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SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF TUESDAY, 25th APRIL, 1950

j> SutfrorfrpRegistered as a Newspaper

FRIDAY, 28 APRIL, 1950

THE INVASION OF SICILYThe following Despatch was submitted to the

Supreme Commander, Allied ExpeditionaryForce on the 1st January, 1944, by Admiralof the Fleet Sir ANDREW B.CUNNINGHAM, G.C.B., D.S.O.Office of the Commander-in-Chief,

Mediterranean.1st January, 1944.

I have the honour to forward the accompany-ing reports on the Invasion of Sicily. Many ofthese reports have been forwarded previouslyto the appropriate authorities in order thatthere should be no delay in the digestion andapplication of the " lessons learnt." The re-ports of the naval Task Force Commanders,and of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Force"H"*, are very full and carefully compiled,giving a complete narrative of the operationin all its stages, and summarising a wealth ofexperience in the sound conclusions they havereached and suggestions they have offered, t

2. It is not my intention to add a furthernarrative to those already written nor to domore than comment on salient points ofimportance. Except in so far as stated in thesucceeding paragraphs, I concur fully in thesuggestions and recommendations of the ForceCommanders.

Planning.3. The following outstanding lesson emerged

from the planning stage of this operation.4. It is essential, if much time is not to be

wasted and much confusion caused, that theresponsible Commanders-in-Chief, together

Admiralty footnotes:* Force " H "—a British naval force under the com-

mand of Vice-Admiral A. U. Willis, C.B., D.S.O., whichwas employed as a covering force for this operation.

t Only the report and narrative of operations of theNaval Commander, Eastern Task Force are reproducedhere.

with the Task Force Commanders who willbe responsible for the tactical conduct of thebattle; should meet at the outset for the dis-cussion and evolution of a sound basic planwhich should not thereafter be changed ex-cept for reasons of exceptional urgency, suchas a complete change in the enemy's disposi-tions or a major strategic upheaval.

5. In the case of "Husky"* this was not^done, since both General Alexander andGeneral Montgomery were absorbed in theTunisian battle. In consequence, although theoperation was authorised on 23rd January andcombined planning headquarters set up on 12thFebruary, the final firm plan was not approveduntil the 12th May. Thus, although fivemonths were available for perfecting plans forthe operation, all detailed planning had in factto be compressed into two months, result-ing in some confusion and considerableunnecessary duplication in the issue of orders.

6. It cannot be too clearly recognised thata combined operation is but the opening, underparticular circumstances, of a primarily armybattle. It is the function of the navy andof the air to help the army to establish abase or bases on die hostile coast from whichthe military tactical battle to gain the objectmust be developed. It is upon the army tac-tical plan for the fulfilment of its object thatthe combined plan must depend. The navyand the air commanders must join with thearmy commander to ensure that the base orbases selected for seizure are capable ofachievement without prohibitive loss in theirrespective elements, and that, when seized, theywill fulfil the requirements of the force; but itis of no use to plan on the seizure of basesunrelated to the realities of the military situa-tion when ashore.

Admiralty footnote:* " Husky was the code name for this operation.

2078 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 APRIL, 1950

7. It was upon this point that the initialplanning of "Husky" broke down. It maybe that the earlier plans would have suc-ceeded equally well; but the fact remains thatthese plans in the end proved unacceptable tothe army leaders called upon to fight the tac-tical battle for the object, and that, had it beenpossible for those leaders fully to study thetactical aspect at the outset, the undesirablelast minute changes would have been saved.

8. A further point is that in the initial plan-ning great weight was lent to the value of air-borne troops for the softening of beach de-fences. The conditions of light required forthe employment of paratroops were inimicalto the secure and undetected approach of navalforces. As the result of much discussion andin view of the importance attached to the air-borne attack, the date selected for the assaultwas one which was not favourable from thenaval point of view. In fact the airborne troopswere never used in the manner projected, butthat they were not to be so used did notemerge until it was too late to change thedate. In consequence, the navies, for noadvantage, had to accept a disadvantageouslight for approach, and a subsequent period ofmoonlit nights off the beaches which couldhave been avoided.

9. The Naval Commander Western TaskForce comments at length and stringently onthis subject in his report.* While I do not inall respects agree with his estimate of the effec-tiveness of naval gunfire, I concur generally inhis remarks, and, in particular, in questioningthe wisdom of attaching a high degree of im-portance in the plan to the employment ofairborne troops. A seaborne assault is unalter-ably committed to a date for some days inadvance of D day. In tidal waters it is evenmore inflexibly bound by time and tide. It maywell be that, on the selected date, airbornetroops are weatherbound and cannot operate^It does, therefore, appear most necessary thatairborne troops should be considered as a use-ful auxiliary rather than as a governing fac-tor which may react to the disadvantage ofother services involved.

10. Apart from the use of airborne troops,many other factors affect the selection of Dday and H hourf: but a dominating factormust always be the high casualty rate inflictedby aimed machine-gun fire. Unless it can beguaranteed to the army that the enemy beachdefences can be neutralised by naval gunfireor air attack or both—or by smoke—it is feltthat darkness will always be chosen for thefirst waves to reach the beach. " Husky " gavebut poor opportunity for judging the soundnessof our choice since surprise was unexpectedlyattained; but it is felt that, had the enemybeen resolute and alert, it would have requiredmore than the gun support actually availableif the soldiers were to be landed in daylightwithout heavy casualties. Bomber forces werenot available since they were occupied inneutralising the enemy air forces.

Admiralty footnotes:* The Western Task Force was an American Task

Force under the command of Vice-Admiral H. K.Hewitt, U.S.N. The publication of the report of theNaval Commander Western Task Force is a matter forthe United States Navy Department, and this report istherefore not included here.

t H hour—the time at which it is planned that thefirst wave of landing craft should " touch down " onthe beach for the assault.

Preparation, Training and Mounting.11. The training and mounting of " Husky "

proceeded under difficulties, particularly in thecase of Force " B "* of the Eastern Task Force,and to a lesser extent of the Western TaskForce. Both these forces had to establish theirbase facilities in captured ports which had beenconsiderably demolished, namely Sfax andSousse for Force " B ", and Bizerta and Tunisfor the Western Task Force. Great credit isdue to all concerned that these difficulties wereably surmounted in the tune available. Force" B ", in addition to other difficulties, was facedat short notice with the task of capturingPantellaria but the task was taken in its strideand successfully accomplished without preju-dice to " Husky ", of which operation indeedit was an essential preliminary.

12. The reception and absorption in thestation of the great number of landing shipsand craft, and the establishment of their bases,presented a heavy problem to both navies. Theprobable performance of these craft, mannedas they were by new and inexperienced officersand men but recently enrolled in their respec-tive services, gave cause for some anxiety," andin the early stages of training they caused someslight wavering of confidence among the troopsthey were to land. The manner in which theybuckled to and met and overcame their in-experience can best be measured by what theyachieved, and deserves the highest praise.

13. Another cause of anxiety at this stagewas the large demand for movement of troops,,airmen and vehicles to their staging points orbases for the attack. This involved heavy andcontinuous running by the landing craft attunes when they should have been training, andfear was felt, not only that their training wouldbe inadequate, but that their engines wouldnot stand the strain. These fears were happilydisproved, and in fact the sea training providedby these voyages must have stood them in goodstead. That the craft themselves withstoodthe extra wear and tear is a tribute to thosewho designed and built them.

14. Additional difficulties in the way of train-ing and mounting arose from late arrival ofcraft and material. This was particularly sohi the case of Force "A"f of the EasternTask Force which received its L.S.T.sJextremely late and had little or no opportunityof trying and practising with pontoons. This,portion of the force was also separated by 900miles from the L.C.T.s§ which were to forma part of its assault. A high standard ofstaff work was required to knit these scatteredcomponents into an operational whole.

15. The Western Task Force was more for-tunate in that opportunities for training andmounting were undisturbed, and all ships wereconcentrated. Although this force alsosuffered to some extent from late arrivals andrushed planning, as compared with the EasternTask Force the Western Task Force was muchbetter placed since the U.S. warships came intothe Mediterranean for the specific purpose ofthe operation, and only very slight calls were

Admiralty footnotes:* Force " B "—a British Task Force under the com-

mand of Rear-Admifal R. R. McGrigor, C.B.t Force "A":—a British Task Force under the com-

mand of Rear-Admiral T. H. Troubridge, D.S.O.J L.S.T.—Landing Ship, Tank.§ L.C.T.—Landing Craft, Tank.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 APRIL, 1950 2079

made upon them for extraneous duties on thestation. In the case of the Eastern Task Force,all ships, belonging as they did to the normalforces of the station, were heavily and con-tinuously employed right up to the date ofsailing for the operation, and in but few casestook part in any rehearsal or training. Thattheir duties were performed so adequatelywhen the time came reflects highly alike onthe adaptability of their ships' companies andon the standard of maintenance achieved inspite of many months of arduous service at sea.Collection of Beach Intelligence.

16. Much credit is due to the officers andmen of the beach reconnaissance parties fortheir arduous and hazardous effort to obtaindetails of the beach gradients and sand bars.Credit is also due to the submarines of the 8thand 10th Flotillas which worked on beachreconnaissance in company with these parties.

Their casualties in this operation were un-fortunately heavy; apart from natural dislikeof such losses, the possibility of capture alwaysgives rise to anxiety on grounds of security.Location of Headquarters.

17. Much discussion was devoted to the bestlocation for the combined headquarters fromwhich the three Commanders-in-Chief shouldconduct the operation. Various alternativeswere explored in an effort to find a commonsite satisfactory to all, but in the end communi-cations problems, and, to a lesser extent, lackof suitable accommodation, caused an unde-sirable dispersion in that though the navy andarmy headquarters moved to Malta fromAlgiers, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chieffound himself unable to move from his exist-ing headquarters at Marsa, where he was inclose touch with his main forces.*

I am sure Malta was a wise choice from bothnaval and army viewpoints, and apart from anunexpected assault of sandflies which devas-tated my staff, the arrangements were in allrespects excellent.

18. The separation of the Commanders didnot in the event have serious reaction, but wasmanifestly undesirable and might have provedextremely awkward had things begun to goawry. In particular the navy and the air areclosely interdependent in a sea assault, andwith the exception of the coastal air compon-ent, the air plans of the operation had all alongappeared to the other services to be somewhatnebulous, and their day-to-day exposition wasnecessary to make the picture clear.The Approach and Assault.

19. The co-ordination and timing necessaryto ensure the punctual concentration of thisvast force in the assault areas, presented aproblem of some complexity. The problemwas to some degree complicated by the greatdistances over which the forces were initiallydispersed f, by the need for deceptive routeing

Air Ministry footnote:* Besides the accommodation and communications

difficulties mentioned, time did not permit of the AirOfficer Commanding-in-chief changing the elaboratearrangements for controlling the air operations fromMarsa.Admiralty footnote:

f Some of the British assault force was sailed fromEgypt and the First Canadian Division from the Clyde.Part of the American assault force was mounted in theU.S.A., making only a short call at Algiers and Oran onpassage to the assault beaches.

A 2

to avoid disclosure of intention, by the bottle-neck presented by the Tunisian war channel,and, finally, by the requirement for toppingup the fuel of escort vessels before their arrivalin the assault area.

Very detailed orders were issued regardingthe routes and timing of the approach, backedup by track charts and the inevitable " MickeyMouse" diagrams which are in my viewessential to the clear understanding of a prob-lem of this nature. Even so, everythingdepended, as always, on the seamanship andgood sense of individual commanding officersand on the smooth working of the berthingand fuelling organisations of the several portsconcerned.

My confidence in their abilities was notmisplaced. The operation ran like a well-oiledclock.

20. The only incidents which occurred tomar the precision of this remarkable concen-tration were the loss by submarine attack offour ships in convoy, the CITY OF VENICEand ST. ESSYLT in K.M.S. 18B on the 4thJuly, the DEVIS in K.M.S. 18B on 5th July,and the SHAHJEHAN in M.W.S. 36 on the6th July. The passage of the convoys wascovered most effectively by the operations ofthe North-West African Coastal Air Force,of No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group, ofsquadrons operating under Air HeadquartersAir Defence, Eastern Mediteranean, and, onD- 1 day, of the North-West African TacticalAir Force Squadrons based on Malta. Theirproblem was one of a complexity equal toour own. It was solved with conspicuoussuccess, since no bomb was dropped on anyconvoy—the majority were not sighted byenemy aircraft—and all reports showed thatthe fighter cover was excellent.

21. An aspect of the approach whichcaused me concern was the slow speed of theL.C.T. convoys, and the necessity for theirarrival at the assault beaches well before firstlight to provide the supporting arms the armyneeded. Throughout the planning stages, theestimates of speed of advance allowable forL.C.T. convoys had continually to be loweredas experience was gained. In the end itbecame clear that not more than 5^ knotscould be counted upon in safety, even in calmweather. I was not sanguine of our abilityto maintain surprise at any time after 1200on D -1, since it appeared beyond doubt thatthe enemy must by then become aware of ourconcentration south of Malta: but it appearedto be beyond the wildest expectation that heshould be unaware of the L.C.T. convoys whichmust be within 20 miles of his coast at sunset.

It is, I suggest, a matter of urgency that somemeans be devised of landing supporting armsat an early stage from craft whose speed isat least in the region of that of the averageinfantry assault ship, if tactical surprise is tobe aimed at.

