Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation: Istanbul ......tools and capacities, (3)...

Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy andMediation: Istanbul Retreat of the UNSecurity Council

APRIL 2012

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E I N S T I T U T E

Cover Photo: UN Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon, President Abdullah Gül

of Turkey, and Under-Secretary-

General for Political Affairs Lynn

Pascoe at the Security Council’s

annual high-level summit, September

23, 2010. ©Anadolu Agency.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in

this paper represent those of the

rapporteurs and not necessarily thoseof IPI or retreat participants. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit

of a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Editor and Senior FellowMarie O’Reilly, Publications Officer

Suggested Citation:

“Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy

and Mediation: Istanbul Retreat of the

UN Security Council,” Arthur Boutellis

and Christoph Mikulaschek, rappor-teurs. New York: International PeaceInstitute, April 2012.

© by International Peace Institute,

2012

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE RAPPORTEURS

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS is a Research Fellow at IPI.

CHRISTOPH MIKULASCHEK was a Senior Policy Analyst at

IPI at the time of the retreat. He is currently a Ph.D. student

at Princeton University’s Department of Politics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI owes a debt of thanks to its many generous donors who

contribute to the Coping with Crisis program. In particular,

IPI would like to thank the government of Turkey and the

Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations for

making this project possible.

CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Taking Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

United Nations Tools and Capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Non-United Nations Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Lessons on Mediation:Coherence and Synergies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Building Preventive Capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Wrap-Up and Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1

Introduction

In early July 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofthe Republic of Turkey hosted an informal retreatfor members of the United Nations SecurityCouncil in Istanbul. The retreat gathered ambassa-dorial-level representatives of the Security Counciltogether with several member states that were notmembers of the council at the time, senior officialsof the United Nations Secretariat, and independentexperts to discuss ways to strengthen preventivediplomacy and mediation. In an informal settingand under the Chatham House rule of nonattribu-tion, the discussion sought to build on and enrichthe ongoing debate on how best to realize the fullpotential of preventive diplomacy and mediation ascost-effective options for dealing with crises. Theexchange of views benefited from insights gained atthe first Istanbul Retreat for members of theSecurity Council in June 2010.1 It drew, as well, onlessons learned from recent and ongoing crises andconflicts that have taxed the council’s capacities formaintaining international peace and security.

The retreat was organized with the assistance ofthe International Peace Institute (IPI). ArthurBoutellis and Christoph Mikulaschek of IPI servedas rapporteurs. Dr. Edward C. Luck, initially as IPI’sSenior Vice President for Research and Programsand then as an independent adviser to thePermanent Mission of the Republic of Turkey to theUnited Nations, oversaw the substantive prepara-tions for the retreat, as well as the drafting of thisreport, as he had for the 2010 retreat.

The 2011 retreat opened with an in-depthexchange of views with Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu,Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic ofTurkey, right before he flew out to visit Egypt andLibya, amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring. Theminister presented Turkey’s foreign policy vision ofdiplomacy and mediation as ultimate instrumentsfor peace. He described the United Nations SecurityCouncil as the backbone of mediation and preven-tive-diplomacy initiatives to which the interna-tional community should refer to, adding thatregional organizations like the African Union andthe Arab League also have an important role to play.

He cautioned, however, that the Security Councilshould avoid creating tensions between values ofnon-intervention and of protection of civilians, andthat the timing and substance of council resolutionsare important. The minister shared his thoughts onmediation efforts that Turkey and he himself hadpersonally been involved with in the Balkans, theCaucasus, and the Middle East, and he answeredquestions from council members on the ArabSpring, including Tunisia and Egypt, as well as theongoing developments in Libya and Syria. Theminister also outlined the fundamental parametersof a mediation process as being (1) confidencebuilding among parties, (2) sustaining a value-based process, (3) laying out a clear vision for thefuture, and (4) providing the necessary diplomaticinstruments. He concluded his remarks by sayingthat Turkey would welcome the presence of moreUN offices.

Six roundtable discussion sessions followed,focusing on (1) taking stock of the United NationsSecurity Council’s experience, (2) United Nationstools and capacities, (3) non-United Nations actors,(4) lessons on mediation: coherence and synergies,(5) building preventive capacities, and (6) wrap-upand next steps. This report provides a synthesis ofeach of these discussion sessions.

According to the 1992 report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: PreventiveDiplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,

The most desirable and efficient employment ofdiplomacy is to ease tensions before they resultin conflict—or, if conflict breaks out, to actswiftly to contain it and resolve its underlyingcauses. Preventive diplomacy may be performedby the Secretary-General personally or throughsenior staff or specialized agencies andprogrammes, by the Security Council or theGeneral Assembly, and by regional organizationsin cooperation with the United Nations.Preventive diplomacy requires measures tocreate confidence; it needs early warning basedon information gathering and informal orformal fact-finding; it may also involve preven-tive deployment and, in some situations, demili-tarized zones.2

1 For the first Istanbul Retreat, see “Maintaining International Peace and Security: A Summit Meeting of the UN Security Council,” New York: International PeaceInstitute, June 2011.

