No. 2015-01

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States _______________

TOMAS HAVERFORD,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF EAGLETON, Respondent.

_______________

On writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit

_______________

BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER

_______________

TEAM NUMBER 3

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the District Court err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence of

methamphetamine and supplies commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine:

a. Whether Deputy Sanderson had reasonable suspicion to extend a lawful traffic

stop about a burnt-out headlight to investigate whether Petitioner was under the

influence of drugs in the operation of his vehicle by having Petitioner perform

field sobriety tests?

b. Was Petitioner constructively seized without reasonable suspicion when the

deputy re-approached Petitioner’s vehicle to request consent to search?

c. If the traffic stop was not lawfully extended to investigate drug use by Petitioner,

was Petitioner’s subsequent consent to search his truck tainted by prior illegality,

so that the evidence seized was inadmissible?

2. Did the District Court err when it refused to allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea:

a. Was Attorney Brendanawicz's assertion that Petitioner's conviction carried a risk

of deportation constitutionally deficient?

b. Was Petitioner prejudiced because of Attorney Brendanawicz's performance?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES ............................................................. iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 6 ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 7

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. . 7 A. Deputy Sanderson Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Extend The Traffic Stop. ........................................................................................................................................ 7 B. Petitioner Was Constructively Seized Without Reasonable Suspicion When The Deputy Re-approached Petitioner’s Vehicle To Request Consent To Search. .............. 10 C. Petitioner’s Subsequent Consent To Search Was Tainted By Prior Illegality, So That The Evidence Seized Was Inadmissible. .................................................................. 13

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW MR. HAVERFORD TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. .................................................... 17

A. The Eagleton Supreme Court Erred When It Held That Brendanawicz Did Not Perform Deficiently. ............................................................................................................ 18 B. The Eagleton Supreme Court Erred When It Held That Mr. Haverford Suffered No Prejudice as A Result of the Performance of His Attorney. ...................................... 21

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 25

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) ............................................................................. 14, 15, 16 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) ........................................................................ 10, 11 Comm. v. Escobar, 70 A.3d 838 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) ................................................................ 20 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ....................................................................................... 10 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) ...................................................................................... 17, 21 Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) ................................................................................... 19 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) ................................................................................... 14 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) ....................................................................................... 8 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) .............................................................................................. 23 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ....................................................................................... 17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .............................................................................. 7, 10 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) ............................................................................. 19 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) ...................................................................................... 22 McGaughey v. State, 37 P.3d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) ........................................................ 15 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) .............................................................................. 18 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) ......................................................................... 17, 21, 22 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009) .................................................................................. 17 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) ....................................................................................... 13 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) ............................................................................... 7 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) ............................................................................. passim Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) ................................................................................... 14 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015) ........................................................................ 8 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ................................................................... 10, 16 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) .................................................. 13 State v. Hogan, 868 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 2015) .............................................................................. 12 State v. Shata, 868 N.W.2d 93 (Wis. 2015) .................................................................................. 22 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................... 17, 18, 21 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .................................................................................... 8, 9, 11, 16 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1981) .................................................................... 7 United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982) ............................................................... 8 United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1994) ............................................................... 8 United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) .......................................................................... 14 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) ............................................................................ 12 United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996) ............................................................... 15 United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 725 (5th Cir. 2014) .......................................................... 22, 24 United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2011) ................................................................ 14 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) ...................................................................... 11 United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 1994) ....................................................................... 8 United States v. Reves, 774 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 7 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2002) ...................................................................................... 19 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ................................................................... 13, 14

iv

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI (B) Controlled substances.

(i) Conviction. Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.

8 USC § 1227(A)(2)(b)(i)

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Tomas Haverford is a 31-year-old resident of the state of Eagleton. Sup. Ct. Order, 2. He

immigrated to the United States from Venezuela in 2003 and has been a lawful permanent

resident since his arrival. Id.

On May 20, 2013, at around 6:00 in the evening, Deputy David Sanderson pulled Mr.

Haverford over for a burnt out headlight. Trial Trans., 2:19−3:4. Sanderson did not initiate the

stop because of erratic driving or any other indication of impaired driving. Id. at 5:20−23. When

Sanderson first made contact with Mr. Haverford, he asked if he could go home because he was

driving to a parking lot adjacent to where he had been stopped, but Sanderson denied his request.

Traffic Stop Trans., 1:3−7.

Sanderson noticed that Mr. Haverford appeared nervous and was shaking, as well as that

his pupils appeared to be restricted. Trial Trans., 3:5−9. Sanderson knew that restricted pupils

could be an indicator of drug use. Id. at 3:20−21. However, Sanderson’s suspicions were based

on his own experience rather than his training, and he is not a drug recognition expert. Id. at

3:12−19, 7:1−2. During the stop, Sanderson did not observe or smell any odor of intoxicants or

drugs, did not observe any open intoxicants inside the vehicle, and did not observe any drugs or

drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. Id. at 6:3−9. Mr. Haverford was not slurring his speech and did

not have any trouble with his balance. Id. at 10−13.

