Sweeney v. Pence, No. 13-1264 (7th Cir. Sep. 2, 2014)

8/11/2019 Sweeney v. Pence, No. 13-1264 (7th Cir. Sep. 2, 2014)

1/59

In the

United States Court of AppealsFor the Seventh Circuit____________________

No.131264

JAMESM.SWEENEY,etal.,

PlaintiffAppellants,

v.

MICHAELPENCE,

GovernoroftheStateofIndiana,etal.,

DefendantAppellees.

____________________

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe

NorthernDistrictofIndiana,HammondDivision.

No.2:12cv00081PPSPRCPhilipP.Simon,ChiefJudge.

____________________

ARGUEDSEPTEMBER12,2013DECIDEDSEPTEMBER2,2014

____________________

BeforeWOOD,ChiefJudge,andMANIONandTINDER,Cir

cuitJudges.

TINDER,CircuitJudge.PlaintiffAppellants,membersand

officers of the InternationalUnion ofOperatingEngineers,

Local150,AFLCIO(theUnion)appealthedistrictcourts

dismissalof

their

suit,

arguing

that

the

Indiana

Right

to

WorkActviolatestheirrightsundertheUnitedStatesCon

stitution and ispreemptedby federal labor legislation.Be


2/59

2 No.131264

causethelegislationisnotpreemptedbytheschemeoffed

erallabor

law

and

does

not

violate

any

constitutional

rights,

weaffirmthedistrictcourtsdismissalofthesuit.

I

After a rancorous, partisanmonthlong fight during

whichhundredsofunionmemberscrowded,dayafterday,

intotheStatehousehalls,1theIndianalegislaturepassedthe

IndianaRighttoWorkActonFebruary1,2012,andGover

norMitchDanielssignedthelegislationintolaw.Thelaws

relevant

provisions

for

this

litigation

are

the

following.

Section8,whichspellsout theprincipalprohibitionsof

theRighttoWorkAct:

Apersonmaynotrequireanindividualto:

(1)Becomeor remainamemberofa labor

organization;

(2)Pay dues, fees, assessments, or other

chargesofanykindoramounttoalabor

organization;

or

(3)Pay to a charity or third party an

amount that is equivalent to or a pro

rata part of dues, fees, assessments or

otherchargesrequiredofmembersofa

labororganization

1MonicaDavey, IndianaGovernor Signs aLawCreating a Right to

Work State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012) at A12, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/indianabecomes

right

to

work

state.html(lastaccessedAug.20,2014).


3/59

No.131264 3

asaconditionofemploymentorcontinua

tionof

employment.

IND.CODE22668.

Section 3, which makes clear what substantive provi

sionsoftheRighttoWorkActaretobeconstruedtoapply

tothebuildingandconstructionindustry:

Nothing in thischapter is intended,orshould

beconstrued, tochangeoraffectany lawcon

cerningcollectivebargainingorcollectivebar

gainingagreements

in

the

building

and

con

structionindustryotherthan:

(1)a law that permits agreements that

would requiremembership in laboror

ganization;


would require the payment of dues,

fees, assessments, or other charges of

anykindofamounttoalabororganiza

tion;or


wouldrequire thepayment toacharity

or a third party of an amount that is

equivalenttooraproratapartofdues,

fees, assessment, or other charges re

quiredofmembersofa labororganiza

tion;

as

a

condition

of

employment.

IND.CODE22663.


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4 No.131264

AndSection13,whichmakesclear thatSections812of

theAct

apply

prospectively:

Sections8through12ofthischapter:

(1)apply to a written or oral contract or

agreement entered into, modified, re

newed, or extended after March 14,

2012;and

(2)donotapplytoorabrogateawrittenor

oral contract or agreement in effect on

March14,

2012.

IND.CODE226613.

On February 22, 2012, PlaintiffAppellants, officers and

membersoftheInternationalUnionofOperatingEngineers,

Local 150,AFLCIO (theUnion),brought suit in federal

districtcourtagainst theGovernorofIndiana, theAttorney

General of Indiana, and the Commissioner of the Indiana

DepartmentofLabor in theirofficialcapacities,seekingde

claratoryrelief.TheyallegedthattheIndianaRighttoWork

Actviolates

the

United

States

Constitution

and

the

Indiana

Constitution.Theyfurtherarguedthattheschemeoffederal

labor law, specifically the National Labor Relations Act

(NLRA),29U.S.C.151 et seq.,preempts8(2)(3)and

3(2)(3)ofthenewlegislation.OnJanuary17,2013,thefed

eral district court grantedDefendantAppelleesMotion to

Dismisson thepreemption claim and the federal constitu

tionalclaims.PlaintiffAppellantstimelyappealed.2

2Webrieflynote that there isparallel litigationpending in the Indianastatecourts.Twodecisionshavebeenissuedbystatetrialcourtsinrela

Continuedonnextpage


5/59

No.131264 5

II

Onappeal,PlaintiffAppellants raise twovarietiesof is

sues:whetherthelawispreemptedbythefederalschemeof

labor law,andwhether theIndiana lawviolates theUnited

StatesConstitution.Weanswerinthenegativetobothques

tions.

1. FederalPreemption

PlaintiffAppellantsmain argument asserts that the In

dianarighttowork law ispreemptedby federal legislation

onthe

same

topic.

The history of the federal legislation in question is im

portanthere.CongressenactedtheWagnerActin1935and

amendeditthroughtheLaborManagementRelationsActof

1947,betterknownastheTaftHartleyAct.TheTaftHartley

Actincludedseveralprovisions intendedtoameliorateper

ceivedimbalancesintheNLRA.Inparticular,Congresswas

concernedaboutabusesstemmingfromtheclosedshop,a

unionsecurity agreementwhereby an employer agreed to

tiontothestatute:inacase inLakeCountySuperiorCourtbroughtby,

interalia, thePlaintiffAppellants (Order,Sweeneyv.Zoeller,No.45D01

1305PL52(LakeCnty.Super.Ct.Sep.9,2013),DocketNo.23),andina

separatecase inLakeCountyCircuitCourtbroughtbymembersofan

other union (Order, United Steel Paper v. Zoeller, No. 45C011207PL

00071 (LakeCnty.Cir.Ct.Jul.17,2014)).Bothdecisionshavebeenap

pealed to the Indiana Supreme Court. (Docket Records of Zoeller v.

Sweeney,No.45S001309PL00596(accessedAug.20,2014);Docket

RecordsofZoellerv.UnitedSteelPaper,No.45S001407PL00492

(accessedAug. 20, 2014)).The state trial courtsdecisions are far from

final inmost respects,and,moreover,havenopreclusiveeffectonourconsiderationoffederalquestionshere.


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6 No.131264

hire only unionmembers. Section 8(3) of theWagnerAct

wasaccordingly

amended

to

ban

closed

shops.

However,

the amended Section 8(3) shield[ed] from anunfair labor

practicecharge lesssevereformsofunionsecurityarrange

mentsthantheclosedorunionshop.NLRB.v.Gen.Motors

Corp.,373U.S.734,739(1963).Forexample,itpermittedan

arrangement requiringnonunionmembers topay tothe

union$2amonth for thesupportof thebargainingunit.

Id.

AlthoughCongresspermittedlessrestrictive,posthiring

unionsecurity

agreements

under

federal

law,

it

also

left

states free toban them. Section 14(b) of theAct provided

thatSection8(3)didnotprotectaunionsecurityagreement

ifitwasprohibitedbyStateorTerritoriallaw.Bythetime

Section14(b)wasincludedintheNLRA,twelveStateshad

statutesorconstitutionalprovisionsoutlawingorrestricting

the closed shop and related devices, laws about which

Congressseemstohavebeenwellinformedduringthe1947

debates.RetailClerks IntlAssn,Local1625v.Schermer

horn,375

U.S.

86,

100

(1963)

(Retail

Clerks

II).

Inrelevantpart,Section8(a)(3)oftheNLRAnowreads:

It shallbe an unfair labor practice for an

employerbydiscriminationinregardtohire

ortenureoremploymentoranytermorcondi

tionofemploymenttoencourageordiscourage

membershipinanylabororganization.

Provided,Thatnothinginthissubchapter,or

inanyotherstatuteof theUnitedStates,shall

preclude anemployer frommaking an agree

ment with a labor organization (not estab


7/59

No.131264 7

lished,maintained, or assistedby any action

definedin

this

subsection

as

an

unfair

labor

practice) to require as a conditionof employ

mentmembershiptherein.

29U.S.C.158(a)(3).

AndSection14(b)oftheNLRAprovides:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be con

struedasauthorizingtheexecutionorapplica

tionofagreementsrequiringmembership ina

labororganization

as

acondition

of

employ

ment in any State orTerritory inwhich such

executionorapplication isprohibitedbyState

orTerritoriallaw.

29U.S.C.164(b).

The Supreme Court has clarified the relationship be

tweenthesetwoprovisions:14(b)wasintendedtoprevent

othersectionsintheNLRAfromcompletelyextinguishing

statepowerover certainunionsecurity arrangements.Re

tailClerks Intern.Assn,Local1625v.Schermerhorn, 373U.S.

746,751(1963)(RetailClerksI).Specifically,[Section14(b)]

wasdesignedtomakecertainthat8(a)(3)couldnotbesaid

toauthorizearrangementsof thissort inStateswheresuch

arrangementswere contrary to the State policy. Id. (cita

tionsand internalquotationmarksomitted).Thus,weread

Section 14(b) as protecting states authority to enact laws

prohibiting unionsecurity arrangements that are permissi

bleunderSection8(a)(3)andotherprovisionsoftheNLRA.

