• Policy initiatives, and• Policy assessment.

STREETCAR SYSTEMS IN CONTEXT

Melbourne and Toronto were chosen for this analysis because theyare the largest streetcar systems in the western world, where trafficvolumes are large and growing. Melbourne has some 167 km (104mi) of mixed track running, and Toronto has 71 km (44 mi). Theseare the two largest streetcar systems in Australasia, North America,and the nations of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (3).

Tables 1 and 2 present a series of comparative data on the Melbourne and Toronto systems. More similarities than differencesexist between the two systems. Both have high shares of track inmixed-traffic operations with resultant low operating speeds andpoor on-time performance. Both systems have short tram stop spac-ing (270/250 m or 885/820 ft), which also reduces speeds. Also,both systems have center lane operations with a high share of curb-side stops. At curbside stops, passengers wait on the curb until tramsarrive. They walk across the curb lanes in front of stopped traffic toaccess trams in center lanes. Both systems have ticketing policies toexpedite fare collection. In Melbourne, tickets were sold on tramsby tram conductors, a practice that was abandoned in favor of onboardticket machines and increased off-system sales of tickets. In Toronto,passengers deposit tickets, tokens (both purchased in advance), orexact change in the fare box; or they show another proof-of-payment(transfer or transit pass) to the driver. However, service time is slowerthan for a pure proof-of-payment system, particularly because onlythe front door is currently used for boarding at most locations.

An obvious difference between the systems is the national drivingrules (left-hand drive in Australia and right-hand drive in Canada).Both systems face traffic conflicts where turning movements (rightturns in Melbourne and left turns in Toronto) in front of trams atintersections are permitted.

Although Melbourne is the larger of the two systems, to someextent the operational context in Toronto has wider challenges. Largerproportions of the Toronto ROW are in mixed traffic, and tram stopspacings are shorter than in Melbourne. Melbourne also has newlow-floor trams that now comprise 19% of the fleet.

CHALLENGES OF STREET RUNNING

Two major challenges are discussed: traffic interference and theproblem of universal access.

Success and Challenges in ModernizingStreetcar SystemsExperiences in Melbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada

Graham Currie and Amer Shalaby

31

On-street running in mixed traffic has been identified as the least desirableright-of-way for light rail and tram systems. While most cities in the devel-oped world have withdrawn streetcar systems, substantial networks havebeen retained in Melbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada. Althoughsome commentators have seen the retention of these systems as visionary,there are substantial challenges to be faced in addressing conflicts betweenstreetcars and rising road traffic. Poor running speeds, unreliability,safety, and difficulties in providing universal access are significant issuesfor modern streetcar systems. Experiences are described in regard toplanning and operating the Melbourne and Toronto streetcar systems.The types of challenges being faced in providing services are contrasted.Programs to address the challenge of creating modern high-quality tran-sit systems out of streetcars are compared. Finally, success strategies inmodernizing streetcar systems are identified.

Of the many types of right-of-way (ROW) that light rail and tramsystems can operate, street running is least desirable because “oper-ating on the streets with congested traffic causes considerable fric-tion with other vehicles, impeding both the streetcars and the autotraffic” (1). While most cities in the developed world have with-drawn streetcar systems, substantial networks have been retained inMelbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada. Although some commen-tators have seen the retention of these systems as visionary (2), thereare substantial challenges faced in addressing conflicts betweenstreetcars and rising road traffic. Poor running speeds, unreliability,safety, and difficulties in providing universal access are significantissues for modern streetcar systems.

This paper details the experiences of planning and managing theMelbourne and Toronto streetcar systems. The types of challengesbeing faced in providing services are contrasted. Programs to addressthe challenge of creating modern high-quality transit systems usingstreetcars are compared and success factors identified. This paper isstructured as follows:

• Streetcar systems in context,• Challenges of street running,

G. Currie, Institute of Transport Studies, Department of Civil Engineering, MonashUniversity, Building 60, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. A. Shalaby, Depart-ment of Civil Engineering, University of Toronto, 35 St. George Street, Toronto,Ontario, M5S 1A4 Canada. Corresponding author: G. Currie, graham.currie@eng.monash.edu.au.

Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board,No. 2006, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington,D.C., 2007, pp. 31–39.DOI: 10.3141/2006-04

Traffic Interference

Melbourne

The operation of streetcars in mixed traffic reduces operating per-formance for the Melbourne system, resulting in 15 kph (9.3 mph)average speed and poor reliability. Some 27.4% of trams do not runon time (4), where on time is defined as less than 59 s early or morethan 5 min and 59 s late. That is a high share of services to be runningunreliably even with this very broad definition of on time.

Although traffic impacts are generally considered the main reasonfor lower than average tram speeds in Melbourne, the number of tramstops in the system has also been suggested as an influencing factor.Melbourne has some 1,800 trams stops and an average spacing of

32 Transportation Research Record 2006

270 m (885 ft) (5). This is very low compared with the Europeanpractice of 400 m (1,312 ft) (unpublished data from South YorkshirePassenger Transport Executive, 2004). The implication is that tramsdo not have enough distance between stops to attain and maintain areasonable top speed. Losses due to deceleration, door opening andclosing, stop dwell time, and acceleration further reduce averageoperating speeds. A higher than average number of stops also impliesthat the frictional impacts of stopping on road traffic movement isincreased. The balancing factor is that passengers do not have towalk as far to access the system.

Curbside stops are a major feature of on-street running services andhave been identified as a major passenger safety concern in Melbourne.They generate pedestrian–road traffic accidents at a rate of 25 annu-ally (one accident per 5.4 million boardings per year) and arethought to result in a far greater number of near misses (unpublisheddata on VicRoads R&D Project; Booz Allen Hamilton, 2003). Sur-veys of passenger perceptions of safety indicated that some 20% ofpassengers consider curbside stops the most significant safety issueon the Melbourne public transport system (VicRoads R&D Project).

