by the time of th e Vitsi andGrammos baules, guerrilla moralewas at the lowest ebb since the startof the war.The Greek Nationa' Army

Those who are inclined to regardthe Gte..ek. Army tolerance for

its early showing in the allli-guerTillawar would do \\'ell to turn b;lrk thepages to (he year 1940. The resultsanained in six months of combatwith the Italian Army afford a striling manifestation of combat efficiency. Fac LOrs wbich went into it were:A well (I"ailll'd regular Army as anucleus fo r expallSioll.Trained reserves.

Competent commanders an d staffofficers.High national morale, universal

and lrllSlinting public support andoutstanding lombat esprit.

These fauors were di ss ipated inthe period between the Greco-Italianwar and the war with the gu errillas.

Unlike the Navy. which withdrewfrom Greece during the occupationand acquired valuable experience inthe ;\Ieditcrranean. the Army wasunable lO withdraw and was forcedto surrenc.ier in Greece. (ollowingwhich it WitS dissolved. A GreekArmy of th e Middle East was formedin Egypt bu t few Army pe rsonnelwere able to join it. The force wasso sma ll that few officers receivedtraining or experience of value.Moreover. the force was no t welldisciplined and it saw combat on lyat EI -Abmein an d Rimini . Consequently. (rom April [941 to the summer of 1915, the Greek Army (forall pranical purp os es) was no nexislent and eluring this lime much ofits know-how was dissipated.

An Army dissolved for four yearsis not rebuilt in a day, and effortsstarted in 1945 did not progressrapidly. Early efforts were devotedprimarily to administrative mallers- the aClivation of units, procuremenL nnd issue of uniforms, weaponsand equipment, the recovery an drestoration of facilities and the reestablishment of services. Trainingproceeded slowly and the gu errillaactivity of the faU o( 1946 found anArmy unprepared for active operations. In an effort to speed up trainling and to provide small units specially trained ,n anti-guerrilla warfare, the British Military Missionpushed the formation of Commandounits, bu t even this prog-raITl movedslowly.

In April 1947 the Army started itsfirst large-scale offensive, an d fromthat time onward its units were soengaged that training was thoughtto be impracticable. Moreover, therewas on the part of officers. wh o had

A, forc.ed recruifing i n c r e r u e d ~guerril la morale went down

long becn deprived at command responsibility or who had it thrustupon thelll without adequat e prepar a tion, a Jack of .--rpprccialioll oftbe importance o( Iraiuing, pan in, .larly in (Ire units. There \\;\:) a lendency to h:c:] that training within aunit which had already seen activecombat enlailed a los", of bee forthe ullit and il s perso nnel . This indifference to unit training W n $ no tdiscouraged by the policies ot theBritish Militarv Mi ssioJl.

His s t ) ' ~ Gov ernment . whichgave suppOrt to the legal government ot Grecce in Deccmher 19H,was critici7.ccI sharply for its "intervention"' in Gr eek affairs. Thereaf ter it becamc semitive to furtherinvolvement. It would supply theArroy, advise it on lcdmiGtl and organiza tional mat[crs I l l d a s s i , ~ t inthe t r a i l l i l ' ~ ,H Iraining- ccnters. bu til would nO l risk g i \ i n ~ op era tionaladvice or the a uachment of advi.'\orsto field l I n i t . Consequently, liuleunit or field training was condllcteduntil th e fall oJ 19'J8 when it wasinitiated Ilmler th e aegis of the U, S.Mission .

The Britjsh :\filitary . iolL didassist at tra ining centers and schoolswhere basic individual ano technicaltraining was given . t : n f o r t u n a t e J ~ ' ,the Army had' been formed so rapidly that few of its personnel. had bene-


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ited Crom sue h tf.lining. The racthal the hrst c"llups were old reo

who h ,tl i had basi(; tfainingprior to the wa r mitigaled thi s cir\V,.i k thi) W;lS an advantage initially, it $uhstcluently bccame

disadnlllage. These "old" reseli S1S weI'( ' lound to be indfcni\"e infield s(,f\'icc.In the spting of El-!8 l h e n wa 'l; nolall hy which lh(!se older Olen w ulde repl:lccd by youu ger Inact, the prevailinl{ l I I p O W t ' r ("cilng Je(t I t l l spate tor tht' tfaining ofeplacemellts. To meet this siUl:Jtion

temponlr ), i l l n ~ < t s e of 15.000 waspproved . In order 1.0 get the great.; t p ( ) s ~ i h l