Thisreading

was

underscored

by

the

Supreme

Courts

deci

sioninRetailClerksII,whichdeclaredthatthelegislativehis

tory ma[de] clear and unambiguous the purpose ofCon


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8 No.131264

gressnot topreempt the field.RetailClerks II, 375U.S. at

101.TheCourt

concluded

that

Congress

in

1947

did

not

de

prive theStatesofanyandallpower toenforce their laws

restricting theexecutionandenforcementofunionsecurity

agreementsandthatitisplainthatCongresslefttheStates

freetolegislateinthefieldofunionsecurityagreements.Id.

at102.Thefreedomreservedtothestatesisextensive;even

if [a]unionsecurityarrangementclearsall federalhurdles,

theStatesby reasonof14(b)have the final sayandmay

outlawit.Id.at10203.TheSupremeCourtcouldnothave

beenmore

explicit

regarding

the

broad

authority

of

states

to

prohibitunionsecurityagreements.

It isagainst thisbackdropofstatesextensiveauthority,

reservedtothembythelanguageofthestatuteandtheSu

preme Courts interpretation, that we consider Plaintiff

AppellantsargumentthatprovisionsoftheIndianarightto

work legislationarepreemptedby federal labor legislation.

Theirprimaryargument is thatSection14(b)permitsstates

tobanonlyunionsecurityagreementsrequiringmember

ship,or

else

compelling

workers

to

pay

afull

membership

fee thatservesas the functionalequivalentofmembership.

TheIndianastatutegoesfurtherbyprohibitingunionsfrom

collectinganyfeesandduesfromunwillingemployees.The

PlaintiffAppellantsassert that thisban is toostrictbecause

employeesmaystillbe required topaya feeequal to their

fair share of the collectivebargaining costssomething

less than the full membership feeand not qualify as

membersoftheunionunderSection14(b).Section8(a)(3),

whichpermitssucharrangements,wouldthen,accordingto

thisargument,

apply

in

full

force

and

preempt

any

state

statutebarringtheunionspractice.


9/59

No.131264 9

PlaintiffAppellants furtherargue that sucha reading is

necessarybecause

unions

are

required

to

act

on

behalf

of

all

employees in labor disputes, and may not discriminate

againstnonmembers.Tocompel theunion torepresentall

employees equally using dues contributed only by some

workers, they argue, creates a freerider problem. Indeed,

theSupremeCourthasobservedthatSection(8)(3)wasde

signed to remedy the inequitiesposedby free riderswho

wouldotherwiseunfairlyprofitfrom theTaftHartleyActs

abolition of the closed shop. CommcnsWorkers ofAm. v.

Beck,487

U.S.

735,

75354

(1988).

Wearenotconvinced thatSection8(3)preempts the In

dianastatute,forseveralreasons.

a. InterpretationsoftheTermMembershipinthe

NLRAContext

PlaintiffAppellants and the dissent admit that the Su

premeCourthasconstruedthetermmembershiptohave

thesamemeaninginSections8(a)(3)and14(b).Indeed,there

is

no

reason

to

think

that

the

term

membership

in

Section

14(b)wouldmeansomethingdifferentfromthetermmem

bership in Section 8(a)(3) of the same act. See Sorenson v.

Sec yofTreasuryofU.S.,475U.S.851,860 (1986) (Thenor

mal rule of statutory construction assumes that identical

wordsusedindifferentpartsofthesameactareintendedto

have the same meaning.) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).As a result, the agreements requiring member

shipinalaborunionwhichareexpresslypermittedbythe

proviso are the same membership agreements expressly

placedwithin

the

reach

of

state

law

by

14(b).

RetailClerks

I, 373U.S. at 751. Ifmembership for purposes of Section

8(a)(3)encompassesanarrangementrequiringnonunion


10/59

10 No.131264

memberstopaytotheunion$2amonthforthesupportof

thebargaining

unit,

Gen. Motors,

373

U.S.

at

739,

then

membershipunderSection14(b) should likewiseextend to

suchfees.

TheSupremeCourthasdescribedunionmembershipas

synonymouswithpayingtheportionofduesgermanetothe

unions collective bargaining. It has held that the term

membershipinSection8(a)(3)hasbeenwhittleddownto

itsfinancialcore.Gen.Motors,373U.S.at742.AndtheSu

premeCourthasalsomadeclearthatthisfinancialcoreof

unionmembership

extends

to

only

those

fees

and

dues

necessary to performing the duties of an exclusive repre

sentativeoftheemployeesindealingwiththeemployeron

labormanagement issues.3 Beck, 487 U.S. at 763 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 745

(Thestatutoryquestionpresentedinthiscaseiswhether

thisfinancialcoreincludestheobligationtosupportunion

activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining,

contractadministration,andgrievanceadjustment.Wethink

itdoes

not.).

In

other

words,

Representation

Feesthose

3ThedissentstatesthatBeckshouldbereadforthepropositionthatthe

termmembershipdoesnotextendtothosewhopayonlyRepresenta

tion Fees. (WedefineRepresentation Fees tobe those feesgermane to

collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjust

ment.)ThatcontradictsBeckssubstantiveholding.TheCourtheldthat

8(a)(3)authorizes theexactionofonlyRepresentationFees,an inter

pretation thatnecessarily requires that the term membership in that

clausebereadtomeanRepresentationFees.487U.S.at76263.Itistrue

that in its statement of facts, Beck distinguishesbetween duespaying

employeeswho

choose

not

to

be

union

members

and

full

dues

paying

unionmembers.Id.at739.Butthatquirkisnotsubstantive.


11/59

No.131264 11

fees germane to collectivebargaining, contract administra

tion,and

grievance

adjustmentconstitute

the

financial

coreofmembershipforthepurposesofSection8(a)(3)and

for Section 14(b). Therefore, Section 14(b)s express allow

ance of state lawsprohibiting agreements requiringmem

bership in a labor organization as a condition of employ

mentnecessarilypermitsstatelawsprohibitingagreements

thatrequireemployees topayRepresentationFees(empha

sisadded).4

In the alternative,we find compelling the fact that the

positionadvanced

by

the

Union

and

adopted

in

the

dissent

necessarilyentailsreading8(a)(3)asmaking14(b)super

fluous.As noted above, in Beck the SupremeCourt stated

that8(a)(3)authorizes theexactionofonly those fees

andduesnecessarytoperformingthedutiesofanexclusive

representativeoftheemployeesindealingwiththeemploy

eronlabormanagementissues.487U.S.at76263(citation

andinternalquotationmarksomitted);seeMarquezv.Screen

ActorsGuild, Inc.,525U.S.33,38 (1998) (8(a)(3)doesnot

permitunions

to

exact

dues

or

fees

from

employees

for

ac

tivities thatarenotgermane tocollectivebargaining,griev

ance adjustment, or contract administration.). In arguing

thatRepresentationFeesarepermissible inalljurisdictions,

4As this analysismakes clear,our conclusion is compelled inpartby

Becksholding that the term membership extends to thosewhoonly

payRepresentationFees,notsimplyby theRetailClerksdecisions.And

weareboundbythatprecedent,eveniftherulethatthetermmember

shiphasbeenwhittleddowntoitsfinancialcoretoincludethosewho

payonly

Representation

Fees

does

not

fit

with

the

ordinary

meaning

of

thetermmembership,asthedissentstates.


12/59

12 No.131264

including states that havepromulgated righttowork laws

inaccordance

with

14(b),

the

Union

is

asserting

that

all

statesmust allowunions to negotiate thebroadest, largest

possible unionsecurity arrangement permitted under

8(a)(3).Thatcantberight.

Bothof thesepointsaremorecompellingthan thealter

native readings of membership presented to us by the

PlaintiffAppellants,whohangtheirinterpretationonsever

alslenderbranches:twocontemporaneousdictionarydefini

tions,andafederalstatutorydefinitionfound inadifferent

statutepassed

twelve

years

after

the

Taft

Hartley

Act.

See

The LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959, 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq. Not only are both of these

sourcesextraneoustothestatutewearechargedtointerpret

in thiscase,but theyalsocannotalter theSupremeCourts

later construction of the term membership in the Retail

ClerkscasesandBeck.

b. StateStatutorySchemesConcurrentwithTaft

Hartley

Alsocompellingarethestaterighttoworklawsineffect

atthetimeoftheTaftHartleyActspassagein1947.Asthe

SupremeCourt stated inRetailClerks II, twelve states had

righttoworklawsineffectwhenTaftHartleywasenacted:

Arizona,Arkansas,Georgia,Iowa,Nebraska,Nevada,North

Carolina,NorthDakota,SouthDakota,Tennessee,Texasand

Virginia.5These laws fell into twodifferent categories.The

5 State Laws Regulating UnionSecurity Contracts, 21 L.R.R.M. 66

(1948).Ofthesestates,tenstatesretainthesamerighttoworkstatutorylanguagetothepresentday.ThetwoexceptionsareNevadaandTexas.

Continuedonnextpage


13/59

No.131264 13

firstbroadlydisallowedcompulsoryunionmembership.The

secondincluded

specific

provisions

outlawing

compulsory

paymentofduesorfeestolabororganizations.Anexample

of a statute from the secondgroup is Iowas righttowork

law,whichwasenactedonApril28,1947, twomonthsbe

forethepassageoftheTaftHartleyAct:

Sec.1.ItisdeclaredtobethepolicyoftheState

of Iowa that no personwithin itsboundaries

shallbe deprived of the right towork at his

chosenoccupationforanyemployerbecauseof

membershipin,

affiliation

with,

withdrawal

or

expulsionfrom,orrefusaltojoin,anylaborun

ion,organization,orassociation,andanycon

tract which contravenes this policy is illegal

andvoid.

[]

Sec.4.Itshallbeunlawfulforanyperson,firm,

association, labororganizationor corporation,

or

political

subdivision,

either

directly

or

indi

rectly,orinanymannerorbymeansasapre

InthecaseofNevada,therewasarighttoworkprovisionineffectfrom

1911to1951intheCrimesandPunishmentActof1911,whichremained

ineffectuntil1951.Afteratwoyearhiatus,aformal,standalonerightto

worklawwasaddedin1953throughinitiativepetition.NevadaLegisla

tive Counsel Bureau Office of Research Background PaperNo. 7508

(1975).InTexas,arighttoworklawwaspassedin1947andstyledTexas

Civ.Code5207a. Itseems tohavebeenupdatedand renumbered to

appearatTexasLab.Code101in1993.The1993amendmentgaverise

toTexass specific language that restrictedcompelledpaymentofduesandfeestounions.


