Guevara v. Guevara DigestFacts:1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed withRULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.Austria vs. ReyesG.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970Facts:Basilia Austria Vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will andtestament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners who were nephews and nieces ofBasilia. The opposition was dismissed and theprobate of the will wasallowed.Under the will ofBasilia, the bulk of herestate would pass onto the respondents Perfecto Cruz,Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Lyn Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed anddeclared by Basilia asher own legally adopted children.More than two years after her will was allowed, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz wassubsequently appointed as executor of her estate. However, the petitioners filed in the sameproceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin ofBasilia and that therespondents hadnot in fact been adoptedby the decedent in accordance with law.Such petition inintervention wasallowed.More than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners moved the lowercourt to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents. Before thedate of thehearing arrived, one of the respondents Benita Cruz Meez fileda motion asking the lowercourt to confine the petitioners intervention toproperties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.The court granted the said motion.The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the lower court. Hence, thisinstant petition for certiorari to have the order restricting petitioners intervention toproperties thatwere not included in the decedents testamentary dispositions annulled was filed.Issue: Whether or not theinstitution of the heirs would retain efficacy inthe event there exists proofthat the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was falseRuling: YES. Article 850 of theCivil Code provides The statement of a false causefor the institution ofan heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity ofsuch cause. Under this provision, before the institution of heirs may be annulled, thefollowing requisites must concur: First, the causefor the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.From the use in the will of the terms sapilitang tagapagmana (compulsory heirs) andsapilitang mana (legitime), the petitioners contended that the institution of the respondents as heirs was only impelled by her belief that they were her compulsory heirs. However, the Court made mentionof the fact that if such reason indeed prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, Basilia didnot make it known in her will. The Court found petitioners theory to be highly speculative of what wasin the mind of the testatrix when she executed the will. The Court could not annul the institution of heirson the basisof guesswork or uncertain implications.The phrases,"mga sapilitang tagapagmana"and "sapilitang mana"were borrowed from thelanguage of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs institutedand the abstract object ofthe inheritance. They offered no absolute indication that the decedent wouldhave willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law tomake allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate which largely favored the respondents showed a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than whatAznar v. DuncanIN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN,ADOLFO AZNAR (EXECUTOR) V. LUCY DUNCAN AND HELEN CHRISTENSEN, 17SCRA 590 (1966)DOCTRINE:The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in this case.While the traditional concept of omission, based onRoman Law, meansthat the compulsory heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator in the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.One point deservessome consideration.Admittedly, the testator wasa citizen ofthe Stateof California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession isunder consideration." (Article 16, Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator wasdistributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account the fact that Article 854 was madeto apply. This point needs clarification.FACTS:Edward Christensen was a citizen ofCalifornia and was domiciled in the Philippines.When he died he left a will which alleged that he had only one child (Lucy Duncan), and that hewas giving a devise of P3,600 to Helen Christensen (whom he alleged was not related to him).1.In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was a natural child of the deceasedand that the properties of the decedent are to be divided equally between Helen and Lucypursuant to the project of partition submitted by the administrator.2.Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Art 906 NCC which states that: Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same may be fully satisfied. Moreover, considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied hisrelationship with Helen, but left her to a legacy although less than the amount of herlegitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Art 918 NCC.Thus, under Arts 906 and 918, Helen is only entitled to her legitime, and not to a shareequal to that of LucyISSUE: Whether the estate should be dividedequally among the two children (Art 854)OR whether Lucys share should just be reducedto meet the legitime of Helen(Art 906)HELD:Helen should only be givenher legitime since therewas no preterition.Manresa definespreteritionas the omission of the heirof the will, eitherby notnaminghim at all, or while mentioning him as father, son,etc., by not instituting him asheir without disinheriting himexpressly, not assigning to him some part of the properties.The decision in Neri v. Akutin is not applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator leftall his property by universaltitle to the children by his second marriage, and(that) without expresslydisinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them, or at least, some of them." Inthe case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her alegacy of P3,600.00.Nuguid v. NuguidNUGUID V. NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449 (1966)DOCTRINE:As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary capacityof the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of the will that thesole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and thatnothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity,then a probeinto the testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified forpractical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified indeclaring the entire willvoid if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will isthe institution ofthe universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be thesame as thenullification of the will itself.FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962,single, without descendants, legitime orillegitimate. Surviving her were herlegitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, andsix (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico,Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, allsurnamed Nuguid.1. On May 18, 1963, petitioner RemediosNuguid filed in the Courtof First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedlyexecuted by Rosario Nuguidsome 11 years before her demise.Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate andthat letters of administration with the will annexed beissued to her.2.On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid,concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceasedRosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate ofher will. Ground therefor, inter alia , is that by theinstitution of petitioner RemediosNuguid as universal heir ofthe deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of thedeceased in the direct ascending line - were illegallypreterited and that in consequence the institution is void.3.On August, 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petitionfor probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved todismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.4.On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition tothe motion to dismiss.5.The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will inquestion is a complete nullity and will perforce createintestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" anddismissed the petition without cost.ISSUE: WON the will is a complete nullity.HELD: Yes.Reproduced hereunder is the will:Nov. 17, 1951I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise and bequeathall of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sisterRemediosNuguid, age 34, residing with meat 38-B Iriga, Q.C.In witness whereof, Ihave signed my name this seventeenth day of November, nineteen hundred andfifty-one.Sgd. (Illegible)T/ROSARIONUGUIDThe statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of theCivil Code which, in part, provides:ART.854. Thepreteritionoromissionofone,someorallofthecompulsoryheirsin the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or bornafter the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devisesand legaciesshall be valid insofar asthey arenot inofficious.xxxANNUL.To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect;to nullify; to abolish; to do away with.(Citations omitted.)And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents, nowoppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them. Theythus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived oftheir legitime; neither werethey expressly disinherited. This is a clearcase of preterition. Such preterition in thewords ofManresa"anularasiempre la institucion de heredero, dandocaracterabsoluto a esteordenamiento,"referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will hereinstitutes petitioner as the sole,universal heir - nothing more. Nospecific legacies or bequests aretherein provided for. It isin this posture that thecourt says that the nullity iscomplete. Perforce,Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:The statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, 'the devices and legacies shall bevalid insofar as they arenot inofficious." Legacies and devices merit consideration only when theyare so expressly given as such in a will.As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before usexcept the institution of petitioner asuniversal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void.And, intestate succession ensues.The will heredoes not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. Itsimply omitstheir names altogether. Said will rather than belabeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one inwhich the said forced heirssuffer from preteritionThe disputed order declares the willin question "a complete nullity." Article 854 ofthe Civil Codein turn merely nullifies"the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the willprovides for theinstitution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same.The entire will is null.The disputed order declares the willin question "a complete nullity." Article 854 ofthe Civil Codein turn merely nullifies"the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the willprovides for theinstitution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same.The entire willis null.REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85(1967)DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one,some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line,whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto.Amongother things, Reyes holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, mustbe a total omission, such that if acompulsory heir in the direct line received something fromthe testator under the terms of the will,such heir cannot be considered preteritedFACTS : Bibiano Barretto was married to MariaGerardo. During their lifetimethey acquired avast estate, consisting of realproperties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.When BibianoBarretto died on February 18, 1936, in the Cityof Manila, he left his share of these properties in a willto SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, andLucia Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion aslegacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto andFelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct ofthe fishpond situated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy,Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for hiswidow,MariaGerard.Inthemeantime,MariaGerardowasappointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared aproject of partition, which was signed by her in her ownbehalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Saidproject of partition was approved by the Court of FirstInstance of Manila. The distribution of the estate and thedeliveryofthesharesoftheheirsfollowed.Asaconsequence, SaludBarretto took immediate possession of hershare and secured the cancellation of the originalcertificates of title and the issuance of new titles in herown nameMaria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discoveredthatsheexecutedtwowill.Inthefirstwill,sheinstitutedSaludandMilagrosasherheirs.Inthesecondwill, she revoked the same and left all her properties infavourofMilagrosalone.Thelaterwillwasallowedandthe first rejected.3.In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,husband of the deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children,it was determined by the lower court that Salud was not a childofMariaGerardoandherhusband,Bibiano.Thisruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmedthe same.4.Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate ofMariaGerardoasalegitimateheirofMariaGerardo,plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate ofthe deceased BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufructtohiswidowMariaGerardo(fishpondproperty).Hence,this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.Milagros then moved to declare the project of partitionsubmitted in the proceedings for the settlement of theestate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because theDistributee,SaludBarretto,wasnotadaughteroftheSps.The nullityof theproject wasbased onArt. 1081ofthe Civil Code of 1889 which provided that : A partition in which a person was believed to bean heir, without being so, hasbeen been included, shall be null andvoid. The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under the projectof partition.ISSUE:WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and thatSalud did not acquire title theretoHELD: No. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir inthe late BibianoBarretto's last will and testament togetherwith defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had betweenthem could not be one such had with a party who wasbelieved to be an heir without really being one, and wasnot null and void under said article. The legal precept(Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants,but of heirs(without distinction between forced, voluntaryor intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her beingone of the heirs expressly named in his testament; forBibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free portionof his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share ()assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentaryheir of BibianoBarretto.2. Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimatedaughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstancewould not invalidate the institution of a stranger as anheir, since there was no preterition or total omission ofthe forced heir.3.Where a partition was made between two persons institutedas heirs in the will, and one of them was found out later not to be the testators daughter, while the other was really his daughter, it cannot be said that the partitionwas a void compromise on the civil status of the person who wasnotthetestatorsdaughter.Atthetimeofthe partition, the civil status of that person was notbeingquestioned.Therecanbenocompromiseonamatterthatwasnotanissue.Whilethelawoutlawsacompromise overcivil status, it does not forbid a settlement by theparties regarding the share that should correspond to theclaimant to the hereditary estate.4.A project of partition is merely a proposal for thedistribution of the hereditary estate, which the court mayacceptorreject.Itisthecourtalonethatmakesthedistribution of the estate and determines the personsentitledthereto.Itisthefinaljudicialdecreeofdistributionthatveststitleinthedistributees.Ifthedecree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by an opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its bindin geffect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidityof the project of partition becomes irrelevant.5. A distribution in the decedents will, made according tohiswillshouldberespected.Thefactthatoneofthedistributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court issued the decree of distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution.Theproceedingforthesettlementofa decedents estateis aproceeding inrem.It isbinding on the distributee who was represented by her mother as guardian.In the instant case there isno doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended topartition theconjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could disposeof by will her half ofthe conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after thedissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugalestate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the willmay be probated. In the instantcase, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.Moreover, he signified his conformity to hiswife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.It results that the lowercourt erred in not proceeding with theprobate of the willas contemplatedin its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973.Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the willevinces anintention on the part ofthe testator to dispose of practically hiswhole estate. So compelling is theprinciple that intestacy should be avoided and that thewishes of the testator should prevail thatsometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.CONSTANTINO ACAIN V. IAC, VIRGINIA FERNANDEZ AND ROSADIONGSON, 155 SCRA 100(1983)DOCTRINE:Acain resolved onceandfor all the issueas to whether or not asurviving spousecouldbe preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved thatan adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The foregoingnotwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child (while given the samerights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could be preterited. Itmust be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not entitled to the right ofrepresentation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would seem, however, that with the provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, the preterition of an adopted child finds greater support.FACTS: In May 1984, petitioner Acain filed withRTC Cebu a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain based on the premise that the decedent Nemesio left a will inwhich petitioner and his siblings were instituted as heirs.1.The will was allegedly executed by Nemesio in February 1960which was written in Bisaya and was not opposed by private respondents2.In the will, Nemesio bequeathed all his properties to his brother Segundo on the condition that if Segundo predeceases Nemesio, said properties will be given to Segundos children (herein petitioner)3. Segundo predeceased before Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as petitioner4.Private respondents, Virigina (legally adopted daughter ofthe decedent) and Rosa (decedents spouse) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:a.The petitioner had no legal capacity to institute said proceedings.Petitioner is merely a universal heirc.The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited5. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.6. On appeal, IAC granted private respondents petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will of Nemesio7.Petitioner argues that: a. The authority of the probate court is limited only toinquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will soughtto be probated, and it cannot pass upon the intrinsicvalidity therof before it is admitted to probateb. The preterition mentioned in Art 854 NCC refers to preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line and does not apply to private respondents who are notcompulsory heirs in the direct line. Thus, their omissionshall not annul the institution of heirsISSUE:WON private respondents have beenpreteritedHELD:Yes.Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they arenot mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor areexpressly disinherited Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art 854NCCmay not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance for she is not in the direct line. However, the samething cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia Fernandez, whose legal adoption by thetestator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Art 39 of P.D. No. 603 (Child and YouthWelfare Code), adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were alegitimate child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. Itcannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and thatboth adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it bedenied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, thisis a clearcase of preterition of thelegally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heirand annulment throws open to intestate successionthe entire inheritance including"la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado,mejora o donacion" The only provisions which donot result in intestacy are thelegacies anddevises made in thewill for they should stand validand respected, except insofar as the legitimesare concerned.The universal institution of petitioner together with hisbrothers and sisters to the entireinheritance of the testator results intotally abrogating the will because the nullification ofsuchinstitution of universal heirs -without any other testamentary disposition in thewill - amounts to adeclaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and inclear terms, Article 854 oftheCivil Code offers noleeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies nor devises having beenprovided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal titletopetitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be,necessarily, the opening of a totalintestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, asalready stated above, be respected.ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURTThe general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of thewill, thedue execution thereof, thetestator's testamentary capacity and thecompliance with therequisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity ofthe will normally comes onlyafter the Court has declared that thewill has been duly authenticated. Said court at thisstate ofthe proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to dowhat the situation constrains it to do and passupon certain provisions of the will.For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void aspetitioner and his brothers and sisters wereinstituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious factthat one of theprivate respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility.It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. The trial court have deniedits probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity ofthe testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.