2 United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111, June 17, 1992, para. 23.

2 STRENGTHENING PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND MEDIATION

Article 33 of the United Nations Charter listsmediation as one of the peaceful means by whichparties to a dispute, the continuance of which islikely to endanger the maintenance of peace andsecurity, shall seek to resolve their differences.3Under Articles 36 and 37, the Security Council may,at any stage of such a dispute, recommendappropriate procedures or methods of adjustment,including mediation. It may call on the Secretary-General to employ his good offices for such apurpose. According to Article 52, member statesshould “make every effort to achieve pacific settle-ment of local disputes” through regional arrange-ments or agencies “before referring them to theSecurity Council,” while the council “shallencourage” such regional efforts and may refer suchmatters to them. Regional arrangements andagencies, on the other hand, are to keep the council“fully informed” at all times of their efforts in thisregard, according to Article 54.

Taking Stock

Though the Security Council has undoubtedly beenpaying more attention to matters of preventivediplomacy and mediation in recent years, views aremixed about how effective and energetic it has beenin utilizing these and other tools of pacific settle-ment under Chapter VI of the Charter. On the onehand, there was a surge of interest in prevention inthe early 1990s with the end of the Cold War. Thecouncil’s role in encouraging or undertakingpreventive measures has certainly grown sincethen, as preventive diplomacy has become a moreprominent feature of its identity and sense ofpurpose. It can play a critical role in bringingattention to situations of concern before they reacha point of no return. On the other hand, thecouncil’s record at prevention has been mixed.According to some observers, the council has notalways given preventive measures time to succeedand has been too ready to resort to more coercivemeasures under Chapter VII. A better balanceshould be sought, according to that viewpoint, inthe employment of the different types of toolsavailable to the council. A fuller and keenerunderstanding is needed of how the tools ofChapters VI, VII, and VIII interact with and affect

each other. Does the Security Council need more effective

tools for preventive diplomacy and mediation, ordoes it need to wield the tools currently at itsdisposal more frequently and effectively? Perhapsmore effort is needed on both counts. Among thecouncil’s options under Chapter VI, some feel thatit could make better use of inquiries and missions,fact finding, démarches, the good offices of theSecretary-General, and consultations with regionaland subregional bodies. An overreliance onsanctions, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding couldleave the council in a largely reactive posture,unable to tap into the full potential of preventionand the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Accordingto this perspective, preventive diplomacy holds thebest promise of averting potentially devastatingconflicts. At a time of fiscal austerity and growingpeacekeeping costs, moreover, early preventiveaction may be seen as cost-effective as well.

A number of useful lessons can be drawn fromthe recent experience of the Security Council inundertaking or authorizing preventive diplomacyand mediation under Chapters VI and VIII of theCharter. Members of the Security Council shouldtry to avoid taking sides in interstate disputesbefore the council. Efforts should be made toaddress situations before they reach the council’sformal agenda. In its resolutions, the council shouldtry to avoid overly vague or ambiguous languagethat could be misinterpreted by parties ormediators. In some situations, a more strategic andlonger-term approach would be helpful. On thepositive side of the ledger, the council has shownthat fact finding can be a helpful element of amediation process; that its own missions, such as toSomalia, can bring fresh perspectives to bear onintransigent conflicts; and that innovative formats,such as the council’s informal interactive dialogueon Sri Lanka, can help to open channels ofcommunication and to encourage fresh thinking ondifficult issues. The council is a dynamic body,whose growing transparency and interactivitycontrast favorably to the more closed and insularnature of its deliberative processes at the time of theRwandan genocide in 1994.

The successful mediation effort to stem the

3 Charter of the United Nations (1945). The other means mentioned in Article 33 are negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort toregional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of the parties’ choice.

violence following the December 2007 elections inKenya was led by Kofi Annan on behalf of theAfrican Union, backed by expertise and staffsupport from the Centre for HumanitarianDialogue and the United Nations Department ofPolitical Affairs (DPA). Among the factorscontributing to its success was the sustained effortby a single lead mediator over forty-one days, thecommon purpose of neighboring countries andexternal powers to avoid another bloodbath like theRwandan genocide, the engagement of Kenyan civilsociety behind the effort, and the consistentsupport from members of the Security Councilwith some leverage over the parties to the dispute.African leadership of the process may well haveadded to its acceptability and legitimacy, whileconsistent messaging from the United Nations andthe larger international community preventedforum shopping and strengthened the mediator’shand in dealing with the parties.

Several of these factors were also at work in thesuccessful effort to secure a peaceful referendum onthe future of South Sudan in 2011. Here again, theUnited Nations and the African Union (AU) largelyworked in unison to move the process forward,with the AU’s Thabo Mbeki and the UN’s HaileMenkerios playing leading roles. The Inter -governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)countries generally supported the process, whilethe so-called troika countries—Norway, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States—helped to ensurebroad external support for a peaceful outcome.However, it could be asked whether the interna-tional community’s preoccupation with achieving asuccessful referendum—as critical as that goalwas—diverted attention from the continuingsecurity challenges in Abyei, South Kordofan, andBlue Nile, and along the new international borderbetween Sudan and South Sudan. Violations of theComprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) havecontinued despite the successful mediation of thereferendum and the subsequent independence ofSouth Sudan. Mediation, in that case, was only partof the larger preventive-diplomacy agenda inSudan.

The post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011 demonstrated both the benefits of andchallenges to collaboration between the Security

Council and regional and subregional arrange-ments in the realm of preventive diplomacy.Writing in Foreign Policy, former South AfricanPresident Thabo Mbeki criticized the UnitedNations for allegedly taking sides and becoming aparty to the conflict rather than remaining animpartial mediator between the Ivoirian parties tothe dispute. He contended that the African Unionshould have been given more time to find apeaceful solution.4 Others have questioned hisassessment and conclusions. Since Security CouncilResolution 1765 (2007) had mandated the UN tocertify the results of the elections, some believe thatthe Security Council had no choice but to act asdecisively as possible in response to the refusal ofthe apparent loser to accept the results of theelection.