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(n lcd .\ nll)' dT\( it'll' dmilll; thee a r l ~ Sl:lgc5 o f the am i -ba nd i l war.In compe ten t f f i < . : e l (:ould no t bedi!lchar ;.;t.'d \,'jth()tll g()v (:l"IIllIl"lu ;.lia e r ~ it '\ (orces toproviue Pl"O tlX tio n for \'a riou 'i (ownsan d \ 'illa gl's , Thi :-i d i s p e of th eA r O l ~ in sla tic h':urisons left tht'g llcrrilb rree to lOam ulllllole.qcc\ .W h t.'ll t il onsibilili elo of ('omlliand for more than fOil I' ,cars.Thll s the :\n n)' needed a oftime ( 0 reesuL lish o ffit.er co rps .This it was no t gr; lIlled , The ,\rlll Ywas ra iled lIpon to ta la ; th e fieldeven befor e it W,IS fully orga ni7cd ,Thl.'l"c WCI'C, rherdo,-e, ShO ft CO lllilios. r 10 pro essiona l (Iualifi. c- alions a!llongco mm anders an d Staff o fficc rs whi l'htended to reduce th e effc.:Clj\'CnesJi oftht., ,\rlll Y in its earlit"!" Clp, 'ratioos,These were manifest in . i n ~ u t f i c irecognition .1nd application of th ebasic principles of wa r . F or example,the initi:ttive w:u n ( ) t sll"t ',sed.It was not a lways I I n d e r ~ th a tde c isive results co ul d be o lH ailiedonl ), by offcll 'i ivc :Inion, The principle o f economy o f (o rce rega rdsstalic garrisons was Ion).; 1I1.'),;"lectc-d.The im po rlan ce of u r p r i ~ W:lfi no talways a p preciatcd. and reconnaissance an d secur il Y measures wereohen Slighted , The lac tical ilHcg rityof tr oop units was no t always re spected and th ere were numerousinstances of piece'lIlealin){ of fo rcesin formatio ns wh ich ha d no adt'quale me chanism of co ntr o l an d nore cogn iza b le chain o f comm and,. henl'(' no ("I)JIlInand p o l l . ~ i h i l i ( y .Adequate r v c ~ were not ail'oaysJ1l;'tintained. Co-ordinJ.tion be tweenunits {n.:t.jLlenlly left llHI(:h LO be d (,lsired. an d u n j t . ~ were: somct imes permitled to drift into actio n withnul ad ear-cut plan ,

Less th an optimum e f " l i \ ' (in th e use of military Staffs in e xercising th e responsi bili ties of co m,mand. so metimC$ res ul ted from in adequa te underSlanding o f naifprinciples an d o r g a n i l ~ t i A\'a il-


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An army'. greale.. Que' - prQfe . onaUy compe,pn' officer.able.., illtllli;;t'lic c wa:, nO l . d w a ll::.edin th e preparation at plam . CUl1lhntinforma ti on was 1I0 t a!\\'ays ~ l l H 'I 1 ~ H ( ' d both verticall y findComh:H orders \ \' ('1'


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King Paul v isi ts th e frolll

ga ined ;h adhel{'\Ii' I I " I I I 1):lI,iIHicGreeks. It wotl ld takt' tillle luI' Ihelllto re mglli.o,: the (h :, j' ::;cd SiUl.l li o ll-111 ;lt lhe g t l l l l l l IlII 100Ign loughtlur Gl eere :lIul freedo m, bUl fo r th eKremlin a nd sl:wery.The wcakt'lled f k l l i \ " l ' i r i lprodlll'l 0 1 Ihese llIan y filt to rs, manirested ibelr in O l " l l d c r ~ in a dis incli n .atiull to COlile to realwith lhe enemy . In the so ld i('r, ill"CSult


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'l'BE ANTI-BANDIT WAll.By Col J.C. Hurray

PAll.T IV


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the Anti-By Col J. C. Murray

Synopsis:Th e Ihree-year conflict ha d drawn Ol l t sina 1946 wi th

Ihl! j!uerrilla.r , li/{hll)' eq uipped and unimpeded by lerrilorial responsibility, holding th e in i{intivt:.

