Strategy for Disaster & Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific (SRDP)
Strategy for and Resilient Development in the Pacific (SRDP) · 2014. 2. 9. · PICTs is...
Transcript of Strategy for and Resilient Development in the Pacific (SRDP) · 2014. 2. 9. · PICTs is...
Strategy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Development in the Pacific
(SRDP)
Supporting Documentation
3 February, 2014
Table of Contents
Purpose of this Supporting Documentation 1
Additional Rationale for the Strategy 1
Preparation of the Strategy 1
Where are we Now? A Situation Analysis 3
Lessons Learned from the Mid‐term Reviews of the PIFACC and the RFA 6 PIFACC Review 6 RFA Review 11
Grounds for Action 16
Achieving the Future We Want 18
Emerging and New Issues 19 Ocean Acidification 20 Loss and Damage 21 Forced Relocation 22 Geoengineering 23 Charges for Emissions from International Transport 24
Strategic Goals 25 Strengthened Risk Management, including Climate Change Adaptation 25 Low Carbon Development 26 Strengthened Disaster Preparedness, Response and Recovery 28
Implementation 30 Effective Planning and Decision Making 30 Strengthened Governance and Institutional Arrangements 30 Partnerships and Coordination 31 Information and Knowledge Management,
including Communications and Advocacy 31 Resource Mobilisation 32 Life Cycle Approach to Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Learning 35
Abbreviations 37
Glossary 39
Endnotes 41
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Purpose of this Supporting Documentation
The information in this document complements that contained in the Strategy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Development in the Pacific (SRDP), allowing that document to be more focussed and reader friendly.
Additional Rationale for the Strategy
The 2010 mid‐term reviews of the two regional frameworks recommended greater policy coherence at the regional level, in order to provide a more conducive enabling environment for managing disaster‐ and climate‐related risks at national and sub‐national levels. This included improved alignment with a strengthened Pacific Plan, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change processes, the post‐2015 development agenda and with the successors to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), the Sustainable Development Goals, and HFA2, respectively.
Climate change adaptation (CCA), emissions reduction, and disaster risk management (DRM) are not sectors in themselves. Disaster‐ and climate‐related risks are related, cross‐cutting development issues. These are best addressed by a joint approach, which should normally be implemented through the policies and plans of the economic and social development sectors, including in the context of addressing other cross cutting considerations such as poverty reduction, gender equity, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and ecosystem management. This is especially the case for small island countries and territories. Failure to better integrate climate and disaster risks, across the various sectors, seriously compromises all efforts to develop sustainably.
However, disaster‐ and climate‐related risks do not always relate to the same hazards, such as in the case of earthquakes, tsunami and volcanic eruptions. Moreover, immediate post‐disaster responses, an important component of DRM, have few commonalities with managing slow onset climate‐related risks. The Strategy accommodates these differences by promoting an all hazards approach, and by acknowledging that heightened capabilities to respond to, and recover from, any disaster are key to reducing the impact of these events on social and economic development.
Where possible and appropriate, a number of Pacific island countries and territories (PICTs) have already made considerable progress in implementing integrated approaches to managing disaster and climate risks. These developments have occurred with respect to policies, plans, implementation and institutional strengthening, among others1. While the two separate regional frameworks related to disaster risk management and to climate change2 had much in common initially, they usually resulted in a distinct separation of policies, institutional arrangements and plans, such as National Action Plans (NAPs) for DRM and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). But over the lifetime of these two regional frameworks PICTs themselves have increasingly adopted and implemented more integrated approaches to managing disaster and climate risks.
Preparation of the Strategy
Consistent with the trends described above, the historic first Joint Meeting of the Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk Management and the Pacific Climate Change Roundtable3 called on the disaster risk management and climate change communities to expedite preparation of an integrated regional strategy for DRM and climate change, with these activities being framed by disaster and climate resilient development (Figure 1). This will help ensure that development in the Pacific is more resilient to these risks, and development gains are not jeopardised by disasters or climate change. Although integration of disaster and climate considerations is ongoing in all regions of the world, the Pacific is the first region to develop a comprehensive regional strategy that brings together the management of both disaster‐ and climate‐related risks within the context of resilient development. In this regard, it can be said that the Pacific is in the lead, globally.
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Figure 1. Framework for disaster and climate resilient development. Building and sustaining resilience includes such considerations as human security and humanitarian action.
Subsequently, and consistent with their respective mandates, the 2011 meetings of the Pacific Platform for DRM, the 14th Regional Meteorological Services Directors Meeting, the Governing Council of the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and the Committee of Regional Governments and Administrations of the Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC) endorsed the preparation of an integrated regional strategy. The new Strategy was reviewed and strengthened at relevant regional meetings, culminating in it being made available to Pacific Leaders in 2015, for their approval. It will come into effect in 2016, thereby replacing the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for Action (2005 – 2015) (RFA) and the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change (2006 – 2015) (PIFACC).
The process of developing the Strategy, including its related implementation arrangements and monitoring and evaluation framework, was commonly referred to as the ‘Roadmap process’. It was jointly facilitated by SPC, SPREP and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), and supported by a Roadmap Technical Working Group4 (RTWG) which assisted PICTs in the development of the Strategy. Their efforts were overseen by a Steering Committee5 that provided leadership and guidance throughout the Roadmap process.
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The Roadmap process adhered to the following principles:
‘Inclusion’ of multiple stakeholder interests in the formulation of the new strategy;
‘Leadership’ by PICTs in defining the parameters and focus of the new strategy; and
‘Ownership’ by PICTs and supporting partner organizations to ensure a sustainable approach to the implementation of the new strategy6.
The Roadmap process resulted in the Strategy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Development in the Pacific (SRDP), including the decision to identify and elaborate the four pillars of disaster and climate resilient development:
strengthened risk management;
low carbon development;
strengthened preparedness, response, relief and recovery; and
adaptive management of new and emerging issues.
The Strategy describes how the objectives related to each of these pillars will be achieved through effective and efficient implementation, such as informed decision‐making, strengthening institutional arrangements and national capacity, clarifying roles and responsibilities of national, regional and international stakeholders, partnerships and coordination structures, communications, information management, advocacy, adequate and effective resource mobilization, and a life‐cycle approach to monitoring, reporting and evaluation. A results based management framework provides a structured summary of the Strategy’s goals, objectives, targets (mid and end of term), indicators and means of verification.
As a result of the learning that has been achieved over the lifetimes of the separate regional frameworks, the present Strategy places greater emphasis on:
a risk management approach, including in relation to both immediate and longer term changes in climate;
enhancing the resilience of social and economic development outcomes; the needs of vulnerable and marginalized groups, as well as on the contributions members of
these groups can make to enhancing resilience, especially at household and community levels; the needs and contributions of the private sector; and acknowledging the diversity within the region.
Where are we Now? A Situation Analysis
After the Sub‐Saharan Africa region, the Pacific islands region has been the most off‐track for achieving all of the Millennium Development Goals by 20157. Significantly, as shown in Figure 2, progress has been poorest for Goal 1 (to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger). This Goal is judged to be the most adversely affected by weather and climate extremes and variations, and by natural hazards that, due to the inherent vulnerability of Pacific communities, often lead to disasters.
Importantly, even the modest development gains already achieved will continue to be at risk from natural hazards such as cyclones and drought. These risks are being exacerbated by climate change. For example, the subsistence lifestyles common in the Pacific region are highly vulnerable to both rapid (e.g. cyclones) and slow (e.g. drought) onset events, as well as to inter‐annual and longer‐term variations and changes in climate.8 But even if climate change was not occurring, the vulnerability of PICTs is increasing, due to economic and social changes such as population growth and migration (internal and external), poorly planned coastal development, unplanned urban growth and land use, and environmental and ecosystem degradation including contamination of sub‐surface and coastal waters.
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Figure 2. Progress in the Pacific to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and their Sensitivity to Climate Change and Disasters (Note: H = high; M = medium. A grade of “low” was available, but not given).9
Vanuatu is at the top of the World Risk Index. The Index assesses: exposure to natural hazards; susceptibility as a function of public infrastructure, housing conditions, nutrition and general economic framework; coping capacities; and adaptive capacities to future natural events and climate change. Four other Pacific island countries (Tonga, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji), out of only seven assessed, are in the top 15 of 173 countries for which the Index is calculated. Eight10 of the 20 countries with the highest average annual disaster losses scaled by gross domestic product are in the Pacific.11
The majority of the 284 disasters that occurred in the Pacific islands region between 1950 and 2013 were caused by severe storms, including tropical cyclones (Table 1). Both individually and collectively, these disasters had enormous social and economic consequences. In many Pacific countries the accumulated impacts of small and medium‐sized hazard events are equivalent to, or exceed, those of single large disasters. Low‐intensity events are typically more widespread, affecting a comparatively larger number of people. They are also likely to involve damage to housing, land, and local infrastructure, rather than major mortality or destruction of nationally‐critical economic assets. As the poor, and other vulnerable, marginalized groups, tend to live in more hazard‐prone areas, increases in the frequency of these lower‐intensity hazards have a large impact on poverty.12 Importantly, the consequences of these small‐ and medium‐sized disasters are far more amenable to being reduced through investments in DRM and CCA, including prevention preparedness and building back better after a disaster.
