Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background & Aftermath - Dorothea Frede & Andre Laks (Brill)

8/12/2019 Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background & Aftermath - Dorothea Frede & Andre Laks (Brill)

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TRADITIONS OFTHEOLOGY: STUDIES

IN HELLENISTIC

THEOLOGY, ITSBACKGROUND AND

AFTERMATH

Dorothea Frede

Andr Laks,

Editors

BRILL


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TRADITIONS OF THEOLOGY


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PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUAA SERIES OF STUDIES

ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY J.H. WASZINK AND W. J. VERDENIUS

EDITED BY

J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIAJ.C.M. VAN WINDEN

VOLUME LXXXIX

DOROTHEA FREDEandANDR LAKS (eds.)

TRADITIONS OF THEOLOGY


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TRADITIONS OF THEOLOGYSTUDIES IN HELLENISTIC THEOLOGY,ITS BACKGROUND AND AFTERMATH

EDITED BY

DOROTHEA FREDEandANDR LAKS (eds.)

BRILLLEIDEN BOSTON KLN

2002


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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Traditions of theology : studies in Hellenistic theology : its background and aftermath

/ edited by D. Frede and A. Laks.p cm.(Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687; v. 89)Papers presented at the 8th Symposium Hellenisticum, Villeneuve-dAscq, France,

1998.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 9004122648 (alk. paper)

1. Philosophy, AncientCongresses. 2. TheologyCongresses. 3. God (Greekreligion)Congresses. I. Frede, Dorothea, 1941- II. Laks, Andr. III. SymposiumHellenisticum (8th : 1998 : Villeneuve-dAscq, France) IV. Series.

B187.T5 T73 2001210.938dc21 2001043098

CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Traditions of theology : studies in Hellenistic theology, its background andaftermath / ed. by D. Frede and A. Laks. Leiden ; Boston ; Kln : Brill, 2001

(Philosophia antiqua ; Vol. 89)ISBN 9004122648

ISSN 0079-1687

ISBN 90 04 12264 8

Copyright 2002 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written

permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personaluse is granted by Brill provided that

the appropriate fees are paid directly to The CopyrightClearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910

Danvers MA 01923, USA.Fees are subject to change.

printed in the netherlands


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CONTENTS

Introduction,Dorothea Frede et Andr Laks..................................... vii

Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle, Robert Sharples................... 1

The Origins of Stoic God,David Sedley......................................... 41

Theodicy and Providential Care in Stoicism,Dorothea Frede....... 85

God and Human Knowledge in Senecas Natural Questions,Brad Inwood ......................................................................... 119

Epicurus as deus mortalis. Homoiosis theoiand Epicurean Self-cultivation, Michael Erler........................................................... 159

All Gods are True in Epicurus,Dirk Obbink............................... 183

Plutarch and God: Theodicy and Cosmogony in the Thought ofPlutarch,John Dillon.................................................................. 223

Sesto Empirico e lastrologia,Emidio Spinelli............................... 239

The beginnings of the end: Philo of Alexandria and HellenisticTheology,David Runia............................................................. 281

Indexes compiled by S. Fazzo and A. Laks

Index Nominum....................................................................... 317

Index Rerum............................................................................. 321

Index Locorum......................................................................... 325


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INTRODUCTION

D. Frede et A. Laks

Le 8e Symposium Hellenisticumsest tenu la Maison de la Recherchede lUniversit Charles de Gaulle-Lille 3, Villeneuve dAscq, les 2429 Aot 1998. Le financement en a t rendu possible grce dessubventions du CNRS, du Ministre de lEducation nationale, et duCentre de Recherche Philologique de Universit de Lille III (compo-

sante de lUMR 8519, Savoirs et Textes). Que ces institutions soientvivement remercies de leur soutien.

Christine Samain, avec sa gentillesse coutumire, sest occupe dusuivi administratifs des dossiers. Elisa Bozzelli a efficacement aid lorganisation matrielle du colloque.

Participaient aux travaux: Keimpe Algra (Utrecht), Jean-FranoisBalaud (Paris), Julia Annas (University of Arizona), Bernard Besnier(ENS Saint-Cloud), Suzanne Bobzien (Oxford), Tad Brennan (Yale),

Charles Brittain (Cornell), John Dillon (Dublin), Tiziano Dorandi(CNRS, Paris), Michael Erler (Erlangen), Dorothea Frede(Hambourg), Michael Frede (Oxford), Alain Gigandet (Paris XII),Brad Inwood (Toronto), Andr Laks (Lille), Carlos Lvy (Paris XII),Antony Long (Berkeley), Dirk Obbink (Oxford), Ren Piettre(EHESS, Paris), David Runia (Leiden), Malcolm Schofield (Cam-bridge), David Sedley (Cambridge), Robert Sharples (Londres),Teun Tieleman (Utrecht), Richard Sorabji (Londres), Emidio

Spinelli (Rome), Steven White (Austin).Le prsent volume runit neuf des dix contributions qui furent

prsentes lors de ces journes. Conformment une pratique bientablie, elles ont t rvises par les auteurs la lumire des dis-cussions et de la relecture dun des participants. Jaap Mansfeld, danssa fonction de directeur de la collection Philosophia Antiqua, agalement revu lensemble des articles qui lui taient soumis pourpublication. Nous lui en sommes trs reconnaissants.

*****Le relation entre philosophie et thologie, au sein de la traditionoccidentale, est loin davoir toujours t sereine. Ceci est certaine-


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viii d. frede et a. laks

ment vrai du mariage agit entre philosophie ancienne et religionchrtienne. Limage de la philosophie comme servante de la tho-logie tait cense rgler, au Moyen-Age, le conflit hrit de lAnti-quit tardive et de la tradition arabe. Mais les philosophes furent loin

de toujours sy plier. Selon la spirituelle suggestion de Kant, laservante devait prcder sa matresse pour lclairer, plutt que deporter sa trane ; ce renversement prludait la sparation desdisciplines, qui rgne depuis.

Cette querelle de prsance est inconnue en Grce ancienne. Laphilosophie apparat plutt comme une parente que comme uneservante de la thologie. A lpoche archaque, on ne peut videm-mentparlerdethologie,conueentantquedisciplinesystmatique.

La vie religieuse salimente une multitude de traditions mytholo-giques et de cultes qui ne se rfrent aucune autorit thologique,texte sacr, ou doctrine arrte. Le caractre non thorique de lareligion grecque explique que, en dpit de tensions incontestablesentre les premiers philosophes dune part, les croyances et les pra-tiques de lautre, le rgime fut plutt celui dune tolrance mutuelle.Les choses changrent au Ve sicle, avec la remise en cause desformes de vie traditionnelle de la socit grecque et la critique des

fondements de la moralit populaire, ches les Sophistes et Socrate.Ce nest donc pas par hasard si Platon fut le premier forger le

terme de thologie (yeologa) pour dsigner les opinions philoso-phiquement justifiables propos des dieux, par opposition ce quiltenait pour des rcits moralement nocifs (R.379a). Aristote devaituser plus librement du mot thologien (yeolgow) propos dau-teurs comme Hsiode ou Orphe ; mais cest aussi lui qui introduisitlexpression yeologik filosofa (la philosophie thologique)

pour dsigner techniquement la partie de la mtaphysique qui sin-tresse aux premiers principes de lunivers. Pourtant, si la thologiedevait dsormais jouer un rle part entire au sein de la philo-sophie, tant en physique quen mtaphysique, ni Platon, ni Aristote,ni aucun de leurs successeurs ne prtendirent subordonner lescroyances communes lautorit de la philosophie. Cette attitude nersulte pas de la simple prudence ou de la prcaution. Le dsaccordentre les philosophes eux-mmes tait aussi trop grand pour

permettre une telle subordination. En absence de toute orthodoxie,les essais de Platon et dAristote daccommoder les croyancesordinaires leurs positions thoriques non seulement diffrent entreeux, mais varient dun ouvrage lautre, en fonction du contexte.


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introduction ix

A lpoque hellnistique, la discussion des problmes thologiquesdevait sintensifier et se diversifier. Les nouvelles coles picurienneset stociennes en partie maintinrent, en partie remirent en questionles principes thologiques de leurs prdcesseurs. La mme chose

vaut pour leur attitude envers la religion commune. Le souci dattirerdes adhrents provenant de toutes les couches de la socit expliqueque les Epicuriens et les Stociens aient t encore plus disposs quePlaton et Aristote faire place la religion traditionnelle dans leursenseignements. Mais la tentative des nouveaux venus de donner unsens aux croyances communes ne peut pas tre traite comme lesimple effet du proslytisme. Chacune des deux coles soutenant unephilosophie de la nature diffrente, il leur incombait de rendre

compte de ce quelles considraient comme des lments divins ausein du monde naturel. Les dbats thologiques entre philosophiesrivales sont par ailleurs caractriss lpoque hellnistique par unestandardisation des questions poses et des rponses donnes. Bienque nous ne sachions que trs peu de choses sur le dveloppementdes coles au dbut de la priode hellnistique, la comptition la-quelle elles se livraient semble avoir fortement contribu ce proces-sus. Chaque cole se devait de dvelopper une stratgie pour traiter

unesriedequestions-typestellesque :lesdieuxexistent-ils ?,quelleest leur nature ? se proccupent-ils du monde et comment ?. Bienentendu, ces questions avaient dj t souleves par Platon etAristote. Mais, outre quelles gagnrent alors encore en importanceet systmaticit, elles atteignirent un nouveau degr de sophisticationaprs le tournant sceptique de lAcadmie platonicienne. Car, bienque les Acadmiciens naient videmment pas embrass lathisme,ils critiqurent rigoureusement la manire dont leurs adversaires

dogmatiques justifiaient leurs argumentations thologiques.Les articles runis ici ne prtendent pas couvrir la totalit du

champ ni mme traiter de tous les problmes majeurs discuts entreles coles. Le volume reflte plutt la discussion actuelle sur unesrie de questions qui nont que rcemment commenc recevoirlattention quelles mritent. Etant donn la longue histoire du dbatphilosophique sur les choses divines, il ny a pas dans ce domainede dbut nettement marqu lpoque hellnistique, moins peut-

tre quailleurs. Cest pourquoi plusieurs contributeurs, comme parun accord tacite, donnent leur expos lpoque classique pour toilede fond. Mais tout comme il ny pas de dbut proprement parler, lafin nest pas non plus fixe, tout au moins de fin qui conciderait avec


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introduction xi

dAristote, aucune image canonique de ses doctrines thologiquesnmergea sur le chemin, long et tortueux, des discussions delAntiquit tardive. Chaque poque, dveloppant son propre agenda,ouvrit de nouvelles questions. Le dossier, patiemment instruit,

permet dexpliquer pourquoi les diffrentes approches dAristotedans lAntiquit aussi bien que chez les commentateurs actuelsprsentent de telles divergences.