. s long as th e gu erillru lailored their tadics to the forcesQ7Ut arms at their disposal they held th e whip -hand. But.whe n established the "provis ion al Dem ocratic Govt'm.ment" an d tr ied to hold grollnd to pr oteel th eir supplyToules th e)' w ere doomed ',.0 failure.

In addition t o the iT tactical blunde r, Ihe guerrill4S .reu ived (Ina/h er heary blow wh en Ti t a split with the Cominrjorm , an d finally closed the Yu goslav bo rder 10 guerrilla

~ ( l f f i c .I II til e meantime, moving slowly, th e Greek Govunmenthad marshalled il f forces and wlt h mofulQ/ Old and m ilita ry'aivl ,r from th e Un Ited Stal e f fi nd Bn/flln had finally bu d t

-tiP its forces to 265,000 we ll equ.ipped troops . E ven so,war d ragged on becau$t! tile Gover nmen t forces lackedcoJ,,:siven eu and th eir movements were mflrked by inded

a(lion.Th en in 1949, Gene ral Alexander Papagos ca me ot/ t ofreti reme n t to accept the post of suprem e com mander of

Cru k land ! orceJ. Seve n months after his appointment th ewar wa..r at an en d .


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Bandit WarPart IV

DISPOSITION OF FORCESTHI t l l GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

enter prominently into a c o n s i ~ r a "tion of the disposition of r O r t e ~ .These are the frontier. the m o u n ~rains and the sea. Th e influence ofme sea an d its importance as ameans of communication are dis,cussed later. The frontier mav heregarded as the source of the asweU as the greatest aHy of the "Democratic Army" in prolonging it . Th emountains. too, were an asset of inetimabie value to (he guerrilla!>.Without them the war in Greececould scan-ely have been sustained.Fl'OIttier

Between the Dardanelle5 and thehead of the Adriatic the coastline ofEurope is either mountainous or anarrow coastal pIain hacked bymountains. There are few passesthrough the mountains. and th eports owe their importance to theirposition near passes which connectthe hinterlands wilh the traffic lanesor the Mediterranean. As land rOuttsleading to the Adriatic from Bulgaria and southern Yugoslavia arelong and poor, these c o u n t r i e ~ seek.an ourlet to the nearby Aegean. Bylb possession of :\facedonia an dWestern Thrace, Greece controlsthese nawral (raffic routes, Consequen[ly. Bulgaria and Yugmlaviaha\'e al .... cast en\ious eyes on theports of Salonika and Alexandtoupolis. on the v a l l e ~ ' s of the Axim an dStrimon and the ~ f o n a s [ i r Gap.

Th e Soviet Union. ( 0 0 , is interested in this area. Th e Sovietizationof the central Ballans would be ofgreater value to the USSR i f theproductivity of the region were fullydeveloped. an d this would be aidedbv access to the ~ e d i l e r r a n e a nthrough the nearby Aegean ports.

~ f o r e important, however. bringingthis coastline within the Soviet fold"would isolate Turkey from European d male It easier for Russia toachieve her ancient ambition ofgaining free access to the ~ f e d . i t e r -ranean hy seiling the Dardanelles.

Th e present northern frontier ofGreece is a composite product of thefin.t and second Balkan wars, theGreco-Turkish 'war, \Vorld Wa r Jand the subsequent treaties. It hasalmost no desirable characteristics.From an ethnological standpoint,there are seeds of disrord in theracial minorities srattered throughOut the atea.