14/59

14 No.131264

requisite toorconditionofemployment tore

quireany

person

to

pay

dues,

charges,

fees,

contributions,finesorassessmentstoanylabor

union,laborassociationorlabororganization.

IOWACODE 736A.1, 4 (1947), renumbered as IOWACODE

731.1,4(1977).

All told,of the twelvestate righttoworkstatutes inef

fectin1947,morethanhalfsevenincludedlanguagesimi

lartoIndianasandIowasstatutes.ARK.CODEANN.113

303

(1947);

GA.

CODE

ANN.

34

6

22

(1947);

IOWA

CODE

731.4 (enacted 1947, renumbered 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.

48217 (1947);N.C.GEN.STAT.9582 (1947);TENN.CODE

ANN. 501203 (1947);VA.CODEANN. 40.162 (enacted

1947, renumbered1970).Congresswaswellawareof these

statuteswhenitdraftedSection14(b).SeeH.R.Rep.No.245,

80thCong.,1stSess.34,reprintedinILegislativeHistoryofthe

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 324 (1948) (listing

states with such statutes).As discussed above, the stated

purposeofSection14(b)wastopreservetheefficacyoflaws

likethese

statutes

that

allowed

states

to

place

restrictions

of their choosing on unionsecurity agreements, including

restrictions onwhether employees couldbe compelled to

payduesorfeesofanykindtoaunion.6

6 The legislative history demonstrates that Congress drafted Section

14(b)topreservetherighttoworkstatutesalreadyineffectin1947.See

IntlUnionoftheUnitedAssnofJourneymen&ApprenticesofthePlumbing

&Pipefitting Indus.,LocalUnionsNos.141,229,681,&706v.NLRB,675

F.2d 1257, 1273 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (Mikva,J.,dissenting) (Thebest evi

denceofcongressional intentmaythereforelie inthekindsof compulsoryunionismthatmembersofCongressunderstoodhadbeenbanned

Continuedonnextpage


15/59

No.131264 15

Presently, twentyfourstateshavesome formofaright

towork

law.7

The

overwhelming

majority

of

jurisdictions

eighteen,byourcount,includingGuamhaveadoptedlan

guagesubstantiallyidenticaltotheprohibitioninInd.Code

2268(2).SeeALA.CODE25734(1953);ARK.CODEANN.

113303 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. 34622 (1947); IDAHO

CODE ANN. 442003(3) (1985); 22 GUAM CODE ANN.

4103(3) (2000); IOWA CODE 731.4 (transferred 1977); LA.

REV.STAT.ANN.23:983(1976);MICH.COMP.LAWS423.17

(2013);MISS.CONST.art.7,198A(1960);NEB.REV.STAT.

48217

(1947);

N.C.GEN.STAT.

95

82

(1947);

OKLA.CONST.

art.23,1A (2001);S.C.CODEANN.41730(1954);TENN.

CODEANN.501203(1947);TEX.LAB.CODEANN.101.004

(1993);UTAHCODEANN.343410(1955);VA.CODEANN.

40.162 (1947);WYO. STAT.ANN. 277111 (1963); see also

N.D. CENT. CODE 340114.1 (1987), repealed by NLRB v.

NorthDakota,504F.Supp.2d750(D.N.D.2007).Thelongevi

tyofmanyofthesestatutes,coupledwiththelackofdisap

provalexpressedbytheSupremeCourt,suggeststousthat

Indianas righttowork law falls squarelywithin the realm

ofacceptablelaw.

We also findpersuasive adecisionby theD.C.Circuit,

theonlydecisionfromasistercircuittosquarelyaddressthe

by thestaterighttowork laws.).Yet thedissentspositionnecessarily

entailsconcluding thatCongressdidnot intend14(b)sprotections to

extendtothemajorityofrighttoworkstatutesthenineffect.Thatisnot

areasonableinterpretationoflegislativehistory.

7NationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,RighttoWorkResources,

available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/laborandemployment/righttoworklawsandbills.aspx(lastaccessedAug.20,2014).


16/59

16 No.131264

questionbeforeus.8 Facedwith the question ofwhether a

unioncould

assess

non

union

employees

for

Representation

Feesinfourrighttoworkstates,theD.C.Circuitfound,on

thebasis of the legislative history of the TaftHartleyAct,

that theassessmentofsuchfeesconstitutedanunfair labor

practice.Journeymen&Apprentices,675F.2dat126062.The

D.C.Circuitheld thatCongressknewpreciselywhatstate

laws it was validating when it passed 14(b) as [t]he

HouseReportlistedeachstatewhichhadpassedarightto

worklaworconstitutionalprovision.Id.at1260.Specifical

ly,the

D.C.

Circuit

was

persuaded

that

Congress

also

knew

about the free rider problem posedby such lawswhen it

sanctioned such lawsby passing 14(b), as shownby a

commentintheSenateCommitteereportonthebillreflect

8Thedissentcitestwocircuitdecisionsthatstandfortheprinciple that

14(b)doesnotauthorize states toprohibit theuseofexclusivehiring

halls that do not discriminate between union members and non

members.SeeLaborersIntlUnionofN.Am.,LocalNo.107v.Kunco,Inc.,

472 F.2d 456 (8thCir. 1973);NLRB v.HoustonChapter,AssociatedGen.

ContractorsofAm.,Inc.,349

F.2d

449

(5th

Cir.

1965).

Both

decisions

pre

cedeBeckanddidnothave thebenefitof theCourts interpretationof

membership in that case.And theD.C.Circuit, inJourneymen&Ap

prentices, foundboth casesclearlydistinguishable from thematterat

handonthebasisthattheseconcernprehiringpractices,whereas14(b)

applies to posthiring union security arrangements.Journeymen&Ap

prentices,675F.3dat1262,1267(Useofaunionhiringhallprecedeshir

ingandthereforedoesnotconstitutemembershipunder14(b).).We

agreethatthesecasesaredistinguishablebecausehiringhallsdonotre

quireprospectiveemployeestodoanythingmorethantemporarilyvisit

unionfacilitiesduringthehiringprocess.Suchtemporaryaffiliationdoes

notamount

to

membership

as

that

term

has

been

interpreted

by

the

SupremeCourt.


17/59

No.131264 17

ingunions concerns about free riders,9 aswell as Senator

Taftsrebuttal

on

that

point

that

[m]any

states

have

enacted

lawsoradoptedconstitutionalprovisionstomakeallforms

of compulsoryunionism in such states illegal.As stated in

the report accompanying the Senate committeebill, itwas

not the intent to deprive the States of such power. Id. at

126061 (citationomitted).And theD.C.Circuitnoted that

thisproblemwassowellknownthatPresidentTrumancrit

icizeditinhisvetomessage.Id.at1261.

PlaintiffAppellants are right that Congress was con

cernedthat

banning

the

closed

shop

would

create

afree

riderproblem,butonlyinthosestatesthathadnoadditional

restriction on unionsecurity agreements. Id. at 1260

([L]eadersoforganized laborhavestressedthefactthat in

9A controversial issue towhich the committeehasdevoted themost

maturedeliberationhasbeen theproblemposedbycompulsoryunion

membership. [A]buses of compulsorymembershiphavebecome so

numeroustherehasbeengreatpublicfeelingagainstsucharrangements.

This

has

been

reflected

by

the

fact

that

in

12

States

such

agreements

have

beenmade illegaleitherby legislativeactorconstitutionalamendment,

and in14otherStatesproposals forabolishing such contractsarenow

pending.Althoughtheseregulatorymeasureshavenotreceivedauthori

tative interpretationby theSupremeCourt (citationomitted) it isobvi

ous that theypose importantquestionsofaccommodatingFederaland

State legislation touching labor relations in industries affecting com

merce (citationsomitted). In testifyingbefore thiscommittee,however,

leadersoforganized laborhave stressed the fact that in theabsenceof

suchprovisionsmanyemployeessharingthebenefitsofwhatunionsare

abletoaccomplishbycollectivebargainingwillrefusetopaytheirshare

ofthecost.Journeymen&Apprentices,675F.2dat1260(citingReportof

theSenateCommitteeonLaborandPublicWelfarepresentedbySenatorTaft,80thCong.,1stSess.6,April17,1947).


18/59

18 No.131264

the absence of [antiunionsecurity] provisions many em

ployeessharing

the

benefits

of

what

unions

are

able

to

ac

complishby collectivebargainingwill refuse to pay their

shareof thecost.) (quoting theReportof theSenateCom

mittee on Labor and PublicWelfare presentedby Senator

Taft, 80thCong., 1st Sess. 6,April 17, 1947).On the other

hand,Congress explicitly permitted states that did restrict

thoseagreementstofindtheirownsolutiontothefreerider

problem,ifitwasaprobleminthosestates.Indeed,unions

continuetothriveandassertsignificantinfluenceinseveral

rightto

work

states,

including

Iowa,10

where

provisions

equivalenttoIndianashavebeenineffectformorethansix

tyfive years. If the PlaintiffAppellants believe that Indi

anaslawwillcreateaneworunexpectedlyseverefreerider

problem,theymayaddressthoseconcernstoCongress.

In sum, in reviewing this substantialbody of empirical

evidence, we are not persuaded by PlaintiffAppellants

claims that Indianas law is somehow an extraordinary

measuredistinctfromthenumerousstatestatutesthathave

harmoniouslyexisted

under

the

federal

labor

law

frame

work.Nor arewepersuadedby their assertions that Indi

anaslawrepresentsamortalthreattothecontinuingexist

enceofunionsasprovidedunderfederallaw.Section8(2)of

10 See, e.g.,KrisMaher, IowasHouse ofLabor is Split,WALL ST.J.

(Nov.20,2007)atA6 (examining the importanceofbig,politicallyac

tive unions in the Iowa caucus vote); Steven Greenhouse, Secret

Weapon inGoreCamp:Unions in Iowa,N.Y.TIMES (Jan.17,2000)at

A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/17/us/the2000

campaigntheunionssecretweaponingorecampunionsiniowa.html

(calling Iowas 150,000member union force amajor weapon in theIowacaucuses)(lastaccessedAug.20,2014).