The situation in Côte d’Ivoire following thedisputed election demonstrated how difficult it canbe to maintain the full support and confidence ofkey partners as an operation takes on more of anenforcement character. Consultations with troop-contributing countries may be most needed duringsuch transitions, when time is short. At differentpoints in the crisis, the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) and the AfricanUnion seemed to be leaning in different directionsin terms of the best way to resolve the crisis and endthe stalemate. Interests and political considerationsmay affect the attitudes and approaches of regionaland subregional bodies, of course, as well as globalones.

The Libyan crisis of 2011 may well prove to be awatershed event for the Security Council.Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) were thefirst instances of the council invoking the responsi-bility to protect in conjunction with the employ-ment of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.Some see the council’s role as a landmark in effortsto protect populations, as it acted in a timely anddecisive manner to save thousands of lives. Otherswould have favored a more graduated approach; forexample, warning of possible referrals to theInternational Criminal Court before taking thatstep. While attracting both strong praise and bittercriticism, the NATO air campaign to enforce theprovisions of Resolution 1973 (2011) illustrated twolong-standing dilemmas for the council: (1) how to

3

4 Thabo Mbeki, “What the World Got Wrong in Côte D'Ivoire,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2011.

protect populations effectively and proportionatelyfrom the air and (2) how to exercise oversight ofenforcement measures when the United Nationslacks military capacity. More broadly, the crisisunderlined—once again—how important andcomplex relations between the council and regionaland subregional arrangements can be. On the onehand, the Arab League and the Gulf CooperationCouncil pressed consistently for strong councilaction against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi forits attacks on the civilian population. On the otherhand, there appeared to be deep divisions withinthe African Union, whose proposed road map wasaccepted by authorities in Tripoli but not by theNational Transitional Council in Benghazi.

In several respects, the council’s response to thesubsequent crisis in Syria took a different course,despite similarities in the nature of the violencelaunched by the regime against those protesting itsabuses and calling for far-reaching reforms. Someof the same regional groups that pushed for boldaction in Libya called for caution in Syria. Thecouncil, in turn, has been much more measuredand circumspect in its response. It did not issue itsfirst presidential statement on the matter untilAugust 3, 2011, a month after the Istanbul Retreat.5Two months later, on October 4th, a draft resolutioncondemning the Syrian crackdown attracted twovetoes and four abstentions. In the view of somemembers, principle has been trumped by interestsin the council’s deliberations on Syria. Some of themembers opposing the draft resolution, on theother hand, attributed their stance in part toconcerns about the risks inherent in going downthe same enforcement path as in Libya. The splitamong council members, which has been less aboutthe protection principles involved and more abouthow to implement them, was quite visible in thecandid discussions in Istanbul. Clearly moredialogue and reflection on these questions areneeded if these differences of view are to bebridged.

United Nations Tools andCapacities

While it is widely believed that the ideal time toresolve disputes is at an early stage, before they

result in violent conflict, it is rare for the SecurityCouncil to undertake preventive diplomacy at suchan early point. Governments often worry thatcouncil involvement could internationalize asensitive situation, bringing extraneous politicalconsiderations into play and lessening the capacityof local parties to control the pace and direction ofsettlement efforts. National sovereignty could beabridged and domestic opposition groups embold-ened. As a collegial body, it may be difficult for thecouncil to act as a responsive and impartialmediator. Some of its members may have a stake inthe outcome or relationships with parties to thedispute. Council members, moreover, may bereluctant to add an item to the council’s agenda orto hold a formal meeting, as such steps could raiseexpectations of further action and make it moredifficult for the members to discuss the situation ina more interactive and informal manner.

The council has therefore developed innovativeformats in recent years to provide space for lessstructured conversation and for engaging withparties without placing the dispute on its agenda.As noted above, council missions to places ofconcern can permit informal dialogue with a rangeof governmental and civil society actors, as well aswith armed groups in some cases. “Arias formula”gatherings and “informal informals” offer ways forcouncil members to hear and query a range ofpolitical and expert perspectives.

In March and April 2009, the council held twoinformal interactive dialogues with the permanentrepresentative of Sri Lanka on the protection ofcivilians during the final stages of the conflict withthe Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Theseclosed sessions provided an opportunity formembers of the council to express their concerns.

In June 2010, the council was briefed twice by theDepartment of Political Affairs on the violence andforced displacements in Kyrgyzstan, the firstbriefing was followed by a press statement by thepresident of the council. These informal sessionswere held under the agenda item on the work of theUnited Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacyfor Central Asia, since the situation in Kyrgyzstanwas not on the council’s agenda.

At times, the work of the sanctions committees


5 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/16, August 3, 2011.

established by the council can serve purposesbeyond simply implementing the provisions of theresolutions that created them. They can help reducetensions, as was the case with the 1718 Committee,dealing with the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea, following the sinking of a naval vessel of theRepublic of Korea in March 2010.