22. Little anxiety had been felt on the scoreof weather, which is so rarely bad hi theMediterranean at this time of year. Never-theless, plans had been made whereby a post-ponement of 24 hours could, if necessary, beordered as late as 1200 on D - 1. Beyond thistime it was felt impracticable to disturb themarch of events, and it was also expectedthat in the event the weather would havesufficiently disclosed its intentions by this time.


Such was not the case however—at 1200 D - 1the wind was blowing force 4 from the north-west but there was no evidence of imminentincrease and no question of postponementarose. By 1700 the wind was force 6 to 7*and a nasty sea had risen. It was manifestlytoo late for postponement but considerableanxiety was [felt, particularly for the smallcraft convoys making up against the sea. Thewind mercifully started to ease from 2330 on-wards, by H hour it was slight, and by morninghad ceased, leaving only a tiresome swell andsurf on the western beaches.

Attainment of Surprise.23. This little blow had various effects but

the most noteworthy was its contribution toour unexpected success in gaming completesurprise. The very efficient cover plan andthe deceptive routeing of the convoys bothplayed their parts. In addition the vigilanceof the enemy was undoubtedly relaxed owingto the unfavourable phase of the moon to whichwe had been so unwillingly subjected. Finallycame this wind which indeed came dangerouslyclose at one time to making some, if not all,of the landings impracticable. These lasttwo, to us, apparently unfavourable factors hadactually the effect of making the weary Italians,who had been alert for many nights," turnthankfully in their beds saying "tonight atany rate they can't come! "

But they came.

The Landings.24. In consequence of the wind not all

assault waves reached the beach at H hour,but none was seriously late. Some of theL.C.T. convoys were very late, the most beingthat for BARK EAST! which was six hourslate, having furthest to go against the wind.One L.C.T. was swamped and capsized. Theperformance of the small craft of both nationsin this period was most creditable. They madevaliant efforts to keep their rendezvous and inlarge measure were successful.

25. The assaults were landed in all sectorsin the right place, nearly at the right tune andwith negligible opposition. In some areassome interference was encountered after day-light from coast defence and shore batteries,but in most cases they were readily silencedby ships' gunfire and the landings proceededsteadily with no appreciable interference otherthan the swell.

The Western Task Force, on their exposedwestern beaches, bore the brunt of oppositionboth by gunfire and surf, the latter par-ticularly at CENTJ beaches which were mostnearly a lee shore. Losses of craft bybroaching in this area were considerable.That the surf was in no wise allowed to inter-fere with the smooth progress of the landingreflects highly on the determination, resourceand sound training of the Western Task Force.

Admiralty footnotes:* Definitions in the Beaufort scale of windforce—

Force 4—moderate breeze (11-15 m.p.h. at sealevel);

Force 6—strong breeze (21-26 m.p.h. at sea level);Force 7—high wind (27-33 m.p.h. at sea level).

t BARK EAST—one of the British assault beaches(see Plan).

J CENT and DIME—American assault beaches, west ofthe Eastern Task Force assault area. DIME beacheswere in the vicinity of Gela; CENT beaches were south-east of Gela, at places between DIME and Cape Scalambri.

26. After the landings the troops movedsteadily inland on both fronts, apparentlyencountering but little opposition exceptinland of Gela in the DIME* area of theWestern Task Force, where the floatingreserve (Kool Force) was ordered to be landedin support. A determined counter attack bythe Hermann Goering Panzer Division startedto develop in this area from 0900 on D dayand had some success, reaching almost to thebeaches on the evening of D + 1. Naval gun-fire played a prominent and praiseworthy partin stopping and turning this attack, beingnotably effective against tanks. By 2230 onD + 1 the situation had been restored and nofurther serious threat to the security of ourbridge-heads developed.

Syracuse was entered by our troops at2100 D day and the port swept and open by0830 D + 1.

Air Action during the Assault.27. The degree of air opposition encountered

in the assault and later could by no meansbe described as serious; but caused somecasualties among shipping and had somenuisance value.

In this respect the Western Task Force wasless fortunate than the Eastern Task Forceand was somewhat bothered, particularly byfighter bomber aircraft .coming low over thehills from inland in such a manner as to evadedetection by radar.

28. The provision of S.E.f fighter cover inthe assault areas prior to the capture ofadequate Sicilian airfields, presented a diffi-cult problem to the Air Command, with onlythe limited airfield facilities of Malta, Gozoand Pantellaria lying within reasonable fighterrange. The number of fighter sorties necessaryto maintain even squadron strength in bothassault areas was prodigious.

The Air Command had to strike a balancein the allotment of their resources between thevalue of defensive patrols and offensive actionat the enemy airfields—both having the sameobject—the security of the assault from enemyair interference.

It was pointed out in my operation orderthat much of the air's effort would be unseenby the naval forces, and the strength of fightersto be expected was outlined.

29. By results I consider that the air appre-ciation was proved sound. To one who hadfought through the Mediterranean campaignfrom the beginning it appeared almost magicalthat great fleets of ships could remain anchoredon the enemy's coast, within 40 miles of hismam aerodromes, with only such slight lossesfrom air attack as were incurred.

The navies (and consequently the armies)owed a great debt to the air forces for theeffectiveness of the protection afforded themthroughout the operation. Nevertheless, therewas palpably room for improvement in theclose air cover of the assault areas, and, inparticular, in the effectiveness of the liaisonbetween the Naval Force Commanders and thefighter forces upon which they had to rely.This improvement was in fact effected in thenext major amphibious operation which wasundertaken hi this theatre.

Admiralty footnote:* (See foot note f of previous column.)t S.E.—single engined.


Routeing of Troop-carrying Aircraft.30. The routeing of aircraft carrying air-

borne troops to the attack was, from thebeginning, recognised as presenting anawkward problem. Allowance was made inthe naval approach plan, in conference withAir Plans, for a gap between assault convoysnorth of Malta through which the troop-carrying aircraft could approach and returnwithout flying over convoys. These routeswere promulgated in my operation orders.

In fact these attacks were delivered withoutinterference between naval and air forcesinvolved; but it was not until D - 3 that theairborne troops' plans became firm and thattroop-carrier command were able finally toconfirm the suitability of routes passingthrough the corridor laid down so long before.

These late decisions were in large measuredue to the late crystallisation of the militarytactical plan already referred to in paragraphs5 to 7 above.

31. Later, airborne troop missions wereflown on the night 10th/llth July to the Gelaarea and on the night 13th /14th July to theCatania area. - .

In the first instance, an ingress corridor overa deserted portion of coast between the twotask forces was allotted and promulgated bysignal. The aircraft were to fly inland by thiscorridor and withdraw passing to the north andwest of Licata, well clear of the Western TaskForce. In fact, owing to heavy ground A.A.fire and possibly due to bad navigation, largenumbers of aircraft forsook the route and flewover the Western Task Force assault areasconcurrently with an enemy air attack. Con-siderable losses resulted.

In the second instance, decision to carry outthe operation was taken too late to enablerouteing to be certainly promulgated to allships. The airborne troops* representative atmy H.Q. was apprised of this danger at thetime. This late decision in combination withthe unexpectedly late sailing of a convoy fromAugusta led to a number of aircraft being shotdown by merchant vessel gunfire. In thisinstance too, enemy aircraft were present tocomplicate the issue.

32. These incidents led to an enquiry beingheld by Allied Force Headquarters with a viewto eliminating such incidents in future. I con-cur in the recommendations of committee whichare forwarded separately.

Though not easy, the routeing of troop-carrier aircraft prior to the main assault, whileships are moving in pre-arranged tracks andin perfect tuning, presents a clear cut problemreadily susceptible to solution by careful plan-ning as was shown on the night of D -1 /Dday in "Husky".

The major problem arises in the routeing ofaircraft to make drops to fulfil military tac-tical requirements arising after the mainassaults, when the situation has become fluid,convoys are being cleared as they unload, andsignal communications are inevitably congested.It was under -these conditions that the incidentsquoted above occurred.

Naval Forces other than Assault Forces.33. The work of the main covering force,

the hinge pin of the operation, was dull andunspectacular as must ever be the case.against a

passive enemy. Force " H " was faced with theprospect of steady patrolling in waters withineasy reach of the enemy's air bases, in condi-tions of moonlight and weather peculiarlysuited to air attack and with a growing U-boatthreat.

It was not until July 17th (D + 7) that thereduced congestion of Malta and my apprecia-tion of enemy intentions combined to allowthis force to be withdrawn into harbour atMalta. In the interval the INDOMITABLEhad, not unexpectedly, been torpedoed andseverely damaged. Force "H" achieved itsobject.

34. The effect of the diversionary operations,"Fracture"* by Force "Z" and "Arsenal"!by Force " Q " and coastal forces, cannot beaccurately assessed. It is presumed that theycontributed to the confusion of the enemy.Both were satisfactorily carried out hi preciselythe manner ordered.

35. The operations of Force " Q " patrollingnightly northward of the landings, were asnecessary as they were unspectacular, andlacked incident. The torpedoing of CLEO-PATRA by a U-boat, anl the sinking of aU-boat by ILEX and ECHO were merely in-cidents of passage unconnected with theoperational function of this force.

36. The operations of coastal forces, and,at a later stage, of the American P.T. boatsjin the Straits of Messina were most gallant anddetermined. They nightly faced an unpleasantvolume of gunfire and inflicted losses on theenemy.

37. The anti U-boat operations, both air andsurface, which were instituted as soon as aU-boat concentration on the east coast of Sicilybecame apparent, did not succeed in makingany kills. But the U-boat activity achievedlittle, and that this was the case was probablyin no small measure due to the active measureswhich were taken to .discourage their presence.

The U-boat kills which were made werefortuitous, notably the capture of BRONZOby the 13th Minesweeping Flotilla off Syra-cuse, and LAFOREY's rapid revenge for thetorpedoing of NEWFOUNDLAND offCatania.

March of Events subsequent to the Assaults.38. An outstanding feature of the operation

was the rapidity of progress of the left whigU.S. 7th Army once they were firmly ashore.The whole of these operations both before andafter the capture of Palermo was a model ofamphibious tactics by the Western Task Force.

In particular, after the capture of Palermoon the 22nd July (D + 12) U.S. generalshipshowed that it had nothing to learn of thevalue of sea power and Task Force 86 underRear-Admiral Davidson, U.S.N. that it hadnothing to learn of the rapid planning andexecution of outflanking operations.

The three " end runs " executed in the ncrihcoast of Sicily saved days of costly fighting.

Admiralty footnotes:* Operation " Fracture "—a bombardment of Favjg-

nana (an island off the western point of Sicily) andconvoy feints towards the west of Sicily.

t Operation " Arsenal"—a bombardment of Catania(east coast of Sicily).

J P.T. boats—the counterpart of British MotorTorpedo Boats!

2082 UPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 APRIL, 1950

39. Progress on the east coast was less spec-tacular and more costly. Augusta was enteredby the army on the evening of 12th July (D+2),after a rather exasperating day in which ourdestroyers alternately entered the harbourtriumphantly and were evicted by enemy shellfire to which they could not reply owing toinability to distinguish our own troops; butthe situation did not really become cleared upand the port rendered safe for democracy untilthe morning of the 13th when the Port Partywas finally installed and a valuable protectedanchorage made available for our use.

Two small commando operations from twoL.S.L(H)* contributed to the capture of thisport. From this time onward, however, nouse was made by the 8th Army of amphibiousopportunities. The small L.S.I.s were keptstanding by for the purpose at the call of Rear-Adtoiral McGrigor (Flag Officer Sicily) andlanding craft were available on call: but theonly occasion on which they were used wason 16th August, 1943, after the capture ofCatania, when a commando landing was made,but fell short of the flank of the retreatingenemy.

40. There were doubtless sound militaryreasons for making no use of this, what to meappeared, priceless asset of sea power andflexibility of manoeuvre: but it is worth con-sideration for future occasions whether muchtime and costly fighting could not be savedby even minor flank attacks which must neces-sarily be unsettling to the enemy. It mustbe always for the General to decide. TheNavy can only provide the means and adviceon the practicability from the naval angle ofthe projected operation. It may be that hadI pressed my views more strongly more couldhave been done.

41. Much use was made of naval gunfireto support the seaward flank of the 8th Army.Reports showed that such support was satis-factory and effective. Only on one occasionwas heavy ship gunfire employed, when WAR-SPITE carried out a brief bombardment ofCatania on the evening of the 17th July.

The End of the Operation.42. The operation concluded with the entry

of Messina on the 17th August, the U.S.7th Army, thanks to their amphibious tacticsand some prodigious road engineering feats,beating the British 8th Army by a short headfor the prize.

Conclusion.43. These remarks contain criticism where,

in my view, criticism is due. Where possiblethe criticism is constructive and designed toavoid a repetition of such mistakes as weremade. It is a cause for congratulation of allconcerned that the criticisms are so few and thetriumph so great.

44. I count myself indeed fortunate that, inthe planning and execution of this, the greatestseaborne operation so far known in history, Imet with a co-operation so complete and cordialas was accorded me by my colleagues GeneralAlexander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder, andtheir subordinates.