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Table 1: Consequences of the Disasters in the Pacific Islands Region 1950 – 2013.13
The total value of the infrastructure, buildings and cash crops in the Pacific islands region that is at risk from tropical cyclones, earthquakes and tsunami is estimated to be over USD 112 billion. This translates into annual average economic losses being as high as 7% of gross domestic product (GDP), with natural disaster losses in any single year sometimes exceeding the GDP.14
A comparison of current and future tropical cyclone risk for 14 Pacific island countries used global climate change models to calculate projected financial losses from cyclone damage to buildings, infrastructure and crops in each country, for both mid and end of this century. No adjustment was made for future changes in any of these assets. The findings indicate increasing losses for the region, largely as a result of the projected increase in category 5 cyclones. While, for the region as a whole, the increase in average annual losses is relatively small, the end‐of‐century increases for many individual countries are large – for example, 25.4% for Samoa, 14.8% for Niue and 7.6% for Vanuatu. Increases are anticipated to be greater for buildings than for infrastructure and crops, with wind being the main contributor to building loss. Flooding is likely to be the main contributor to increasing infrastructure losses.15
Notwithstanding that PICTs make only marginal contributions to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they are disproportionately vulnerable to climate change and to weather‐ and climate‐related disasters. As an ‘ocean of islands’, the Pacific islands region is highly vulnerable because of the high frequency of, and exposure to, a wide variety of natural hazards (cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, electrical storms, extreme winds, floods, landslides, storm surges, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions), geographical remoteness and isolation, and dispersion across the vast Pacific Ocean.
Climate change is exacerbating the current vulnerabilities of PICTs, with CCA and disaster risk reduction (DRR) fast‐becoming the key risk management response options. Climate change is affecting food, water, health, economic, environmental and political security. Responses must extend beyond concerns related to the anticipated increases in weather‐ and climate‐related hazards, to considering the underlying causes of vulnerability to hazards such as hardship and isolation, poorly informed planning, or no planning at all.
Recently prepared climate change projections16 show that, among other changes, there will be large increases in the occurrence of extremely hot days and warm nights, and an increase in the number of heavy rain days (20–50 mm), such that extreme rainfall events which currently occur once every 20 years on average will occur four times per year, on average, by 2055 and seven times per year, on average, by 2090 under a high emissions scenario. Such changes in rainfall will be especially marked close to the equator
In the South Pacific sub‐basins there could be a decrease in the frequency of tropical cyclones, with a possible increase in the proportion of more intense storms. On the other hand, in the North Pacific sub‐basin a decrease in both the frequency of tropical cyclones and the proportion of more intense storms is projected. While not uniform across the region, sea‐level rise will generally be similar to the global average.
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Depending on the GHG emissions scenario, global mean sea‐level rise for 2081−2100, rela ve to 1986–2005, will likely be in the range of 0.26 to 0.98 m, with the rate during 2081–2100 being as high as 8 to16 mm yr–1. Regardless of the scenario, the rate of sea‐level rise will very likely exceed that observed during 1971–2010, due to increased ocean warming and increased loss of mass from glaciers and ice sheets17. Ocean acidification is expected to increase, with greatest rates occurring in the eastern equatorial Pacific and affecting the easternmost islands of Kiribati, while droughts are projected to occur less often18.
Climate projections also show that, by the mid‐ to late twenty‐first century, there will be an intensification of both El‐Niño‐driven drying in the western Pacific Ocean and rainfall increases in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific.19
From community through to regional levels, many initiatives have already been undertaken to reduce climate and disaster risks, covering policies, plans, implementation and institutional strengthening, among others. Overall, the region is witnessing major transformations in DRM and CCA, including increasing emphasis on disaster prevention and preparedness. This is in response to the growing recognition of the clear moral and economic case for investing in DRR rather than bearing the full economic and human costs of devastation when a disaster strikes. After a disaster, both DRR and CCA considerations come into play when building back better.
DRR initiatives increasingly include climate change considerations, thereby taking into account both current and anticipated disaster risks. In addition, CCA initiatives are now better informed, planned and implemented. Together, these efforts are increasingly aimed at alleviating poverty and reducing risks to other development outcomes.
One outcome of these efforts has been a significant reduction in the number of human fatalities when a disaster occurs. This almost certainly reflects the investments made in disaster preparedness and response in the Pacific in recent decades, including improvements in early warning systems, both nationally and regionally. Significantly, the number of people affected by each disaster, and the economic losses per disaster, are still increasing. These trends are consistent with population growth, development patterns and, in many cases, movement of people to more hazard‐prone, peri‐urban areas. Therefore, the Pacific continues to experience an unfortunate combination of circumstances ‐ poorly planned and implemented socioeconomic development initiatives are increasing the already significant exposure to natural hazards, including extreme weather and climate events20. While this situation is not unique to the Pacific, the statistics presented above, as well as elsewhere21, demonstrate that the Pacific islands region is an extreme case. Numerous studies for the Pacific22, and for other regions23, have highlighted the changes that need to be made in order to increase the resilience of development outcomes.
Lessons Learned from the Mid‐term Reviews of the PIFACC and the RFA
A. PIFACC Review
The mid‐term review of the PIFACC24 was aimed at strengthening the relevancy of the PIFACC and its Action Plan, with specific objectives to:
consider gaps including ecosystem‐based approaches, adaptation technology, links with mitigation, disaster risk management and community‐based approaches; and
focus on ensuring that a clear set of recommendations for how the PIFACC might be implemented over the remaining term, which links to the operations of the PCCR and includes a specific and measurable performance framework.
The available evidence suggested that the main practical benefits resulting from having a regional policy on climate change had been four‐fold:
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PIFACC was providing a regional mandate and an ‘entry point’ for taking action at the regional level that supports subsequent implementation at the national level to address climate change;
PIFACC was being used by some donors and regional organizations as high‐level guidance when deciding how they will assist the region to address the issue of climate change;
some countries had used the PIFACC to guide preparation of national policies, including both wider development and more focussed climate change policies; and
some countries had referred to PIFACC and its Action Plan when developing a national action plan or projects, in order to show alignment with regional and donor priorities.
The lack of formal monitoring and reporting procedures in PIFACC implementation made it difficult to judge its overall impact. The available evidence suggested that the impact was far less than desirable, and considerably less than its potential. For example, at country level the PIFACC was seldom used proactively as a guidance document during project planning and related discussions. Most government officials did not see the relevance of the PIFACC to national level activities. This was in part because there had never been a sense of collective national ownership of the PIFACC. At both regional and national levels, actions to address climate change reflected national and sector priorities and the strategic plans of regional and international agencies. Although these might well be consistent with the PIFACC, they did not necessarily result in implementation of PIFACC Action Plan per se.
Stakeholders indicated a high preference for a policy that:
focuses on high‐level strategic guidance which facilitates linkages with other cross‐cutting themes, such as water and food security, as well as with sector‐based responses to climate change;
has a scope which is consistent with the resources available for implementation as well as with the ability to monitor, report on and evaluate its implementation;
provides a high‐level framework for actions to address climate change that, in the Pacific, are best undertaken at the regional level due to economies of scale, capacity constraints and other considerations;
provides high‐level strategic guidance related to actions best undertaken by countries, including mainstreaming, planning, preparing work programmes and on‐the‐ground interventions, including ecosystem‐ and community‐based initiatives;
acts as a high‐level advocacy document, highlighting the need for an integrated and coordinated approach to reducing the adverse impacts of climate change, while also acknowledging the capacity and financial and other resource constraints faced by countries and the region as a whole;
provides a framework for, and high‐level strategic guidance on, the integration of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, how to benefit from other synergies and linkages, how best to pursue ecosystem‐ and community‐based approaches, and on promotion and uptake of appropriate adaptation and mitigation technologies;
links with the processes related to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such as preparation of National Communications, meeting other obligations under the Convention and effective engagement of countries in negotiations;
sends signals to development assistance partners, including donors and regional and international organisations, as to how they might best assist countries, and hence the region as a whole, to address climate change;
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is supported at regional level by strong institutional arrangements and effective operational processes and oversight; and
through monitoring and reporting, can demonstrate the level of national and regional efforts to address the issue of climate change, and the extent to which the efforts have been successful.
