Structures of Militarized Conﬂict in a Post-Sovereign...

Structures of Militarized Conflict in aPost-Sovereign World

Philip A. SchrodtDepartment of Political Science, Pennsylvania State [email protected]

Presentation at the Graduate Institute of International And DevelopmentStudies, Geneva28 September 2012

By way of introduction…

No t-tests

Approach is historical-theoretical• “The longer you look back, the farther you can look forward.”

Winston Churchill

Grad students:• tenured presenter• do not try this at home

42.9**(21.8)

The Westphalian-Clausewitzian-realist paradigm

Westphalian• the dominant actors in the international system are sovereign, territorial

nation-states exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of force withintheir borders;

υ As will be noted shortly, this in fact has very little to do with the 1648Treaty of Westphalia;

Clausewitzian• states legitimately use violence against each other through professional

militaries supported by, and in the service of, the state; Realist

• international politics is predominantly driven by the pursuit of somevaguely defined “national interest” in a quasi-anarchic system employingbalance of power politics.

Standard introductory IR “origin of nation-state”

Greek city-states (Thucydides) look like nation states Chinese “Warring States” period (all 60 years!) looks like

nation states. We’re cross-cultural! Italian city-states (Machiavelli) look like nation states The medieval system was, well, just too “medieval,” but

religious warfare (ca. 1520-1648) wasn’t too cool either Hugo Grotius figured out a better system The Treaty of Westphalia implemented it This was so wonderful that it spread throughout the world! End of history: it’s all nation states

• and yes, this will be on the test…stop checking Facebook on youriPhone…

Problems with this approach

Blindingly obvious• Rome, ca. 400BCE - 450CE• Medieval Europe, ca. 450CE - 1600CE• China, 200 BCE - present, minus a couple more inter-dynastic

periods Requires some homework

• Byzantium, 300CE-1456CE• Treaty of Augsburg, 1555• Treaty of Westphalia had almost nothing to do with the political

transition• All that unpleasantness we called “imperialism” might have

something to do with the spread of the system. U.S. post-imperialism might explain most of the rest

Inflated impressions of Treaty of Westphaliaaren’t not confined to IR theory…

Allegory of the Peace ofWestphaliaJacob Jordaens, 1654National Gallery of Norway, Oslo

A more sophisticated approach…

Relevant theorists: Joseph Strayer, William McNeil,Charles Tilly, Mancur Olson

Issues• Medieval: elite violence and absence of secular control• Late medieval: peasant revolts• Religious war is an irritant, particularly with Philip II, but

controllable

Technological change• Gunpowder• Plague• Global trade

MOST “Westphalian” transition

Trade and manufacturing by economic elites provide asource of revenue

Which supports centralized bureaucratic states Which support increasingly apolitical professional

militaries Which provide domestic security and imperial conquest to

support trade and manufacturing [However, this is a fairly idiosyncratic set of

circumstances, not some teleological imperative]

Nation-Statiness, 1648-1880

European colonial ventures European internal empires

• Hapsburg, Russian Militarized colonial corporations

• Hudson Bay, Dutch East India, British East India Non-European empires

• Ottoman, Qing Lack of consolidation of Germany and Italy Pirates


European colonial ventures: new, improved with direct rule!• Treaty of Berlin 1885

New colonial powers: Germany, Japan, USA Imperial crises

• Fashoda, 1st Morocco, Agadir• Assorted Balkans wars at Hapsburg-Ottoman interface• “Great Game”:Anglo-Russo competition in Central Asia• Spanish-American, Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars

Anti-colonial resistance movements: Boer, Boxer, Cuban Transnational terrorism: anarchism


Empires involved in WWI• British• French• Austria-Hungarian• Russian• Ottoman

Non-imperial powers (sort of)• Germany (subsequently blamed for everything)• US (couldn’t take the heat, got out of the kitchen)


Still have those pesky British and French empires• Also Dutch, Belgian, Portuguese, US, Japanese

Third Reich• Whatever it was, it wasn’t a nation-state• Lasts only 12 years, despite coverage on the History Channel

proportional to that of a Thousand-Year Reich

US-Japanese imperial competition in Asia

Birth of the Nation-State System: 1648 1956

Key elements of British empire rapidly disintegrating: 1948 French defeat at Dienbienphu: 1954 US and Soviet Union terminate British and French

reassertion of colonial control in Suez Crisis: 1956 Decolonization follows the Westphalian-Clausewitzian

model Cold War follows the realist model

Challenges to Westphalian-ClausewitzianSystem by 1987

Iran-Iraq, the last Clausewitzian war, is winding down

Soviets nearly defeated by Afghan mujihadeen

• Soviet Union would subsequently disintegrate more or less

peacefully

First Palestinian intifada begins in December Hezbollah has emerged as the major anti-Israel force in

Lebanon Development of various post-colonial wars in Africa

Decline of interstate conflict 1948-2003

Source: Human Security Report 2005.

