Summary of Craig v. BorenS. Ct. (1976)

Relevant Facts: Appellant Craig and Whitener brought an action to have an injunction issued against Oklahomas enforcement of the 3.2% beer law. That law prohibits the sale of 3.2% beer to males under age 21 and females under 18. Appellants allege this law is unconstitutional by way of invidious discrimination.

Legal Issue(s): Whether each of the Appellants has standing to sue

Courts Holding: Whitener has standing, Craig does not.

Law or Rule(s): Article III U.S. Constitution, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants actions, or that prospective relief will remove the injury. Case or controversy requirement. Jus tertii is a rule of self restraint by the court. Minimizes unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are ill defined or speculative.

Procedure: District Ct. sustained the constitutionality and dismissed action. S. Ct. Reversed.

Court Rationale: Craig attained the age of 21 after this court noted jurisdiction. Whitener evidenced that appellees caused an injury in fact sufficient to guarantee concrete adverseness. She is either obliged to heed the discrimination, and suffer economically, or disobey the statutory command and suffer, sanctions and loss of liberty.

Plaintiffs Argument: The state statute places discriminatory action mandatorily upon vendors, and therefor vendors have standing to sue.

Defendants Argument: Appellees do not have standing absent a showing of an injury in fact. A litigant may only assert his/her own constitutional rights.jus terrii: Right of third party.

Tatad vs. Garcia

Facts:Petitioners filed to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and supplemental agreement of the former. Petitioners are suing in their capacities as senators and taxpayers.The argument of the petitioners were: the winning bidder for the construction and operation of the LRT is a foreign corporation violating the constitution; build-lease-transfer is not defined nor recognized by the law nor its implementing rules and regulations; award of the contract on negotiated basis violates RA 6957; award of contract violates requirements provided in the implementing rules and regulations of the BOT law; agreement violate EO 380 for failure of bearing presidential approval; and agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government.Respondents contend the petitioners have no legal standing; writ of prohibition as not a proper remedy and requires ascertainment of facts; scheme adopted is actually a Build-Transfer scheme allowed by BOT law; nationality requirement for public utilities does not apply; the presidentially approved agreements are not disadvantageous to the government; the negotiation granting the award of the contract and not through public bidding is allowed by BOT law; and direct negotiation as mode of award for infrastructure projects is supported by RA 7718.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner has legal standing on the petition.

Held:The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to questions contracts entered into by the national government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. The Supreme Court upheld the legal standing of the petitioners as taxpayers.Agreements in question have been entered into by DOTC in the exercise of its governmental function. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the government agencies entrusted with said function. Petitioners claim that Build-Lease-Transfer scheme and direct negotiation of contracts are not contemplated by the BOT law has now been rendered moot and academic. RA 7718 Sec. 3 authorizes all government infrastructure agencies, GOCCs and local government units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified proponent for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure or development facilty.Ultimately, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

IBP vs. Zamora

Facts:In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The President directed the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improvedA special civil action filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to sue.

Held:The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.The IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case

Philconsa v Enriquez

Petition: certiorari, prohibition, mandamusPetitioner: Philconsa, 16 members of the Senate, FDCRespondent: Sec. Enriquez of the DBMPonente: QuiasonDate: Aug. 19, 1994

Facts: Case at bar is consolidation of 5 cases relating to claims of authority between the Legislative and Executive on the General Appropriations Act of 1994 GAB of 1994 was passed on December 17, 1993; said bill fixed the budget of the government for the following fiscal year. On December 30, President FVR signed the bill into law (turning it to RA 7663). FVR delivered Veto Address on the same day. Petitioners (claiming to have standing as taxpayers and/or legislators) primarily assail the constitutionality of: 1) conditions imposed by the President in some of the items in the budget, and 2) the veto made by FVR on the appropriation for debt service. Particular items/special provisions were on: 1) debt servicing 2) revolving fund for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) 3) road maintenance by the DPWH 3) purchase of military equipment & medicines 4) AFP pension fund 5) CAFGU deactivation (specific items tackled in the ratio)

Pertinent laws/provisions: Sec. 24 & 25, Art. VI pertaining to appropriation bills Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI Presidential power to veto items in money billsIssues:1. WON petitioners have standing2. WON veto of special provision for debt ceiling is constitutional3. WON vetoes and conditions set by the President on particular items are constitutional

Ruling:1. YES2. YES3. (See ratio regarding the validity of the particular vetoed items)

Ratio Decidendi:1. Case at bar concerns appropriation of national budget, taxpayer suit stands. Legislators likewise granted standing because the petition touches on the legislative power on appropriation as stated in the Constitution.