David Sedley

La contribution de D. Sedley est lune de celle qui marque le mieuxcombien les fontires entre la philosophie classique et la philo-sophie hellnistique sont fluentes (Sedley parle de pont). La thse

est que les antcdents de la dotrine du dieu stocien doivent trecherchs dans lAcadmie platonicienne de la fin du IVe sicle av.J. C., et plus prcisment chez Polmon, dont Sedley pense que laphysique est saisissable. Limportance du Timeet de ses interprta-tions ressort clairement de lanalyse, qui donne aussi lieu unervaluation: contrairement la communis opinio, la prsentation de laphysique acadmicienne par Antiochus dAscalon, dans les Tuscu-lanesde Cicron, doit tre considre comme une source dinforma-

tion digne de foi.

Dorothea Frede

Larticle instruit une comparaison entre la doctrine stocienne sur laprovidence divine (largement tire du trait de Cicron Sur la naturedes dieux) et le modle platonicien dvelopp dans le dixime livredes Lois, premire vue trs proche : dans les deux cas, le monde estune uvre dart conue par des puissances omniscientes et omni-

prsentes, qui se proccupent du bien-tre des hommes. Pourtant, la diffrence de Platon, les Stociens semblent reconnatre une inter-vention divine directe en faveur des individus. Une telle interventionnentre-t-elle pas en conflit avec leur croyance en un ordre du monderationnel rigoureusement fix ? Lide dune justice spciale neserait-elle pas une simple concession la moralit commune ? Larponse ici avance est que sil existe un lment divin providentielinhrent toute chose, comme le prsuppose le panthisme tlo-

logique des Stociens, alors lordre divin nest pas seulement beau-coup plus finement agenc quil ne lest chez Platon, mais est aussiexplicitement tourn vers le bien-tre humain, mme si lindividu necomprend pas toujours la raison qui se cache derrire lordre divin.


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xii d. frede et a. laks

Brad Inwood

Les Stociens faisaient de la thologie une partie de la physique elle en est mme le point culminant. B. Inwood illustre cette relationentre physique et thologie sur le cas des Questions naturelles de

Snque, en montrant comment la procupation thologique con-stitue le thme souterrain, et parfois le contexte direct, de la discus-sion mtorologique. La prudence pistmologique dont Snquefait preuve plusieurs reprises prend ainsi un sens nouveau. Ind-pendamment de la confirmation quelle apporte de limportancesystmatique de la thologie pour le systme stocien, la lectureoriginale qu Inwood fait dune oeuvre nglige, dont il propose unparcours densemble, livre par livre, contribue sa rhabilitation.

Michael Erler

M. Erler cherche moins tablir lexistence dune continuit entre lethme platonicien de lassimilation dieu, dont la formulationclassique se lit dans le Thtte176b, et le statut paradigmatique de ladivinit picurienne, qui constitue, pour le philosophe picurien,lidal de la tranquillit et du plaisir, quil ne montre comment leconcept de lmovsiw ye, tel quil est spcifiquement mis en oeuvre

dans le Timeet les Lois, peut servir de toile de fond pour interprterle prome du cinquime livre de Lucrce. Le fameux il fut un dieu,un dieu (V 8) marque, selon M. Erler, la russite dune assimilationqui exploite la possibilit dune divinisation non seulement de lapartie immortelle, mais aussi de la partie mortelle de lme,thmatise par les deux textes platoniciens de rfrence. Lanalysedtaille du passage de Lucrce permet ainsi de mieux comprendrecomment les Epicuriens remplirent dun vin nouveau les bouteilles

tires des caves de lAcadmie.

Dirk Obbink

Les dieux picuriens existent-ils dans un espace intercosmique, titredentits discrtes, qui mettent perptuellement des images ? Ousont-ils une classe dentit spciale, matriellement cause et psycho-logiquement perptue par nos propres processus mentaux ? Enfaveur de cette seconde version, subjectiviste et plus htrodoxe, de

la thologie picurienne, D. Obbink allgue le tmoignage du Depietatede Philodme, et en particulier laffirmation, nonce dans lecontexte dune rplique aux accusations dathisme lance contre lesEpicuriens, selon laquelle Epicure ne reconnaissait pas seulement


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introduction xiii

tous les dieux des Grecs, mais beaucoup dautres en outre. Donnersens cette affirmation suppose cependant une clarification de lamanire dont Philodme conduit sa critique de la doctrine tholo-gique de la tradition philosophique, et donc une confrontation avec

la doxographie parallle de Cicron dans le De natura deorum. D.Obbink montre comment lapproche philodmienne de lhistoire dela thologie, loin dtre purement ngative, est guide par unprogramme prcis qui permet de clarifier certains points de ladoctrine picurienne. Ce nest pas seulement le cas pour le problmedes modalits dexistence des dieux, mais galement de lassertionselon laquelle les dieux sont causes pour les hommes de bienfaits etde dtriments.

Emidio Spinelli

La religion astrale est un aspect essentiel de la thologie platoni-cienne ; lastrologie, de manire plus gnrale, est lobjet denjeuxthologiques, notamment travers les dbats sur la providencedivine. Le livre cinq du trait de Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathema-ticos(Contre les savants), constitue cet gard un tmoin la fois privi-ligi et original. Privilgi, parce quil constitue le dernier chanon

dune longue tradition argumentative ; original, parce quil minimisedlibrment le rle du concept de destin pour se concentrer, enconformit avec la pratique des astrologues eux-mmes les Chal-dens sur les questions que pose la dtermination de lhoroscopeau moment de la naissance. E. Spinelli analyse en dtail la structureet les articulations internes de ce trait assez peu lu, afin de dresser lacarte des sources utilises et disoler la srie des objections propre-ment pyrrhoniennes diriges contre les pratiques astrologiques.

John Dillon

Deux formes de dualisme semblent coexister chez Plutarque. Ledualisme modr, tel quil ressort en particulier du trait Sur le E deDelphes, oppose un dieu suprme transcendant et immuable unedivinit dmiurgique qui laisse place des puissances mauvaises.Cette conception dun dmiurge sublunaire, qui ne rapparatra pasavant lpoque de Jamblique, a des antcdants dans lancienne

Acadmie. Elle rpond par ailleurs au transdendentalisme grandis-sant de la thologie platonicienne depuis Eudore, qui conduit lhy-pothse de divinits secondaires, sans quil soit besoin dvoquer lestendances gyptianisantes dAmmonius, le matre de Plutarque. La


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xiv d. frede et a. laks

seconde forme de dualisme, reprsente par le trait sur Isis et Osiris,semble plus radicale, puisquelle prsuppose deux forces antith-tiques, selon un modle peut-tre influenc par le Zoroastrisme.Dillon recommande pourtant de ne pas survaluer ce schma. Ici en-

core, les puissances du mal sont restreintes la sphre sublunaire, etil nest pas difficile de retrouver le modle hirarchique du Timeder-rire les mythologmes gyptiens. En particulier, Seth-Typhon nestrien dautre que le principe de dsordre dj postul par Platon.Dillon en conclut la consistance de la thologie de Plutarque, qui sesitue bien dans le mouvance du Platonisme scolaire contemporain.

David Runia

Philon est notre seule source, en matire de thologie, pour lapriode qui stend entre Cicron dune part, Snque et Plutarquede lautre. Sappuyant sur leDe opificio mundi, Runia cherche situerle tmoignage et lapport de cet auteur sui generis. Les divergencesentre la pense religieuse de Philon et les formes de pense de laphilosophie hellnistique, quil connaissait bien, ne sont pas dues son seul judasme. Elles refltent plutt le fait que lpistmologiedirecte de la philosophie hellnistique a cd la place une

approche de la thologie tout la fois moins confiante et plus com-plexe. On peut affirmer lexistence de Dieu, mais sa nature resteinconnaissable. Loriginalit de Philon par rapport la tradition juiveest dtayer ce point par une argumentation rationnelle. Les noncsde rsonance platonicienne sur lineffabilit du Crateur ou desconceptions stocisantes sur la toute puissance de lintellect divintendent tablir la suprmatie de Dieu comme la source absolumenttranscendante de la Loi divine. Ce souci na pas de parallle dans les

sources stociennes ou mdio-platoniciennes, bien que Philon ait putre influenc par la renaissance pythagorico-platonicienne Alexan-drie, avec Eudore. Il est en tous cas le tmoin dun changementdatmosphre, le dbut de la fin de la confiance dans une thologierationnelle caractristique de la philosophie hellnistique.


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ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY AFTER ARISTOTLE1

R.W. Sharples

I will begin with three quotations:

Aristotle in his third book de Philosophiacreates great confusion ... atone moment he attributes all divinity to intellect; at another he saysthat the universe itself is a god; then he puts some other god incharge of the world and gives it the role of governing and preserving

the movement in the world by a sort of counter-rotation; and then hesays that it is the heat of the heaven that is god ... when he wants godto be incorporeal, he deprives him of all sensation and wisdom.

