STRATFOR nk report 5 05 - WikiLeaks · 2014. 1. 14. · nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, claiming to...

ABOUT STRATFOR.......................................................................................................................iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................1

NORTH KOREA: Hoist with Its Own (Nuclear) Petard?......................................................2

STRATFOR SERVICES..................................................................................................................24

CONTACT STRATFOR.................................................................................................................26

ii© 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

iii© 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

STRATFOR is the world’s leading private intelligence firm providing corporations, governments and individuals with geopolitical intelligence and analysis to manage risk and anticipate the political, economic and security issues vital to their interests. Armed with powerful intelligence-gathering capabilities and working in close col-laboration with STRATFOR’s expert team of analysts, clients are better able to protect their assets, diminish risk, compete in the global market and increase opportunities. STRATFOR has an unparalleled record for accuracy and clarity in its forecasts and has been called “the Shadow CIA” by Barron’s.

Hundreds of Fortune 500 companies and government agencies rely on STRATFOR for unbiased, insightful, ac-tionable analysis of global activities to keep ahead of local, national and international developments to plan strategy and be more confidently informed.

· Hedge Fund Managers use STRATFOR intelligence to identify future market opportunities. · Oil & Gas Executives rely on STRATFOR intelligence to look into the future to determine areas for exploration, investment and market volatility. · Government & Military Personnel utilize STRATFOR intelligence to gain insights on triggers affecting geopolitical events and potential movements around the world. · Manufacturers gain intelligence on emerging markets, resource fluctuations and potential regional threats in the coming years. · Logistics Company Executives use STRATFOR intelligence to be informed on what disruptions could impact their supply chains. · Global Finance, Insurance and Investment Executives use STRATFOR intelligence to be prepared for any market fluctuations that may impact their clients’ businesses.

Unlike news organizations and research firms that are set up to deliver information on what’s already happened — so all you can do is react — STRATFOR was founded in 1996 to deliver insights and forecasts our clients can use to stay ahead of the curve.

Our services range from online Geopolitical Intelligence & Analysis subscriptions to confidential Custom Intelligence Services. We provide geopolitical and strategic intelligence services focused on international politi-cal, economic and security issues; business intelligence on issues ranging from technology to global alliances; and issues analysis and intelligence on public policy issues and the international legislative, legal and regulatory environments that shape those issues.

For more information on how STRATFOR’s services can impact your business, please contact us at:

Strategic Forecasting, Inc.1666 K Street, Suite 600Washington, D.C. 20006

(U.S.) 202.429.1800www.STRATFOR.com

1© 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY

The North Korean nuclear crisis is now reaching a new height. It has simmered in various states of turmoil since the October 2002 meeting in which North Korea claimed the right to a uranium-based nuclear program — Pyongyang later denied it actually had such a program, but the implication alone set off the current crisis mode. Rumors and leaks of an imminent North Korean nuclear test, possibly as early as June, now dominate headlines and meetings throughout Northeast Asia.

A North Korean nuclear test will have significant implications. In the best-case scenario, it would simply lead to North Korea’s total isolation — even by China, Russia and South Korea — while triggering only a slight increase in regional weapons procurement and a hefty increase in regional intelligence activities.

A second-tier scenario would see a significant increase in regional tensions, with Japan, South Korea and possibly Taiwan joining the nuclear race, even if clandestinely. Each of these nations possesses a technology level far beyond North Korea’s — political will, not a lack of qualified scientists and machinists, restrains these states from producing nuclear weapons.

A third tier would involve surgical U.S. military strikes on known or suspected North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological and missile sites. It could also see South Korean, Japanese and even Chinese forces coordinating with, if not taking part in, such actions. In the unlikely case that such strikes trigger the collapse of the North Korean regime, humanitarian and economic crises would follow. If the regime doesn’t collapse, it could strike out, either by transferring technology and capabilities to other “states of concern,” embarking on guerilla and terrorist campaigns in and out of the region to retaliate, or simply launching a reciprocal war.

The fourth tier would be an all-out war — a complete invasion of North Korea by the United States. This could quickly escalate, drawing in South Korea, China and Japan; it could also trigger simultaneous crises in Taiwan and even as far away as Iran, where other states would take advantage of the U.S. focus on North Korea.

Any of these scenarios would have a significant impact on East Asia’s sense of security. As the potential for economic and social upheaval in countries surrounding North Korea rises, the love affair with the Chinese economy fades — along with South Korea and Japan’s stability as reliable markets and suppliers. This affects not only the Korean peninsula, but the global flow of investment monies, goods and energy.

This paper examines the status of the North Korean nuclear program, the North Korean decision-making calculus in the current crisis (including whether or not to test a nuclear bomb) and other parties’ role in shaping the outcome of the current standoff. As tensions rise, having a clearer grasp on the background, being able to see through the eyes of the players and glimpsing into the future becomes even more pressing.


I N T R O D U C T I O N

Warnings of an imminent North Korean nuclear test somewhere around the northern town of Kilju in North Hamgyong province continue to circulate on a whirl of conflicting and corroborating aversions and denials from the United States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and China. The question of a North Korean nuclear test burns brightly — not just for those concerned about the immediate military implications and potential consequences, but also for those involved in or concerned with the economies of Northeast Asian nations, global oil supplies and demands, the flow of investment capital … in general, for most everyone involved in the global economy.

North Korea has long stood as a pariah state, particularly since the end of the Cold War, when Pyongyang’s traditional sponsors, Moscow and Beijing, began seeking alternative linkages in the international system. This left Pyongyang with a backward and weak economy, a massive military, and a sense of impending external pressure to alter or destroy the existing regime. Thus, Pyongyang embarked upon a series of nuclear exploits, creating international crises that kept the small nation in the international spotlight and provided a new and infinitely repeatable source of economic assistance while forestalling political collapse. Or at least it thought the process was infinitely repeatable.

For Pyongyang, the 2003 nuclear crisis — still going on today — represented just another attempt to eke economic, political and, if possible, security concessions out of the international community (read: the United States). But unlike the crises in 1994 and 1998, Pyongyang failed to account for the change in the international system and in U.S. attitude brought about by the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Pyongyang thought that the “hard line” of the Bush administration would create the conditions for a repeat of the “only Nixon can go to China” phenomenon (slightly altered to apply to North Korea). But the deep-seated fear of a repeated al Qaeda attack on the continental United States — this time, with nuclear weapons obtained from “rogue” nations — left the Bush administration with little patience for one of the charter members of the Axis of Evil.