Th e weakness of the frontier froman economic standpoint Jies in thefa n [hal Yugoslavia and Bulgariaare interested in free access to the

~ f e d i l e t t a n e a n . Bulgaria in p a r t k u ~lar seek." access to the Aegean coast,'filitarily, the prewm frontier complete ly satisfies no one. Yugoslaviaand Bulgaria lend to regard thecoastal region to the south as. abridgehead of their s e c u r i t ~ " Jones.\\'as not Salonika used as .a base foran expeditionary foree of ';00,000during Wurld \\'ar f, and were notplans made for irs for that pur"po,e during World \Vat fI :From the Handpoint of Ihe Greeks.defense of the frontier co; ;t HCl"cuiem

wk., From the Adriatic lO the Turkisb border the frontier m e a s u r ~more than 700 milC$. I f Creece'seight wartime divisions were disposed along the border, the averagedivisional frontage would be n e a r l ~ '100 miles, Bu t its length is only apart of the problem" Th e trace ofthe frontier, running from one en dto the other through a maze of mountains, has no defensive strength. Tothe north lie other moun rains permitting defeme on successive postlions. bur. the coastal plain to thesouth affords no such possihilities.Thus, the historic routes betweenthe Aegean and the central Ralhr. .which cross th e {ronlier in the valleys of the- Strimon an d the Axio


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came under Communist nominationfollowing the withdrawal o ( theGerman occ upation forces. Relationsbetween these l'ounlries and Greecewere nOl harmonious following thewa r. Buigarian troops hotl o("cupiedGree(e eluring th e war ami postoccupatio n feding wa s high. Comnl1l1lins in all Ihrec s


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guards nf IIlot' satellites while th eguerrillas p,"epan:d to reappeal' a t anew point, or at rhe sallie poim tlfterthe Governmcnt forces had withdra ....n . This un nculral t.:ontluct onthe pan of thc lIeighuol"ing COUlltri es was on e of (he poi nts that theGreeks complained ahollt ill theirpetition to the Un i ted Nations .

The case of the Greek GO\"I.:rnment in estahl ish ing th('se LK t .. hI'.fore the Pnited Nations W t l ~ IUC ,iU diced hy a Communist propagandaca mpaign designed to create the iIllpreSSion that unrest in Gn:en:: W;ISnot tOnfined (Q the lIorder an:,IS hutspread over all Greece. This neatl"tlan impress ion that the wa r had awidespread (haracter which wa sscarcely co nsistent wilh tht' fa u s.Meanwhilc the ComnnllJists penelraled into south amI


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-..

01 . . . .---,..;..----Ic i .w, sr.

(our divi ions and twO i n c l e r ~ e .btil,rade1 assigned to on e corps werec 1 i s ~ ( ' d in l 'hcss., ly. Epmu andcentra l 1\f;-.t"C'don ia. Three di \'isio l1sami ind ependent brigade assigned to the other corps wen:InCHed in CJ.J(cm Murcdolli.J. :w dTh ratt. tl nd fou r i n c 1 e ~ d e n brigades Wt l e diJposr


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vulnerabL From operaling bases inthe moun Ii_ins the guerrillas couldreadily to harass them atany pOilU . The war, therefore, developed as a war without a fixedirOnto

Early efforts to arrest guerrillaactivity LOok the form of putting omfires. That is, the Army respondedto allacks by counter-attaeks whichcame lOa late, by pursuits whichwere too leisurely to maintain contact, and by local searching operaliollS. Uncoordinated reactions ofthis lype accomplished lillie as theguerrinas attached no importance toany particular area. ' ' ' 'hen attack.edin one area they moved to another,sometimes ollly to rel l l r i l to the firstas soon


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control of communications gave itstratcgic f1cxibility and taClical s ~ a y -ing power. \ 'Vhc!lever Ann y forcesventured off the established routes,as they m l l ~ ( to engage the guerrilla,rhey fonnd the terrain (he greatestobstacle. The guerrilla had superiorobservation, the ability to executerapid tactical movements an d theubility to interpose terrain obstaclesbetween himself and the Government forces.

The guerrillas' control of communications outside the base areaswas of a low order. This inAuencedadversely his ability to concentrattforces an d to supply them, par.ticulad), during a protracted engagemen t. This disadvantage was minimal so long as the "Democrati cArmy" conducted guerrilla-type op erations using small bands . Jt grewin significance as the bands formedinlo ba na l ions. brigades and divisio ns.