45. Of the Navies, I can only say that I neverwish to command better, and I count it a great

Admiralty footnote:* L.S.I.(H)—a type of Landing Ship, Infantry.

honour that, through the person of Vice-Admiral Hewitt, I was privileged to commandso large and efficient a force of the UnitedStates Navy. Both the Western Task Force,under Admiral Hewitt, and the Eastern TaskForce, under Admiral Ramsay, performed theirunaccustomed tasks in a manner befitting thehighest tradition of any fighting service.

(Signed) A. B. CUNNINGHAM,Admiral of the Fleet.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower,Supreme Commander,

Allied Expeditionary Force.

Admiralty,S.W.I.

1st October, 1943.I have the honour to forward herewith the

report of proceedings of the Eastern NavalTask Force during the initial phase of opera-tions for the capture of the Island of Sicily,known as Operation " Husky ". These opera-tions were wholly successful, but consideringthe large force involved and the time allowedfor preparation, any other result could onlyhave been most unexpected and disappointing.

2. By reason of the weakness of the Italianopposition, the success of the assaults in"Husky" cannot be considered as a reliableguide to what may be attempted or achievedelsewhere. Nevertheless, valuable experiencewas gained which will be of inestimable assist-ance in future operations, notably in regard tomaintenance through the beaches, handling andserviceability of landing ships and craft, open-ing of captured ports and in the use of navalarmaments in support of the army in subse-quent operations along the coast.

3. Casualties to shipping and amongst land-ing craft were considerably less than had beenanticipated and allowed for. This was gratify-ing and is considered to be due to: —

(a) the very high degree of air superiorityachieved ;

(b) the efficiency of the A/S* organi-sation ;

(c) the unexpected attainment of a con-siderable degree of tactical surprise. Thattactical surprise was effected is considered tohave resulted from a combination of circum-stances, such for example as the adoption ofa waxing moon period for the assaults, thelack of enemy air reconnaissance on D -1day and a prolonged period of " alert"preceding D day, all of which, together withthe unexpected high wind which got up p.m.on D-l, lulled the enemy coast defencesinto a false sense of security. ^4. The performance of landing ships and

craft was uniformly good and, in the majority ofcases, creditable seamanship was displayed bythose in charge of them, having regard to theirnecessarily restricted training and lack of pre-vious experience. The advantage enjoyed bythe personnel of the flotillas which were sent tothe Middle East in advance of the operationwas very marked and much credit is due to

Admiralty footnote:* A/S—-anti-submarine.


Rear-Admiral T. H. Troubridge, D.S.O. (Rear-Admiral (G)) for the excellent training whichhe gave them.

5. Period of Preparation and Planning.—Theconditions that would result from the largedistances between the various headquarters hadbeen foreseen, and, as expected, planning bytelegram inevitably led to misunderstandingsand a large number of amendments to theoperation orders in the last few days. Due tothe unavoidable delay in getting the operationorders to the various Task Group Commanders,considerable complications arose by the inclu-sion in some of their orders of matter whichwas properly the concern of higher authorities.This again increased the number of amend-ments necessary, and presented great difficultiesto the smaller craft who received a mass oforders and amendments a few days before theoperation.

6. The Plan.—There are two outstandingpouits about the plan which call for remark.The first has to do with the operational andthe other with the administrative aspect. Inmy opinion the primary consideration is theoperational aspect. The army must first ex-amine the implications of the land campaignnecessary to achieve the object in view. Afterthis the administrative authorities must assessthe administrative implications. In the earlystages of planning for " Husky " too little im-portance and attention was paid to the opera-tional aspect whilst too much was paid to theadministrative, with the rpsult that the outlineplan given to the Commanders of the EasternTask Force was operationally unacceptable.This situation was further complicated by thepre-occupation of the Army and Air Com-manders with current operations and the widedispersal of all planning authorities which re-sulted in a prolonged period of negotiationand delay.

In the end military necessity dictated theacceptance of. -administrative risks and thechoice of a sound operational plan. It is to behoped that plans for future operations will bebased on operational requirements and not tosuit the administrative appreciations, which in-cidentally always appear ultra-conservative hiprobabilities.

By the time the final orders were issued Ifelt entirely satisfied that the best plan avail-able to us had been adopted, and my hopesthat the weight of our attacks on a narrowfront would overwhelm the enemy were, inthe event, justified.

7. Mounting of the Operation in the MiddleEast.—From the moment of my arrival inCairo on 2nd March, .1943, every possibleassistance was- afforded myself and my staff inthe mounting and preparation for "Husky"by the Commander-in-Chief, Levant, AdmiralSir Henry Harwood, K.C.B., O.B.E., and hissuccessors, Admirals Sir Ralph Leatham,K.C.B., and Sir John H. D. Cunningham,K.C.B., M.V.O., and the other naval authoritiesand departments in the Middle East. All theresources of the Levant Station, personnel,material and training, were made availableand too great credit cannot be given to thatCommand for its share in the successful opera-tions which followed.

Training in the Middle East was satisfac-tory. The rehearsals were carried out in the

Gulf of Aqaba from 10th to 17th June butwere necessarily limited in scope, as only fourM.T. ships and four L.C.T. were able to bepresent, no L.C.I.(L)* were available, and alimit had to be placed on the number of beach-ings that could be made by operational assaultcraft.

8. Move to Malta.—With my staff I tookpassage to Malta in H.M.S. ORION, arrivinglate on 2nd July. It had always been foreseenthat there would be a large amount for my staffto do on arrival at Malta hi the few days avail-able previous to the operation, e.g., the allo-cation of landing craft by numbers to flotillasand task groups, and the briefing of the largenumber of landing craft and smaller warshipsbased there. The forethought given to thesematters by Vice-Admiral Malta enabled thework to be undertaken expeditiously and withhis full understanding. I cannot speak toohighly of the assistance given by Vice-AdmiralA. J. Power, C.B., C.V.O., and his staff through-out the period that I was in Malta. His organi-sation enabled the heavy and intricate pro-gramme of loading, sailing and refuelling, etc.,to proceed without a hitch, and all my require-ments were readily and efficiently met.

9. Narrative of the Operation.—A compositenarrative for the Task Force is attached. Moredetailed narratives for each sector are includedin the Task Group Commanders' reports.

The Eastern Naval Task Force came undermy operational control at 1200 on D -1, 9thJuly, and I was afloat on that and the followingday with my flag flying in H.M.S. ANTWERP.Weather conditions were fair during the fore-noon, and although the wind had risen slightlyby noon, at which time I was in company withthe four main ship convoys, south of Malta,I was not seriously concerned. The L.C.T.convoys from Tripoli and Tunisia had pre-viously been spoken off Malta earlier in theday, and they and the ship convoys were all intheir appointed positions. During the afternoonand evening the wind increased steadily fromthe north-west to a strength of at least 6 andby 1800 a nasty sea was running.

The effect of these conditions on the landingcraft and at the beaches caused me someanxiety but postponement did not seriouslyenter into my mind. My reasoning was basedon long acquaintance with Mediterraneanweather conditions which led me to expect thatthe wind would go down suddenly before morn-ing, together with the knowledge that all butone of my landings were to be made on aweather shore where conditions would not betoo bad. It may be stated here that the windand sea did start to drop soon after midnightand daylight saw the beginning of a perfectday with a clear blue sky and steadily decreas-ing swell. Except at BARK WEST,f where Force"V"t had to compete with a slight sea andswell, conditions at the beaches were perfect.It must be remembered, however, that theL.S.I, reached their release positions at 0030,before the wind and sea had abated to anyextent, and the conditions in which the L.C.A.§Admiralty footnotes: •

* L.C.I.(L)—Landing Craft, Infantry (Large).f BARK WEST—one of the British assault beaches (see

Plan).I Force " V "—a British Task Force under the com-

mand of Rear-Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian, K.B.E.§ L.C.A.—Landing Craft, Assault.


were lowered with the first flight and whenL.C.I.(L) came alongside to embark theirtroops were very unpleasant. The more creditis due to them for the fact that the initiallandings were made as near to H hour as wasthe case.

I did not myself see any landing craft duringthe night, but all reports show that their per-formance together with that of the H.D.M.L.,*etc., was very satisfactory taking into accountthe prevailing weather.

10. The L.C.T convoy xor BARK EAST,having been held up by the weather and havingeventually made BARK SOUTH, f arrived closeon six hours late, that for AcroJ two hourslate, and that for BARK SOUTH about two hourslate, but the L.C.T. for BARK WEST, which hadbeen given a shorter route than originally in-tended, passing east of Gozo, arrived onlythirty minutes late. This latter convoy hadthe worst of the blow, and their prompt arrivalreflected high credit on Lieutenant-CommanderK. A. Sellar, R.N., who led them.

11. In general the marking submarines werein their correct positions and navigational aidswere working and were picked up by the con-voys on approaching their release positions.The ships at the release positions were not ap-parently detected by the shore defences, anHthe only difficulties experienced in loweringand forming up landing craft were those im-posed by the weather. It is clear that the allow-ance of two and a half hours from the arrivalat the release position to H hour was in noway excessive as the majority of the assaultswere a few minutes late.

12. The defences were taken generally bysurprise when the assaulting formations landedand there was little organised resistance on thebeaches. It is understood that a proportionof the coast defences were not, in fact, mannedon that night; those that were manned were,in the majority of cases, not stoutly fought.

13. At first light there was a certain amountof shelling from shore batteries, but these wereeffectively dealt with by supporting monitors,destroyers and gun boats. The effectiveness ofthe supporting fire from our naval forces was afeature of the operation, and many tributeshave been paid it, both by the army and byenemy prisoners.

14. Due to the late arrival of the L.C.T. con-voys the only L.C.T. to beach before daylightwere those at BARK SOUTH. Although these didso successfully, and on a shore that was gener-ally rocky, insufficient experience was gainedin the operation as a whpls to show how farthe beaching of L.C.T. in large numbers indarkness is a practical proposition. Theproblem of landing the supporting arms imme-diately behind the assault infantry cannot yetbe considered to be solved, and it is recom-mended that comprehensive trials should beundertaken as early as possible to examine thismatter. If difficulties are experienced, it isbelieved that a dark assault should be timedto be about one hour before first light, unlessthe army are prepared to rely on naval sup-porting fire for a longer Deriod until firstlight. .Admiralty footnotes:

* H.D.M.L.—Harbour Defence Motor Launch.t BARK SOUTH—One of the British assault beaches

(see Plan).J Acn>—a sector in BARK EAST (see Plan).

15. It was unfortunate that the L.CR.* werenot able to soften the beach defences, but theirsubsequent performance suggests that they arewell fitted for this role. L.C.G. (L)t engageddirect targets effectively at short range, andthe moral effect of both the L.C.R. and theL.C.G. (L) firing from close inshore is reportedto have been considerable.

16. The slow convoys arrived in accordancewith the plan and in every case ships hadmoved to an inshore anchorage by 0800/10thJuly. No mines were found inshore.

17. Unloading of the M.T. ships was com-menced without delay, and proceeded satisfac-torily, despite bad exits and soft sand in theACID sector and false beaches and soft sandat BARK WEST. It had always been known thatBARK WEST beach was unlikely to be suitableas a maintenance beach, but it is clear that itwas nevertheless correct to assault on it closeon the flank of BARK SOUTH. It was generallyconsidered by Task Group Commanders thatthe strength of the Docks Operating personnelin the M.T. ships was insufficient, and this wasborne out in " Husky ". It is. probably correctto say that the bottleneck in maintenancethrough the beaches was the insufficiency of theDocks Operating Companies to work the shipscontinuously. Casualties to landing craft dueto enemy action were very small, but as in" Torch ",J a few L.C.T. and L.C.M.§ were putout of action due to bad seamanship displayedby their half trained crews.

18. Both the L.S.T. (2)|| and the L.C.I. (L)proved invaluable in their respective roles, andit is considered that the speed with which bothvehicles and personnel were landed was one ofthe principal factors of the operation from thenaval point of view. Although at times therate at which stores were unloaded appeared tobe disappointing, the totals unloaded for thebeaches were, in fact, greater than the plannedfigures. On 21st July 4,400 tons of stores weredischarged at BARK SOUTH. This was of coursean exceptionally good beach, and by that timethe organisation there had been perfected andthree beach groups were assisting, but theprevious estimates for beach maintenancewould seem to need revision. It appears thatneither BARK SOUTH nor BARK EAST wereworkecl to capacity during "Husky". Thesalient feature of this period was the successof the L.S.T. (2), L.C.I. (L) and the D.U.K.W.flof which the latter were making their firstappearance in European waters: they fulfilledour highest expectations.

19. In general; it is considered that thebeach organisations worked satisfactorily,although Naval Commander Force "V" re-ported that his S.N.O.L.** organisations wereslow in settling down. The shortage of trans-port ashore to clear the beach dumps wascommented on by Task Group Commanders,and was aggravated by the very quick for-ward advance of the army. This is not likely,however, to obtain in future operations under-taken against a more determined enemy.

Admiralty footnotes:* L.C.R.—Landing Craft, Rocket.t L.C.G. (L)—Landing Craft, Gun (Large).t " Torch "—the code name for the landings in North

Africa.§ L.C.M.—Landing Craft, Mechanised.II L.S.T. (2>—a type of Landing Ship, Tank.if D.U.K.W.—ah amphibious vehicle.

