SUBMISSION TO THE NSW PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO …...Final Submission to the NSW Parliamentary...

SUBMISSION

TO THE NSW PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

INTO THE TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE

OF NUCLEAR WASTE

SUTHERLAND SHIRE COUNCIL

15 AUGUST 2003

Final Submission to the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into the Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste Sutherland Shire Council 15 August 2003

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 4 A. The Types and Form of Radioactive Waste Generated at

Lucas Heights Science & Technology Centre 5 a. The Nature of the Radioactive Wastes 6 b. Current Waste Management Problems at LHSTC 7 c. Future Waste Arisings 8 d. Medical and Industrial Use of Isotopes 10

B. Legal Issues regarding Management and Regulation 12

C. Storage and Transport of Nuclear Waste 16 a. Potential for Accidents 16 b. Hazard Response 18 c. Sabotage 18 d. Current Radioactive Materials Transport 20 e. Commonwealth Indemnity 21 D. The Security Problems with Radioactive Waste 22

E. NSW Services and Infrastructure Considerations 25

F. The Commonwealth Track Record on Hazardous Industry Planning and Information Sharing 33 a. Quality of the Planning 33 b. Public Consultation 34

Conclusion 34

List of Recommendations 35

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List of Attachments

Attachment 1: Safety Implications of Waste Storage and Disposal in Australia

– Frank Barnaby, 29 July 2003 Figure 1: Projection of Yearly Waste Arising from ANSTO Site

– SSC Submission to Reactor Research Review, 1993 Attachment 2: Summary of Alternatives to a New Nuclear Reactor

– Morris & Budnitz, Future Resources Associates, 2001 Attachment 3: Nuclear Transport – Some Regulatory Issues

– Jim Nolan,4 August 2003

Attachment 4: Protection of Radioactive Waste during Storage and Transportation – Christopher Payne, 28 July 2003

Attachment 5: Submission to Transport & Storage of Nuclear Waste Inquiry

– Centennial Consultancy (Bob & Betty Walker), 8 August 2003

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INTRODUCTION

Council welcomes the opportunity to provide this submission to the Inquiry into the

Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste.

Council notes the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry: To consider and report upon proposals by the Commonwealth Government to transport nuclear waste through and potentially store nuclear waste within New South Wales, with specific reference to the following matters:

a) Logistical arrangements associated with the proposals, including sourcing, transport and storage of waste;

b) Health and safety risks associated with the transportation and storage of nuclear waste in New South Wales;

c) Extent of possible resource implications associated with the transportation and storage of nuclear waste within New South Wales; and

d) Any other relevant matter. Council’s submission is based upon over a decade of experience in observing and interacting with the Commonwealth and its agencies regarding ongoing nuclear activities in Sutherland Shire. This includes experience with a large research reactor, isotope production facility and associated radioactive waste operations (ANSTO at Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre). Council’s elected representatives and senior staff have represented Council in Commonwealth forums and committees and senior staff continue to participate in ARPANSA Committees (the Commonwealth regulator of Commonwealth nuclear activities), representing the interests and concerns of local government. Council views current Commonwealth radioactive waste storage and disposal activities, and proposals for transport to repositories and stores, with concern. The existing and potential problems outlined below reflect difficulties imposed on the local community and the NSW Government by ill-judged Commonwealth development decisions, particularly sourced from a replacement nuclear reactor. The quantities and types of waste to be produced are frequently hazardous, very long-lived, and difficult to manage. Council seeks to: i) alert the Joint Select Committee to particular local and state problems arising from

Commonwealth nuclear research and manufacturing in NSW, ii) propose improvements to current practice regarding radioactive waste sources and

associated emergency planning and health and environment protection issues, iii) define problems for public health protection which NSW should require the

Commonwealth to solve, including poor attention to community health protection and emergency planning, and

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Final Submission to the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into the Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste Sutherland Shire Council 15 August 2003 iv) request that State Parliament oppose continued nuclear activities, including waste

producing activities such as reactor use, pending adoption by the Commonwealth of satisfactory or alternative approaches which avoid waste, waste storage, waste disposal and radioactive waste transport.

The Submission includes reference to advice commissioned from four independent experts in the nuclear and associated disciplines. These reports and curricula vitae are attached to the Submission. The Submission subsections also identify recommendations for action by the NSW government which flow from the facts and arguments made in the submission and attachments. A. THE TYPES AND FORM OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE GENERATED

AT LUCAS HEIGHTS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CENTRE

The majority of radioactive wastes in Australia are generated from the Lucas Heights Science & Technology Centre and its historic activities. Notwithstanding the routine importation of isotopes for medical and scientific research, the LHSTC and particularly, the reactor, has generated large quantities of low level solid waste and intermediate level solid waste from spent reactor fuel and from solidification of medical isotope liquid by-products. These are stored on site at LHSTC. Low level liquid waste is disposed of in the sewer with outlet near the Cronulla beaches, highly radioactive intermediate level liquid waste is stored on site pending solidification, a process which has taken many years to develop. Highly radioactive spent reactor fuel is to be stored at LHSTC for periods up to 10 years. International and Australian experts and reviewers inform us that the spent fuel would sensibly be categorised as high level waste but for questionable Commonwealth Government definitions of convenience. The practical implications of these waste categories and the forms of waste at LHSTC are that the storage and disposal of waste at LHSTC is far from best practice, with only occasional attempts to consolidate the forms of waste for easier management. In light of these poor management processes, the Commonwealth is establishing a below ground low level and short lived intermediate solid waste repository and separate long lived intermediate level solid (and probably liquid) waste store. The Commonwealth repository EIS indicates that short lived waste is not the only category destined for that site, with some long lived waste including plutonium and uranium destined to be sent there. Dr. Frank Barnaby of the UK, trained in nuclear physics, examined the draft repository EIS and relevant associated material about LHSTC and the store proposals. His independent report is Attachment 1 to this submission. It is referred to in the sections below.

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(a) The Nature of the Radioactive Wastes

Special attention is required to radioactive waste because it provides additional waste management challenges beyond the more common (chemical or explosive) hazardous wastes.

i) Toxicity of the Waste

The somewhat arbitrary distinction between low level and intermediate level waste, based upon radioactivity levels, belies the fact that both are radiotoxic to humans and the environment, subject to the amount and form of exposure. Furthermore, the potential threat of radiation exposure means that that even low level solid or liquid waste dispersed in the environment can significantly affect public access to local areas and private properties contaminated with the material.

Radiotoxicity is itself constantly under review. Dr. Barnaby discusses in Attachment 1, for example:

“The discharge of tritium, for example, has recently become a more important issue because a recent authoritative publication has shown that the toxicity of tritium is greater than the radiological protection authorities have so far recognised. It is shown that tritium is at least twice as toxic as previously thought. Organically bound tritium can be up to 12.5 times more dangerous for infants.

Tritium is discharged into the environment by ANSTO either as tritium gas or as tritiated water.”

Council is concerned that the increased levels of radioactive waste from ANSTO in our sewers will seriously limit the public reuse of grey water in the future, particularly in drought. Tritium will also be sent to the repository.

ii) The Longevity of the Radioactive Waste

While some radioactive compounds have a half-life of minutes, hours, up to years, a number of significant radiotoxic isotopes have a half-life of centuries to thousands or millions of years. The presence of these long-lived wastes, which raise significant equity problems regarding pollution and management for future generations, is exacerbated by their presence as mixtures in wastes, including spent fuel, medical isotope by-products, and some low level waste materials. Separation of these longer-lived radiotoxic compounds can be difficult and extremely costly, if possible at all.

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(b) Current Waste Management Problems at LHSTC

Council has for many years expressed well-founded concerns about the quantities and manner in which radioactive waste is stored at LHSTC. Indeed, the NSW EPA inspected the site in the mid 1990’s and found considerable shortcomings in waste management processes and methods at that time. The NSW EPA subsequently withdrew its previously voluntary actions in monitoring radioactive waste emerging from LHSTC. This reflected the fact that the Commonwealth land is excluded from state regulatory activities, despite radioactive waste from the site entering local sewers and waterways, and potentially impacting on community re-use of sewer water in the long term.