SUPPLY AND EVACUATIONThe "Democratic Army "General

The supply si tu ation of the"Democratic Arm y" HI;}Y bf dcscril.lf'din terms of oV('rall availability of'illpplies and their distribution . ThetwO were cloi'dy interrela ted .

The guerrillas were supported byforeign aid, hu t no t all supp lies wereimponed. In fact, the quantities ofsupplies ;lIld equipment inv oll,...edwere relatively small, hu t rhis smallquantity of sllpplies was still essen-(ial to lhe continu ance of Ihe gue r-rilla movement in Greece.

RequirementsThe l' . S. soldier uses each da), of

(,()Illbat pounds of supplies, in ( Iu d ing: 6 pounds of 13 lio IlS, 6pounds of eq uipment, 5 pound s offuel and oil and 20 pounds o[ ammunition. Ha d the guerrillas usedsupplies on a com parab le: basis th e ir25,000 men would have needed amillion pounds ()I ' fo ur hundred 2V2-ton truckloads daily. Needless 10say, th ey did not use supplies on thisscale.

The a\'erage guerrilla was inured10 hardship. His need's were lew.He was sa risfied with a diet of bread,milk, cheese, lamb and goat. Suchitems as sa lt, sugar, mffe.c and tobacco \\'e.re difficult to come hy an d weresometim es missing. His equipmentcom pri sed boats, dothing, a blanket,a knife or baronet and a firearm.Medical supplies, while negligible ona pro rala basis. didl in the aggregate(o l1$l ilUte a signifir:al1l quamity. TheamJIIllnilion carrif'd on the individual was 20 to 30 rounds, while200300 ",'e ,"C carried (or machineguns. Owing to this low initiala llowa nce an d the difficully of eC-(e


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Terrnin: the Guerrilla'. greate.1 a.. t

Alter Ihree yel,,. 01 f igh l ing-a return to rwrmlllcy

The requirement lor transporiprobably varied between one andtwo pounds pe r day for each guerrilla opera liDg in ~ o u t h and cen tralGreece. This stems insignifical1l, bu tneither the supplies nor thei r quantity were insignificant. Without thesesupplies, which could not be ob tained locally, the guerrillas couldno t function etlectively. They werevital, therefore, to guerrilla opera tions.

Fi ve thousand guerriHas i ll ' sou thand central Greece would have used50 to 100 animal loads dail)'. Taking120 lililes as the I \ ' ~ r a g e distallcefrom the base


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(ultur: procurement offo


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1'BE ANTI-BANDIT WAR

By Col J.C. Murray

PART V


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By Col J. C. Murray

the AntiConcluaioDAIR FORCES

ON 10 AUCUST 1949 THE AIu.cylaunched i15 long-awaited attack inthe Vi lSi area. From the 6ru, lightaircraft were over the area searchingfor, and a ttacking targelS in assistingthe ground advance. By nightfall169 sorties had been flown, higher by63 than any other da y in the wafTh e average daily sortie rate duringthe five days of the VilSi operationwas 126.

Again on 24 August, when theArmy started the Jast large-scale attack of the war in the Mt. Grammosarea, air was ac tive. Following a dayo[ sus tained ai r operations by Spitfires and C47 convened bomben.the newly fanned Helldiver (SB2C)Squadron, flying an JS-plane formatio n, made its debut in combat.During the period 24 to 29 August,planes su pported the Grammos attack with 826 sorties. During thesix-day period perhaps 250 tons ofbombs, rockets and napalm were deJivered against the guerrillas .

The victory in Vi lsi was a result of{he effectiveness of artillery and ai rsupport and to a piece of unex-peCted luck in the unopposed occupation of a key terrain fearure by agroup of CommandOs. The participation of air in the Grammos battle


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was no le:s.s effective. While the:setwo inStance!/. are not representativeof the air effort throughout the antibandit war, they do afford at onetime it useful measure of what wasaa:omplished and an indication ofwhat might have been accomplished.Air i pport of . . . . ."" toKes

It is a truism today thal successfulground operations cannol be conducted without air superiority. Butair superiority alone merely freesground forces from the eilects ofenemy ai r action. This favorable

:here a new Grttk Air Force cameinto being. The Hellenic BomberSquadron was employed, as a partof the RAl'. primarily in long rangepatrols in the Mediterranean. TheGreek Air Force was not preparedby its wartime experience for its rolein the anti-guerrilla war.