Key issues raised by stakeholders were:
the need for a consensus on the purpose of the PIFACC;
the current low awareness and use of PIFACC, at both national and regional levels;
the absence of direct funding for PIFACC implementation, including for monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities;
while the Action Plan has always been viewed as a “living document”, is there a similar opportunity to revise the PIFACC itself, based on the findings of the mid‐term review?
the need to lift the level of the current Action Plan to presentation of high‐level strategies and, in doing so, differentiate between what can be best considered and delivered at national and regional levels;
how broad or focussed should the scope of PIFACC be, given that climate change is a cross‐cutting issue, but also that there are other regional policies which address climate change concerns?
the current preamble does not provide historical and institutional contexts for the policy framework;
the “principles” in the current PIFACC are in fact action themes; the revised PIFACC should include meaningful principles;
what are the most appropriate institutional arrangements to support implementation of the PIFACC?
what is an appropriate monitoring and assessment framework for the PIFACC?
There was no suggestion that a regional climate change policy is not needed. The many new and increased levels of risk that climate change brings to the region are well documented. The critical importance of climate change to the sustainability of development in the region, the many players involved in addressing the issue, and the substantial resources that are being allocated and utilized in the region were the main reasons given, for having a regional policy on climate change. A regional climate change policy that continues to have the support of all parties – countries, donors and regional and international organisations ‐ is vital.
There is a need for high‐level strategies able to accommodate emerging issues such as ocean acidification and loss of land as a result of sea‐level rise. The supporting narratives for each strategy should consider such aspects as ecosystem‐based approaches, adaptation and mitigation technologies, links between adaptation and the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, disaster risk management and community‐based approaches to addressing climate change impacts, as well as the need to focus on interventions that deliver tangible, on‐the‐ground benefits, rather than on further policy development and planning.
The review proposed that four high‐level strategies (enhancing resilience to climate change, in part through adaptation and disaster risk reduction; strengthening the capacity to respond, including through improved governance, decision making, coordination, education, training and mobilization of resources; achieving sustainable low carbon development; and monitoring, reporting and evaluation) be supported, at regional level, by seven implementation strategies, namely:
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research and development – due to common needs and circumstances, limited national research capacities and the comparative advantage of regional and multi‐country research institutions such as the University of the South Pacific and the University of Papua New Guinea;
human resources development – advanced and specialized training is often conducted with greater effectiveness and efficiency by regional bodies;
enhancing governance and supporting policy development and planning – countries need strategic advice and support to ensure a strong enabling environment for responses to climate change; many regional and international agencies have a comparative advantage in this respect and can achieve economies of scale;
partnerships, coordination and finance mobilization – with the many players involved at national, regional and international levels there is need to effective coordination and partnership approaches that ensure national capacities are used with maximum efficiency;
enhancing effective engagement in international climate change negotiations – the focus is on strengthening the negotiation skills of national delegates, including their capacity to absorb and utilize specialized information, as well as exploring opportunities for Pacific island delegations to adopt and pursue further common negotiating positions;
knowledge generation and management – in many cases only regional bodies, and their international partners, have the capacity to generate specialized information, while considerable gains in efficiency and effectiveness can be obtained if information is managed and disseminated regionally; and
monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the aggregated national responses to climate change, and the resulting outcomes from a regional perspective.
The above represent a limited number of actions that are best undertaken at the regional level. These can help address national needs as well as support associated actions at national level. Identification of such actions is informed by opportunities to achieve economies of scale and by the comparative advantage of regional and international organizations to implement the actions regionally while also delivering outputs and outcomes for countries in an efficient and effective manner.
The review recommended that, because they will be delivered regionally, the seven PIFACC implementation strategies should be reflected in the work programmes of the relevant CROP and other agencies operating regionally, rather than in a PIFACC action plan. To ensure effective implementation of these strategies it was considered important that regional and international partners, including donors, allocate adequate and predictable financial and other relevant resources. This would include timely and targetted support of SPREP’s role in coordinating the implementation and operationalisation of the PIFACC.
The review also noted that DRM and CCA share commonalities in purpose in that they aim to reduce the vulnerability of societies to hazards by improving the ability to better anticipate, resist and recover from their impacts. DRR is increasingly contributing to adaptation as the DM debate moves beyond core humanitarian actions of emergency response, relief and reconstruction towards disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. However, some geophysical hazards are unrelated to climate change, at least in the short to medium term. For this reason alone the review emphasised that there can never be a total convergence of DRR and CCA.
In the Pacific, weather‐ and climate‐related hazards underpin the majority of disasters. Thus, at the operational level in countries and communities, DRR and CCA are largely indistinguishable. It is difficult for countries to make effective use of two regional policy frameworks that have so much in common. It is therefore desirable to work towards harmonization of the two frameworks, including much of the monitoring and reporting.
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The review noted that the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for Action was also undergoing a mid‐term review, and recommended that every effort be made to coordinate the two reviews. This provides a real opportunity to harmonize these two regional policy frameworks, and the implementation efforts.
A lack of appropriate institutional arrangements, and support, were highlighted by the review as being among the many reasons offered for the poor performance in implementing the PIFACC. In terms of supporting more effective implementation, it was reaffirmed that a strengthened Pacific Climate Change Roundtable (PCCR) have principal regional oversight for the monitoring and evaluation of the PIFACC. Its role would also be to help ensure a rational and effective use of resources through assessment of the regional, sectoral, thematic and national work programmes that represent the collective Pacific response to climate change.
The work of the PCCR could be supported by both SPREP, serving as its secretariat, and by joint working groups comprising government officials with relevant expertise along with representatives of development assistance partners, including donors and relevant regional and international organizations. A working group could be established for each of the four high‐level strategies in the PIFACC, while also taking into account the needs and opportunities reflected in other relevant regional policies.
The review also noted that there was cautious agreement among relevant CROP agencies on the desirability of holding joint meetings of the Pacific Platform for DRM and the PCCR in alternate years (noting that the Platform meets annually while the PCCR meets bi‐annually), with perhaps one day of joint meetings (plenary session plus meetings of joint working groups). These would be based on the working groups already existing under the Disaster Risk Management Platform and the PCCR. Similar benefits would arise if the PCCR had comparable links with the Regional Meteorological Directors’ meeting and with the Pacific Energy Advisory Group, among others.
The lack of quantitative performance indicators, baseline information and performance targets was identified as another of the reasons why there had not been more effective implementation of the PIFACC, and why there is little knowledge of what the PIFACC has achieved. It was proposed that implementation of a simple and yet effective PIFACC monitoring and evaluation framework should be funded as part of the SPREP work programme, with reports being submitted to the SPREP Governing Council via the PCCR. In the proposed monitoring and evaluation framework for PIFACC, the emphasis was on process and outcomes, but some indicators related to inputs were also included.
Placing an additional monitoring and reporting burden on countries and CROP agencies was considered difficult to justify. The severe capacity constraints experienced by all Pacific island countries and territories had to be acknowledged. For these reasons, a simple monitoring and evaluation framework was proposed, based on the four high‐level strategies, and including performance indicators, baseline information and performance targets.
As part of their normal monitoring activities, performance information using the indicators could be provided by countries, territories, development partners and the joint working groups. The information could be submitted online, at least annually, using the Climate Change Portal maintained by SPREP. Provision could also be made for submitting, accepting and utilizing meta‐data. Passwords could ensure that information would be secure, where necessary. Subsequently, SPREP could aggregate and evaluate the information, including reporting to the PCCR in time for its bi‐annual meetings. The PCCR could, in turn, report the regionally aggregated results to the SPREP Governing Council and, through it, to the Forum Leaders and other relevant parties.
With the agreement of a country, national information ‐ as opposed to just the regionally aggregated information ‐ could also be made available to all parties via the Portal. This would
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provide SPREP and other development partners with the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of their bi‐lateral work programmes on an ongoing basis.
The PIFACC monitoring and evaluation framework presented at part of the report drew on the monitoring and evaluation plans of other regional policies, including the Pacific Plan, the RFA, the Framework for Action on Energy Security in the Pacific and the Action Strategy for Nature Conservation in the Pacific Islands Region. In particular, efforts were made to harmonize monitoring of the implementation of the PIFACC and the RFA .
