Surp Final Final

8/14/2019 Surp Final Final

1/21

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH:BUILDING

SOCIAL CAPITAL BY A

WIN - WIN- WIN METHODOLOGY

Prof. Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis

School of Management and Economicsex Director

Technological Educational InstituteKalamata

Abstract: The paper deals with local development, both as a regional and social sciences

field. It has to prove that building social capital at local level mainly depends on social trust

links among local people: Social cohesion based on social capital may be measured by the

diversification Rate (R*) from strict globalization rules: From this point of view, local people

intervention should be useful, so as to diversify these rules at local level adjusting them to

local identity, including communication code, customs, ethics, culture. The Win-win-win

methodology [Papakonstantinidis Model] should facilitate local people to readjust

bargaining globalization rules locally, through a sensitization process: Community is defined

as a discrete spatial/ cultural entity at its sensitization process limit.

Key-words: Methodology, Bargain, Sensitization, Social Confidence, win-win-win model,

Social Trust Links, Community as a Discrete Entity.


2/21

1. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT- METHODOLOGY

The aim of this paper is to prove that, (1) Social Capital as a concept of community

behavior and natural resources management, defined as the capital that refers to

connections within and between social networks (emphasizing the social trust, in this

paper)- something of a cure-all, for the problems of a modern society (Portes, A.,

1998) may be the base of a local development program. (2) Local Development may

be concerned as a unique diversification / declination from the globalization rules

(Papakonstantinidis, 2007) (3) The discrete entitys diversification rate (R*) from

globalization/ or bargaining rules, (Walras S, 1980) may be the crucial parameter

which would define Local Development as a social cohesion result at local level.

(4)Local Development is concerned as the limit-end of a unique and continuous

sensitized development process, applied in a discrete spatial entity

(Papakonstantinidis, 2008/ May), (5) Local Development is achieved via GOOD

CASES rather than good practices, due to the unique identity each region has, as

well as its people with their own communication code, ethics, mentality, customs.

(Katseli Luca 1979), (5) A win-win-win approach may be the appropriate

methodological tool toward introducing sensitization in the development process. It

may strengthen social cohesion process by improving its confidential indicators (so to

trust each-other in interrelations process).

In order to meet with paper requirements it is indispensable that the appropriate

methodology be adopted, step by step : (1) A theoretical foundation is provided by

recent literature (in points), connecting Local Development with Social Capital/

Social Cohesion, as well as with The Bargaining Problem- Games Theory & the

Modern Innovation Theory (M.I.T)[Fischer M. M 2002, Kamitza R 1994, Moseley

M. 2003, Petrella R 2001 ] (2) According to the afore-mentioned theoretical

background, it is necessary to strictly define the Bargaining Problem (as the basis

of Globalization rules) by its math /philosophical validation and try to define the

local development process in terms of diversification (R*) from Globalization

Rules (3) Next step is to create links between the local development process (as a

continuous sensitization process) and the bargain in terms of diversification rate

from G. R, building Social Trust Links- see at Swensen Social Confidence

Indicators, 2006 (4) Finally, the Community is included in the model as the third or
http://www.in.gr/dictionary/lookup.asp?Word=strengthenhttp://www.in.gr/dictionary/lookup.asp?Word=strengthen


3/21

invisible part of each bargain between two persons, based on instant reflection, so

each part wins ( the win-win-win model).

Limitations are resulted, both by the Games Theory and the Modern Innovation

Theory application in social sciences and their synthesis into a social market problem

within the Community.

2. RECENT LITERATURE IN POINTS

From the Local Development side, Kenneth Wilkinson (1991) focuses on the

endogenous local development process / bottom-up approach (bargain, locally) 2nd,

Friedman / Weaver UCLA (1978)in their classic Territory and Function refer :

The base of an autonomous local development may be a discrete value system, an

ideology, local peoples reaction to the dominant local principles (including local

communication code, customs, culture), creating thus the social cohesion

environment at local level.