** S.N.O.L.—Senior Naval Officer Landing.


20. The immunity from air attack was assurprising as it was satisfactory and consider-ably greater than I had been led to expect. Ourships were not attacked until 1015/10th July,when a raid was made on the ships at ACID.On subsequent days there were intermittent airattacks, principally on the east coast, and anincreasing number at night. It was fortunatethat more damage was not done by theseattacks; only three M.T. ships and one hospitalship were sunk by them. The hospital shipTALAMBA was deliberately attacked andsunk and the ABA and DORSETSHIRE werealso attacked whilst lying over five miles toseaward fully illuminated. It is regretted thatthe orders regarding the conduct of hospitalships were not sufficiently clear; it had alwaysbeen my intention that if hospital ships hadto remain off the beaches at night they shouldremain darkened and in the fleet anchorage,and that normally full illumination would onlybe switched on when five, miles clear of thebeaches and on passage to or from the assaultarea. It is clear that the illumination ofhospital ships stopped offshore provides theenemy with a temptation to- attack that istoo great to resist and, in consequence, afterthe TALAMBA incident hospital ships werekept in the arichorages all night without lights.This procedure is recommended for futureoccasions.

2L Syracuse was occupied at 2100/10thJuly, the port party entered during the fore-noon of llth July and the D + 3 personnel con-voy arrived there according to plan on 13thJuly: unloading all twelve ships and sailingthem again at 1800 the same day was a notableachievement. Attempts were made to enterAugusta which was reported as having beenevacuated at 0500 on 12th July but on her wayto do so ESKIMO with Naval CommanderForce "A" onboard was damaged in an airattack. Later in the day other ships of Force" A" again entered Augusta, and I myselfwent in in the evening in BROCKLESBY withNaval Commander Force " A ". At this timethe enemy on the outskirts of the town com-menced to shell our ships intermittently withfield guns and we had to clear out. I stronglysupport the recommendation of Naval Com-mander Force " A " that the foremost elementsof the army should have some means of notify-ing their positions to supporting warships, ason this occasion we saw a large amount ofM.T. which we thought belonged to the EighthArmy but which in fact belonged to the enemy.In consequence we missed an excellent andeasy target.

22. In accordance with my instructionsNaval Commander Force "V" took over theBARK sectors on 13th July hi order that NavalCommander Force " B" could proceed toSyracuse to take over the duties of Flag OfficerSicily. On visiting that port on 15th JulyI found a certain amount of confusion existingin the naval organisation which was absorbingthe attention of Rear-Admiral McGrigor, tothe detriment of the performance of hisfunctions as Flag Officer Sicily. As I wasanxious that he should proceed to and carryout these functions in Augusta without furtherdelay, and as I deemed it advisable that anaval officer of standing should be temporarilypresent in Syracuse to supervise, the NavalOfficer-in-Charge and put matters right, I

directed Naval Commander Force "A" toproceed there forthwith and Flag Officer Sicilyto carry on to Augusta.

23. A larger number of L.S.T. and majorlanding craft was found to be serviceable onD -1 than had been anticipated, and as aresult it was possible to commence loadingthe first flight of the ferry service before shipsand craft which had been engaged in theassaults had returned. The Eighth Army planwas to clear the high priority vehicles andstores from Malta before working craft in anynumbers from Sousse and Tripoli, and in thefirst seven days 56 L.S.T., 36 L.C.T. and 33L.C.I.(L) cleared loaded from Malta. Someinitial difficulty was experienced over the con-trol of the Ferry Service, as the Military Move-ments organisation set up in Malta did notappear adequate to meet the demands madeupon it, but after a shaky start things wentmuch better, and the planned programme wasfinally completed earlier than anticipated.' 24. It was decided, both to reduce signallingand to avoid delays to sailings, that the shortpassage between Malta and Sicily should bemade by L.S.T. and major landing craft en-gaged in the ferry service without makingany sailing signals. The organisation of aconvoy was often only completed immediatelybefore it sailed, and I am satisfied that thisapparently casual method was fully justifiedin order to continue the build-up of the armyas fast as possible. As far as I know therewas only one mishap; WALLACE engagedan L.C.I.(L) on the night of 12th/13th July,but happily only one rating was wounded. Itwould not have been possible to continue tosail these landing craft convoys in this manner,unescorted or only lightly escorted as theywere, had the weather not remained calm afterD day, and had there not been an increasingperiod of moonlight. Although the firstquarter of the moon at first sight appearedunfavourable for landing operations from thenaval aspect, in the event it proved greatlyto our advantage against a weak enemy andwith' our possession of great air superiority.

25. Major landing craft seemed to keep run-ning very well during the first few days ofthe operation, but my flag was struck at aboutthe time when I imagine that defects werebeginning to accumulate. It must alwaysremain a difficult decision in future operationsas to when to withdraw a proportion of land-ing craft for essential maintenance as the needfor this must be balanced against the vitalrequirement of following up the initial blowas expeditiously as possible.

26. It is greatly regretted that a number ofour troop-carrying aircraft were shot downby our ships off the east coast on 13th July.The question of the rules for the engagementof aircraft off the beaches was always a vexedone during planning, and the orders were twicealtered by agreement with the R.A.F. Asfinally framed, ships were free to open fire atnight at aircraft whose approach indicatedhostile intent, and it was stated that if friendlyaircraft had to fly over our convoys theywould do so above 6,000 feet. All troop-carrying aircraft were routed in lanes to avoidour convoys on the night of D- 1/D, but forthe second airborne attack on D + 3, they flewlow over the Gulf of Noto. It is understoodthat Mediterranean Air Command had


obtained the agreement of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to this some hoursearlier, and warning signals were at once sentby the latter to all ships and forces concerned.It is not certain that they did hi fact reachall the merchantmen, and by unfortunatechance a small number of enemy aircraft wasin the vicinity at the time our aircraft wereapproaching. As might be expected, firingwhich started spasmodically soon becamegeneral, and it is hard to blame ships forengaging low-flying aircraft which appeared tobe menacing them during an air raid. It isconsidered that in only very exceptional cir-cumstances should ships be deprived of theirright to open fire at low-flying aircraftapproaching them. The solution must bealways to route transport aircraft clear of ourshipping.

27. I cannot close this letter without payingtribute to the magnificent work throughout afistages of " Husky " of my Task Group Com-manders, Rear-Admirals R. R. McGrigor, C.B.,Sir Philip L. Vian, K.B.E., D.S.O., and T. H.Troubridge, D.S.O.—as well as that of CaptainLord Ashbourne. I could not have been moreefficiently and loyally supported by them norby my staff under Commodore C. E. Douglas-Pennant, D.S.C.

28. Although the enemy did not make adetermined attempt to prevent our assaults,conditions were not always easy, and it isconsidered that in general a very highstandard of seamanship and devotion to dutywas shown by officers and men of the EasternNaval Task Force.

(Signed) B. H. RAMSAY,Vice-Admiral,

Naval Commander,Eastern Task Force.

Commander-m-Chief, Mediterranean.

NARRATIVE OF THE OPERATION.D-l DAY.Friday, 9th July, 1943.

Naval Commander Eastern Task Forceassumed operational control of all his shipsand craft at noon. Leaving Malta in his Head-quarters ship, H.M.S. ANTWERP, at 0630,he proceeded to the southward to sight firstthe L.C.T. groups approaching from Sousseand Tripoli, carrying the supporting arms forthe assault, and later the fast and slow assaultconvoys from the Middle East and UnitedKingdom, all of which were in their assignedpositions and proceeding according to plan.The forces and landing craft starting from, orstaging through, Malta sailed as arrangedthroughout the day to join then* respectivegroup or convoy. H.M.S. ANTWERP re-turned to Calafrana in the evening to landthe Chief of Combined Operations, and sailedagain after dark for the scene of the landingssouth of Syracuse.

Weather.—The weather which in the earlymorning was good deteriorated throughout theday until in the evening the wind was force 6from the north-westward. A short steep searesulted which, while it did not interfere withthe timing of the ship convoys, had the effectof slowing down the craft convoys and drivingthem off their course to the eastward. The state

of the weather caused a certain amount ofanxiety regarding the suitability of conditionsoff the beaches for carrying out the assault,but the question of suggesting a postponementdid not come to be seriously considered.

Enemy reports.—No reports of enemy air-craft were received during the day.

D DAY.Saturday, IQth July.

Weather.—After midnight the wind com-menced to decrease in strength and the dawnushered in a perfect blue Mediterranean day.

The Assaults.The detailed accounts of the various assaults

are given in the reports of the respective TaskGroup Commanders, etc., and only a generaloutline will be found in this narrative.

A. BARK WEST.The fast assault convoy (K.M.F. 18) under

Naval Commander Force " V " anchored abouthalf-an-hour late, in a position subsequentlyfound to be two miles to the eastward of theplanned release position.

(i) SUGAR Sector.Considerable swell was still running hi this

sector, but the first assault flight were quicklyand successfully lowered, and moved off notmore than ten minutes behind schedule. Thesecond flight were at once lowered and weregot away only fifteen minutes late (/.«., 0155).The two flights beached on their correctbeaches five and eighteen minutes late respec-tively. A runnel with nine feet of waterinside a bank off the beaches, of which warninghad been received while on passage from U.K.,was encountered but all craft were carriedover it by the surf.

The loading of serials* was put under wayimmediately the other craft had departed, butwas slow on account of the swell.

Shortly after 0330 success signals wereobserved and about 0415 a signal was receivedthat the shore was ready to take serials.

The Royal Marine Commandos alsosuccessfully landed and reported about 0330.The batteries which formed their objectiveproved to be dummies, and they suffered onlya few casualties.

These landings were made without surprisebeing lost and there was little opposition atthe beaches; in fact it was not until the firstflight was leaving the shore that machine-gunfire was opened.

The first L.C.A. reported back to theirparent ship about 0430. Naval casualtiesamounted to two wounded.

(ii) ROGER Sector.Having regard to the runnel mentioned above

an alternative plan was devised and orderedwhereby the troops would embark in L.C.T.instead of L.C.A. at the release position andthen be launched in D.U.K.W. on reaching therunnel.

The L.C.T. duly arrived and loaded fromS.S. MARNDC VAN SAINT ALDEGONDE,but none reached H.M.S. GLENGYLE and

Admiralty footnote:* Serials—convoys of ships or groups of landing craft

when employed on regular ferry service between portsor from ship to shore, were organised as a " series " andeach passage or trip was given a " serial" number.


on instructions from the Naval CommanderForce " A " she loaded her L.CA. as originallyplanned. This necessitated the reorganisationof her troops and it was not until nearly 0230that her craft were ready for lowering and itwas 0315 before the first flight got away owingto the second flight from S.S. DERBYSHIREpersisting in an attempt to form up at the sametime. The beach was found without difficultywith the aid of the Folbot* from the mark-ing submarine.

The first flight from H.M.S. GLENGYLEbeached about 0500; .the second flight fromS.S. DERBYSHIRE at 0520; and theremainder from S.S. MARNIX at 0545.

The first flight from H.M.S. GLENGYLEwas met by a little machine-gun opposition,which was effectively dealt with by L.C.S.ffrom S.S. MARNIX. There were no casualtiesto craft personnel.

ROGER GREEN I and n beaches were usedfor the assault as in the light of conflictinginformation they appeared to be the best. Inthe event all the ROGER beaches were foundto be shallow with constantly changing sand-banks, except ROGER RED which, though verysmall and rocky, was shown by a survey to bethe most suitable for all types of landing craft.There was also an appreciable and abnormaltidal effect and many L.C.M. were strandedand could not be re-floated for some tune.H.M.S. BOXER, THRUSTER and BRUISERwere unable to beach within a reasonabledistance from the shore and had to be un-loaded by L.C.T*

Slow assault convoy arrives.—The slowassault convoy K.M.S. 18 arrived on time atthe release position and brought up in .theappointed anchorage.

Inner anchorage occupied.—Shortly beforedaylight, Naval Commander Force "V" inH.M.S. HILARY led into the intermediateanchorage after the approach channel had beenswept. A searching sweep indicated that theinner anchorage was free of mines and at 0900shipping was entered into the bay.

By midday both S.N.O.L.(R) andS.N.O.L.(S) had moved ashore. A reasonablerate of unloading was continuously maintainedand at 1630 the L.S.I.(L) and L.S.P4 had com-pleted disembarkation and sailed for Malta.

B. BARK SOUTH.In spite of the weather which made station

keeping by L.C.I.(L) very difficult, the assaultconvoy for BARK SOUTH was only fifteenminutes late when it anchored. L.C.A. weregot promptly away from the L.S.I.(M), butthe swell made it difficult for L.CI.(L), bothin coming alongside and in embarking theirtroops.

However, at 0115 the signal for the assaultparty to proceed was given, and the craft movedoff with the exception of some L.C.I.(L) whichhad not completed loading ; these followed laterdirect to the beaches.

The landings on RED beaches were made totune though two to three hundred yards to thewestward of the correct position in the case

Admiralty footnotes:* Folbot—a collapsible rubber boat.t L.C.S.—Landing Craft, Support.} L.S.P.—Landing Ship, Personnel.

of RED III. The GREEN beaches were foundcorrectly but owing to the weather more tunethan anticipated was required for the passageand the landings were forty minutes late.