19/59

No.131264 19

the Indiana righttowork statute is thusnotpreemptedby

theNLRA.

c. PlaintiffAppellantsMiscellaneousPreemptionAr

guments

PlaintiffAppellants assert two other preemption argu

ments.Bothdeserveonlyquickconsideration.

The first assertion, that federal labor law preempts the

Indiana lawscriminalpenalties,clashessquarelywith lan

guage in Retail Clerks II,where the SupremeCourt stated

that

Inlightofthewordingof14(b)andthislegis

lative history, we conclude that Congress in

1947didnotdeprive theStatesofanyandall

powertoenforcetheirlawsrestrictingtheexe

cution and enforcement of unionsecurity

agreements.Since it isplain thatCongress left

theStatesfreeto legislate in thatfield,wecan

onlyassumethatitintendedtoleaveunaffect

edthe

power

to

enforce

those

laws.

RetailClerksII,375U.S.at102.

TheUnionssecondargumentisthattheNLRApreempts

8(3)of thestatute,whichbarsmandatorypaymentsofan

amountequivalent touniondues toacharity.Theyrelyon

19 of theNLRA,which allows conscientious objectors to

payduestoacharityratherthantoaunion.Buttheapplica

bilityofthatsectionnaturallypresupposestheexistenceofa

unionsecurityagreementthatrequiresthepaymentofdues.

Andas

we

have

demonstrated,

states

are

permitted

to

re

strictorprohibitsuchagreements.Weagreewiththedistrict

courts assessment that [n]othing in the language of 19


20/59

20 No.131264

suggests or supports interpreting it as an exemption to

14(b)

that

would

preempt

any

state

attempt

to

outlaw

the

kindofprovisionthat19permits.Sweeneyv.Daniels,2013

WL209047,*11(N.D.Ind.Jan.17,2013).

2. FederalConstitutionalClaims

Thedissentclaims thatour interpretationof the federal

statutoryschemaworksanunconstitutionaltakingonHoos

ier unions. We consider this argument first. Plaintiff

Appellants also allege violations of theContracts, Ex Post

Facto,and

Equal

Protection

Clauses

of

the

United

States

Constitution.BecauseboththeirContractsandExPostFacto

Clauseargumentshave forceonly if thestatuteappliesret

roactively,weconsiderthemtogether.

a. IndianasLawDoesNotWorkanUnconstitutional

Taking

Thedissentassertsthat,shouldwehold thatthefederal

statutory schemedoesnotpreempt Indianas righttowork

statute,thatholdinglikelyviolatestheTakingsClauseofthe

FifthAmendment,

as

applied

to

the

states

under

the

Four

teenthAmendment.Dissent at 1718.We observe that no

argumentbasedontheTakingsClausewasadvancedbythe

Union,andsoanysuchargumentwasforfeited.SeeJackson

v.Parker,627F.3d634,640(7thCir.2010)(notingthatargu

mentsnotraisedbefore thedistrictcourtareforfeited);Trs.

ofChi.Painters&DecoratorsPension,Health&Welfare,&De

ferredSav.PlanTrustFundsv.Royal IntlDrywall&Decorat

ing,Inc.,493F.3d782,790(7thCir.2007)(noting thatargu

ments not raised in the openingbrief are forfeited). And

there is the problem of whether the Union has sued the

proper defendants for the purposes of advancing a claim


21/59

No.131264 21

under theTakingsClause.TheUnionsallegeddeprivation

isthe

product

of

federal

law

and

the

Indiana

statute

operat

ingintandem.Becauseitisfederallawthatprovidesaduty

of fair representation, Indianas righttowork statute does

nottakepropertyfromtheUnionitmerelyprecludesthe

Unionfromcollectingfeesdesignedtocoverthecostsofper

formingtheduty.EvensupposingtheUnioncouldjustifyits

suitbyinvokingsomethinglikethetortdoctrineofconcur

rentactualcauses,11thedissenthasnotexplainedwhythe

proper remedywouldbe tostrikedown Indianas rightto

workstatute

rather

than

striking

down

or

modifying

the

federallawimposingonallunionsthedutyoffairrepresen

tation, in righttowork states and nonrighttowork states

alike.

Even so,we engagewith thedissentspositionbecause

we believe it overlooks the fundamental fact that distin

guishes the unions duty of representation from the other

hypotheticalsitpresents.Thatistosay:webelievetheunion

isjustlycompensatedbyfederallawsgranttotheUnionthe

rightto

bargain

exclusively

with

the

employer.

The

reason

theUnionmust represent all employees is that theUnion

alone gets a seat at the negotiation table. See IntlAssn of

Machinistsv.Street,367U.S.740,761(1961)(Aunionssta

tusasexclusivebargainingrepresentativecarrieswithitthe

duty fairlyandequitably to representallemployeesof the

11 See Hill v. Edmonds, 26 A.D.2d 554, 55455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966)

(Whereseparateactsofnegligencecombinetoproducedirectlyasingle

injuryeach

tort

feasor

is

responsible

for

the

entire

result,

even

though

his

actalonemightnothavecausedit.).


22/59

22 No.131264

craft or class,union andnonunion.);HughesToolCo., 104

N.L.R.B.318,

32425

(1943)

([A]

union

could

not

assess

nonmembersforcostsarisingfromcontractnegotiationsfor

thelatteraretheexclusivedutyandprerogativeofthecerti

fied representativewhich thenonmemberminority isboth

entitled toandboundunder.).Thepowersof thebargain

ingrepresentativearecomparable to thosepossessedbya

legislativebodybothtocreateandrestricttherightsofthose

whom itrepresents.Steelev.Louisville&N.R.Co.,65S.Ct.

226,232(1944).Thedutyoffairrepresentationisthereforea

correspondingduty

imposed

in

exchange

for

the

powers

granted to theUnion as an exclusive representative. Id. It

seemsdisingenuousnot to recognize that theUnionsposi

tionasasolerepresentativecomeswithasetofpowersand

benefitsaswellasresponsibilitiesandduties.Andnoinfor

mationbefore uspersuadesus that theUnion is not fully

andadequatelycompensatedbyitsrightsasthesoleandex

clusivememberatthenegotiatingtable.

b. ContractsandExPostFactoClauseArguments

TheContracts

Clause

provides

that

[n]o

State

shall

passanylawimpairingtheObligationofContracts.U.S.

CONST.art.I,10,cl.1.AstateviolatestheContractsClause

when a change in state lawhasoperated as a substantial

impairmentofacontractualrelationship.Gen.MotorsCorp.

v.Romein,503U.S.181,186(1992)(citationandinternalquo

tationmarksomitted).The relevant inquiryhas threecom

ponents: 1) whether there is a contractual relationship;

2)whetherachangeinlawimpairsthatcontractualrelation

ship;

and

3)

whether

the

impairment

is

substantial.

Council

31oftheAm.FednofState,Cnty.,&Mun.Emps.v.Quinn,680

F.3d875,885(7thCir.2012)(citingKhanv.Gallitano,180F.3d


23/59

No.131264 23

829,832(7thCir.1999)).TheExPostFactoClauseisviolated

bystate

or

federal

legislation

that

makes

an

act

done

before

thepassingofthelaw,andwhichwasinnocentwhendone,

criminal,andpunishes suchaction.Peughv.UnitedStates,

133S.Ct.2072,2081 (2013) (citationand internalquotation

marksomitted).ThepartiesagreethatfortheIndianalawto

violatetheseclausesof theConstitution,the lawmusthave

some retroactive application: it must either impair an al

readyexistingcontractorelsepunishpastconduct.Wefind

thatthelawdoesnotapplyretroactively.

Thisconclusion

is

relatively

easy

to

reach

because

Section

13oftheIndianastatuteprovidesthatthesubstantiveprovi

sionsof the legislationSections8 through12applyonly

tocontractsentered intoafterMarch14,2012,anddonot

applytoorabrogateawrittenororalcontractoragreement

ineffectonMarch14,2012.IND.CODE226613.Themain

objectionPlaintiffAppellantsmakehereistoSection3ofthe

statute.TheyarguethatSection3isasubstantiveprovision

notmentionedinSection13,andthatitthushasretroactive

application.

Ininterpretingthelanguageofastatute,wemustexam

inethelanguageanddesignofthestatuteasawhole.Wells

FargoBank,NatlAssnv.LakeofTorchesEcon.Dev.Corp.,658

F.3d684,694(7thCir.2011)(citationsandinternalquotation

marksomitted).Andwemustalsokeepinmind[t]hepre

sumptionagainst retroactive legislation,whichembodies

a legaldoctrinecenturiesolder thanourRepublic.Vartelas

v.Holder,132S.Ct.1479,1486 (2012) (citationand internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

We

are

inclined

to

agree

that

Sec

tion3isanoddlydraftedprovision.Itresidesinaneighbor

hood of prefatory clauses, nestled amid definitions of key


24/59

24 No.131264

termsandexceptions,butitssubsectionsappearsurprising

lysubstantive:

indeed,

Section

3s

sub

provisions

are

identi

calincontenttothesubsectionsofSection8.However,Sec

tion3smainclauseisdraftedinthelanguageofexception.

