Svensson and Hoglund 2008

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International Negotiation 13 (2008) 341–364 www.brill.nl/iner

‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if You Don’t’:Nordic Involvement and Images of Tird-Party

Neutrality in Sri Lanka

Kristine Höglund * Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Uppsala University, Sweden(E-mail: [email protected])

Isak Svensson** Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Uppsala University, Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden (E-mail: [email protected])

Received 3 September 2007; accepted 2 December 2007

Abstract Tird-party actors who mediate or monitor peace often strive to uphold an image of neutrality. Yet, theycommonly face accusations of partiality. Te Nordic engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process is anillustration of this puzzle: despite the efforts to uphold an image of being neutral mediators and monitors,they have been seen as favoring one side or the other. Tis article suggests that part of the explanation fortheir failure to be seen as neutral lies in the fact that armed conflicts are characterized by certain asym-metries between the main antagonists – in capabilities, status and behavior. Tese imbalances pose par-ticular challenges to the third party aspiring to act in a neutral manner. We suggest that third parties havetwo strategies available to deal with imbalances in the relationship between the contenders: 1) they canchoose to disregard the asymmetrical relationship and act in an even-handed manner or 2) they can seekto counterbalance the lopsidedness. Tis article explores the dynamics of these strategies by analyzing the

Nordic involvement in Sri Lanka’s peace process that began in 2002.

KeywordsNegotiations, mediation, internal conflict, third party, mediators, monitors, asymmetry, Sri Lanka, Nor-way, SLMM

*) KRISINE HÖGLUND has specialized in the inter-linkages between conflict resolution and vio-

lence. Her research has covered issues such as the dilemmas of democratization in post-war societies, theimportance of trust in peace negotiations, and the role of international actors in dealing with crises inwar-torn societies. Cases analyzed include Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Kosovo, and Sri



342 K. Höglund and I. Svensson / International Negotiation 13 (2008) 341–364

Introduction

Tird-party actors who mediate or monitor peace often strive to uphold an imageof neutrality. Yet, mediators and monitors commonly face accusations of biasnessand partiality in their efforts to bring the parties towards peace. Although neutral-ity is not a prerequisite for mediation success – biased mediators can sometimesalso be important peacemakers – this issue raises important challenges for thirdparties. Tis dilemma has been at the heart of the Nordic involvement in the SriLankan peace process. Maintaining neutrality has been an important objective ofthe Norwegian mediators and the Nordic monitors throughout the intervention.Still, they have often been perceived, among the public and the main parties, as

biased and partial. In some instances, this has resulted in vigorous oppositionagainst the Nordic presence, with Norwegian flags being burnt outside theembassy in Sri Lanka’s capital, Colombo. Why have the Nordic third parties failedto create the image of impartiality despite their efforts? Tis article addresses thisconundrum.

We suggest that part of the explanation for the image problem of the Nordicthird parties lies in the inherent asymmetrical context in which they have had tofunction. Armed conflicts, in particular internal ones, are characterized by certainasymmetries between the main antagonists relating for instance to capabilities

and recognition. Tese asymmetries pose challenges to the third party seeking toact in a neutral manner during a peace process. In this article, we explore thequestion of third-party neutrality in the context of such asymmetries. We focusspecifically on responses or ‘strategies’ employed by third parties to manage dis-putes arising from asymmetrical relationships. We suggest that third parties canchoose between two main strategies when situating themselves in an asymmetri-cal context. First, they can disregard the asymmetrical relationship and act in aneven-handed manner in spite of the difference between the two sides, here termedthe strategy of even-handedness .1 Alternatively, the neutral third party can seek tocounterbalance the lopsidedness by strengthening the weaker party, here termedthe equalizing strategy . Yet, both responses may lead to criticism from the partythat sees itself as disadvantaged by the third party’s actions. Generally speaking,parties benefiting from an asymmetry have incentives to seek to preserve the sta-tus quo, whereas weaker parties have incentives to seek adjustments and changes. When conflicts are asymmetrical, it is particularly diffi cult for mediators andmonitors to uphold a perception of neutrality: regardless of which strategy thethird party applies it is likely to be contested, criticized and condemned. In asym-

metrical conflict situations, the neutral third parties will be damned if they do,and damned if they don’t.



K. Höglund and I. Svensson / International Negotiation 13 (2008) 341–364 343

Te article explores the dynamics of third party neutrality in asymmetricalconflicts by examining the Nordic engagement in Sri Lanka’s most recent peace

process. More specifically, we analyze the strategies utilized by the Norwegianmediators and the Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Te SLMMhas consisted of personnel from the Nordic countries only: Norway, Sweden,Denmark, Finland and Iceland. Te SLMM has been serving as a neutral observergroup, with the mission to identify and report violations and adherence to thecease-fire agreement, brokered by the Norwegian mediators in February 2002. Inthis agreement, the main antagonists in the Sri Lankan conflict, the Liberationigers of amil Eelam (LE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), com-mitted themselves to cease violent actions against each other, take measures torestore normalcy and initiate a political dialogue focused on finding a solution tothe armed conflict. From the very outset of the peace process, the neutrality of thethird parties – Norway and SLMM – has been a contested issue. We analyze thedilemma confronting these actors by examining four crucial issues in the peaceprocess: the general response to the violations against the cease-fire agreement,reactions to the clashes between the Sea igers and the Sri Lankan Navy, the ques-tion of the High-Security Zones (HSZ), and the import of radio-equipment tothe LE through Norwegian diplomatic channels. Tese events are character-

ized by the fact that they reveal the imbalance between the parties and pose con-siderable challenges to the third parties on how to manage these situations.Building on the theoretical distinction between an even-handed versus equalizingapproach, the study examines which strategies have been used and sheds light onthe problems that arise in relation to different responses.