B. RFA Review
In 2010 a mid‐term review (MTR) of the RFA was undertaken in 201025. Since then, two biennial progress reviews of the RFA have been completed for 2009‐2011 and 2011‐2013, at regional and national levels. In the case of the 2011/2013 progress review, climate change related programmes, initiatives and mechanisms across the region were also captured to “put into practice the rhetoric surrounding the integration of these two (DRR and CCA) fields”26.
These reviews provide commentary on progress made and lessons learned in implementing the six themes of the RFA. These lessons will be important considerations for guiding and shaping the development of any future regional DRM‐related policy and strategic planning instruments including during the Roadmap process27.
In the case of the MTR for the RFA, eight questions were used to frame the review and form the basis for the following key lessons and findings:
Regionally, the RFA has been instrumental in bringing various stakeholders together, strengthening partnerships and improving coordination in DRM and has been a useful advocacy and policy guidance tool. Nationally, the RFA has had a low profile and reach, across governments and within countries and has largely failed to engage with the wider cross section of government departments;
The tendency for DRM priorities to be driven and determined by major disaster events rather than by strategic guidance of the RFA and addressing underlying risks. Attributing the level and extent of the RFA’s contribution to reducing losses in the Pacific, PICTs and communities has been difficult to identify and determine, due to the lack of reliable and readily available data;
RFA endorsement by Pacific Island Forum Leaders in 2005 has not translated into DRM being reflected in the national sustainable development plans or strategies of all PICTs. There has been increased recognition of DRM by decision makers in some PICTs which have resulted in the development of National Action Plans for DRM (NAPs), and more recently the development of Joint National Action Plans for DRM and Climate Change (JNAP) by other PICTs, which has been considered a promising approach towards achieving greater political will;
Human and financial resource constraints faced by many government departments at national and sub‐national level often render them unable to absorb technical assistance and resources to effectively implement and respond to national policy commitments. The MTR recommends that succession planning and mapping career paths for DRM specialists could address the challenges of high staff turnover and ongoing capacity building requirements. Capacity building through the use of counterparts, internships and mentoring should also be considered28. Many regional partners also face capacity constraints and the frequent emergency response operations that they support often divert resources and effort away from programmes that they may have for disaster risk reduction. Sustained budgetary allocations for DRM remain challenging for governments to and DRM budgets are often reallocated to other pressing needs and priorities;
At the sub‐national level there is little, if any, awareness of the RFA within Pacific Island communities, as well as at local government level. A major challenge is that there is no budget allocation for disaster risk management at the provincial and district level in most countries.
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Where it exists, the understanding of disaster risk management is very limited, explaining why there have been no significant improvements with regard to risk sensitive infrastructure and development planning; and
Although the RFA includes CBDRM, traditional knowledge and culture as cross‐cutting issues, NGOs and civil society organisations CSOs have been slow to embrace the RFA in their work with communities. This could be the result of the level of community participation in the development of the RFA and it being perceived to be a predominantly top‐down, regional strategy document led to the suggestion that CBDRM receive greater emphasis in the RFA by becoming a theme on its own to allow for a more effective involvement of communities.
Actual implementation on the ground continues to be a challenge, with CBDRM projects in the Pacific usually carried out as isolated initiatives. Consequently, the extensive suite of practice, experience and learning that they generate is rarely shared and used across the wider regional network of PICTs and partners. Many CBDRM projects claim to work at the provincial level, but many of these do not engage effectively with local government, rather they tend to work through National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) at the national level.
In terms of the institutional mechanisms responsible for ensuring links between national to community levels, a broad spectrum of stakeholders at the national level need to collaborate better in order to achieve this. The establishment of National Platforms for Disaster Risk Management was discussed as an appropriate mechanism for achieving this, wherein the Ministries of Finance and Development Planning could facilitate the trickling down process, as most ministries and departments have counterparts at the district level. In particular, the health and education sectors were considered key when it comes to raising community awareness of disaster risk management and CBDRM. While the role of the NDMOs, is more geared towards disaster response.
Successes and approaches to reduce underlying risk factors need to be shared more widely and in particular the application of risk assessment methodologies and how they have influenced investment decisions. Some countries have made progress with the development of building codes but the main challenge is their effective enforcement and particularly in circumstances where traditional land owners have legal rights to over‐rule government regulations. This is of concern if land owners are not aware of the links between certain building/development practices and DRM/CC issues.
The increased involvement of the private sector and professional associations such as the South Pacific Engineers Association has been a promising development in recent years and more is needed to exploit linkages with the private sector, beyond the engineering sector. Given the lack of awareness across the Pacific and particularly at the community level regarding basic building principles that can limit damage from natural hazards, many homes have suffered major damage due to non‐compliance with basic building principles.
In most cases the NDMOs in the Pacific are small and under‐resourced units with a variety of responsibilities ranging from preparedness, to response, and more recently disaster risk reduction. Although the human and financial capacities of NDMOs, need to be strengthened it was considered crucial to get the Ministries of Finance and Planning more engaged in disaster risk reduction, as they are likely to give weight to any intervention as well as command the necessary leadership across other key development sectors, which is important for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development.
Sector level experiences should also be exploited to both illustrate and address underlying disaster risk factors such as the many examples from the Ministries of Agriculture for Samoa and Fiji that are finding salt tolerant varieties of trees and crops and considering planting these in coastal areas, and establishing seed depositories in more than one location to reduce vulnerability of the agricultural sector to weather extremes through spreading the risk and ensuring that seed production continues
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in locations that have not been impacted by the natural hazard event. In addition community participation is also seen as an important determinant of successful disaster risk reduction. For example, after the tsunami disaster in Samoa, communities themselves ‐ and not the government ‐ decided to move to less hazardous locations on elevated ground that belonged to them. The fact that the majority of households had access to safe lands was certainly a key to success.
Although the Pacific has a number of well developed generic regional approaches, experience has shown that the greatest success can be achieved when initiatives start small and align with a country’s own policies and systems. This enables the pace of progress and improvement to be consistent with the low capacity environments found in NDMOs and government departments in the Pacific. Linking disaster risk management frameworks to other existing policy frameworks, such as climate change and poverty reduction also provides opportunities for mainstreaming.
On the matter of identifying entry points in the RFA to integrate or link with CCA the following recommendations were made:
SPREP, SOPAC, UNISDR and selected representatives of national governments set up a steering committee to identify some common priorities and provide consistent technical inputs in order to link disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation throughout the Pacific. The Roadmap process to develop an integrated regional strategy for DRM and Climate Change responds positively to this recommendation;
Explore opportunities for joint programming of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction initiatives and the pooling of resources;
In particular, the development of common National Action Plans for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation and carrying out combined risk assessment for DRM/CCA were considered as important entry points. For this to happen, more emphasis would have to be placed on coordination and bringing together the DRM and CCA stakeholders and to identify ways to utilize contributions from different parts of government. Development of JNAPs in countries such as Tonga and the Cook Islands have responded positively to this recommendation;
Recent trends to bring the responsibilities for DRM and CCA under one department or ministry, such as institutional reforms in Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are considered promising developments;
A panel of DRR/CCA experts at the national level to guide policy and strategic planning was also considered necessary such as Vanuatu’s National Advisory Board for DRM and Climate Change, which also serves as a joint coordination mechanism, providing coordination and monitoring and evaluation functions as well as information sharing. Other good practices on where DRR and CCA have been linked successfully need to be documented and shared; and
The need to focus on integrated approaches at the community level where the issues of development, environmental degradation, climate change and DRM naturally converge and where it is easier and more efficient to plan and mitigate their consequences in an integrated manner should be encouraged. For example, the CBRM+ approach should be examined and shared as a possible approach to integration of disaster and climate risk and Development planning at community level .