Over the last few years, the briefings of thecouncil by Secretariat officials have become morefrequent, varied, and candid. The high commis-sioner for human rights, the high commissioner forrefugees, and the emergency relief coordinator areappearing more often, along with the heads of theDepartments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping, andField Support, and various special advisers,representatives, and envoys of the Secretary-General. Sources of early warning have multiplied,both from United Nations and civil society sources.A key innovation over the past twelve months hasbeen the monthly tour d’horizon briefings by theUnder-Secretary-General for political affairs,which range beyond the council’s agenda items andcover threats to international peace and securityfrom intrastate as well as interstate conflict. Thecouncil has also supported mediation efforts by theSecretary-General on situations, such as Yemen,that are not on its agenda.

Occasionally, the Security Council itself can serveas a mediator or facilitator. In February 2011, forinstance, the council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for political affairs and theforeign minister of Indonesia in his role as chair ofthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) on the tense situation on the borderbetween Cambodia and Thailand. It also heardfrom the ministers of foreign affairs of the twocountries. The resulting press statement by thepresident of the council helped to facilitate apeaceful settlement by defusing tensions andreinforcing the ongoing mediation effort byASEAN. More typically, however, the council actsto authorize or support the mediation efforts of theSecretary-General and his representatives or toendorse processes that are not led by the UnitedNations. The latter function, as discussed above,reflects the pattern of global-regional arrangementsfor peaceful settlement envisioned in Chapter VIIIof the Charter.

One of the Security Council’s distinct strengths isits capacity for employing or authorizing the whole

range of tools available under Chapters VI, VII, andVIII of the Charter. This flexibility is a considerableasset, but it also imposes responsibilities on thecouncil to understand the relationships amongthese tools, to develop a strategic approach to theiruse, and to take into account how its involvement islikely to be perceived by the parties to a dispute,given the range of pacific and coercive measures atits disposal. Any engagement of the council inmediation or preventive diplomacy will carryadded political implications because of its uniquelegal authority and political legitimacy. In differentsituations, this could be an asset or a liability. Thecouncil has chosen to play a low-key role at times,but more often it has found high-visibility engage-ment to be its most effective way to assist conflict-prevention efforts. The latter have involved issuingpress statements and presidential statements,passing resolutions, authorizing formal inquiries orfact-finding missions, and calling on the Secretary-General or regional organizations to use their goodoffices. The council can also take further steps toinfluence the cost-benefit calculations of parties toa conflict, such as threatening to refer cases to theInternational Criminal Court or to impose targetedsanctions. Over the years, there have beennumerous cases in which the council’s initialinvolvement was under Chapter VI, but later itfound it necessary to take Chapter VII measures aswell. Parties often are quite aware of this historyand potential.

By offering credible and tailored incentives anddisincentives to the parties, the Security Councilcan endow mediators with greater leverage and givea keener sense of urgency to stalled negotiations.Targeted sanctions, such as curbs on the trading ofcertain commodities, asset freezes, travel bans, andarms embargoes, may help to keep a peace processon track when their threat or use are carefullycoordinated with the mediator. Investigativemandates may help to build public trust, facilitatereconciliation and healing, and ease tensions whenquestions of fact are in dispute, as is often the case.For instance, the Secretary-General’s decision toestablish an International Commission of Inquiryto investigate the killings in Conakry on September28, 2009, has been credited as the turning point inthe mediation effort in Guinea. The establishmentof a political or peacekeeping mission by the UnitedNations or by a regional organization may provide

5

the mediator with additional leverage in terms ofmaterial incentives and political support. Thesecould take the form of peace dividends andeconomic assistance, steps to monitor theimplementation of agreements, and measures tobolster security-sector reform and foster the rule oflaw, among other supplementary steps to reinforcea peace process. As discussed at the 2010 IstanbulRetreat and reflected in the Statement by thePresident of the Security Council of September 23,2010,6 these considerations argue for an interlinkedand strategic approach to preventive diplomacy,peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Security Council actions, especially coerciveones, may affect the political space available to theSecretary-General and to other mediators. In thatregard, the council should try to be consistent inapplying standards and to act as an honest brokerwhenever possible. One of the questions thatshould be addressed in this context is whetherspoilers should be excluded from negotiationprocesses. Some believe, for example, that theLord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has acted in a waythat makes it ineligible to participate in peaceprocesses. The Security Council’s designation ofsome actors as terrorist organizations has had muchthe same effect. So the council is currentlyreviewing the broad criteria adopted in the earlyyears of this century. This has led to the recognitionof a distinction between al-Qaida and the Talibanin Afghanistan. Some would encourage the councilto continue this review process with a view toallowing some nonstate armed groups with limitedpolitical goals to make the transition into thepolitical mainstream.

At the same time, it should be recognized that thecouncil is a political, not a technical, body. TheCharter provisions on its mandate, authority,composition, and procedures underline thisdistinction. Nevertheless, council members need tobear in mind that its success in maintaininginternational peace and security will bedetermined, in part, by how effectively it supportsand nurtures mediation and conflict-preventionefforts by other United Nations and non-UN actors.Other UN organs have made significant thematicand operational contributions to the development

of mediation and preventive diplomacy in recentyears. Under Article 11(1) of the Charter, theGeneral Assembly is to “consider general principlesof co-operation in the maintenance of internationalpeace and security.” In its normative capacity, forinstance, the assembly recently adopted its firstresolution on strengthening the role of mediationin the peaceful settlement of disputes and inconflict prevention and resolution.7 The Group ofFriends of Mediation, which actively promoted thisresolution, can now play a significant role in itsimplementation. Though it needs strengthening,the Peacebuilding Commission can help ensurecoherence and synchronization among actors, aswell as ease the Security Council’s burden. Thecouncil, however, retains the ultimate responsibilityto make peace sustainable.