What, someone might say, do you class Aristotle and Epicurustogether? Certainly, as far as the point at issue is concerned. For

what is the difference, as far as we are concerned, between banishingthe divine outside the world and leaving no association between usand it, or confining the gods inside the world but removing themfrom earthly affairs? ... For we are looking for a providence that

makes a difference to us, and he who does not admit daimones(damonew) or heroes or the possibility of the survival of souls at all hasno share in this.

This outstanding investigator of nature and accurate judge of divinematters places human affairs beneath the very eyes of the gods butleaves them neglected and disregarded, managed by some natureand not by gods reasoning.

The first quotation is from Cicero, in a passage2where the Epicurean

Velleius is presented as tendentiously seeking to discredit theories ofthe gods other than Epicurus own.3The second and third quotations

1 Versions of this paper have been delivered at Edinburgh, as an A.E. TaylorLecture; at Gothenburg; and at the Symposium Hellenisticum in Lille. I amgrateful to all those who have contributed helpful comments: especially to BradInwood who read through the penultimate draft, and also to Monika Astzalos,Silke-Petra Bergjan, Enrico Berti, Bernard Besnier, Tad Brennan, Sarah Broadie,John Dillon, Philip van der Eijk, Michael Frede, Mats Furberg, Charles Genequand,Pamela Huby, Tony Long, Jaap Mansfeld, Jan Opsomer, Christopher Rowe, Mary

Ruskin, Richard Sorabji and Emidio Spinelli. Responsibility for the views expressedhere, and for any misuse of their advice, of course remains my own.2 Cic. N.D.I 33 = Arist. fr. 26 Rose; cf. Cherniss 1944, 592-594.3 Appeal to Aristotles surviving works can give at least some degree of

credibility to all the descriptions of Aristotles god given by Velleius except theclaim that god, being incorporeal, can have no wisdom, this being based on the


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2 r.w. sharples

are from Atticus,4 of all Platonists in antiquity perhaps the mostimplacably anti-Aristotelian.

There has been no shortage of discussion among modern scholarsas to just what Aristotles own views on god were. I cannot hope toreproduce that whole debate here, let alone develop it further. Theidentification of certain central questions will here be purelypreliminary to consideration of how these are reflected in discussionsof Aristotles views in the subsequent half-millennium. On a strictinterpretation of Hellenistic philosophy it is indeed only the firstthree of those five centuries that are strictly relevant. However,interpretations of Aristotles position from the first two centuries ofthe Roman Empire reflect those developed in the Hellenistic period;

and the views developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias and his schoolaround the turn of the third century A.D., much more fullydocumented than what had preceded, are developments of, andreactions to, the preceding debate.5 Moreover, in terms of thecontrast between Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic theology developedby Runia elsewhere in this volume, Alexanders treatment, justbecause it keeps so closely to the Aristotelian texts and the problemsthey raise, falls on the Hellenistic side of the divide, in spite of its

later date.Recent scholars have rightly supposed that we can trace develop-

ments in Aristotles thought about god and about the heavens fromone of his works to another.6The ancients, however, did not considersuch developmental hypotheses; their aim was to extract a coherentposition from consideration of Aristotles works. This means that theyhad a motivation which we do not for reconciling apparently

Epicurean assumption that without sensation there can be no wisdom. Cf. Jaeger1923/1948, 138-139; Bos 1989, 185-191. (I have throughout used a lower-case initialfor god in the singular as well as in the plural, to avoid question-beggingimplications of monotheism where they are not necessarily present in the originalGreek texts. I am grateful to Christopher Rowe for raising this point.)

4 Fr. 3, 52-57, 71-74 and 81-85 des Places. Cf. Happ 1968, 79-80.5 On the general history of the Peripatetic school in the Hellenistic period see

Wehrli, F., Der Peripatos bis zum Beginn der rmischen Kaiserzeit, in: Flashar, H.,ed., Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, begrndet von Friedrich Ueberweg: DiePhilosophie der Antike, 3, Basel: Schwabe, 1983, 459-599; in the Imperial period,

Moraux 1973, id. 1984, and Gottschalk 1987. I have attempted an overview of theentire period in The Peripatetic School, in D.J. Furley, ed., From Aristotle toAugustine, London: Routledge 1999 (Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 2), 147-187.

6 Cf. Jaeger 1923/1948, especially 342-367; Ross, W.D., Aristotles Physics, Oxford1936, 94-102; Guthrie 1939, xv-xxxvi ; Frede 1971; Kosman 1994. Below, nn. 12, 14,32.


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aristotelian theology after aristotle 3

conflicting claims in different Aristotelian texts.7 It also means fortunately that questions of Aristotles own development areperipheral to our enquiry.

A particular issue here relates to the exoteric Aristotelian workswhich were not incorporated into Andronicus canon and are nowlost. Their relation, on the issues that concern us here, to thethought of the surviving esoteric works has itself been a subject ofmodern dispute;8this in turn poses a difficulty for our assessment ofany relation between changes in interpretations of Aristotelian theo-logy at different periods in antiquity and changes in the accessibility,popularity or canonical status of different Aristotelian texts. Thegeneral impression one has, however, is that these played, as far as we

can now tell, only a minor role. Some of the developments connectedwith Alexander of Aphrodisias can be seen as the result of closer andmore careful study of the esoteric texts; for example, the distinctionbetween the souls of the heavenly spheres and the Unmoved Movers(though that is itself still controversial as interpretation of Aristotle).Others however, such as Alexanders construction of a revised Aristo-telian theory of providence, are more naturally seen as a response todebate with other philosophical schools. And, correspondingly, the

distinctive features of discussions of the Hellenistic and earlyImperial periods may be due not so much to use of the exotericrather than the esoteric works though that remains a possibility wecannot for lack of evidence disprove as to a lesser emphasis on theneed to take account of all relevant passages in Aristotles writings indeveloping an interpretation. There are after all passages in theesoteric works too which suggest a very different position from that(apparently) found in MetaphysicsLambda.9

7 It is true that the tendency of much recent work on this issue since Jaeger hasbeen to look for similarities between different stages in Aristotles thought as wellas noting differences; cf. e.g. Kosman cited in n. 32 below. It is also true that thedesire of ancient interpreters to reconcile different passages is sometimes qualifiedby a concentration on the immediate exigencies of the particular passage currently

under discussion; see below, at nn. 97-98. But neither of these points alters the factthat the goals and approaches of ancient and modern interpreters are in thisrespect at least fundamentally different.

8 Below, nn. 14, 53.9 Below, n. 49. I am grateful to Brad Inwood for prompting me to think

further about the issues in this and the preceding paragraphs.


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4 r.w. sharples

1. Aristotle

For Aristotle the heavens are ensouled.10It is true that he does not

himself refer to a soulof the sphere in setting out his views in Physicsbook eight or in the latter part of MetaphysicsLambda.11 But thespheres cannot be moved by intellect alone without appetition, so atleast these two soul-faculties must be present in the heavens.12

This however raises the question: are the soul of the heaven andthe Unmoved Mover different? For Physicsbook eight suggests thatthe souls of terrestrial animals are, not as Plato thought self-movers,but unmoved movers that move the animals bodies and are thereby

moved themselves, though only accidentally.13

Might the heavenlyUnmoved Mover then be, not a separate, entirely immaterial entitywhich is the object of the desire of the heaven, but simply the soul ofthe heaven itself?14On the other hand Aristotle himself, in the caseof terrestrial animals, also describes the object of their desire as anunmoved mover, and their faculty of desire as a movedmover,15andTheophrastus raises doubts about the Unmoved Mover in a way that

10 Even though Zeller 1909,828 n. 5 (in connection with Herminus andAlexander of Aphrodisias) regards the claim that the heavens are ensouled asun-Aristotelian, and Gottschalk 1987, 1159 finds the doctrine startling. Cf.Guthrie 1939, xxix-xxxv; Jaeger 1923/1948, 300; Nussbaum 1978, 132 n. 29; Judson1994, 159; Genequand 2001, 7-8. I am grateful to Bernard Besnier, David Runiaand others for discussion of these issues.

11 L6, 1072a2 is a reference to Platos position.12 Cf. perhaps Metaph.L5, 1071a2-3; the causes of all substances may be soul

(cux) and body (sma), or mind (now), appetition (rejiw) and body (sma).Alexander, in Metaph. fr. 21 p. 98 Freudenthal 1884 = p. 125 Genequand 1984

refers the second option, mind, appetition and body, explicitly to the heavens; cf.Freudenthal 1884, 42. In Aristotles early dialogueDe Philosophia it was the heavenlybodies themselves, i.e. the planets and stars, that had souls, while in the latertreatises it is rather the spheres carrying these bodies that do so: Jaeger 1923/1948,300.

13 Ph.VIII 6, 259b2-3, 16-20; Alexander, de An.21.24, 22.13; Furley 1978.14 This may be the position of Aristotle in de Caelo: Guthrie 1939, xvii-xxix,

Moraux 1963, 1200-1203. The presence of a separate Unmoved Mover both in dePhilosophiaand inde Caelo is however argued by Cherniss 1944, 584-590, 594-6. Seealso Bos, A.P., Providentia Divina: The theme of divine Pronoiain Plato and Aristotle,Assen 1976, 24-25; id. 1989, 186, 191-200; and below, nn. 29-30. Sorabji 1997, 205

notes that Arist. Ph.VIII 5, 258a7, 258a19 would allow the soul of the heavens to bethe unmoved mover; only VIII 10, by arguing that there cannot be an infinite forcein a finite magnitude, excludes it. The Unmoved Movers and the sphere-souls wereidentified by Averroes and Zabarella: Ross 1924, cxxxvi, Berti 1997, 68-69.

15 Arist. de An.III 10, 433b15-17. Cf. also Ph.VIII 2, 253a11ff., VIII 6, 259b6-16,with Furley 1978; also Bodnr 1997b, 104 n. 35, Broadie 1993, 391 n. 12.