Particular areas of LHSTC which are of concern to Council are:

i) Waste practices at LHSTC

- Low Level Solid Waste. The source of these wastes across the site and their

ultimate storage in drums in a warehouse pending transport to a repository - Low Level Liquid Waste with respect to its source across the site and its

disposal: (i) as a liquid from large storage tanks on the site into the sewer and eventual

passage to the Cronulla Sewerage Treatment Plant and into the ocean and (ii) the solar drying of the solid residue in a concrete lined solar evaporation

pond for drying and ultimate storage on site in drums.

- Long Lived Intermediate Level Waste. This includes highly radioactive liquid waste from molybdenum production which after many years delay is being solidified for safety purposes.

- Spent Reactor Fuel in:

(i) water ponds which were recently contaminated and remain so and (ii) below ground holes in which water infiltration caused fuel corrosion and

radioactivity release into the holes.

- Aerial and liquid discharges: This issue has been raised repeatedly over the years. With respect to these, Dr. Barnaby states (Attachment 1):

“Aerial discharges from ANSTO are constrained to 0.3 milli-Sieverts per year (mSv/y). This is a relatively high level and should be reduced to no more than 0.1 mSv/y, and preferably less. The aerial discharge of radioactive iodine should be constrained to no more that 0.03 mSv/y. It should be emphasised that, using available or developable technologies, all aerial and liquid discharges into the environment could be eliminated – if, that is, the authorities were prepared to pay the cost.”

He lists several abatement techniques available to the Commonwealth to minimise radioactive pollution from the LHSTC site (Attachment 1).

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ii) Special areas of LHSTC radioactive waste management

- The fact that some long lived intermediate level wastes including uranium and plutonium are to be included in the repository inventory defies its definition as a short-lived repository because the radiotoxicity of these lasts well beyond the 200 year institutional life of the Repository.

- The Little Forest Burial Ground at Lucas Heights where solid waste was formerly buried in poor containment and which includes radioactive plutonium and toxic non-radioactive beryllium (some 1 tonne).

It is clear that the Commonwealth has given only cursory attention to radioactive waste management at LHSTC, and that the full costs of best practice radioactive waste management have been avoided by the Commonwealth and by ANSTO.

(c) Future Waste Arisings

A significant issue for this Inquiry is the proposed increase in quantities of radioactive waste from ongoing nuclear activities at LHSTC. Previous ANSTO projections indicate a rapidly increasing amount of medical radioactive waste by-product with reactor replacement (Figure 1). Furthermore, the decommissioning of HIFAR will greatly swell the existing stocks of low level and intermediate level solid and possibly liquid wastes.

With respect to spent fuel waste, Dr. Barnaby states (Attachment 1):

“The arrangements with Cogema for reprocessing HIFAR (and RRR) fuel are far from firm; they may not be long-lasting. The experience with the unforeseen stopping of reprocessing of Australian (and other) spent research reactor fuel at Dounreay is a salutary indication of the uncertainties of reprocessing abroad.

“There is rapidly mounting pressure in Europe to end reprocessing…. This arises because the economics of reprocessing is very questionable and because of the concern, both national and international, that separated plutonium (reactor plutonium) produced at reprocessing plants could be used by terrorists or governments to fabricate effective nuclear weapons. France and the UK may decide to stop reprocessing in the foreseeable future.

ANSTO may, in the end, need to condition and dispose of spent fuel in Australia. Contingency plans for this should be formulated very soon.” Although it appears that the government is currently opposed to allowing spent fuel to be conditioned in Australia it may in the end come to that. If spent fuel elements have to be stored at ANSTO for more than 10 years, there may be insufficient storage space there.”

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These observations have particularly sinister implications for the people of Sutherland Shire and elsewhere in Australia. Reprocessing or conditioning of spent fuel is hazardous and costly. The poor assessment of the replacement reactor proposal by the Commonwealth, and restricted public planning process, indicate that unacceptable and hazardous developments relating to spent fuel will be imposed on the public in the future.

Dr. Barnaby adds: “An increasingly common approach to radioactive waste storage is to store it at the site where it is produced, to minimise the risks of accident, sabotage, terrorist attacks, and spills. It also minimises the need for transportation, and the associated risks. There is also a tendency to argue in favour of dry storage above ground, so that the waste is retrievable and easily monitored…..On the other hand, it is argued by some that highly radioactive waste should be kept in purpose-built facilities, designed with the best long-term protection of people and the environment. This would mean that highly radioactive waste would not be kept at Lucas Heights unless a new facility is built there.”

The people of Sutherland Shire and Sydney are significantly disadvantaged by the Commonwealth’s ill-judged reactor development, whatever the radioactive waste solution envisaged. It is the high levels of radioactive waste ultimately emerging from reactor production which causes this problem. Alternative nuclear technologies are available which are effective, cleaner, safer, and cheaper.

Barnaby expresses further concerns at the ultimate waste disposal question:

“Now that the decision to store low-level and short-lived intermediate level waste near Woomera has been made, two more decisions will eventually have to be taken – where to store securely LLILW and where to site a geological repository for the permanent storage of radioactive waste. The granting of a licence by ARPANSA to operate the RRR should depend on resolving the problem of the reprocessing and conditioning of spent RRR fuel and of the transport and storage of the waste that would be created.

One would have thought that at least the location of the storage site should have been chosen.”

and “The experience of finding a suitable geological repository in the USA shows how difficult it is to find a suitable and acceptable site. Eventually, a site at Yucca Mountain has been chosen. But the finding of the site and its preparation has proved extremely expensive, involving a great deal of high-quality scientific research and development. Perhaps most difficult of all is persuading communities to accept the repository.”

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This suggests further problems for Sutherland shire and NSW, particularly if conditioning of spent fuel in Australia is forced on the Commonwealth by international events. Australian State governments should unite now to demand a halt to radioactive waste production unless waste management and disposal are appropriately addressed.

(d) Medical and Industrial Uses of Radioisotopes

Council’s concern over radioactive waste goes to the issue of whether nuclear activities by the Commonwealth are appropriate and justified. Council has taken a responsible position in this respect. The evidence from the Research Reactor Review in 1993 and subsequently, in independent expert reports, clearly indicates that important processes such as medical procedures can be undertaken without increased reactor activities and generation of additional radioactive waste (Attachment 2). A similar situation applies with respect to other industrial application of radioisotopes. It is Council’s view that interim importation of radioisotopes and development of less radioactive waste-producing processes such as accelerators, will significantly reduce the production of radioactive waste and be safer, for both Australia, and eventually for overseas countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the NSW Parliament recommend that:

• The management of radioactive waste at ANSTO be recognised as falling below the standards of best practice and can and should be improved.

• Abatement technologies be used to eliminate liquid discharges into the sewage system and general environment from LHSTC.

• BEPO/BPM be used to keep radiation doses to the public as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). See Attachment 1.

• Radioactivity in aerial waste be minimised by efficient filtration and other technology.

• Aerial discharges from LHSTC be constrained to less than 0.1 mSv/y. • Aerial discharges of radioactive iodine should be limited to less than 0.03

mSv/y. .

2. That the NSW Parliament recognise that storage of radioactive wastes in NSW, whether at LHSTC or a separate store, is unacceptable based on the facts presented.

3. That the NSW Parliament oppose continued nuclear activities, including

radioactive waste producing activities such as reactor use, pending adoption by the Commonwealth of satisfactory or alternative approaches which avoid waste, waste storage, waste disposal and radioactive waste transport.

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4. That the NSW Parliament:

• support the predistribution of stable iodine tablets to communities adjacent (within 5 kilometres) of LHSTC reactors as a precautionary public health approach.

• Require that consideration be given to further developing the capacity of Area Health Boards and State Emergency Services to participate in State responses to an emergency situation eg in the distribution of iodine tablets to public exposed to radioactive materials.

5. That the NSW Parliament recognise that further nuclear waste production in NSW

is unacceptable unless alternative technologies and better Commonwealth practices are undertaken.

6. That the NSW Parliament require that the NSW Department of Health undertake an

independent inquiry into interim importation of radioisotopes and development of less radioactive waste-producing processes such as accelerators, with the aim of significantly reducing the production of radioactive waste in Australia and overseas.

7. That the NSW Parliament recognise that all Intermediate Level Waste should be

stored in a passively safe form, and therefore that the liquid waste should be solidified as soon as possible.