From the pure Sociological side, J. Coleman (1988) as Social Capital describes the

cooperation processes of individuals, which minimize possible dilemma, coming

from individuals, networks and common actions. Besides, Glen Loury (1977) used

the term social capital to describe a dynamic theory of racial income differences

discrimination (women, minorities, etc). J Coleman adopted Glen Lourys definition,

in developing and popularizing the concept Also, Putnam (2000) describes social

capital as the basis of social schemes creation (i. e networks)

In conclusion, an increasing number of recent literature in the local development field,

currently recognizes the existence of links among local development process, social

trust & capital A number of Local Development approaches toward this theme are

referred below: The Political Entity (Freedman-Weaver, UCLA, 1978, the

Selected Closed-Spatial Discrete Entity of the Intra-Scientific Vienna Centre (Stohr

& Todtling 1980), The S. H. I. E. L. D Model, Papakonstantinidis, 1997, Rome)

The Tre Italy Model, Bagnasco, 1987, The parallel system and The sensitized

Community (Papakonstantinidis, 1998 & 2002), The political Democracy (LSE,

Fotopoulos, 1998), the Grass Roots Model in Latin America (Luis Llambi, 2003)


4/21

Barquero A-Vasquez A (1991) These theoretical approaches pre-existed to the

suggested win-win-win.

3. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM

A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals (Neuman & Morgenstern

1947), who have the opportunity, either to be competitors to each-other (win-lose)

[von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1928/1947-zero sum two players game Theory]

Filinis Kostas (1973), or to make coalitions, or even to create pure individual

strategies, based on bargainers instant reflection behavior (win-win) [Nash J. F,

1950, Arrow K 1954, Aumann Robert, 1987, Crawford V, 1997, Kottarides K, 2002,

Varoufakis Y, 1990). J.F. Nash ( 1950) focused on payoff shares/utilities

combination:

Bargain may result either in agreement or disagreement. (Kuhun H.W-Nassar S,

2001) Papakonstantinidis, 2003, 2005, Varoufakis Y, 1990) Utility expresses the

constraint or the fear factor of disagreement for the negotiator who desires

negotiations to be led in agreement more than the other one. Who needs more,

negotiation leading to an agreement expects more utility, but probably there is a lossin terms of shares, due to lack of risk. On the contrary, who is indifferent about

agreement or expects less utility /per unit, has- to win in shares under the dogma

the more risk, the more profit (Crawford V. 1997).

It is necessary to analyze the Nashnon-cooperative- instant reflection game /or a

win-win perception as follow:

Non-co-operative game, is a game between two (2) players/ individuals who have

opposite interests (Aumann Robert , 1987). Each player makes his own choices, based

on instant reflections rational movements and his physical cleverness.

The game/ bargain is defined by the result (pay-off) and not by players expectations-

It presupposes best choices by both players towards meeting individual interests

[winning strategies-Harsanyi John(1973].


5/21

Players/ or negotiators do not regret, a posteriori, from their own decision taken,

based on personal choices, during the bargain. Each of the players knows a priori that

the other negotiator (or player) is as clever as he is.

During the bargain, a mutual respect between the two bargainers to each others

best choices is necessary.

It is recognized that The more DETERMINED to break down the negotiation (= less

utility), the more satisfied (=better shares) the more risk, the more profit .

Social behavior is not recognized as an acceptable one in the bargain, thus deriving

unfair results: That means, who needs the agreement as the result of a bargain, has

to loose in shares, by accepting any result.

Information may be the link between knowledge creation and the bargaining

process. In particular, Information is a power factor in pure individuals winning

strategies (Aumann Robert, 1987).

The more information, the better winning strategy, the more profit. Each of the

players / negotiators, starting negotiations with the other, expects to gain the

maximum profit.

Interaction, based on instant reflection individual winning strategies, is the base of the

Nash Non Cooperative Games Theory A two (2) 2person anticipation is based on

utilities.

According to Nash Theory, a unique solution exists that maximises the product of the

participants utilities. There is, therefore an interaction between utilities andstrategies In particular, utility expresses individual choices based on individual

necessities Strategies express choices + will in personal level, taking into account

the interaction factor (the others choices) Utility is the subjective and strategy is the

objective factor of the same anticipation.

Negotiation may lead either to agreement or disagreement Utility expresses the

fear factor constraint of disagreement for those who desire the agreement, more

than the other negotiators. (Aumann 1987).


6/21

In conclusion, at any moment according to the N. C. G Theory- there is only one

equilibrium point at which any individualat any moment- makes the best choices

for himself, in relation with the other persons best choices.