The human rights tools and architecture of theUnited Nations can provide significant assistance topreventive-diplomacy and mediation efforts. Bymonitoring human rights violations on a contin-uing basis, by establishing investigative commis-sions, by reporting findings to governments andUN bodies, and by drawing attention to situationsof particular concern, the Human Rights Counciland the Office of the High Commissioner forHuman Rights engage directly in preventivediplomacy. As members of the Security Councilhave increasingly recognized the correlationbetween severe human rights violations and risks tointernational peace and security, the high commis-sioner has briefed the council more frequently.

Non-United Nations Actors

Over the past two decades, the number and varietyof mediators has proliferated. States, regional andsubregional arrangements, prominent individuals,and independent organizations have offered theirservices on either a case-by-case or generic basis.Some independent nongovernmental organiza-tions, such as the Centre for HumanitarianDialogue (HD) and ACCORD, have developedspecialized expertise in supporting peace processes.The latter has focused on backstopping the preven-tive diplomacy of the African Union, the regionaleconomic communities, and African governments.


6 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2010/18, September 23, 2010.7 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 (July 28, 2011), UN Doc. A/RES/65/283.

The former has a more global mandate. It workedalongside the United Nations in providing essentialsupport for the extended mediation effort led byKofi Annan to end the post-election violence inKenya.

Such professional mediation support groups mayface fewer constraints in interacting with nonstatearmed groups than would intergovernmentalorganizations, and their initial efforts to opendialogue may prepare the ground for more formalnegotiations involving governments and intergov-ernmental bodies. Each group or individual bringsa distinct combination of skills, experience, andorientations to the table. It is thus not unusual tohave multiple mediators working simultaneouslyon different aspects of the same situation. In thekinds of complex crises that populate the council’sagenda these days, a differentiated division of laboris often required to address their multipledimensions.

The tendency to recruit prominent personalities,often former heads of state, to lead mediationefforts has worked well in some situations andmuch less well in others. Sometimes they bring toomuch baggage from the past, as well as proving tobe high maintenance. Personality and temperamentmatter, as do their relationships with the parties tothe dispute. The lead mediator should have a deepknowledge of the country, the parties, and thehistory of the conflict, as well as a feel for theculture. In addition, the parties must haveconfidence in the lead mediator, trusting that he orshe will be impartial and even-handed. BecausePresident Bongo of Gabon possessed thesequalities, he was able to mediate successfully in theCentral African Republic. Questions of ownershipof the process did arise, however, as the parties andthe larger international community at times seemedto assume that Gabon would carry the costs of theeffort on its own. So the selection of the leadmediator is a critical matter, and one subject moreto art than science.

In such a crowded environment, the UnitedNations should review its place and its comparativeadvantages in each case. More may not be better, soboth the Security Council and the Secretary-General should weigh when and whether the worldbody should seek the role of lead actor. Beforedeploying a special representative or envoy, a sobercost-benefit analysis should be undertaken. Such an

assessment should distinguish between low- andhigh-profile cases, taking into account the likelyimplications of the conflict for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security. Whether or notthe United Nations takes the role of lead mediator,it often needs to act as coordinator and facilitator—roles that can take on added meaning in a world ofmany potential mediators. Making such judgmentsentails having a balanced, sober, and strategicunderstanding of what is at stake and of theinterests and capacities of each of the players—parties, external actors, and would-be mediatorsalike. This, in turn, puts a premium on the often-stretched analytical capacities of the UnitedNations.

The relatively successful efforts at conflictprevention in the Central African Republicinvolved a layered set of responsibilities amongsubregional, regional, and global organizations, aprominent personality (President Bongo), profes-sional mediation support groups (particularly HD),civil society, religious groups, and neighboringcountries. In Liberia, women’s organizations helpedto create a mass peace movement that created theconditions for a successful mediation. Preventivediplomacy can be a bottom-up as well as a top-down process. In many places, grassrootsmovements led by women’s groups and other civilsociety actors have helped fill the gap between thenarrow interests of elites and those of the largerpopulations that need to be on board if a peacesettlement is to be both just and sustainable.Groups of friends, such as the Contadora Group inCentral America, can help to ensure a sharedunderstanding of the nature of the dispute and acommon sense of purpose within the internationalcommunity, lessening the risk of external spoilers.Competition between regional and subregionalgroups, as was the case in Madagascar, canundermine even a well-prepared mediation effort.In Libya, the African Union sought to play a leadingrole, but was undercut by persistent differences inperspective among its members and by the percep-tion on the part of leaders in Benghazi that itsapproach was one-sided. Its attempt to employ agroup of heads of state to act as intermediariesproved unwieldy, and its roadmap gained littletraction, especially after Security CouncilResolution 1973 (2011).

As noted at the outset, the UN Charter looks first

7

to the parties to resolve their differences peacefullyand then to regional arrangements for mediationand peaceful settlement before referring the disputeor conflict to the Security Council. This suggeststhe advantage of viewing mediation as a set ofconcentric circles from the parties to regional orsubregional bodies to the United Nations, with itsSecretary-General and Security Council. Therelationship among these levels should be comple-mentary, with the question of who should take thelead on various elements of the peace process to bedetermined on the basis of comparative advantage.As noted earlier, the United Nations is unique in itsuniversal membership and the Security Council inits enforcement powers. Regional and subregionalbodies have the advantages and disadvantages ofproximity. Sometimes they may be better placed totake the lead role in mediation and preventivediplomacy, given their more intimate knowledge ofthe situation. Their pre-eminence for such a role,however, should not be automatically assumed.Their membership may be divided on how toapproach the situation, some of them may have tiesto one party or another, or there may be seriouscapacity gaps that would limit their effectiveness.