8. That the NSW Parliament recognise that the Commonwealth is underfunding the

management of existing radioactive wastes in NSW, notably at LHSTC.

9. That the NSW Parliament require the Commonwealth to give renewed urgent attention to radioactive waste management at LHSTC, and that the full costs of best practice radioactive waste management at LHSTC be accepted and provided by the Commonwealth and by ANSTO.

10. That the NSW Parliament require that ARPANSA not license a RRR until the

details of the reprocessing and conditioning of spent RRR fuel and of the transport and storage, including permanent storage, of the waste that would be created have been firmly decided.

11. That the NSW Parliament require that, to avoid misleading the public, the

Commonwealth classify spent fuel elements from ANSTO’s HIFAR reactor, and eventually the RRR, as High Level radioactive waste.

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B. LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

The issue of the source of radioactive waste in Australia, notably the Commonwealth development continuing reactor activities at LHSTC, has had significant legal question marks. These uncertainties relate particularly to Commonwealth-State responsibilities, nuclear regulation, and protection of the public. An independent legal expert, Jim Nolan, barrister, has prepared a report for Council (Attachment 3). His report states: “The most striking thing about the legal issues surrounding the transport and storage of nuclear waste is the relative lack of readily accessible information concerning the legal framework within which these activities will occur. The other notable feature is the fact that the predominant responsibility remains with the Commonwealth – notwithstanding that the States and Territories retain legislative responsibility for many of the activities involved in transportation. This will be addressed below.

These concerns are not idle.” and “…significant difficulties may be experienced by NSW government agencies because of the legal and regulatory uncertainties which surround the transport of nuclear waste materials. It is pointed out below that this lack of clarity and the uncertain relationship between state and federal law will almost inevitably result in jurisdictional disputes - the last thing needed where an issue as controversial as exposure to radioactive waste is at stake. These are real and tangible concerns since, in the final analysis, accidents usually mean costs and legal responsibility determines where these costs fall.” With respect to the important area of nuclear regulation and radioactive waste, Nolan expresses the following concern: “The powers of ARPANSA to inspect and regulate, and the powers of the Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council to prescribe codes and standards add up to a significant potential capacity to regulate the transport of nuclear waste materials. While addressed in general terms in the IAEA Regulations, the degree of prescription required to implement the IAEA regulations in practice appear to be yet to be formulated. The deficiencies in the statutory regime have been highlighted by no less significant body than the (then newly appointed) Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council which referred to following advice to the CEO of ARPANSA in December 2002:

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‘The main issues confronting Australia in relation to transport of radioactive material, including radioactive waste, are that with so many jurisdictions and competent authorities, uniformity and cross-jurisdictional issues arise in the implementation of the Transport Code within different regulatory frameworks. The recommendation includes issues identified by an earlier meeting of Transport Competent Authorities, on which there has been little progress’. [Council Advice on Radioactive Waste 11 December 2002.]

In his response to the Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council’s request, the CEO of ARPANSA agrees with its recommendation and pointed out that now that the Code has been adopted in most jurisdictions, the issues identified by the Council need discussion and resolution by the Transport Competent Authorities Working Group [‘TCAWG’] - a body referred to under the Code. It appears that at least at the date of the response (December 2002) the TCAWG had not met for a considerable time, and it was proposed to refer these issues to its convenor.”

And regarding concerns on cross-jurisdictional issues in implementation of the transport code (“Safe Transport of Radio Active Material Radiation Protection Series No. 2 ARPANSA 2001”) adopted by the Commonwealth: “Even accepting that these implementation issues can be addressed in a satisfactory manner, it should also be noted that the Code says very little about the issues of legal liability and responsibility which attach to the various handlers of radioactive material. Nor, for example, does it require the Commonwealth, as the ultimate authority responsible for ARPANSA and ANSTO, to provide an indemnity to those who suffer from any environmental calamity which might flow from the release of radioactive material for any reason.” With respect to NSW regulatory issues, Nolan notes uncertainty and concern even within Commonwealth-constituted experts [the Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council of ARPANSA]:

“As the Advisory Committee [Council] has pointed out however, the precise issues which remain the subject of NSW law remain problematical and may give rise to ‘jurisdictional’ and similar disputes – a state of affairs which is far from satisfactory in circumstances involving the handling of nuclear waste.” Nolan comments: “The effectiveness of a regulatory scheme however, requires the commitment of resources and practical measures which guarantee the implementation of the regulatory scheme. Not surprisingly, the issue of the transport of nuclear waste and the regulatory regime which governs it, has become contentious in the United States of America, especially since new large repositories of nuclear waste have been identified by the US Government in recent years”.

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He cites examples of problems in regulation in overseas jurisdiction with considerably more experience regarding nuclear waste regulation than Australia: “In a comprehensive article “TRU Co-operative Regulatory Federalism: Radioactive Waste Transportation Safety in the West” (2002) 22 The Journal of Land Resources and Environmental Law 41, Bernard P. Haggerty identifies significant gaps in the US regulatory framework…”

“Haggerty points to US evidence which shows that trucks carrying “low level” waste shipments have accidents at the standard accident rate - estimated at one accident in every 150,000 miles travelled…Even allowing that the containers of radioactive materials have been very substantially upgraded – see IAEA regs - since that time, this statistic is sufficient in itself to raise legitimate concerns about the appropriate levels of regulation and vigilance with respect to the transportation of this material.” Haggerty cites disturbing examples of lack of attention to safety standards and also refers to similar sorts of incidents which have been recounted in European countries. He notes that more severe penalties, auditing and inspection procedures were recommended. This last point is disturbing given ARPANSA’s current track record of applying little or no sanction for documented breaches of the licence issued by ARPANSA for construction of the replacement reactor. Nolan further states: “These examples serve to suggest that the mere adoption of protocols without comprehensive legal compliance mechanisms – and appropriate sanctions - are insufficient to guarantee compliance. Equally important is the clear demarcation and definition of the respective roles and functions of regulatory authorities. Most importantly, NSW emergency services agencies must have a clear picture of their respective roles and responsibilities and how these relate to the federal regulatory agencies. Equally urgently, ordinary citizens should have a clear idea of the remedies available to them and the authority responsible for providing those remedies. Neither is clear at present and both require clarity and certainty.” With respect to directions for regulation in Australia, Nolan comments: “Significant areas remain to be addressed by the regulatory scheme. These areas may be identified as extending to accountability, transparency and legal redress. The development of a regulatory scheme which addresses squarely the transportation of nuclear waste should occur in a setting of open-ness and information sharing. The importance of transparency in this process has been emphasised by the Advisory Council itself – it has placed special emphasis upon open deliberations and the publication of its own deliberations on the ARPANSA web site…”

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“…Nothing could be more demoralising for any victims of an accident involving the release of waste that to be confronted by jurisdictional and liability disputes. It is submitted that these issues are far too significant to be attended by doubts of the kind raised by the Committee. The issues should be identified and clarified so that all doubts can be eliminated. If it is necessary to promulgate a revised code, or enact further legislation, then this should be done.

It is submitted that a range of safeguards would need to be spelt out in a supplementary, legislation and/or a legally binding code of practice and/or in conditions placed upon licences which are issued to contractors or others who will undertake the actual transportation of the nuclear waste materials…The regulatory regime should provide reassurance to those communities that damage, if any is sustained in consequence of an accident involving the release of nuclear waste, will be made good and will be indemnified in the last resort by the Commonwealth Government.

The authorities should also be required to promulgate an extensive management plan ready to be implemented in conjunction with emergency service authorities and local government authorities in those areas through which the nuclear waste is proposed to be transported. Arrangements must be made to ensure that all relevant authorities are equipped with the requisite knowledge and information of the possible hazards entailed in the event of an accident which results in the release of nuclear materials. To this end emergency service personnel must be given unrestricted access to all relevant information.” RECOMMENDATIONS: 12. That the NSW Parliament repeal Section 8(3) of the Uranium Mining and Nuclear

Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986.

13. That the Joint Parliamentary Committee explore which parties take responsibility for cross-jurisdictional decisions, and who will be accountable for a decision in the event of a radioactive waste accident or incident.

14. That the NSW Parliament require that the regulatory regime provide reassurance to

local communities that damage, if any is sustained in consequence of an accident involving the release of nuclear waste, will be made good and will be directly indemnified by the Commonwealth Government.