3.1 The bargaining problem Utility Theory (math)

Bargaining Problem is mainly based on Utility Theory- a mathematical theory of

the Neo-classical School of Thought, able to satisfactory explain individual

expectations/ anticipations, of a possible outcome. Usually it is expressed in the form

of a mathematical function, f(u) = u1/2

Individual winning strategies are corresponding 1-1 to utilities U (A) and U (B)

(Chun Youngub, 1990). Utility theory of the individual is mainly based on the

concept of anticipation.

In the Two-person utility Theory there are two (2) individuals in a bargain who

have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. In its

simple/initial version, no action, taken by one of the two individuals without the

consent of the other can affect the well-being of the other one, but in real terms there

is only ONE decision, taken by the involved in a bargain individuals.

Utility in the bargain is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared.

(Kuhun-Nassar, 2001)

Utility units express fear units of a disagreement outcome

If A needs more the agreement to be achieved, than the payoff coming

from the bargain, then he should be ready to accept any result of agreement,

even if it is not favorable for him (loss of shares)

If A has decided not to accept an agreement during the bargaining process,

then he risks more but at the same time- has to win more from the agreement,

in terms ofshares.

The utility range expresses the optimist and/or the pessimist instant

reflection of each party.

Utility expresses individual choices based on individual necessities and

will. It is rather a subjective than objective factor, influencing individual

behavior. On the other hand, individual strategies in the bargain the


7/21

objective factor- are defined by personal choices and will, resulting from the

necessity to meet personal needs. From this point of view, Utility , as a

subjective factor is expressed by strategy an individual winning strategy-

in the bargain, so as to meet Utility. There are links between Utility and

Strategy: Utility is the ability to meet needs and Strategy is the plan

the individual plan- to achieve this ability, step by step

Utility is the subjective factor and the Individual Winning Strategy is the

objective factor of the same thing: Bargainers have needs (=utilities). In

order to satisfy these needs, they use individual winning strategies, as the

result of their instant reflections in the Bargain. (table 1)

Lim U1i(&)U2i(&)=max U1iU2i (1)

i

3.2 Nash win-win random sharing/utilities- An example

It expresses utilities/strategies, as the interaction between two negotiators and (2)

expresses the utility function- as a shares/utility combination The bargaining problem

decision making during negotiations of A & B -Nash highlighted the payoffs of the

bargain, # personal expectations(Table 1):

Table 1: BARGAIN

Random Sharing between A and B

Share A

(%)

Share B

(%)

Utility A Utility B Utility AXB

100 0 0 71 090 10 1 70 70

80 20 5 68 340

70 30 10 64 960

60 40 16 60 960

50 50 23 52 1196

4 5 55 40 31 1 240

( max)

30 70 45 24 1080

20 80 50 12 600

10 90 61 4 244

0 100 80 0 0


8/21

3.3 The equilibrium point

Suppose that winning strategies [ Pi, Qi] are in a fine ratio with the players

(bargainers) UTILITY ( linear function: corresponds 1-1 to bargainers Utility

Function), under the dogma the more decisive to break the contract down, the more

satisfied from the bargain leading to the contract (Kuhun-Nassar, 2001). That is true:

Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilities for each of them, coming from

the bargain. (Bernheim & Douglas B. 1984). On the other hand, the more

information, the more uncertainty. Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation.

People are competitive rather, than co-operative: Winning strategies are led by

bargaining rules (rules of pure competition). Nash has described the bargaining

problem not by expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-off) of the bargain.

In our example, the crucial point [the max] is 1240 (40x31) : this is the point of final

agreement led by the bargain. On that point, shares are: 40% for A and 60% for

B. On that point, personal satisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A and 31 units

for B : Thats the point of agreement, expressing fear of breaking down the

agreement for player A and , at the same time, the risk for the player B of

breaking down the agreement. In a 2-person anticipation, each of the two (2)bargainers may ask themselves one question, as the result of good strategies [instant

reflection thinking] in the bargain:

What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other

person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best for

himself thus recognizing that the other person may be as clever as

I am?

4. SUGGESTION: THE WIN-WIN-WIN MODEL

4.1 What the suggested win win- win is

According to the afore-mentioned analysis, paper contribution in the scientific

thought (2008) should be summarized in introducing the third WIN for the

COMMUNITY (the third-part pole).