Rather than engaging North Korea, the Bush administration from the start embarked on a well-de-fined (if severely misunderstood) policy of aggressive neglect. On one hand, Washington encouraged (not very effectively, as it turned out) all nations to further isolate Pyongyang, stopped support for the KEDO light-water reactor, pulled back from the 1994 Agreed Framework and launched the Proliferation Security Initiative — designed to close off North Korean exports (and imports) of precursor chemicals and products, missiles, and other assorted potentially dangerous technologies. At the same time, Washington hurled insults at the sensitive North Korean leadership and generally withdrew from any serious attempts to engage in negotiations. Instead it let Pyongyang posture and bluster, considering the North Korean regime ultimately sane — and therefore extremely unlikely to actually carry out any of its bellicose threats, which would inevitably have led to its own destruction.

Two and a half years later, with Washington having called North Korea’s bluff and Pyongyang finding no face-saving way to back down, the situation remains unresolved. Washington and Tokyo have dropped subtle hints at a June deadline for North Korea to rejoin talks on U.S. terms (one year after North Korea stopped attending the six-party talks). Pyongyang has raised the stakes, withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), restarting and then shutting down its


nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, claiming to have reprocessed fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium and claiming possession of nuclear weapons.

As June rapidly approaches, the lenses of satellites from around the globe are focused on an apparent reviewing stand being built a few miles from a mine that may or may not be the site of a possible North Korean underground nuclear test. And the burning questions stands: Will North Korea test a nuclear bomb?

This report looks at the North Korean calculus — the decision-making process currently under way in Pyongyang, and the external stimuli framing the North Korean decision. A North Korean nuclear test could forever alter the strategic balance in Northeast Asia, triggering the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons, a U.S. military intervention or even a regional war that could rapidly expand to a global scale.

And somewhere in North Korea, Kim Jong Il, dynastic successor to North Korea’s founder and president in perpetuity Kim Il Sung, weighs the potential benefits and dangers of carrying his nuclear plans beyond the blackmail stage and into the uncharted waters of recognized nuclear statehood. And as internal and external pressures mount and the moment of decision nears, Kim faces his own question — whether there is any way to now avoid being hoist with his own nuclear petard.

U N D E R S TA N D I N G T H E N U C L E A R C R I S I S

To understand the current North Korean nuclear crisis, and predict the various players’ next steps, one must first look at three key components: Pyongyang’s capabilities, Pyongyang’s decision-making criteria, and the role of other actors — from Washington and Tokyo to Seoul, Beijing and Moscow.

First we will look at the status of the North Korean nuclear program, assessing North Korea’s key capabilities, from its nuclear technology to safeguards on materials and technologies — to the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon.

Upon assessing the capabilities, we will then turn to the current North Korean regime’s intent, its strategy, and the domestic and foreign enablers and constraints that shape and guide its policies and actions.

Finally, we will assess the role of other players in the crisis, particularly the members of the six-party negotiations. The actions and interactions of the other five concerned parties — China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States — all help to shape the choices for North Korea and the United States, and ultimately will frame the final outcome.

Together, these three angles create a more complete picture of the current nuclear crisis, offering a clearer view of the various players’ next steps.


N O R T H K O R E A’ S N U C L E A R P R O G R A M : H O W B I G I S T H E T H R E A T ?

By most accounts, North Korea already has at least two or three simple nuclear devices, perhaps as many as eight. Pyongyang is also believed to have enough weapons-grade plutonium to make at least a few more bombs, and has made little secret of its intent to continue reprocessing nuclear fuels. The questions of whether North Korea can or will produce nuclear weapons appear to be answered.

Accepting that Pyongyang has the technology and the will to build 1940s- or 1950s-vintage bombs is only one part of assessing the true level of the North Korean threat. So long as the North Korean arsenal remains small, primitive and secure, it provides a known threat — one that the international community already knows how to deal with.

Three key aspects of the nuclear program present a more serious challenge for the United States, North Korea’s neighbors and the world:

First, how secure are the North Korean nuclear facilities? In other words, is North Korea now, or could it become a nuclear proliferator to other states (or stateless actors like al Qaeda) — either intentionally or through lax security?

Second, can North Korea produce modern mini-nukes small enough to fit onto ballistic missiles for delivery? A large or unwieldy nuclear device has only limited use as an offensive strike weapon, though it still presents a deterrent capability and can serve as a suicide-type defensive weapon.

Third, if North Korea can produce smaller, more compact nuclear weapons, is can it marry these to ballistic missiles — and furthermore, what range do said missiles have? This final question plays heavily into Washington’s calculus for deciding just when North Korea has crossed a “red line,” and presents a threat that cannot be handled through isolation or neglect.


H I S T O RY, C O O P E R A T I O N A N D T H E Q U E S T I O N O F P R O L I F E R A T I O N

North Korea’s nuclear program dates back as far as the late 1940s, at least in the conceptual phase. Significant action in the field of nuclear technology did not take place until the mid-1960s, when North Korea received its first 2MW ITR research reactor from the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, Pyongyang had embarked on a nuclear weapons development program, around the same time that Seoul was also pursuing nuclear weapons.

While the United States quashed Seoul’s program (though recent reports suggest that at least the capabilities remain intact, even if the active official drive toward weapons procurement ended), and Russia reduced assistance to Pyongyang, North Korea continued to pursue weapons technology. But despite reduced Soviet assistance, North Korea’s program was not entirely indigenous. Early on, North Korean nuclear scientists trained in the Soviet Union and China — though not for the manufacture of weapons — and North Korea bought equipment in Europe as well.

Moscow and Beijing remained extremely cautious about the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, concerned that the unreliable regime could trigger another major war. They did, however, assist in training and cooperation with North Korean nuclear energy scientists. Pyongyang also sent scientists to Pakistan in the early 1980s and to France in the mid 1980s, apparently after the Soviet Union refused to transfer nuclear weapons technology to Pyongyang. Around this time, Pyongyang began construction of a 50 megawatt (MW) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, near its indigenous 5MW reactor.

In 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which gave it 18 months to negotiate nuclear safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (a paperwork mix-up resulted in North Korea’s later being granted an additional 18 months). Shortly thereafter, the Yongbyon 5MW reactor came online. After that, China — concerned that Pyongyang was launching a nuclear weapons program —withdrew its nuclear technicians and cooperation from North Korea, and criticized Pyongyang for not telling Beijing about the Yongbyon 5MW reactor.

As the 5MW reactor reached its final stages and came online, Pyongyang began construction of facilities to reprocess the nuclear fuel — the first step toward producing nuclear weapons. In 1988, North Korea granted IAEA inspectors access to the 2MW IRT research reactor, part of a process of ensuring the proper handling and storage of nuclear materials and their security. North Korea, however, continued to delay the signing of the additional safeguards on its nuclear program.

As the end of the Cold War approached, the situation for North Korea began to change. Russia and China were withholding certain technologies and assistance from Pyongyang as they sought to engage the world rather than remain in isolation. Pyongyang had increasingly turned to hosting scien-tists — including nuclear technicians — from East Bloc countries to conduct research in its universities and laboratories.