Te article consists of four parts. First, we explore previous debates on third-party neutrality in the context of asymmetry. We discuss the different notions ofunbalanced relationships and how neutrality taps into these dynamics. We sug-gest that there are two different approaches to what neutrality implies in the

context of asymmetry. We then proceed to the second part, in which we explorehow different types of asymmetries play out in the Sri Lankan context, and howthe Nordic third parties have tried to relate themselves to these. In the third partof this article, we discuss the findings and relate them to previous debates. In thefourth part, the conclusions from the study are outlined.

Neutrality in Asymmetrical Conflicts

Internal armed conflicts are characterized by their asymmetrical nature. Ratherthan being a permanent imbalance between the physically stronger and weakersides asymmetry is a multidimensional and dynamic concept (Mitchell 1995 26)




Four of these are particularly important to examine in the Sri Lankan case: legalasymmetries, material imbalances, imbalance in negotiation capacities, and tacti-

cal asymmetries.First, one of the most important differences between governments and non-

state actors is the legal status (Mitchell 1995: 26). Legal asymmetries capture thefact that the main antagonists facing each other in internal armed conflicts arelegally very different. On the one hand, being the formal representative of a coun-try, the government represents an entity with international recognition. Tismeans that it has the ability to sign international agreements, represent the statein international forums, and make and implement laws that regulate the behaviorof its citizens. Insurgents, on the other hand, lack (or are in the process of estab-lishing) such position and institutions.3 Tey therefore seek recognition (Zart-man 1995). For this reason, King stresses that “overcoming the asymmetry ofstatus is often a major goal of insurgent groups and can represent an importantstep on the road to a negotiated settlement” (King 1997: 48).

A second dimension of asymmetry concerns imbalances relating to materialand military capabilities. Mitchell (1995: 41) classifies this as a ‘coercive capacity’and suggests that this aspect of asymmetry arises when one of the parties has anadvantage in its ability to impose costs on the other side.4 It may be in the stron-

ger parties’ interest to reject mediation, because they expect to prevail (ouval1993: 266). Terefore, parties often decide to negotiate when the distribution ofpower is moving towards parity (Zartman 1985: 234), or when they approach asituation of a ‘hurting stalemate’, where their capacities for imposing costs oneach other have become more equal (Zartman 1995).

A third dimension of asymmetry in this context is the imbalance between lev-els of ‘access.’ Tis asymmetry implies that the adversaries have “differential capa-bility [. . .] to put forward their demands and inform the national politicalcommunity about goals and aspirations” (Mitchell 1991: 31). Put differently, the

belligerents possess uneven resources to conduct their public relations, whichaffects their ability to participate in the peace process in an equal manner. A fourth dimension of asymmetry is the “behavioral asymmetries of tactics”

(Mitchell 1995: 26). Tis tactical asymmetry refers to situations where the partiesemploy or have incentives to employ fundamentally different tactics. Te behav-ioral dimension of asymmetry does not necessarily follow the same lines as asym-metrical capabilities. In other words, it is not always the strong that applies tacticsin an uneven manner. In fact, the weaker side can seek to compensate for its rela-tive weakness by using tactics that can give it certain advantages.




ypes of Tird-party Neutrality and Responses to Asymmetry

Tird-party neutrality is a widely-discussed subject within peace and conflictresearch.5 In mediation research, proponents of third-party neutrality (Jackson1952; Young 1967; Ott 1972) have been challenged by other scholars who sug-gest that biased mediators might carry certain advantages. For instance, they maypossess greater leverage and ability to change the belligerents’ incentives or per-ceptions (ouval 1975; ouval and Zartman 2001), or they may be able to cred-ibly reveal information about the other side’s reservation points (Kydd 2003).

Te theoretical literature distinguishes between source -bias and content-biaswhen discussing the question of third-party neutrality (Carnevale and Arad

1996). Whereas the first category refers to third parties who have particular tieswith one of the antagonists, the latter refers to third parties who seek to favor oneside in the negotiation process. While it is diffi cult for a third party to have muchinfluence over perceptions about source-bias, content-bias is highly dependent onthe behavior and strategies employed during a mediated peace process.

Te presence of a third party – whether through mediation, monitoring orpeacekeeping – changes the structure of the conflict from a dyad to a triangularrelationship (Zartman 2002: 78–79). For this reason, third parties can employdifferent strategies to address the asymmetrical relationship between the parties.

A first strategy is to accept the imbalance as it is, in this article termed a strategyof even-handedness . From such a perspective, any attempt by the third party tochange the balance of power between the parties is considered too intrusive forthe third party to claim neutrality. However, a second strategy suggests interven-tion to level the playing field for the disadvantaged side, here termed the equal-izing strategy . Te equalizing strategy rests on the assumption of equal peace:“[e]quals make peace more readily and more easily than unequals” (Mitchell1995: 36). Derived from this assumption, it is suggested that “empowerment ofa weaker party [. . .] is necessary before any genuine search for a settlement provespossible” (Mitchell 1995: 37).6 Mediation in severe power imbalances would beineffective (Levine 1984), since mediation would only serve as an instrument forstronger parties to dominate the weaker side (Pinzón 1996). Where power isasymmetrical, the mediator may work to empower the weaker party in order tocreate the structural ground for meaningful negotiations (Assefa 1987: 19). Tus,

5) A ‘third party’ is defined as an actor that is “external to a dispute between two or more people and thattries to help them end their conflict” (Pruitt & Kim 2004: 227).6) However, this idea of the beneficial effects of symmetry on conflict reduction can be questioned. For

instance, Mitchell suggests that “some equalizations may improve the chances for conflict reduction whileothers may make it less likely” (Mitchell 1995: 39). Rubin and Zartman claim that “equal power does notlead to a more effective negotiation” because “[s]ymmetry in conflict situations tends to produce and




a reconstruction of relationships from imbalance to balance is seen as a prerequi-site for reaching a sustainable peaceful relationship (McCormick 1997).