Curbside stops also have an impact on the efficient use of the roadspace. During each boarding and alighting, all road traffic behind thetram must stop. Traffic simulation has shown this reduces averagetram and traffic speeds by as much as 8% to 12% compared with roadswithout curbside stops (Currie et al., unpublished data on VicRoadsR&D Project 799, 2004). The same modeling has shown that curbsidestops cause trams to run unreliably because following trams are slowedby delay wave impacts caused by tail backs of traffic queuing behindtrams stopping at curbside stops.

There is a traffic safety rule particular to Melbourne which isspecifically designed to assist trams when traffic is turning in frontof the tram. Called the hook turn, traffic rules ban turning movementsin front of trams at key [mainly central business district (CBD)] inter-sections but lets traffic make the turn from the curbside lane instead.Figure 1 shows a diagram of this maneuver (which occurs in left-handdrive conditions and hence affects right-turning traffic).

TABLE 1 Comparative Data: Melbourne and Toronto Streetcar Systems

Measure Melbourne Toronto

Population (M, year)

Operator

Total streetcar track length (km/mi)

Share in mixed traffic (km/mi/% share)

Main track location

Average operating speed (kph/mph)

Headways

Reliability

Traffic driving direction

Tram traffic signal priority

On-board driver ticket sales

Ridership per year (M, year)

Car km/mi p.a. (M)

Total tram stops

No. curbside (%)

Average tram stop spacing (m/ft)

Operating performance measures:boardings per car km/mi

3.6 (2003)

Yarra Trams

250/155

167/104/67%

Center lanes

15.0/9.3

Typical = 7.5 minSt. Kilda Road = less than 60 s

Poor27% not on time (more than 1 min early or 6+ min late)

Left side of road

All 600 intersections

No

135.9 (2003)

22.5 km/14.0 mi

1,800

1,200 (67%)

270 m/885 ft

6.0/9.7

2.5 (2001)

Toronto Transit Commission (TTC)

79.6/49.5

71/44/89%

Center lanes

15.0/9.3

Typical = less than 5minKing Street = 2 min

Poor50% within 0–3 min of average headway (5 mins)

Right side of road

At 160 intersections with at least 58 to be installed

No

88.6 (2005)

12.2 km/7.6 mi

715

590 (82%)

250 m/820 ft

7.3/11.7

TABLE 2 Fleet Details: Melbourne and TorontoStreetcar Systems

Road 1st AdditionalStep Height Steps to

Type No. (mm/in.) Floor

Melbourne

C Citadis 36 330/13 0

D Combino 59 300/11.8 0

A class 70 338/13.3 2

B class 132 338/13.3 2

W class 53 347/13.7 2

Z class 150 334/13.2 2

Total 500

Toronto

CLRV 196 252/9.9 3

ALRV 52 252/9.9 3

Total 248

Traffic turning right must wait in the left-hand lane on red. Whenthe lights turn green they can wait across the intersection but not infront of the tram. When the lights change they can make their turn.This traffic rule assists tram operations considerably but is not inplace in Toronto and may be unique to Melbourne conditions. Thisroad rule is well accepted by both road users and the road manage-ment authority in Melbourne. However, it only applies to Melbourne.Anecdotal evidence suggests it is a challenge for visitors who areunfamiliar with this rule, however there is no accident data suggest-ing it is a significant concern.

A range of evidence suggests traffic congestion is growing inMelbourne:

• Car travel in Melbourne has increased at a rate of 1.9% per yearbetween 1996 and 2000 (6).

• VicRoads, the Road Authority, has reported a general declinein peak road travel speeds between 2000 and 2005 (7 ).

• The costs of traffic congestion in Australian cities is forecastedto grow from AU$ 12.8B (US$ 9.8 billion) in 1995 to AU$ 29.7B(US$ 22.8 billion) in 2015 (8).

This exacerbates problems that Melbourne’s streetcars are facing.Hubert Guyot, former chief executive officer of the tram company hassuggested that average a.m. peak hour travel times of trams on themajor Collins Street link have increased by 8.4% between 2003 and2005 (9). Yarra Trams has also stated that “by late 2003, the average

Currie and Shalaby 33

tram speed had declined 8% in the previous 4 years. If that trend con-tinued, there was real danger that the tram system would be aban-doned by many of its patrons” (10). By comparison, peak road trafficspeeds have declined by 3.4% between 2000 to 2005 (7) and suggestthat trams are more affected by congestion effects than by traffic.

There is some evidence that reliability of trams is also affected.Between October and December 1999 and October and December2003, the share of a section of Yarra Trams services that were noton time increased from 20% to 37%, suggesting reliability is gettingworse (4). However, more recent performance data show a levelingoff of on-time performance.

There is evidence that traffic congestion will continue to grow.Modeling suggests that the length of a.m. peak roads with a volumeto capacity ratio of over 1.0 will increase from 640 km (398 mi) in2001 to 1,300 km (808 mi) by 2021 (7 ). Overall, it is clear that themixed traffic operation of Melbourne’s streetcar system is not a goodenvironment for fast and reliable services and that, in the future,performance will continue to deteriorate.