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hardly suggests that Unmoved Mover and sphere-soul were simply tobe equated in the doctrine he is discussing.16

If we identify the Unmoved Mover with the sphere-soul it mayseem that this soul will be moved accidentally as its body rotates; butAristotle expressly says that, unlike the souls of terrestrial animals, theUnmoved Mover must not be moved even accidentally.17 Kosmansuggests that the soul of the outermostheaven is not moved as itrotates, for there is nothing surrounding it to provide it with anAristotelian place in terms of which it could move.18This may seemto prove too much, for by this argument the bodyof the first spherewould not move as it rotates, either.19However, that the soul of theoutermost sphere is not moved as it rotates is in fact a view canvassed

by ancient interpreters.20Broadie argues that the Unmoved Mover is related to the heavens

as a soul to its body, with the two differences that it is not the actualityof an organicbody or a first as opposed to a second actuality,21andthat its activity is explained by its desire for its own act of movingrather than by any external goal.22 On the conventional view, shecontends, the Unmoved Mover is a final cause in a different way foritself and for the heavens. In the case of the latter it is an exemplary

cause; but it can hardly be an exemplar for itself.23

16 Bodnr 1997b, 85 n. 5. Below, n. 57.17 Ph.VIII 6, 259b24.18 Kosman 1994, 146-7.19 Judson 1994, 162.20 Cf. Arist. Ph.IV 5, 212a31ff., Eudemus, fr. 80 Wehrli; Sorabji 1988, 193-196;

id., Theophrastus on place, in Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Sharples, R.W., eds.,Theophrastean Studies,New Brunswick 1988 (Rutgers University Studies in ClassicalHumanities, 3), 139-166, at 144-146; Algra, K. Concepts of Space in Greek Thought,

Leiden 1995, 255-257; Sharples, R.W., Eudemus Physics:Change, Place and Time,forthcoming in Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Bodnr, I., eds., Eudemus of Rhodes,NewBrunswick (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities,11). Below, nn. 89, 93.

21 Broadie 1993, 390, 392-393, 397. The Unmoved Mover is the substance of thesphere (410).

22 Berti 1997, 75-82 distinguishes the Unmoved Movers from the spheres, but rejecting the notion of imitation as does Broadie considers the UnmovedMovers themselves, not the spheres, as the subject as well as the object of the desirereferred to in L7; the Unmoved Movers, he argues, move the heavens as efficientcauses (below, n. 44) because of their self-directed desire. He cites (81-82) Arist.Metaph.L10, 1075b10: medicine is in a way health, so that the final cause and what

moves for the sake of it are identical. (The implication, not explicitly drawn byBerti, would seem to be that the doctor, quadoctor, produces health in patientsbecause he desires to practise medicine, not because he is concerned in the firstinstance for the health of specific patients; they are simply necessary as the materialsubstrate in which health can be produced.)

23 Broadie 1993, 382, 385.


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apparently refer to the Unmoved Mover as being outsidethe heaven;29

but the relation between these passages and the theory of the Physicsand of MetaphysicsLambda is uncertain.30Gill however has arguedthat the heavenly spheres differ from animals in having onlyexternalmovers, not internal ones, and that the movement of the spheres bydesire inMetaphysicsLambda requires only a passive capacity, not anactive one as is found in animals, so that there is an Unmoved Moverbut no sphere-soul.31Both on the view of those who, like Kosman32

and Broadie, make the Unmoved Mover in some sense the soul of thesphere, and on that of Gill, we are dealing not with three things the body of the heavens, the soul of the heavens, and an UnmovedMover but with just two.

In Physicsbook eight and in most of MetaphysicsLambda Aristotlespeaks only of one Unmoved Mover; it is only in chapter 8 ofMetaphysicsLambda that he introduces the notion of a plurality ofconcentric heavenly spheres and argues that each has its ownUnmoved Mover.33This introduces a further aspect to the question

which he sometimes envisages, (namely) that which moves itself; for the soul isposterior and contemporary with the heaven, as he says. For this suggests that

Aristotle wants to make his Unmoved Mover prior to the heaven in a way thatPlatos world-soul is not.29 Cf. Jaeger 1923/1948, 356-357; Cherniss 1944, 588; Gill 1994, 32.30 Solmsen, F., Beyond the Heavens, MH33 (1976), 24-32, at 29, followed by

Bos 1989, 122, argues that the extra-cosmic beings of Cael. I 9 279a19 cannot becauses of movement, because 279a33-b3 asserts that the primary and highestdivinity is immutable, in constant motion, but not moved by anything superior toitself. Conversely Kosman 1994, 143-4 finds no difficulty in interpreting the beingreferred to as the soul of the heavens even though it is beyond them. Simplicius, inCael.287.19ff., reports Alexander as interpreting 279a19 as possibly referring to thePrime Mover not being in place because it is incorporeal, though favouring rather

the view that the reference was to the sphere of the fixed stars which is not in placebecause there is nothing outside it far less plausibly, because he then had toexplain the reference to the things under discussion being beyond the outermostmotion (for) by arguing that for refers to rectilinear motion, as opposed tocircular motion which isperifor(288.4). Cf. Moraux 1963, 1202-3; Mueller 1994,152 n. 56.

31 Gill 1994, 29-30 and n. 44, citing MA 4 700a6-11. Cf. Nussbaum 1978,122-123; Berti 1997, 80; Bodnr 1997b, 111 n. 51. Bodnr 1997b, 112-113 notes thatin the case of the heavens we are speaking of nature in a somewhat moreextended application, just because with the celestial stuff the distinction betweennature and a passive potentiality breaks down anyhow.

32 Kosman 1994 argues that the Unmoved Mover is the soul of the heaven in deCaelo, Physics8 and MetaphysicsLambda alike, though with a new emphasis in thethird of these works on its activity; the Prime Mover form[s] with the heaven whatis essentially the soul and body of a single divine entity (145).

33 The problem how there can be several movements if there is a singleprinciple is raised by Thphr. Metaph.5a17-18; Frede 1971, 71.


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of whether sphere-souls and Unmoved Movers are identical ordifferent; why can the spheres not move, each in its own way, throughthe desire of a different sphere-soul in each case for one and thesame Unmoved Mover?34

If there is a plurality of Unmoved Movers, it seems reasonable tosuppose that they can be ranked in a hierarchy;35for only so does itseem possible to defend them against Aristotles own argument atMetaph.L8, 1074a31-836. He there claims that the reason why therecan be only one cosmos is that otherwise there would need to be aplurality of Unmoved Movers, which is impossible if UnmovedMovers have no matter to differentiate them. If the Unmoved Moversfor our world form a hierarchy, they can be differentiated even

though they have no matter; in effect, each would be the uniquemember of a different species. But, we must suppose, there is no wayof ranking Unmoved Movers for different worlds in a hierarchy.37

A further problem concerns the content of the Unmoved Movers(or Unmoved Movers) thinking. One interpretation has it that theUnmoved Mover thinks only of himself, as pure self-thinking thought

34 Why need we suppose that a plurality of worlds could not all have their

outermost heavens moved by desire for one and the sameUnmoved Mover? aquestion which is actually raised by Alex. ap. Simpl.in Cael. 270.9ff. (Genequand,loc. cit.). If the Unmoved Mover is identical with the soul of the outermost sphere,the answer is clear enough; a single soul cannot be the soul of two bodies. If theUnmoved Mover is transcendent, the answer is less clear; it is however provided bySimplicius, who responds that only what is itself unified can desire a unity(271.21ff.). Cf. Ross 1924, cxli; also Bodnr 1997a, 200 and n. 26, and Genequand1984, 41, on Averroes. Aristotle himself, at Metaph. L8, 1073a23-34, says that thefirst cause is unmoved per se and per accidens, but of the movers of the inferiorspheres only that they are unmovedper se, which could be taken to imply that theyare like animal souls which are unmoved per se, but movedper accidens by their own

movement of the bodies in which they are (Arist. Ph. VIII6, 259b16). IndeedThem. in Metaph. L26.4ff., says that the first cause is unmoved bothper seandperaccidens, while the movers of the inferior spheres are unmoved per sebut movedperaccidens like the soul. Simpl. in Ph. 1262.5-13 however suggests that Aristotleshould be understood as saying that the movers of the inferior spheres are movedby something other than themselves, but that this is not movement per accidens. (Iowe this reference to Huby, P. and Steel, C., Priscian on Theophrastus on Sense-Perception with Simplicius On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12, London 1997, 20 and 139 n.54.)

35 As Aristotle indeed asserts at 1073b1-3, if we take this to refer to transcendentUnmoved Movers.

36 And in any case the different Unmoved Movers must all in some way relate tothe first one if the world is to be a unity. Cf., with Kahn 1985, 187, GCII 10 337a21;and below, n. 101.

37 Merlan, P., Aristotles Unmoved Mover, Traditio4 (1946), 1-30; cf. Krmer1964, 167-168. Discussion of this issue is well summarised at Guthrie, W.K.C., AHistory of Greek Philosophy, vol. 6: Aristotle: An Encounter, Cambridge 1981, 271-276.


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whatever that means. A rival view, which has found increasingsupport in recent years, holds that the content of the UnmovedMovers thought may include timeless and unchanging truths, thetheorems of mathematics, and perhaps also the forms of sublunaryliving creatures, as was already argued by St. Thomas Aquinas,38though not the vicissitudes of individuals histories.39A third possibil-ity is that the supreme Unmoved Mover thinks of the subordinateUnmoved Movers only.40

An austere interpretation of the relation between the UnmovedMover and the world might be somewhat as follows. Human beings,who possess intellect, can and indeed should aspire to a conditionlike gods, even if they can achieve it only temporarily; according to

ENX 7, 1177b33 we should try to regard ourselves as immortal as faras possible, and conversely according to Metaph.L7, 1072b14 godslife is always as ours is at its best for a short time. The four sublunaryelements, according to GCII 10, 336b25ff., achieve what eternity theycan through constant replenishment by mutual interchange; thosechanges too are caused by desire for the Unmoved Mover, albeitindirectly, for it is the rotation of the heavens, and in particular theseasons produced by the complex motion of the sun on the ecliptic,

that keeps the whole process going.41The movement of the sun onthe ecliptic also contributes to animal generation.42The reproduc-tion of irrational animals is seen by Aristotle, following Plato in theSymposium, as an attempt to achieve a type of immortality;43 but

38 Krmer 1969, 363, setting out the three interpretations distinguished here.39 Cf. Norman 1969; R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, London 1980, 218 n.