However, attempts by third parties to counter asymmetry in internal conflictscan lead to a number of problems related to neutrality. For instance, efforts bythird parties to address the legal asymmetries can undermine the legitimacy of thethird-party involvement:

Te fact that the conflict is asymmetrically structured on a legal dimension means that, as thepreservation or destruction of that asymmetry becomes a leading issue in the conflict, any peace-making efforts that seek to treat the parties as legally the same are likely to be unsuccessful. Suchinitiatives may be supported by the insurgents, seeking to establish legal symmetry, but are likelyto be rejected by incumbents seeking to preserve an advantageous legal asymmetry (Mitchell1991: 31).

In a similar vein, Aggestam contends that the question of legitimacy is put intoquestion when third parties intervene in conflicts with legal asymmetry: “Temajor challenge for third parties [. . .] is to gain legitimacy for intervention in anasymmetrical conflict. Frequently, third-party intervention is viewed by one orseveral parties as an intrusion and as illegitimate. For instance, the stronger partymay reject intervention on the basis of state sovereignty and interference in inter-nal affairs” (Aggestam 2002: 72; our emphasis).

International mediation offers an opportunity for rebels to gain recognition,which the government may try to deprive them of (Zartman 1995). Negotiationsconfer legitimacy upon the insurgents (Modelski 1964: 131). Tus, insurgentscommonly use the mediators as part of the game of recognition (Mitchell 1993).It may therefore be in the interest of the weaker party to search for and accept amediator who will empower them (Richmond 1998: 712).

Behavioral asymmetries also pose distinct challenges to the claimed neutralityof third parties. Te basic problem for a third party claiming impartiality is

whether it should let the behavioral differences between the parties be reflected inthe relationship with the third party. Te mediator can intervene if one sidechooses to use tactics that, for instance, violate the agreed rules of conduct. Agustí-Panareda (2004: 30) suggests that “the mediator who sees an abuse ofpower can halt the process to avoid any such domination.” But in seeking touphold the image of neutrality, it is not clear whether the third party should takea clear stance against violators or if it should overlook such activities.

o summarize, the asymmetry in terms of legal status, material capabilities, andbehavioral tactics create specific challenges for third parties seeking to act in

a neutral way. Te two basic approaches that a third party can use are to dis-regard the asymmetries (even-handedness ) or seek to empower the weaker side




Te Nordic Involvement in Sri Lanka

Te Nordic countries have had a special role in Sri Lanka during the peaceprocess, which had its genesis in the early 2000s. Norway has been the key medi-ator and the Nordic countries have been the sole contributor to the Sri LankaMonitoring Mission (SLMM). Norway has a long history of engagement inSri Lanka through development assistance. Te armed conflict in Sri Lankabetween the separatist rebel group LE (Liberation igers of amil Eelam) andthe government forces has been ongoing since 1983 with varying intensity. Sev-eral unsuccessful initiatives have been taken to bring the conflict to an end.7 TeNorwegian-mediated peace process was initiated after the regime change in 2001,

which paved the way for a cease-fire agreement between the LE and the gov-ernment in February 2002.8 Te peace process produced six rounds of negotia-tions between the government and the LE, before the rebels withdrew fromthe peace talks in April 2003. Since then, the peace process has been stalled. Inspite of efforts to reinitiate the negotiation process, the violence escalated in 2005and 2006 to a state of war.9 Nonetheless, the Nordic efforts to bring the partiesback to the negotiation table have continued.

Tere are several factors explaining why the task of brokering peace in SriLanka fell on Norway. Some of these relate to Norway as a small, peaceful coun-

try with no colonial past and with a known reputation of peacemaking efforts inIsrael-Palestine, Guatemala and other places (Moolakkattuu 2005). Te Norwe-gian approach to mediation has been characterized by “credibility, impartiality,consistency, and confidentiality” (Lieberfeld 1995: 203).10 Important in thisregard is the Norwegian self-perception of being neutral and without any majorinterests in Sri Lanka.11 Over time, the Norwegian mediators were able to gainthe trust of key individuals on both sides. An important aspect was also that

7) For details, see K.M. de Silva & G.H. Peiris (2000); Kethesh Loganathan (1996). Robert I. Rotberg(1999); Kumar Rupesinghe (1998). 8) After the failure of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (1987), the Sri Lankan government had objected toexternal involvement to solve the conflict. However, in the year 2000, President Chandrika Kumaratungamade a major policy shift and together with LE leader Prabhakaran offi cially invited Norway to helpfacilitate contacts between the parties. Tis invitation had been preceded by a period of preparations andcontacts in secret. See Alan Bullion (2001) and Arne Follerås (2002) on the early involvement of Norwayin the peace process.9) For analyses of the initiation and developments of the 2002 peace initiative, see for instance Rajat

Ganguly (2004); Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2003, 2006); Kumar Rupesinghe (2006); Jayadeva

Uyangoda & Morina Perera (2003).10) See also Ann Kelleher and James Larry aulbee (2006) on Norway’s mediation style.11) Tis does not necessarily imply complete disinterest as such. Te motivations for Norwegian involve-




Norway was acceptable to India, a country that has been reluctant to accept for-eign mediation in its sphere of influence (Keethaponcalan 2005).