Toronto

Generally, on-street running in Toronto creates the same problemsthat exist in other systems with similar operation: low running speedand large variability in headway. The magnitude of these problems

Traffic Sign

RIGHT TURNFROM LEFT

ONLY

TramOperatingDirection

TramOperatingDirection

WAIT HEREUNTIL THELIGHTS IN

THE STREETYOU ARE

ENTERINGHAVE

CHANGED TOGREEN

TURN ANDCONTINUESTRAIGHT

AHEAD

YOU MUST BE INTHE LEFT LANE

TO MAKE AHOOK TURN

INDICATETHAT YOU

ARE TURNINGRIGHT

FIGURE 1 Melbourne traffic rule: hook turn stops turning traffic from interfering withtram operations (traffic operates in left-hand lanes in Australia).

is amplified by Toronto’s exceptionally small proportion of dedicatedROW operation.

In Toronto, the average streetcar speed has been measured at approx-imately 15 km/h (9.3 mph), whereas new light rail systems withindedicated ROW routinely attain averages of 30 km/h (18.6 mph)(11). In addition to the effects of operation in mixed traffic, slowtravel speeds have been associated with the use of curbside stopswhich, as in Melbourne, lead to delays in car traffic that further delayupstream streetcars.

Reliability also plagues Toronto’s streetcars. Headway reliabilityhas been identified as one of the most important factors influencingcustomer satisfaction. The 504 King streetcar route, Toronto’s busiest,represents the culmination of both speed and reliability issues andserves to illustrate the difficulties affecting the entire system.

The King streetcar line has a scheduled headway during peakperiods of only 2-1⁄2 min. During these periods, excessive headwayvariability is often experienced, with the standard deviation of head-ways exceeding the mean headway. In addition, due to the lengthof the route, headway variability progressively increases as street-cars approach the end of the line. Near the terminal stop, headwayvariability can be five times that experienced at the beginning (12).

Capacity issues further complicate the issue. Because some passen-gers are left behind at stops, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC)actually decreases the headway to 2 min between streetcars duringthe peak periods. Despite increasing capacity, this strategy only exac-erbates the problem of headway variability, since even a small delayof 1 min can put a vehicle 50% behind schedule. In addition, bunch-ing, in which one streetcar ends up almost immediately behind anotherwithout the ability to pass, is a frequent problem (12). Thus, trafficinterference, as well as curbside stops, contribute to making the Kingstreetcar line one of the system’s slowest and most unreliable routes.

The experience of the King streetcar line is extreme, but in manyways typical. All streetcar lines experience these problems to somedegree, and as ridership and congestion continue to rise in the down-town core, they can be expected only to increase in magnitude. TheKing streetcar line also demonstrates another difficulty shared by manydowntown routes: the width of the existing roadway and presenceof buildings at the curb line make provision of a dedicated ROWimpractical at this point. Although options such as a pedestrian mallhave been discussed, for the foreseeable future, the King streetcarwill be operating in mixed traffic on a busy roadway.

As in Melbourne, Toronto’s problems with streetcars are probablyat least partially attributable to the short distance between stops. Theaverage spacing between stops in Toronto is 250 m (820 ft), but thereare no efforts currently to reduce the number of stops.

A final challenge of on-street running is the difficulty of banningtraffic from streetcar route segments where turning traffic prohibitionsand exclusive transit lanes are in place. It is noteworthy that extensiveenforcement initiatives have been attempted along the King streetcarline, but they failed to lead to significant and lasting improvementsin compliance rates.

Universal Access

Melbourne

The 1992 Australian Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) requiresthat, within 20 years, all public transport be made fully accessiblefor persons with disability. Trams in Melbourne have been given aspecial dispensation under the act (13), which extends the period by

34 Transportation Research Record 2006

which the existing infrastructure must become accessible to 30 years.The year 2032 is the target date for full accessibility, and there is arolling program whereby parts of the system must become accessible(e.g., 25% system compliance by 2007 and 55% by 2012).

The special dispensation for Melbourne’s trams was granted largelybecause of the considerable difficulties the system faces in becomingfully accessible. A program for provision of low-floor trams [withinitial steps heights of 300 to 330 mm (11.8 to 13 in.) from the road]has been fast tracked. However, these vehicles do not in themselvesprovide for full access. Most tram stops in Melbourne are curbsidestops (Figure 2); hence, even with low-floor trams an initial stepheight of at least 300 mm (11.8 in.) is required, which does not meetthe requirements of the DDA.

The two main approaches for providing access for persons withdisabilities on trams involve platforms or lifts (14). Platforms aimto create level entry between platforms and vehicle entrances. Liftscan be either on-vehicle or on-platform. Either can be expensive tobuild and maintain, and they cause delays. Lifts on vehicles causedelays during passenger loading and unloading. They also reducevehicle seating and standing capacity. There is a view among mem-bers of the Melbourne disability lobby that vehicle lifts will not meetthe requirements of DDA legislation because not all people with dis-abilities can use lifts. Lifts on platforms are rare and have a pooroperational delay record; platform mounted lifts on the San Jose lightrail system result in train delay of 4 to 6 min per person (15). Thiswould be unacceptable performance for streetcar lines operating atshort headways.

Ramps, a lower-cost solution, are not practical because the grade oframps from road to even low-floor trams is higher than that requiredby DDA standards.

Overall, platforms appear to be a less expensive and more effec-tive solution. However, platforms are not always feasible. Curbsideplatforms are feasible only if tracks are next to the curb. With centerlane operations, platforms are possible only if roads are narrowed toa single lane using a curb extension, or bulb. This reduces road widthsto a single lane in both directions, which limits road capacity forother road users considerably. There is a single example of this typeof stop, called a curb access stop. It has been introduced as part ofthe Box Hill Tram Extension on Whitehorse Road.