Until late 1946 operational control of the Greek Air Force remainedunder the RAF. while a d m i n i s t r a ~tive control was exercised by theGreek Air Staff, When it becamenecessary to employ the Air Force goi.... the bandits, the RAF "'lin-

au1 program was instituted,Pattem of lir Ictioft

By this time the pattern of airactioo was developing. Air operations against the guerrillas were oftwo general types. The tint consh.ted of air operations aimed at"isolation of the battlefield." H o w ~ever. an Greece was a batrlefield andthe objective of such operations wassimply the destruction of guerrillaforces. The $e(:ond type of ai r actionwas direct support of ground troops

Three techniques were employed

Bandit War The defeat of the guerrillas w ........de pouihle bytheir departure from proper guerrilla organization,and by 80 doing, they opposed weakness to 8tre"lrtbcondition can be exploited tullyonly II the ai r has ,be capability 01eflecti,,'ely supporting the groundforces. No one questions the necesaity of achieving air superiority northe value of interdiction. However,at such time, when aircraft can beemployed most effectively in the direct support. there must be an effective technique for the delivery ofsuch support,

In Greece the infantryman paidthe forfeit for past neglect of thedO:St: support problem. There wasno aerial war, Control of the air wasachieved by defaulL The primaryindeed the: only task of the RoyalHeHenic Air Force-was the attackof ground targets either independentlyor in conjunction \'toith gr9undunits. While: independent attackswere of great value. there were manyoccasions when aircraft could havebeen employed most ad ...antageouslyin direct support of ground troops.Destruction of guerrillas by any andall means was the objective, and theair effort must be Valu,ned in thislighL ,\Va$ the air et(ort. completewith its manpower and materialproblems. warnnted by the results?In seeking the answers. familiaritywith the background of the RHAFi$ essential.History and composition of RHAF

Follo""'ing the Allied withdrawalfrom GrC'e(:e in 1941, many Greekainnen made their way to. Egypt

quished operational controL Thisforced a reorganilation of the AirForce. At this time it consisted of58 obsolete aircraft and approximately 291 pilots (all veterans of warservice; no pilot training had beenundertaken since the liberation).An order was placed with the UKfor 250 war-surplus aircraft. Deliv.ery was expedited because of the

bandit waf and was completed duting the summer of 1947. This orderincluded Spitfire fighters. Wellingronbomben. C.41 transports and liaisoncraft. The WeHington bomber wasfound to be inoperable in Greece,and they were grounded.The middle of 1947 then, foundthe RHAF with a strength of about5,000, or which 400 were flying per"sOnnel. Its uni ts were: two fightersquadrons of Spitfires, one liaisonsquadron of Harvards (T 6), Austenand L-Ss. one transport squadron ofC47. and AruolU, one refresher Bigh'of Spitfires and other types; and oneprojected fighter squadroo.Aircraft on hand were sufficient tosupport thee squadrons; training 01pilotS had been resumed and some50 cade. . had fwl completed advanced training in England. Schoolswere established to train pilots.chanics and electrical. hydraulic, airframe and signal technicians. Training was conducted under the s u p e r ~vision of the RAY De1egation. r o n ~sisting of 15of6cen and ISO men. Itwas at this juncture that the U. S.

in conducting the first type of ~tions, Fif$l. there were pre-plannedstrikes on targets localed in a d v ~by ground intelligence or by aerialpholography. The second. armed reconnaissance. was nor-many COIldueled only when information i n d i ~catcd the probability of finding aprofitable largel. as . .ben I:atp;