9/21

According to my suggestion, COMMUNITY the C factormust participate in any

bargain by its bargainers characteristics (shares/utilities), thus adding the THIRD

WINat any two bargainers win-win expectation between TWO (the METRON

analysis or the THREE POLES analysis like in other fields i.e philosophy, economy,

creating an interactional flow By introducing the THIRD POLE in the bargain, then

the crucial bargainers QUESTION must be changed in:

What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other

person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best for

himself thus recognizing that the other person may be as clever as

I am and, at the same time, taking into account that COMMUNITY,

as the third or invisible part also participates by the bargainers

characteristics (shares/utilities)

4.2 Win-win-win analysis methodology

The following methodology is adopted in points (Papakonstantinidis):

knowledge creation creating a non conflict behavior inserting sensitization

integrated information creation uncertainty due to negative entropy thus,

smoothing potential conflictsclosing differences in the competitive bargainpayoff-

utilities & shares, influencing behavior in the bargain /individual winning strategies

influencing by a new behavior in the opposite, the more decisive, the more risk

,should derive more profit in a globalizing world but inserting sensitization in the

bargainthus smoothing the conflict strategies taking into account the C factor

converting a bilateral conflict into a 3-part negotiation leading to a new social

perception , the win-win-win perception, including a real cooperation between

negotiators, thus, carrying alongside a social markets perspective- the

INTERMEDIATE POSITION

4.3 Information/ behavior & the bargaining problem (Knowledge

transfer, information, behavior)


10/21

Paper conception is mainly based on Games Theory especially on its Non-

Cooperative Games Theorys version by J. F Nash, 1950- in relation with the Modern

Innovation Theory - (M. M. Fischer, 2000).

M. I. T provides us with useful methodological tools as knowledge creation and

knowledge transfer (Table 2).

Table 2: Scheme: Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of Behavior

Type of

Knowledge-1

Type of

Knowledge-2

Synthesis Resulted Behavior

tacit tacit Sympathetic Socialization

tacit codified Conceptual Externalization

codified tacit Procedural Internalization

codified codified Systemic Networking

sympathetic systemic Conceptual Sensitization

systemic systemic Procedural Strategic

Papakonstantinidis, 2003

Literature (Reinsmann, Fischer,2002 & others) introduced various processes of

knowledge conversion based on the proven and built information systems

incorporated in an organization. Possible cases among different types of knowledge

produce the four (4) major processes of knowledge conversion : (1) Tacit knowledge

to tacit knowledge produces sympathized knowledge (socialization) (2) Tacit

knowledge to codified knowledge produces conceptual knowledge (externalization)

(3) Codified knowledge to tacit knowledge produces procedural knowledge

(internalization) (4) Codified knowledge to codified knowledge produces systemic

knowledge (combination). Each of these processes of knowledge conversion

corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of information (Papakonstantinidis 2003) i. e :

Social Information-Sensitization

External Information- Participation


11/21

Internal Information-Involvement

Combined Information-Networking

4.4 The suggested win-win-win approach

According to the above analysis, paper contribution in the scientific thought (2007)

should be summarized in introducing the third WIN or the third person in a two-

party bargain, i. e the C invisible part, which should be the Community interest

= C , thus taking part as community be present in every two-party bargain,

claiming its own share from this

Suppose that:

Ua = Pi, Ub = Ri , Uc = Qi , ....in a mathematical approach (tables

1, 2):

Ua = x , Ub = (100-x)k and f = [ x (100-x)k ] = 0 , so that Ua +

Ub = max

THEN

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua + Ub + Uc

i

or, how to transform a competition into the absolute cooperation,

taking into account the integrated information, coming from

knowledge transfer AND the sensitization process in the community,

thus maximizing bargainers utilities and the Community utility (Uc)

4.5 The Sharing problem in a Bargain [Utilities, Shares, strategies,

decision- choices, behaviour, Final Agreement]

Having defined: (1) How information resulting from knowledge creation

/knowledge transfer should contribute to what we call social market (2) How

sensitization should be introduced to given information, as to turn it to an integrated

information (Papakonstantinidis, 2006) (3) How integrated information should

influence human behaviour during the bargain, or negotiations (4) How a human

social behaviour could lead to a new perception of thinking or taking a decision,

in the bargain (see at Calvert Randall, 1995, Berger,J 2005 Cinneide M. O 1991,


12/21

Coleman J 1988, Yitzak Samuel 1997, Bernheim Douglas B. 1984 (5) How

socialization could influence human choices or winning strategies during the bargain,

based on instant reflection (Nash) (6) How scientific thought could transfer the

problem from utilities (personal perception) to pay-offs (objective perception =

counting size)Harsanyi John(1973), then, the data of Table 2 may be transformed in

a new set of data, as Table 3.