Opposition was everywhere slight, surprisebeing complete or almost so. At the GREENlandings some casualties were suffered inL.C.I. from machine-gun fire and hi the REDsector an L.C.A. received several direct hitsfrom a jnortar.

The L.C.T. convoy were late but proceededdirect to the waiting position arriving thereat 0330. The majority had beached by firstlight.

All RED and GREEN beaches were found tobe smaller than expected, and there was somecongestion, particularly when the ReserveBrigade went hi at first light. Notwithstandingthis all L.C.I. and L.C.T. had beached anddischarged by about 0745.

Between 0800 and 0900 reconnaissance ofAMBER beach by land and water proved, asanticipated by the military, that this beach wasonly lightly defended. The only oppositionwas one burst of machine-gun fire, immediatelysilenced by a broadside from EGGESFORD.

By midday AMBER beach was in use, withL.C.I. beaching there in formation. A rockypromontory at the eastern end was found suit-able for L.S.T. and needing only a little workto make it into an excellent hard. Elsewherea false beach with three feet of water inshorecaused some inconvenience and necessitatedthe use of D.U.K.W. and a pontoon.

The three L.S.I.(M) were sailed for Sousseat 1400 followed at 2100 by the first convoyof empty L.S.T. for Malta. Empty L.C.I.(L)had been proceeding to Malta in groups as,and when, ready since 0900. H.M.S. ROYALULSTERMAN was retained by S.N.O.L.(Q)as his headquarters.

C. BARK EAST.When approaching Sicily it was found that

the southerly set was stronger than had beenanticipated but allowance was made for thisand the convoy stopped in the correct posi-tion at 0030/10th July. All landing craft werelowered on arrival.

All flights touched down at the correct time,and the sea inshore being calm, all landingswere made without difficulty. Surprise waslost fifty yards from the shore and lightmachine-gun fire and sniping were encounteredby most on the beach. L.C.S. and L.C.F.*replied with effect and only slight military, butno naval, casualties were suffered. Only atRED beach was any serious opposition met andthis was disposed of by troops landed onSCRAMBLE RED. Throughout the assault onlyone landing craft was lost—an L.CP.f burntout after being hit in the petrol tank by ashell splinter.

Although the beaches had been cleared, noprogress could be made in the landing of sup-porting arms until nearly 0700 when the firstL.C.T. arrived via BARK SOUTH, having beendelayed and diverted by the weather.

At 0520 the coastal battery north of Pachinobegan a barrage on a line about 200 yards offAdmiralty footnotes:

* L.C.F.—Landing Craft, Flak.t L.C.P.—Landing Craft, Personnel.

208$ SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 APRIL, 1950

the beaches without doing serious damage andin less than an hour-and-a-half was virtuallyneutralised by the Dutch gunboats SOEMBAand FLORES.

At 0615 the slow assault convoy arrived atthe release position and a searching sweep byM.M.S. (L.L.)* and fleet sweepers having re-vealed no mines, at 0640 all ships were orderedto the anchorage. It was reached by the lead-ing ships about 0740. The ferry service thenstarted and all personnel were ashore by noonwith army baggage and light stores soon after.

By 1400 S.N.O.L. (N) had transferred toH.M.S. ALYNBANK, and K.M.S. KERENand the personnel ships sailed for Malta.

D. ACID SOUTH and ACID NORTH.The marking submarine was in the correct

position and no difficulty was experienced inpicking up her transmissions and the screenedsignal lamp. Swell caused some difficulty inembarking troops in L.C.I. (L), and wind andsea made some formations late in getting underway. .

The assault waves touched down up to thirtyminutes late, but with one exception the cor-rect beaches were all found.

Although the wind had considerably de-creased the big ships were quickly set down toleeward: Le+ the south-eastward: and thefollow-up flights had considerably more thanthe planned distance to cover.

There was little organised resistance to thelandings and after a short period of heavymachine-gun fire the defenders withdrew. Afew casualties were caused by mines on onebeach before it was cleared. Success signalsWere received from all beaches by 0500 andships were then ordered to close the shorewithout waiting for the anchorage to be sweptfor mines.

From first light onwards there was consider-able shelling from batteries inshore, but thesewere silenced by supporting destroyers andgunboats by 0800.

The arrival of L.C.T. with supporting armswas rather disorganised, and none beached be-fore daylight. Two of the beaches at AeroNORTH intended for use by L.C.T. were foundto be composed of large boulders instead ofthe shingle indicated by the air photographs,a fact which did not make easier the task ofbeaching the craft and discharging them. Theslow assault convoy arrived an hour-and-a-halflate, but all had taken up their anchor berthsby 0700.

The first large personnel ship completed dis-charging by 0900 and all, with one exception,had disembarked personnel and baggage andhoisted their craft by 1415. With four-ex-ceptions they were on passage to Malta at1500.

The rate of discharge of L.C.T. was slow,but the unloading of the slow convoy pro-ceeded satisfactorily in spite of being unableto discharge L.S.T. and L.C.T. at most of thebeaches without pontoon bridging and difficul-ties with wheeled vehicles due to heavy shingleand soft sand.

Admiralty footnote:* M.M.S. (L.L.)—motor minesweepers.

Gun Support.The following details of gun support are

available:—A. BARK WEST.

Since the assaults met little opposition, firefrom the destroyers in support was confined toa few rounds only and L.C.S. were able tofurnish all the support needed on the beaches.

Between 0415 and 0542, when the batterywas silenced, H.M.S. BLANKNEY at a rangeof 6,000 yards fired 80 rounds at P.4 battery inROGER sector. At 0740 another 37 rounds;were fired at the same battery, fire ceasing-when our troops were seen in the vicinity.

H.M.S. ROBERTS carried out three shootsin the course of the day:

(i) at 0510. Impromptu from anchor at arange of 15,000 yards against the CasaGuUiano battery of five 149 mm. guns whichhad fired .about a dozen rounds haphazardat landing craft without scoring a hit. After/ten rounds from H.M.S. ROBERTS thebattery was silenced.

(ii) 0540, another four rounds from 15,000yards for the second time silenced the samebattery which had again opened ineffectivefire at craft on and close to the beach.

(iii) 1556, at the request of the army, fourr-teen rounds were fired at the southern out-skirts of Spaccaforno and the . area wasobserved to be well covered by the fall ofshot.H.M.S. BRISSENDEN also carried out

several shoots:(i) at 0645, at a range.of 3,800 yards, six

smoke shell to thicken the screen laid byL.C.S. on SUGAR RED beach. Result wasgood.

(ii) 1550 to 1600 at anchor, range 11,000yards, with H.M.S. ROBERTS, at southernoutskirts of Spaccaforno, 90 rounds in salvosseen to be spread with effect over the area.

(iii) 1825, on call from Forward Observa-tion Officer 84 rounds fired at infantry atCasa Basile. Result very effective.H.M.S. PUCKERIDGE.

(i) 0515, fire opened impromptu at flashesfrom four guns of 149 mm. of the CasaChiusa battery which were firing irregularlyand without success at landing craft. Fromanchor, range 9,200-8,800 yards, eightrounds. Result—battery ceased fire and wascaptured by troops soon after.

(ii) 0532, at gun flashes from Casa.Guiliano battery when it opened fire againafter H.M.S. ROBERTS' first shoot. Range8,000 yards, eight rounds. Result—shot seen •to fall in target area, and battery ceasedfire.

(iii) 0600, the last mentioned battery againopened fire and H.M.S. PUCKERIDGEwas ordered in to eliminate it. At ranges6,000-4,200 yards, twenty rounds were firedunder way and the battery which had con-stituted almost the only opposition to the

• landing was finally silenced.Three of the four L.C.G. (L) in Force " V "

engaged direct targets during the assault, andfired ten rounds H.E. full charge each. Anammunition dump was blown up by L.C.G. (L)9 with her seventh round at 500 yards range.


B. BARK SOUTH.(i) Between 0308 and 0420, three L.C.T. (R)*

carried out pre-arranged shoots on flank targetsat the beaches.

(ii) After daylight H.M.S. WHADDON andEGGESFORD gave close support and threeL.C.G. also fired a few rounds. H.M.S.LAFOREY also joined in the silencing ofmachine-guns at Portopalo Bay.

(iii) Later in the day ships of the Bombard-ing Squadron (H.M.S. NEWFOUNDLAND,ORION, LAFOREY, LOYAL, LOOKOUT)fired direct shoots at areas five miles inlandincluding Rosolini and Spaccaforno.

C. BARK EAST.L.C.S. and L.C.F. replied with effect to the

machine-gun fire and sniping encountered bythe assault craft on beaching.

H.N.M.S. SOEMBA and FLORES engageda battery 2,000 yards north of Pachino at 0533,which with five guns of 100 mm. had been firingat the rate of one round per gun per minute adefensive barrage on a line about 200 yards offthe beaches. The two ships underway and keep-ing station on dan buoys, at ranges of 7,000and 7,800 yards respectively, fired in periodsuntil 0645 when the battery was virtuallyneutralised.

D. Aero SOUTH and NORTH.Bombardments were carried out as fol-

lows:—(i) By H.M.S. MAURITIUS.

(a) at 0600, fire was opened on a coastdefence battery which had been worryingHow and JIG beaches. After thirty-sixrounds had been fired no further shellingoccurred from this direction althoughgreat difficulty was experienced in locat-ing the target.

(b) at 0840, in response to a call, a de-fended area was bombarded for fiveminutes, the shells appearing, from visualobservation, to hit the required area.(ii) By H.M.S. ESKIMO.

(a) at 0545 at a range of 10,000 yards,five salvos were fired at a battery con-cealed among trees north-east of Avolawhich had been dropping shells on Howsector. The battery ceased fire.

(6) at 0610, at another battery shellingHow beaches. The battery quickly ceasedfire but opened up again soon after. Thebombardment was resumed at 0715 andafter the sixth salvo there was an explosionand fire at the position of the battery fromwhich nothing further was heard.(iii) By H.M.S. TETCOTT.

(a) at 0510, opened fire at a batterywhich had been shelling JIG beaches, anddrew its fire which was very inaccurate.

(b) at 0559, changed target to anotherbattery giving trouble at the beaches, butas H.M.S. MAURITIUS opened fire atabout the same time, reverted to first tar-get so as not to confuse her, the firstbattery having again come into action.The battery ceased fire as a result.

(c) at 0641, opened fire at a third bat-tery of three guns, which ceased fire.

Admiralty footnote:* L.C.T. (R)—Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket).

(iv) By H.M.S. TARTAR.(a) at 0410, fire was opened at two

searchlights in the vicinity of Avola, whichwere extinguished.(v) By H.M.S. EREBUS.

(a) at 1415, fire was opened on an in-fantry defended post with six pill boxes.Target reported destroyed after twelverounds at 12,600 yards had all beenspotted and corrected upon the target, in-cluding two direct hits and seven withinone hundred yards of the centre of thetarget.

(&) at 1945 at a range of 18,700 yards,six rounds fired at another infantry de-fended post. Five direct hits and targetreported by Forward Observation Officeras destroyed.

Enemy Air Activity.Prior to the landings enemy air activity

against the expedition was non-existent and itwas only slight throughout D day. Somedetails were as follows: —

A. BARK WEST.Shortly after 2200, an attack was made on

the anchorage in the course of which a stickof bombs fell close between H.M.S.HAMBLEDON and H.M.S. WALLACE.Flares dropped by the aircraft were effectivebut the anchorage was heavily protected bysmoke and no damage was sustained.

B. BARK SOUTH.There were indications of air activity, but

no bombs were dropped. One low-flying air-craft was shot down after dark.

C. BARK EAST.(i) At 0550 two Me. 109 made a cannon-

fire attack on RED beach; one stoker of anL.C.S. was wounded.

(ii) From 2010 to midnight there were inter-mittent attacks on the ships and H.M.S.ALYNBANK was near missed by a diveattack, two ratings being killed.

D. ACID NORTH and SOUTH.While waiting to cover the later flights two

L.C.S. (M) were machine-gunned by an air-craft and some minor casualties were suffered ;the aircraft was seriously damaged. Thenbetween 0630 and 0700 fighter bombersappeared overhead but no bombs weredropped. Next, at 1015 about ten Ju. 88 andsome F.W. 190 dropped bombs in the vicinityof shipping. During the afternoon two L.C.T.were damaged by near misses and in furtherintermittent attacks, including an attack byforty aircraft at 1630, near misses on S.S.BERGENSFIORD and L.S.T. 407 were theonly incidents of note.

Night attacks began soon after 2100 and aconsiderable number of bombs scored nodirect hits until 2200, when the hospital shipTALAMBA, lying illuminated five miles toseaward of GEORGE sector, was sunk in adeliberate attack. Another hospital ship,ABA, was attacked at the same time, butescaped damage.

D + 1 DAY.Sunday, llth July.

Weather.—Weather and sea conditionscontinued to improve at all sectors, though


some wind and surf persisted at BARK WESTand ACID.Situation at beaches.A. BARK WEST.

The beaches assaulted were unsatisfactoryfor maintenance owing to flat gradients, thesandbars already mentioned, and poor exits.SUGAR RED beach I was opened and provedsatisfactory for L.C.M. and vehicles and gunswere unloaded here throughout the day, whileL.S.T. and L.C.T. discharged on to ROGERRED. Unloading as a whole was slow, someof the delays being attributable to the in-experience of the men handling the VehicleLanding Ramp, its liability to "snake" andthe length of time required for adjustmentwhen an L.S.T. came up to it.