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C. STORAGE AND TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR WASTES

With respect to the levels of radioactivity to be transported to a low-level repository or intermediate level store, the repository Environmental Impact Statement indicates that the actual Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), that must be met before radioactive waste can be accepted for disposal at the repository, are to be developed before repository operations begin. This has significant implications for the potential radioactivity amounts to be transported, and leaves considerable latitude for the Commonwealth. The Code of Practice for the near-surface disposal of radioactive waste in Australia (1992) gives some indication of activity concentrations proposed as suitable for disposal in a remote arid site of Australia. The concentrations include, for example, up to 109Bq/kg of beta and gamma emitters with half-lives equal to or less than 5 years. Indeed there is “no limit” to the concentration of these emitters if they fall into “Category B” waste which is described in the Code as “solid wastes and shielded sources with considerably higher activities of beta or gamma emitting radionuclides than “Category A” waste. It is clear, therefore, that the waste categories are not strictly defined in the Code. The practical implication with respect to radioactive waste storage and transport is that significant amounts of radioactivity are involved, significant flexibility appears to be available to the Commonwealth, and the presence of these levels of radioactivity in shipments at a given point in time make radioactivity accessible to misadventure or sabotage. Dr. Barnaby notes an important truth with respect to radioactive waste management at LHSTC and in Australia: “The practice of removing radioactivity from liquid and aerial waste streams, instead of discharging it to the environment, and immobilising and storing the solid material will, of course, increase the volume of waste in store and increase the number of transports to the store (to Woomera, for example). On balance, the immobilisation and storage of the radioactivity is considered to be better practice than discharging it.” Significant concerns arise with respect to storing and moving radioactive waste and its impact on communities in both Sutherland Shire and at more distant locations. These include: (a) Potential for Accidents

Notwithstanding storage, packaging and transport code use for radioactive waste, evidence has emerged that truck and other accidents, notably including fire, may liberate radioactive waste and that this experience has been documented overseas. Several Councils have agreed that a significant radioactive spill in the Sydney region and waterways, or in areas such as the Darling Basin, would have potentially

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deleterious effects on the local environment, and on the public with respect to both health risk and value of local properties.

Dr. Barnaby states (Attachment 1):

“It is important that emergency services (including police, fire, and ambulance) are informed about the transport of nuclear waste through their area. Authorities responsible for nuclear transports, however, do not want to give anyone details for security reasons. A sensible balance has to be struck here.

There is also the question of insurance to cover radioactive contamination arising from an accident involving a nuclear transport. The transport of radioactive waste through major agricultural regions is likely to have adverse consequences for the image of local communities and for the farming, wine and tourist industries.”

and “In a serious accident involving the transport of radioactive waste by road, the waste containers may be breached by mechanical shock or, more probably, by a fierce fire and radioactivity released.” With respect to transport of highly radioactive spent reactor fuel off the NSW coast, Barnaby states:

“…ramming and collision forces between ships at sea can involve energy levels far higher than the IAEA test levels. John Large, an expert in the sea transport of nuclear fuel, stated, in evidence given to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Extension on 15 November 2001:

‘Test and Development work on Type B flask designs show that a flask could withstand a hydrogen fire (temperatures of about 800 degrees centigrade – kerosene) of 100 minutes but that at 90 minutes the internal lead liner had completely melted and the flask commenced to expel and continued to expel for 120 minutes from the onset of the fire.’

If the cargo was spent fuel, or vitrified waste, and a high temperature fire occurred, it may involve the release of most of the radionuclides in the spent nuclear fuel rods or the vitrified waste. The radioactivity would then be dispersed in the atmosphere.

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Another scientist, Ed Lyman, points out the weakness of the elastomer seals in Type B casks. The material of these seals fails at temperatures of as low as 250 to 300 degrees centigrade. He concludes that:

‘a 800 degrees centigrade fire of modestly greater duration than the 30-minute regulatory fire, or a lower temperature, longer duration fire, could cause breach of containment.’”

(b) Hazard Response

NSW has a well-structured but limited HAZMAT capability with respect to radioactive waste response in broader NSW. It is far from clear that HAZMAT have appropriate radioactive personal protective equipment, and that this equipment, or HAZMAT timely response generally, is available in the many remote regions of NSW through which low level and intermediate level waste will be transported.

(c) Sabotage

Mr. Christopher Payne is a security expert familiar with the security system in Australia, and with LHSTC and radioactive waste issues. He prepared a report for Council on security issues at LHSTC in 2002, which is appended to his current report on nuclear waste (Attachment 4). He notes that the threat posed by terrorism has changed little since his earlier report. It is clear from Mr. Payne’s independent expert advice that movement of radioactive wastes can even further heighten its potential as a target for both disruption and dispersal by sabotage and for theft and use in terrorist activities such as bomb making. Payne states: “The transport of nuclear material is probably the operation most vulnerable to an attempted act of unauthorised removal of nuclear material or sabotage1. In stating this, the IAEA recognises that cargo in transit is more at risk that cargo within a secure centre.

From purely a security perspective, the amount of time that any valuable cargo spends in transit should be kept to a minimum. This is because the protection provided by high security storage facilities is lost when cargo is in transit. Whilst in transit, cargo is difficult to protect because it is mobile.”

Dr. Barnaby states (Attachment 1):

“Participants at a conference on nuclear transport organised by the IAEA in July 2003 were told that countries are ill prepared to deal with terrorist or criminal attacks on nuclear materials in transit…. A standard nuclear transport

1 IAEA INFOCIRC 225,8.1.1.

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vehicle loaded with radioactive material could easily be attacked with a missile or rocket-propelled grenade with disastrous results for the local population.”

and “Given current concerns about nuclear terrorism, the cooling pond and storage facility for the fuel elements are inadequately secure to prevent the release of radioactivity during a possible terrorist attack. The physical protection of Lucas Heights itself should be of higher quality, at least complying with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provisions”.

also: “There is considerable current concern about the risk that a terrorist group will fabricate and explode a radiological dispersal device, commonly called a dirty bomb, the simplest and most primitive terrorist nuclear device. A terrorist group could steal or otherwise acquire radioactive waste, perhaps from a transport or a store, and make a dirty bomb.”

With respect to the lower level security for low level and intermediate level waste Payne notes in his report (Attachment 4):

“…The reason why these [spent fuel] shipments are carried out with better security than that proposed for the shipment of waste to the Repository seems to be that the spent fuel rods are classified as Category One Nuclear Materials, thus subject to far more stringent safeguards.”

With respect to hazardous materials response Payne states: “The Draft EIS envisages the agencies responding to an incident involving radioactive materials will be the Fire Brigades, the police and ambulance services and, to a lesser extent, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA)2. These are all NSW state bodies. The agency with the greatest responsibility is the Fire Brigade, in particular, their Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) units…”

“There is a distinction between the levels of equipment held at the three main HAZMAT stations and the regional HAZMAT units. The Fire Brigade itself states that ‘Heavy HAZMAT International’ units are stationed at the HAZMAT stations whilst ‘Rescue and Support HAZMAT vehicles’ will be allocated to accredited country stations3. The latter vehicles are based on the Mercedes-Benz Sprinter van.

“The Fire Brigades also state that there are 12 ‘intermediate HAZMAT stations’ which have been located to service the main arterial routes between Victoria and

2 DEST Draft EIS chapter 7. 3 http://www.nswfb.nsw.gov.au/index.asp?sectionid=119

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Queensland4. They are Dubbo, Port Macquarie, Bathurst, Turvey Park, Tamworth, Goulburn, Inverell, Griffith, Broken Hill, Kariong, Narrabri and Goonellabah.