TABLE 3: Suggesting Sharing between A , B and C

Share

(%)

Share

(%)

Utility

A

Utility

B

Utility

AXB

Share C

(%)

Utility

C

Utility

AXBXC

90 4 1 71 71 6 1 71

80 13 2 70 140 7 2 280

70 22 5 68 340 8 3 1020

60 31 10 64 640 9 4 2560

50 40 16 60 960 10 5 4800

max

41 50 23 52 1196 9 4 4784

32 60 31 40 1240 8 3 3720

23 70 40 24 960 7 2 1920

14 80 50 12 600 6 1 600

(Papakonstantinidis Proposal)

Notes, as to explain the symbols :

C expresses the Community (an acceptable system value at local level), as

the third or invisible part in the bargain- In real terms, it reflects the

confidence indicators, or, in other words, if and at which level each member

of the Community trusts the other, during the bargain (H. Hans 1997).

The less shares for A+ B the more share for C part.

Utility is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared to each other. They

express the fear of breaking down the agreement.

If A needs more the agreement than the payoff, then he should be ready to

accept any form of agreement.

Based on this concept ( the C factor) then, it is concluded that

Sensitization process applied in local people has succeeded to change/

transform individual winning strategies into a NEW type of social trust

behavior (Swensen, 2006), leading to SOCIAL COHESION, at local level

(Papakonstantinidis, 2006, 2007, 2008).


13/21

TABLE 4: Social Confidence Indicators (%)

Country Indicator (%)

2007

1 Denmark 64.5

2 Norway 63.9

3 Sweden 62.3

4 Finland 56.4

5 Netherland 53.9

6 New Zeeland 52.6

7 Canada 47.0

8 Australia 46.9

9 Indonesia 46.7

10 Iceland 45.3

11 North Ireland 43.9

12 Suisse 42.1

13 USA 42.1

14 Japan 42.0

..46 GREECE 23.7Swensen, 2006)


14/21

This should be the ground for a Flag Theme local people creation (table, below)

TABLE 5: FLAG THEME - Flow Chart

Source: Papakonstantinidis, 2000 & 2007

Flag Theme may be concerned as an innovative idea- an open discussion theme

based on the sensitisation process at local level which concentrates local resources,

skills, abilities, talents, leadership as well as priorities and properties at local level

(Gannon Agnes, 1990, Wilkinson Kenneth, 1991).

5. CONCLUSIONS/ PROPOSALS

1. Social Cohesion necessary for the L-D process, thus building local people

identity AND development (through the appropriate for the place- flag

theme - may be , at the same time, the cause and the result of building the

Social Capital at Local Level

2. Building the Social Capital at Local Level, may be proved to be equivalent to

Social Confidence, or Social Trust among local people (Llambi Louis

2008,Lados M,& Lachewski Lutz (2003)

3. At the same time, Community [ the C factor ] participates as the

THIRD or invisible part in any two-person negotiations

LocalAbilitie

Leadership Properties

Priorities

Flag Theme

Active

ParticipationRoles in

planning/

Creating a

teampsychology

Jointing theendogenous

forces on acommonoal

Converging individual strategies on a commongoal, through cooperation


15/21

4. By introducing the C factor in any 2-person negotiation, then what should

be result, could improve individual strategies and /or behavior in the bargain,

from a pure conflict to round the corners of this conflict, then transforming

competitors to instant alliances (including the Community profit) : This is

the papers contribution)

5. Local Development is mainly based on this new perception

6. Based on this perception (round the conflict corners-the Community within)

its easy for local people to find a FLAG THEM (2007- S Africa) for their

L-D process: see at Flow Chart That is the win-win-win Methodology/

Papakonstantinidis Model)

7. According to win-win-win methodology, L-D process, in terms of

diversification rate, from Globalizations Rules may be justified, creating the

Community as a discrete spatial Entity

8. Technological changes and human / social relations move in the opposite

direction-vice versa.