Itexplainsthatthestatuteshouldnotbereadtochangethe

lawsof thebuildingandconstruction industry,an industry

thathasitsownsetofelaboratelaborlaws,excepttoprohib

itagreementsofthetypebannedbySection8.Itisadouble

negativeno change except the following changesthat

wouldbemorecomprehensibleifdraftedinthepositive,but

theplacement

of

the

clause

makes

sense

among

the

other

prefatory,exclusionaryclauseslikeSections1(Thischapter

doesnotapply to the following:.)and2 (Thischapter

doesnotapplytotheextentthat.).IND.CODE22661,

2.Inlightofthedesignofthestatuteasawhole,wearesat

isfied that the provision in question is prefatory, not sub

stantive. It simply explains thedomains towhich the sub

stantiveportionsofthestatuteapply.TotheextentthatSec

tion 3 contains substantive language, it is language that

simplypointstothelatersubstantivesectionsoutlawingun

ionsecurityclauses.Thisreadingbestharmonizesthestruc

tureof the statuteand thepresumption against retroactive

legislation.12

12Insupportofourreading,DefendantAppelleesassertthefactthatthe

IndianaCommissionerofLaborhasdisclaimedanyretroactiveinterpre

tationofSection3,butthisisnotpersuasive.Whilethedistrictcourtwas

satisfiedby theCommissioners declaration, terming itbinding under

theprinciplesofjudicialestoppel,itisdifficulttodeterminewhateffect

such declarationswould have on future executive administrations or

officeholders.ButourreadingofthestatuteconvincesusthatSection3isnotretroactive,soweneednotrelyontheconceptofestoppel.


25/59

No.131264 25

c. EqualProtectionClauseArguments

TheEqualProtectionClause of theFourteenthAmend

mentstatesthatnostateshalldenytoanypersonwithinits

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.U.S.CONST.

amend.XIV.Equalprotectionscrutinyistriggeredwhena

regulationdrawsdistinctionsamongpeoplebasedonaper

sonsmembershipinasuspectclassorbasedonadenial

ofafundamentalright.Srailv.Vill.ofLisle,Ill.,588F.3d940,

943(7thCir.2009)(citationsomitted).Ifeitherasuspectclass

orfundamentalrightisimplicated,thegovernmentsjusti

ficationfor

the

regulation

must

satisfy

the

strict

scrutiny

test

topassmusterundertheEqualProtectionClause.Id.Butif

neitherconditionispresent,theproperstandardofreviewis

rationalbasis.Id.

PlaintiffAppellantsarguethattheIndianaRighttoWork

ActviolatestheEqualProtectionClauseintwoways:(1)be

cause it allows free riders to infringe on unionmembers

FirstAmendment free speech rights, and (2)because it al

lows free riders to infringe on the rightofunionmember

ship,which

is

afundamental

right

because

it

involves

the

exercise of First Amendment association and assembly

rights.Weholdthatthelawdoesnotviolatetheequalpro

tection clausebecause itdoesnot implicate a fundamental

right,anditpassesthelowbarofrationalbasisreviewwith

ease.

i. FirstAmendmentFreeSpeechRights

ThestrongerofPlaintiffAppellantstwoequalprotection

argumentsistheassertionthatnonpayorsofRepresentation

Fees will be freeriders who siphon valuable Union re

sourcesawayfromtheUnionspoliticalactivities.Indimin


26/59

26 No.131264

ishingthefinancialresourcesavailableto theUnionforpo

liticalspeech,

Plaintiff

Appellants

argue,

the

Indiana

law

in

fringeson theUnionsFirstAmendment freespeechrights.

We agree that unions have the right under the First

Amendment to express their views on political and social

issues without government interference. Knox v. Serv.

Empls.IntlUnion,Local1000,132S.Ct.2277,2295(2012).

However,PlaintiffAppellantsargument isundercutby

threelongstandingprinciples.First,theSupremeCourthas

statedthatunionshavenoconstitutionalentitlementtothe

feesof

non

member

employees.

Davenport v.Wash. Educ.

Assn,551U.S.177,185(2007).Andmorerelevantly,theFirst

Amendmentprotectstherighttobefreefromgovernment

abridgementofspeech,butitdoesnotrequire[]thegov

ernmenttoassistothers in funding theexpressionofpar

ticular ideas, including political ones. Ysursa v. Pocatello

Educ.Assn, 555U.S. 353, 358 (2009). Stated anotherway,

althoughgovernmentmaynotplaceobstaclesinthepathof

apersonsexerciseoffreedomofspeech,itneednotremove

thosenot

of

its

own

creation.

Regan

v.

Taxation

With

Repre

sentationofWash.,461U.S.540,54950(1983)(internalquota

tionmarksandcitationsomitted).ItmaybetruethattheUn

iondoesnothavemoneyasitwants,andthuscannotexer

ciseitsfreedomasitwouldlike,buttheConstitutiondoes

notconferanentitlementtosuchfundsasmaybenecessary

torealizealltheadvantagesofthatfreedom.Id.at550(in

ternal quotationmarks and citations omitted). A legisla

turesdecisionnottosubsidizetheexerciseofafundamental

rightdoesnot infringe the right,and is thusnot subject to

strictscrutiny.

Ysursa,

555

U.S.

at

358

(internal

quotation

marksandcitationsomitted).


27/59


28/59

28 No.131264

membersarenotsuspectclasses.Univ.Proflsof Ill.,Local

4100v.Edgar,114

F.3d

665,

667

(7th

Cir.

1997);

seealsoCityof

Charlottev.Local660, IntlAssnofFirefighters,426U.S.283,

286(1976)([T]hiscourtwouldrejectsuchacontentionifit

weremadethatrespondentsstatusasunionmembersis

suchastoentitlethemtospecialtreatmentundertheEqual

ProtectionClause.).Sinceweagreewith theTenthCir

cuitsassertionthatneitherunionnornonunionstatusim

plicatesafundamentalrightorconstitutesaprotectedclass,

Local514v.Keating,358F.3d743,754(10thCir.2004),weopt

forrational

basis

review

unless

Plaintiff

Appellants

can

as

sert a cognizable fundamental right thathasbeen violated

bytheIndianastatute.

PlaintiffAppellants claim that they never asserted that

unionmembersareasuspectclass.Instead,theytrytocob

bleabrandnewfundamentalrighttounionmembershipout

of the fact that union membership implicates the First

Amendmentrightsof freedomofassemblyand freedomof

association. But besides being intellectually threadbare

consider,for

example,

that

these

same

facts

could

be

mar

shalled to support a fundamental right toCivilWar reen

actmentthislineofreasoningwasrejectedbytheSupreme

Courtlongago.UnionmembersinNorthCarolinaandNe

braskamade thesameargumentwhen theychallenged the

twostatesrighttoworklawsinthelate1940s.Theyassert

ed,interalia,thattheirfreedomofassociationandassembly

was infringed. In Lincoln Federal LaborUnionNo. 19129, v.

NorthwesternIron&MetalCo.,theSupremeCourtstated:

There

cannot

be

wrung

from

a

constitutional

right of workers to assemble to discuss im

provementof theirownworking standards,a


29/59

No.131264 29

further constitutional right to drive from re

munerativeemployment

all

other

persons

who

willnotorcannot,participateinunionassem

blies.Theconstitutionalrightofworkerstoas

semble,todiscussandformulateplansforfur

theringtheirownselfinterestinjobscannotbe

construed as a constitutional guarantee that

noneshallgetandholdjobsexceptthosewho

willjoinintheassemblyorwillagreetoabide

bytheassemblysplans.Forwhereconductaf

fectsthe

interests

of

other

individuals

and

the

general public, the legality of that conduct

must be measured by whether the conduct

conforms to valid law, even though the con

ductisengaged inpursuant toplansofanas

sembly.

335U.S.525,531(1949).

There is no doubt that union workers enjoy valuable

rightsofassociationandassemblythatareprotectedbythe

FirstAmendment.

See, e.g., Thomas v.Collins, 323

U.S.

516

(1945).ButasinLincolnFederal,thatrightalonecannotoper

ateasanoffensiveweapontowrestrightsfromothers:here,

theHoosierworkerswhose rightsnot toassociatewith the

unionareprotectedby thenew legislation.See, e.g.,Harris,

134S.Ct.at2643(notingtheFirstAmendmentinterestsof

thosewhodonotwishtosupporttheunion);Knox,132

S.Ct.at2289(holdingthatcompelledmembershipinapub

licsectorunion,whichtakespositionsduringcollectivebar

gaining

that

can

have

powerful

civic

and

political

conse

quences,canconstituteaformofcompelledspeechandas

sociation that imposes a significant impingement on First


30/59

30 No.131264

Amendment rights (citation and internalquotationmarks

omitted)).Plaintiff

Appellants

must

thus

make

agreater

showing:aclearbasisforhow the lawswillexpresslyfor

bidthefullexerciseofthoserightsbyunionorunionmem

bers, Lincoln Federal, 335U.S. at 530, or even a plausible

demonstration of how allowing nonunionworkers to not

payRepresentationFeeswillsomehowweakenthebondsof

theunionsownassociationandassembly.Theyhavefailed

todo sohere.Rationalbasis review is appropriate for this

equalprotectionclaimaswell.

iii.

TheStatute

Passes

Rational

Basis

Review

Statutesthatdonotencroachonafundamentalrightare

reviewedwithconsiderabledeference.SeeUnitedStatesv.

Moore, 644 F.3d 533, 555 (7thCir. 2011). The pertinent in

quiryiswhetherthestatuteinquestionbearsareasonable

relationtoanyproperlegislativepurpose.Id.at55556.Itis

notour task todiscern thespecific intentof the legislature,

buttodetermineifanyproperlegislativepurposeisserved

byIndianaslaw.

Thedistrict courts analysison thispoint is apt.As the

court stated, [a]belief that the passage ofRight toWork

legislation contributes to a businessfriendly environment

that can attract companies and encouragejob growth pro

vides a legitimate governmental objective that may have

been(andwasinfactclaimedtobe)areasonforthepassage

of IndianasRight toWork legislation. Sweeney, 2013WL

209047 at *8.Weneed lookno further for a rationalbasis.

The Indiana law does not violate the PlaintiffAppellants

rightto

equal

protection.


31/59

No.131264 31

III

We noted at the outset that this legislation prompted

vigorousdebate,bothinthegeneralpublicandtheIndiana

Statehouse. But the legislative history and context of the

TaftHartleyActmakeclearthatthecontroversyisonethat

oughttobeaddressedandresolvedattheleveloflegislative

politics, not in the courts. The statutory question posed is

whether Indianas new law is preemptedby federal labor

law,or threatens theUnionsFirstAmendment rights.The

answerisanemphaticno.RighttoWorklawslikeIndianas

haveexisted

since

before

the

passage

of

the

Taft

Hartley

Act

and the inclusion of Section 14(b) of theNLRA.Congress

specificallyreservedtothestatesthepowertowriteanden

force laws of this nature, in accordance with individual

statesneedsandwisdom.Itisnotourprovincetowrestthis

authority,whichhasbeen intact andundisturbed for over

sixtyfiveyears,fromthestatesanderasethedistinctionbe

tweenrighttoworkstatesandnonrighttoworkstates.