Sanderson issued Mr. Haverford a traffic citation and explained it to him. Id. at 4:3−4.

Mr. Haverford asked if he was now free to go home, but Sanderson kept him at the scene to

perform field sobriety tests. Traffic Stop Trans., 2:22−25, 33−35. Sanderson told Mr. Haverford

the reasons for conducting the tests were Mr. Haverford’s nervous behavior and restricted pupils.

2

Traffic Stop Trans., 2:24−25. Sanderson made clear that Mr. Haverford’s behavior was an

indicator of possible drug use. Id. Mr. Haverford told Sanderson that he did not use drugs, but he

was taking prescription Adderall. Id. at 2:26−28. Sanderson stated that he had encountered

individuals taking Adderall before, and they were not as nervous as Mr. Haverford. Traffic Stop

Trans., 2:29−30.

Mr. Haverford expressed frustration that Sanderson was keeping him at the scene when

he wanted to go to bed, but agreed to the field sobriety tests. Id. at 2:31−35. Sanderson had Mr.

Haverford perform four tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the one-leg-stand, the walk and

turn, and the finger-to-nose test. Id. at 3:40−4:66. Sanderson concluded that Mr. Haverford was

not impaired and told him, “Alright you’re okay to go. I’ll let you get on your way then.” Trial

Trans., 4:8−10; Traffic Stop Trans., 4:66.

Mr. Haverford got back into his vehicle and closed the door, but did not start the car and

leave. Sup. Ct. Order, 3. When Sanderson got back to his patrol car, he wondered if Mr.

Haverford would consent to a search of the vehicle and he re-approached to ask if they could

speak again. Trial Trans., 4:9−12. Twelve seconds had passed since Sanderson had told Mr.

Haverford he was free to go. Id. Mr. Haverford exited his vehicle and Sanderson asked for

permission to search the car, which Mr. Haverford gave. Id. at 4:15−17.

During the search of the car, Sanderson found a glass bottle with a small amount of liquid

substance, a mason jar with a clear liquid in it and a rubber glove on top of it, rubber gloves,

coffee filters, and fuel for a heating canister. Id. at 4:19−21. Sanderson also found medication

bottles with Mr. Haverford’s name on them, one of which contained a plastic bag with a sandy

substance in it, muriatic acid, syringes, and glass drinking glasses. Id. at 4:21−22, 5:1−2.

3

Sanderson placed Mr. Haverford under arrest for possession with intent to manufacture

methamphetamine. Traffic Stop Trans., 4:77−79. The sandy substance was later tested and

yielded a positive result for methamphetamine. Trial Trans., 5:6−7. On May 30, 2013, Mr.

Haverford was charged with a violation of the Eagleton Controlled Substances Act, Eg. Stat. §

841(a)(1). Sup. Ct. Order, 3. On June 19, 2013, Mr. Haverford’s attorney filed a motion in

Pawnee County Court to suppress the evidence found during the search. Id. The trial court

denied the motion. Id.

On August 21, 2013, Mr. Haverford appeared for a plea hearing represented by his

attorney, Mark Brendanawicz. Plea Hearing Trans., 1. Brendanawicz initially requested an

adjournment because he had not yet determined the immigration consequences of Mr.

Haverford’s plea. Id. at 2:11−15. After a brief recess, Brendanawicz indicated to the court that

Mr. Haverford would plead guilty, however he admitted that Mr. Haverford was still concerned

with deportation. Id. at 2:7−9. When asked by the court whether he informed his client of the

possibility of his deportation, Brendanawicz said, “Yes, I told him that deportation is a strong

possibility.” Id. at 2:12. The court addressed Mr. Haverford directly and asked him if he

understood that he may be deported as a result of his plea, and Mr. Haverford reiterated his

worry, but told the court that he understood. Id. at 2:18.

The State recommended a ten year prison sentence, despite Mr. Haverford’s lack of a

criminal history and his cooperation and remorse. Id. at 2:20−3:2. Brendanawicz tried to

convince the court to sentence Mr. Haverford to a five year prison sentence, but stay the

imprisonment, place him on probation and expunge his record after he has completed his

sentence. Id. at 3:4−9. Brendanawicz appeared to believe that this would allow Mr. Haverford

4

to avoid deportation. Id. at 3:9. The court followed the State’s recommendation and sentenced

Mr. Haverford to ten years in prison for violating the Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 3:10−13.

On September 23, 2013, Mr. Haverford received a notice to appear from the U.S.

Department of Justice alerting him to the fact that he was now deportable as a result of his guilty

plea. U.S. Dept. of Justice Notice, Sept. 23, 2013. Mr. Haverford then filed a motion under

Eagleton R. Crim. Pro. 11 requesting to withdraw his guilty plea due to the deficient

performance of Brendanawicz and a motion hearing was held on October 16, 2013. Post-

Conviction Motion Trans. 1−2:9. During the hearing, Brendanawicz admitted that he never told

Mr. Haverford that his deportation would be mandatory if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 2:14−16. He

also admitted that he failed to even research the relevant immigration statute. Id. at 2:17−19.