As the East Bloc crumbled, many of these scientists stayed on, as the prospects for similar research in the newly democratic Central and Eastern European nations rapidly faded. By the early 1990s, North


Korea ran its nuclear programs at home, with technological assistance from foreign scientists working independent of their governments, and minimal official assistance from the Soviet Union or China. As the Soviet Union dissolved into Russia, and as China embarked on a massive acceleration of its economic opening and reform program (including establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea), North Korea began a broader international search for partners in its nuclear program, turning to places as far away as Cuba, Pakistan and Iran.

North Korea’s bargaining chip for the transfer of nuclear technology and know-how was its ballistic missile program. The export of missiles, missile technology and missile technicians brought a reciprocal influx of whatever nuclear data and equipment North Korea could obtain. North Korean links with Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan, for example, solidified around this time. However, up to this point, North Korea had pursued a plutonium program, whereas Pakistan followed a uranium-based program. Though some technology and ideas were transferable, it was not a perfect match.

Creating enriched plutonium for nuclear weapons is a relatively simple process compared to creating the highly enriched uranium necessary for uranium-based nuclear weapons. However, plutonium weapons use more complex triggering mechanisms to detonate the fissile material than the simple, “gun-type” triggers for uranium weapons. In the mid-1990s, Pyongyang began considering a parallel line of research and development into a uranium-based weapons program.

When Pakistan carried out its nuclear tests in 1998, North Korean scientists were probably present, or were at minimum given access to some of the testing data. However, as previously noted, this was not directly transferable to North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program. But despite the differences, these contacts established linkages between the North’s nuclear program and nuclear scientists from other countries — primarily countries the United States deemed “of concern.”

Throughout the 1990s, North Korea pursued its nuclear program with a very strong intent to keep it indigenous. Though Pyongyang was quite willing to accept technological assistance from others, it was


much less interested in sharing its nuclear knowledge outside its borders. Instead, Pyongyang relied on the export of its missile technology. North Korea considered the nuclear weapons program a national asset, something that could offer security in a world where traditional sponsors were no longer reliable and where standing up to the United States seemed increasingly difficult.

Little concrete evidence exists that North Korea has actively spread nuclear technology, equipment or materials abroad. The ability to use the nuclear program both for domestic security and for leverage in international negotiations required that Pyongyang retain sole control over its nuclear technology and materials. If they leaked to other nations, Washington would not only have clear proof of their existence (and probable cause for an intervention), but could also assess the true state of the North’s nuclear program. This would limit North Korea’s advantage of ambiguity, and would potentially reveal deficiencies that could give the United States confidence that it still had time for pre-emptive action without the risk of nuclear retaliation.

This remains a concern of the North Korean regime. Pyongyang is notorious for deploying weapons systems long before they are tested, thus denying its opponents any true gauge of the weapon’s capabilities or limitations. North Korea has tested few ballistic missiles, for example, preferring to use information from tests by recipients of its technology, like Pakistan, Iran and Syria. Pyongyang’s nuclear technology and capabilities remain an even tighter-kept secret.

The North Korean nuclear program is, to some extent, a time bomb in its creator’s hands. North Korea sees the nuclear weapons as a key component of preventing any military adventurism by the United States, South Korea or Japan. The risk that Pyongyang really does have a nuclear device, even a primitive one, makes other nations take a serious second look at any plans to invade or to destabilize the regime. The first Iraq War, the Kosovo War and the most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq only reinforced this line of reasoning in Pyongyang — the lack of a clear deterrent capability gave Washington freedom to choose the time, place and extent of action.

For Washington, after the Sept. 11 attacks, the threat of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors like al Qaeda became a top-tier concern. The United States established the Proliferation Security Initiative in response, seeking to restrict the transport and transfer of dangerous materials, including missiles, chemical and biological weapons agents, and nuclear materials and technologies. The concern of overt transfers of such materials to al Qaeda paralleled the concern that security breakdowns could occur during the transportation of those materials, and that terrorists could get their hands on the weapons and technologies through the black market, from corrupt officials or security forces, or simply through neglect.

Although North Korea currently keeps a tight grip on its nuclear facilities, technology and material, the possibility exists for rogue actions by scientists and officials. Given the strict governmental controls, however, these chances remain slim. The regime desperately wants to ensure that Washington has no international justification to isolate or attack North Korea, so keeping a tight lid on its own nuclear weapons, technologies and material remains a high priority. In addition, release of identifiable and measurable materials would completely undermine the policy of strategic ambiguity. If North Korea, like Iran, becomes interested at some point in international recognition, not just as a legitimate state but as part of the nuclear club, it would want to show that it can be responsible.


For now, the proliferation threat remains constrained. Should Kim Jong Il’s centralized control begin to weaken, or should North Korea determine that it can no longer benefit from restricting the movement of technologies and materials, that could change. But any clear proof would likely leave North Korea on the receiving end of significantly increased sanctions (even from its main economic partner, China), punishment or even military actions — and until the regime is willing to take such a risk, it will work hard to maintain secure control over its nuclear legacy.


N O R T H K O R E A N N U C L E A R B O M B - M A K I N G : S I Z E M A T T E R S

North Korea can create nuclear weapons. This is no longer a question. In the mid-1980s, North Korea conducted a serious of tests of high explosives. These tests are part of the process of developing the high-explosive charges necessary to compress the plutonium in the core of an implosion-type weapon. Russian reports indicate that North Korea could have developed its first nuclear device by 1990, though most other estimates put the initial date several years later.

Most intelligence assessments agree that North Korea currently has at least two or three nuclear weapons, though Chinese and Russian estimates put the number slightly higher. Assessing even the theoretical number of weapons remains problematic because two vital questions — how much plutonium North Korea possesses and how much plutonium it needs for each device — can only be answered with guesswork and extrapolation, given the secrecy with which Pyongyang operates its program.

Plutonium 239, used in making nuclear weapons, is a non-natural, highly controlled substance produced from neutrons reacting to uranium. Obtaining the material is a multi-step process. Uranium is mined and milled and processed into fuel for the nuclear reactor. Once the fuel burns, the fuel rods are removed from the reactor and placed in a cooling pond for three to five months. The plutonium is then separated from the spent fuel rods through a chemical process.

It is estimated that North Korea shut down the Yongbyon nuclear reactor shut down three times between 1987 and 1994, allowing Pyongyang to reprocess the fuel rods and extract weapons-grade plutonium at least twice. Given incomplete information on the reactor’s efficiency or the separation process, the final amount of weapons-grade nuclear material available to the regime prior to the


1994 shutdown was likely enough for the production of two to five nuclear weapons. The reprocessing done after the 1994 shutdown may have doubled that number.

In early 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, kicked out IAEA inspectors, restarted its Yongbyon reactor and commenced reprocessing stored fuel rods, adding enough material for another four to 10 nuclear weapons.