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Cuerrilitu , haggard and haraned -lhe tables hatllurnedSuch shortag ...s had, in Greece. agrC:Hcr significance lhan th ey mighth:we had in a more highly imJU5'

trialized cou lIlry where sk.illed pt:.-sOllllcillli15ht have been dr:tfted frominduslry .lnd where i n d u ~ t r y couldhave supplied (he d l ' ~ l L/cililics

~ l I 1 d equ ipment. I\'ot ill Green:.Indu sll'Y wuld supply fc\\' of thesk iJls required hy the Ai r Force. . ir cra ft lechniLians had fO be train edand lh e n\'eragc recruit had h:ldlillie prnious experiellce whichwould aid in n n r t i n him into alcchui t.:a l spccialisL F \ ' t (he con st11lction of ;1ir6elds exceeded th e C:d -

c i l ~ ' o( the post-war economy ofG n e c e . Litllc cou ld b..: done withrcspt'ct to the procuremen l o f equipm CIH an d lhe dc\-clopmcol of f:u.:i litit's except through th e British )orissinn.

Unforlunately, the nef'd for ai rpower coincided in l i m ~ with tht:B r i t i Government"s di scovery thatit could no longtr bear the financialburden of aiding Greece. A program of aircraft procurc;ment wasinitialed an d supported until theli. S. coult.! ta ke over the re_ponsibilil,Y. While i t was an adequa teinitia l program so far as numbers ofaircrnft were concerned, the sparepan; j>1O!-;T!\nl did no t discoullt suffic i e I H the maintenancc cap.lhiliLiesof the RHAF an d the ai r effort soon5uffert:d as a rc!>"Uit.t i. S. assumption of rlllancia L respollsibi li ty. nine momhs after tbeeml oC flritish aid. did no t result inany hilid new ai r program . The re

S l ) ( ) l h i b i l i t ~ for lh e orga nizalion an dtritining of die RHAF (which impliesthl' arrcpt::wce of Ll high degree of

r e ~ p o l l S i h for its performance inba ltle) remained for lhe most partwith the RAF Delegation, whereasth e rcsponsihiJit)' for providing lheIlleanS was vestel1 in the AmericanMission. A similar arrangement wasfound to be satisfactory as regardsthe Navy where the prior provisionhr the British of long.l ife capitalitems was the domi llam consideration. As r e ~ a n h th e .'\ ir Force. how('vcr, it scn icf' wlu:rc material is aparamoullt c O l l ~ i l 1 e r : l . I i o n and whereequipnlclIl consists of relatively complica ted OInd short li ,ed items, it isullsouncl to separate responsibilityror perform:llll...e ion hall ic from contm l of the material means to im.prove that performance. The RA FDelegation was in the unfortunateposition of being respo nsible for lheo pera ting efficiency of the RHAF,while the U. S. Mission was in aposltion to monitor any recommendation for its improvement entailingthe expenditure of funds. This expl"L"!lSC \ the relationship in the worstp o ~ s i b l e lC.:rms an d may be misleading. The fact remains that indecision and hatemea sures are inherencin any such division of responsibi lily.

Some of the factors wbich mililateel agailHl getting maximum re-turn from the air enort have beenenulll cr:Hetl


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liv e 1 I ~ l I l j ( k . l : u l i o ~ c:c l' ;cIJif.: 01 (fil l,1 , f ( l i J ) ~ ~ U p p O l t "ilCr;Ii( \q'lC: av:\il;Ible III lli e j,),]l/lIlld IIllih."1 hn( ' werce lllpll Jyc.; d Ipll \\ iLil Lll(" :IWIlIIL IJ:lllaliOI1 \ , blll :It IJI igadc alld d i v i ~ i o l lhC :ldqu:lll


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,

Ruonlllrllcrion: lJabotage had taken. it , tollthe ~ a \ ' } " I,-as ca lled upon to par-ticipate in a hlrgc-IiGtl a mphibiou slanding. The da) -lo -f.by dudes of,he RH:\ ','cn: the pat rolling ofGl"e( i;ln II a nd the provi!ol on o(sea uOl mpon for lhe 1II ()"cmem o (tm op" tlnd slJppiiC's. Thus the 1'\avym .. 11l a ined {o ll ll v i o( Lhe !>t"fI$ sur ro unding Lreccc, denyin g lhose\fate" t the g t, r rri llas. By pro\' iding sea it 1 ~ ~ i ~ L t : d in thefILII exploitation of lhe ;tth:1l1Iagcswhich accrued to Ihe G o \ ' r n m ~ n tth ro ugh i ls LOllllnand o r th e sea .Recent history , size and compo!>itionof the Royal Hellenic Navy