The only effort he made to determine the immigration outcome of Mr. Haverford’s plea was to

call a few federal prosecutors, and none of them gave him a definitive answer. Id. at 2:21−3:2.

Brendanawicz ultimately recommended the plea agreement because he did not believe Mr.

Haverford could succeed at trial. Id. at 3:7−8. Brendanawicz claimed that before Mr. Haverford

pleaded guilty, he informed him that he had a “strong change of being deported.” Id. at 3:10.

Mr. Haverford testified that Brendanawicz never told him that his deportation would be

automatic, and he never would have pleaded guilty if he knew deportation was automatic. Id. at

3:19−4:5. Mr. Haverford stated that Brendanawicz was trying to get him probation because “they

would only deport [him] if [he] went to jail.” Id. at 4:1−2. Finally, Mr. Haverford explained that

staying in this was country incredibly important to him because Venezuela is dangerous, he no

longer has any family there, and his life and work are here, in the United States. Id. at 4:5−9. If

he is sent home, Mr. Haverford believes that he will have nothing. Id.

5

The District Court ultimately ruled that while Brendanawicz failed to perform as an

effective counsel, Mr. Haverford suffered no prejudice as a result of Brendanawicz’s failure, and

the court refused to allow Mr. Haverford to withdraw his guilty plea. Order on Mtn. to

Withdraw, 7. Mr. Haverford appealed both this order and the order denying the suppression of

the evidence seized during the traffic stop to the Eagleton Supreme Court. Eagleton v.

Haverford, 13-cr-100, *1. The Eagleton Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motion to

suppress and the denial of the Rule 11 motion. Id. at *13.

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1. The District Court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from

the search of Tomas Haverford’s vehicle. Deputy Sanderson did not have reasonable suspicion to

extend a traffic stop for a burnt out headlight to conduct field sobriety tests. The factors weighing

against impairment overshadowed the factors Sanderson believed to indicate drug use, and there

was no reason to continue to detain Mr. Haverford after issuing the traffic citation. Mr.

Haverford’s subsequent consent was tainted by the illegality of the unlawful extension. The

consent was given only twelve seconds after the end of the traffic stop, there were no significant

intervening circumstances between the traffic stop and the consent, and Sanderson asked for

consent knowing it was his only way to get inside Haverford’s vehicle. Further, Mr. Haverford

was constructively seized when Sanderson re-approached his vehicle to request consent. A

reasonable person in Mr. Haverford’s position would not have felt free to disregard the officer

and go on their way.

2. The District Court erred in denying Mr. Haverford’s Rule 11 motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. Mr. Haverford’s right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated

because Brendanawicz failed to research or even read the statute in question, which was clear

and unambiguous. As a result of Brendanawicz’s failure, Mr. Haverford did not realize that his

deportation was mandatory if he pleaded guilty. Mr. Haverford was also severely prejudiced by

Brendanawicz’s failure because he lost the opportunity to either receive a different plea

agreement that took into account his strong desire to stay in the United States, or to proceed to

trial.

7

ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. The Fourth Amendment guarantees every citizen the right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “No right is more sacred, or is more carefully

guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of

his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and

unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1981).

“[T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy⎯his right to be let alone by other

people⎯is, like the protection of his property and of his very life . . . .” Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347, 350−51 (1967).

This Court reviews questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make

warrantless searches de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996). This Court

reviews a trial court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. See Eagleton R. Civ. P.

52 (a) (6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside

unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s

opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). In reviewing the trial court’s denial of an

Eagleton R. Crim. Pro. 11 motion, this Court reviews the trial court’s conclusions de novo.

United States v. Reves, 774 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014).

A. Deputy Sanderson Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion to Extend the Traffic Stop.

Deputy Sanderson did not have reasonable suspicion that a crime other than the traffic

violation had taken place, and thus illegally extended the traffic stop when he conducted field

sobriety tests.

8

A traffic stop by its nature is limited in scope and duration, and is more analogous to a

Terry stop than a formal arrest. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).

However, a routine traffic stop is unlawful if it extends past the de minimis intrusion of the

original stop. Id. at 1613−14. The officer must not extend the stop beyond the time reasonably

required for the issuance of the traffic ticket. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).

An officer may always stop a vehicle when he reasonably believes the driver is violating

a traffic law. United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994). After a stop is made,

the officer may only expand the scope of inquiry to investigate additional suspicious factors that

come to his attention. United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1994). The officer’s

questions must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for the stop. United States v.

Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982). When an officer expands the scope of inquiry

beyond the time that would have been required by the original stop, he must have separate,

individualized suspicion apart from that for the original stop. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614−15.

Deputy Sanderson did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. The focus

of an investigatory stop is reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20−21 (1968). The

reasonableness of a stop must be assessed under the totality of the circumstances. Id. An officer

must have facts in front of him that, taken together, give him reasonable and articulable

suspicion to conduct the stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21−22. Deputy Sanderson must have been able

to articulate the presence of factors which amounted to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Haverford

committed a crime, and that field sobriety tests would further the investigation of that crime. Id.