H.M.S. BOXER, T H R U S T E R andBRUISER having completed, sailed with threeM.T. ships for Malta, leaving twelve ships ofthe slow assault convoy to complete dis-charging.B. BARK SOUTH.

Unloading of L.S.T. continued satisfactorilythroughout the day and by nightfall nearly allof the first flight was unloaded and twenty hadsailed for Malta with H.M.S. ROYALULSTERMAN, S.N.O.L. (Q) having landedand established himself and party ashore atAMBER beach. The General Officer Com-manding 30 Corps had also disembarkedduring the afternoon and set up his head-quarters ashore. At 1900 H.M.S. LARGSsailed for BARK EAST and the A/S patrol offBARK SOUTH was discontinued, the destroyersthus released reinforcing the patrol at BARKEAST.C. BARK EAST.

Unloading at this sector was delayed as aresult of the time required for dischargingL.C.T. with 51 Division stores which had beentransferred from BARK SOUTH owing to thepoor beaches in the latter area. In addition,L.S.T. 9, also from BARK SOUTH, grounded onIsola Grande.D. ACID SOUTH and NORTH.

The only outstanding incident was thesuccessful launching of D.U.K.W. from L.S.T.over the ramp while the L.S.T. were underway. It was found that this method of dis-charge presented no difficulty in fine weather.

Good progress was made with unloadingM.T. and stores, the flow to the beachesincreasing steadily and much of the arrearsdue to delays in discharging L.C.T. theprevious day was made up.

Large L.S.I. sail from Malta.—ConvoyM.K.F. 18 consisting of eleven large L.S.I,sailed from Malta westbound and soon aftermidday twelve similar ships left eastbound inM.E.F. 36.

Malta shuttle service begins.—The firstempty landing ships and craft arrived back atMalta from Sicily and the shuttle service com-menced. The first empty M.T. ships were alsosailed from the beaches.Gun Support.

Supporting fire was provided by ships atvarious points as required from time to time.In particular:

(i) between 0030 and 0250, at the requestof 1st Canadian Division, H.M.S. ROBERTS

fired from anchor four rounds in each ofthree prearranged shoots from 12,400 yardsat high ground in the Pozzallo area.H.M.S. BLANKNEY and BLENCATHRAhad earlier in the night carried out harassingfire on the same area. The object of theseshoots, which was achieved, was to forcethe enemy to retire before the Divisionadvanced at 0300.

(ii) between 1130 and 1205, simultaneouslywith a shoot by H.M.S. DELHI on Spacca-forao and by H.M.S. BRISSENDEN onPozzallo, H.M.S. ROBERTS on request from1st Canadian Division carried out a pre-arranged shoot on an area N.E. and S.W.of Rosplini in which the enemy were con-centrating. At a range of 18,000 yards, 30rounds were fired from anchor, the area beingswept three times. All enemy troops whocame under this fire were demoralised andsurrendered promptly.

(iii) H.M.S. BRISSENDEN, under way,fired 40 rounds at a gun emplacement and120 rounds at a building and area in thevicinity of Pozzallo. At the conclusion ofthe shoot a white flag was hoisted on thegun emplacement.

(iv) H.M.S. ORION carried out a bom-bardment of Medica at the rear of BARKWEST.

(v) H.M.S. UGANDA engaged a hostilebattery at the southern end of Augusta Bay.

(vi) H.M.S. UGANDA and MAURITIUSbombarded the enemy's line of retreat hithe vicinity of Augusta.

Enemy Air Activity.There was rather more activity by enemy

aircraft and it was more widespread than onD day. Some particulars follow: —

A. BARK WEST.Sporadic attacks during the night D day/

D + l day caused no damage to ships butwere responsible for a few casualties.

B. BARK SOUTH.No loss or damage was suffered, though

there were several " Red " warnings.

C. Aero SOUTH and NORTH.Several sharp raids took place and at 1235,

S.S. BAARN at anchor off JIG sector wasnear missed by a Ju.88 and cased petrol inNo. 1 hold set on fire. The fire became un-controllable and in view of the risk of a seriousammunition explosion she was later sunk.Another M.T. ship JOSEPH C. CANNON offHow received a direct hit at about 1900, butalthough the ship's bottom was penetrated nofire resulted as the hold was nearly emptyand she was eventually able to proceed toMalta. Raids after dark were ineffective.

Syracuse occupied.—The army entered Syra-cuse at 2100 on 10th July, and at 0600/11thJuly, fleet sweepers and B.Y.M.S.*, escorted byH.M.S. NUBIAN and H.M.S. TARTAR, pro-ceeded to sweep the approach channel intothe port. No mines were swept; there wasno opposition, and at 0830 H.M.S. WHITE-HAVEN passed through the gate. NavalCommander Force "A" entered in H.M.S.CROMARTY shortly after, and the majority

Admiralty footnote:* B.Y.M.S.—British Yacht Minesweeper.


of the port party landed at the same time.The boom and gate were intact, though inpoor condition in spite of the existence ofspare gear on the spot. The town was almostdeserted. There was no damage to port in-stallations apart from that caused by our ownaircraft on the night of the beach assaults.About 2130, Naval Commander Force "A"advised that all personnel ships of the con-voys due on D + 3 day should proceed 'toSyracuse to discharge.

Pozzallo occupied.—Following the bombard-ment by H.M.S. BRISSENDEN mentionedabove, the white flag was hoisted and H.M.S.BRISSENDEN closed the town of Pozzallo.The Bombardment Liaison Officer and anarmed party landed and accepted the surrenderat 1315, returning on board with 98 prisoners.The port was found to be useless for unloadingeither vessels or craft.

A.A. cruisers transferred.—To strengthenthe defence of the ACID anchorages which hadso far borne the greater part of the enemy'sair attacks, H.M.S. DELHI, hitherto at BARKWEST, was transferred to the orders of NavalCommander Force " A " from noon.

H.M.S. COLOMBO from Force "V" wastransferred to the Western Task Force to re-inforce the protection of Gela anchorage whereenemy aircraft were also troublesome.

D+2 DAY.Monday, 12th July.

Weather.—Weather continued fine, and onthe whole less inconvenience was experiencedfrom swell at the anchorages and beaches,though it still retarded the rate of dischargeat the western end of the area. *

Situation at beaches.A. BARK WEST.

" G" Naval Commando moved fromSUGAR sector to BARK SOUTH and " N " Com-mando took over SUGAR sector in addition toROGER.

M.T. continued to come in on SUGAR REDI beach and a number of L.C.T. beached atSUGAR RED n. The exits from these beacheswere only moderate, and the roads behindbad, while approximately one vehicle in threewas " drowned " getting ashore. Accordinglyit was decided that S.N.O.L. (S) should trans-fer to BARK SOUTH (QUEEN sector) and receivethe follow-up convoy, while S.N.O.L. (R) re-mained to complete the discharge of the assaultconvoy over ROGER sector. Stores began tocome in at about midday, and an urgent callfor petrol in the evening was met by unload-ing from L.C.T. throughout the night.

B. BARK SOUTH and EAST.At 0600 the first follow-up convoy of L.S.T.

arrived at BARK SOUTH and commenced tobeach and unload during the forenoon. Allthe original L.S.T. and L.C.T. completed un-loading by the afternoon. The rocky ledgeat the eastern end of AMBER beach had beenlevelled and improved by this time to an extentwhich enabled five L.S.T. to be discharged ata time.

Two M.T. ships from BARK WEST arrived atBARK SOUTH and commenced to discharge bymeans of D.U.K.W.

Naval Commander Force " B " decided thatas soon as the M.T. ships of the assault convoy

were cleared BARK EAST beaches should bekept open mainly for 51 Division stores inL.C.T. which were becoming congested at BARKSOUTH and that S.S. D1OMED, the onlyfollow-up ship destined for BARK EAST, shouldbe diverted to BARK SOUTH.

Late in the evening the two Category " A "ships of the assault convoy completed unload-ing (the third had been sunk en route).

C. (i) ACID SOUTH.Discharge was completed of the four Class

" A " M.T. ships of the assault convoy and thestevedores thus released were transferred to theClass "B" ships.

(ii) ACID NORTH.At 1900 an additional beach, called BLUE,

was opened at the northern end of the sectorand proved satisfactory for both L.C.T. andL.C.M. though inadequate approaches andshortage of labour precluded its use for land-ing stores.

Gun Support.Supporting fire was provided by ships as and

when required and opportunity offered.H.M.S. MAURITIUS had a busy day and

carried out shoots as follows :—(a) from 0830 to 0900, in response to an'

urgent call for support, Mellili was effectivelyengaged.

(b) at 0930, a coast battery was engagedand gave no further trouble.

(c) at 1115, in response to an immediatecall, a battery north of Priolo which washolding up the army's advance was effectivelyengaged. After a short bombardment theForward Observation Officer reported thetarget destroyed.

(d) at 1205, fire, reported effective fromdirect observation, was again opened onMellili.

(e) at 1251, a strong point near Augustawas bombarded at the request of the army.

(/) at 1340, Mellili was again bombarded,direct observation indicating that the firewas effective.

(g) at 1403, the target was another de-fended post and the Forward ObservationOfficer reported the shoot as particularlysatisfactory.

(h) at 1500, an accurate and successfulshoot on a defended area near Augusta.

(0 from 1532 to 1541, direct fire in theAugusta area.

(/) from 1834 to 1843, a successful shootat a coast defence battery.

(&) at 2006, an effective shoot on Augustadefences in support of a commando landingfrom H.M.S. ULSTER MONARCH.H.M.S. TETCOTT, in support of the com-

mando landing from H.M.S. ULSTERMONARCH,

(d) at 1930, engaged and silenced a lighthigh velocity gun on the ridge overlookingAugusta.

(6) at about the same time, effectivelybombarded at a range of three cables with4-inch pom-pom and Oerlikon a cementworks near the shore from which machine-gun fire was observed.


H.M.S. EREBUS was also well occupiedduring the day carrying out the followingshoots:—

(a) from 0542 to 0602, coast defence bat-teries, range 1,800 yards, rounds 27. Targetarea covered.

(b) from 0628 to 0634, anti-aircraftbattery, range 2,650 yards, rounds 10.Target area covered.

(c) from 0653 to 0658, coast defencebattery, range 3,000 yards, rounds 6. Targetarea covered, probable ammunition dumpblown up.

(d) from 0744 to 0747, coast defencebattery, range 14,800 yards, rounds 6. Targetarea covered, and barracks observed hit.

(e) from 0749 to 0756, coast defencebattery, range 3,000 yards, rounds 8. Targetarea covered and explosion observed.

(f) from 1018 to 1029, coast defencebatteries, range 11,000 yards, rounds 13.Target area covered and explosion observed.

(g) from 1031 to 1033, same coast defence. batteries, range 10,000 yards, rounds 7.

Target area covered and on closing to twomiles, guns in first target observed appar-ently intact but building immediately behinddamaged. Guns of second target badlydamaged.

(K) from 1050 to 1058, H.A. battery, range12,600 yards, rounds 10. Indirect shoot, nospotting.

(0 from 1132 to 1142, town of Mellili,range 18,300 yards, rounds 12, of which 8observed to fall in target area.

(/) from 1338 to 1400, town of Mellili,range 18,000 yards, rounds 32. Whole areaof town covered.H.M.S. ORION and UGANDA also carried

out bombardments in the vicinity of Mellili andAugusta in the course of the day.

Enemy Air Activity.Once again the northern end of the area ex-

perienced the heaviest attacks during a daywhen activity was on much the same scab asthe previous day. Details :—

A. BARK WEST.There was slight activity at dawn, and one

aircraft was shot down by a night fighter con-trolled by the radar set in L.C.T. 305.

B. BARK SOUTH.A raid warning in the early hours left BARK

SOUTH untouched. On this occasion M.L.s*put up a very effective smoke screen. Afternightfall, further warnings, with aircraft pass-ing overhead, still produced no bombs.

C. BARK EAST.The hospital ship DORSETSHIRE had

arrived the previous afternoon and before night-fall had been sent to sea by S.N.O.L.(N) so asto be well clear of the assault area and illumi-nated during the night. Nevertheless, at 0500 /12th July, she was attacked and sustained somestructural damage and casualties from nearmisses. Though the attacks on the anchoragewere of some weight no other damage wascaused.

Admiralty footnote:* M.L.s Motor Launches.

Following the experience of TALAMBA andDORSETSHIRE the latter and AMRA werefor the night of 12th/13th July darkened andanchored close to the convoy so as to have thebenefit of the anti-aircraft and smoke protec-tion of the anchorage.

D. ACID SOUTH and NORTH.At 0500, H.M.S. ESKIMO, when about three

miles to the southward of Cape Murro di Porcoon her way with Naval Commander Force"A" to investigate the situation at Augusta,was attacked by several aircraft and hit inNos. 5 and 6 oil fuel tanks. The ship stoppedand was ordered to Malta in tow of H.M.S.TARTAR; they arrived at 1700 withoutfurther incident.

At dawn an attack developed off JIG sectorand a near miss at the fore end of S.S. OCEANPEACE caused a fire in the cased petrol inNo. 1 hold. The fire could not be controlledand the ship had to be sunk to prevent furtherdisaster. The usual raids after dark onanchorage and beaches were again ineffective,causing only a few casualties ashore. A goodsmoke screen was put up before the raidsbegan.