But the equation has a second half: the amount of plutonium North Korea needs to produce a weapon. Older estimates suggested that a country with moderate technological capabilities could make a functional plutonium-based nuclear weapon with 8 kilograms of material. This estimate was later halved, and could be cut in half again if the North has sufficiently advanced technological and machining capabilities.

A large, primitive nuclear weapon could be dropped from a North Korean cargo plane or delivered by rail or ship, but could not travel on North Korean missiles. This significantly limits Pyongyang’s ability to use such a weapon as an offensive or strike tool. Such slow-moving and large vehicles provide easy targets for defensive forces and have minimal ability to stealthily approach a potential target.

To add delivery capability, North Korea needs to miniaturize the nuclear weapon, making it small and light enough to be carried on one of Pyongyang’s ballistic missiles. North Korea has mid- and long-range missile capabilities, and the United States and Russia have made it clear that North Korea has nuclear weapons. Pyongyang also has the technical capability of marrying a nuclear device to a missile. But that technical capability requires a small enough nuke to use.

There are a few main ways to construct a boosted-fission plutonium nuclear weapon, one that requires a smaller amount of nuclear material and can be made smaller. These involve adding a booster fuel to the weapon, using a combination of deuterium — a commonly obtainable substance — and tritium or lithium.

Tritium, a highly radioactive gas produced from neutrons reacting with lithium, reduces the mass of plutonium needed to make a nuclear weapon. Theoretically, a reactor that produces plutonium can also produce tritium. It is a by-product of a heavy-water-moderated or light-water reactor. However, tritium has a very short shelf-life (the half-life is only 12 years) and needs constant replacing to keep the weapon operational. If purchased, rather than indigenously produced, tritium costs some $2 million per bomb.

Lithium is a common low-density metal. Fueling nukes with a small amount of LiD (Lithium-6 deuteride) produces a bigger boom from a lighter package, but requires a significantly higher level of technology.

Whether North Korea has obtained a sufficient amount of either of these materials, and has the expertise to use them, remains a mystery. A North Korean nuclear test would likely clear up the question. Though it is technically possible to build a functional nuclear warhead without tests, the weapon would not be predictable or reliable. The science is available, as are the technicians and


machinists, but without a monitored test the weapon’s functionality remains in doubt — although some nuclear analysts speculate Pyongyang could test various components separately and raise the confidence level.

If North Korea has the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons small and light enough to fit on its ballistic missiles, it may only have one or two such devices, given the high level of effort and skill required to make them and the maintenance necessary to keep them operational.


P O S S E S S I O N I S N I N E - T E N T H S O F T H E E Q U A T I O N , B U T W H A T A B O U T D E L I V E RY ?

North Korea’s ballistic missile program, like its nuclear program, started in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s. From the early Scud and FROG missiles supplied to North Korea by Russia, Pyongyang began a domestic program of reverse engineering and technological development that has led to both an impressive arsenal of ballistic missiles and a booming export business.

North Korea has an indigenous scientific school of missile specialists, brought up and trained in the country, who share information with the myriad North Korean missile and technology customers — including Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Iran, and, in the past, Iraq and Libya. North Korean missile scientists also have worked at times with Russian and Chinese scientists, though much of that cooperation, like the nuclear cooperation, began to fade in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In its arsenal of ballistic missiles, Pyongyang currently has the Scud B, two Scud variants Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, the recently tested SS-21 variant KN-02, the Nodong-1 and the recently-introduced-but-untested (in North Korea) Nodong-2, and the Taepodong-1 long-range ballistic missile (made notorious during its one and only test in 1998). At that time, the missile was configured for launching a satellite — though all indications suggest that the final-stage separation failed, and despite North Korean protestations to the contrary, the Sputnik-like satellite did not circle the earth broadcasting the “Song of General Kim Jong Il” to the masses.

North Korea is also developing a Taepodong-2, and has carried out ground tests of the engine in the last few years. This rocket, if successful, would give Pyongyang a truly intercontinental reach. The Taepodong-2 and its predecessor, the Taepodong-1 (believed to be designated the Paekdusan in North Korea), most concern Washington.

If North Korea has a small enough nuclear weapon to mount on a missile — one in the 500-800 kilogram range — Washington is most concerned with whether that weapon can be delivered to the continental united States, or to Alaska or Hawaii. For North Korea’s immediate neighbors, the biggest concern comes from the Nodong family of missiles. These are already deployed operationally in North Korea and can strike all areas of South Korea and Japan.

Two key problems still face Pyongyang, even if it finds itself possessing a small enough nuclear warhead to fit on one of its intermediate or long-range missiles. First, North Korea has a liquid-fueled missile fleet, making a surprise launch quite unlikely. Given the effectively never-ending coverage North Korea gets from intelligence satellites searching for any trace of North Korean nuclear or missile activity, getting off a surprise launch of a Nodong would be difficult; a surprise Taepodong launch will be nearly impossible. This gives weapons systems time to prepare to intercept the North Korean missile or to launch pre-emptive strikes on the missile as it fuels.

North Korea still also has a problem with missile guidance systems. Deploying missiles without testing them keeps the air of uncertainty thick over North Korea’s nuclear program in more ways than one. While it prevents opponents from ever truly assessing the missiles’ capabilities, it also prevents North Korea from knowing how well they work. All North Korean ballistic missile tests to date have, by dint


of geography, necessitated a splashdown in the ocean. This makes measurements of the final targeting guidance system quite impracticable.

Instead, North Korea participates in missile tests in other countries, including Pakistan and Iran — tests of missiles based on North Korean designs and technologies. But Pyongyang has yet to test any of its own guidance systems at home, and Russian and U.S. military sources say this remains one of the North Korean program’s weak points. Pyongyang had enough trouble trying to launch a first-generation satellite into orbit; it has yet to demonstrate that it can redirect a ballistic missile down-ward toward its target.

The KN-02 is believed to have better accuracy than its SS-21 predecessor, but it too remains untested — and being a smaller, more in-theater missile, it is unlikely to carry a nuclear warhead (though the Soviet version was designed to carry battlefield nukes). The North Korean Taepodong’s accuracy remains unknown; however, given the limited number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, should Pyongyang ever launch nuclear-tipped missiles, it would choose large targets like cities or large military bases — targets the Taepodong could hit — rather than specific facilities.

But the threat of a missile launch, moreso than the actual possibility, will drive the planning and actions of those threatened by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Though Pyongyang may have no plans to launch an attack on its neighbors or the United States — as such a move would be tantamount to suicide — one of the other nations concerned could deem the very capability to perform such an action too risky to allow. Thus, if North Korea tested a nuclear weapon, demonstrating without a doubt that it had the weapons (and enough of them to waste at least one in a test), and if it successfully tested another long-range missile, demonstrating the capability to strike the United States, then Washington’s calculus of the North Korean threat would shift precipitously.

N O R T H K O R E A’ S N U C L E A R P R O G R A M : D E T E R R E N T O R B A R G A I N I N G C H I P ?