There was no evidence or articulable suspicion that Mr. Haverford was operating his

vehicle while intoxicated. Sanderson rests the validity of the extension on the fact that Mr.

Haverford appeared to have restricted pupils and that he was shaking and appeared nervous.

9

Traffic Stop Trans., 2:22−35. These are common occurrences and do not, taken together or

separately, constitute reasonable suspicion for extending the traffic stop. Sanderson noted that

Mr. Haverford’s pupils were restricted approximately one to two millimeters smaller than the

average pupil, which he took to be an indicator of drug use. Trial Trans., 3:5−7, 14−21.

However, Sanderson is not a drug recognition expert and his basis in concluding that Mr.

Haverford’s pupils indicated drug use was based on experience rather than any formal police

training. Id. at 3:17−19, 7:1−2. Sanderson knew that pupil size could be an indicator of drug use,

but did not know how methamphetamine affected a human pupil. Id. at 7:3−6. Sanderson’s lack

of articulable facts as to how Mr. Haverford’s pupil size supported his conducting field sobriety

tests does not amount to reasonable suspicion.

Sanderson further noted that Mr. Haverford was shaking and appeared nervous. Id. at

3:5−11. Although shaking and nervousness may be indicators of drug use, these behaviors also

have innocent explanations. Members of the public are regularly nervous during interactions

with police officers, even during routine traffic stops. It would be illogical and impractical for

police officers to conduct field sobriety tests on every person who shakes or is nervous during a

traffic stop. Further, Mr. Haverford stated that he was taking Adderall, which provided further

explanation for his pupils and behavior. Traffic Stop Trans., 2:24−28. Although a series of acts,

each of them innocent on its own, taken together can support reasonable suspicion, Terry, 392

U.S. at 22, this is not the case here. Sanderson’s observations of easily explainable behavior did

not provide him with reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.

The remaining circumstances surrounding the stop compel this conclusion as well. Mr.

Haverford was not pulled over for erratic driving or any other indicator of impaired operation, he

was stopped for a burnt out headlight. Trial Trans., 5:17−23. Mr. Haverford pulled over

10

immediately after Sanderson activated his emergency lights. Id. at 6:1−2. Sanderson did not

observe or smell any odor of alcohol or drugs. Trial Trans., 6:3−5. Nor did he observe any open

intoxicants or drug paraphernalia in the vehicle before the search. Id. at 6:6−9. Mr. Haverford did

not exhibit slurred speech or have any trouble with his balance. Id. at 6:10−13. These

circumstances, even when taken with Sanderson’s observations that Mr. Haverford’s pupils were

restricted and he was shaking, do not under the totality of the circumstances support an inference

that Mr. Haverford was operating his vehicle while intoxicated. Thus, Sanderson did not have

reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.

B. Petitioner Was Constructively Seized Without Reasonable Suspicion When The Deputy Re-approached Petitioner’s Vehicle To Request Consent To Search.

Mr. Haverford was constructively seized when he gave Deputy Sanderson consent to

search his vehicle. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

unless they fall within one of several specific and well-delineated exceptions. Katz, 389 U.S. at

357. One of the exceptions to the requirements of a warrant and probable cause is validly

obtained consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Consent must be freely

given without coercion or submission to express or implied assertion of authority. Id. at 221. The

issue of consent is determined under a totality of the circumstances analysis. Id. This Court has

recognized the constitutional legitimacy of consent searches, but they are still subject to careful

scrutiny to determine if the consent was in fact coerced. Id. at 229. Mr. Haverford’s consent to

the search does not survive this strict scrutiny.

A seizure does not occur solely because an officer approaches an individual and asks

them questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). As long as a reasonable person

would feel free to “disregard the police and go about his business,” no seizure has occurred.

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). Generally, a seizure occurs when an officer

11

restrains the liberty of an individual by means of physical force or show of authority. Terry, 392

U.S. at 19 n. 16. A person has been seized when, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, a

reasonable person in that situation would have believed that he was not free to leave. United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Factors that tend to indicate seizure include the

threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical

touching of the person of the citizen, and the use of language or tone of voice indicating that

compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. Id.

The District Court found that because Sanderson and Mr. Haverford exchanged parting

words and Sanderson allowed twelve seconds to pass before re-approaching the vehicle, that the

traffic stop had concluded and Mr. Haverford was no longer seized. Sup. Ct. Order, 8. These

factors are not dispositive. This Court must examine the traffic stop in its entirety in order to

determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Mr.

Haverford’s position would have felt free to leave. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 554. The necessary

answer is a reasonable person would not.

A seizure occurs when a suspect yields to an officer’s lawful show of authority. See

Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 (holding a seizure had not occurred when the suspect did not yield).

Thus, there is no question that when Mr. Haverford pulled to the side of the road when

Sanderson activated his emergency lights, he was seized. During the course of the traffic stop,

Mr. Haverford was visibly uncomfortable. Traffic Stop Trans., 1:8−11. He stated that

Sanderson’s presence was upsetting him and twice asked if he could go home. Id. at 1:6−7,

2:23−24, 29−32. When he was first pulled over, Mr. Haverford asked if he could pull into the

parking lot where he lived because he was just trying to go to bed. Id. at 1:6−7. Sanderson denied

the request, which was reasonable, as the traffic stop was still occurring. Id. Then, after

12

Sanderson had printed the ticket, explained it to Mr. Haverford and handed it to him, Mr.