With respect to support that could be provided by the international/regional community to further effective implementation of the RFA, the following main points were made and are relevant for considering arrangements under any new regional policy/strategy/planning instruments:
The need to find appropriate solutions for better coordinating the many regional actors working in the Pacific. The role of SPC’s SOPAC Division as regional DRM coordinator and as implementer of key technical programmes needs to be examined;
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As well, establishing an appropriate level of regional technical support to move ahead national DRM agendas in a manner that generates government ownership and sustainability also needs to be examined given that some PICTs will always remain dependant on regional technical assistance given their size and limited technical capacity and others could start to build their own capability through targeted capacity building efforts. For some highly specialized areas (such as tropical cyclone forecasting or tsunami warning) regional delivery of goods and services may continue to be the most appropriate and cost effective approach;
Donor funding was considered neither sufficiently flexible nor programmatic and long‐term enough to suit the needs of PICT governments to achieve sustainable results. In particular, difficulties in securing funding support for NAP implementation mechanisms was considered to set back and slow progress in DRM significantly. Synchronising donor assistance with NAP planning time frames would be beneficial for effective implementation. It was felt that:
Donors need to investigate avenues within their own institutions for mainstreaming DRR in their development funding such as including DRR criteria in their guidelines for project preparation. This would contribute to making development investment more resilient to the impacts of natural hazards;
Regional support needs to be complemented with appropriate bilateral funding for in‐country programmes. In this context it was noted that PICTs needed more information and guidance on how to access financial support from regional/bilateral and international sources;
Governments need to demonstrate their commitment beyond the endorsement of their National Action Plans, the RFA and the HFA, by matching investments for implementing their DRM priorities either through national resourcing for DRM or tapping into regional and global support. To make this happen, national planning agencies need to become more involved so that DRM can be fully integrated into National Sustainable Development Plans and corporate plans; and
Relatively easy access by PICTs to post‐disaster humanitarian assistance often acts as ‘discouragement’ or as a dis‐incentive to invest in DRM. Therefore more effort needs to be placed on the ability to assess and communicate the long‐term economic benefits of disaster risk reduction versus post‐disaster humanitarian assistance as this would help support advocacy for DRM within governments with evidence based arguments. There is a need to strengthen the continuum between disaster risk reduction and disaster response by involving the UN‐led Pacific Humanitarian Team more consistently in the discussions on the RFA.
The following challenges identified in the 2011/2013 regional synthesis report of the RFA are framed within the Pacific context of “a vast ocean with small islands containing rich cultures, adaptable populations facing a range of development challenges and experienced experts (if only relatively few) in DRM and climate change”29:
i) Governance and institutional arrangements:
More is needed in many PICTs to provide the institutional basis for progress in DRM, particularly in relation to integration with CCA;
Links between DRM and development;
Some PICTs struggle with enforcement of various regulatory instruments such as Environmental Impact Assessments and other mechanisms designed to integrate DRM and CCA into development planning; and
In some PICTs, traditional land owners have legal rights to over‐rule local government regulations, which present challenges if land owners are not aware of the links between some development practices and DRM/CCA issues.
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ii) Limited Data:
The lack of systematic data collection presents challenges in understanding baselines and trends; and
Limited data availability across a range of areas including past events and impacts, demographic data, weather and climate data and high resolution climate change projections all present challenges to planning and implementation of DRM/CCA initiatives.
iii) Limited visibility of national DRM investments:
National HFA Reviews have revealed some progress is occurring in terms of national investments in DRM and CCA. Greater transparency is needed to better capture these investments in a systematic approach, rather than the currently ad‐hoc and often disorganised manner that currently exists.
The MTR provided the following recommendations, for the remaining years of the RFA:
Coordination at regional and national level to be proactive and strong in order to manage and bring in multiple partners/sectors/levels;
Further clarify the roles of partners and stakeholders vis‐à‐vis the RFA and how they can support its implementation;
Develop and integrate financial targets into the RFA and NAPs. For example the percentage of humanitarian assistance and the percentage of adaptation funding;
Provide more flexible funding for DRM programmes;
Disaster risk management and reduction is not the sole responsibility of the NDMOs;
Effective avenues for mainstreaming DRR into national and sectoral development needs to be found;
Examine how the linkages between response and DRR could be strengthened in order to achieve a better continuum; and Strengthen evidence‐based decision making on disaster risk reduction through socio‐economic impact assessment and cost‐benefit analysis.
These are augmented by the biennial progress review 2011/2013 which identifies challenges under the broad themes of governance and institutional arrangements; links between DRM and development; limited data; and the limited visibility of national DRM investments. It made the following main recommendations which would need to be considered in DRM‐related policy, strategy and planning in the future:
i) Governance and institutional arrangements:
Continue efforts to progress DRM and CCA through integrated approaches at the national level (through JNAPs or similar initiatives), sub‐national and the regional level, through the proposed integrated DRM and CCA framework;
Regional partners to continue to support PICTs in their efforts to develop or maintain appropriate governance and institutional arrangements that support DRM and CCA efforts according to the unique situations of all PICTs; and
Regional partners to continue to encourage and support an inclusive approach to national DRM and CCA decision making bodies, with genuine participation from key government ministries, local government representatives, NGOs, civil society and the private sector.
ii) Recognise inherent capacity limitations:
Provision of strategic and coordinated in‐country engagements from Pacific Disaster Risk Management Partnership Network (PDRMPN) and development partners that address the
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priority needs is recommended. New initiatives need to acknowledge existing programs and capacity gaps;
Existence of a single national body that oversees DRM and CC initiatives as a joint coordination mechanism can assist with information sharing, coordination and monitoring and evaluation of initiatives addressing similar issues; and
Recognition of limited human resource capacity and high staff turnover through ongoing succession planning in key agencies (e.g. NDMOs) and capacity building through the use of counterparts / internships / mentoring.
iii) Support community‐based approaches to DRM and CC:
Support community based approaches to DRM and CC and strengthen the capacity of the Community – based Disaster Risk Management Working Group to better coordinate CBDRM projects and approaches and to share lessons learned and insight gained from such initiatives across the region;
Build on existing mechanisms, past successes and lessons learned:
Learn from the success of online communities (e.g. Pacific Solution Exchange) and draw upon the well‐established nature of Pacific Disaster Net (PDN – www.pacificdisaster.net) with the use of ‘Forums’ to encourage discussions, information sharing, capacity building and support; and Encourage and maintain efforts to embrace or revitalise traditional knowledge and coping mechanisms across the region for reasons relating to cultural, environmental, social and economic sustainability.
Grounds for Action
The Strategy identifies four key challenges that will need to be addressed and resolved in order to achieve climate and disaster resilient development.
Natural hazard related risk whether they are geophysical or climate‐related are not given meaningful priority on political and economic agendas. 30 , 31 Governments and other key stakeholders acknowledge that natural hazard risks have cross‐cutting management imperatives for resilient development. Yet these public pronouncements in local, national, regional and international debates fail to secure the political and economic will and commitment that is required to make DRR and CCA meaningful national sustainable development priorities. Strong leadership and commitment of central agencies for finance and economic planning is required in order to ground risk considerations within the operational policies and plans of development sectors and influence development planning and investment.32,33
Grounding risk management considerations and practice inside development planning and processes requires and encourages the management and control of potential and prospective risks to be an integral part of day‐to‐day development choices and investment decisions and considered a co‐benefit for sound development practice. 34 , 35 Tangible development benefits and gains generate positive political, economic and social visibility and opportunities, leading to strengthened political and economic commitment for disaster risk management and climate change, within the context of development.
Strengthened and informed political and economic leadership and authority facilitates inclusion of disaster and climate risk considerations in national economic planning and budgetary processes.
• Separate governance and institutional arrangements and the plethora of policies and plans are counter‐productive to achieving disaster and climate resilient development outcomes. DRM, climate change and development largely operate as three distinct communities of practice at international through to local levels.36 Each practice area has its own governance and institutional
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arrangements, which act to segregate the cross‐cutting development imperatives of DRM and climate change, by keeping them on the periphery of central processes of national development, financing, and aid coordination and effectiveness.37,38 Collectively these use significant human and financial resources. Institutional fragmentation diminishes the potential to exploit the many synergies between these three cross‐cutting issues. It results in duplication of effort, leads to inefficiencies in the use of limited financial and other resources for effective implementation, and limits learning and knowledge sharing.39 This calls for targeted capacity support, to ensure that relevant tools, information and skills are available to consider disaster risks throughout development planning and investment processes.
Reshaping current risk governance and institutional arrangements as an integral part of finance and economic development policy, processes and practice is required to deliver disaster and climate resilient development outcomes.
• While DRR and CCA are gaining some traction, damage and economic losses from recent disaster events are climbing due to accumulating disaster risk. Recent disaster events in the Pacific show a trend of fewer casualties yet higher damage costs and economic losses.40,41,42This suggests that, while there is strengthened disaster preparedness and response capacity and capability in PICTs, not enough is being done to assess and address natural hazard risks as an integral part of development planning and investment. Higher damage costs and increasing economic losses are a result of unsustainable development and mal‐adaptation initiatives, such as from unplanned urbanisation and the unsustainable management of land and natural resources that increase exposure to hazards.
Poorly planned and implemented public and private sector development investment initiatives are responsible for creating and accumulating more risks, by increasing already significant levels of vulnerability and exposure to hazardous events.43 While there are some clear examples of progress with disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, the main focus of these efforts has been to address existing disaster risks.44 The growing consequences and implications of not tackling the root causes of risk creation and accumulation as part of the development planning process will almost certainly mean an ongoing and futile battle to reduce disaster risk and adapt to the challenges of climate change, thereby placing increasing burdens on the limited resources allocated to climate and disaster‐related financing.45
Improved, knowledge‐based understanding of how hazards, vulnerability and exposure interact throughout development processes is cornerstone to effectively allocating resources that deliver disaster and climate resilient development.