The North Korean nuclear program originated at a time when nuclear weapons were still viewed as likely tools of war. Following the end of the Korean War in 1953, both North and South Korea maintained a tense and acrimonious standoff along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). While each half of Korea embarked on a rapid program of reconstruction after the devastation of the war, both also looked to increase their defense capabilities in preparation for a rematch.

Both North and South Korea engaged in a nuclear arms race in the 1960s and 1970s, seeking to develop the technology to produce their own nuclear weapons. This raised concerns from Moscow and Beijing as well as Washington. All three feared that the two Koreas, if not carefully controlled, could trigger another war that would escalate to global proportions. U.S. troops stayed in South Korea as much to rein in South Korean military ambitions as to deter or repel a North Korean attack.

Washington, Beijing and Moscow all moved in the same direction to limit the nuclear technology in the hands of their Korean proxies. But while South Korea had tens of thousands of U.S. troops present to guard it — backed by the U.S. nuclear arsenal — North Korea had no substantial foreign military presence. Instead, Moscow and Beijing supported the massive conventional forces in North Korea


to serve as a buffer to both keep the United States on the defensive and prevent Washington from pressing to the Chinese/Soviet frontier.

Even without approval or official assistance from its sponsor states, however, Pyongyang continued a clandestine nuclear program. From the North Korean leadership’s view, as long as nuclear weapons sat on South Korean soil, North Korea needed similar weapons to maintain parity — particularly as China and the Soviet Union had left unanswered the question of whether North Korea could shelter under their nuclear umbrellas.

By the late 1980s, North Korea saw its sponsors — and its security — slipping away. China’s 1979 economic opening and reform program took Beijing out of the realm of isolation and into the international sphere, where relations with a backward state like North Korea moved to the back burner. As the Soviet Union began to lose a grip on its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and eventually lost its own territorial boundaries, Pyongyang saw its isolation increasing.

At this time, the nuclear program saw renewed vigor as North Korea prepared to be its own defender. Murmurs of a nuclear crisis with North Korea trickled up to the surface throughout the late 1980s and into the first part of the 1990s. Despite Pyongyang’s accession to the NPT in 1985, North Korea did not finally sign the additional safeguard agreements and allowed inspection of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon until 1992. By that time, it had already reprocessed weapons-grade fuel and may have even constructed its first nuclear weapon.

But from the start, the North Korean leadership saw the nuclear program as something that could provide a certain level of security while serving as a diplomatic bargaining chip. Pyongyang used its numerous delays in allowing nuclear inspections to finally induce the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear stockpiles from the Korean Peninsula in 1991. Not long thereafter, Pyongyang and Seoul signed agreements calling for a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

In 1992, Pyongyang signed the additional NPT safeguard agreements, opened up the 5MW reactor to IAEA inspectors and offered to end its existing nuclear program, in return for international technological and financial assistance with the construction of light-water nuclear reactors, which do not produce weapons-grade materials as a byproduct.

While debate continued inside Pyongyang as to whether North Korea was truly willing to give up its nuclear program in return for economic and energy assistance, Kim Il Sung recognized both the bargaining potential of the nuclear program and the steadily deteriorating North Korean position as China signed diplomatic relations with South Korea. For North Korea, it was a question of continuing on in isolation and hoping to survive without the economic sponsors it had grown quite dependent upon, or breaking free from isolation and embracing the path of controlled opening of China, Russia and Eastern Europe.

In 1994, the first North Korean nuclear “crisis” reached a head. Washington drew up plans for pre-emptive strikes on the Yongbyon facility, and Kim Il Sung suddenly emerged sitting next to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in Pyongyang and striking compromise deals on ending the North Korean nuclear program and opening its facilities up to IAEA inspection and monitoring. Kim Il Sung even


invited South Korea’s then-President Kim Young Sam to Pyongyang — an invitation that never materialized into a summit because of Kim Il Sung’s unexpected death.

Despite Kim Il Sung’s death, the North Koreans completed negotiations with the United States and the IAEA and signed the Agreed Framework, which traded North Korea’s existing nuclear facilities for oil shipments and an internationally funded and built light-water nuclear reactor. But as the North Korean leadership transferred from father to son, Pyongyang closed its doors again for three years, giving Kim Jong Il time to consolidate his power and plot his own strategy.

Faced with ecological crises that exacerbated poor agricultural techniques, Kim Jong Il soon found himself presiding over a nation facing localized famines and in no better economic position than three years before. Thus Kim Jong Il, in part to firmly establish himself as leader in the minds of his own people and abroad, triggered a new nuclear crisis.

In early 1998, North Koreans began interfering with the IAEA monitors. Pyongyang sent messages through China that it intended to unseal the 5MW reactor, then upped the ante by allowing satellites to observe the construction of an underground facility in Kumchang-ri. U.S. officials identified the site as a new nuclear facility. Pyongyang also reportedly tested high-explosive detonators like those used in a nuclear bomb. To top it all off, in August 1998, North Korea launched its Taepodong missile, which flew over part of Japan and sparked a renewed outcry of concern.

The 1998 crisis, triggered four years after the conclusion of the previous crisis (and around the same time as India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests), led to the lifting of U.S. sanctions on North Korea and promises of more aid. In return, Pyongyang allowed inspections of what turned out to be a large, empty building that U.S. inspectors deemed unsuitable for reprocessing nuclear fuel. This was North Korean nuclear diplomacy at its best. A year after the 1999 resolution of the second nuclear crisis, Kim Jong Il hosted then South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in Pyongyang in the first ever inter-Korean summit.

Kim Jong Il had successfully continued his father’s manipulation of the nuclear program and taken it to a new level. The construction of a purposeless building in Kumchang-ri brought new economic benefits at absolutely no cost to the North Koreans. The 2000 inter-Korean summit solidified the South Korean push toward economic cooperation with the North, and Pyongyang came out quite a bit ahead. All in all, quite a showing for a leader hitherto characterized as a drunken womanizer who had fallen off his horse onto his head one too many times.

Kim Jong Il had clearly signaled his intentions of what a successful resolution of the crisis would look like, even before he started escalating it. He wanted the reduction of U.S. sanctions on North Korea — sanctions that stifled the fledgling economic experiments he was overseeing as a way to reconstruct (or resuscitate) the North Korean economy.

Kim Jong Il again clearly signaled his optimum outcome before the 2003 crisis as well — a non-aggression pact with the United States, or better yet, a formal end to the Korean War and full diplomatic relations. The 2003 nuclear crisis is not a discrete event. It is a link in a chain of crisis diplomacy, initiated by a North Korea that, without the bargaining position of nuclear weapons,


would neither get the time of day from the United States nor have any assurances that Washington, in one of its post-Cold War whims, would not act to actively undermine the North Korean regime.