For wide roads at high traffic volumes, a platform could be designedeither as a set of side platforms or an island platform in the center ofthe road (termed “super stops” in Melbourne). In both cases, roadtraffic surrounds the platforms and passengers must cross traffic lanes

FIGURE 2 Typical Melbourne curbside tram stop, not fullyaccessible even with low-floor tram.

to access and egress services. These options are not always feasiblewhere road widths are confined. Around 20 of these stops have beendeveloped in Melbourne, mostly side platforms in the center of theroad within the Melbourne CBD.

An innovation is the easy access stop being tested in Danks Street,Port Melbourne (3). The design incorporates a speed hump in thecurbside lane which also acts as a level entry platform to a centerroad operating tram. Tram tracks are not raised, and traffic is excludedfrom the center lane. This solution has proven successful in theDanks Street application but still reduces road widths to a singlelane, effectively providing a solution with similar performance tothat of the curb extension or bulb option.

While solutions are still under development the stark fact is that1,200 curbside stops remain inaccessible. Only a handful of solutions,fewer than 30 in total, have been found in the first 4 years of the30-year accessibility program. This leaves more than 1,100, or morethan 40 a year, to complete in the next 26 years.

The vast majority of curbside stops are in roads where super stopsare not feasible due to road width constraints. Curb extensions (oreasy access stops) are probably feasible in most cases. However, ifimplemented, the implication is that the majority of Melbourne’sinner urban CBD access roads would be narrowed to a single lanein each direction at more than 1,000 locations. These roads representthe most congested parts of the road network. Impacts on congestionand accessibility would be considerable. These difficulties are com-pounded by the likely need to remove local parking in busy shop-ping strips so that these trams stops, which are wider than traditionalstops, can be provided. Local resistance to such measures has beenhigh, as will be discussed.

Overall, this leaves Melbourne with a difficult problem in achievingfull accessibility. It must narrow its busiest inner urban streets to a sin-gle lane in each direction or replace trams with a more accessible alter-native. Curbside track relocation is not feasible given the size ofconversion required [more than 167 km (104 mi)], considerable costinvolved, and considerable removal of curbside parking. Although con-version of the system to bus is a feasible and cost-effective option, thereis little interest in this option due to the popularity of trams in Mel-bourne, regardless of their performance. Policy initiatives have there-fore been examined to find ways of improving existing tram service.

Toronto

Streetcar accessibility is also a challenge in Toronto. In 2005, theprovince of Ontario passed the Accessibility for Ontarians withDisability Act (AODA), which updated and enhanced the Ontarianswith Disability Act of 2001. The AODA mandates that all publictransit must be universally accessible by 2025. In 2003, TTC issuedthe first Accessible Transit Services Plan (16). This document,updated annually, details efforts to provide universal access to thetransit system. Streetcars operated by TTC are included in the plan.As in Melbourne, the streetcar system has been identified as the mostdifficult component of the transit system in which to provide accessfor persons with disabilities.

Numerous efforts have been undertaken recently to plan for com-pliance with the timeframe set by the AODA. As with the situation inMelbourne, it was deemed too expensive and operationally inefficientto outfit the existing streetcar fleet with lifts, at the cost, per lift device,of approximately AU$ 90,000 (US$ 70,000) (17 ). (The price wascomputed for 2006 values at the current rate of 1.3.). Instead, TTCis currently proceeding to procure new accessible low-floor streetcarsthat are expected to be acquired starting in 2010. Existing stops with

Currie and Shalaby 35

platforms will have the platforms retrofitted, if required, to adjustthe height and width to allow for level boarding and alighting oflow-floor vehicles. In addition, all new streetcar facilities are built toaccommodate low-floor vehicles. For example, the dedicated ROWreconstructed along St. Clair Avenue has platform stops that conformto accessibility standards.

Although low-floor streetcars and continuing efforts to increasethe proportion of dedicated ROWs and platform stops will increasesystem accessibility, these efforts alone would still leave large portionsof the system out of the reach of Torontonians with disabilities. Asin Melbourne, the issue of accessibility at curbside stops needs to beaddressed. Ultimately, even under the most optimistic prediction ofToronto’s transit future, including dedicated ROWs and pedestrianstreets, curbside stops will still constitute a large portion of the street-car system for the foreseeable future. Therefore, as in Melbourne,there is a need to provide access along these corridors.

TTC is currently assessing various options to make the new street-cars accessible at curbside stops, probably through the use of ramps.This is the only solution with a realistic chance of opening up theentire streetcar system to use by all. No design has yet been selected,but the addition of ramps will not be the only modification. Toronto’sstreetcar system presents numerous challenges that will make cus-tom design a necessity: an atypical track gauge (4 ft, 10-7⁄8 in.), tightcurves, and steep slopes mean that no off-the-shelf design will workfor TTC.

POLICY INITIATIVES

Melbourne

Think Tram

The main tram policy initiative in Melbourne is called Think Tram.This is a AU$ 30 million (US$ 23 million) joint program betweenthe Victorian Department of Infrastructure, VicRoads (the roadmanagement authority), and Yarra Trams aimed at improving tramtravel times, reliability, and safety along the busiest parts of Melbourne’s tram network. The program includes a package of on-road infrastructure developments and deployment of new tech-nology to improve traffic flow. The program focuses on eight prior-ity routes through Melbourne’s CBD and on major approaches to theCBD, including many of Melbourne’s shopping strips. The firstphase of the program finishes in 2006 although it has recently beenextended to 2010 with an additional investment of AU$ 47.3 mil-lion (US$ 36 million) plus some AU$ 500 million (US$ 384 million)for 100 new low-floor trams. To date, the elements of the programfall into three main categories (10):

• Priority—including traffic signal priority to ensure trams aregiven priority over road traffic where possible;

• Separation—installing physical barriers using kerbing or raisedtram tracks to prevent road traffic encroaching on to tracks; and

• Tram stops—installing platform stops to reduce passengerloading times, facilitate access, and improve safety. Optimization ofstop location is also included in this category.