Haverford again asked if he could go home. Traffic Stop Trans., at 2:18−25. This time, although

the purpose of the traffic stop had concluded, Sanderson told Mr. Haverford that he was still not

free to go. Id. 2:18−25. He then began to conduct field sobriety tests. Id. at 2:33−35. When Mr.

Haverford tried to explain that he was taking Adderall, Sanderson expressed that he did not

believe that was the only thing he had taken and continued with the sobriety tests. Id. at 2:26−35.

“The reasonable person ‘free to leave’ standard bears little relationship to what

individuals actually believe.” State v. Hogan, 868 N.W.2d 124, 140 (Wis. 2015) (Walsh Bradley,

J., dissenting). An average individual would not rationally believe that he has nothing to lose if

he refuses to cooperate with the police or that he has the choice to ignore the police altogether.

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 212 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). Sanderson’s

behaviors created an atmosphere in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. The

purpose of the traffic stop was completed when Sanderson gave Mr. Haverford the ticket for his

headlight. Traffic Stop Trans., 2:18−20. A reasonable person would believe that once they

received the citation for the purpose of the stop, they would be free to go. But when Mr.

Haverford asked if he could go home, Sanderson refused. Id. at 2:23−35. It would be clear to a

reasonable person in Mr. Haverford’s situation that he was still not free to leave when he

otherwise would have been.

After the sobriety tests had been concluded, Sanderson told Mr. Haverford he could

leave, only to ask for consent to search the vehicle twelve seconds later. Id. at 4:66−74. Given

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop, a reasonable person in Mr.

Haverford’s position would not have believed that those twelve seconds separated the traffic stop

and an entirely new encounter for the purpose of requesting consent. Sanderson had already

13

denied Mr. Haverford’s request to leave when he ordinarily would have been free to go, and had

made it clear that he suspected Mr. Haverford of being intoxicated. Traffic Stop Trans., at

2:23−25. Mr. Haverford was upset because Sanderson “would not leave him alone” and he

wanted to go home after he received his ticket. Id. at 2:31−32. Thus, when Sanderson re-

approached after a mere twelve seconds, a reasonable person would have believed that

Sanderson was going to conduct further investigation and he was still not free to leave. Simple

parting words and the passing of twelve seconds do not negate the overall nature of the stop.

C. Petitioner’s Subsequent Consent to Search Was Tainted by Prior Illegality, So That the Evidence Seized Was Inadmissible.

Mr. Haverford’s consent was invalid because it was tainted by the earlier illegality of the

unconstitutionally extended traffic stop.

In order to give effect to the fundamental constitutional guarantees of protection of one’s

home and person, evidence seized during an unlawful search, whether it be direct or indirect,

cannot be used against the victim of the search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484

(1963) (citations omitted). The exclusionary rule does not operate just to prohibit the exclusion

of evidence before the Court, but operates to prevent it from being used at all. Silverthorne

Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). This does not mean that the evidence

becomes inaccessible, but the Government cannot be allowed to profit from its own wrongdoing.

Id.

Attenuation analysis is appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that the

challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity. New York v.

Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990) (citation omitted). In situations where the exclusionary rule

applies, this Court has “declined to adopt a per se or ‘but for’ rule, that would make inadmissible

any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through

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a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest.” United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,

276 (1978) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975)). If the unlawful police conduct

was a “but-for” cause of the search, an attenuation analysis must be conducted. Hudson v.

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006). The Court must determine whether, in light of the initial

illegality, the objectionable evidence that is the result of the illegality is sufficiently

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. The Court looks to

three factors to determine whether evidence recovered from an illegal seizure is sufficiently

attenuated as to dissipate the taint caused by that seizure: (1) the temporal proximity of the

misconduct and the seizure; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose

and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−04.

Sanderson’s request to search the car occurred in extremely close temporal proximity to

the illegal detention; only twelve seconds separated the two events. Trial Trans., 4:8−12. Twelve

seconds is not enough time to dissipate the taint of the illegal extension of the traffic stop. For

Mr. Haverford’s consent to be valid it must be shown that it was the product of his own free will.

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 416−17. The twelve seconds that passed between the traffic stop and the

request for consent are not long enough to satisfy that standard. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604−05

(holding a period of less than two hours between an illegal arrest and a confession was not

sufficient to dissipate the taint); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 416 (holding that statements made almost

immediately after an illegal entry and arrest were inadmissible because not enough time had

passed to dissipate the taint). Timespans of a few minutes have traditionally weighed against the

finding of a consensual search. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107 (1980) (45 minutes

did not dissipate the taint); United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 524 (5th Cir. 2011) (30

seconds did not dissipate the taint); United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979−80 (10th Cir.