Similar concerns also explain the fact that the SLMM has been made up solelyof Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland).12 Tecease-fire in February 2002 provided for the creation of the SLMM. In the agree-ment, the LE and the government agreed to refrain from any ‘offensive mili-tary operations,’ and buffer zones were created to separate their areas of control.13 Te amil paramilitary groups who had acted in support of the government hadto disarm. Te main aim of the cease-fire was to facilitate a negotiated settlementto the conflict. SLMM’s mandate has been to “conduct international verificationthrough on-site monitoring of the fulfillment of the commitments entered into.”14 In addition, local monitoring committees were established which, along with theSLMM, were to find solutions to disagreements over the implementation of theagreement.15 In spite of the unraveling of the cease-fire from late 2005 andonwards, the SLMM has remained in Sri Lanka.

Te Sri Lankan Peace Process and Conflict Asymmetries

Te conflict in Sri Lanka has several important dimensions of asymmetry. o begin

with, the LE has been striving for legal recognition, an asset the Sri Lankangovernment clearly possesses. As an example, the issue of de-proscription came todominate the early stages of the peace process. Te LE had been banned duringthe war and it demanded to be legalized as a prerequisite for talks to start.16 Teaim was to achieve recognition and a sense of parity. For instance, LE leaderPrabhakaran expressed at a press conference in April 2002: “[t]he LE viewedthe de-proscription as a visible sign of power asymmetry between the two” (Rudr-akumaran 2005). In spite of vigorous opposition, the government removed theban in early September 2002, and the first round of talks was held in Tailand

12) At its outset, all Nordic countries contributed personnel. After the EU-ban on the LE in 2006, themonitors from EU-countries – Sweden, Denmark and Finland – left because the LE made clear thattheir safety was no longer ensured.13) Te cease-fire agreement (CFA) is available on-line at Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), www.slmm.lk. Tere are a few studies on the role and functioning of the SLMM. See in particular Ingrid Sam-set (2004) and a series of chapters in Kumar Rupesinghe (2006).14) See the CFA, Article 4.15) SLMM has its headquarters in Colombo and was originally organized in six districts (Jaffna, Mannar,Vavuniya, rincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara). Combined with the six district offi ces there were localmonitoring committees with representatives from the LE and the government.16) On the international arena, the LE has been listed as a terrorist organization by a number of states.I di ib d h LE i 1992 f h i i f h I di P i Mi i R ji G dhi




shortly thereafter. However, issues concerning recognition remained. For instance,the so-called Sea igers, the naval unit of the LE, was never included in the

cease-fire agreement, and therefore the parties did not work out any safe-guardingmechanisms that could mitigate the tense situations that could potentially arise atsea. Although both parties had maritime capacities, only one side’s forces wererecognized. Hence, a basic problem was that the de facto balance of power was notreflected in the agreement, resulting in an asymmetry of recognition.

Te material imbalance between the two main antagonists has also been animportant factor in the Sri Lankan conflict. Te cease-fire agreement came intoexistence after a long period of intense fighting between the government and theLE. Tere had been no sustained pause in the fighting since the previous peaceeffort in 1994–95. Whereas the government has been the stronger side through-out the conflict, the cease-fire agreement was negotiated at a time when the LEhad shown considerable strength on the battlefield. Tus, the mediation effortwas initiated when the LE had won a series of military battles against the SriLankan state (Uyangoda and Perera 2003: 20).

It was against this background that the cease-fire agreement was reached andthird-party monitors were invited to observe the implementation of the agree-ment. Te SLMM held the position that the cease-fire agreement relied on a bal-

ance of forces, and that this balance was important to maintain in order for theagreement to be durable and stable. For instance, the first SLMM head, Generalrond Furuhovde, stated the SLMM belief that a balance of forces was crucial forthe cease-fire to hold (Reuter News, 21 February, 2003). It is noteworthy that thecease-fire agreement itself says nothing about this, yet the idea seems to have beencentral to the conceptual thinking of the Norwegian mediators and the SLMM.

Yet, the parties interpreted the notion of balance of forces as the basis for thecease-fire in different ways. Te LE held the position that the agreement itselfwas a sign of recognition of its structures and control:

It recognized amil Eelam’s de facto existence, with its unique characteristics: a distinct population;a government comprising a defense force, a police force, a judiciary, a civil administration and otherinstitutions for effective governance of a people, and capability of entering into agreements withother governments with a line of control reflecting the ground reality of the existence of the amilhomeland demarcated with recognized borders. Te CFA recognized the balance of power betweenthe Government and the LE and was premised on this balance of power (LE 2007).

Te government, on the other hand, was very sensitive to the recognition thatmight be bestowed on the LE. For the government side, it was a necessary de

facto recognition made in order to regulate the conflict behavior. Te government’sresponse has been complicated by the fact that power at the centre, until the par-




formed a government after the general election in late 2001. Chandrika Kumara-tunga’s party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), had lost power in 2001, but

she had remained as president.17 Te Prime Minister and the President clearlywere not equally sensitive to the question of implicit recognition. Whereas thePrime Minister accepted and tried to work with the LE, the President wasmuch more reluctant to moves that could be interpreted as recognition and legit-imization of the LE.

Te rest of this section is devoted to an analysis of four areas of disagreementrelating to asymmetries and the Nordic third parties’ responses to these.