T he ::'\a\'Y at th e inception of hostili ties was in better shap e thane ilher the .. l 1 n ~ or the A il' Force.Unlike thelll, it had been able 10withdra \\' most of its forces \\'henGreece fell to the Germans . Thusit h


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U.ited S_ assistance to RHNSince the Greek. :-':avy was meetingits operational requirements with the

equipment then on hand, the tJ. S.Naval Group. upon its arri\'al inGreece in the summer of 194i. deduced that its miMion could be fulfilled by pJ'Oviding the minimumsupporr. An exception (.0 this policywas made in the case of six patrolcrah procured from U.S, naval sur.pluses to permit an extension ofpaltolHng. Th e Navy Group s p o n ~sored the repair an d construction ofthe facilities of the damaged 1'\3\'31Ba.se at Salamis Island. as thes.e wererequired to enable the Navy to keepits ship$ operating. Assistance wasgiven to the development of trainingfacilities at Sacaramanga """hieh wererequired in order to bring trainingstandards to an acceptable level.

As a result of this pollcy to limitexpenditures, the end of the ... atfound the Greek Xav", with no betterequipment than it ~ d started with.whereas both the Ann\' and the AirForce had. for all practical purposes.been completely re-equipped.

CONCLUSIONSOn the political. psychologicaJ andeconomic frollts. facton which con

tributed to the defeat of the g u e r ~riHas were;I. The British .n d U. S. Procram.. f aid to GlftCe

Th e presence o[ British ltOOpS inGreece at the onset of guerrilla operations exercised a re5trainingftuence on the USSR and the s a t e l ~lites. preventing direct interventionin Greece an d open aid to the guerwriHas. U. S. patticipation strengthened this restraining inDuence. TheBritish and American aid programssustained the government of Greeceand enabled it to mobilile, equipand supply large military forces.""hile at the same time Slaving offthe collapse o[ the national economy.

American interest, moreo\'('r,tended to fill the vacuum when UKalone could no longer provide support on the required scale, Americanassistance Was provided O'n such ascale as to improve the morale of theGreek nation by giving it hope thatpeace might be restored and thai adegree o[ e,[rength of th(' armed forces duringhis tenure. Jr ''''it.'' \ i m p l ~ ' tbat {he

for(("$, as they existed; were usedmore effectively. Continuous pressure kept the guerrillas on the move.inDicted heavy c a s u a l t i ~ an d afforded them no opportunity fo re -supply or replace casualties. Thus.their relative combat power g r a d u a l ~1y declined during the six monthsperiod which pIeded their finalcoll.po resulting from the TitoCominform rift may j u s l i f ~ : it s i d e n t i ~6calion as the proximate cause or theguerrilla coHapse,The ""mal .b.tndonme.t of guerrilbtatOO by lite "Dtmocratic Anny"

Th e tendenc\' of the "DemocraticArmy" during }'948 and 1949 towardsa mllitarr s t r a l e g ~ . ' . ",'hich dependedlor its S\l(cess upon the organilationof Jarger formations and the employment of r t h o d o ~ military lactics, implied a growing reliance upon military Coree alone. Vnder the existingcondition!'. a n ~ ' such developmentplayed into [he hands o[ the go\'ernmenl f o r c ~ , Th e guerrillas were opposing weakness to strength, Th edecisi\'e defeat of the guerrillas ~ ' a Smade possible by their depanurefrom proper guerrilla organilationand tactin in their effort to ddefHIthe base areaSc along the northernfromier and the gathering of theirone-tilltt: Somali hands into larger(onnatiom, ranging in she up to Ihedi\"isJon. -


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INSTRUCTIONAL SUPPORT BRANCH'- 1st Specia! Forces Schoo;

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SWS Greece2

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