The stated target of Think Tram is to reduce tram journey times by25% (18). Initiatives undertaken in the program include the following:

• Greater priority at intersections,• Traffic turning bans in front of trams,

• New hook turns introduced for the first time outside the CBD, and• A series of tram curbing measures aimed at segregating the

tram ROW from traffic.

Think Tram is yet to be completed. However, generally it has hadmixed performance compared with its stated objectives. Although atarget of 25% improvement in tram travel time was set, it is clearthat improvements have not been of this order. The only publishedimprovements to date have been around 5% on Route 19 associatedwith the Sydney Road corridor (10).

A far more comprehensive set of measures was tested in ClarendonStreet, including the use of new hook turns, claiming of road space forfuture provision of platform stops that have a curb extension model,right-turn bans, and separation curbing. Several tram stops wererelocated from the approach to the departure side of intersections tofacilitate signal priority. This package of measures met significantresistance from local traders who successfully campaigned to removemost of these initiatives. Traders suggested that removing parkingwas reducing trade and that traffic measures were unsafe and causedcongestion. The trial evaluation showed only modest tram traveltime improvements, between 15 and 45 s (19). Significant negativefeedback on the trial was found in consultations. The tram stop mea-sures were effectively removed from the program because the trialhad not sufficiently met its objective of improving tram performanceand reliability. Parking removed by the trial tram stops was replaced,and preexisting curbside stops returned. The trial was not a completefailure, though. Tram priority measures, including hook turns, havebeen retained.

The experience of the Clarendon Street trial has led to a more con-sultative approach being taken. Performance has been weak to date,as shown by the following results:

• Relatively minor improvements in travel time have been gener-ated (on the order of 5%). They affect only a small proportion of routes.Systemwide data suggest that tram speeds have declined by 8% in 4 years. This suggests the program is playing catch up as opposed toimproving base performance. It is likely that reliability improvementshave been of a similar order.

• Fewer than 10 platform stops have been provided in on streetsections. Although they are in the CBD, a major traffic generatorand hence an important part of the system to convert, more than1,100 curbside stops in the system remain to be converted for DDAaccess. From this perspective, the program is a drop in the ocean.

• The program has shown some success at reducing the number oftram stops. However, fewer than 10 have been removed. If Europeanstop spacing is to be achieved, more than 500 stops would have tobe removed.

Route 109 Project

The Route 109 project is a related and older Melbourne tram improve-ment initiative. This is a premium route strategy in which planningand design activity is concentrated on a single service to scope outwhat is possible for performance improvement.

The 109 project is highly consultative, including a comprehensiveprogram of public meetings and surveys. The program is based on aconsensus approach that is used to select measures for implementation.As part of this initiative, new low-floor trams are deployed on the route.The Box Hill tram extension and infrastructure improvement workshave been provided. At least four existing stops have been replacedwith super stops (three of them are within the Melbourne CBD). Three

36 Transportation Research Record 2006

new platform stops plus the curb access stop in Whitehorse Road havealso been provided. However, these are new stops, not a replacementof existing curbside stops, which is the major challenge for the system.

There are likely to be travel time and reliability improvementsresulting from the program, and at least some tram stops have beenremoved. However, public reporting on the impacts of the projecton tram performance has been limited so little is known about theoutcome of the project, which is continuing. Clearly, only a handfulof stops have been made accessible, and although the program hasbeen running since 2001, it has taken 5 years of consultation to achievethe outcomes on this route so far. Significantly, two large sections ofthe route remain to be implemented. The rollout of the consultationprogram in the city of Yarra has yet to commence (18).

It is difficult to comment on the performance of the Route 109project, given the lack of publicly available performance impact data.However, it is clear that adoption of a consultative approach tomaking changes to tram infrastructure is a time-consuming activity.In 5 years the program has not completed upgrades to a single route,with another 24 major tram routes to address. What is clear is thatthe program has not found an answer to the accessibility question.Again, only a handful of stops have been converted. The currenttimetable (March 7) shows only 12 (48%) of the 25 stops on Route 109to be accessible.

Toronto

Dedicated Right-of-Way

The City of Toronto and TTC have identified the separation of cartraffic and streetcars by means of dedicated, physically separatedROW as a priority (20). Benefits of this type of operation are clear.It is the only mode of operation that realistically “gives streetcars thespeed, safety and time advantage necessary to compete effectivelywith the automobile and shift commuters to transit” (11).

The most important dedicated ROW construction completed thusfar is the 510 Spadina line, which opened to traffic in 1997 (Figure 3).Previously, this line, extending south from Spadina Station to Queen’sQuay, had been operated as a bus route. The results of this conversionhave been positive. Since implementation of the new line, ridershipalong Spadina has grown from 26,350 passengers per day in July 1997to 35,730 in April 2004, according to the most recent statistics (21).Data also demonstrate increased line capacity through use of fewervehicles and increased average speed, and consequently less time to

FIGURE 3 Toronto Spadina line right-of-way.

travel the route. In addition, evidence points to improved reliabilityof service and a reduced need for short turning.

There are also other, less quantifiable benefits that have beenidentified on the Spadina line. A survey of businesses after openingrevealed that

• 36% thought business was better,• 50% believed there was no change, and• 14% thought business was worse (11).

Given that opposition from businesses can be a significant obstacleto new construction, these results are significant. The opening of theSpadina line also sent a message to the people of Toronto that the citywas serious about retaining and modernizing its system of streetcars.