26; id., Time, Creation and the Continuum, London 1983, 146-149; Lear, J., Aristotle: theDesire to Understand, Cambridge 1988, 295-309; George 1989; de Koninck 1993-94.

Against, Lloyd 1981, 17-20; and for a summary of views Kraye 1990, 339 n. 3.40 Jackson, H., On some passages in Aristotles Metaphysics 7, Journal ofPhilology 29 (1904), 138-144, at 143-144; Krmer 1964, 159-173; id. 1969, 364; Movia1970, 74-5 n. 7. Jackson argues that the subordinate Unmoved Movers simply aregods thoughts. See also below, n. 101.

41 Cf. also Ph.VIII 6, 260a1-17, Cael.II 3, 286b2-9, Mete.I 9, 346b20-23, Metaph.L6, 1072a10-18. Moraux 1973, 204; id. 1984, 421 n. 71.

42 Metaph.L 5, 1071a14-15 refers to the sun and the ecliptic, as well as thefather, as moving causes in human generation; cf. also Ph.II 2, 194b13, a humanbeing is produced by a human being and the sun (which Alexander quotes; below,n. 140). In the first century B.C. Xenarchus says that the movement of the heaven is

the cause of the coming together of form and matter (ap. Jul. Or.VIII[V] 3 162ab;below, n. 82).43 Cf. Arist.de An.II 4, 415a26-b2; Pol.I 2, 1252a27-30; Metaph. 1 8, 1050b22-30.

Kahn 1985, 189, 193-194. And compare alsoENVII 13, 1153b25-32: all animals andhuman beings pursue pleasure, perhaps not that which they think or would say,but the same (for all of them); for all things that are by nature have something


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neither in the case of the inanimate elements nor in that of animalreproduction can there be any question of conscious awareness oremulation of the divinity.

That is an austere account; god as Unmoved Mover is simply there,influencing a world most of which has no conscious awareness ofhim, and himself affecting the world only as an object of desire. Thismay not, indeed, exclude describing him as in some sense anefficient cause.44But, as we have already seen from Atticus attack,the important issue for ancient interpreters was the extent to whichgod could be seen as actually involved with the world.

Certain passages in Aristotles writings suggest a rather differentpicture. The main point of the comparison with the army in Metaph.L

10, 1075a13-15 is to argue that the good is present in the universeboth in a transcendent and in an immanent way, and that the formeris primary.45It may be wrong to press the analogy further. But if wedo, one might suppose that the general is aware of the army, andindeed influences it as an efficient cause, by issuing commands. Anarmy which has discipline and good order through its desire to belike the impeccably organised and self-disciplined general, whohimself issues no commands to the army at all, would be a rather

strange one; even more so if the general was not aware that the armyexisted.46(True, Natali observes that It is not necessary to think thatthe general is the efficient cause of order; at times his motionless andsilent presence is sufficient for the soldiers to arrange themselves inorder and stand to attention.)47Still, it is reasonable to suppose that

divine about them. (I am grateful to Professor Broadie for drawing my attention tothis passage.) Berti 1997, 73 however points out that Aristotle describes the trans-

formation of the elements and the reproduction of living things not as imitatingthe Unmoved Mover, but rather as imitating the eternal movement of the heavens.44 Broadie 1993, 389 argues that an efficient cause can cause motion without

being affected itself. Judson 1994, 164-167 argues that what causes motion by caus-ing desire for itself is a non-energetic efficient cause as well as a final cause (cf.Bodnr [1997b] 117); cf. also ps.-Alex. in Metaph.706.31. The question whether theUnmoved Mover is an efficient cause, and in what sense, goes back in moderndiscussion at least to Brentano 1867/1977, 162-180; cf. Ross 1924, cxxxiii-cxxxiv,and, recently, Berti 1997; against, Natali 1997, especially 106-112. Simpl. in Cael.271.13ff. already argues against Alexander that god is for Aristotle the efficient(poihtikn) and not just the final (telikn) cause of the universe, appealing inter

aliato Aristotles claim that nature and god do nothing in vain. See also below, nn.94, 96.45 I am grateful to Michael Frede for emphasising this.46 Cf. Brentano 1867/1977, 167; Verdenius 1960, 61 and 67 nn. 32-33; Bods

1992, 200; Broadie 1993, 379 n. 4.47 Natali 1997, 112 and 119-123. He further observes that it is in this way that


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the divine general need only be aware of his staff officers (thesphere-souls?) and the general principles of military organisation,not also of individual private soldiers.48

Other passages refer in passing to divine concern for mankind. Itwould be questionable procedure to dismiss these as just statementsof common opinion which Aristotle himself does not share;49and inany case our concern here is not so much with Aristotles own posi-tion but with what later ancient interpreters may have made of thetexts. At EEVIII 2, 1248a16-33, in a passage which is often taken toimply that there is a divine element in the individual soul, Aristotleattributes certain peoples correct judgement to god:

What we are looking for is this, (namely) what is the beginning of themovement in the soul. Well, it is clear. As [1] in the whole it is god,(so) also in that. For in a way it is [2] the divine element in us thatcauses all movement. But the beginning of reason is not reason, butsomething superior. What then could be superior to both knowledgeand intellect, except [3] god?

Clearly [2] refers to reason as the divine element in each of us;whether [3] refers to a specific divine element in each of us, or rather

Alexander (fr. 30 in Freudenthal 1884 = p. 154 Genequand 1984; cf. Genequand1984, 39) explains Metaph.L7, 1072b2-3, and argues that he read sti gr tin to neka ka t. Cf. also Berti 2000, 233.

48 Pines 1987, 189 n. 30 interprets Themistius comment on this passage of L(in Metaph. 34.33-34) as implying divine involvement. But when, in the Latinversion at least, Themistius compares the influence of the Unmoved Mover to theeffect of law(lex; Pines has government) on magistrates and of a kings commandon subordinates, one might suppose that he is rather trying to minimisethe concernof the divine with what is inferior to it; laws and commands are simply there, and

we react to them. Cf. Berti 2000, 237-238. George 1989, 70 suggests that the claimat Metaph.L10, 1075b10 that medicine is, in a way, health (above, n. 22) suggestsawareness by the Unmoved Mover of the things it produces; cf. Brentano1867/1977, 128-131, and below, n. 147.

49 Cf. ENI 9, 1099b9-18, X 8, 1179a24, X 9, 1179b21-3; Brentano 1867/1977,167-168; Verdenius 1960, 60, 66 n. 28, 67 n. 31, 68 n. 44; Bods 1992, 22-24.Verdenius notes that Boyanc, P.,Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs,Paris1937, 193-194, insists that theENX 9 passage expresses the same doctrine as EEVIII 2 below. (Professor van der Eijk drew my attention to these discussions and tothe references in the next note.) Bods 1992 argues that it is wrong to interpretMetaphysicsLambda as presenting Aristotles theology in the modern sense of that

term; rather, Aristotles views on divinity are to be found in passages like thosementioned here, and in Metaphysics Lambda he is appealing to aspects of thenotion of divinity as supporting evidence in a metaphysical enquiry, rather thandeveloping a systematic theology. (Cf. also Natali 1997, 114.) The treatment of LasAristotles theology is however already present in Alexander of Aphrodisias:Bods 1992, 67 n. 34, citing Alex. in Metaph.171.5-11.


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to the effect on each one of us of god as a power greater than and notnecessarily localised in human individuals, may be less certain.50

In the dialogue de PhilosophiaAristotle argued that, if people werereleased from a cave and saw the surface of the earth and the heavensfor the first time, they would regard them as divine handiwork.51Thepoint might have been to emphasise the order and beauty of thecosmos, rather than to argue that it actually wasa divine creation;52

but even so the passage might have been misunderstood after all,it has survived because it is quoted by Balbus, the Stoic spokesman inCicerosDe natura deorum, in the context of an argument for divineprovidence. Bos attributes to Aristotle in the early dialogues the viewthat the First Cause, the Unmoved Mover, does not exercise provi-

dence over the world, while the heavens do.53Pines notes that Abu Ali al-Miskawayh attributes to Aristotle a text

On the Virtues of the Soul, and that this claims, as does Alexander ofAphrodisias in his de Providentia (below, n. 160), that gods primaryconcern is for himself and that his effects on the sublunary region aresecondary. Pines compares the claim at Arist. Pol.VII 3, 1325b28ff.that god and the cosmos have only internal activities, not concernwith anything outside themselves, and suggests that Miskawayhs text

is to be linked with Aristotles reference to his exoteric discussions(jvteriko lgoi) at Pol. VII 1, 1323a22.54However, it is not clearthat the activities of god on the one hand and of the cosmos on theother are being distinguishedat VII 3, 1325b28ff.55Fazzo and Wiesnernote that references in Arabic sources to a work On Providence byAristotlereflect a misunderstanding of Alexanders presentation of hisown theory as Aristotles, this having been taken to indicate actualquotation of an Aristotelian text.56

50 I am grateful to Michael Frede for discussion of this passage. Cf. also van derEijk, P., Divine Movement and Human Nature in Eudemian Ethics 8.2, Hermes117(1989), 24-42, and Bods 1992, 253-254, 278.