Neither regional and subregional arrangementsnor the United Nations always have the materialresources and political capital to sustain anextended mediation effort. Burden-sharing alonemay require a higher degree of global-regionalcooperation than either level may contemplate atthe outset. Leverage and expertise may be in shortsupply, underlining the advantages of a working-level partnership. Cooperation thus may comemore quickly and naturally in the field and betweensecretariats than at a political level. For instance,even when relations between the Security Counciland the AU’s Peace and Security Council arestrained, desk-to-desk dialogue, joint training, andexchanges of assessments tend to continue produc-tively, just as do working relationships in the field.Nevertheless, preventive diplomacy could beenhanced through a reinforcement of patterns ofcooperation and synchronized effort between theUnited Nations and its regional, subregional, andcivil society partners.

Lessons on Mediation:Coherence and Synergies

To some observers, the simplest way to ensure acoherent approach to mediation and preventivediplomacy is to designate a single lead mediator ormediation team. If more than one internationalorganization is involved in the effort, thennominating a single joint envoy for the two or moregroups could achieve the same result. With multiplemediation tracks, there is a risk that the right handwill not know what the left is doing, and actionsmight be taken or messages delivered that couldundermine what others had achieved. Forumshopping on the part of the parties might beencouraged, as they try to play one mediator offagainst another. On the other hand, as noted above,today’s multilayered peace processes may welldemand a broader set of players with a range of skillsets. It might not be wise to put all of one’s eggs inone basket given the mixed records of leadmediators in the past. To place all of one’s trust in asingle mediator places a heavy burden, as well, onthe selection process. If the United Nations is to bethe lead organization in all or most cases, then whatwould become of the place for regional orsubregional actors? The provisions of Chapter VIIIwould seem to imply that regional arrangementsshould take the lead initially in mediation efforts,some of which can be quite extended.

In any case, it seems to be inevitable thatmultiparty mediation will continue to be more therule than the exception. That, of course, will place asubstantial burden on determining how best toachieve coherence and productive synergies inmultiparty mediation processes. Sometimes, as inKyrgyzstan, it can be helpful for the United Nationsto act behind the scenes in a supportive role thatencourages and enables regional, national, and civilsociety groups to take greater ownership and moreinitiative within an agreed internationalframework. Even today, the United Nations, theEuropean Union, and the Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are speakingwith one voice there. The Security Council can helpby identifying areas for complementary efforts by


the various international actors, as has beenpracticed in the Balkans. It can also help to monitorprogress, as mediators sometimes have an interestin extending the life of the process. The council canalso help to persuade neighboring countries andexternal powers to play more constructive roles orat least to avoid acting in a way that couldundermine aspects of the peace process. Both thepresident of the council and the Secretary-Generalcan use their prominent bully pulpits to reinforceand amplify core messages to the parties,importantly including cautions against takingcertain actions that could be damaging to theprospects for reconciliation or a sustainable peace.Where the United Nations has a substantialpolitical, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding presenceon the ground, it can act as a skilled plumber inensuring that conditions for implementation are assolid as possible, even if it is not the sole architect ofthe larger peace structure.

Peace processes can have their downsides as well.Sometimes the most intransigent items are setaside, to be addressed at some unspecified point inthe future. They can then become the focus offurther tensions. The fate of national minorities aretoo often ignored or underplayed in peace effortsfocused more on conflict prevention than atrocityprevention, such as in Rwanda in 1993-1994.Questions of justice and human rights may seem tobe inconvenient in the near term, yet often theyprove to be central over the longer term. Mediationprocesses may prove to be self-perpetuating,coming to be seen as goals in themselves. Theumbrella offered by peace processes, moreover, mayhide dark clouds, as in Georgia pre-2008. Overtime, supporting the umbrella can become burden-some. If it leads to false expectations, it can becomepart of the problem. It is essential, therefore, thatspecial representatives and special envoys tell themembers of the Security Council what they need tohear, not just what they want to hear, as the Brahimireport advised in 2000.8

Building PreventiveCapacities

In recent years, there have been substantial effortson several levels—within the United Nations

Secretariat, regional and subregional arrangements,and civil society groups—to boost internationalcapacity for conducting and supporting preventivediplomacy and mediation. One of the more signifi-cant innovations has been the establishment of aMediation Support Unit (MSU) within the UnitedNations’ Department of Political Affairs. It managesa roster of mediators and a Standby Team ofmediation experts. Experienced senior mediatorsnevertheless remain in short supply. Trainingopportunities for mediators and mediation expertshave also improved.

There have been significant enhancements in theorganization’s capacity to support political andmediation missions from within the theater ofconflict as well. The United Nations Office for WestAfrica, the first such regional political presence,was established in 2002. It has been followed morerecently by similar offices in Central Asia andCentral Africa. In a low-profile manner, theseregional offices can maintain contact with the keyactors, help avoid relapses of conflict, and facilitatea more coherent international response. They canbe particularly helpful where the world body doesnot have a substantial presence on the ground, as inKyrgyzstan.