9. Introducing a three-poles dealing system may improve the bargaining

perception thus influencing social behavior, introducing a new bargaining

perception/ethic

10. A new bargaining perception including the Community profit as the

third or invisible parameter in a bargain between TWO persons-players

may change some Globalization negative conditions, providing them with

rules/ social rules through social behavior changing.

11. Reforming a bilateral contradiction in a 3-part bargain between two players

(including the Community C as the invisible part between TWO, in fact

may reverse the base of human negotiation : From competition to co-

operation Reforming the competition to step towards social cohesion ,

the objective perception of the world may be changed into a more

ideological: From material to a thinking world (Kamitza R 1994) The C

partner my be proved to be the key-factor, against war feelings thus

introducing the Greek philosophys METRON

12. Each of the THREE parts (A, B, & C) in any bargain, may ask itself THREE

questions, thus maximizing its own profit (economic, social, cultural,

environmental etc) :


16/21

What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person (bargainer

in a negotiation) should try for the best for himself thus recognizing that the other

person as clever as I, AND taking into account [at the same time] that

Community as the third or invisible part of negotiations between TWO, also

participates and also tries under the same conditions [ Community as clever as the

two bargainers] so bargainers AND the Community to be winners? - 3win Model.

REFERENCES

Arrow Kenneth Debrew Gerard (1954) Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive

EconomyEconometrica, v. 22 (3) p.p 221-231.

Arnstein G. (1991) Public Participation, The Edge Publishing, N.Y.Aumann Robert (1987) Game Theory in Eatwell John, Murrey Milgate & P.Newman

Editions The New Pugrave Dictionart of Economics, v 2 London, Mc Millan

Press, pp 460-482.

Bagnasco A (1977) Tre Italy: La Problematica Territoriable dello Svillupo Italiano- II

Mulino Ed, Bologna.

Barquero A-Vasquez A (1991) Sectoral Diversification in Rural Areas: Problems and

Potentials- UCG / International Centre for Development Studies, special issue.

Berger,John (2005) Points on Political Orientation - Le Monde Diplomatique- 18.11.2005.Bernheim Douglas B. 1984 Rationalizable Strategic Behavior Econometrica, v 52, pp

1007-1028.

Calvert Randall (1995)The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions NY Cabridge Univ

Press.

Cinneide M. O (1991) Points on what Rural Areas are Center for Development Studies

Press, University College Galway (U.C.G) IRL.

Chun Youngub etc Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points Econometrica, v 58,

1990 pp 951-959.

Coleman J (1988) Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital American Journal of

Sociology 94 Supplement 95-S120 Chicago University.

Crawford Vincent etc 1997: Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction

Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University Press.

Filinis Kostas (1973) Games Theory, KEIMENA Ed, 1972 Athens, Greece.

Fischer M.M (2002) Learning in neural spatial intervention models: A statistical

perspectiveJournal of Geographical Systems, issue 4 (3) p.p 30-38.

Friedmann J and Weaver C (1979) Territory and Function U.C.L.A Press (U.S).


17/21

Fotopoulos, (1998), The Political Democracy LSE Edition.

Gannon Agnes (1990) Rural Development-Strategic Objectives F.A.O Ed, Vienna,

Grossman Gene etc 4/ 1985 Strategies Trade Policy: a Survey of Issues and Early Analysis

Special Papers inInternational Economics.

Harms Hans (1997)Citizen Participation- A Response to the Crisis of the Representative

Democracy International Sociological Association (I.S.A) special issue, Toronto

Canada.

Harsanyi John(1973) Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs International Journal of

Games Theory, v 2 -1973 pp 1-23.

Kamitza R (1994) Structural Adjustment without a Human Face Southern Africa: Political

and Economic Monthly 7 (6): p.p 11-12.

Katseli Luca (1979) Motivating the Indigenous Human Force Greek Ministry of National

Economy annual report.

Kerepeszki Istvn (2003): Capacity Building by Non-financial support of SMEs. Hungarian

Academy of Sciences, Regional Studies Department special issue.

Kottarides K-Siriounis G (2002) John Nash: Games Theory EVRASIA Ed , 2002

Kuhn H.W and Nasar S. (2001)The essential John Nash Princeton University Press, pp.

31, 43, 56, 85-89, 99-103.