51 Arist. fr. 12 Rose3= Cic. N.D.II 95.52 Cf. Allan, D.J., The Philosophy of Aristotle,Oxford 19702, 19-20.53 Bos 1989, 72; cf. id. 87, on the Middle Platonist view referred to at n. 162

below.54 Pines, S., Un texte inconnu dAristote en version arabe, Archives dhistoiredoctrinale et littraire du Moyen-Age23 (1956) 5-43 (reprinted in Pines, S., Studies in

Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Medieval Science, Jerusalem/Leiden 1986,157-195) 14-15, 31-32.

55 On this passage see also Brentano 1867/1977, 177-178.56 Fazzo and Wiesner 1993, 135-137.


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2.1. Sphere-souls and Unmoved Movers from Theophrastus to Alexander

Theophrastus, Aristotles colleague and successor, in his own so-called Metaphysicsraises problems about the Unmoved Mover57and

apparently argues for the heavens being ensouled but self-moving.58The aporetic character of Theophrastus discussion should not beunderestimated,59 but there is no independent evidence whichcompels us to suppose that Theophrastus did accept the UnmovedMover.60Cicero attributes conflicting views on the nature of god toTheophrastus, but without any reference to a mind dissociated fromany body, or to a being superior to the heavens;61 and Clement ofAlexandria says that god for Theophrastus is sometimes the heaven

and sometimes pnema.62The notion of god as absorbed in thinkingof himself alone was found objectionable by the author of the MagnaMoralia.63

Subsequently a tradition developed which saw the heavenly region,but not the sublunary one, as the object of divine providential care

57 5a14-6a5, 7b9-8a2, 10a16.58 Thphr. Metaph. 7b19-22, 10a14-19. (True, at 10a15-16 the rotation of the

universe is only described as likea sortof life; see Longrigg 1975, 218, and above,

nn. 21 and 31). See also Thphr. frs. 159, 160, 252, 254A, 255 and 269 FHS&G; Rossand Fobes 1929, xxv, and Theiler 1957, 128 n. 5.59 Ellis, J., The Aporematic Character of Theophrastus Metaphysics, in

Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Sharples, R.W., eds., Theophrastean Studies,New Brunswick1988 (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities,3) 215-223, at 217-20.

60 The interpretation of Xenarchus ap. Jul. Or.VIII(V) 3 162A-C = Thphr. fr.158 FHS&G is at least uncertain (see below, n. 84), and while Pico della Mirandolain Thphr. fr. 160 FHS&G attributes to Theophrastus inter alia the view that godmoves the heavens as a final cause, the source of his whole report is unknown.Little weight is to be attached to the inclusion by Denis the Carthusian, in Thphr.fr. 255 FHS&G, of Theophrastus in a list along with Aristotle and Arabic philoso-

phers who accepted the existence of Unmoved Movers andof god as a supremeefficient and final cause superiorto these. Mansfeld, J., The pseudo-Hippocratic tractPERI EBDOMADVN and Greek Philosophy,Assen 1971, 84 n. 89, Longrigg 1975, 218,Sorabji 1988, 158, 223, id. 1997, 204-5 and Berti 1997, 66 all hold that Theo-phrastus rejected the Unmoved Mover. See Sharples 1998, 87-88.

61 Cic. N.D.I 35 (= Thphr. fr. 252A FHS&G). See above, n. 2.62 Clem. Prot.V 66.5 = Thphr. fr. 252B FHS&G. For Theophrastus views on

divine influence on the cosmos see also below, n. 111.63 [Arist.] MM II 15 1212b38-1213a7. Jaeger 1923/1948, 451 attributes this to

Dicaearchus criticising Aristotle; cf. also Merlan, P., Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle,Wiesbaden 1960, 85-88, against Dirlmeier, F., Aristoteles: Magna Moralia, Berlin 1958

(Aristoteles Werke in deutscher bersetzung, 8) 469-470, who interprets it as Aristotlesown polemic against a view developed in the Academy which he himself subse-quently took over. Dring, I., Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens,Heidelberg 1966, argues that it is Aristotles own record of an Academic objectionto the theory of MetaphysicsLambda. Cf. Donini, P.L., Letica dei Magna Moralia,Turin 1965, 40-141 n. 22; Movia 1970, 76 n. 1.


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according to Aristotle a view which I shall refer to from now on asNSP, No Sublunary Providence. Why such a doctrine should beattributed to Aristotle is an issue to be considered in 3.1 below; forthe present our concern is with its implications for the identity of thedeity and its relation to the heavens. NSP clearly presupposes thatthere is someheavenly divinity. But human beings, and so presumablygods too, can take forethought for themselves; so no distinctionbetween the heavens and the god who cares for them is necessarily tobe presupposed. One may further remark that, while the attributionto Aristotle of a doctrine of providence in some form or other can beseen as a response to contemporary philosophical and cultural press-ures, the question whether Aristotles supreme god is to be identified

with the heavens or is superior to them may not have been subject tosimilar influences, in the Hellenistic period at least; after all, anidentification of the divine with the world as a whole, but with theheavens in particular, was orthodox Stoic doctrine.64

The earliest known exponent65of NSP is Critolaus, the Peripateticwho went on the notorious philosophical embassy to Rome in 156/5B.C. He argued that the world was the cause of its own existence andtherefore eternal.66One may wonder whether he would have put the

point in this way if he had held the doctrine of a separate UnmovedMover; and when he is quoted by Stobaeus67as holding that god isintellect derived from impassibleaither (non p afiyrow payow)the impassibility in question would seem to be that of a particulartype of matter, not that of an Unmoved Mover which is altogetherincorporeal. Diogenes Laertius V 32 (writing perhaps in about 200A.D., but drawing on earlier sources), while attributing NSP toAristotle, describes god as unmoved or unchanged, knhtow; pre-

sumably this is simply reproducing Aristotles terminology, athowever many removes, and the question whether Diogenes, or hissource, understood the reference as being to a sphere-soul unmovedin itself, or as being to a transcendent Unmoved Mover, may not beone that it is appropriate to ask.

64 D.L. VII 139. A general tendency to emphasise divine transcendence mayhave played its part in the early Roman period; but we should distinguish between

separation of the divine from the sublunary (which had throughout been a featureof Peripatetic thought as contrasted with Stoicism) and separation of the divinefrom any matter whatsoever, even that of the heavens.

65 See below, n. 109.66 Critolaus, fr. 12 Wehrli.67 Critolaus, fr. 16 Wehrli.


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The pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo (composed at some point be-tween the latter first century B.C. and the second century A.D.) doesnot, as we shall see, exactly follow NSP. It describes god as seated onthe highest summit of heaven and above in a pure region (6,397b27, 400a6), and speaks of the divine power68as moving the sunand moon and causing the heavens to rotate (6, 398b9-10); but thisneed not imply a distinction between god and the heavens, orbetween Unmoved Movers and sphere-soul. After all, the heavenscould be moved by a soul present within them, and there is noreference here to their being moved by desire.69

[Plutarch],Epitome1.7 = Atius, II 7.32 Diels (Atius writing per-haps in the later first century A.D., but drawing on earlier sources)

states thatAristotle says that the highest god is a separateform, mounted on thesphere of the whole, which is an aetherial body, the one which hecalls the fifth. This is divided into spheres which are contiguous bynature but separated by reason, and he thinks that each of thespheres is a living creature composed of soul and body; the body isaetherial, moved in a circle, but the soul is an unmoved logos, thecause of the movement in actuality.70

The parallel text in Stobaeus adds that this highest god is a separateform as in Plato.71The most natural implication of the passage isthat there is one Unmoved Mover, distinct from a plurality of sphereseach of which also has its own unmoved soul.72 (But Athenagoras,

68 See below, n. 116.69 Gottschalk 1987, 1136 and 1138 rightly notes the emphasis on monotheism

in theDe mundo. That would rule out a distinction between unmoved mover andseparate sphere-souls; whether we are then to think of a soul within the heavens

moving them, or a transcendent deity causing the movement of an otherwiseinanimate heaven, is perhaps relatively unimportant. (See above, at n. 32.)70 Aristotlhw tn mn nvttv yen edow xvristn pibebhkta t sfar& to

pantw, tiw stn afiygion sma, t pmpton p auto kalomenon: dirhmnou dtotou kat sfaraw, t mn fsei sunafew t lg d kexvrismnaw, ksthnoetai tn sfairn zon enai snyeton k smatow ka cuxw, n t mn sm stinafiyrion kinoumenon kukloforikw, cux d lgow knhtow atiow tw kinsevwkat nrgeian. For NSP in Atius see below, at n. 115.

71 movw Pltvni. This can be taken as a reference back to the reference togod as a separate form in the account of Plato which immediately precedes inAtius (see Runias paper in this volume [p. 282 and n. 3]). Brad Inwood however

points out that mounted on the sphere of the whole sounds like a reminiscence ofon the back of the heaven (p t to orano nt) at Plato, Phdr. 247bc. Sincethere is no similar reminiscence in the Atian account of Plato himself, the phraseas in Plato might have been added as a gloss and incorporated into the text beforerather than after the relevant words.