Augusta entered.—Late the previous nightthere had been a report that Augusta wasbeing evacuated by the enemy and in execu-tion of orders from Naval Commander EasternTask Force, sweepers proceeded to sweep thechannel at first light. They were not molestedby coast defence batteries, which were underoccasional fire from H.M.S. EREBUS to keepthem quiet, but a field gun opened fire on theB.Y.M.S. (L.L.) when on their last leg out

At 1045, 'H.M.S. EXMOOR, flying the flagof Naval Commander Force "A"—he hadtransferred from H.M.S. ESKIMO after shehad been bombed—proceeded into the harbour.The gate was open and the boom vesselabandoned, and there was no sign of life untila field gun, or possibly a tank, concealedbehind trees, began shelling the ship at shortrange. The fire was accurate, and as no targetcould be distinguished EXMOOR was orderedout. No counter shoot could be conductedowing to the proximity of our own troops.

N.C.E.T.F. enters Augusta.—H.M.S. EX-MOOR with the Greek Hunt class destroyerKANARIS in company re-entered the port at16pO followed later by H.M.S. BROCKLESBYflying the flag of Naval Commander EasternTask Force. Again the ships had to withdrawbecause of fire from high velocity guns of 3 to4-inch calibre to which no adequate replycould be made owing to uncertainty in regardto the exact whereabouts of our own troops.Much transport was seen in motion ashore, butcould not be engaged as it was not knownwhether they were friend or foe—they were infact enemy.

Late in the evening one of the brigades of5 Division penetrated into the town, and thenaval port party arrived from Malta. Thearmy's hold was, however, precarious, and laterthe S.B. Squadron, S.A.S. Regiment* wassuccessfully landed by H.M.S. ULSTERMONARCH as a reinforcement. In conse-quence of this uncertainty and a statement bythe Brigadier that he might have to retire fromAdmiralty footnote:

* S.B. Squadron, S.A.S. Regiment—Special BoatSquadron, Special Air Service Regiment.


the town, the Naval Officer-in-Charge tempo-rarily withdrew his party except for some keyratings.

H.M.S. ROBERTS to Acid North.—H.M.S.ROBERTS from Force "V" was ordered.tomove to ACID NORTH ready to be called for-ward either to join Force " K " or to supple-ment the anti-aircraft defences of capturedports as and when required. In the meantimeshe was placed under the orders of Naval Com-mander Force " A ".

U-boats.—Although. it was estimated thatsome eighteen Italian U-boats were at sea inthe area of operations of the Eastern andWestern Task Forces there had so far been nocontact with' any. This day, however, severalwere encountered.

H.M.S. OAKLEY claimed a "probablysunk " in the vicinity of Sousse, and the GreekHunt class destroyer PINDOS was unsuccess-fully attacked two miles east of Cape Passeroat 0445. , The latter U-boat was counter-attacked, and one pattern of depth chargesdropped, but though A/S vessels hunted untilnoon no further contact was obtained. '

BRONZO captured.—While the 14th Mine-sweeping Flotilla were engaged in screening thecruisers bombarding Augusta, H.M.S. SEA-HAM sighted a periscope shortly before 1300and closed at full speed with the intention oframming. The U-boat surfaced and fire wasopened on it with all possible weapons and hitswere observed on the conning tower with the3-inch. The U-boat replied, but surrenderedafter a sharp engagement, which had lastedabout half-an-hour. The U-boat was the ItalianBRONZO, and she was towed by H.M.S. SEA-HAM to Syracuse. Twenty prisoners weretaken out of a crew of forty, the remainder in-cluding the Commanding Officer having beenkilled by gunfire or drowned when abandoningship.

H.M.S. BLANKNEY and BRISSENDEN incollision.-^While on A/S patrol off BARKWEST, H.M.S. BLANKNEY and H.M.S.BRISSENDEN came into collision. Both sus-tained damage and were detached to Malta forrepairs, BRISSENDEN proceeding there p.m.12th July and BLANKNEY p.m. 13th July.

D + 3DAY. ,Tuesday, 13th July.

Weather,—The weather remained fine, andthe calm sea permitted the passage to Sicilyfrom Malta of lighters and harbour craft foruse in the captured ports.

N.C.F.V. takes 'over from N.C.F.B.—In pur-suance of orders given by Naval CommanderEastern Task Force when in Sicily the previousday, Naval Commander Force "V" at 0400took over the BARK areas from Naval Com-mander Force " B " who proceeded to Syra-cuse to assume duty as Flag Officer Sicily.

Situation at beaches.A. BARK SOUTH.

S.N.O.L.(Q) left for Sousse during the fore-noon and S.N.O.L.(S) from BARK WEST tookover the sector.

The follow-up convoys, K.M.F. and K.M.S.19, consisting of three personnel, fourteenM.T. ships and two petrol carriers arrivedat BARK" SOUTH" at 0700. Unloading of M.T.by L.C.T. and of stores by a fleet of about

fifty D.U.K.W. began at once. By 1630 thepersonnel ships, using L.C.I.(L) and L.C.M.,had discharged and by 1930 sailed for Malta,in addition to four M.T. ships of the slowassault convoy for Tripoli. This left eight shipsof the slow assault convoy and the newcomersremaining at the beaches.B. BARK EAST and WEST,

Naval Commander Force "V" decided inthe forenoon to continue his predecessor'spolicy of using BARK EAST only for L.C.T.when the assault convoy M.T. ships had beencleared. This entailed all ships, as opposed tocraft, leaving BARK EAST p.m. and resulted inthe S.N.O.L. ship H.M.S. ALYNBANK beingwithdrawn. The latter was in any case par-ticularly needed to increase the anti-aircraftprotection at BARK SOUTH.

In the afternoon, however, there was a par-tial reversal of this plan when, with a viewto avoiding the increased concentration atBARK SOUTH which would result from the deci-sion to close BARK WEST, the Naval Com-mander Force " V " ordered three nearly emptyM.T. ships from BARK WEST to BARK EASTthe following day. The one ship of the follow-up convoy for BARK EAST which had beendiverted, was also sent back there.

The decision to close BARK WEST wasreached because BARK SOUTH was in everyway superior. L.S.T. and L.C.T. could beachat the eastern end without using a ramp, andL.C.M. could land stores almost dry shod atthe western end which was backed by a goodmaintenance area.

In consequence of these changes S.N.O.L.(S)transferred to BARK SOUTH while S.N.O.L.(R)remained at BARK WEST and S.N.O.L.(N)moved ashore and set up his headquarters ina house on Isola Piccolo.

The two Category "A" ships of the slowassault convoy at BARK EAST sailed a.m. underescort to join the ACID portion of a convoy forTripoli, and the three Category " B" shipscleared by the evening.C. ACID SOUTH and NORTH.

The follow-up convoys M.W.F: and M.W.S.37 arrived. The fast section entered Syracuseat 0945 and at once began to discharge. Suchgood progress was made that by 180b all twelveships were empty and away from the port. Theslow section of thirty ships anchored off thebeaches at 0900. Thirteen ships of the slowassault convoy having previously been clearedfrom the anchorage sailed immediately withthe escort of M.W.S. 37. Of the new arrivalsten were ordered to enter Syracuse at first lightthe following day.Gun Support.

Gun support.units continued their activitiesas required.

The following are some particulars: —H.M.S. MAURITIUS.

(a) from 0900 to 0930, an apparentlyeffective shoot, using direct observation, atCarlentini.

(ft) a few minutes later, at a battery atCampolato which had opened fire on theship. One hit observed and battery ceasedfiring.

(c) at 1032 and from 1144 to 1240, spas-modic engagement of gun opposition ashore.


Results probably not satisfactory, observationby Forward Observation Officer difficult andpossibly an incorrect map reference received.

(d) at 1720, against a defended post nearCatania. Result reported satisfactory byForward Observation Officer.

(e) from 1753 to 1800, target Lentini.H.M.S. TETCOTT.

(d) at about 2300, opened fire on adefended area south of Catania in supportof commando landing from HM.S. PRINSALBERT at Murazzo Point. Enemy gunsnot completely silenced. Target engagedagain after midnight with the result that theenemy guns ceased fire.H.M.S. EREBUS.

(a) at 0938. Shore batteries nearCarlentini, range 2,500 yards, rounds 10.

(6) at 1105. Catania Airfield, range30,000 yards, rounds 10. Indirect fire.

(c) at 2140. Catania Airfield, rounds 20.Results unobserved but a fire seen whenbombardment complete.

Enemy Air Activity.The only ah* attacks this day were in the

Aero area. There were continuous thoughineffective raids during the night 12th/13thJuly, as well as the usual dawn attack. Themost serious incident occurred a little beforenoon when two fighter bombers scored hitson S.S. THOMAS PICKERING in the afterhold. The ship, which had only arrived earlierin the morning, became a total loss.

Shortly before midnight intermittent attackswith bombs and torpedoes on the empty per-sonnel ships from Syracuse caused some con-fusion but no damage or casualties.

Augusta.—The naval port party returnedduring the forenoon. The town was founddeserted with considerable damage at thenorthern end but none at the southern end.There was no power and a shortage of water.

The conditions in the harbour varied in onepart and another. Only the northern entrancewas open, but there was a four hundred footquay with twenty-two feet of water alongsideand ample berthing for all types of landingship. The Carlo del Molo harbour and jettieswere, however, found to be completely ob-structed. The floating dock was undamagedand, in addition to one large oil carrier andthree small petrol carriers, lighters wereavailable though without means of towage.

Commando landing.—After dark H.M.S.PRINS ALBERT successfully landed No. 3Commando with little loss near MurazzoPohit, north of Augusta. H.M.S. TETCOTT,escorting, effectively engaged a battery whichopposed the landing and also sank one of threeE-boats* which attacked.

Local Defence Forces.—In view of the pro-gress made and in anticipation of the captureof Catania, Naval Commander Eastern TaskForce re-allocated local defence forces asfollows:—

1. Syracuse.13th Trawler Group (A/S),153rd B.Y.M.S. Flotilla,6 H.D.M.L. from Force " A ".

Admiralty footnote:* E-boats—motor torpedo boats.

2. Augusta.8th Trawler Group (A/S, M/Sf),105th M.M.S. Flotilla,4 H.D.M.L. from Force " B ".

3. Catania.4th Trawler Group (A/S, M/S),4 H.D.M.L. from Force " A ",2 H.D.M.L. from Force " B ".

4. Group "P".Hunt class destroyers, CROMARTY,

POOLE, BOSTON, SEAHAM and 22ndML. Flotilla to be based on Augusta whenCatania occupied.5. 20th M.G.B. Flotilla and 32nd M.T.B.Flotilla to be based on Augusta as orderedby Commander-m-Chief.Inshore Squadron for army support.—In

accord with instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Commander Eastern TaskForce also placed under the orders of FlagOfficer Sicily for service in the inshoresquadron in support of the army the follow-ing: H.M.S. EREBUS, ROBERTS, D.S.FLORES, SOEMBA, H.M.S. CROMARTY,POOLE, ROMNEY, SEAHAM, the 22ndM.L. Flotilla and temporarily two Hunts tobe detailed by Naval Commander Force " A ".It was stated that three L.C.R., three L.C.G.and four L.C.F. would also be available fromMalta if required. The latter were requestedforthwith by Flag Officer Sicily.

S.N.O.L. prepare to leave.—At the end ofthe day proposals were submitted byS.N.O.L.(N) and (Q), with which Naval Com-mander Force "V" concurred, that theyshould withdraw from the Island on the 15thJuly with their staffs, leaving the Beach Com-mando and Deputy S.N.O.L. at BARK EASTand a nucleus beach party at BARK SOUTH.Naval Commander Eastern Task Force alsoconcurred with this.

U-boats.—Further successes were recordedagainst U-boats at no great distance from theoperational area of the Eastern Task Force.

M.T.B. operating under the orders of theCommander-in-Chief encountered two U-boatssouthbound in position 38°10'N.15°27'E. andsank one with a torpedo. The U-boat wasnot identified.

H.M.S. ECHO and H.M.S. ILEX, two ofForce " H " destroyer screen, sank the ItalianNEREIDE in position 37° 36' N. 16° 17' E.,taking twenty-five prisoners. This boat wasonly twenty-four hours out from its base.

D+4 DAY.Wednesday, 14th July.

Weather.—Weather was unchanged at veryfine.

Situation at beaches.. A. BARK WEST.

All unloading was stopped over thesebeaches. The M.T. ships were divided betweenBARK SOUTH and EAST with their superiorfacilities and there was an improvement in therate of unloading. All ships were clear ofBARK WEST by 2030 and H.M.S. HILARY,headquarters ship Force "V", anchored atBARK SOUTH.

Admiralty footnote:* M/S—minesweeping.


Six more ships of the slow assault convoywere sailed at midday.

B. BARK SOUTH.S.N.O.L.(S) set up his headquarters in a

house above Punta Portopalo with DeputyS.N.O.L. and a V/S* station in the centreof the stores beach.

L.S.T. were employed in addition to L.C.T.in transferring vehicles from the M.T. ships,as more transport was urgently needed at thefront.