Lachewski Lutz (2003) Micro businesses Networks and Rural Development Agencies: a

Paradoxical Relationship special issue, The Hungarian Academy of Sciences,

Department of Regional Studies, Nov.

Lados M (2003) Report on SMEs local capacities building special issue-Nov 2003,

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Department of Regional Studies.- head of the

Department.

Llambi Louis (2008) Grass Roots Model in Latin America (trnsl) part of the Book Social

Cohesion and Society Development The Aegean University/ Dept of Sociology 1st

edition.

Loury Glen (1977) A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences Chapter 8 Women,Minorities and Employment Discrimination Ed P. A Wallance and A. Le Mund.

Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.

Meyer T (2000) presentation on future economy perspectives, to Ministers and multi-

national managers / G8 (group eight) Davos (trnsl), Monde Diplomatique, 2000

Moseley M. (2003) Towards a Knowledge Society in an Enlarged European Union, p.4

special issue, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Nash John Forbs (1951) Non Co-operative Game/Princeton University Ed, Princeton.

Neuman (von) & Morgenstern (1947) Game Theory and Economic Behavior The

Princeton University Press U. S.


18/21

Osirim Mary J (2003) Carrying the Burdens of Adjustment and Globalization International

Sociology, volume 18, number 3, Sept.2003.

Papakonstantinidis L.A , (1996) The Strategy of Development, MAREL-NIKAS Ed, Vol II,

trnsl. Athens Gr.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (1997) The S.H.I.E.L.D Model, International Sociological

Association (I.S.A) Special Issue (R.C 26) Toronto Canada, AND Channel View

Publications, Bristol, U.K (2003)

Papakonstantinidis, 2000) The Strategy of Local Development (Vo II, pp 6-7, 26-29, 30, 44-

49, 66).

Papakonstantinidis L. A (2002) The Sensitized Community Typothito Edition, Ath trnsl

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003The Strategy of Economic and Regional Development

Typothito .

Papakonstantinidis L. A (2003, Nov) Building the Social Capital and Local Capacities in

Rural Areas special issue of Hungarian Academy of Sciences- Department of

Regional Studies, Nov, 2003.

Papakonstantinidis L. A (2004) Sensitization and Involvement the Community: A Rural

Tourism Application of the win-win-win Model Review of Economic Sciences-

TEIEP, issue 6.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) Knowledge Creation and the win-win-win model Scientific

Review of Applied Economics TEIPI Ed, Jan 2004.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Jan) Rural Tourism: win-win-win Journal of Hospitality and

Tourism , issue 2 , India.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Febr) Digital Economy and Hyper-cube space Journal of

Applied Economics and Management, issue 1, India.

Papakonstantinidis-LagosIntegrated Total Quality Management and Sustainable

Development [Lagos D, Papakonstantinidis L.A] Journal of Hospitality and Tourism

Volume 1, issue 1, /2003 pp 64-82, ISSN 0972-7787 www .johat .com .

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003) Digital Economy and Hyper-cube: New Applied Economicsin Managing a Local Government Organization : A Proposal Journal of Applied

Economics and Management, Volume 1, issue 1,/ 2003, pp 17-34, ISSN 0972- 8937,

JAEM- INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, Bundelkhand University,

Jansi.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004)Sensitization as a form of knowledge creation and the Win-

Win-Win Model Scientific Review of Applied Research, Vol VIII, No 2 /2003, pp

89-108, ISSN 1106-4110.
http://www.johat.com/http://www.johat.com/


19/21

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) Rural Tourism: Win-Win-Win-case study Women

Cooperative Gargaliani, Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Volume 1, issue 2, /

2003 pp 49-70, ISSN 0972-7787 www.johat.com

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) Sensitization and Involving the Community. A Rural

Development Application of the Win-Win-Win Model Review of Economic

Research 6/2004 pp 177-192

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) Operations Management by a hyper-cube & win-win-win

perspective: A Local Development Approach Journal of Applied Economics and

Management, Volume 2, issue 2,/ 2004, pp 111-130, ISSN 0972- 8937, JAEM-

Institute of Economic and Finance Bundelkhand University, Jansi.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005)Win-Win-Win Model and Sensitization Process-Journal of

Space and Community- Hungarian Academy of Sciences/Regional Studies Dept.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2002) The win-win-win model Developing Sustainable Rural

Tourism Thematic guide- chap 7.9 Euracademy Guide, Gotland-Sweden,

www.euracademy.org.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003) Building the Social Capital and Local Capacities in Rural

Areas- The Animation Process2003 [ Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for

Regional Studies] Gyor-Hungary Euracademy Guide p 1.