Why the shift to non-state conflict?

Global market for light weapons financed by global tradein resources such as timber, diamonds, and narcotics, aswell as expatriate monetary transfers (Kaldor)

Decline in major power war due to• Democratic peace (Rummel)• Liberal peace (Friedman)• “Hollandization” (VanCrevald, Luttwak)—substitution of trade

and finance for military activities “Hourglass effect”—increase in power of international and

local institutions at the expense of centralized government

Another issue: three contemporary paradoxesconfronting international relations realism

Empirical failure of balance of power theory (Bennett andStam 2004)

Obsolescence of war hypothesis (Mueller, Kaysen, Luard,Luttwak)

Prevalence of failed states: in realist theory, a failed state isan opportunity, not a problem

Nation-State Era = Elvis + 10

Elvis1954 That’s All Right

with Sun Records

1956 Hound Dog on EdSullivan show

1970: Deputized as anti-drug agent

1977: Dies(event contested)

Nation-State1954: Dienbienphu

1956: Suez Crisis

1970: Collapse of BiafranRebellion

1977: Deng Xiaopingrehabilitated,beginning China’seconomic rise

1987: End of major powerwar; MNSA’sdominate conflict

Nation-State Era = Elvis + 10

Elvis1954 That’s All Right

with Sun Records

1956 Hound Dog on EdSullivan show

1970: Deputized as anti-drug agent

1977: Dies(event contested)

Nation-State1954: Dienbienphu

1956: Suez Crisis

1970: Collapse of BiafranRebellion

1977: Bill Gates winslawsuit againstAltair, beginningworld domination

1987: End of major powerwar; MNSA’sdominate conflict

The international conflict system (in theory)

Sovereign IGOs

The international conflict system (in practice)

Transnational

States IGOs

Warlord

Primitive

Empires

“Ideally, you should find example for your IRlecture in the morning paper”

Collapse of NATO transition strategy in Afghanistan dueto successful Taliban infiltration of police trainingoperations

Libya militia attacks on U.S. consulate, followed bycounter-attacks by pro-U.S. crowds on Libyan militias

Sunday New York Times: list of about a dozen states in theprocess of fragmenting

• No comparable list of states uniting: Korea is about the onlycandidate

Harvard public health study of the dangers of urban gangs

Example: 18 December 2007

BAGHDAD — Iraqi leaders criticized Turkey on Monday for bombingKurdish militants in northern Iraq with airstrikes that they said had leftat least one woman dead.

The Turkish attacks in Dohuk Province on Sunday — involving dozens ofwarplanes and artillery — were the largest known cross-border attacksince 2003. They occurred with at least tacit approval from Americanofficials. The Iraqi government, however, said it had not beenconsulted or informed about the attacks.

Massoud Barzani, leader of the autonomous Kurdish region in the north,condemned the assaults as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty that hadundermined months of diplomacy. “These attacks hinder the politicalefforts exerted to find a peaceful solution based on mutual respect.”

New York Times, 18 December 2007http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/world/middleeast/18iraq.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin

(Accessed 18 December 2007)

A “spectrum” of political violence

MultilateralIndustrialClassicalFeudalEthnic

Less complexity Greater complexity

COWWestphalian-Clausewitzian-realist

Worldview

Contemporary political violence

MultilateralIndustrialClassicalWarlordEthnic


Yugoslavia 1994-1999Somalia 1991-1995

Afghanistan 2001-presentLiberia 1991-2004




Kashmir 1948-presentPalestine 1936-present

Southern Lebanon 1985-2001Chechnya 1793-2004




Lebanon 1976-1985India 1945-present

Rwanda 1994Yugoslavia 1991-1995




Zaire/D.R. Congo 1997-2002

Contemporary Political violence



AfghanistanSomalia

Congo

YemenLibya ? Syria?

Political violence: Pirates of the Caribbean



More piratesPirates

British East India CompanyArrrgh, matey…

Why create typologies?

“Because we can…”• Apple Computer’s standard excuse for any dramatic but useless

graphical interface feature.