• Terminology matters – emphasis on ‘natural disasters' skews perceptions about the real causes of disasters, influencing attitudes, approaches and emphasis.46,47 We know that a disaster bringing death, damage and major disruption can happen when a ‘natural hazard’ event impacts a location occupied by a vulnerable population and property. We also understand that, while we will never be able to eliminate all natural hazards, we are able to prevent or limit disasters. Yet most of our attention and resources continue to be focused on disaster relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation rather than on DRR and CCA. Even less emphasis is given to address how disaster risks can be avoided in the first place.48 Furthermore, hazards typically refer to sudden onset events such as a tropical cyclone or a volcanic eruption. However, the slow onset climate related changes, such as ocean acidification or sea level rise, should also be considered as hazards that can lead to irreversible economic, social and cultural disasters.49
Maintaining the status‐quo guarantees a Pacific future where disasters will continue to threaten and undermine development, affect peoples’ welfare and their well‐being, and degrade natural resource capital and the environment.50 It would perpetuate our preoccupation with disasters as separate to development, and encourage a wilful ignorance of the cumulative consequences and implications of
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increasing our already significant exposure and vulnerability to natural hazards.51 The result would mean ever‐increasing economic, human and cultural losses into the future.
The identification, management and treatment of underlying development drivers of risk is the priority, to curb the creation and accumulation of new disaster risks, resulting from unsustainable development practices and processes. Current efforts in disaster risk reduction and post‐disaster reconstruction opportunities must also continue.
Changing the current approach from focusing on disasters to adopting development‐centred disaster and climate risk management pathways will require unprecedented levels of inclusiveness, engagement and collaboration of all key stakeholder groups.52,53
New ways of working to shape the new paradigm of disaster and climate resilient development will require the roles and responsibilities, as well as interests and accountabilities of government, the private sector, civil society, donors and development partners and other stakeholders to be better defined.
Achieving the Future We Want
Reversing the current trends of rising disaster and climate risk—which are outpacing gains in resilience—will require a major shift in development planning and practice, including ensuring adequate access to the high quality and targeted evidence needed to underpin such improvements. By taking well‐informed, firm and timely action to reduce vulnerability and strengthen resilience, PICTs can protect lives, as well as their built and natural assets, from known and anticipated hazards as well as the adverse consequences of climate variability, extremes and change. PICTs can also avoid creating new risks if development sector policies and plans incorporate disaster and climate risk management considerations, as well as including low carbon resilient development options.
While this will include large‐scale investments in hard measures, such as resilient infrastructure and the physical protection of high‐value assets, it will also require increased investment in soft measures such as early warning systems, land use planning, institutional strengthening, and the application of new technologies and innovative solutions, including ecosystem‐based management approaches to reducing risks54. It will also include investing in education, training and awareness raising and ensuring that the specific needs and contributions of various groups (including women, the elderly, children, persons with disabilities, the poor and the communities most exposed to hazards and to climate variability, extremes and change) are duly recognized in preventive risk reduction approaches.
For the Pacific, the main requirement for a paradigm shift towards disaster and climate resilient development will be to move away from development practices that lead to the construction and accumulation of risk and other adverse consequences, including practices that are incompatible with anticipated changes in climate. Success will include realisation that increased exposure to hazards and to the consequences of climate change does not have to mean increased vulnerability of societies, economies and environment. This involves further integration of the disaster risk management and climate change agendas and the pursuit of more preventive, integrated and inclusive approaches to climate and disaster risk management that strive to achieve resilient development outcomes.55 Numerous studies for the Pacific56 and for other regions57 , have highlighted the changes that need to be made in order to increase the resilience of development outcomes. These can be summarised as:
• A stronger enabling environment, from community through national to regional and international levels, directed at avoiding the creation of new risks and reduced risks to society and environment through greater disaster risk consideration in policy and investment.
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• More effective decision support, including targeted information, relevant tools and advisors with appropriate knowledge, skills and experience.
• Climate and disaster risk considerations integrated into key economic and social planning and budgetary processes, including DRR, CCA and low carbon development investments in energy efficiency and conservation, fuel substitution through development of renewable energy and ecosystem conservation such as the sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
• Implementation of resilience building initiatives, especially on the ground through large‐scale, sustained investment.
• Increased preparedness, response and recovery capacity, as climate and disaster risks can never be completely eliminated.
• Ongoing review and evaluation of outputs and outcomes to ensure that goals are being met and that lessons learned are documented, disseminated and applied.
Emerging and New Issues
New and currently unforeseen challenges to achieving and maintaining the resilience of PICT development outcomes will arise throughout the life of the Strategy58. Some will manifest relatively slowly, and may represent issues that are already apparent but not yet of major and widespread concern (for example, use of geoengineering to combat climate change). Others will occur as relatively rapid onset and unwelcome surprises, such as has been the case with recognition of ocean acidification as an issue of great consequence for PICTs. It is important that PICTs, and their development partners, have in place mechanisms that facilitate early identification of these issues as well as appropriate responses, despite inherent shortcomings in information and understanding and the high uncertainties that result.
Surprising and emerging issues are future developments that are still outside the mind‐set of organisations and/or society, but could have a significant impact on organisations, the economy and society within PICTs. The emerging issues would be preceded by early warning signals (Figure 3), with a combination of various signals providing an indication that an issue with significant consequences might develop. An important aspect to be mindful of is that the emerging issue in itself may not be known, while the early warning signals could be well known. For example, recognition of ocean acidification as an environmental threat has taken many decades to occur. Throughout much of the 20th century CO2 uptake by oceans was considered a beneficial process which ameliorated climate change. While the oceanic sink for CO2 is still critical as a buffer against climate change, understanding that CO2 uptake by oceans could be “too much of a good thing” has been late in developing. For example, in the late 1970s direct ocean CO2 disposal by capture of fossil fuel CO2 at the point of combustion, and injection into the ocean via a pipeline, was proposed as a way slow the rate of climate change by accelerating the rate at which CO2 was be absorbed by the oceans59.
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Figure 3. Adaptive management process for new and emerging issues identified through early warnings.
Responses to new emerging issues require adaptive management, which is using a systematic process that continually improves management policies and practices by learning from the successes and failures of operational programmes, and drawing on new interdisciplinary scientific understanding, practical experience and traditional knowledge. It is particularly relevant to climate change adaptation planning and decision‐making processes, due to the uncertainties associated with characterizing the future climate and its effects, including impacts on people and their livelihoods.
In adaptive management there is explicit acknowledgement of uncertainties and knowledge gaps about existing and new drivers of change, as well as how a system will respond to management interventions. Reducing these uncertainties through learning becomes one objective of management. For adaptive management, decision‐makers need to be flexible, accept new information and understanding as they become available, while stakeholders share their experiences and knowledge with others and develop a common understanding of complex problems to inform collective decisions.
The new and increasingly important issues which PICTs and their development partners are currently grappling with highlight the importance of having the capacity to consider adaptive management of wild cards and weak signals such as ocean acidification, forced displacement and other forms of loss and damage, geoengineering, and the imposition of charges for greenhouse gas emissions from international transport60.
Ocean Acidification. The last decade has produced both a growing understanding and concern that ocean acidification may be more of a threat to coral reefs and other calcifying organisms than coral bleaching, although the latter remains a more serious and immediate threat to the supply of food protein61. Rising concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are increasing the amount of dissolved CO2 in seawater. This results in a concomitant rise in pH and decrease in the amount of dissolved carbonate being taken up by reef‐forming and other calcifying organisms. The increased ocean acidity means that more energy is required by these organisms to extract carbonate from seawater
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to build their skeletons and there are increased rates of carbonate dissolution, including for coral reefs62.
In pre‐industrial times carbonate saturation states in Pacific Ocean waters were close to or above levels considered optimal for healthy coral reef ecosystems. Now only the surface waters of the South Equatorial Current have saturation states at or above this level. Evidence indicates that changes in carbonate saturation states may eventually lead to a condition where processes that act to degrade reefs (such as bioerosion, dissolution, storm damage) overcome the capacity of corals and other calcifiers to grow and maintain a healthy reef ecosystem, resulting in less productive fisheries. Degradation of coral reefs not only affects the people whose lives depend on marine resources, but would also decrease the protection of tropical islands from ocean waves and storms. This would threaten both the physical and economic foundations of PICTs. The impacts of ocean acidification are also likely to affect the entire marine ecosystem, impacting on all of the key ecosystem services provided by reefs63. Currently, there is only moderate confidence in the range and distribution of possible futures and consequences for ocean acidification in the Pacific. This is because the projections are based on climate models that do not resolve the reef systems that can play a role in modulating large‐scale changes64.