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1996) (timespan of less than 35 seconds did not dissipate the taint); McGaughey v. State, 37 P.3d

130, 141 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (the fact that only a few minutes had passed between the

illegal detention and the request for consent to search weighed against finding the taint cleansed).

In light of the established case law regarding timespan, it is against logic to find that

twelve seconds purged the taint of Sanderson’s illegal extension of the stop. Mr. Haverford’s

consent was given almost immediately after the illegal extension and there was not sufficient

time to dissipate the taint of the illegal seizure.

The conditions of the stop further compel this conclusion. Mr. Haverford expressed his

discomfort and desire to go home throughout the encounter with Sanderson, and it was only

Sanderson’s denial of those requests that kept him at the scene. Traffic Stop Trans., 1:6−7,

2:23−24. During an ordinary traffic stop, an individual is free to leave after they receive their

citation, but Sanderson kept Mr. Haverford at the scene to conduct field sobriety tests. Id. at

12:13−24. Sanderson’s illegal extension of the stop when Mr. Haverford would have otherwise

been free to leave increased the coercive nature of the encounter. The timespan and conditions of

the encounter only suggest that the illegality tainted the subsequent consent.

The Court must also look to intervening circumstances between the illegal seizure and the

consent. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−04. In this case, the only intervening circumstances are

Sanderson’s statement that Mr. Haverford was free to leave, followed by the two men walking to

their vehicles. Trial Trans., 4:9−12. Although the State alleges that these events are significant

because they signaled the end of the traffic stop, they are not significant enough to purge the taint

of the original illegality.

Sanderson did not give any indication that Mr. Haverford could decline the request to

search the vehicle. Traffic Stop Trans., 4:67−76. Although an officer is not required to inform an

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individual of their right to decline, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232−33, it is a circumstance of

relevance in this case. During the unlawful extension of the traffic stop, Mr. Haverford asked if

he was allowed to return home after he received his ticket. Traffic Stop Trans., 2:18−24. Where

he ordinarily would have been free to go, Sanderson denied his request, and proceeded with the

illegal detention. Id. at 2:23−25. Were it not for this show of authority, Mr. Haverford would

have left the scene upon receiving his ticket; Mr. Haverford stated that he was upset that he was

being kept there after receiving his ticket, when he ordinarily would have been free to leave. Id.

at 2:29−32. Nothing in Sanderson’s request for consent suggested that if Haverford declined, he

would not be denied by Sanderson once again. The parting words and twelve seconds that passed

were not enough to remedy this belief.

Finally, the Court examines the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown,

422 U.S. at 603−04. Although Sanderson’s conduct does not appear to indicate wanton, flagrant

disregard for policy or knowing and intentional misconduct, his behavior does indicate a

conscious attempt to gain consent for a search based on a hunch. Sanderson made clear his

suspicion that Mr. Haverford was using drugs. Traffic Stop Trans., 2:24−25. But Mr. Haverford

passed the sobriety tests and showed no indication of being impaired. Trial Trans., 4:3−12. When

he could not obtain evidence of intoxication by illegally extending the traffic stop, Sanderson

returned to the car to try to find another justification for searching the vehicle. This Court has

consistently refused to sanction intrusions of Fourth Amendment rights based on nothing more

than inarticulate hunches. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. Sanderson’s purpose in extending the stop was

to find a reason to search Mr. Haverford’s vehicle. When that failed he asked for consent,

knowing that it was his only recourse. This Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence cannot

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allow such deliberate behaviors in an attempt to validate a hunch absent any reasonable

suspicion.

In examining the three factors, each one weighs against a determination that there was

sufficient attenuation between the unlawful extension of the traffic stop and Mr. Haverford’s

consent to the search. There was no real break between the unlawful extension and the request

for consent, there were no significant intervening circumstances, and Sanderson acted knowingly

and intentionally in obtaining Mr. Haverford’s consent.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW MR. HAVERFORD TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. The District Court’s refusal to allow Mr. Haverford to withdraw his guilty plea was

improper because his attorney failed to properly inform him of the deportation risks that

accompanied his guilty plea, and he was severely prejudiced as a result.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a right to effective

counsel for all criminal defendants. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). This

right “embodies a realistic recognition … that the average defendant does not have the

professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his

life or liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462−63 (1938). It is “well settled” that the

Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant has the right to have effective counsel

present at “all critical stages of the criminal proceedings. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1405

(2012) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009)). The United States Supreme

Court has held on multiple occasions one of those “critical stages” in the criminal process is

when a defendant enters a plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58−59 (1985) (holding that

Strickland applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel);

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Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that counsel must inform her client

whether his plea carries a risk of deportation).

In an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court must first determine whether the

“counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Padilla, 558

U.S. at 365 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, the Court must find that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Id.

A. The Eagleton Supreme Court Erred When It Held That Brendanawicz Did Not Perform Deficiently.

The Eagleton Supreme Court erred when it held that Mr. Haverford’s counsel did not

perform deficiently because his attorney failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney would

when he provided incomplete and inaccurate information regarding the possible repercussions of

a guilty plea.