The NSW Fire Brigades Employees Union has raised concerns about the absence of radiation monitoring equipment in “nearly all” Fire Brigade appliances5. Radiation is invisible to the naked eye. Firefighters responding to a radiological incident need radiation monitoring equipment to find a safe pathway into the scene of the accident. Without such equipment, they are left with a choice; stay away from the scene until equipment arrives or take a risk that their exposure to radiation will be within acceptable limits.”

and routes: “The Draft EIS then suggests the most likely routes to transport radioactive material from Sydney to the Repository. It adds however that these routes are suggested routes only and that a flexible approach would be used in selecting them…”

“How the radioactive material will actually leave Sydney is not discussed in the Draft EPA yet Sydney is the largest population centre in the country. If the route selection criteria of using first class roads and the efficiency are used, then the following routes emerge as obvious candidates…” (see map in Attachment 4) “Broken Hill route: From the LHSTC in the Sutherland Local Government Area (LGA) to Lithgow via the LGA’s of Bankstown, Auburn, Parramatta, Holroyd, Blacktown, Penrith and then Blue Mountains. Total population (excluding Sutherland) of 985,000. Mildura route: From the LHSTC to Goulburn via the LGA’s of Liverpool and Campbelltown. Total population (excluding Sutherland) of 313,000.”

(d) Current Radioactive Materials Transport

Some medical isotopes are transported routinely from LHSTC to hospitals and other facilities in Australia. Some wastes, for example from Victoria, have been transported to Lucas Heights and some wastes from NSW to South Australia, in past Commonwealth activities. It is clear that the proposed development and licensing of a low-level repository, targeted for South Australia, and an intermediate level store, will bring new risk issues to light compared with these routine or one-off activities undertaken previously. These include:

4 http://www.nswfb.nsw.gov.au/indesx.asp?pageid=2650&navid+ 5 “Intervention in Emergency Situations involving Radiation Exposure. NSW Fire Brigades Employees Union. February 2003.

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• Waste differs from specifically manufactured medical radioisotopes in that:

- Waste is broadly a crude mixture of residues from nuclear activities. It is generally a heterogenous mixture of rejected and largely uncharacterised radioisotopes.

- Radioactive waste is by definition of no value and therefore its processing, packaging and treatment is not supported by a value-adding income component. This can mean that least-expense approaches are taken to waste treatment, transport and disposal, particularly over time.

- Jurisdictional difficulties have been identified regarding State and Commonwealth regulation of radioactive materials and emergency response. These are exacerbated in the case of radioactive wastes. Medical radioisotopes have a commercial destination, a commercial transaction, and are subject to supplier-consumer arrangements. This means that clearer lines of regulation and jurisdiction are available than generally occurs with waste. The fact that, for example, the South Australian government is currently in serious dispute with the Commonwealth with respect to the proposed repository, and potentially with respect to travel routes, is an indication that waste regulation differs from regulation and management of other radioactive materials.

• Radioactive waste differs from other dangerous goods due to the long life-time

of radioactive waste (information from the EIS for the repository indicates that several centuries will be required to pass before repository radionuclides will be rendered effectively non-radioactive. Furthermore the Commonwealth proposal is to include uranium and plutonium and other long-lived radionuclides with half lives of potentially hundreds or thousands of years.

• The fact that radioactive waste will be “diluted” by dispersal in the low-level

repository indicates, by definition, that it will be more concentrated during transport or storage at other sites. The dispersal at the repository is proposed to render it less harmful to workers at the repository, particularly to potential clean-up personnel. Again, by definition, this indicates that the concentrations during transport would not be suitable for direct human exposure.

(e) Commonwealth Indemnity

Notwithstanding the claim that the Commonwealth indemnifies the public against nuclear industry accident, it is clearly the case that the Commonwealth only bases that claim on potential success of affected citizens through the Courts, or possible out-of-court settlement of claims against the Commonwealth. This practice falls well short of the common international practice of indemnifying the public against radioactivity accidents with respect to government activities.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

15. That the NSW Government review the location and adequacy of the states

HAZMAT resources with respect to Commonwealth transport of radioactive waste across the state by road.

16. That the NSW Parliament recommend that transportation of radioactivity should be

kept to an absolute minimum and that emergency services be informed about the transport of radioactivity through their area – including the route, timing and the type and amount of radioactivity being transported.

17. That the NSW Parliament require that the development of a regulatory scheme

which addresses squarely the transportation of nuclear waste should occur in a setting of openness and information sharing with the Commonwealth.

18. That the NSW Parliament acknowledge that:

• the financial and non-financial costs associated with transportation and storage of radioactive waste – not just the low level or short-lived intermediate wastes that are the subject of the current proposal – may be so high as to warrant a re-evaluation of the proposals to complete the replacement reactor at LHSTC, and

• relocating that facility far from population centres and closer to sites suitable for

long-term storage of radioactive waste may be a better hazardous industry planning approach.

D. THE SECURITY PROBLEMS WITH RADIOACTIVE WASTE The independent expert report (Attachment 4) has identified security concerns regarding Commonwealth radioactive materials stored at LHSTC. The report highlights the vulnerability of the radioactive waste generating sources at LHSTC, such as the reactor. Payne states: “The Commonwealth is also concerned about the possibility of acts of terrorism involving nuclear materials…. Concern over terrorists obtaining radioactive waste relate to ‘dirty bombs’, also known as radiological weapons.”

He adds:

“Three areas of security interest therefore arise:

a) Security of radioactive wastes during transport; b) Security of radioactive wastes at the Repository;

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c) Security of radioactive wastes at the LHSTC.” and

“Furthermore road transport, statistically, is more prone to accidents than either air or sea transport: National road fatalities 2001 1736 National rail fatalities 2000 34 National air fatalities 2002 10 6 Road transport accidents are common. One of the most recent being an accident involving three trucks on the Newell Highway north of Moree in which two trucks collided head-on before one crossed the road into a third truck. The third truck burst into flames, killing its trapped driver7. Other factors that have not been considered include the large cargo capacities of modern cargo aircraft8 and the enormous cargo capacities of freight trains9, driver rest breaks and overnight stops on a road trip from Sydney to Woomera and, most importantly from a security perspective, keeping time in transit down to an absolute minimum.” The report also highlights the risk of even low level radioactive waste stored at LHSTC, at a future store, or transported therefrom, and the potential for utilisation of the material in “dirty bombs” by limited state of Commonwealth regulation of nuclear activities and radioactive waste management, given that the ARPANS Act is a narrow regulatory statute. In particular, the Commonwealth radioactive waste management and regulatory processes are poorly integrated with State and local regulatory and planning mechanisms. Also, Payne’s report notes that important details such as the issue of whether security patrols at the proposed repository and store are to be performed by local contractors or by other Commonwealth resources is not stated in government documentation. With respect to the issue of the levels of radioactivity proposed to be stored or transported and the potential for the waste to be a sabotage target, the expert reports from Barnaby and Payne indicate that dirty bomb manufacture is a concern. Council does not propose to discuss publicly the issue of how dirty bombs are made or what level of radioactivity is relevant. However, information available on the internet indicates that low-level solid and liquid radioactivity, of the type acceptable for the repository, and including material used in laboratory situations, are relevant to the threat. With respect to hazards affected by security at LHSTC, the Payne report notes:

6 Aust. Transport Safety Bureau. 7 Daily Telegraph. 24 July 2003. 8 The RAAF C130H aircraft has a payload of 19.3 tonnes – defence website. 9 Coal trains can haul up to 10,000 tonnes – Queensland Rail website.

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“…The NSW Fire Brigades Employees Union, in a submission to ARPANSA in February this year, recommended the immediate distribution of stable iodine tablets to local residents. The union stated that if there was an emergency and if local residents followed the ANSTO advice of seeking shelter in their homes, then neither the fire brigades nor the ambulance service would be able to distribute the tablets to the homes. The union also raised concerns of ‘guaranteed chaos’ in the event of a radiological emergency at the LHSTC. “ RECOMMENDATIONS: 19. That the NSW Parliament require that the NSW EPA undertake an independent

inquiry into the non-release by the Commonwealth of the consequence analysis used in the licence approval for the replacement reactor at LHSTC.

20. That the NSW Parliament require that key affected local government areas be

represented on NSW State Emergency Management Committee and associated planning bodies.

21. That the NSW Parliament recommend that:

• Security of the cooling pond and storage facility for HIFAR (and RRR) fuel

elements be further up-graded to prevent the release of radioactivity during a potential terrorist attack. The physical protection of the Lucas Heights establishment itself should be brought up at least to a level complying with the standards recommended by the IAEA. The security of the site should be adequate to prevent the theft of fresh fuel elements waiting to be loaded into the reactor.

• Further attention be paid to the strength of ANSTO’s perimeter barrier and of the

security personnel’s guardhouse, and these to be strong enough to resist an armed attack.