To some extent, the Spadina line policy is an example of a premiumservice strategy as adopted for Route 109 in Melbourne. It acts to focusstrategy, operations, design, and investment, as well as media andpublic opinion on a single route to identify what can be achieved witha systemwide problem. In addition, there have been other locationswhere the city of Toronto has planned or is currently constructingdedicated ROWs for streetcars. The most significant ROW currentlyunder construction is the St. Clair Avenue line.

The St. Clair line extends approximately 7 km (4.4 mi) alongSt. Clair West Avenue, from Yonge Street to Gunns Road, and it willbe completed in 2007. The line will feature a dedicated ROW in thecenter of the street, alongside two lanes of traffic in either direction.Tracks will be on a segregated portion of the road, elevated by 153 mm(6 in.) relative to car traffic. During peak hours, no parking will beallowed to provide two lanes of traffic in each direction. Duringoff-peak hours, on-street parking will be available. The 153-mm(6-in.) elevation was chosen because it is pronounced enough to sep-arate the streetcars from the traffic, but it permits use by emergencyvehicles. Improvements will also include 13 new platform stationson the far side of intersections.

Despite these improvements and willingness of the city of Torontoto explore ROW construction, there are numerous streetcar lines whereit is currently unfeasible or even impossible to construct dedicatedROWs. Several of these routes, for example, the 504 King streetcar,are approaching the practical capacity limit for mixed traffic operation(22). Many of these streets have been designated for further growthand development in the city of Toronto’s official plan. Therefore,congestion and demand can be expected only to grow in the future(22). More radical solutions, such as the conversion of King into apedestrian and transit mall, have been proposed, although none havebeen adopted by the city (22). Therefore, plans for increasing speedand reliability of streetcars operating in mixed traffic must be devel-oped to help maintain and increase ridership in the Toronto core.Several such strategies have been identified. The most important ofthose in the Toronto context are discussed as follows.

Transit-Signal Priority

A substantial portion of streetcar delays occur at intersections. Street-car performance can be improved by reducing traffic signal delaysusing transit-signal priority (TSP) by either the extension or quickrestoration of the green phase, to improve the running time of transitvehicles. A TSP implementation program is under way in Toronto.Some 160 intersections on transit lines have been equipped withTSP. Every year, one new route is equipped with TSP, as well asseveral other “infill” intersections along other transit corridors withtypically 30 to 40 new intersections being equipped annually. Cur-

Currie and Shalaby 37

rently, 58 intersections along major surface transit routes remainwithout TSP.

Issues exist with implementation of TSP. In some instances, thecity of Toronto has rejected implementation of the technology becausestreetcar volumes were too low, or operating conditions made itsuse difficult. Some of the intersections without TSP are located atimportant components of the system, for example, along the dedi-cated ROW at Queensway/Lakeshore, on Kingston Road, and alonga significant portion of the new line on Spadina. In addition, sometransit signal algorithms were restricted by city staff, rendering themless effective. Ongoing efforts currently address these problems.For example, TTC is currently designing a new TSP algorithm forthe Spadina line, and applications are being filed to remove existingTSP restrictions at some intersections.

Benefits of TSP on streetcar performance are significant. In regardto the 504 King Street line, a study revealed that the current TSPsystem reduced the round-trip cycle time by 11%, increased transitspeed, and reduced headway variability, among other benefits (23).TTC performance data show an average delay reduction of 6 to 8 sper intersection approach, as well as a small reduction in travel timevariability.

The combination of a left-turn ban at intersections equipped withTSP suggests a synergistic effect (23). Modeling and experimentalevidence points to transit vehicles frequently being stuck behindturning traffic, essentially wasting the effect of the extended green.Traffic turn bans in conjunction with TSP further decreased roundtrip cycle time by 13%, increased speed, and increased headwayreliability (23). However, implementation of left-turn bans, like traf-fic prohibition from transit tracks in general, suffers the same prob-lems as enforcement does. Perhaps the hook-turn model operated inMelbourne could generate benefits of this kind in Toronto.

Multiple-Unit Operation

Maintaining uniform spacing between streetcars is of paramountimportance to the operation of high-frequency transit routes and canbe assisted using a multiple-unit operation (MUO) strategy. It involvesenhancing vehicle capacity by coupling two streetcars while doublingthe headway between streetcars to maintain capacity. This shouldreduce the effects of service disruptions on shorter headway tramsand should reduce bunching by providing a time cushion betweensuccessive streetcars. It should also help to absorb small variationsin headways, leading to more stable service.

The primary benefit of MUO is to lower headway variability,although simulation tests have shown that route speeds also improve(12). This is the result of many factors, including the reduced impactof fewer streetcars on traffic speed. In addition, simulation testshave shown MUO to increase the effectiveness of TSP, indicat-ing the benefits of implementing a so-called bundle of strategies toimprove streetcar performance.

The 504 King Street streetcar is a prime candidate for MUO dueto its short headways. Microsimulation studies have suggested MUObenefits on the King Street streetcar as well as on the St. Clair AvenueWest line. This is significant because the two lines demonstratemarkedly different characteristics: King operates in mixed trafficand has the highest ridership of the streetcar system whereas theSt. Clair line operates on a dedicated ROW with fewer passengers.This benefit across lines with different operating characteristics pointsto the robustness of the measure.

The only drawback to MUO is that the doubling of headways cansometimes create unsuitably long waits. For example, the St. Clair

Avenue streetcar currently operates at a peak-hour headway of 3 min45 s. Doubling this headway during peak periods could create anunacceptably long headway for a major transit corridor.

To enable MUO, TTC is currently building coupling capabilities inits entire streetcar fleet, under the vehicle rebuild engineering program.