Fortheforegoingreasons,weAFFIRMthedistrictcourts

judgment.


32/59

32 No.131264

WOOD,ChiefJudge,dissenting.Todaysdecision iseither

incorrector

it

lays

bare

an

unconstitutional

confiscation

per

petuatedbyourcurrentsystemoflaborlaw.Inmyview,the

betterviewistheformer:themajorityhassimplymisunder

stood the federal statutory scheme, taken as awhole. The

plain languageof section14(b)of theNationalLaborRela

tionsAct(NLRA)doesnotsupportsuchsweepingforcefor

IndianasRight toWork law.IND.CODE2266.Noruling

of theSupremeCourthasgone this far,and the legislative

historyofsection14(b)(forthosewhoconsideritrelevantat

all)is

inconclusive.

Even

if,

however,

one

thought

that

there

weresomeambiguityintheNLRA,theprincipleofconstitu

tional avoidance provides a powerful reason to reject the

majoritysholding.Iwouldfindsections8(2)and8(3)ofIn

dianas statute, Ind.Code 22668(2), (3), preemptedby

federalstatute.Ithereforerespectfullydissent.

I

It is impossible tounderstandwhat isatstakeandwhy

themajoritysresolutionisinerrorwithoutabriefreviewof

thelabor

law

regime

in

the

United

States.

Inaugurated

in

1935with thepassageof theWagnerAct, 49Stat. 452, the

NLRAreliesonasystemofexclusiverepresentationofbar

gainingunitemployees.See29U.S.C.159(a).That is, ifa

majorityoftheemployeesinadefinedsectionofaworkforce

vote in favor of aparticularunion to represent them, that

unionisrequiredbylawtorepresentalltheworkersinthe

bargaining unitsupporters and nonsupporters, members

and nonmembers, alike. Id.; see IntlAssn ofMachinists v.

Street,367

U.S.

740,

76061

(1961)

(a

unions

status

as

exclu

sivebargainingrepresentativecarrieswithitthedutyfairly

andequitablytorepresentallemployeesofthecraftorclass,


33/59

No.131264 33

union and nonunion). (This is hardly an unfamiliar ar

rangementin

ademocracy.

Even

after

the

most

hotly

con

testedpresidentialelection, thepersonwho isdeclared the

winnerbecomes thePresidentforallcitizens,notjust those

whovotedforhimorher.)Thereisnothinginevitableabout

our systemof labor law; it canbe contrastedwithahypo

theticalregime that ismoreprotectiveofminorityormem

bersonlyunions,underwhichemployeeswhowanttobar

gaincollectivelymightbe free to formamembersonlyun

ion and interactwith their employer on thatbasis.But, to

repeat,that

is

not

the

system

that

the

United

States

has

adopted.

Consequencesflowfrom theunionsstatusastheexclu

sive representative of allmembers of thebargaining unit.

Themostsignificantiswhatisknownasthedutyoffairrep

resentation.SeeSteele v.Louisville&N.R.Co., 323U.S. 192

(1944)(recognizingthedutyoffairrepresentationunderthe

RailwayLaborAct);FordMotorCo.v.Huffman,345U.S.330,

33738 (1953) (extendingduty of fair representation to the

NationalLabor

Relations

Act).

The

duty

of

fair

representa

tionrequirestheexclusivebargainingrepresentative(i.e.,the

union)toservetheinterestsofallmembers[ofthebargain

ingunit]withouthostilityordiscrimination towardany, to

exerciseitsdiscretionwithcompletegoodfaithandhonesty,

and toavoidarbitraryconduct.Vacav.Sipes,386U.S.171,

177 (1967).Thisduty isnot limited to thenegotiationpro

cess; it covers allunion representational activity. See id. at

19091(dutyoffairrepresentationextendstogrievanceand

arbitration);AirLinePilotsAssn,Intl.v.ONeil,499U.S.65,

67(1991)

(We

hold

that

the

rule

announced

in

Vaca

ap

plies toallunionactivity .).TheSupremeCourtsopin


34/59

34 No.131264

ioninAboodv.DetroitBd.ofEduc.,431U.S.209(1977),sum

marizedthe

scope

of

those

duties

well:

Thedesignationofaunionasexclusiverepresentative

carrieswith itgreat responsibilities.The tasksofne

gotiating and administering a collectivebargaining

agreementand representing the interestsofemploy

eesinsettlingdisputesandprocessinggrievancesare

continuing and difficult ones. They often entail ex

penditureofmuch timeandmoney.The services

of lawyers,expertnegotiators,economists,anda re

searchstaff,

as

well

as

general

administrative

person

nel,mayberequired.Moreover,incarryingoutthese

duties, the union is obliged fairly and equitably to

represent all employees , union and nonunion,

withintherelevantunit.

Id.at221(internalcitationandquotationmarksomitted).

As thispassageacknowledges,amajorpartof thework

assigned tomostunionsundercollectivebargainingagree

ments

relates

to

the

administration

of

the

grievance

proce

dure.Grievingandarbitratingclaimsisnotcheap.Theweb

siteoftheTeamstersunioninformsitsmembersthat78%of

theirduesstaywithyourlocalunionforavarietyofpur

poses,includingtheretentionof[a]ttorneystoassistinne

gotiations, grievances, and arbitration. See

http://teamster.org/about/frequentlyaskedquestions

faq#faq06 (this and all otherwebsites cited in this opinion

were last visitedAugust 29, 2014). The LaborArbitration

Rulesof theAmericanArbitrationAssociation,availableby

followingthe

links

in

the

Rules

&

Procedures

tab

at

http://www.adr.org, outline a comprehensive process that

obviouslycostsrealmoney. It isnostretch toestimate that


35/59


36/59

36 No.131264

vidually(thatis,thesellercanensurethatonlythebuyerob

tainsthe

benefit),

free

riding

will

not

be

aproblem.

But

if

eachpersoninthegroupobtainsthebenefitofthecollective

goodwhetherornotshepaysforit,thenthereisariskthat

thesupplyofthegoodwilldiminish,orinthelimitingcase

will disappear altogether. See generally Earl R. Burbaker,

FreeRide,FreeRevelation,orGoldenRule?18J.L.&ECON.147,

149150(1975);RussellB.Korobkin&ThomasS.Ulen,Law

andBehavioralScience:RemovingtheRationalityExceptionfrom

LawandEconomics,88CALIF.L.REV.1051,1139(2000).Thus,

forexample,

the

realization

of

the

risk

of

free

riding

by

dis

tributorswhodidnotwant toprovide services thatmanu

facturers valued led antitrust law to change from aper se

prohibition of vertical restraints to a ruleofreason ap

proach.SeeContlT.V.,Inc.v.GTESylvania,Inc.,433U.S.36

(1977); LeeginCreative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551

U.S.877(2007).Inoursituation,thenonmemberoftheunion

willreapthebenefitsofbeingrepresentedbytheuniondur

ing a grievance, for instance,but hewill pay nothing for

those benefits, which might include a lay representative,

maybeevena lawyer, investigativeservices,andsoonall

thingsthatcosttheunionrealdollarstoprovide.Inshort,he

will takeafreerideon thedues that theunionmembers

maketotheunion.

Thesameproblemarisesinaunionizedworkplace(that

is,aworkplace inwhichamajorityof theemployeeshave

votedtohaveaunionrepresent them, inanelectionsuper

visedbytheNationalLaborRelationsBoard,orNLRB).Be

causeallmembersofthebargainingunitbenefitasamatter

ofright

from

the

unions

representational

activities

regard

lessofwhethertheyjointheunion,thereisanincentivefor

employeesinthebargainingunittorefusetocontributeto


37/59

No.131264 37

theunionwhile obtainingbenefits ofunion representation

thatnecessarily

accrue

to

all

employees.

Abood,

431

U.S.

at

222.Thebenefitsinthiscase,asinmost,extendwellbeyond

theboostfromunionspeechthat theSupremeCourtfound

inadequate to support a rule requiring nonmember fair

sharecontributionsinHarrisv.Quinn,134S.Ct.2618,2636

37(2014).IdiscussHarrisinmoredetailbelow.

Thequestionisthereforewhetherthelawasitstandsto

dayincludesasolutiontothepotentialfreeriderproblem.If

itdoes,bycreatingawaytorequirenonmemberstopayfor

actualbenefits

received,

then

all

is

well.

If

it

does

not,

then

issues of constitutional magnitude arise. As the Supreme

Courthasrecognized,[t]ocompelemployeesfinanciallyto

support their collectivebargaining representative has an

impactupontheirFirstAmendmentinterests.Id.Buttoex

empt employees from reimbursing a service provider for

workperformedcreatesadifferentconstitutionalissueone

that theSupremeCourthashad little tonooccasion todis

cuss.ButwecangleansomethingfromPhillipsv.Washington

LegalFoundation,

524

U.S.

156

(1998),

which

addressed

the

question whether interest income generated by funds in

lawyerstrustaccounts(IOLTA)wastheprivatepropertyof

theclient.TheCourtheldthatitwas.Thatholdingraisedthe

questionwhetherclientscouldbecompelledtodonatetheir

property toafoundationthatprovidedlegalservices to the

indigent.InBrownv.LegalFoundationofWashington,538U.S.

216(2003),theCourtheldthatifthestatewishedtorequire

the clientsproperty tobe transferred from the IOLTA ac

count to the foundation, its actionhad tobejudgedunder

theTakings

Clause

of

the

Fifth

Amendment.

It

held

that

the

clientspropertyhadbeentakenforapublicusewhenitwas


38/59

38 No.131264

turnedover, see538U.S.at235,but thatno compensation

wasdue,

because

the

petitioners

net

loss

was

zero.