A defendant has a right to challenge his guilty plea if he can show that his counsel was

not a “reasonably competent attorney” and the advice that he was given was not “within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687−88

(citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770−771 (1970)). An attorney is not “reasonably

competent” if they fail to act reasonably considering the “prevailing professional norms.” Id. at

688. In order to determine whether an attorney is acting reasonably, considering the prevailing

professional norms, this Court should examine the totality of the circumstances, including the

prevailing norms of practice as reflected in the American Bar Association Standards. Id. at

688−89.

This Court has already made it clear that it is incredibly important to give noncitizens

accurate legal advice. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. Deportation is at least an integral part, if not the

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most important part, of any penalty that could be imposed on a noncitizen who pleads guilty to a

crime. Id.

Mr. Haverford’s attorney failed to act reasonably considering the prevailing professional

norms because he failed to read the relevant immigration statutes, failed to consult with a

knowledgeable immigration attorney, and as a result, he gave incorrect and incomplete advice to

Mr. Haverford. The ABA Standards for Defense Counsel make it clear that an attorney should

not “recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study

of the case has been completed.” American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice,

Pleas of Guilty, § 14-3.2(b) (3d. ed. 1999). Mr. Haverford’s attorney openly admitted during the

hearing that he had failed to research the immigration statutes that were applicable to his client.

Tr. 28:17−19. The attorney also failed to consult with knowledgeable immigration experts. Tr.

28:21−29:2. Despite failing to conduct an “appropriate investigation” as was required by the

ABA standards, Brendanawicz still recommended to Mr. Haverford that he take the plea deal.

It is well settled that “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to

his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential

example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081,

1089 (2014). See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2002) (finding deficient

performance where counsel “failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered

extensive records, not because of any strategic calculations but because they incorrectly thought

that the state law barred access to such records); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385

(1986) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to conduct pretrial discovery and that

failure “was not based on ‘strategy,’ but on counsel’s mistaken belie[f] that the State was obliged

to take the initiative and turn over all of its inculpatory evidence to the defense”).

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Brendanawicz’s ignorance and failure to perform research on this issue is even more

egregious than the cases cited above because this Court has already considered the exact

immigration statute in question in this case, and held that “the terms of the relevant immigration

statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for [the defendant’s]

conviction.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 (discussing the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)).

This Court’s ruling in Padilla also undercuts the reasoning of the Eagleton Supreme

Court in this case. After acknowledging that the Court in Padilla found that the ramifications of

the immigration statute were clear, the Eagleton Supreme Court engaged in some analytical

gymnastics to find that the immigration ramifications of that same statute were somehow less

clear in this case. Eagleton v. Haverford, 13-cr-100, *11–*13. The Eagleton Court relied on a

court that held that because prosecutorial discretion exists in the immigration system, counsel has

no obligation to give a clear indication of whether or not their plea bargain would result in

deportation. See Comm. v. Escobar, 70 A.3d 838, 841–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).

The biggest issue with this line of reasoning is that it directly conflicts with this Court’s

finding in Padilla. This Court stated that, “Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has

committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is

practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion

vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes

of offenses. Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense

related to trafficking in a controlled substance.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363−64 (emphasis added).

The Eagleton Supreme Court looks right past those “limited exceptions” from the “limited

remnants” and comes to a conclusion that undercuts this Court’s holding in Padilla.

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The Court in Padilla made it clear. An attorney who is acting as an effective counsel

under the Sixth Amendment, when confronted with 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) would tell his client

that his deportation was “presumptively mandatory”, or that he would be subject to “automatic

deportation.” Id. at 357, 359. Anything less than that is simply unacceptable under the Sixth

Amendment.

B. The Eagleton Supreme Court Erred When It Held That Mr. Haverford Suffered No Prejudice As A Result Of The Performance Of His Attorney.

The Eagleton Supreme Court erred when it held that Mr. Haverford suffered no prejudice

because it relied on its finding that Mr. Haverford’s attorney was not deficient, and therefore

there could be no prejudice.

Once it is determined that a defendant’s attorney was deficient, the Court must examine

whether he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. In order to show prejudice, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. In a case where a defendant is alleging that the ineffective assistance

led him to accept an offer that he would not otherwise have accepted, he must be able to show

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1409 (citing Hill, 474 U.S.

at 59).

The trial court held that Mr. Haverford had not suffered prejudice for two reasons: (1)

that he failed to show that a decision to turn down the plea agreement and go to trial was a

rational decision and (2) because the trial court’s warnings weighed against a finding of

prejudice. Order on Mtn. to Withdraw, 7.

1. Turning Down the Plea Agreement Was a Rational Choice

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The trial court focused their analysis on whether turning down the plea agreement was

rational solely on whether or not Mr. Haverford was likely to win at trial. Id. It held that

because the evidence against him was so strong, and he faced higher penalties if he did not plead

guilty, it would not be rational for him to turn down the plea agreement. Id. However, that

argument ignores the previous holdings of this Court.