• Good communications are essential to enable assistance to be called if needed, such

that police reinforcement are able to reach the site rapidly. 22. That the NSW Parliament require that particular attention be given to the security of

radioactive materials, including radioactive waste during transportation, to prevent them falling into the hands of terrorists who could use them to, for example, make dirty bombs.

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E. NSW SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS.

It is clear from the repository EIS, as well as the ongoing activities at LHSTC and from the radioactive store proposal, that storage and transport of radioactive waste adjacent and across NSW public land has implications for state services and infrastructure. Council commissioned a report from Dr. Bob Walker and Betty Con Walker, independent economics and accounting consultants (Attachment 5). Their expert report examines the Draft EIS from the perspective of whether it meets basic requirements for the evaluation of a proposed policy of interest to the community. It is primarily directed at the financial and management issues that arise from the proposals, but which have not been addressed in the Draft EIS. The report raises important concerns regarding commonwealth radioactive waste proposals, including: “…the Commonwealth’s proposals can be expected to impose considerable costs on the State of NSW. The Draft EIS does not attempt to quantify these costs, or to suggest how NSW would be compensated by the Commonwealth.”

Of particular concern is the absence of a detailed management plan in the Commonwealth radioactive waste proposals, which leaves the resource requirements required on behalf of NSW as a matter of speculation. The report indicates that a management plan should encompass:

1. arrangements for the selection of suitable vehicles for transportation, and

whether such vehicles would be owned or hired and controlled by relevant government agencies, or whether vehicles and drivers would be supplied by contractors;

2. arrangements for the training of drivers; 3. arrangements for the loading of cargo, and responsibilities for ensuring that the

cargo was contained and secured before departure, and certification that the cargo did not contain liquid wastes;

4. arrangements or the testing of emissions prior to departure from source; 5. whether trucks would travel in groups (as a ‘convoy’) or singly; 6. maximum speed of travel of trucks conveying radioactive waste; 7. arrangements for the maximum ‘shifts’ to be taken by drivers en route; 8. the nature of escort arrangements throughout the journey; 9. whether roads would be closed to other traffic when shipments passed along

highways and secondary roads; 10. general arrangements for the co-ordination of activities with NSW government

agencies and NSW local councils regarding the transportation of nuclear waste; 11. the advice to be given to relevant agencies concerning impending transhipment

of radioactive materials along the NSW road network (e.g. NSW Police Service, NSW Fire Brigades, Rural Fire Service, State Emergency Service, NSW Environment Protection Authority, local councils);

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12. when and in what form such advice would be provided, and to what officers in those agencies;

13. arrangements for the training of emergency services and health services personnel;

14. the advice to be provided to agencies involved in the provision of health services (e.g. NSW Department of Health, NSW Area Health Boards, ambulance services and local hospitals) regarding appropriate responses in the event of accident or terrorist attack leading to spillages of radioactive materials;

15. minimum requirements for the upgrading of the capability of emergency response units to cope with the discharge of radioactive materials as a result of accident or terrorist incident;

16. how emergency response units would respond to incidents (e.g. closing roads, diverting traffic, evacuating residents from neighbouring areas, notifying health personnel, etc);

17. military involvement in security arrangements; 18. military involvement in responses to incidents; 19. delineation of responsibilities and the overall chain of command of a multi-

agency response to the release of hazardous materials; 20. communication systems to be utilised in the event of adverse incidents, to

ensure efficient execution of containment plans and the removal of hazards; 21. arrangements for the development of protocols for the application of equivalent

processes to truck movements from Queensland and the ACT; 22. arrangements for the notification of relevant agencies in South Australia (the

destination of the radioactive waste) about impending truck movements; 23. arrangements for the notification of relevant agencies in South Australia

concerning points for the hand-over of responsibilities for escort and security services;

24. arrangements for the checking of containers and vehicles for radioactivity after they have discharged their cargoes by Commonwealth agencies, and for the sharing of findings with relevant NSW services agencies;

25. arrangements for the recording of data relating to the movement of radioactive materials and the recording of any accidents, or incidents (including spillages, leakages, etc. in transit). “

The report also emphasises that several objectives of the Commonwealth proposal are inherently in conflict: “For example, it may be claimed that, in the interests of ‘security’, the impending movement of radioactive cargoes should not be publicised, and that transportation should be ‘low profile’, unpredictable in timing, and swift. On the other hand, it may be considered appropriate in the interests of community safety for transportation to be along cleared roads, or at least subject to escort arrangements that eliminate passing traffic or the risk of collision from on-coming vehicles; emergency services personnel should be informed in advance of plans to transport radioactive materials though specific districts, and the nature of the materials being transported should containers be breached through mechanical shock or fire.”

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It also questions the adequacy of some Commonwealth proposals:

“Currently, quantities of highly-radioactive waste (in the form of fuel rods) are regularly transported from Lucas Heights to Sydney ports for transhipment to France for re-processing, and return. These movements are subject to high levels of security and secrecy – apparently because the materials involved could be utilised for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and are therefore considered at risk of terrorist attack. Given suggestions that intermediate level radioactive materials could also be utilised to make a ‘dirty bomb’, some may argue that the same security and secrecy arrangements should prevail in relation to transportation of radioactive waste to the proposed National Repository.

The Draft EIS indicates that the Commonwealth proposes to pursue the former strategy – that is, to move low level and short lived intermediate level waste under conditions of secrecy.” The report suggests that the Inquiry may wish to explore which parties take responsibility for this last decision, and who will be accountable for this decision in the event of accident or incident. The report (Attachment 5) also presents an assessment of minimum requirements to minimise risk associated with the transportation of radioactive materials across NSW, including:

“(i) Safety inspections of the vehicles to carry radioactive materials “…In order to minimise the risk of accidents arising from the use of unroadworthy vehicles, it may be appropriate for vehicles that are to be used to transport radioactive materials on NSW roads to be subject to specific licences, and to be checked prior to their use for the transhipment of those materials. (ii) Supervision of cargo loading “… Because of the high level of risk associated with the handling of radioactive materials, it may be considered appropriate for the RTA or some other agency to inspect loads to ensure that canisters containing radioactive materials have been properly secured within containers, and that those containers have been properly secured to the vehicles, before trucks and trailers depart from Lucas Heights (or from other destinations) to travel along NSW roads.

Some process of certification may be required to ensure that cargoes do not contain liquid wastes. The Committee may wish to explore what protocols could be followed to ensure that the only wastes being transported are in solid form.

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(iii) Testing of levels of radioactivity of loads prior to departure The Committee may wish to consider whether or not it supports a system of checks and balances, in the form of NSW verification of Commonwealth activities in the transportation of waste.

and: “The Committee may wish to obtain technical advice as to whether the radiation monitoring equipment on these vehicles could be used to check whether radiation from the loads is within tolerable levels for transportation on public roads.

(iv) Road closures or reliance on security escorts “…the draft EIS does not consider whether escort vehicles would be required to redirect on-coming traffic into a single lane, or to redirect on-coming traffic to alternative routes. Depending on the security arrangements chosen, one can readily envisage the need for a minimum of 20 police officers per shift to provide security escort services when passing through the outskirts of Sydney and through towns.”

“…The Committee could assess the cost of providing such services (including the cost of training personnel), and use that to extrapolate the cost of managing the movement of trucks carrying radioactive materials from Lucas Heights, and other sources within NSW. (v) Minimum requirements for the upgrading of emergency response units

There appear to be two major options for provision of emergency response capability to minimise risks to the community arising from the transportation of radioactive materials: (a) trucks carrying radioactive waste to be followed by HAZMAT units; or (b) HAZMAT units to be located at fire stations along the projected transport

routes. The Draft EIS indicates that truck movements will be kept secret. Hence option (a) will not be implemented, utilising State-based emergency services. It is not clear whether the Commonwealth proposes to provide its own HAZMAT units, or whether, in effect, it is not bothering to provide any emergency response capabilities in the event of transportation accidents or incidents. The Committee may wish to clarify this issue.

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It is understood that the NSW Fire Brigade Employees Union (FBEU) takes the view that in order to protect the NSW Community it would be necessary to provide HAZMAT units at 10 existing or new fire stations along the route of the proposed movement of radioactive materials. At an estimated cost of $1.5 million for each HAZMAT truck and equipment, that alone would require initial expenditure of some $15 million. To that would be added maintenance and replacement costs over time. The FBEU also proposes that radiation monitoring equipment should be installed on all pumpers at 34 fire stations along proposed routes.