72 Mansfeld 1992a, 140 regards this passage in Atius as drawing a distinction


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cited by Diels as a parallel to this passage, straightforwardly identifiesthe Unmoved Mover with the sphere-soul, the ether being its body.)73

Arius Didymus refers to gods who move the spheres, and describesthe greatest of these gods, who surrounds all the spheres, as arational and blessed living being who exercises providence over theheavens. Moraux interprets these gods as the Unmoved Movers.74

Nicolaus of Damascus, in the late first century B.C., paraphrasingMetaphysicsLambda, speaks of an Unmoved Mover for each heavenlysphere;75as with Aristotles text, so with Nicolaus report a distinctionbetween the Unmoved Movers and the sphere-souls seems the mostnatural reading, but we cannot be certain about this.76Atticus in thelater second century A.D. draws no distinction between the heavens

and the Unmoved Mover;77as we have seen, he locates the divine forAristotle inside the world rather than outside it as for Epicurus, andhe compares divine concern for the heavens in Aristotle with theEpicurean gods concern for their ownwell-being, finding both equal-ly irrelevant to human concerns.78Hippolytus (early third centuryA.D., but drawing on earlier sources) distinguishes between theheavens and the fifth substance located at their outermost surface,the former being the subject of metaphysics and the latter of theo-

logy;79 on this Mansfeld comments that Aristotles first UnmovedMover has here been converted into a physical entity.80

The Emperor Julian (the Apostate) reports that the first-centuryB.C.PeripateticXenarchus,whorejectedthefifthheavenlyelement,81

between god and the sphere.73 Athenag. leg.6 (DielsDox.p. 305). Moraux 1963, 1227-8; Mueller 1994, 154

and n. 33.74 Ar. Did. fr. phys. 9 Diels; Moraux 1973, 286, noting that to describe the

supreme Unmoved Mover as exercising providence is un-Aristotelian. HoweverMueller 1994, 156 n. 42 observes rather that Arius shows the same uncertaintyabout spheres and transcendent deities as does Hippolytus (for whom see below).

75 Nic. Dam. fr. 24 Drossaart-Lulofs.76 Nicolaus regarded the stars as alive but lacking sense-perception: Moraux

1973, 496.77 Cf. Happ 1968, 81 and n. 37.78 If providence is abolished according to Epicurus, even though the gods

according to him exercise all care for the preservation of their owngood things,then according to Aristotle too providence is abolished, even if the things inheaven are disposed in a certain ordering and pattern: Atticus, fr. 3 66-71 des

Places.79 Hippol. Haer.VII 19.2. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P.III 218; Moraux 1963, 1227;Mansfeld 1992a, 139-141; Mueller 1994, 151-153, 156. For Hippolytus and NSP seebelow, n. 114.

80 Mansfeld 1992a, 140.81 Cf. Moraux 1963; id. 1973, 198-206. Simpl. in Cael.25.24 cites Xenarchus as


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attacked Aristotle and Theophrastus for seeking a further cause forthis element.82Moraux argued, from Xenarchus reference to Theo-phrastus as straying towards the intelligible, that his objection was tothe Unmoved Mover rather than, as Theiler had argued, to theheavens being ensouled.83If so, then we must either suppose afterall that Theophrastus did himself accept the Unmoved Mover, or elseinfer that Xenarchus objection was to Theophrastus even discussingthe topic.84But Moraux interpretation is not certainly right; earlierin the passage Theophrastus is commended for not having investi-gated the cause of incorporeal and intelligible substance, and weknow from Proclus (in Ti. II120.18 Diehl = Theophrastus fr. 159FHS&G) that Theophrastus criticised Plato for giving an account of

the generation of the soul. If incorporeal and intelligible substanceearlier in the passage refers to the soul, straying towards the intelli-gible may do so as well. Xenarchus himself explained the movementof the heavens naturalistically, arguing that the upward movement offire changes to circular movement when it reaches its proper place;85

Julians report is possibly evidence that Xenarchus himself rejectedthe notion that the heavens are ensouled, or else, if we followMoraux interpretation, that he rejected the Unmoved Mover.

The apparent redundancy in the explanation of the heavenlymotion both by the nature of the fifth element and by the soul of theheavens created problems for interpreters of Aristotle.86Herminus in

Philoponus source for the rejection of the fifth element; Moraux 1973, 214 n. 57.82 Jul. Or.VIII(V) 3 162a-c = Thphr. fr. 158 FHS&G. On this passage cf. Sharples

1998, 94-96.83 Moraux 1973, 204-5 and n. 31; Theiler 1957, 128 n. 5.84 One may in any case wonder how well-informed Xenarchus was about

Theophrastus views, as opposed to Aristotles. According to the scholion in someMSS (printed e.g. by Ross and Fobes 1929, 38) the work we know as TheophrastusMetaphysics was unknown to Andronicus, though it was known to Nicolaus ofDamascus. Gottschalk 1987, 1095 argues for dating Andronicus activity in the 60sB.C. and the following decades. Nicolaus was born in c.64 B.C. and lived till after 4B.C. (Gottschalk 1987, 1122); Xenarchus taught Strabo (who was also born c.64B.C.) and was a friend of Augustus (Gottschalk 1987, 1119). This suggests thatXenarchus was younger than Andronicus but older than Nicolaus, and this may inturn suggest that Xenarchus may not have known the Theophrastean work. But allthese considerations fall far short of being conclusive.

85 Simpl. in Cael. 20.10-25, 42.19-22; Moraux 1973, 201; Gottschalk 1987, 1119-

20.86 Julianus of Tralles had argued that the soul of the heavens explained thedirection of the heavens motion and its uniform velocity. Cf. Simpl. in Cael.380.1ff., 29ff., and in Ph.1219.1ff.; Merlan, P., Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei ps.-Alexan-dros und ein Plotinus-Zitat bei Simplikios, RhM89 (1935), 154-160, at 157; id.,PlotinusEnneads2.2, TAPhA74 (1943), 179-191; Moraux 1963, 1198-1200, 1238-9;


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the 2nd century A.D. was criticised by his pupil Alexander ofAphrodisias for holding that the souls specific contribution was tocause the motion to be eternal; Alexander insisted the cause of theeternity of the motion was rather the Unmoved Mover.87But it wouldbe unwise to conclude that Herminus consciously rejected thepossibility that the Unmoved Mover could be distinct from thesphere-soul; it is one thing to produce an explanation that in factleaves no role for the Unmoved Mover, another to do so deliber-ately.

2.2. Alexander of Aphrodisias

The Quaestiones attributed to Alexander recognise a distinctionbetween Unmoved Mover and sphere-soul.88There are however somepassages reported from his Physics commentary which seem lessdecided. At Ph. VIII 6 259b22ff. Aristotle says that, while the firstprinciple must be unmoved even accidentally, some of the heavenlyprinciples, those which have complex motions, are moved accident-ally by things other than themselves, while only perishable things aremoved accidentally by themselves. Simplicius, in Ph. 1261.30ff. refers

to Alexander as identifying the things moved accidentally by thingsother than themselves with the souls of the inferior spheres,89and ascontrasting them with the principle which moves the outermostsphere and is not moved accidentally either by itself or by anythingelse.90

Simplicius then continues (in Ph. 1261.33-7):

Bodnr 1997a, 190 n. 1. Julianus view is adopted by Kahn 1985, 186 and n. 6 andby Judson 1994, 160-161.87 Simpl. in Cael.380.5ff. Merlan, locc. citt. Alexander himself identified the

soul of the sphere with its nature, thus removing the redundancy while retainingthe possibility of explanation of the movement by the sphere-souls desire for theUnmoved Mover: Simplicius, in Cael.380.29,in Ph.1219.1; Alex. Aphr.de Princ.p.123.18 in Badaw 1968 = 19 in Genequand 2001.

88 Alex. Aphr. Quaest. I 1 4.1ff., I 25 40.8-10. Cf. ps.-Alex. in Metaph.707.1ff.Moraux 1963, 1199; Genequand 2001, 9-10.

89 One might ask why the souls of the inferior spheres are not moved acci-dentally by themselves, since they do after all move their bodies, but presumably the

thought is that a soul that extends throughout a spherical body is not moved, evenaccidentally, just because the sphere rotates, though itismoved if the whole sphereis moved around a different axis by the sphere above it. See above, n. 20, andSimpl. in Ph. 1261.35-36 cited immediately below; Genequand 2001, 14.

90 See above, n. 34. ps.-Alex. in Metaph.701.1-3 says that the Unmoved Moversof allthe spheres are unmoved bothper se andper accidens.


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The first cause, (Alexander) says, which moves the sphere of thefixed stars, will not be moved accidentally either by itself or bysomething else, because the sphere of the fixed stars moves in a singlemotion and (does) this with its poles remaining in the same place; orelsebecause it is not even, to start with, the formof the moved body,

but rather some separate substance.91

Simplicius here attributes to Alexander two alternative reasons forthe principle of the first sphere not being moved. The first is that asoul is not moved just because its spherical body rotates. The secondexplanation (1261.36-7) is that the principle is not moved because itis separate from the sphere i.e., a transcendent Unmoved Mover.92

Rather similarly, at in Ph.1354.16ff. Simplicius reports Alexander as

saying that the mover of the first sphere is not moved even acci-dentally because it extends throughout its circumference,93and thencomments (1354.26ff. ; cf. Genequand 2001, 15 n.34) that Alexanderhad explained the problem better previously94 by saying that themover of the first sphere is not itself in place at all, and is not the

91 t d prton, fhsn, ation t tw planow kinhtikn ote f auto otep llou kinoto n kat sumbebhkw t man knhsin kinesyai tn plan, ka

tathn n t at menntvn tn plvn, t mhd tn rxn edow enai tokinoumnou smatow, ll osan tin kexvrismnhn.92 It is indeed a general feature of Alexanders commentaries that multiple

explanations are advanced without there always being a very clear indication of apreference between them. Moraux 1967, 169 n. 1; Sharples 1990, 97 and n. 108.