These are welcome developments. They shouldbe accompanied, however, by efforts to improve thecost-effectiveness of the world body’s preventive-diplomacy and mediation initiatives and to avoidtheir bureaucratization. For instance, an economicanalysis of when and where the United Nationsdeploys mediators might conclude that seniorstatesmen, based far from the theater of conflict,should be reserved for the most urgent high-profilecases, while simmering local disputes could beaddressed by United Nations officials alreadyworking in the area. Much of the organization’swork on mediation and preventive diplomacy isconducted through special political missions.Unlike its peace operations, the United Nations’special political missions are funded through theregular budget. Theoretically, this distinction couldhinder the growth of their capacities over time.However, many observers, pointing to the enhance-ments noted above, do not believe that resourceshortages have significantly hampered their abilityto operate effectively.

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8 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.

Not only has the number of special advisers,envoys, and representatives of the Secretary-General grown impressively, but the portion ofthem with thematic or regional mandates instead ofcountry-specific ones has increased markedly. Thistrend should offer fresh cross-cutting insights thatcan enrich the organization’s ongoing efforts atmediation and conflict prevention. But the diversityof players and perspectives also puts a premium oncoordination, especially of messaging. The SecurityCouncil’s task of maintaining international peaceand security may be affected, at times, by who isconveying what messages to which parties at whichjunctures in a crisis. Consistency in messaging is asessential as it is sometimes hard to attain.

As the Secretariat and members of the SecurityCouncil have gained a deeper understanding of therequirements for achieving a sustainable peace andfor preventing further rounds of conflict, they haveput greater emphasis on security-sector reform, theestablishment of the rule of law, and nationalreconciliation. In many cases, these elements needto be taken into account in the process and contentof preventive diplomacy. If these matters are notaddressed early in the process, domestic fissuresand obstacles to a sustainable peace may grow.These factors have encouraged the Security Councilto assign increasingly detailed and ambitiousmandates to both political missions and peaceoperations. At times, the result has been a substan-tial gap between mandates and capacities, andbetween expectations and results. Strong andconsistent political support by the council and itsmembers, however, can help to overcome suchcapacity gaps, which could become disablingwithout the council’s sustained support. As notedabove, regional and subregional arrangements andcivil society partners, such as the Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue and ACCORD, can alsohelp to fill gaps in the kinds of specific expertiseand capacities needed for these purposes.

Wrap-Up and Next Steps

The Security Council occupies a unique place in thehistory and practice of international organization.Its role in the conduct of mediation and preventivediplomacy should reflect its special status andpowers. As the only principal organ that can call onall of the diverse tools of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII

of the Charter, the council faces a distinct set ofchallenges and opportunities. One is finding theproper equilibrium or balance in its employment ofthese measures. Some observers, for instance,contend that the council has not made sufficientuse of the measures of pacific settlement availableto it under Chapter VI, and has been too ready toinvoke its enforcement powers under Chapter VII.Yet others point out that it is the provisions ofChapter VII that are unparalleled in human history,while there are many actors willing and capable ofengaging in mediation and preventive diplomacy.They assert that the council’s experience and areasof comparative advantage lie more in the realm ofmessaging, setting mandates, and authorizingmediation than in directly conducting it. If othersare to do the mediating, however, then questionsarise about how to exercise effective oversightwithout squeezing the political space available formediation.

The abundance of policy choices offers thecouncil flexibility even as it poses the challenge ofcoherence. In some cases, such as the South Sudanreferendum earlier this year, a united council hasbeen able to employ diverse tools in a coherent andstrategic manner. The difficulty of developing andsustaining a broad-based and integrated approachto specific conflict situations in a political organsuch as the council, however, should not beunderestimated. It demands more attention to howthe measures in each Chapter—VI, VII, and VIII—relate to each other. For instance, some members ofthe council may be reluctant to place a situation onthe agenda or to engage in preventive diplomacylest such a step might lead to pressures for furthermeasures down the road. As discussed above, oneanswer has been to develop various mechanisms forinformal briefings and interactive dialogue. Withthe accumulation of experience in utilizing theseformats, it may be possible to begin an assessmentof when they have proven most or least productive.

Coherence may be hardest to achieve when theUnited Nations and its regional, subregional, andcivil society partners are simultaneously engaged intrying to bring the same conflict to an end. ChapterVIII, especially Articles 52(2) and 54, describes aprocess that is both top-down and bottom-up.Neither direction seems to be working consistentlywell at the moment. So the council might want toconsider some informal lessons-learned discussion


with its regional partners concerning their compar-ative experiences in and perceptions of recentsituations, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Sudan, andSyria. Historically, where have these relationshipsworked more or less well, and why? Is capacitybuilding needed on the linkages between global andregional or subregional bodies, as well as at eachlevel?

The very breadth of the council’s attention spanmay also raise questions about priorities,messaging, and coherence. Over the past decade,for instance, the council has come to play a leadingrole in the articulation of normative principles andthematic concerns in the peace and security realmin addition to its daily efforts to resolve specificconflict situations. It has made seminal contribu-tions to thinking and policymaking about thehuman dimensions of security across a range ofhuman-protection challenges, from children andarmed conflict, sexual violence, and civilian protec-tion to the responsibility to protect. It has broughtissues of security-sector reform, governance,peacebuilding, and the rule of law to the forefrontof strategies for securing the peace as well as forending armed conflict. In this way, the SecurityCouncil has helped to shape the way policymakersin capitals, as well as at the United Nations,approach and evaluate contemporary securitychallenges. These have been proactive agendas,putting the council in a better position to preventconflict, not just react to it. It has incorporatedthese broader dimensions of security into itsstatements, resolutions, and mandates, includingthose concerning mediation and preventivediplomacy. The integration of its thematic andoperational concerns, however, is not complete.Nor do all members of the council appear to viewthese questions, including how to balance these twosides of the council’s work, in quite the same way.