Aristotle did it

This is not a new approach…

“The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combinedwith the observation that the government may consist of one person, afew, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional forms(Aristotle, Politics I.7):

Correct Deviant One Ruler Kingship Tyranny Few Rulers Aristocracy Oligarchy Many Rulers Polity Democracy

“This six-fold classification (which is adapted from Plato's Statesman)sets the stage for Aristotle's inquiry into the best constitution, althoughit is modified in various ways throughout the Politics.”

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ (accessed 12 May 2005)

Why create typologies?

“Because we can…”• Apple Computer’s standard excuse for any dramatic but useless

graphical interface feature.

Aristotle did it Typologies serve as a means of simplifying a complex

world “Like behaves as like”—ideally, cases classified similarly

will behave similarly, giving some element of prediction

Traditional Typologies of Violence:Historical/Developmental

Heroic/primitive• War as practiced in pre-urban societies. Classical mythology

provides numerous archetypes, as do most modern comicbooks/”graphic novels”, video games, and H/Bollywood films.

Classical• This model is found from the beginning of urbanized, stratified

societies until the transition to gunpowder-based militaries, aperiod of about 3,500 years. Some elements appear to havedeveloped independently in multiple, disconnected cultures—e.g.China, Meso-America, and the Middle East—whereas otheraspects have resulted from cultural diffusion This category usuallyinvolves imperial, feudal and nomadic variants.

Traditional Typologies of Violence:Historical/Developmental cont.

Modern• WCR model of state-sponsored, gunpowder-based militaries fighting for the

interests of the state. It emerges in Europe with the simultaneous rise of thegunpowder-based military and the consolidation of military power into sovereignstates, and is subsequently enhanced by the industrial revolution.

Contemporary/Post-Modern• This model notes the impact of three contemporary changes. First, the globalized

mass production of military technology has ended the military advantage enjoyedby industrialized states during the 1750-1950 period, and small armed groups cannow successfully challenge weak or over-extended states. Nuclear weapons havemeanwhile introduced a high level of caution into major-power conflict. Finally,economic production has reached a level where war no longer provides a credibleroute to wealth. These factors combine in the “obsolescence of war” thesis ofMueller (1989) and Kaysen (1990).

Traditional Typologies of Violence: Structural

Low-intensity conflict• Conflict involving actors with a low level of political organization such as

terrorists, warlords, and peasant revolts.

Civil War/Revolution• Conflict contesting the control (or establishment) of a state from within.

Interstate War• WCR conflict between two or more states.

Systemic war• Wide-spread conflict involving most of the states within an international

subsystem such as the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars I and II.

Alternative: Organizational-BehavioralTypology

Material explanations

“Follow the money”• Somali warlord: “We decided we couldn’t afford to spend $100,000 on a

six-hour firefight” Coercive efficiency: how many individuals can be supported by the

efforts of one armed individual?• This must be substantially greater than 1 to support a professional military

Too much fighting and not enough farming means everyone starves• Both DNA and linguistic evidence seem to support the hypothesis that

until recently—perhaps the past 300 years—population expansionprimarily followed agricultural innovation rather than conquest.

Weakness of the material approach:Societies in similar material-economic circumstances can behave quitedifferently with respect to violence

Constructivist considerations

Ideas matter: individuals will engage in violence for non-materialgains such as status, honor, religion, or revenge

• To say nothing of gaining status by revenging the honor of religion… Due to the risks inherent in violence, non-material motivations may be

at least as important as material for the individuals engaged in theactivity

• Never share a foxhole with a rational utility maximizer. Share a foxholewith a romantic hero.

Weakness of the constructivist approach:"Hokey religions and ancient weapons are no match for a good blasterat your side, kid."Han Solo, Star Wars, Episode IV.

Primitive Mode: Characteristics

Key work: Lawrence Keeley, War Before Civilization Violence is generally ritualized and seasonal Lethality is usually relatively low in individual incidents

• However, in some instances it may be quite high. Furthermore, protracted violence insmall population groups can, over time, lead to situations of complete extermination

Rewards involve both status and economic resources; territory can be acquired• This contrasts with earlier approaches; territorial acquisition also occurs with

chimpanzees Violence is done by amateurs, usually young males

• (who are biologically expendable)• Cross-cultural mortality curves from homicide are almost identical in shape but differ

in scale: Japanese kill each other at 1/10th the rate of Americans, but do so with thesame age profile

There is a high degree of variation between societies—organized violence seemsto be cultural, and obviously also requires very specialized technology. As bestwe can tell, at least a few civilizations had low levels of military organization forextended periods of time.