93 Cf. Simpl. in Ph.1355.15ff. Zeller 1909, 828 n. 5.94 Even though Simplicius himself wants to insist, in explicit opposition to

Alexander, that the Prime Mover is for Aristotle not just a telikon(telikn, final)cause but also apoietikon(poihtikn, efficient) cause, soul causing the movement toinvolve change in place but unmoved intellect causing its permanence (1354.34ff.;and cf. in Cael. 271.13ff. cited in n. 44 above). There is however an oddity, in that at

1361.31 and 1362.13 Simplicius cites Alexander, in commenting on Aristotle, GCI3, 318a1-5, as saying that the Prime Mover is a poietikoncause of the movement ofthe heavens. Moreover in the second of these passages he apparently attributesconflicting views to Alexander: Since both Alexander and some other Peripateticsthink that Aristotle thought (there is) a telikonand kinetikon(kinhtikn, motive)cause of the heaven, but not apoietikonone, as the passage from Alexander cited alittle while ago showed, when he said that the primary mover is the poietikon(cause) of the motion of the heavenly body, (since the body itself) is ungener-ated. The inconsistency could indeed be removed if Simplicius were takingAlexander to accept that there is a poietikoncause of the movementof the heavensbut not of their very existence; but, apart from this not being very clearly indicated

by Simplicius, it is hard to reconcile within Ph. 1354.34ff., cited at the beginning ofthis note, where Simplicius regards even the claim that the Unmoved Mover is apoietikoncause of the movement as involving a disagreement with Alexander. Cf.Sorabji, R., Infinite power impressed: the transformation of Aristotles physics andtheology, in id. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and theirinfluence, London 1990, 181-198, at 191.


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form of the sphere, but a separate incorporeal entity which causesmovement as an object of desire.

Simplicius, in Cael.116.31-117.2 reports Alexander as interpretingAristotle at Cael.I 3, 270b8-9, all people assign the highest place tothe divine ... on the grounds that immortal is joined with immortal,as speaking of the relation between the divine heavenly body and itslocation in the heavens. Simplicius himself objects that the relation israther between the heavenly body and the incorporeal UnmovedMover. Alexanders (reasonable) interpretation of the Aristoteliantext need not however imply a rejectionof the Unmoved Mover on hispart; it is simply not mentioned.95Alexander in his comments on theanalogies in Metaph.L 10 emphasised the distinction between the

first cause and the things that strive to be like it.96Returning to Simplicius, in Ph.1261.30-37, we may note that noth-

ing is said in his report of Alexander there about separate UnmovedMovers for the inferiorspheres. Jaeger indeed interprets Ph.VIII 6,259b29 as indicating that there is only one transcendent UnmovedMover, that of the first sphere; Aristotle is not yet unequivocally orconsistently committed to the plurality of transcendent UnmovedMovers that we find in Metaph.L8.97 It may then be that, even if

Alexander did himself recognise a plurality of Unmoved Movers, hedid not raise the matter in the Physicscommentary precisely becauseit would involve him in awkward explanations of why Aristotle himselffailed to mention such a plurality here. Aristotles colleague Eude-mus, in his own Physics,introduced a reference to plural Unmoved

95 Unless indeed one were to follow Zeller 1909, 828, who introduced a distinc-

tion between god and the heavenly sphere in Alexanders view too here by reading totouin 116.31.96 fr. 30 in Freudenthal 1884 = p. 154 Genequand 1984. When the pseudo-

Alexander commentary on MetaphysicsLambda argues that the efficient causes ofthe spheres are not their souls as these are not gods (706.31), it must be theUnmoved Movers that are referred to as efficient causes (cf. above, n. 44). At701.4ff., where each sphere is said to be moved by its own soul, not in the way thatanimals are moved by their souls exerting force on their bodies but rather in theway described in book two of De caelo (Hayduck ad loc. identifies the passagereferred to as II 12, 292a18ff., where Aristotle argues that the heavenly bodies arenot inanimate but share in action and life) pseudo-Alexander is simply endeavour-

ing to accommodate the argument at Cael. II 1, 284a27ff. that the soul of theheaven cannot move it by force.97 Jaeger 1923/1948, 361 and n. 1. Indeed Aristotles text does not even clearly

distinguish afirsttranscendent mover from the soul of the outermost sphere; andthis explains Alexanders being non-committal on this point also whencommenting on the passage (above, n. 91).


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Movers at this point for the sake of consistency with L8;98but Peri-patetics were less constrained by the canonical status of Aristotlestext in the fourth century B.C. than in the second or third centuryA.D.99

Donini has argued that Alexanders de Anima shows a definitecommitment to a plurality of transcendent intelligible forms.100Ifthere is a plurality of Unmoved Movers, they might each be thinkingof the others and thus, given the identity of thought and its objectwhere immaterial beings are concerned, form a unity-in-pluralityanticipating Neoplatonic Intellect, but with the difference that thecontent of this unity-in-plurality will in itself have no relation to thesublunary world.101

In a text surviving only in Arabic, On the Principles of the Universe(henceforth:De principiis), Alexander argues that there cannot be aplurality of movers because they have no matter to differentiatethem.102He then suggests (131.11-13 = 88 in Genequand 2001) thatthey might rather be differentiated as prior and posterior, but objectsthat this too would involve the presence of contrariety and hencecomplexity (131.13-16).103 But he goes on to argue that not allrelations of superiority and inferiority involve contrariety.104 The

98 Eudemus, fr. 121 Wehrli.99 There is another passage that might suggest that Alexander recognised only

one Unmoved Mover: Quaest.I 25 40.25-30 seems to connect the Unmoved Moverswith the daily rotation of the inferior spheres rather than with their own propermotions, leaving the latter with no explanation beyond the sphere-souls themselves.But the passage has been successfully reinterpreted, in my view, by Istvn Bodnr,so as to remove this as a necessary implication. Cf. Sharples 1982, 210; Bodnr1997a; Fazzo and Zonta 1999, 190-191.

100 See most recently Donini, P.L., Alessandro di Afrodisia e i metodi dellese-

gesi filosofica, in Esegesi, parafrasi e compilazione in et tardoantica: Atti del TerzoCongresso dellAssociazione di studi tardoantichi, a cura di C. Moreschini, Naples 1995,107-129, at 114-15; Accattino and Donini 1996, 283-4 citing Alex. in Metaph.179.1,376.2.

101 Cf. Donini 1974, 29-35; Lloyd 1981, 19-20, 59. Above, n. 40. ps.-Alex. inMetaph.707.2, 707.17ff., 709.28, 721.32 speaks of the dependence (jartsyai) ofthe Unmoved Movers of the inferior spheres on that of the first sphere. Somerelation between the plurality of Unmoved Movers is indeed needed if the world isto be a unity (above, n. 36).

102 Alex. de Princ.130.44-131.11 Badaw 1968; 86-87 Genequand 2001. Above, atnn. 36-37.

103 This passage ends (131.16-18 Badaw = 89 Genequand) by citing Ph. VIII 6259a16ff. for Aristotles having held that there is only one Unmoved Mover; butGenequand argues that this passage in De princ. is an interpolation (Genequand2001, 11, 159).

104 132.14-18 Badaw = 93 in Genequand 2001. The example he uses, that it isnot through an admixture of cold that flame is less hot than heated iron, also


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intellects that make up Plotinian intellect as a whole are distinct inthat they each have the whole of Intellect for their object but eachfrom its own perspective; it is less clear whether, in the absence of atheory of emanation and of the derivation of plurality from unity,such a move is available to Alexander.

3.1. Aristotle and Divine Providence: The standard view and somevariations

The standard view attributed to Aristotle in antiquity by friend and byfoe, pagan and Christian alike, is that the heavenly region is theobject of divine providence but the sublunary world is not; the view

above labelled NSP.105 This is the view that the Platonist Atticusattributes to Aristotle and fiercely attacks.106 It also appears in thereport of Peripatetic doctrines by Epiphanius (4th century A.D.):

Aristotle, son of Nicomachus, was a Macedonian from Stagira accord-ing to some, but a Thracian in race according to others. He said thatthere are two principles, god and matter,107and that the things abovethe moon are objects of divine providence, but the things below themoon exist without providence and are borne along in some irratio-nal way as chance has it. He says that there are two world-orders, thatabove and that below, and that that which is above is imperishable,but that which is below is subject to passing-away. And he says that thesoul is the continuous activity of the body.

Theophrastus of Eresus held the same opinions as Aristotle.Strato of Lampsacus said that the hot substance was the cause of all

things. He said that the parts of the world are infinite and that everyliving creature is capable of possessing intellect.

Praxiphanes of Rhodes held the same opinions as Theophrastus.Critolaus of Phaselus held the same opinions as Aristotle.108

appears in Quaest. II 17 attributed to Alexander (62.1-2 Bruns) though since thedifference is there explained by the physical properties of the iron, and moregenerally the difference between heavenly and terrestrial fire is explained by thelatter at least having matter, it is difficult to see how the argument can be used in dePrinc. to explain the difference in rank between two Unmoved Movers neither ofwhich has matter. Cf. Genequand 2001, 160.

105 Festugire, A.-J., LIdal religieux des grecs et lvangile, Paris 1932, 224-262;Moraux, P., Lexpos de la philosophie dAristote chez Diogne Larce, RPhL47(1949), 5-43, at 33-4; id. 1970, 54-55; id. 1973, 286 n. 46; id. 1986, 282; Happ 1968,

81; Mansfeld 1992a, 136.106 Atticus, fr. 3 des Places (above, n. 4).107 This suggests Stoic influence, even if the doctrine of two principles

originated in the early Academy; see David Sedleys paper in the present volume.108 Aristotlhw Nikomxou, kat mn tinaw Makedn p Stagervn, w d

nioi Yrj n t gnow. lege d do rxw enai, yen ka lhn. ka t mn pernv


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The structure of this report is strange: if Theophrastus thought thesame as Aristotle, why couple Praxiphanes with the latter and Crito-laus with the former? But this would have come about naturally ifCritolaus was the source for the earlier views, and reported Theo-phrastus as agreeing with Aristotle and Praxiphanes with Theophras-tus; Epiphanius, or his source, will then have added the statementthat Critolaus agreed with Aristotle and thus produced the apparentinconsequentiality in the report.109

The considerations that led to the attribution of NSP to Aristotlemust remain a matter of speculation. But we can at least distinguishtwo aspects of the question; why a doctrine of providence wasattributed to Aristotle at all, and why it was a doctrine that confined

providence to the heavens. As to the former, we have seen that thereare passages in the esoteric works, and th

Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background & Aftermath - Dorothea Frede & Andre Laks (Brill)

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