The FBEU estimates that additional manpower requirements to provide these facilities would be extensive (16 retained firefighters per unit), if HAZMAT units were to be manned 24 hours a day x 7 days per week. Additional manpower would be required for a new fire station at Wilcannia. Moreover, the personnel involved would have to be trained, and would have to undertake refresher courses and exercises to maintain their readiness to respond to such emergencies. Of course, this level of manning would not be required if the Commonwealth were to advise when the movement of radioactive materials was to occur.”

The report notes other options, such as ‘quarantining’ of accident sites pending arrival of HAZMAT units. It invites the Inquiry to explore the number of traffic movements occurring on relevant roadways, and estimate the cost to the national and local economies of delays of hours or days if traffic has to be diverted, or to wait for sites to be cleared. The report states: “In effect, the Commonwealth’s concern to maintain secrecy about truck movements will impose costs on the State of NSW if the NSW Government is to meet the challenge of ensuring the safety of the communities along the route of trucks carrying radioactive materials – if indeed, safety can be assured.”

(vi) Communication costs “…the absence of a detailed management plan in the Draft EIS means that there is no explanation of the proposed chain of command for the management of incidents of varying severity, and the lines of communication expected to be utilised.” The report notes that the Committee may wish to explore the likely costs of developing and maintaining this capability. “(vii) Monitoring of experience in the transportation of nuclear waste

As staff of the European Commission have observed:

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‘Two factors that affect the acceptability of the nuclear sector are the transparency and safety of its activities. It is therefore important to create databases recording the number and characteristics of shipments of radioactive materials and possible events that could occur during transport of radioactive material (RAM). These data bases will contribute to safety improvements of shipments of RAM, and facilitate the application of harmonised emergency arrangements in case of possible events that could occur during these shipments’ (Rossi and Tricas, 2001).

“The regime being developed by the European Commission involves the development of standard certificates prior to shipment of radioactive materials.

The Committee may wish to explore whether arrangements for the shipment of radioactive materials within Europe could be readily translated to proposals by the Commonwealth for the shipment of radioactive materials between the States and Territories – if indeed, such transport arrangements are to eventuate. The Committee may also wish to explore whether the current arrangements for the shipment of highly radioactive materials from Lucas Heights to Port Botany comply, at a minimum, with currently-proposed European standards for safety and transparency.” The report also considers two further important aspects of the infrastructure and services question:

(a) The Implications for NSW Emergency services and other state-funded Services of the

Radioactive Store Proposal

The report states: “Most of the observations made above would also apply to the foreshadowed proposals – but with greater force. It is likely that the cost of safeguarding the public of NSW from the risk of incident or accident during transportation of waste would be far greater than those described above.” and “…consideration should be given to developing the capacity of Area Health Boards and State Emergency Services to co-ordinate responses to an emergency situation e.g. in the distribution of iodine tablets to personnel exposed to radioactive materials.”

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(b) The Transportation of Waste Problem as a Component of the Decision to Retain the

Reactor at Lucas Heights

“Underpinning the current Commonwealth proposals for the transportation and storage of nuclear waste from Lucas Heights is an earlier assessment that it is more cost-effective to retain that facility in its present location than to locate a replacement reactor at an alternative site, distant from high density residual communities. “The analysis supporting that assessment has been hidden from public view, on grounds of ‘cabinet confidentiality’. and “…The evaluation contained in that analysis was the subject of a devastating critique prepared by Applied Economics Pty Ltd for Sutherland Council in October 1998…[this] critique remain valid. The report (Attachment 5) lists extracts from that critique, including:

- “the EIS generally overstates the benefits likely from the proposed reactor….

- the EIS presents an exaggerated and very broad picture of the medical

benefits from local production of radioisotopes. - The EIS appears to assume implicitly that the full range of service that the

proposed research reactor can provide must be provided. It does not seriously address lower cost options that could provide a less than full range of these services.

- …The authoritative Report of the Research Reactor Review (McKinnon et

al., 1993) concluded that 'at present the case for a new reactor on scientific grounds cannot be sustained'. It may be questioned whether the EIS overturns this judgment

- A proper economic evaluation, or indeed any evaluation, would consider

not only the least cost way to produce a predefined level of services. It would also examine the services that could be obtained for lower expenditures, the incremental benefits and costs of alternatives, and the optimal timing of expenditures. The EIS does not provide these.

The Walker report (Attachment 5) notes that the Commonwealth subsequently sought some form of cost-benefit analysis of whether it was appropriate to install the new reactor at Lucas Heights. That analysis has never been made public.

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The report considers that in itself is a serious concern: “ It is in the public interest for there to be absolute transparency about this issue. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any projects for which there would be a stronger case for public disclosure of a cost-benefit analysis – given that the proposal for the operation of a nuclear facility within what is now a residential area carries with it risks to public health… As for the ‘retain Lucas Heights’ or ‘relocate the replacement reactor’ options, certain documents were obtained from the Commonwealth several years ago, in terms of an FOI request. Those documents suggest that the cost-benefit analysis undertaken was superficial, and lacked credibility. “ The documents that were obtained showed, for example, that the study:

“did not allow for the costs associated with transporting radioactive waste (high level, intermediate or low level) through Sydney and other population centres.”

The Walker report states: “The latter omission now seems remarkable, particularly since it has been suggested that the replacement reactor is likely to generate greater volumes of waste over its operating life than the current reactor. ANSTO’s predecessor organisation was committed to the development of nuclear power stations, but a change of Commonwealth policy saw the abandonment of those proposals. (Yet ANSTO’s annual report 2001-02 describes the organisation’s mission as including the undertaking of research concerning the ‘nuclear fuel cycle’.)

Decisions made in the past about the operations of Lucas Heights may have been based on the best available scientific knowledge, yet now many of the practices adopted in the conduct of that facility are now seen as being, at best, sub-optimal. ANSTO’s Radioactive Waste Management Policy: Preliminary Environmental Review (1996) acknowledged, for example, that storage pits constructed in the early 1960s were ‘virtually full’ and had not been designed for retrievable storage; and that the use of ‘Dounreay’ flasks for storage of certain waste should be phased out since they were designed to older standards and are unlikely to be licensed for transport purposes.”

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

23. That the NSW Parliament require that NSW emergency services agencies have a clear picture of their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to Commonwealth transport of radioactive waste across the state by road, and of how these relate to the federal regulatory agencies.

24. That the NSW Parliament require that NSW and commonwealth authorities be

required to promulgate an extensive management plan ready to be implemented in conjunction with emergency service authorities and local government authorities in those areas through which nuclear waste is proposed to be transported.

25. That the NSW Parliament require that a process of state certification be required to

ensure:

• NSW verification of Commonwealth activities in the transportation of waste of radioactive wastes in NSW.

• That cargoes transported in NSW do not contain liquid radioactive wastes, and • That appropriate protocols be followed to ensure that the only wastes being

transported are in solid form.

26. That the NSW Parliament require an assessment of the cost of providing NSW regulatory and emergency services with respect to movement of trucks carrying radioactive materials from Lucas Heights, and from other sources within NSW.

F. THE COMMONWEALTH TRACK RECORD ON HAZARDOUS

INDUSTRY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

(a) Quality of the Planning

The hazardous industry and hazardous waste planning, assessment and management processes of the Commonwealth fall well short of those undertaken in the well-established NSW Government hazardous industry planning process. (NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, including provision for Commissions of Inquiry). Indeed, FOI documents have shown that the Commonwealth ignored the direct advice and request from the NSW Department of Urban affairs and Planning that the Commonwealth fully assess alternative reactor sites to LHSTC . Planning, management and regulation of hazardous activities are most successful when undertaken in an open, thorough and co-operative climate. Unfortunately the Commonwealth record in development assessment of its radioactive-waste producing activities, notably the replacement reactor proposal and transport of radioactive

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material, is poor. It demonstrates that the Commonwealth undertakes minimal consultation and inclusion of affected State and local governments, regarding potential locations and regions affected by radioactive waste transport, storage and disposal, the costs involved, and the implications for local citizens regarding indemnity against accident or sabotage of Commonwealth wastes is minimal. The Commonwealth required no inquiry under the Commonwealth EPIP Act, for the replacement reactor, or EPBC Act, for the repository, to test the EIS information on these hazardous industry proposals. This falls well short of state government best practice in hazardous industry planning. It also ignored repeated public recommendations and requests for an inquiry. Council is currently facing the prospect of attempting to undertake sensible land use planning which is protective of the public despite the refusal of the Commonwealth to inform Council of the potential consequences of major reactor accidents at LHSTC. It appears likely that the same position will be taken by the Commonwealth with respect to potential impacts of radioactive waste transport accidents.