The escalations in the nuclear issue — 1994, 1998 and 2003 — both had specific tactical aims and were part of a broader North Korean strategy of survival which Stratfor at one time dubbed the “crazy fearsome cripple gambit.” In essence, this strategy relies on the somewhat contradictory nature of the North Korean regime itself.

It lays out a series of items accepted as reality: 1. North Korean leaders are crazy and might do anything when provoked. 2. North Korean leaders are fearsome — they possess a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, maintain one of the world’s largest standing armies and could well have nuclear weapons to boot. 3. North Korean leaders preside over a crippled nation. Economic and agricultural troubles leave North Korea perpetually on the verge of collapse.

These three points play together as such: 1. If the North Korean leadership is both crazy and fearsome, it presents a significant and unpredictable threat that requires a high level of attention. 2. Though the logical step is to disable such a regime, doing so would likely trigger the unpredictable use of vast quantities of conventional — and a few less-conventional — weapons, wreaking devastation on South Korea and Japan, if not one or two West Coast U.S. cities. 3. Knowing that the leadership is crazy and unpredictable and possesses this vast arsenal of weapons — and is most likely to use it if facing the systemic collapse of its system — North Korea’s famine and other social and economic hardships could accelerate that collapse, and that is bad. 4. Thus, countries concerned with this situation, including the United States, have but one recourse in dealing with North Korea — appeasement.

This logic worked well in the first two nuclear crises. Both were resolved relatively quickly after they escalated to precipitous heights. Both then saw a burst of economic and diplomatic ties bloom, howev-er briefly, after their resolution. And the North Korean regime remains in place, refraining from using those fearsome weapons.

And this is what North Korea expected with the 2003 nuclear crisis — a quick resolution that achieved the goal of a non-aggression pact with the United States. In fact, sources close to the North Korean regime even offered a date for their expected resolution — July 27, 2003. Pyongyang was quite ambitious with this timeframe, as the “crisis” only kicked off in October 2002, when North Korean delegates responded to U.S. accusations that Pyongyang had a secret uranium-based nuclear program under way with the cryptic, “North Korea has the right to have a uranium-based nuclear program.”

By December 2002, North Korea had begun to move fuel rods back to the 5MW reactor and ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the country. In January 2003, North Korea declared it was pulling


out of the NPT. In February it claimed it had restarted its reactor. By April, North Korea said it had processed most of the 8,000 fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, and a month later said the non-nuclear agreement with South Korea was void. By July, North Korea was again conducting high-explosives tests.

But the resolution never came. North Korean leaders failed to take into account the Bush administration’s changed perception following the Sept. 11 attacks. Whereas North Korea’s games were quaint and almost forgivable in the past, as all worked out well for a time, they were no longer so. The United States was dealing with perceived threats in a very different manner.

The U.S. administration rejected the “crazy” part of the crazy fearsome cripple gambit, and suddenly the whole plan collapsed on the North Koreans. Whereas they had expected Washington to be concerned about the potential for a nuclear-capable, missile-wielding North Korea, Washington instead called the North Korean bluff, determining that Pyongyang was neither stupid enough nor suicidal enough to carry the crisis further by launching an attack or testing a nuclear weapon. While Washington effectively ignored the North Korean bluster, it stepped up its own rhetoric and attempts to isolate the North Korean regime further.

This left Pyongyang confused, to say the least. It consulted with the Russians and Chinese, neither of whom were all that amused with the nuclear crisis, particularly coming at troubling domestic economic and political times for each of their respective nations. With little support, and no chance of direct bilateral negotiations with the United States, Pyongyang accepted the six-party talks format and soon found itself prodded by China, which had assured Washington that everything was under control.

North Korea backed off its demands for a non-aggression pact, asking instead for removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and more economic and energy aid. Washington responded by telling North Korea the United States would only deal once Pyongyang returned to its pre-2002 status and abandoned its nuclear programs and ambitions. North Korea’s nuclear gambit had begun to backfire.

Pyongyang’s interest in either of the two desired outcomes — a non-aggression pact or removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism — was the same. North Korea has carefully studied the economic opening experiences of Russia, China and a few other formerly closed states like Vietnam, and is preparing to embark on its own. The problem is, as long as there is a sense of hostility with the United States, Pyongyang will find it difficult to garner international attention and involvement in these economic experiments. Furthermore, if Pyongyang simply drops its nuclear program unilaterally — what is now referred to as the Libya model — it loses all protection against the United States’ simply applying an “Iraq solution” to North Korea. After all, North Korea was listed right next to Iran and Iraq in President Bush’s Axis of Evil.

North Korea has recently upped the ante again, having failed to garner U.S. cooperation in its plans. The reason here is twofold — first, Washington is returning to a more normal pace of operations and state of mind now that Sept. 11 is several years in the past. This, North Korea hopes, will make


Washington more amenable to simply striking a deal and getting rid of this nagging nuclear crisis on the Pacific Rim.

Second, North Korea’s economic experiments are well behind schedule, and the domestic economic situation isn’t getting any stronger by waiting around. And Kim Jong Il wants to identify a clear successor, to add a sense of stability to what will undoubtedly be a harrowing time for the hermit kingdom as it embarks on a new path toward a socialist market economy.

And so, North Korea has come up with a new “drop dead date” — Oct. 10, 2005, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party. This date is already being played up in North Korean media, months before its arrival, in everything from pep talks to the military to discussions of the current planting season. With that date in mind, North Korea began accelerating the threatening posture in February, declaring officially that it possessed nuclear weapons. In March, Pyongyang announced it was no longer bound by its self-imposed moratorium on testing ballistic missiles. Around this time, rumors from Japan said that the United States had set its own, much closer deadline — June — for the resumption of six-party talks.

Pyongyang responded in April by shutting down the Yongbyon reactor and removing the fuel rods for reprocessing. Washington responded the same month with rumors of an impending North Korean nuclear test, possibly as early as June. It based this on satellite photos of movement around a mine near Kilju and a large reviewing stand being built nearby — ostensibly for dignitaries to take in the underground nuclear test. Pyongyang has done nothing to hide this, and as they are fully aware of the non-stop satellite coverage of their small nation, it must be assumed they intend this to be seen, just as the building in 1998 was seen. In May, Pyongyang tested a KN-02 ballistic missile and declared it had completed reprocessing the fuel rods pulled from the Yongbyon reactor.

The sudden upsurge in rhetoric and actions, in threats and posturing, resembles the heightened tensions just before resolutions of the 1994 and 1998 nuclear crises. Where things go next depends on the interactions and calculations of the members of the six-party talks: North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan.