Id.at

240.

ThelessonfromtheIOLTAcasesforusisthatastatelaw

compelling one private party to give property to another

private partymustbe assessed under the TakingsClause.

Thefactthatthosetwocasesinvolvedmoney,whileourcase

involves thecompulsoryprovisionofservices, isofnomo

ment.(This,incidentally,showswhytheplaintiffshavesued

the correct party: it is the Indiana law that is compelling

them todonatevaluableservices to thenonmembersof the

unions,just

as

it

was

state

law

in

Phillips and

Brown that

compelledclientstodonatetheirmoneytothelegalfounda

tions.Compareanteat20.)Servicescostmoney toprovide:

unionrepresentativesmustbepaid,union lawyersmustbe

paid, and collective bargaining is not free. Justice Scalia

flaggedthisprobleminhisseparateopinioninLehnertv.Fer

risFacultyAssn,500U.S.507(1991)(concurringinjudgment

inpart,dissentinginpart):

Wherethestateimposesupontheunionadutyto

deliverservices,

it

may

permit

the

union

to

demand

reimbursementforthem;or,lookedatfromtheother

end,where thestatecreates in thenonmembersa le

galentitlementfromtheunion,itmaycompelthemto

paythecost.Thecompellingstateinterestthatjusti

fies this constitutional rule isnot simplyelimination

of the inequityarisingfrom thefact thatsomeunion

activityredounds to thebenefitoffreeridingnon

members;private speech often furthers the interests

of

nonspeakers,

and

that

does

not

alone

empower

the

statetocompelthespeechtobepaidfor.Whatisdis

tinctive, however, about the free riders who are


39/59

No.131264 39

nonunion members of the unions own bargaining

unitis

that

in

some

respects

theyare

free

riders

whom

the lawrequires theunion tocarryindeed,requires

theunion togo out of itsway tobenefit,evenat the

expense of its other interests. In the context ofbar

gaining,aunionmustseek to further the interestsof

itsnonmembers;itcannot,forexample,negotiatepar

ticularlyhighwage increases for itsmembers in ex

changeforacceptingnoincreasesforothers.Thus,the

freeridership(ifitwerelefttobethat)wouldbenot

incidentalbut

calculated,

not

imposed

by

circum

stancesbutmandatedbygovernmentdecree.

Id.at556.Lehnert itselfdealtwith limitationson theuseby

publicsectorunionsofdissenterscontributions.TheCourts

holding that thestateconstitutionallywasnotpermitted to

compel its employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or

otherpoliticalactivities innowayundermines the forceof

JusticeScaliasobservationsabout thefreeriderproblemas

it relates to the representational services that the unions

mustprovide

to

nonmembers.

Actingwhollywithin theboundaries of the governing

legislation,theSupremeCourthasreconciledthecostlydu

ties imposedby law onunionswith the rights ofworkers

whodonotwish toparticipate in (orpay for) thatunions

nonrepresentational activities. Ithasdone sobydrawinga

linebetweenwhatnonunionmembersofabargainingunit

canandcannotbecompelledtopay theunion.Pursuant to

section8(a)(3)oftheNLRA,29U.S.C.158(a)(3),unionsand

employers

may

require

all

employees

within

a

bargaining

unit(unionmembersandnonmembersalike)topaytheun

ion for the costsassociatedwith theunions collectivebar


40/59

40 No.131264

gainingandcontractadministrationfunctions.See,e.g.,Beck,

487U.S.

at

738.

Beckheld

that

although

section

8(a)(3)

of

the

Act permits an employer and a union to enter into an

agreement underwhich all employeesmustmake certain

paymentstotheunion(essentiallyreimbursingtheunionfor

servicespromisedandrendered),itdoesnotpermittheun

iontocollectfundsfromobjectorsforactivitiesunrelatedto

collectivebargaining, contract administration, or grievance

adjustment.Id.

MycolleaguesbelievethatBeckcharacterizesthoseobjec

torsas

union

members,

and

indeed

at

one

point

the

Court

saysthatthemembershipthatmaybesorequired[bysec

tion8(a)(3)]hasbeen whittleddown to its financialcore.

Id.at745.Butall theCourt is talkingaboutat thatpoint in

the opinion iswhat canbe compelled of employees. Else

where,itmakesclearthattheBeckobjectorswerenotunion

members.Howelsecanonereadthestatementatthebegin

ning of theopinion,where theCourt says [i]nJune 1976,

respondents,20employeeswhochosenot tobecomeunion

members,initiated

this

suit

.

Id.

at

739

(emphasis

added).

Themajority has effectively deleted from theCourts Beck

opinionitsstatementofthepreciseissueitwasdeciding:

Todaywemust decidewhether this provision also

permits aunion, over the objections of duespaying

nonmember employees, to expend funds so collected

on activities unrelated to collectivebargaining, con

tractadministration,orgrievanceadjustment,and, if

so,whethersuchexpendituresviolatetheunionsdu

ty

of

fair

representation

or

the

objecting

employees

FirstAmendmentrights.

Id.at738(emphasisadded).


41/59

No.131264 41

Tojustify its decision to assign the status of statutory

membersto

nonmembers

of

the

union,

the

majority

seizes

onthecommenttowhichIjustreferred,totheeffectthatthe

1947 amendments to theNLRA whittleddown the term

membershipinthestatutetoitsfinancialcore.Thislan

guagecamedirectlyfromNLRBv.GeneralMotorsCorp.,373

U.S. 734, 742 (1963), and so in order to understand it,we

mustlookatthatdecision.Whenonedoesso,itisapparent

that themajoritys reading cannot stand.Nothing ineither

GeneralMotorsorBeckwipedouttheconceptofnonmember

inthe

course

of

defining

the

term

member.

The

passage

in

GeneralMotorsfromwhichthatquoteisliftedisprefacedby

the statement that[u]nder the secondproviso to8(a)(3),

theburdensofmembershipuponwhich employmentmay

beconditionedareexpresslylimitedtothepaymentofinitia

tionfeesandmonthlydues. Id.(emphasisadded).TheCourt

didnotequateinitiationfeesandmonthlyduestothefair

sharepayment that it recognizedaquarter century later in

Beck. The only point itwasmaking inGeneralMotorswas

thatadutytopaybothinitiationfeesandmonthlydueswas

enoughtomakesomeoneamember,eveniftheuniondis

claimed the idea thatmembershipwent alongwith those

payments.Reality, inotherwords, iswhatgoverns;not la

bels.Unsurprisingly,peoplewhoarecompelledtopaypre

cisely the same amount as unionmembers pay shouldbe

considereddefactomembers.Withthisbackgroundinmind,

themajoritysrationalefordisregardingtheCourtsownde

scriptionof theissuethatitdecidedinBeckfallsapart.Beck

makesclearthatobjectorsarenotmembers,butthattheycan

becompelled

to

pay

for

the

services

that

they

consume.

Insodoing,Beckfinetunestherulesgoverningarecog

nized union, on the one hand, and the nonmembers for


42/59

42 No.131264

whom theunion is responsible,on theother. Itdoes soby

holdingthat

while

the

collection

of

dues

unrelated

to

collec

tivebargaining(andotherrepresentationalactivitiessuchas

thehandlingofgrievances)wouldviolate theFirstAmend

mentrightsofthenonmembers,federallawneverthelessen

titles the union to collect fees fixedby their underlying

purposedefrayingthecostsofcollectivebargaining.Beck,

487U.S.at759. Interestingly, theCourtalluded to the free

rider issuewhen it recognized that the legislativejustifica

tion for section 8(a)(3)was to ensur[e] that nonmembers

whoobtain

the

benefits

of

union

representation

can

be

made

topayforthem.Id.

Beforeturningtothewayinwhichtheseprinciplesapply

tothecasebeforeus,IaddafewwordsabouttheSupreme

Courts recentdecision inHarrisv.Quinn, supra.Theques

tioninHarriswaswhethertheFirstAmendmentpermitsa

Statetocompelpersonalcareproviderstosubsidizespeech

onmatters of public concernby a union that they do not

wish tojoinor support.134S.Ct. at 2623.TheCourt an

sweredthat

question

in

the

negative.

It

held

that

the

person

alcareworkerscouldnotberequiredtopayeventheagency

feethatAboodhadauthorized,intheunusualcircumstances

of theirworkplace.TheCourtstressed the fact that thedif

ferencebetweencoreunionspeechandissuessuchaswag

es,pensions,andbenefits forpublicemployees is farmore

elusive than it is for private employees. It commented on

the conceptualdifficultyofdistinguishing inpublicsector

casesbetweenunionexpenditures thataremade forcollec

tivebargainingpurposesandthosethataremadetoachieve

politicalends.

Id.at

2632.

The

Court

also

found

significant

thefactthatthepersonalcareassistantswerehardlypublic

employeesatall: theywerehired, fired,andsupervisedby


43/59

No.131264 43

theclient,andtheywerenoteligibleforahostofstatebene

fits.This

unusual

status,

it

wrote,

has

important

implica

tionsfortheabilityoftheuniontochargeanagencyfee.Id.

at2636.Aboods rationaleisbasedon theassumption that

theunionpossessesthefullscopeofpowersanddutiesgen

erallyavailableunderAmericanlaborlaw.Id.

InHarris,practicallytheonlythingtheunionwasdoing

waspresentingitsviewstothestate.Itcouldnotsetwages,

whichwereestablishedbylaw,andithadnoauthorityover

grievances.Inthatsetting,allthatwasleftwasspeech.Well

establishedprinciples

entitled

the

objectors

to

refuse

to

pay

a

fee that could onlybe subsidizing that speech. TheCourt

uncoverednothingofvaluethattheunionwascompelledto

furnishto theobjectors,andso ithadnooccasion toworry

aboutanycompelledtransferofpropertyorservices.