As might be expected in a time of global change,the vocabulary to describe the council’s evolvingapproach to the maintenance of peace and securityis also unsettled. It is widely agreed, for example,that the Security Council should adopt a culture ofprevention. It is less clear, however, what that wouldmean in practice. It is said, for instance, thatprevention should involve early engagement, notjust early warning. This is sound advice, but thecouncil is not well structured or placed to meetdirectly with women’s groups, youth, media, and

other elements of civil society, nor with other keystakeholders, as part of an early-preventionstrategy, except when it undertakes a mission to thecountry in question. Upstream prevention can alsoraise sovereignty concerns, especially whenpursued by the council itself. So the members of thecouncil may want to consider ways of making itsmissions serve conflict-prevention goals moredirectly; for instance, by conducting more of thefact finding or investigations contemplated underArticle 34 of the Charter and by engaging morefully with civil society stakeholders.

The first rule of mediation and preventivediplomacy is surely to do no harm. To that end, asnoted above, the council should avoid taking sidesin the conflicts it addresses. The council, however,is not an apolitical body. It cannot be impartialwhen it comes to the purposes and principles of theCharter or to its primary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and security.Mediation is not value-free. It is bound, to somedegree, to involve efforts to manipulate the parties’political choices. If preventive diplomacy is tosucceed, it must be intensely political, if only tocomprehend and address the motivations of theparties. If the members of the council arecompletely disinterested, they will not have the willto sustain a preventive engagement or bring to beara persuasive set of incentives and disincentives.With deeper and more sustainable interests at stake,one or more parties will simply outlast them. Sothere are limits to being disinterested and impartial,terms that to some extent have to be reinterpretedand reframed with each situation. Mediation andpreventive diplomacy are practiced case by case,taking into account the distinctive features andhistory of each situation.

It is true that the United Nations spends far moreresources—human, material, and financial—onpeacekeeping and enforcement than it does onmediation and preventive diplomacy. Moreresources for these purposes are undoubtedlyneeded at the global, regional, subregional,national, and civil society levels. Yet it should alsobe recognized that the absolute level of expendi-tures by the United Nations on prevention hasgrown substantially in recent years. At a time offinancial strain for most member states, it would beunwise to expect these upward trends to besustained over the next few years. The first task will

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be to use existing resources more efficiently andeffectively in the expectation that strong perform-ance will be rewarded with increased investmentsover time. In the meantime, the most criticalresource, and at times the rarest, will remainpolitical will.

The good news is that the appreciation of thevalue of mediation and preventive diplomacy isgrowing around the United Nations system and,most importantly, among the member states. Thishas been reflected in General Assembly Resolution65/283 of July 28, 2011, in the Secretary-General’sreport on Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results,in the convening of high-level dialogues in theGeneral Assembly and Security Council, and in thepresidential statement of September 22, 2011.9 Thepresident of the General Assembly also identifiedmediation as the main topic for the high-levelGeneral Debate in September 2011, and one of hisfour key focus areas for the whole session. With thecontinuing encouragement of the Group of Friendsof Mediation, there is reason to expect thismomentum to be sustained in the months and yearsahead.

At the same time, the limits of mediation andpreventive diplomacy should also be acknowl-edged. These tools do not operate in a vacuum.Their effectiveness will be conditioned by largergeopolitical developments, by political dynamicswithin the Security Council, by the attitudes andpolicies of neighboring states, by the actions of civiland uncivil society, by how others wield incentivesand disincentives, and, of course, by the calcula-tions of the parties themselves. Most of thesefactors are beyond the control of the practitioners

of mediation and preventive diplomacy. Currentand reliable information and sound analysis aretherefore essential ingredients of successfulmediation. This conclusion places a premium onthe two-way flow of information and analysisbetween the council and practitioners, facilitatedand enriched by the Secretariat, particularly theDepartment of Political Affairs. It also underscoresthe need for tempered expectations and the value ofone of the less common resources: world-classanalytical abilities.

At the end of the day, the following questionsneed to be asked: how is the United Nations doingin the fields of mediation and preventivediplomacy? Can the Security Council do more toensure their success? Where has the council donerelatively well in that regard, and where not? Why?The answers to these queries would require adegree of certainty and sophistication in assessmentthat does not yet exist. Results are very difficult tomeasure and cause-and-effect relationships arehard to establish. While scholars and think tankstry to sort out these questions, the members of theSecurity Council, with the help of the Secretariat,could well take a hard look at how it is doing insupporting mediation and practicing preventivediplomacy. A good first step would be for thecouncil to conduct a “continuous process of reflec-tion and adaptation of its practices in preventivediplomacy,” as called for by its presidentialstatement of September 23, 2010.10 This report onthe results of the July 2011 Security Council Retreatin Istanbul is envisioned as a contribution to thisongoing process of reflection and adaptation.


9 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 (July 28, 2011), UN Doc. A/RES/65/283; United Nations Secretary-General, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, UNDoc. S/2011/552, August 26, 2011; United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/18, September 22, 2011.

10 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2010/18, September 23, 2010.

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