Primitive Mode: Examples

Pre-urban tribal warfare Contemporary street gangs

• (to the extent that they are transient rather than professional)

Ethnic violence• Automatic weapons and other methods of efficient mass killing

may have changed this in recent decades

Warlord Mode: Characteristics

De facto long-term control of a defined territory, plus the possibility ofacquiring further territory

Full-time professionals in the use of violence Hierarchical social structure, usually with a personalist leadership Questionable political legitimacy—systems usually co-exist (and can

economically exploit) more organized systems Warlord systems are stable!—in fact they are probably the

fundamental unit of political violence• Most warlords don’t want to become governments, though they

may be willing to be designated as one if you ask politely and thisdoesn’t involve very much additional work…

Warlord Mode: Examples

Nomadic raiders• Economic base: the raided

Western Europe, 400 - 1500 CE• Economic base: manorial agriculture

Military warlords• Economic base: anybody in the vicinity weaker than they are

Economic warlords• Economic base: narcotics, smuggling (this requires co-existence with a

state structure to make these activities illegal and therefore lucrative, butmay be serving a willing market)

Organized crime• Economic base: Typically gambling, prostitution, kidnapping and

protection rackets. Occurs within a sovereign state.

Sovereign mode: Characteristics

Territorial with an established legal-bureaucratic state structure whichhas some legitimated means of extracting revenue

• Legitimacy greatly increases coercive efficiency Professional military focusing on

• Internal control—monopoly on the use of violence which promoteseconomic stability (Tilly, McNeill, Olson, Strayer)

• External security Hollandization (Mueller): state does not engage in military expansion

but instead concentrates on becoming fabulously wealthy• Military activity is limited by the Westphalian compromise with

the economic elite: they support the military in the expectation thatthis will provide economic benefits

Sovereign mode: Examples

Classical city-states

• When they weren’t realist.

18th century: Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland

Post-WWII: “Old Europe”, Japan

21st century: Russia

21st century: China??—let’s hope…

Balance of power: Characteristics

Military control (or political legitimacy) is sufficientlystrong to be able to extract significant economic resources

Political elites behave according to realist/balance-of-power principles

In many—historically most—cases, these states areactually hegemonic, though they typically view themselvesas struggling to survive (cf. George Bush and the U.S.neoconservatives).

Unlike what realist theory suggests, “balanced” systemsappear to be very rare and rather transient

Balance of power: Examples

Classical empires—Assyria, Egypt, China, Persia, Rome, Byzantium,Ottoman, etc.

• Imperial conquest provided an autonomous resource base for themilitary

• Isolation allowed some of these to operate in a Westphalian modeat times

Napoleon/France and Bismarck/Prussia Late industrial states—Britain, France, Japan, USA, Germany

• Proximate cause: mass production, population growth and themechanization of agriculture dramatically reduced the real cost ofmilitary power

21st century USA?—position as sole superpower

Transnational: Characteristics

Military operations that are not primarily for the benefit ofa territorial political entity

• These would be distinct from conventional military alliances,which are simply realist policy tools

UN Peacekeeping Troop Levels 1948-2006

Transnational: Examples

International peacekeeping operations Transnational terrorist and criminal groups Multinational corporations to the extent that these exercise

autonomous military power• Most do not but, for example, the Dutch East Indies Company, the United

Fruit Company, and most everything Cecil Rhodes was involved in did.• Contemporary oil and mining companies• Private military corporations? Or are these primary just cost-efficient

means of providing sovereign states with military power as needed? Transnational religious military organizations

• Crusades (well, at least that was the theory…), Knights Templars• Islamic Caliphate (again, in theory)

Clash of Civilizations• if this actually exists, it fits here. But it probably doesn’t exist.

[my] Counter-arguments

The nation-state model has actually transferred quite well in a numberof non-European areas, along with the “Westphalian”economic/military compromise

• Many of the states which are fragmenting are just breaking into smallersovereign units, but these do not invalidate the “Westphalian” model.

• The viability of small states may just be an effect of post-industrialtechnology

Is the problem sovereignty, or realist theory with its emphasis on war?• Though if it is realism, IR theory is still in big trouble…

Warlords and other militarized non-state actors seem to be primarilyan issue in a few marginal areas and don’t affect most of the world’spopulation

• Though they seem to drive a lot of U.S. policy

Questions?

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