Cease-fire Violations: General rends

During the Sri Lankan peace process, there was a clear tactical asymmetry in thesense that the LE committed more acts in violation of the cease-fire than thegovernment did.18 Te SLMM frequently published (mainly on a monthly basis)statistics on complaints about cease-fire violations and rulings on these. Cease-fireviolations included a number of different actions and activities, including theillegal carrying of arms, movement in the buffer zone separating rebel-held andgovernment territory, and hostile acts against the civilian population. Te major-ity of the complaints have been leveled against the LE. Paralleling this trend,

most of SLMM’s rulings made the LE responsible for the vast majority of thecease-fire violations. From SLMM’s published information, it can be concludedthat during the period of 2002–2005, the LE have committed 96% of thecease-fire violations (Daily Mirror, 4 August, 2006). Since late 2005 there hasbeen a clear escalation of offensive attacks by both parties. However, before late2005, the overwhelming share of complaints was over child recruitment andabduction of adults. For instance, of the 1955 complaints against the LE dur-ing year 2003, 670 were related to child recruitment. Te second largest categorywas abduction of adults, numbering 348 cases. Most complaints against the gov-ernment side concerned harassment carried out by the military and police forces.19

Te Nordic monitors have been criticized for turning a blind eye on LEviolations.20 Te cease-fire agreement gives the SLMM an independent role in

17) A political crisis had been unleashed in November 2003 by President Kumaratunga’s decision toovertake three important ministries, in effect taking control over the defence, the mass media, and thepolice; announcing a state of emergency, and suspending the parliament. After a period of attempts tounite the President and the Prime Minister, new elections were called in February 2004 to be held in Aprilthe same year. Te election was won by a coalition of parties, including President Kumaratunga’s party,

the SLFP. Mahinda Rajapakse was appointed new Prime Minister and later won the Presidential electionin 2005.18) See Keenan 2007, 95.




relation to Norway, and the Head of Mission has the “final authority regardinginterpretation” of the cease-fire (specified in article 3.3 of the cease-fire agree-

ment). Nonetheless, a large share of the public perceives the SLMM as biased. Forinstance, the Peace Confidence Index – a public survey carried out regularly bythe Centre for Policy Alternatives – shows that over time an increasing numberof people have come to see the SLMM as not being impartial. For instance, inMay 2002, 15.7% of the respondents disagreed with the statement that theSLMM was impartial, while in September 2005, 52.5% disagreed.21 Te figureprimarily reflects dissatisfaction within the Muslim and Sinhalese communitiesthat clearly do not perceive the SLMM as impartial (the responses are also pre-sented according to ethnic breakdown). Similar figures are displayed with regardto perceptions about the effectiveness of the SLMM.22

Tus, the observation can be made that, although the SLMM has generallybeen acting according to its mandate and has been acting even-handedly when itcomes to the reporting and rulings of cease-fire violations, this has led to accusa-tions of bias. Calls have been made from the Sinhalese community, but also fromhuman rights activists, for the Nordic monitors to take a clearer stance against theLE. However, the SLMM’s dual role complicates its work. It is mandated tomake rulings on cease-fire violations, but at the same time it is to work with the

parties to ‘resolve any disputes regarding the implementation’ of the cease-fireagreement. Terefore the SLMM has to engage with the LE. Tis raises adilemma for the monitoring mission: “Even though the monitors cannot enforcecompliance, one might expect them to exert leverage by ‘naming and shaming’ inthe event of violations. On the other hand, their mediation role demands a lowkey and pragmatic approach. “It is normally easier to bring about de-escalationwithout extensive press and public involvement” (Goodhand and Klem 2005: 70).

Incidents at the Sea, Spring 2003

In the spring of 2003, a series of incidents involving the Sea igers took place.Tree incidents threatened to cause a dangerous escalation of the conflict at sea:on February 7, 2003, an LE crew sank their own trawler after SLMM moni-tors had found ammunition and weapons on board; on March 10, the Sri LankanNavy sank an LE vessel; and on March 20, unknown (but most likely LE)speed boats attacked a Chinese fishing trawler. Due to the fact that the maritime

21) Te statement posed in the survey was: “I think the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission is impartial in its

monitoring of the ceasefire agreement”, Peace Confidence Index, op-Line Results, September 2005. TePeace Confidence Index is available on CPAs webpage (www.cpalanka.org).22) Te SLMM has a limited mandate and limited capacity to carry out its work. Although the monitors




tion can be found in the lack of trust from the President as her party voiced heavycriticism against his suggestion of recognition of the Sea igers (BBC, 16 January,

2004).o conclude, the series of incidents at sea in the spring of 2003 showed that the

interactions between the parties as one of the battlegrounds had a dangerouspotential to escalate. It was therefore urgent to address one of the limitations ofthe cease-fire agreement, namely that it did not regulate the interactions betweenthe Sea igers and the Sri Lankan Navy. Yet, once the SLMM tried to address thisissue, these proposals were seen as biased and the SLMM was severely criticized.

Te Question of the High-Security Zones

Te High-Security Zones were a controversial issue during the peace process, andthe debate on this question absorbed much of the discussion at the differentrounds of talks (Fernando 2006: 78–79). Te High-Security Zones have both ahumanitarian and a security dimension. Te establishment of these zones in pop-ulated areas has displaced amil civilians, the numbers ranging from 10,000 upto 30,000. Te army feared that if the High-Security Zones were altered, thenLE cadres would have the possibility to infiltrate these strategically importantareas, and that the Sri Lankan army’s operational capacity would be reduced (Fer-

nando 2006: 72). Te LE, on the other hand, demanded that the High-Security Zones in Jaffna were removed, so that resettlement of internally displacedpersons (IDPs) could begin in these areas. Te removal of armed forces from theHigh-Security Zones was seen as part of the normalization process, a processstipulated in the cease-fire agreement. In Article 2 (‘Measures to restore nor-malcy’), certain confidence-building measures were described, where the partiescommitted themselves to vacate places of worship held by the forces of either ofthe parties within 30 days after the agreement. Similarly, school buildings andother public building were also to be vacated by the armed forces.