Ocean acidification may impede some aspects of PICT’s development policies and plans to sustainably use and benefit from fisheries and mariculture to foster economic development, government revenue, food security and livelihoods. The projected degradation of coral reefs due to increases in ocean acidification, and from other pressures, may also affect the long‐term viability of tourism operations. Uncertainties in the rate and consequences of ocean acidification demands an adaptive management approach. This includes initiatives at community level designed to manage coastal fisheries in the face of ocean acidification and the many other drivers of change that are influencing the sector. Specific possible actions include minimising sediment and nutrient inputs to the coastal zone from runoff, eliminating activities that damage the structure of coral reefs, research and other studies of coral resilience, and prohibiting activities that reduce mangroves and damage seagrasses65.
The Strategy proposes that further studies be undertaken to determine the implications for national policies of the current and expected ecological, social and economic consequences of ocean acidification.
Loss and Damage. In 2010, and after lengthy negotiations, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established a work programme to consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. In this context “residual loss and damage” refers to the entire range of damages and permanent losses associated with climate change impacts that can no longer be avoided by reducing greenhouse gas emissions or through adaptation, despite the best political and other efforts of the affected country. Such loss and damage has social, economic and environmental dimensions, among others. Considerations of loss and damage have been a Pacific priority since 1991 when, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Vanuatu submitted a proposal to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee that drafted the UNFCCC.
It is important to note that “loss and damage” has a very different meaning among disaster management practitioners, where the term has been used for many decades. Disaster effects are categorised as “damage” ‐ being the total or partial destruction of physical assets in the affected area, and measured in physical units or in terms of replacement costs, and “losses” ‐ being the changes in economic flows arising from the disaster and occurring until full economic recovery and reconstruction is achieved (this includes the decline in output in productive sectors, lower revenues and higher operational costs in the provision of services, and unexpected expenditures to meet
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humanitarian needs during the post‐disaster emergency phase) 66 . Well‐established disaster damage, loss and needs assessment methodologies are now being used by some PICTs67.
However, addressing loss and damage from climate change impacts is receiving increasing attention and is an emerging and fast‐evolving issue. Evidence from the Pacific, such as for Kosrae State, Federated States of Micronesia, shows that the many measures against coastal erosion, such as building sea walls and planting trees along the fore‐shore, are insufficient, and some have additional costs, such as cultural values and heritage being lost due to ancient ruins being dismantled and used to build seawalls68.
At the global level, AOSIS is advocating for the establishment of an international mechanism that would address the comprehensive loss and damage needs of small island developing States (SIDS) under three component areas:
An Insurance Component ‐ that assists SIDS and other particularly vulnerable developing countries to manage financial risk from increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events.
A Rehabilitation/Compensatory Component ‐ to address the progressive, negative impacts of climate change; even with financial risk management mechanisms in place along with efforts to reduce physical risks and exposure, some measure of loss and damage due to climate change impacts will be unavoidable, and will need to be addressed.
A Risk Management Component ‐ to support and promote risk assessment and risk management tools, and to facilitate and inform the initiatives in the insurance and rehabilitation/compensatory components.
Substantial financial resources would be needed to support such an international mechanism, commensurate with required and projected adaptation needs. External support would be required, perhaps through a new Convention Adaptation Fund supported by Annex I Parties as well as from the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund69.
Currently most PICTs cannot obtain insurance cover for natural hazards. Where cover is available, it is becoming increasingly expensive and unaffordable. Initiatives to help address this gap will need to be explored.
In the context of residual loss and damage the Strategy provides guidance to PICTs on initiatives they might take that would be consistent with UNFCCC processes. The Strategy also seeks to identify how regional and international development partners might best support PICTs to address the loss and damage they experience as a result of climate change.
Forced Relocation. Relocation due to extreme natural events and sea level rise has been a continuing feature of human history in the Pacific, despite individuals and communities in the Pacific traditionally having a high level of resilience in the face of environmental degradation linked to climate change and disasters. But now the effects of climate change and recurrent disasters are increasingly resulting in population movements.
Between 2008 and 2012 over 56,000 individuals living in the Pacific were displaced annually70. While such population movements primarily take place within the borders of Pacific countries and territories, some are already cross‐border in nature. Voluntary migration abroad, while still mainly in response to economic opportunities, is increasingly associated with environmental degradation linked to climate change and disaster risks.
Planned relocation and forced displacement are expected to rise significantly in the next decades and beyond. As a result, identification of suitable land to relocate at‐risk communities, or those whose land has already been rendered uninhabitable, is fast becoming a major challenge.
For most Pacific Islanders land is an essential part of their being, and hence a key priority is to remain close to, if not on, their ancestral/customary land. However, some Pacific Leaders are
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convinced that the time has come to prepare for future population movements by agreeing now on measures that will protect the rights and dignity of affected people. This would avoid forced displacement, or the need for evacuations. It would also make adequate provisions to respond to displacement when it takes place. There is currently no international legal assurance that, where a sudden‐ or a slow‐onset disaster leaves individuals with no other option for survival, they would be able to seek international protection in another country, either temporarily or permanently.
Other Pacific Leaders are less willing to engage in such discussions, fearing that this will be seen as a failure to safeguard PICTs and their people from climate change and disaster risk impacts. In addition, migration may not always be an effective response to disasters or to climate change. It may well give rise to additional protection concerns, for the migrants, for the receiving communities and countries, and for those unable to relocate due to physical, social or financial limitations. The latter may be left without adequate access to sufficient levels of food, water, medication and other necessities71.
While the priority for the Pacific is to strengthen emissions reduction and adaptation efforts so that Pacific Islanders can continue to live where they choose, in the context of increasing disaster risks and climate change, the Strategy offers guidance on precautionary actions PICTs might undertake to prepare for future population movements. It also identifies the actions and resource mobilization that would be appropriate at regional and international levels.
Geoengineering. Proposals to respond to climate change by geoengineering the Earth’s climate system are not new. Some, such as carbon capture and storage, are now being pursued on a significant scale. Proposed geoengineering strategies include both carbon dioxide removal methods and radiation management techniques. The former address the problem directly at its source by removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, while the latter aim to offset the warming effect by decreasing absorption of solar radiation by the Earth. Such measures (Figure 4) are being proposed as a potential back‐stop climate change solution over and above mitigation and adaptation, especially as concern grows about tipping points and possible surprises such as releases of stored methane as the Arctic region warms.
Despite a growing awareness of the potential for serious negative impacts of geoengineering, some small‐scale geoengineering experiments have been conducted, albeit with limited oversight. These include changes in regional precipitation and in ozone concentrations as a result of intentional high‐altitude releases of cooling aerosols. A single country’s decision to counter global warming by geoengineering, perhaps by fertilizing the ocean to grow photosynthetic organisms or by injecting sulphate particles into the stratosphere, could create conflict with other countries.
The Strategy does not suggest that PICTs themselves, either individually or collectively, contemplate direct involvement in geoengineering. But it does acknowledge that current discussions around geoengineering constitute a “weak signal” for PICTs, requiring commensurate responses and at least maintaining a watching brief. Some PICT development partners are already engaging in experimental geoengineering and should keep PICTs informed of these initiatives. As partners they should also consider their moral and ethical obligations to PICTs, and as good global citizens.
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Figure 6. Potential Geoengineering interventions72. Stratospheric aerosols would use the injection of sulphate or other light‐scattering aerosols into the stratosphere (upper atmosphere), to mimic the cooling effect of volcanic eruptions; cloud brightening would increase the extent and/or reflectance of clouds through the injection of tiny cloud‐seeding particles, such as sea salt, into the atmosphere; ocean fertilization is the addition of nutrients such as nitrogen or iron into the oceans in order to enhance algal blooms, and the resulting photosynthetic activity, with the intention of increasing storage of carbon from the atmosphere into the deep ocean; direct air capture uses chemical technologies to remove CO2 directly from the air; such technologies are similar to those being implemented to capture and store CO2 from the exhaust of power plants for a long period of time in what is known as “carbon capture and storage”.
Charges for Emissions from International Transport. Aviation contributes around 2% of global carbon emissions and maritime transport over 3%. Emissions from international aviation reported by developed countries grew by around 80% between 1990 and 2007. Such growth is expected to continue, unless regulated. Controls on emissions from international transport have been discussed since the first UNFCCC Conference of Parties in 1995. However, unlike for emissions from national transport systems, there is still no international agreement on emissions from international bunker fuels.