2. Debt Servicing was one of the special provisions in the GAA (Guingona Jr. v Carague explains why Congress was allowed to appropriate so much for this item). The President vetoed said special provision, without vetoing the amount set aside by Congress (around 86B pesos).

The Court relied on the ruling in Gonzales v Macaraig Jr. that defined inappropriate provisions, which introduced items that are more appropriate to be tackled in a separate legislation. Moreover, the vetoed provision on debt servicing appeared to be an attempt to repeal PD 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and EO 292. Repeal should be made in another law and not in the GAA.

Inclusion of debt servicing policy in the GAA was out of place and was clearly an attempt to log-roll legislation; Court sustained the veto since the provision was inappropriate anyway and the action was part of the executives prerogative/presumption that the President will execute the law faithfully.

3. A) on SUCs: Petitioners argue that the Presidents veto of the provision that gave SUCs revolving funds was a grave abuse of discretion, since other govt. agencies were allowed to retain theirs. Court said that agencies such as the Natl. Stud Farm (lol), which had a revolving fund as per the GAA, have already been enjoying such as privilege by operation of other laws. Veto valid.

B) on 70/30 division for road maintenance: the GAA as crafted by Congress laid down explicitly that only 30% of costs for road maintenance should be contracted out to the private sector. The provision is in consonance with Sec. 25(2), Art. VI of the Constitution and is not an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed. If the President wished to veto this portion, he would have to veto the entire GAA. Veto invalid.

C) on medicine purchases by AFP: President vetoed the provision in light of the Generics Drugs Law. Court said that Congress inserted this item in the GAA to ensure compliance of procurement of medicines for the AFP with the National Drug Policy of the DOH. FVR vetoed w/ the belief that it is more appropriate to have a transition period for the AFPs medicine procurement system to comply w/ Generics Act. Court did not find this reasoning valid enough to justify the veto. Veto invalid.

D) on military equipment: Congress legislated that modernization fund for AFP will not be released w/o Table of Organization and Equipment (I suppose a budget plan) to be duly reviewed and approved by the legislature. This amounted to a legislative veto. The Executive asserted that this violated certain contractual obligations, hence its rejection of the provision. Court found said provisions to be inappropriate in character also. Veto valid.

E) on AFP pension: provision allowed for money to be re-appropriated by AFP. Violated Secs. 25(5), 29(1), Art. VI. Veto valid.

F) on deactivation of CAFGUs: Congress in effect legislated that CAFGUs (vigilantes created by Cory heh) will be deactivated and shall receive benefits, by providing in the GAA of 1994 that CAFGUs were to receive a separation pay. President vetoed as he saw the measure as premature due to ongoing operations of said units in the field. Petitioners claim that by vetoing, the President disregarded the deactivation requirement (and the appropriation of funds thereof). This was an act of impoundment or refusal to tap into appropriations made by Congress; it is in effect an implied veto. Likewise, the subject matter should be tackled in another law, as it appeared to repeal PD 1597 and RA 6758 (again, inappropriate to be placed in an appropriations bill.) Veto valid.

G) on SC, CHR, etc: President set conditions on the appropriations for certain items. Presidents creation of guidelines on what Congress has legislated is part of his executive power.

Dispostion: Petitions (except those pertaining to debt servicing) dismissed.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan vs. Zamora

Facts: In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement in 1991. The Philippines and US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On July 18 1987 Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of VF. Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text. Thereafter, President Ramos approved the VFA.On October 5 1998 President Estrada through respondent Secretary of Affairs Zamora, ratified the VFA. Officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative oversight its implementation. Debates then ensued.Respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown any interest in the case. Petitioners on the other hand, counter that VFA is a matter of transcendental importance.

Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing?

Held: The court said that petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result fo the enforcement of VFA. They also dont have standing to sue as tax payers since VFA does not involve the exercise of Congress taxing or spending power. In a taxpayers suit. The act complained of should directly involve the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The other petitioners who filed as petitioners-legislators do not have the requisite of locus standi to maintain this suit. According to the court, while it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which may allegedly impair their legislative powers, they failed to show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. IBP, another petitioner also lacks standing since there is no board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing the National President to commence the present action. The court, nevertheless decided to take cognizance of the issues raised. The court upheld its ruing in previous cases such as that of Gonzales vs Comelec and Kilosbabayan vs Guingona. Technicalities of procedure may be brushed aside in view of the transcendental importance to the public where cases are demanded to be settled promptly and definitely. The court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even when there is no direct injury to the party suing if the case is of transcendental importance.

People vs. VeraFacts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.