Te dispute over the High-Security Zones became one of the factors decreasingthe trust between the parties and was given as one of the reasons why the LEdecided to withdraw from the political negotiations (Balasingham 2004: 232).Te explanation for the non-fulfillment of these stipulations in the cease-fireagreement was, according to Bernard A.B. Goonetilleke, the Director General ofthe government’s peace secretariat, “the undue haste in which the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was negotiated” (Goonetilleke 2006: 305). Since the SriLankan armed forces were not given the opportunity to examine the drafts of the

cease-fire agreement, he contended that “the Government and the armed forceshad to accept conditions and targets, such as vacating places of religious worship,public buildings occupied by the armed forces etc within the given time frames




manoeuvre designed to move the armed forces out of the Jaffna Peninsula [. . .]not with a view to addressing the ‘existential problems’ of the civilian population”

(Goonetilleke 2006: 306).Te heads of the SLMM have held the perception that the balance of forces

between the government and the LE was the foundation of the cease-fireagreement. Te strategy of the SLMM was to recommend the avoidance of anymeasures that would risk this balance of forces, since the third parties perceivedthat such measures would jeopardize the entire peace process. In this way, theSLMM considered the dismantling of the High-Security Zones as a tool forchanging the balance of power on the ground. For instance, General rondFuruhovde, head of the SLMM, stated on December 26, 2002:

Representatives of the LE have stated that maintaining their military strength is vital if they areto be successful in the negotiations. What applies to LE in this context should also apply for theGovernment. [. . .] In Jaffna, simply dismantling High Security Zones for resettlement and handingover land for cultivation will decrease both security and combat potential of the Government forces.Te balance of forces is the basis of the Ceasefire agreement and disturbing that balance is disturbingthe Ceasefire. An unrealistic normalization program in the name of progress and developmentshould not be allowed to come into force at the expense of security, as this could undermine thebuilding of permanent peace (SLMM 2002).

Te LE reacted harshly, stating that it could not accept the “comments andvalue judgments” of the monitors (Daily Mirror, 28 December, 2002). AntonBalasingham, one of the LE front figures, also sent a letter to the SLMM inwhich he disputed its arguments, and stated that the SLMM’s view was legitimiz-ing the High-Security Zones and in effect undermining the work that was donein the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization, which had been cre-ated as part of the peace process. He further stated that the Sri Lankan Army wasusing civilians as human shields (Daily Mirror, 29 December, 2002). Te SLMM,however, maintained its position on the issue.

o conclude, we can note that the position and actions of the SLMM regard-ing the High-Security Zones were aimed at protecting the status quo and thebalance of forces between the two sides. Te SLMM was not prepared to suggestor endorse any measures that would jeopardize the status quo, although suchmeasures could be seen as part of the normalization process stipulated in thecease-fire agreement. Tus, the importance of preserving the balance of forcesoverrode other objectives in the cease-fire agreement. Tis position gave rise toconsiderable criticism from the LE, and this time the SLMM was considered

as biased in the sense that it took a position that was not considered favorable forthe LE.




clandestine Voice of the igers radio station that operated in LE-held territory.Te request stated that radio broadcasts in the north and east were virtually non-

existent, and that the LE should be allowed to broadcast in this area for thepurposes of raising awareness of the peace process in the amil community. In theLE’s view, informing the public would strengthen the peace process (LEletter quoted in Daily Mirror, 28 December, 2002).

Te necessary equipment had already been purchased in Singapore, and theLE requested to be allowed to import the equipment without having to paycustom duties and VA (value-added tax) (Daily Mirror, 28 December, 2002). According to statements from the government, tax exemption could not be gran-ted due to the laws of Sri Lanka. For unknown reasons, the government insteadapproached the Norwegian facilitators to circumvent these laws, asking the embassyin Colombo to act as consignees for the imports, since equipment and materialimported by an embassy is exempt from tax duties. Te facilitators agreed to this.

Te story about the radio equipment reached the headlines in the Sinhalesemedia in early December, and the opposition parties People’s Alliance and the JVP vehemently attacked the government and Norway on their conduct in thismatter. Tey claimed that the import had circumvented Sri Lankan laws and thatone could now question Norway’s role as a facilitator. For instance, the spokes-

man of the Peoples Alliance, including the President’s party, stated that the importput into question Norway’s impartiality. Te JVP accused the government ofbetraying the country and stated that the Norwegians were acting as the rulers ofSri Lanka (Daily Mirror, 14 December, 2002; 21 December, 2002).

An offi cial clarification on the radio equipment import came from Prime Min-ister Wickremesinghe and the government on December 28. In this letter to thepublic, the government explained how and why the incident took place, empha-sizing that LE broadcasts would help strengthen the peace process, and thatthe LE decisions to ask for government permission represented a significant

change in the LE stance towards the government. According to the govern-ment, the Norwegian embassy agreed to act as consignees due to the interest thegovernment had in furthering the peace process through LE broadcasts to dis-seminate information on the peace talks (Daily Mirror, 28 December, 2002).

President Kumaratunga reacted to the incident around the same date, statingthat she would write to the Norwegian Prime Minister to demand an explanationfor the actions of the Norwegian facilitators and to enquire into how it mightaffect their legitimacy as neutrals (Daily Mirror, January 1, 2003). PresidentKumaratunga, in a letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik on

January 1, 2003, claimed that the embassy of Norway in Sri Lanka had breachedcustoms laws, and implied that the embassy had interfered in the internal affairs




Te crisis over the import of radio equipment was part of larger tensionsbetween the two main Sinhalese parties. President Kumaratunga ‘politicized’ and

tried to undermine the peace process through the issue of the radio equipmentand critique of the government (Perera 2003). She even threatened to expelthe Norwegian ambassador Jon Westborg over the controversy (Daily Mirror,12 January, 2003).

In sum, the efforts taken for what was seen as strengthening the LE’s peace-promoting capabilities resulted in severe criticism of the Norwegian mediators, inspite of these activities largely being accepted by the government.