S I X PA R T Y TA L K S , F I F T E E N B I L A T E R A L C O N V E R S A T I O N S

In August 2003, representatives from the United States, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea began the short-lived six-party talks. The meetings, intended to bring a solution to the nuclear crisis, were structured to give a voice to each of the “concerned parties” to the North Korean nuclear issue. While Pyongyang preferred one-on-one talks with the United States, those were obviously not very efficient or successful. Pyongyang then accepted the multi-party format, and quickly learned to take advantage of it. The six-party talks soon became a forum for the United States and North Korea to seek additional backing for their point of view while weakening support for their opponents’. Washington, continuing its policy of aggressive neglect, basically handed responsibility for progress over to Beijing, which coordinated and hosted the six-party talks. This allowed the United States to appear engaged while pointing out the North Koreans’ intransigence.


Pyongyang used the six-party format to gain additional support for its cause — or at least to gain assistance in mollifying Washington’s inflexibility. Perhaps unexpectedly, South Korea — rather than Pyongyang’s traditional allies China and Russia — has taken the strongest position of support for North Korea.

Each of the other nations involved also used the six-party forum toward their own national interests and agendas, and the six-party talks degraded to a series of some 15 bilateral negotiations all taking place in, around and through each other. And this complex interaction shapes the framework within which North Korea calculates its next moves.

China, North Korea’s closest ally and main economic partner, thought it had gained a major political benefit by facilitating the six-party talks. Beijing attempted to establish itself as the honest broker, the best middle-man between Washington and Pyongyang. This gave Beijing a bargaining chip of its own in other dealings with the United States — it could influence either an increase or decrease in perceived threatening behavior from Pyongyang. However, Washington decided that its interests were better served by holding China responsible for North Korean behavior, something that Pyongyang soon noticed and took advantage of. Thus Beijing ended up being manipulated by the two nations it wanted to manipulate.

At the same time, China hoped to reduce Russian involvement in the six-party talks, to avoid giving Pyongyang and Washington other options. Beijing also took a very different approach with the two remaining delegates to the talks. China sees Japan as a major regional rival and a potential future threat, and Beijing sought to use its ties with Pyongyang as a lever in Japanese relations as well. After all, Japan had a Taepodong rocket fly over it. But Japan sought to break through and engage in its own bilateral talks with North Korea, interested in such seemingly unrelated issues as former kid-napped Japanese citizens.

Pyongyang grabbed at the chance for potential moves toward normalized relations with Japan, seeing this as a path to relations with the United States. However, the differences between the nations remained, and Tokyo exploited the nuclear and missile issue to add impetus to its own constitutional reform, which will include a reinterpretation of Japan’s pacifist Article Nine.

China’s ties with South Korea were quite different. Facing an increasingly untenable economic situation at home, Beijing sought to attract all the appreciation of the South Korean government — and the attendant foreign investment and economic cooperation. And Seoul, in the midst of a political realignment that had seen the rise to power of the opposition and the emergence of a new doctrine seeking a more independent Korea, jumped at the opportunity to establish close linkages outside the United States.

South Korea also had its own stake in a peaceful and rapid settlement of the nuclear issue. Seoul and Pyongyang have been moving on an increasingly similar path where both sides see the reunification of Korea as a given, and as something unlikely to come as a result of war. With an estimated two decades until reunification, Seoul launched into a program to strengthen North Korea’s infrastructure and economic capabilities, with the intent of limiting the painful realities of a unification of two nations with such vast differences in socio-economic status and technology.


This left Seoul often at odds with the United States and Japan, both of which maintained a much harder stance against North Korea and sought to squeeze the regime out of Pyongyang. North Korea exploited this dynamic as well, latching on to Korean nationalist issues and joining Seoul in criticisms of Japan. Pyongyang also maintained dialogue with Seoul, cutting it at moments when it was beneficial to “remind” South Korea that the United States was hindering reunification and peaceful coexistence. This impression was reinforced by the coincidental timing of the restructuring of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea sits within this framework, observing the world around it and carefully planning its next moves.

Pyongyang does not seek a military confrontation with the United States. North Korea is quite confident that, though it might be able to inflict a painful wound on the United States and could keep up a guerilla campaign following its defeat, that defeat is inevitable. And since the North Korean regime is neither crazy nor suicidal, it wants to find the right level of pressure — high enough to elicit the desired result without crossing the threshold that will trigger complete isolation, regime change or war.

At home, North Korean leaders see an increasingly dismal economic situation. They have already experimented with lifting restrictions on local rural markets and are phasing out food certificates and other similar controls. At the same time, while the Sinuiju Special Economic Zone plan failed, Pyongyang is trying other variations on the theme of isolated bubbles of foreign investment and technology flow. The main focus is currently in Kaesong, where South Korean industry is starting to trickle in, along with energy supplies from south of the DMZ.

But for Kim Jong Il to feel comfortable enough to go much further, he needs to feel secure in his position and reduce the international impression that a war is imminent on the Korean Peninsula or that, if someone decided to invest, they would have to deal with the United States’ ire. Though creating a nuclear crisis seems perhaps an odd way to go about it, Pyongyang is currently trying to gain some of those assurances through a non-aggression pact, removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism or, preferably, formal diplomatic relations with the United States.

This approach worked in 1998, reducing U.S. sanctions and opening the door for a diplomatic push into Europe. And North Korea has made other more recent observations as well. The United States attacked Iraq to force regime change, claiming Baghdad was seeking nuclear weapons. At the same time, U.S. officials hinted that countries already in possession of nuclear weapons would be dealt with through diplomacy rather than invasion.

With this stage set, but with the United States not responding as desired, Pyongyang is now raising the stakes even higher. Pulling out of the NPT was not enough. Reprocessing nuclear fuel was not enough. And so Pyongyang is sending signals that a nuclear test is imminent. In fact, Pyongyang has long communicated that this crisis had one of two outcomes: a new relationship with the United States or a formally recognized nuclear North Korea.


The make-or-break time is now rapidly approaching. Pyongyang is signaling that time still remains for diplomacy, but not much. Washington is still assessing whether North Korea is bluffing or not.

North Korea knows that a nuclear test will have real consequences. On one hand, Pakistan’s nuclear tests did not result in an invasion, or even significant pressure for regime change. And now, less than a decade later, the United States and Pakistan are partners, however uneasy, and Washington continues to support the stability of the Musharraf regime, despite its lack of democratic credentials.

On the other hand, a nuclear test removes the ambiguity that has thus far insulated North Korea from international sanction or intervention. It also threatens to trigger a significant military buildup throughout Northeast Asia and may well lead to the nuclearization of Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan. This is not an outcome China wants. And Beijing has worked to make that explicitly clear to Pyongyang — a nuclear test is the red line North Korea cannot cross.

Beijing would like to keep a chained dog on its northeastern frontier for leverage with other problems, but North Korea does not always play along with its neighbor. So China is making clear its calculus to North Korea. If the United States carries out pre-emptive strikes on North Korea — targeted tactical bombing of key facilities — Beijing will withhold assistance or intervention, though it will, of course, roundly criticize the action in international forums. If Washington invades North Korea, China may well act — but only to seize Pyongyang before U.S. forces could do so, thus firmly estab-lishing China as a key facilitator of any post-war situation. China replaced its border police along the North Korean border with military units a few years back, and remains poised to intervene if it deems it necessary.