Papakonstantinidis L.A 2004) Sensitization & the win-win-win model: An answer to

Globalizations Impact on Local Communities and Common Perceptions of the

World Tendencies- Case Study: Community Redefinition- Tychero Evros- ISA e-Ed.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) New trends in Regional Policy: Territory-Space Definition by

a 3-level Bargaining Approach- The Win-Win-Win Model. Case Study: The

LEADER EU Initiative Application in Greece Regional and Rural Development

Interface Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of Economics Cluj-Napoca Romania, -

European Program Reabalk European Project.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) Le migration economique polonaise dans quelque lieux du

Peloponnese I.S.A. Ed.Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) Networking SMEs: A win-win-win approach ISA Ed special

issue Networks and Partnerships for 'Learning Regions' in everyday practice.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) Bargaining win-win-win Model and the Hypercube (the

MARTIX concept) Dimension Journal of Applied Economic & Management vol

1 issue 1, JENSEN, India.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2007) Bargaining Problem and Local Development Gutenberg,

(trnsl GREEK) Athens, 2007.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2007) Clustering & Networking SMEs in Rural Areas & win-win-

win Model ISA World Congresss minutes, Durban South Africa (July, 2006).
http://www.johat.com/http://www.euracademy.org/http://www.johat.com/http://www.euracademy.org/


20/21

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) Win-Win-Win Methodology on Rural Tourism Activities /

Good Practices from Greece The Asian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism

(AJHT) v1/iss 1 Santo Tomas University Manila Philippines , pp 95-120.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) "Forecasting the tourist impact based on GINI Index: Flexible

development policies" Journal ITTM / India (Vol.1 No.2) pages 48-57.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) Bargaining as the basic Globalization Ideology Review of

Social Sciences Dec 2008- draft (approved).

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008-Sept) Building Social Capital for Local Development : The

Economy of Poor and the win-win-win Model International Sociological

Association/ First ISA Forum of Sociology Sociological Research and Public

Debate- Barcelona Spain September 5-8 2008, Official e-minutes (2008S00879).

Petrella Ricardo (2001) Globalization impact on space-time (trnsl) Local Government

Journal (tetradia topikis autodioikissis), Athens, Greece, Nov 2001.

Portes A (1998) Social Capital : its origins and application in a modern sociology Annual

Review of Sociology v. 24 p. p 1-24.

Putnam R (2000) Bowling Alone the Collapse and Revival of American Community- New

York Simon and Schuster, based Development The case of Mining Areas in Orissa

India Draft paper Social capital Initiative South Asia Infrastructure Unit.

Ramonet Ignacio Mondalisation et les perspecives sociale dans leconomie glolale trnsl-

Monde Diplomatique, Aug, 2000

Schor Juliet (2000) The Over-worked American Le Monde Diplomatique

Stochr W and Todtling F (1979) Spatial Equality : some antithesis to current regional

development doctrine H. Folms Ed.

Swensen T (Danmark-2008) Confidence Indicators (trnsl in Greek).

Torreta Gullietta (1997) Sociological Aspects in the Human Resources Management inside

the Public Administration I (I.S.A) R.C 26 , special issue, Toronto Canada

van Damme Eric, Stability and Perfection on Nash Equilibria, New York and Berlin:

Springer-Verlag, 1987, second edition, 1991.Varoufakis Yanis, Young, Conflict in Economics, Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf and New

York: St Martin's Press, 1990.

Varoufakis Yanis,(1991) Rational Conflict, Oxford: Blackwell.

von Neumann John, Morgenstern Oscar, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour,

Princeton University Press, 1944 (second edition, 1947. third edition, 1953).

Wilkinson Kenneth(1991) Social Stabilisation: The Role of Rural Society- International

Center for Development Studies U.C.G IRL, special issue,1991.

Walras S.(1980) Global Rules for a Global Economy N.Y Ed.


21/21

Yitzak Samuel (1997) The Changing Realm of Organisations: New Challenges for

Sociological Practice International Sociological Association (I.S.A R.C 26),

special issue, Toronto Canada.

Surp Final Final

Documents

Transcript of Surp Final Final