Analysis and Discussion

Te events and issues discussed above crucially worsened the relationship betweenthe parties and led the peace process into the stalemate from which no progresswas made. Te inability of the parties to find acceptable solutions to the disagree-ments helps to explain why the peace process broke down in mistrust and hostil-ity. o some extent, the waning legitimacy of the Nordic third-party actors (dueto perceptions of biasness) negatively influenced the mediators’ and monitors’ability to play a constructive role. Yet, the main reasons for the failures of thepeace process should not be sought in the dynamics of the third-party efforts, butin the structural and personal characteristics of the main parties themselves. Lackof willingness to earnestly seek a compromise solution, an inability to integrate aplurality of society into the process, and a growing uncertainty about the parties’power bases are some of the potential explanatory factors behind the lack of prog-ress in the peace process.

Te responses of the Nordic mediators and monitors when confronted withdifferent problems related to asymmetry in Sri Lanka are summarized in able 1:

able 1: Asymmetry and Tird-Party Responses in Sri Lanka

Incident Asymmetry Tird-Party Strategy

Violations againstCease-fire

Imbalance of tactics reat both parties similarly (Even-handedness)

Clashes at Sea Imbalance ofrecognition

Change status quo(Equalizer)

High-Security Zones Imbalance ofmaterial/militarycapabilities

Maintain status quo(Even-handedness)




Tese responses had implications for how the parties – the LE and the govern-ment – perceived the neutrality of the SLMM and the Norwegian mediators.

Te degree to which the parties during the peace process acted in violation ofthe cease-fire agreement was clearly asymmetrical. At the heart of understandingthe LE’s continuation of violent tactics during the peace process is the asym-metrical nature of the conflict. Violence is one of the few means that an armedopposition group seeking to change the status quo has at hand. For this reason,rebel groups and other armed non-state actors have a propensity to continue touse violence as peace talks begin and agreements are being drafted. In the SriLankan case, this asymmetry was managed by the Nordic third parties by con-tinuing the interactions with both sides, without clearly ‘naming and shaming’the side that stood for the absolute majority of the violations. One reason for thismight have been that too-harsh reactions against the LE would have beenharmful for the progression of the peace talks. Tis illustrates a potential tensionbetween the aspirations of the mediators to pursue the negotiation process on theone hand, and of the monitors to identify violations and make the violators visi-ble on the other. Te fact that the Norwegian mediators were responsible forappointing the head of the SLMM, and that Norwegians formed an importantpart of the mission, meant that the mediators had a greater risk of being accused

of biasness.Te sea incidents during the spring of 2003 put the legal asymmetry betweenthe LE and the government at the focal point of the conflict, and when theSLMM tried to address this asymmetry, it was perceived as being biased towardsthe LE. Hence, the third parties in this regard responded to the asymmetry inrecognition by suggesting a change of the status quo, a change that in essencewould empower the side that was not recognized.

In the debate on the High-Security Zones, the LE strived, supported bysome of the formulations in the cease-fire agreement, to get the government

forces to withdraw from strategically important locations, in order to enable there-settlement of internally displaced civilians. Te SLMM’s position concerningthis matter was that such efforts would endanger the balance of forces and there-fore risk the stability of the cease-fire. Hence, the monitors took the position thatit was important to uphold the military balance and that quick demilitarizationof these zones would be counter-productive to such aims. Once again, the moni-tors came under heavy criticism, but this time from the opposite end. Here thethird parties applied a strategy of even-handedness by suggesting that measuresshould not be taken that would risk disturbing the balance of forces.

With regard to the radio equipment incident, the third parties managed theasymmetry in capabilities (that is, access to the public and publicity) by empow-




the strengthening of the LE’s political capacities (and its ability to build popu-lar support for the peace process) was conducive to the continuation of the peace

process. Empowering the side that lacked resources in this regard was seen as astrategy that would benefit the peace process. Yet, this position led to criticismsfrom some elements of the stronger side and most importantly from PresidentKumaratunga. Hence, enhancing capabilities in situations of asymmetry –although this was a position shared both by the third party and the government –led to accusations and perceptions among sections of the Sinhalese population ofthe Norwegian third party siding with the LE.

Five observations can be made concerning the events and issues discussed inrelation to the Sri Lankan peace process. Firstly, this article’s point of departurewas an empirical and theoretical puzzle. An important objective of the third par-ties has been to uphold an image of impartiality. Still, the Norwegian mediatorsand the Nordic monitors have, under several circumstances, been seen as biasedand partial. Tis is reflected in the fact that a large share of the public does notapprove of Norway’s and the SLMM’s role in the peace process, as indicated inthe public surveys carried out by the Centre for Policy Alternatives. As an exam-ple, the Peace Confidence Index showed that, in March 2005, more than 70% ofthe amil community held Norway as the most suitable state to play a facilitator’s

role in the peace process. However, only 13.5% of the Sinhalese favored Norwayover other potential mediators.24

Te reasons why the SLMM and the mediators failed to create the image ofneutrality (despite their efforts) can partially be sought, this study suggests, in theinherent asymmetrical context in which the third parties acted. Te SLMM heldthe position that the cease-fire relied on a balance of forces between the twoparties. When this balance was challenged, the SLMM took the position that itwas important to maintain it. For instance, the SLMM’s suggestion of a de facto recognition of the Sea igers led to fierce reactions from the Sinhalese side.

Observers such as Ganguly (2004: 911) saw the recognition of the Sea igers as amajor concession from the government. Hence, efforts to handle the asymmetryled to the perception that the SLMM sided with the LE-position. It wasbecause of the efforts to manage asymmetries that the images of neutrality werechallenged.

Secondly, this analysis deals with the question of neutrality. Could it be con-cluded on the basis of the study that the SLMM and the mediators have beenbiased towards either the LE or the government? Our analysis suggests noclear-cut bias in favor of one or the other side. Te image of partiality seems to be

different depending on the situation in focus. Whether it was the LE or the




government that was critical of the third party depended on who was on thereceiving or benefiting end of the asymmetrical relationship. Although most of

the critique came from the Sinhalese side (and in particular, from the President,the nationalist media and the nationalist opposition, such as the JVP), the LEalso leveled criticism against the SLMM.