Proof of Payment

The purpose of a proof-of-payment (POP) fare system is to reducevehicle dwell time at stops. Passengers boarding with valid POP(i.e., transit pass, paper transfer) can board through any of the doorsof the vehicle. Passengers entering through the front door and payinga fare also receive a paper POP. This differs from the system currentlyused on the majority of Toronto streetcars, pay on entry, in which eachpassenger must enter through the front door and either show a validpass or transfer or pay a fare (exact change, ticket, or token). The pri-mary advantage of the POP system is that all doors can be used forboarding, thereby further reducing dwell times and the correspondingstreetcar speeds. This system is currently in use on the Queen Streetstreetcar.

A microsimulation-based study of the King Street and St. Clairstreetcar lines indicated that POP not only improves streetcar speedbut also has potential to reduce headway variability, thus enhanc-ing service reliability (24). The benefits of POP extended, likeMUO, across both the King and St. Clair line, pointing to its effec-tiveness with varying streetcar operating characteristics.

Despite being a low-cost measure with proven benefits, the useof POP has been limited in Toronto to the Queen Streetcar only.However, TTC will likely implement POP at other streetcar routeswith the acquisition of new streetcars, because the European modelsbeing considered do not accommodate fare collection.

38 Transportation Research Record 2006

POLICY ASSESSMENT

Table 3 presents a synthesis of the policy approach and operationalstrategies attempted in Melbourne and Toronto. There are opportu-nities for both systems to benefit from the lessons learned by theirpartners. First, hook-turn provisions and some of the innovativetram stop designs in Melbourne could be tested in Toronto. Second,increased streetcar capacity (via articulated vehicles or multiple unittrains) as a strategy to manage bunching is an approach consideredin Toronto but not fully appreciated in Melbourne.

Both systems view route segregation as the single most success-ful strategy to apply to solve the problems of streetcar operations.However, both also recognize the considerable community andtrader constraints associated with the reductions in curbside park-ing implied by these measures. A consultative approach has beenfollowed in both cases. However, achieving consensus has provendifficult. In Melbourne investment, and government commitment ishigh. However, community resistance is holding back any significantprogress.

TSP is a new technology solution that has proven beneficial inboth cities. However, achieving a high share of green time has beendifficult due to congested traffic and reticence of road authorities tolimit traffic capacity in these conditions. Both systems are developingnew technologies to optimize signal priority to get the most out ofthese technologies.

Toronto is still developing its approach to universal access and isheavily constrained by funding uncertainties that have limited fleetreplacement. Nevertheless, their strategy is not unlike the Melbourneapproach, although there is consideration of access ramps (however,this has not been fully committed).

Ramps are still an option in Melbourne, though strategies havetargeted platform stops and the easier to convert locations so as to

TABLE 3 Synthesis of Policy and Operations Strategies: Melbourne and Toronto Streetcar Systems

Approach Aims Outcomes

Hook turn

No delay ticketing

Premium route strategies

Route segregation

Traffic signal priority

Increase streetcar capacity

Low-floor trams

Platform stop approach

Curb extensions andeasy access stop

Removes turning traffic from in front of streetcars.

Vehicles not delayed during boarding.

Concentration of strategy, planning, resources, and investment on a single premium route to test out and demonstrate good planning before systemwide rollout.

Separation of tram right-of-way from traffic includinguse of raised track beds, tram curbing.

Provide priority at signalized intersections.

Use larger vehicles or multiple-unit trains to ensure lessbuildup of demand when services are unreliable and toeven out headways to avoid bunching.

Adopt a fleet with low floor to assist in universal access.

Introduce platform stops to improve safety and provideuniversal access to low-floor trams.

Remove pedestrian walking in front of traffic and provideuniversal access with curbside platform stops.

Successful in Melbourne. Not tried in other operations.

Successful in both Melbourne and Toronto. Being considered for fullintroduction in Toronto.

Successful in both cities; Route 109 in Melbourne, Spadina inToronto. Consultative approach can be frustrating as it takes a longtime to achieve results.

Very successful for tram operations; however, difficult to achieve inpractice. Trader and some local resident reluctance to removeparking is a major issue to be tackled.

In operation in Melbourne for 20–30 years and being rolled out inToronto. Has proven successful in improving operation but haslimited benefits in congested traffic conditions.

This is being followed with the articulated streetcars and proposedmultiple-unit approach in Toronto and also with the use of the5000 series of Combino trams in Melbourne. Noted as successfulin Toronto; evidence in Melbourne is unclear where the wider benefits of larger vehicles were not considered in this context.

This has been successful in Melbourne and is an approach beingplanned for Toronto. However it does not solve the disabilityaccess standards (in Australia) since steps are still required.

Successful in both cities but not a solution for narrow roads in busystreets.

Limited success in Melbourne. Yet to be tried in Toronto. Not likelyto be a complete solution in most environments due to parking androad capacity reductions.

progress the large backlog of stop conversions required. Both citiesare looking to low-floor trams as part of the solution.

There is clearly much to learn about the practices of cities that havehad the vision to retain streetcar systems as a major element of theirtransit systems. Light rail research has focused on reserved ROWsto the exclusion of unique and challenging issues associated withstreetcar operations. Streetcar systems have often been seen ashistorical idiosyncrasies rather than serious opportunities to providemass transit in inner urban settings. This situation is changing, for anumber of U.S. cities are now considering upgrading transit sys-tems using modern streetcar initiatives. Examples are Albuquerque,New Mexico; Tucson, Arizona; St. Louis, Missouri; and Portland,Oregon. There is much opportunity for transit research to address thisknowledge gap into the future.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank the following individuals for helping with the prepa-ration of this paper: Jim Sinikas of the Toronto Transit Commission;Les Kulesza of Yarra Trams; Andrew Salzberg, Asmus Georgi, andRichard Soberman of the University of Toronto; and Zed Senbergsof Monash University. The paper’s reviewers also provided usefulinput to the paper, which is appreciated.