North Korea also risks losing its burgeoning cooperation with South Korea, which, while nowhere near replacing China as a primary economic partner, is certainly working to develop and restructure the North Korean economic landscape. Even in the best-case scenario for the North, a nuclear test would trigger increased isolation (even by Beijing and Moscow) and put off any new attempts at economic openings or reforms for several years. Given the current state of the North Korean economy and the exhibited urgency of the regime, this becomes a last-resort tactic.

In fact, if North Korea really wanted to surprise the world with a nuclear test unnoticed until after it happened, it could easily do so. But instead, Pyongyang is playing to the satellites that pass over its territory every day. There is little need to build a large reviewing stand near the old mine in which the nuclear test would take place. In fact, if the test succeeds, there should be little evidence at the surface. And if it fails, or if there is an accident, being too near the test site is not really the best of ideas.

For Pyongyang, this is a simple proposition — it will suspend its nuclear program in return for removal from the terrorist list and for assurances, preferably in treaty form, that the United States will not attempt to attack North Korea or undermine its regime through subterfuge or other methods. For the United States, it is also simple — unless Pyongyang gets rid of its nuclear program completely (which would require the constant presence of international inspectors and monitors in North Korea), no major breakthroughs will occur on the diplomatic front. If Pyongyang wants to back down for less — verbal assurances and promises of continued talks, for example — then Washington is ready to play ball.


So will North Korea test? Only if it sees no other recourse, or if Beijing’s position shifts. Pyongyang keeps delaying the test, hoping it will never need to follow through. If there are signs of imminent U.S. action — pre-emptive strikes against North Korean facilities, for example — then Pyongyang will likely go ahead with a full test, to shock Washington into holding back. In most other cases, a full nuclear test does more to hurt North Korea’s position than to bring it further forward.

But North Korea will never fully give up the technology for nuclear weapons. Even with new economic and diplomatic agreements, it wants to preserve the capability. Secretly, South Korean officials are not too upset about that, knowing that one day the program will belong to a unified Korea.

A partial solution appears the most likely course at this time — energy supplies to North Korea, a watered down non-aggression pact and the return of IAEA inspectors. But if Pyongyang finds its situation again deteriorating, the whole cycle could rise up again, as it has twice before. Each little opening exposes Kim Jong Il more to domestic shifts — he has carefully watched the revolutions in the former Soviet republics in the past year and monitored the economic and social shifts in China brought about by economic policies and relaxing social controls there.

If China sees the benefit of once again becoming a sponsor nation to North Korea, for example, the need for nuclear bargaining diminishes. If domestic issues require a very visible show of technology that North Koreans can rally around while chanting nationalistic praises, a new missile test or even a nuclear test may be in order, re-instilling the sense of national embattlement and achievement despite international isolation. This was in part the intent of the 1998 satellite launch as well.

A nuclear test is extremely risky — it could fail, malfunction or trigger any number of ill consequences for the regime. Some in Pyongyang argue that it can follow the Pakistan model and re-enter the international community after only a few years of isolation triggered by the nuclear tests. In particular, given that U.S. troop levels are low, they argue that any test must be sooner, rather than later. Once it is carried out, the window of opportunity for U.S. interdiction closes.

Others argue that any test will sound the death knell of the regime and system, either through invasion or through sheer isolation. They don’t feel North Korea can survive if it is cut off from Chinese food and energy supplies, and they know that Chinese forces along the border can simply bottle in North Korea, leaving it no connections.

In the end, Kim Jong Il will base his decision on the best prospects for regime preservation. Kim sees this autumn as the decision-making point, and until then, the calculus constantly changes.


Custom Intelligence Services: Consulting Tailored to Your Intelligence Needs

STRATFOR has a proven track record of offering highly confidential custom intelligence and decision-oriented, actionable intelligence to corporations, businesses, government agencies, and high-profile executives. We equip our clients with critical intelligence that will allow them to better manage risk, develop strategies for corporate growth, protect their brands, and ensure personal security.

These are just a few of the customized services we offer:

Threat and Opportunity Assessments – Assessments noting or analyzing potential or existing risks to or opportunities for a client’s assets, infrastructure, personnel, or brand equity. Our forecasting ex-pertise assists our clients in formulating long-range strategic plans by identifying risks and opportuni-ties, defining the most efficient deployment of resources, and ultimately providing maximum return on investment and profitability.

Monitoring – Monitoring of a social, political, economic or security issue vital to a client’s business, with regular reports or updates provided as developments occur. Monitoring provides our clients with the necessary intelligence to anticipate trends, make informed decisions regarding global issues, and enhance and protect their brands.

Personalized Security Services – Assessing risks to the physical safety of executives or other key per-sonnel, as requested by the customer.





Geopolitical Intelligence and Analysis: Online Intelligence to Keep You Ahead Of the Game

As a leading provider of strategic intelligence, STRATFOR delivers its renowned subscription intel-ligence services to many prestigious Global 2000 clients. STRATFOR gives you the insights, analyses, and unbiased commentary you need on global developments, and delivers it all in concise formats you can use.

STRATFOR Premium – An all-inclusive package covering STRATFOR’s expert analysis, net assess-ments, quarterly and annual forecasts, terrorism coverage and special reports. Plus, automatic ser-vices such as email alerts, situation reports, the Morning Intelligence Brief, and Travel Security reports provide up-to-the-minute geopolitical intelligence you can use.

STRATFOR Enhanced – A specialized selection of daily analysis designed for those who need action-able intelligence at a truly affordable price. You also get the Geopolitical Diary, STRATFOR Weekly, and valuable periodic pieces, such as regional net assessments, situation reports, alerts and Intelli-gence Guidance.

STRATFOR Standard – Intelligence for those who want to know more than what the media reports, but don’t have bottom-line intelligence needs. You get daily analysis, situation reports and STRAT-FOR’s intelligence guidance.

World Terrorism Report – An entire site dedicated to analyzing major terrorist threats and trends around the world, as well as developments in counterterrorism. This service is an invaluable resource for security professionals and individuals interested in understanding terrorist motivations and move-ments, and potential affects across the globe.

Enterprise Subscription Packages – STRATFOR also offers multiple-user packages to corporations, government agencies, educational and non-profit institutions that need reliable intelligence and in-sightful analysis and forecasts in their everyday activities.





STRATEGIC FORECASTING, INC.1666 K STREET, SUITE 600WASHINGTON, DC 20006

TELEPHONE(U.S.) 202.429.1800

WEB SITEWWW.STRATFOR.COM

STRATFOR nk report 5 05 - WikiLeaks · 2014. 1. 14. · nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, claiming to...

Documents

Transcript of STRATFOR nk report 5 05 - WikiLeaks · 2014. 1. 14. · nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, claiming to...