The casebefore us does not share thosedistinguishing

featuresofHarris.Itconcernsprivateemployersandprivate

employees, not state employees. The rights of employees

whoarenotunionmemberstorefrainfromsubsidizingun

ionspeech

are

fully

protected

by

their

entitlement

to

give

the

uniononlyafairsharethatiscappedbythecostsofrepre

sentational activity.TheHarrisCourt itself recognized that

the casebefore it lacked all of the features that havebeen

understoodtojustifytheagencyfee:

Whatjustifies the agency fee, the argument goes, is

the fact that theStatecompels theunion topromote

andprotecttheinterestsofnonmembers.Ibid.Specifi

cally,theunionmustnotdiscriminatebetweenmem

bersand

nonmembers

in

negotiating

and

adminis

tering a collectivebargaining agreement and repre

sentingtheinterestsofemployeesinsettlingdisputes


44/59

44 No.131264

andprocessinggrievances.Ibid.Thismeansthatthe

unioncannot,

for

example,

negotiate

particularly

highwage increases for itsmembers inexchange for

acceptingnoincreasesforothers.Ibid.Andithasthe

dutytoprovideequalandeffectiverepresentationfor

nonmembersingrievanceproceedings,seeIll.Comp.

Stat.Ann.,ch.5,315/6,315/8,anundertaking that

can be very involved. See, e.g., SEIU: Member Re

sources, available at www.seiu.or/a/members/

disputesandgrievancesrightsproceduresandbest

practices.php(detailing

the

steps

involved

in

adjust

inggrievances).

134 S. Ct. at 263637. Every one of the features thatwas

missinginHarrisispresentinthecasebeforeus.Itherefore

conclude that nothing inHarris undermines either Beck or

theanalysisIhavedescribedthusfar.

II

The questionbefore us is how these principles operate

when

a

state

chooses

to

adopt

a

so

called

right

to

work

law (either by statute or in its constitution). Indiana has

passed such a law. See IND. CODE 2266. Federal law

leaves some room for such state laws,pursuant to section

14(b) of theNLRA, 29U.S.C. 164(b).But the question is

whetherstatelawcancommandtheunion(aprivateorgani

zation)toperformuncompensatedservicesforotherprivate

parties(thenonmembers).Ifthefederallaborlawspreempt

thiskindof state law, then the state lawmustyield. If the

federalstatuteeitherauthorizes thiskindof takingor issi

lent,then

we

must

move

to

the

constitutional

issues

to

whichIhavealluded.


45/59

No.131264 45

Bearinginmindthatweshouldalwaysconsiderstatuto

ryarguments

first,

see,

e.g., SolidWasteAgency ofN. Cook

Cnty.v.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngrs,531U.S.159,162(2001),I

analyze theNLRAbefore tacklingany constitutional issue.

WeallagreethatthepivotalsectionoftheNLRAissection

14(b), 29 U.S.C. 164(b). Section 14(b)was added to the

NLRAin1947bytheTaftHartleyAct,61Stat.151,aspartof

aneffort toreinincertainunionpracticesthatCongressre

garded as abusive. Entitled Agreements requiring union

membership in violation of State law, section 14(b) states

that:

Nothing in this subchaptershallbeconstruedasau

thorizing theexecutionorapplicationofagreements

requiringmembershipinalabororganizationasacon

dition of employment in any State or Territory in

whichsuchexecutionorapplication isprohibitedby

StateorTerritoriallaw.

29U.S.C. 164(b) (emphasis added). This is the language

thatwemustconstrue.Thequestioniswhatitmeanstosay

thatstates

can

prohibit

agreements

requiring

membership

inalabororganizationasaconditionofemployment.More

particularly,wemustdecidewhethersection14(b)authoriz

es the sweeping prohibitions found in Indianas Right to

Worklaw.Plaintiffschallengebothsection3andsection8of

thatlaw,Ind.Code22663and22668,butIagreewith

themajority that section 3 adds nothing to the picture. I

thereforefocusonsubparts2and3ofsection8,whichpro

videasfollowsinrelevantpart:

Aperson

may

not

require

an

individual

to:


46/59

46 No.131264

(2) pay dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of

anykindoramountto

alabor

organization;

or

(3)pay toacharityor thirdpartyanamount that is

equivalent tooraproratapartofdues, fees,assess

ments,orotherchargesrequiredofmembersofa la

bororganization;

asaconditionofemploymentorcontinuationofem

ployment.

IND.CODE22668(emphasisadded).

Statutoryinterpretation

begins

with

the

plain

language

ofthestatute.UnitedStatesv.Berkos,543F.3d392,396(7th

Cir. 2008).Courts should assume that thepurpose of the

statute is communicated by the ordinary meaning of the

wordsCongressused;therefore,absentanyclearindication

of a contrary purpose, the plain language is conclusive.

UnitedStatesv.Ye,588F.3d411,41415 (7thCir.2009).My

colleagues read theword membership oddly, as aword

thatdescribesbothunionmembersandnonmembersofthe

union.Nonmembers

somehow

morph

into

members,

they

say, if thenonmembersare required topay theunion any

thing, even a fee limited to reimbursement for the services

thatfederal law insists theyareentitled toreceive from the

union.By this logic, IbecomeamemberofChicagosUni

versityClubtheminuteIsomuchaspayformydinneratan

eventhosted there.Thiswould come as a surprise toboth

theClubandme.Onemightevenaskifmoneyissignificant

atall:Iassume thatnonmemberswhoenjoyunionservices

forfreefalloutsideeven themajoritysdefinitionofmem

bership,thoughIdonotknowwhythatshouldbethecase,

iftheyarestillbeingrepresentedbytheunion.Themajority


47/59

No.131264 47

believes that its interpretationof section14(b) iscompelled

bythe

language

of

the

NLRA,

as

interpreted

by

the

Supreme

Court. In addition, it relies very heavily on the legislative

historyoftheTaftHartleyAct,anteat1318.Withrespect,I

donotagreewithitsreadingofthestatutorylanguage,andI

cannot agree that the legislative history has anyparticular

persuasivevalue.

ThedecisionsknownasRetailsClerksIandIImarkedthe

first time theSupremeCourtaddressedastatespowerun

der section 14(b). SeeRetailClerks IntlAssn, Local 1625 v.

Schermerhorn,373

U.S.

746

(1963)

(RetailClerks I)

and

Retail

Clerks Intl Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96

(1963)(RetailClerksII).InRetailClerksItheCourtreviewed

anagencyshopagreementunderwhichallemployeesatthe

companywere required topay fullunion fees,whetheror

nottheywereunionmembers.TheCourthadheldinGeneral

Motors thatanagency shop clause thatwasnotprohibited

bystatelawwasapermissiblesubjectofcollectivebargain

ing. 373 U.S. at 735. But GeneralMotors arose in Indiana,

whichat

the

time

permitted

agency

shop

agreements;

Retail

Clerks I, in contrast, arose inFlorida,whichhas a rightto

work law that forbade thesearrangements.Relyingon sec

tion 14(b) and the righttowork legislation, the plaintiffs

(nonunionizedemployees)broughtalawsuitseekingadec

laration that the agencyshopprovisionwas void.Defend

antsargued,interalia,thatsection14(b)gavestatesonlythe

power toprohibit agreements that required membership

inlabororganizations.Agencyshopagreements,defendants

pointedout,didnotrequiremembership;theymerelyre

quirednonmembers

to

pay

fees

equal

to

membership

fees.

This,defendantsurged,wascompatiblewiththestatute.


48/59

48 No.131264

Thedistrictcourtfoundthatthestatesrighttoworklaw

outlawednot

only

union

shops

(under

which

union

mem

bershipcouldbecompelled)butalsoagencyshops.TheSu

premeCourtaffirmed, finding that[a]t thevery least, the

agreements requiring membership ina laborunionwhich

are expressly permittedby the proviso [to 8(a)(3)] are the

same membershipagreementsexpresslyplacedwithin the

reachof state lawby 14(b). 373U.S. at 751.Pointing to

GeneralMotors, theCourt found that agencyshop arrange

mentswhichimpose[]onemployeestheonlymembership

obligationenforceable

under

8(a)(3)

by

discharge,

namely,

theobligationtopayinitiationfeesandregularduesisthe

practical equivalent of an agreement requiringmember

ship ina labororganizationasaconditionofemployment.

Whatevermay be the status of less stringentunionsecurity ar

rangements,theagencyshopiswithin14(b).Id.at75152

(emphasisadded).

As the statement just highlighted demonstrates, the

Courtwascareful inRetailClerksIto leaveforanotherday

thestatus

of

less

comprehensive

arrangements.

It

observed

that thepetitionersoriginallyhad likened their case to the

GeneralMotorsagencyshop.373U.S.at752n.4.Only later,

uponbriefingandargument,didtheytrytodistinguishtheir

situation from the fullblown agency shop. Id.At that late

hour,theyarguedthattheclauseintheiragreementprovid

ed thatnonunionemployeeswouldcontribute to theunion

for thepurpose of aiding theUnion indefraying costs in

connectionwith its legalobligationsand responsibilitiesas

theexclusivebargainingagentof theemployees in theap

propriatebargaining

unit.

Id.

at

752.

The

petitioners

assert

edthatthislanguageconfinedpaymentsfromnonmembers

tocollectivebargainingpurposesaloneandprohibitedthe


49/59

No.131264 49

union fromusing thepaymentsfor institutionalpurposes

unrelatedto

its

exclusive

agency

functions.

Id.

The SupremeCourt rejected this lastminute attempt to

distinguishGeneralMotors.Itpointedoutthatcontrarytothe

petitionerssuggestion,theclauseatissueimposednoiron

clad restrictiononwhat theunioncoulddowith thepay

mentsitreceivedfromnonmembers,andthustherewasno

safeguardagainsttheunionsuseofthemoneyforinstitu

tional items. Id. at 753. In addition,because theproposed

servicefeewassetatanamountequaltotheunionsiniti

ationfees

and

dues,

which

could

be

used

for

any

Sweeney v. Pence, No. 13-1264 (7th Cir. Sep. 2, 2014)

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Transcript of Sweeney v. Pence, No. 13-1264 (7th Cir. Sep. 2, 2014)