(b) Public Consultation

The Commonwealth record on public consultation in its development processes is very poor, based upon the discretionary nature of the EPBC Act. It is clear that consultation of communities both in Sutherland Shire and in areas along likely radioactive waste transport routes, has been very limited and of poor effect. A recent public survey undertaken by Council confirmed this and reinforced our local community’s concern with respect to storage of radioactive waste at LHSTC and to transport of radioactive waste through NSW.

RECOMMENDATION: 27. That the NSW Parliament recognise the conclusion that Commonwealth commitment

to more thorough, open and inclusive statutory planning is in the public interest.

CONCLUSION Sutherland Shire Council has outlined a case for the NSW Parliament to seriously question the value of current Commonwealth activities generating radioactive waste. The problems include the quality of hazardous industry and radioactive waste management assessment by the Commonwealth; the impacts of Commonwealth nuclear activities on local communities state-wide in NSW; the appropriateness of current radioactive waste generation and management at LHSTC; and the transport of radioactive waste through NSW to repository or store sites. Council’s position is based upon well-researched independent and public information. The recommendations as to steps which the NSW Parliament can take to address the problems include are formally listed below:

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Final Submission to the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into the Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste Sutherland Shire Council 15 August 2003 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That the NSW Parliament recommend that:

• The management of radioactive waste at ANSTO be recognised as falling below the

standards of best practice and can and should be improved. • Abatement technologies be used to eliminate liquid discharges into the sewage system

and general environment from LHSTC. • BEPO/BPM be used to keep radiation doses to the public as low as reasonably

achievable (ALARA) – see Attachment 1. • Radioactivity in aerial waste be minimised by efficient filtration and other technology. • Aerial discharges from LHSTC be constrained to less than 0.1 mSv/y. • Aerial discharges of radioactive iodine should be limited to less than 0.03 mSv/y.

. 2. That the NSW Parliament recognise that storage of radioactive wastes in NSW, whether at

LHSTC or a separate store, is unacceptable based on the facts presented. 3. That the NSW Parliament oppose continued nuclear activities, including radioactive waste

producing activities such as reactor use, pending adoption by the Commonwealth of satisfactory or alternative approaches which avoid waste, waste storage, waste disposal and radioactive waste transport.

4. That the NSW Parliament:

• support the predistribution of stable iodine tablets to communities adjacent (within 5 kilometres) of LHSTC reactors as a precautionary public health approach.

• Require that consideration be given to further developing the capacity of Area Health Boards and State Emergency Services to participate in State responses to an emergency situation eg in the distribution of iodine tablets to public exposed to radioactive materials.

5 That the NSW Parliament recognise that further nuclear waste production in NSW is

unacceptable unless alternative technologies and better Commonwealth practices are undertaken.

6 That the NSW Parliament require that the NSW Department of Health undertake an

independent inquiry into interim importation of radioisotopes and development of less radioactive waste-producing processes such as accelerators, with the aim of significantly reducing the production of radioactive waste in Australia and overseas.

7 That the NSW Parliament recognise that all Intermediate Level Waste should be stored in a

passively safe form, and therefore that the liquid waste should be solidified as soon as possible.

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Final Submission to the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into the Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste Sutherland Shire Council 15 August 2003 8 That the NSW Parliament recognise that the Commonwealth is underfunding the

management of existing radioactive wastes in NSW, notably at LHSTC. 9. That the NSW Parliament require the Commonwealth to give renewed urgent attention to

radioactive waste management at LHSTC, and that the full costs of best practice radioactive waste management at LHSTC be accepted and provided by the Commonwealth and by ANSTO.

10. That the NSW Parliament require that ARPANSA not license a RRR until the details of

the reprocessing and conditioning of spent RRR fuel and of the transport and storage, including permanent storage, of the waste that would be created have been firmly decided.

11. That the NSW Parliament require that, to avoid misleading the public, the Commonwealth

classify spent fuel elements from ANSTO’s HIFAR reactor, and eventually the RRR, as High Level radioactive waste.

12. That the NSW Parliament repeal Section 8(3) of the Uranium Mining and Nuclear

Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986. 13. That the Joint Parliamentary Committee explore which parties take responsibility for

cross-jurisdictional decisions, and who will be accountable for a decision in the event of a radioactive waste accident or incident.

14. That the NSW Parliament require that the regulatory regime provide reassurance to local

communities that damage, if any is sustained in consequence of an accident involving the release of nuclear waste, will be made good and will be directly indemnified by the Commonwealth Government.

15. That the NSW Government review the location and adequacy of the states HAZMAT

resources with respect to Commonwealth transport of radioactive waste across the state by road.

16. That the NSW Parliament recommend that transportation of radioactivity should be kept to

an absolute minimum and that emergency services be informed about the transport of radioactivity through their area – including the route, timing and the type and amount of radioactivity being transported.

17. That the NSW Parliament require that the development of a regulatory scheme which

addresses squarely the transportation of nuclear waste should occur in a setting of openness and information sharing with the Commonwealth.

18. That the NSW Parliament acknowledge that:

• the financial and non-financial costs associated with transportation and storage of

radioactive waste – not just the low level or short-lived intermediate wastes that are the subject of the current proposal – may be so high as to warrant a re-evaluation of the proposals to complete the replacement reactor at LHSTC, and

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• relocating that facility far from population centres and closer to sites suitable for long-

term storage of radioactive waste may be a better hazardous industry planning approach.

19. That the NSW Parliament require that the NSW EPA undertake an independent inquiry

into the non-release by the Commonwealth of the consequence analysis used in the licence approval for the replacement reactor at LHSTC.

20. That the NSW Parliament require that key affected local government areas be represented

on NSW State Emergency Management Committee and associated planning bodies. 21. That the NSW Parliament recommend that:

• Security of the cooling pond and storage facility for HIFAR (and RRR) fuel elements

be further up-graded to prevent the release of radioactivity during a potential terrorist attack. The physical protection of the Lucas Heights establishment itself should be brought up at least to a level complying with the standards recommended by the IAEA. The security of the site should be adequate to prevent the theft of fresh fuel elements waiting to be loaded into the reactor.

• Further attention be paid to the strength of ANSTO’s perimeter barrier and of the

security personnel’s guardhouse, and these to be strong enough to resist an armed attack.

• Good communications are essential to enable assistance to be called if needed, such that

police reinforcement are able to reach the site rapidly. 22. That the NSW Parliament require that particular attention be given to the security of

radioactive materials, including radioactive waste during transportation, to prevent them falling into the hands of terrorists who could use them to, for example, make dirty bombs.

23. That the NSW Parliament require that NSW emergency services agencies have a clear

picture of their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to Commonwealth transport of radioactive waste across the state by road, and of how these relate to the federal regulatory agencies.

24. That the NSW Parliament require that NSW and commonwealth authorities be required to

promulgate an extensive management plan ready to be implemented in conjunction with emergency service authorities and local government authorities in those areas through which nuclear waste is proposed to be transported.

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25. That the NSW Parliament require that a process of state certification be required to ensure:

• NSW verification of Commonwealth activities in the transportation of waste of radioactive wastes in NSW

• That cargoes transported in NSW do not contain liquid radioactive wastes, and • That appropriate protocols be followed to ensure that the only wastes being transported

are in solid form.

26. That the NSW Parliament require an assessment of the cost of providing NSW regulatory and emergency services with respect to movement of trucks carrying radioactive materials from Lucas Heights, and from other sources within NSW.

27. That the NSW Parliament recognise the conclusion that Commonwealth commitment to more thorough, open and inclusive statutory planning is in the public interest.

SUBMISSION TO THE NSW PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO …...Final Submission to the NSW Parliamentary...

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