Tirdly, the third parties faced a dilemma between acting as effective peacebrokers and staying even-handed. Given the lack of regulations of the Sea igersin the cease-fire agreement, the third parties needed to suggest measures for pre-venting further escalation. Yet, taking actions in order to prevent violent clashesbetween the parties at sea led to charges of being partisan. Tey were caughtbetween accusations of biasness and ineffi ciency. Te SLMM took steps toenhance the effectiveness of the cease-fire and thereby prevent further escalationat sea. Te stance taken by the SLMM implied recognition of the LE, whichwas what the rebels were striving for. Tus, since the incidents at sea escalated, theSLMM was facing a dilemma between risking either the image of neutrality or ofbeing ineffi cient. Te dilemma was aggravated by the fact that Norway as a medi-ator also was awarded an important role in the SLMM (to monitor the cease-fireagreement).

Fourthly, this article taps into the debate on third-party neutrality. Tis study

does not aspire to compare biased and unbiased third parties, nor does it suggestthat neutrality is always a necessary condition for mediation success. Neverthe-less, we problematize the role of neutrality in asymmetrical internal armed con-flicts. Tis article has sought to identify the patterns through which third partiesthat are perceived as neutral at the outset of peace process come to be seen aspartial, resulting in waning legitimacy. We have seen that the asymmetrical char-acter of these types of conflicts creates inherent dilemmas, where the perceptionof third party neutrality will inevitably be affected one way or another. Tird par-ties seeking to be perceived as unbiased by the belligerents should take into

account the challenges involved in maintaining such an image. Maintaining aperception of neutrality becomes, over time, close to impossible. An interesting observation in this regard is that although the perception of

partiality has undermined the legitimacy of the Nordic third parties in Sri Lanka,it has not prevented them from acting as a channel for communication and dia-logue between the belligerents. Tis can partly be explained by the differencebetween elite versus public opinion on neutrality. Te peace process in Sri Lankahas been elite-driven, and although the common perceptions of partiality haveresulted in a decline in the third parties’ legitimacy, it has not hindered them to

continue as peacemakers. Tus, although storms of protests in the public aroseagainst the Nordic third parties, the leadership of the belligerents continued to




Fifthly, accusations of third-party biasness must be viewed in light of the inter-nal power dynamics and divisions within each of the conflict parties. Both sides

can strategically use the accusation of a third-party bias in order to advance theirown goals. Tis point is important to bear in mind when we explore the debateson the neutrality of the monitors and the facilitators. Tere was an apparentincrease in the polarization between the armed forces and the UNP government,with their views on the Sea igers not being especially coherent (Goodhand andKlem 2005). In this sense, the Nordic third-party effort to some extent fell victimto the power division in Southern Sri Lanka. Also, the SLMM was drawn intothese intra-party political battles, for instance, between the main Sinhalese antag-onists President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe. Likewise, inthe debate on the radio equipment the main controversies stood, on the onehand, between some parts of the Sinhalese side (the President, the nationalist par-ties and media) and, on the other hand, Prime Minister Wickremasinghe and theNorwegian mediators. In fact, the Norwegians decided to transmit the radioequipment upon the request from the government. Te LE did not play anysignificant role in this debate. Hence, the debate on third-party neutrality was notbetween the main antagonists as much as within one of the sides. o some extent,the accusations of bias are part of the game of peacemaking. Mediators can take

the pressure off the parties by taking some of the frustration and blame uponthemselves. Yet, this is a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, silently accept-ing blame may benefit the parties and their ability to continue the process. But,on the other hand, it might undermine the third party’s legitimacy, which mayhave long-term repercussions on its peacemaking activities.

Conclusion

Tird parties who have been invited to help belligerents pursue a negotiationtrack will at some point face accusations of favoring one or the other party. Whyis it so diffi cult to preserve an image of neutrality? We argue, based on an analysisof the Nordic involvement in Sri Lanka, that part of the answer lies in the simplefact that internal armed conflicts are characterized by an asymmetrical relation-ship along a set of dimensions: recognition or legal status, material and politicalcapabilities, and tactics. In responding to crises over asymmetries (which is neces-sary to bring the peace process forward), the third party runs the danger of beingaccused of siding with one party or the other.

What can be done by third parties aspiring to remain neutral in such a contextof asymmetrical conflict? More research is needed on how third parties can upholdtheir image of neutrality Te highly politicized media in Sri Lanka has clearly




instance, while the SLMM and the Norwegian mediators in principle work inde-pendently of each other, the perception of the two is commonly confused.

Te function of neutrality in asymmetrical conflict also needs to be exploredfurther, taking into consideration the strategies applied by the third parties. Aspointed out by Bercovitch and Gartner, there is a “[c]lose relationship betweenwho mediates, what mediators can do, the nature and intensity of a conflict, andthe likely range of outcome” (2006: 333; see also Quinn et al 2006). For instance, Aggestam (2002) suggests that manipulative strategies in asymmetrical settingscan generate counter-productive results. Interesting in this regard would be tostudy the extent to which the international community has used carrots andsticks – for instance, promises and threats of international aid, the banning of theLE as a terrorist-organization, etc. – in the context of asymmetry, and theextent to which this has helped or hindered the process towards peace.

Acknowledgements

Te authors have contributed equally to this article – the order of authors isalphabetical. We would like to thank Ralph Sundberg at the Department ofPeace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, for invaluable research assis-

tance on the Sri Lankan case. An earlier version of this article was presented at theNordic International Studies Association (NISA), Denmark, 23–25 May, 2007. We are also grateful for research grants from Sida/Sarec and the Swedish ResearchCouncil.

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