On multiple occasions, this Court has allowed the showing of alternate counterfactuals,

outside of whether a defendant was likely to succeed at trial, in determining whether there was

prejudice. In Frye, the Court considered whether the defendant would have accepted a different

plea offer if his attorney had not performed deficiently. 132 S.Ct. at 1409−1410. In Lafler v.

Cooper, this Court considered a case where the defendant was not properly offered a plea

bargain and he was ultimately convicted at trial. 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384−85 (2012). The Court in

that case held that there can still be prejudice in having to stand trial and being sentenced to a

longer sentence than was included in the plea offer. Id. at 1385−86. Therefore, the analysis

should not simply be whether he would have won or lost at trial, but whether it was rational for

him to turn down the plea “in hopes of obtaining a different plea offer that would not result in

deportation, even if doing so exposes him to a longer sentence.” State v. Shata, 868 N.W.2d 93,

122 (Wis. 2015) (Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).

Part of that analysis requires an examination of the statements of the defendant. United

States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 725, 725−26 (5th Cir. 2014). Mr. Haverford made it clear in the plea

hearing that he was very concerned about the risks of deportation. Plea Hearing Trans. at 2:18.

He clarified his position more fully in the October 16, 2013 hearing where he stated:

No, I don’t want to be deported. I would have tried to find some way to stay here. I would have told my attorney that I wanted to go to trial and I never would have plead guilty. I have not been to Venezuela since I came to the United States. It is a more dangerous country, and all of my family

23

in Venezuela is gone. My life and my work are here, and I would have nothing if I have to go back. No family, no job, nothing.

Post-Conviction Motion Trans. 4:5-9. His desire to stay in the United States and his aversion to returning to Venezuela

were both incredibly strong. Unlike Kayode, where the defendant never stated that he

would have proceeded to trial, instead stating that he would not have pleaded guilty, Mr.

Haverford could not have been more clear in stating in open court, under oath, that he

would have went to trial but for the bad advice of Brendanawicz.

This Court has already recognized on numerous occasions that staying in the

United States may be more important to a criminal defendant than the actual length of

their jail term. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).

Mr. Haverford made it clear that he would not accept a guilty plea if it meant that he

could not stay in this country. Considering the possibility that staying in the United

States was rationally more important to Mr. Haverford than the length of his jail sentence,

and the chance that he could have worked out a plea deal that allowed him to stay in this

country, or he could have taken his chances at trial, Mr. Haverford suffered significant

prejudice to justify the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

2. The Trial Court’s Warning Could Not Cure the Prejudice Suffered by Mr.

Haverford.

The trial court’s warning about the possible immigration consequences of his plea were

not sufficient because they were substantially more vague than the statement required by Padilla.

The trial court relied on relied on Kayode, when it held that that the warnings issued by

the judge weighed against a finding of prejudice. Order on Mtn. to Withdraw, 7. In this case,

the Court should decline to follow Kayode.

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In Kayode, the defendant’s attorney failed to inform his client that there were possible

immigration consequences to his guilty plea. Kayode, 777 F.3d at 723–24 (Dennis, J.,

dissenting). During the plea hearing, the defendant was given vague warnings from the bench

that “if your citizenship is revoked you also…that conviction may lead to your deportation or

exclusion from this county. Id. at 738. The court in that case held that those judicial

admonishments weighed against a finding of prejudice. Id. at 738.

In this case, Mr. Haverford received incomplete and inaccurate advice from

Brendanawicz. Considering Padilla’s holding regarding the importance of receiving accurate

immigration advice, it makes very little sense to hold that the prejudice suffered from incomplete

and inaccurate advice can be cured by vague and generic judicial admonishments. During the

plea hearing, the court stated, “There is a risk, if found guilty of this crime, that you may be

deported or denied admission…[a]nd you understand you may be deported.” Plea Hearing

Trans., 3:14-17. “Such a perfunctory judicial warning, coming only after the defendant has taken

all but the final prejudicial step toward his conviction, afford such a defendant no genuine

protection against his counsel’s wrongful acts or omissions, and therefore does not offset or

weigh against the prejudice caused by the defendant by the directions of his counsel.” Kayode,

777 F.3d at 731 (Dennis, J., dissenting).

Considering the inadequacy of the judicial warning, and the fact that Mr. Haverford

would have turned down the plea bargain if Brendanawicz properly explained the ramifications

to him, this Court should find that Mr. Haverford did in fact suffer prejudice as a result of the

failures of Brendanawicz.

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CONCLUSION The Eagleton Supreme Court erred in affirming the District Court’s denial of the motion

to suppress, as well as the denial of the motion to withdraw Mr. Haverford’s guilty plea. Deputy

Sanderson did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and Mr. Haverford’s

subsequent consent was not so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of that illegality, thus rendering

the search impermissible under this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The District

Court further erred in finding that Mark Brendanawicz was not deficient in his services to Mr.

Haverford when he failed to research the effects of the advice he gave his client, resulting in

significant prejudice to Mr. Haverford in the disposition of his case.

For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests this Court to reverse the

decisions of the Eagleton Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent

with that decision.

Respectfully Submitted, Team Number 3

Counsel for Petitioner