C. BARK EAST.The three Category "B" ships of the

assault convoy sailed at 1400 to BARK SOUTHto join convoy. This left only one M.T. shiphi the anchorage.

D. ACID SOUTH and NORTH.The remaining ships of the slow assault

convoy were sailed for Tripoli at 0630.JIG sector closed down and all M.T. ships

and landing craft proceeded to Syracuse.GEORGE and How sectors were progressingwell though the stevedores were very tiredowing to the frequent night air raids. Toalleviate this they had been sent to sleepashore.

N.C.F.A. turns over to F.O.S.Y.—NavalCommander Force "A" turned over alloperations from Syracuse northwards to FlagOfficer Sicily who was by now at Syracusein H.M.S. LARGS. In the evening,having finished at Aero, he proposed turningover to S.N.O.L.(H) with a view to proceedingto Malta the following day hi H.M.S.BULOLO.

KM. 19Y ordered forward.—By noon thesituation was such that the Commander-in-Chief ordered forward convoys K.M.F. andK.M.S. 19Y, i.e., those parts of the follow-upconvoys from the United Kingdom which hadbeen held at Algiers until required.

H.M.S. CARLISLE to Augusta.—Aboutmidday Naval Commander Eastern Task Forceordered H.M.S. CARLISLE to be sent toAugusta as soon as Flag Officer Sicily thoughtfit, to provide long range air warning. FlagOfficer Sicily had, in fact, released her the pre-vious day as he had expected Syracuse to beempty that night except for H.M.S. LARGSand L.S.T. He was of the opinion, however,that she should return to Syracuse on 14thwhen M.T. ships were due, as the A.A. defenceswere still below minimum and somewhatextempore.

Gun support.—Ships continued to givesupporting fire to the army as required but,apart from a bombardment of Lentini byH.M.S. MAURITIUS lasting from 0702 to0730, there were no shoots of particular note.

Enemy Air Activity.The night 13th/14th July was almost free

of air raids and the customary dawn attackat Aero was less intense than on previous days.While on patrol at BARK SOUTH after darkH.M.S. MENDIP and H.M.S. WALLACEwere bombed. The full moon and manyflares dropped by the enemy made evasiondifficult for the destroyers, which apparently

Admiralty footnote:* v/S—visual signalling.

were taken as substitute targets, since themerchantmen in the anchorage were quiteinvisible in the smoke screen put up. Severalsticks of bombs fell within one to two cablesof the destroyers but no damage or casualtieswere caused. There was much activity andmany flares were dropped at about 2100 butno incidents occurred.

At BARK EAST in the evening smoke coverwas also used most effectively, the ships beingwell backed up from the shore. After thesmoke had become effective three M.T. shipsand two hospital carriers made the anchoragesafely. One circling torpedo was reported,but failed to find a target and neither at BARKEAST or at Aero were any ships damaged bybombs.

At Syracuse there were no daylight raids,and three night raids by single aircraft wereineffective.

Great confidence was inspired among theships by the successes of nightfighters, andA/S screening vessels also took toll of low-flying aircraft.

Own aircraft engaged by ships.—As aresult of our own aircraft being engaged byour ships, in particular low-flying transportaircraft on the night 13th/14th July, the Coni-mander-in-Chief issued orders that fire was tobe withheld unless aircraft were clearly identi-fied as hostile, and that the strictest firediscipline was essential.

A/S measures.—Implementing the Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's policy ofemploying every possible A/S vessel in activeoffensive measures against title known concen-tration of U-boats in the operational area,Group " W " of four Hunts was detached fromForce " B " to devote all its time to systematichunting.

D + 5 DAY.Thursday, 15th July.

Weather.—There was no change in theweather which remained fine and calm.Situation at beaches.A. BARK SOUTH.

L.C.M. arrived from BARK WEST where therewas nothing more for them to do, and thenumber of D.U.K.W. available was increasedto about 160. By this time a number of L.C.M.were suffering from defects (though many con-tinued to run satisfactorily on one engine), asthe beach repair party were still at BARK WESTsalvaging damaged craft.

By the end of a good day little M.T. re-mained to be discharged and two ships weresailed.

B. BARK EAST.After a considerable quantity of stores had

been discharged from the ships which had comeround from BARK WEST they were sailed at1800 to join a Tripoli convoy from Aero. Twofurther M.T. ships arrived during the eveningfrom BARK SOUTH having discharged theirvehicles there.

C. Aero SOUTH and NORTH.Seven ships of the D + 3 day convoy com-

pleted discharge and sailed in convoy at about1*00.

H.M.S. BULOLO with Naval CommanderForce " A "left at 1800 and S.N.O.L. (H) tookcharge of the area.


Ports.—The situation at Syracuse was notsatisfactory, and it was decided by Naval Com-mander Eastern Task Force that Naval Com-mander Force " A " should take over there topermit Flag Officer, Sicily to proceed toAugusta where he was urgently required.Accordingly the staff of Force "A" wereplaced .at the disposal .of N.O.I.C. Syracuseto help straighten matters out.

At Augusta the harbour and approachchannel were both swept for mines during theday with negative result. A start was madewith the establishment of coastal forces andlanding craft bases.

N.C.E.T.F. visits ports.—Naval CommanderEastern Task Force visited Syracuse andAugusta in H.M.S. LAFOREY during the day.

Gun support.—The normal supporting firewas carried out when, and where, required bythe army. The only incident of note wasdamage inflicted by H.M.S. ROBERTS uponherself while engaged in a bombardment. Thisincluded one 4-inch mounting put out of actionand an Oerlikon wrecked.

Air activity.—Air activity was restricted tonight raids in the north which resulted innothing worse than some near misses. Heavybarrage from shore defences and extensive useof smoke probably prevented any attempt atprecision bombing.

D.S. SOEMBA and FLORES to Augusta.—By order of Flag Officer Sicily the Dutch gun-boats SOEMBA and FLORES sailed fromBASK EAST for Augusta.

D -'- 6 DAY.Friday, 16th July.

Weather.—Fine weather still prevailed overthe whole area of operations.

Beaches.A: BARK SOUTH.

Discharge of stores continued satisfactorilyall day. The pontoon with three mobile craneson it was used for discharging stores fromL.C.T. and Scammels to off-load crates frombeached L.C.M. Part of the beach repairparties having come round from BARK WEST, arepair park for craft was established on onesection of the beach.

B. BARK EAST.Good progress was made with the unloading

of the three M.T. shies in the anchorage andL.C.T. with stores for 51 Division continuedto arrive from BARK SOUTH for unloading.

Four ships of the 14th Minesweeping Flotillacarried out a searching sweep in the approachto the anchorage.

C. ACID SOUTH and NORTH.The last Class "A" ship of the D+ 3 day

convoy sailed to join a convoy from Syracuse.F.O.S.Y. to Augusta—¥\2i% Officer Sicily

in H.M.S. LARGS transferred from Syracuseto Augusta.

K.M.S. 19B and C forward.—It was de-cided that K.M.S. convoys 19B and C, whichhad been held at Malta, should be sailed forSicily the following morning. This was to re-lieve congestion at Malta and permit economicuse to be made of escorts.

Gun support.—Supporting fire was given tothe army as required, but there was again noshoot worthy of particular note.

Enemy air activity.—Only at the northernend of the area of operations was there anyparticular incident. Raids on a reduced scalewere experienced during the night 15th/16thJuly at Syracuse and near misses resulted insome damage to H.M.S. BOSTON and a fewminor casualties in that ship and H.M.S.POOLE. Aircraft mining was also reportedsouth of Syracuse by H.M.S. ROOKWOOD.

D + 7 DAY.Saturday, 17th July.

Weather.—There was no change in theweather which remained consistently favour-able.

Beaches.A. BARK SOUTH.

Unloading continued satisfactorily and fourM.T. ships and two cased petrol carriers werecleared and sailed, leaving eight ships in theanchorage.

B. BARK EAST.It was decided by Naval Commander Force

" V " that after the completion of discharge ofthe three ships then present, BARK EASTbeaches were to be closed. S.N.O.L. (N) wasrelieved in the evening by CommanderR. W. D. Thompson, R.N. and Captain (D),21st Flotilla assumed responsibility for thesafety of the ships in the anchorage.

When S.N.O.L. (N) left, all landing craft inthe sector with the exception of two L.C.M.and one L.C.T. were still in good runningorder.

Augusta.—The presence of two E-boats inthe searched channel during the night 16th/17th July caused minelaying to be suspected.Convoy movements were held up until 0930when the port was re-opened after a 100 percent, sweep of the channel over a width of twocables on either side of the centre line hadbeen completed without disclosing a mine ofany type.

The E-boats were also reported by a patroltrawler to have fired torpedoes and H.M.S.MAURITIUS at anchor in the harbourobserved two flashes resembling torpedo ex-plosions outside. No damage was done.

Syracuse.—H.M.S. BULOLO sailed fromSyracuse for Malta at 2000 with Naval Com-mander Force "A" on board, the situationbeing, by then, satisfactory with a newN.O.I.C., Captain A. N. Grey, R.N. tempor-arily in charge. It had previously been agreedbetween Naval Commander Force "A" andFlag Officer Sicily that a prolongation of thestay of H.M.S. BULOLO would eventuallylead to confusion owing to divided control, andthat the shore organisation would settle downmore quickly when there was no doubt as towho was in charge.

Gun Support.The Inshore Squadron once more gave its

support to the army in then- operations alongthe coast, but no call was made upon thebombardment cruisers.

In the evening between 1842 and 1902,H.M.S. WARSPITE bombarded Catania, firing57 rounds of 15-inch at ranges opening at


15,000 yards and finishing at 11,200 yards. Atthe same time the accompanying destroyersengaged shore batteries of about 4-inch calibreto the northward of Guardia. The batteriesengaged the destroyers intermittently and withlittle accuracy.Enemy Air Activity.

Enemy aircraft were little in evidence andthere was only one incident of moment. In theearly hours of the morning, H.M.S. QUEENEMMA with Royal Marine Commandos onboard was near missed at Augusta, and anumber of casualties were suffered amongboth the ship's company and the Commandos.In all about 18 were killed and about 70wounded. In addition to superficial damagethe ship sustained many holes in her sides andsuperstructure as well as fractures in fire -mainand piping systems.

H.M.S. WARSPTTE saw enemy fightersonce, and some unidentified aircraft on anotheroccasion, but no attack developed.

U-boats.—H.M.S. WARSPITE recordedthat there were two doubtful reports of thepresence of U-boats in her vicinity, but nocontact was obtained, and no attack apparentlymade.

D + 8 DAY.Sunday, ISth July.

Weather.—Favourable weather conditionsstill prevailed.Beaches and Ports.

Unloading was steadily becoming a matterof routine, and at 0700 S.N.O.L. (N) with hisstaff sailed for Malta in H.M.S. BRECON.

At BARK SOUTH as a result of some re-organisation and re-allocation of craft the dailytotal was again increased.

At Syracuse, operations were hindered by aserious petrol fire at the Molo San Antonio, thefuelling point connected with the bulk installa-tion inland, and all efforts failed to extinguishthe fire which continually broke out afresh.As a result, two alongside berths in the harbourwere rendered untenable and the bulk storageimmobilised.

At ACID NORTH, a period of twelve hoursthis day, Royal Engineers constructed at BLUE

beach a causeway sixty feet wide with a depthof 3 feet 6 inches at the seaward end.

Three ships of the KM. 19 Y convoy arrived.In the course of the normal patrols off the

ports there were no incidents.

Gun support.—Support was given to theright flank of the army by L.C.G., gunboatsand destroyers, and during the forenoonH.M.S. MAURITIUS and NEWFOUND-LAND bombarded Catania.

Enemy air activity.—This was on a smallscale and the night 17th/18th July saw onlyone raid oh Augusta. Two small fires werestarted ashore but no damage was suffered byport or ships.

U-boats.—A combined sweep east ofAugusta was carried out during the night17th/18th July by destroyers and A.S.V. air-craft.* Two U-boats were located by aircraftin positions 37° 26' N., 16° 22' E. and37° 09' N., 15° 42' E. respectively. The firstwas attacked with depth charges, and the air-craft claimed to have inflicted severe damage.The enemy was last seen on a course 047° stillon the surface, but the supporting destroyersfailed to find it. The second U-boat alsoescaped.

D + 9 DAY.Monday, 19th July.

Weather.—Continued fine weather was ex-perienced at all sectors.

Beaches and ports.—At BARK SOUTHfurther re-arrangement resulted in the dailytotal of personnel, stores and vehicles whichlanded being still further increased.

N.C.E.T.F. hauls down his flag.—NavalCommander Eastern Task Force proceededfrom Malta to Sicily for a final inspection dur-ing the day. At noon his appointment lapsed,his task being regarded as completed, and hisflag was struck. The duties hitherto performedby him were assumed between them by theCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Malta and Flag Officer Sicily.

Admiralty footnote:* A.S.V. aircraft—aircraft fitted with radar equipment.

ERRATUM.Supplement to The London Gazette of

Friday, 8th October, 1948.Naval Operations in the Aegean between the

7th September, 1943, and 28th November,1943.In paragraph 21, after "BEAUFORT"

delete " (Lieutenant-Commander Sir StandishO'G. Roche, Bt., D.S.O.)" and substitute" (Lieutenant J. R. L. Moore, R.N.) ".

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