REFERENCES

1. Vuchic, V. R. Urban Public Transportation: Systems and Technology.Prentice Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, N.J., 1981.

2. Vuchic, V. R. Transportation for Livable Cities. Center for Urban PolicyResearch, Rutgers, N.J., 2000.

3. Currie, G., and P. Smith. Innovative Design for Safe and AccessibleLight Rail or Tram Stops Suitable for Streetcar-Style Conditions. InTransportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation ResearchBoard, No. 1955, Transportation Research Board of the National Acad-emies, Washington, D.C., 2006, pp. 37–46.

4. Track Record. Department of Infrastructure, 2006. www.doi.vic.gov.au/trackrecord. Accessed June 18, 2007.

5. Guyot, H. Revitalisation of the Tram System in Melbourne—TheChallenges Ahead. Presentation to the Australian Fabian Society, July 7,2004. www.fabian.org/au/892.asp. Accessed June 18, 2007.

6. Challenge Melbourne—Issues in Metropolitan Planning for the 21stCentury. Department of Infrastructure, Melbourne, Australia, Oct. 2000.www.dse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/B616BF98C864ED55CA25702600025B1B/$File/CM_pp1-9pdf. Accessed June 18, 2007.

7. Submission to the Inquiry by the Victorian Competition and EfficiencyCommission into Managing Transport Congestion. Department of Infra-structure, Victoria, Australia, Dec. 7, 2006. www.vcec.vic.gov.au/CA256EAF001C7B21/0/E6F4A4748F936D23CA2570840004A41A?OpenDocument. Accessed June 18, 2007.

8. Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics. Traffic Congestionand Road User Charges in Australian Cities. Report 92. Bureau of

Currie and Shalaby 39

Transport Economics, Australian Government Publishing Service,Canberra, Australia, 1996.

9. The Age. Melbourne, Australia, April 2, 2005.10. Yarra Trams. Yarra Trams’ Submission—Inquiry into Managing Trans-

port Congestion. Dec. 9, 2005. www.vcec.vic.gov.au/CA256EAF001C7B21/0/E6F4A4748F936D23CA2570840004A41A?OpenDocument.Accessed June 18, 2007.

11. Gormick, G. The Streetcar Renaissance: Its Background and Benefits.2004. www.toronto.ca/wes/techservices/involved/transportation/st_clair_w_transit/pdf/report/streetcar_renaissance.pdf. Accessed July 23, 2006.

12. Shalaby, A., K. Ling, and J. Sinikas. Multiple-Unit Streetcar Operation:Evaluation Using Microsimulation Modeling. TRB 85th Annual Meet-ing Compendium of Paper, CD-ROM. Transportation Research Boardof the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2006.

13. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. Notice of HREOCExemption Decision re Public Transport Corporation (Victoria) andOthers, March 15, 1999. www.hreoc.gov.disability_rights/exemptions/melbtram/notice.htm. Accessed June 18, 2007.

14. Geissenheimer, H. North American Light Rail Station Design: Attractive,Passenger-Oriented, Easy to Maintain, with Mobility Impaired Access.UITP Light Rail Conference, Zurich, Switzerland, 1998.

15. Kittelson & Associates, KFH Group, Inc., Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade& Douglas, Inc., and K. Hunter-Zaworski. TCRP Report 100: TransitCapacity and Quality of Service Manual, 2nd ed., Transportation ResearchBoard of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2003.

16. Toronto Transit Commission. Accessible Transit Services Plan, 2005.www.toronto.ca/ttc/pdf/accessible_transit_service_plan_2005.pdf. Accessed July 23, 2006.

17. Toronto Transit Commission. Report 9: Technology and Costs AffectingAccessibility on Streetcars. 2006. www.toronto.ca/legdocs/2006/agendas/committees/pof/pof060411/it022.pdf. Accessed July 23, 2006.

18. Think Tram Program. VicRoads, 2006. www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/vrne/vrne5nav.nsf/childdocs/-2BBDC9EF1E56C40ACA256FD300241C3B-77CD75CA2AE22CFCCA256FD300241C47-82FAA6D7FF352471CA256FD300241C5C-DC57D80CDF39687ECA256FEA000B6D58?open.Accessed April 4, 2006.

19. City of Port Phillip. Report on the Clarendon Street Think Tram Trial Proj-ect, 2005. www.portphillip.vic/gov/au/council_agenda_june05.pthlm.Accessed June 18, 2007.

20. City of Toronto. The Official Plan, 2002. www.toronto.ca/planning/official_plan/pdf_chapter1-5/chapter1-5_toc.pdf. Accessed June 18, 2007.

21. Toronto Transit Commission. 510 Spadina Ridership Comparison.Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 1998.

22. Toronto Transit Commission. Ridership Growth Strategy, 2003. www.toronto.ca/ttc/pdf/ridership_growth_strategy.pdf. Accessed July 23, 2006.

23. Shalaby, A., B. Abdulhai, and J. Lee. Assessment of Streetcar TransitPriority Options Using Microsimulation Modelling. Special Issue onInnovations in Transportation Engineering, Canadian Journal of CivilEngineering, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2003, pp. 1000–1009.

24. Ling, K., A. Shalaby, and A. Georgi. Evaluation of Proof-of-Paymentand Multiple-Unit Streetcar Operation: A Case Study of the 512 St. ClairRoute and the 504 King Route. Report for the Toronto Transit Commission.Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2006.

Any omissions or errors in the paper are the responsibility of the authors.

The Light Rail Transit Committee sponsored publication of this paper.