Some initiatives, albeit limited, have been taken, such as the decision by the European Union (EU) requiring airlines to pay carbon permits covering flights taking off and landing within the EU's borders, effective from 2012. Subsequent strong opposition to the law, due to it intruding on national sovereignty, resulted in the EU suspending enforcement until late 2013, to allow time for nations to agree on equivalent, global actions under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In mid 2013 the International Air Transport Association (IATA) passed a resolution agreeing on a single global "market‐based mechanism" – such as emissions trading – that would enable airlines to account for and offset their emissions.
ICAO has called on world governments to agree on measures to manage carbon dioxide from air travel, which would come into force from 2020. It remains to be seen if such moves by IATA, and
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subsequent decisions by ICAO, will convince the EU to continue the suspension. Regardless, emissions by the aviation sector will eventually be regulated, with costs being passed on to passengers and other customers. A similar situation exists for maritime transport.
As PICTs are heavily reliant on both international aviation and maritime services, including cruise ship tourism, any cost increases will have economic and social consequences. Arguably, impacts will be greatest for those PICTs with tourism dependent economies. In the case of the Caribbean, a study suggested that the introduction of international regulation of aviation emissions could cause tourist arrivals to the Caribbean to decline by between 1 and 4% by 2020, and by as much as 24% under a worst case scenario of a ‘serious’ climate policy73.
Recent research on climate change policy and tourism in PICTs has included examining the impact of different aviation policies on airfares and arrivals at small island destinations74. However, analyses of the impact of international emissions reduction policies on tourist arrivals for PICTs has yet to be undertaken. This Strategy recommends that such fore sighting studies be undertaken.
Strategic Goals
i. Strengthened Risk Management, including Climate Change Adaptation
Baseline, Challenges and Opportunities. The vulnerability of PICTs is increasing due to poorly planned and implemented socio‐economic development such as unplanned urban growth, poorly planned coastal development, unsustainable land use and practice, and water resources and ecosystem degradation due to population pressure urbanization, and unsustainable resource management practices. This vulnerability is exacerbated by high exposure to natural hazards and the growing impacts of climate change, coupled with low human and financial capacity and capability to assess and manage hazard risk75.
Climate effects are already exacerbating these vulnerabilities by affecting resource sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, water, transport and energy, as well as human and ecosystem health and the economy, including the tourism industry. In the longer‐term the continued challenges of changes in the climate are likely to further exacerbate these negative effects and heighten critical issues such as food, water and energy security which may in turn lead to social and political unrest76 ,77. Studies highlight that marginalised groups such as women, young people, the elderly and infirm and persons with disabilities, as well as the poor, are the most vulnerable and at risk amongst Pacific peoples.78 But there is growing recognition of the productive and constructive role that vulnerable people have in building the resilience of their lives and livelihoods through combining social protection, DRR and CCA approaches.79
Risks can be managed and reduced. We know that increased exposure to a wide variety of natural hazards, to climate change and to other challenges need not translate into increased vulnerability of Pacific island societies, economies and their environment. Creating a paradigm shift which systematically grounds disaster and climate risk considerations within development practice, including anticipated risks from likely changes in climate, while still investing in disaster preparedness and DRR, would be a cost effective and efficient approach to strengthening risk management. This should become the priority if current trends of increasing damage costs and economic losses from extreme events, and increasing social and economic hardship, especially of marginalised groups and the poor from all sizes and manner of natural hazards such as high frequency‐low impact events, are to be reversed80.
Embedding disaster and climate risk management considerations within economic development planning, processes and practice, including related national budgetary processes, will catalyse changes. Actions that would help achieve this include: (i) reshaping of governance and institutional arrangements; (ii) modifications to systems and processes such as relevant sector policies and plans and key legal and regulatory instruments; (iii) a rationalisation of resources and capabilities and skills; and (iv) identification and application of appropriate information and tools to assist decision
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makers at all levels to make informed development choices and investment decisions, as well as provide clarity of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities. These changes are necessary in order to achieve an integrated risk management approach that is grounded in development practice, supportive of well‐coordinated strategic and operational level objectives and capable of delivering development outputs and outcomes that are resilient and adaptable, based on comparative benefit.
The changes would be inclusive of, and applicable to, all key actors and stakeholders including all levels and sectors of government, the private sector, civil society ‐ communities, households and individuals ‐ and donors and development assistance partners. It requires whole‐of‐country, whole‐of‐government, whole‐of‐organisation and whole‐of‐community efforts to ensure that the change to an integrated and evidence‐based risk management approach in development processes and pathways, is embraced by all, for the long‐term.
Spanning multiple sectors and being inclusive of multiple stakeholders will be a crucial and fundamental tenet for a paradigm shift toward disaster and climate resilient development. Bearing in mind the multi‐dimensional characteristics of risk, that a large proportion of disasters in the Pacific are small to medium in size, and risk management is integral to resilient development practice the emphasis for both risk and development governance would need to be based on strengthened participation, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability at all levels.
ii. Low Carbon Development
Baseline, Challenges and Opportunities. Collectively, PICT emissions of greenhouse gases are minor on a global scale. Nevertheless, all PICTs are committed to reducing emissions. They wish to demonstrate a willingness to join with other countries to slow the rate of climate change, while at the same time increasing their energy self‐sufficiency and security.
Low carbon development (LCD) achieves the outcomes of reduced emissions and energy self‐sufficiency and security by implementing forward‐looking national economic development strategies and plans that encompass low‐emission and climate‐resilient economic and social development through energy efficiency and energy conservation initiatives and through development of renewable energy. Renewable energy, and energy efficiency and conservation are considered to be the twin pillars of access to sustainable energy in the Pacific. Energy efficiency is the use of less energy to accomplish the same task, while energy conservation is the practice of using less energy. Driving the same distance, but in a more fuel efficient vehicle, is an example of energy efficiency, while choosing to drive less is an example of energy conservation.
The near total reliance of almost all PICTs on imported fossil fuel leaves Pacific economies vulnerable to volatile global fuel prices, high fuel transport costs, potential spills, supply chain risks, and ongoing carbon emissions that contribute to climate change and rising sea levels81. Such considerations have implications for socio‐economic development and on everyday life because they affect the economy, public health and safety, and the environment. Under the Pacific Plan, economic growth requires that all sectors of society, especially vulnerable groups, have the benefit of energy security. Yet estimates suggest that seven out of ten people living in PICTs lack access to any form of electricity. As a result, the region has largely concentrated on generating extra electricity and improving access. But attention is also increasingly focusing on more efficient use of the electricity already available. These links mean that energy security must be integrated into the development agenda.
Investment in clean and affordable energy, such as renewable energy, can diversify the sources of energy and thereby strengthen resilience to economic shocks. Equally, investment in energy efficiency and conservation helps optimise the use of available energy. All these measures help reduce the environmental effects of fossil fuel use.
It is generally considered more cost‐effective to invest in end‐use energy efficiency improvements, (i.e. demand side‐management), than to satisfy demand through increases in the
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energy supply. In addition, in the energy sector, increasing efficiency typically shows the highest potential to reduce greenhouse emissions, even compared to investing in renewable energy. Appliance labelling and standards is one of the most cost‐effective and efficient demand‐side management strategies to reduce electricity demand and hence fossil fuel dependency82. Efficient appliances do not necessarily cost more to buy, but they certainly cost less to run. As more and more countries adopt energy labelling and standards programmes, any country that does not do so risks receiving appliances that are inefficient and more costly to operate. This undermines and runs counter to regional efforts to substitute renewable energy for diesel.
Despite a number of factors contributing to higher installed costs for renewable energy projects on outer islands and in rural areas, these technologies are becoming an increasingly competitive solution for meeting demand, particularly for remote off‐grid electrification, where diesel costs are high and there are logistical problems such as infrequent shipping schedules, inadequate port facilities and long lead times for spare parts (Figure 4). Renewable energy has the added benefit of reducing and complementing fuel imports, increasing energy security.
Figure 4. Cost of electricity from renewable power generation technologies for Pacific Islands. Note: Diesel generation costs can be as high as USD 2/kWh in remote, small‐scale applications83.
Renewable energy, and energy efficiency and conservation are synergistic and complementary, but they are seldom assessed together in the Pacific. For remote areas and outer island electrification, in particular, efficiency options should be assessed as part of all renewable energy investment plans. In addition, renewable energy technologies should not be considered in isolation from other forms of energy production, but rather as part of an integrated energy system.
There are other synergies between low carbon and resilient development, such as reducing the build‐up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere through conservation, sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks. Forests are vital to the well‐being of the people in the Pacific, with cultures strongly linked to inland and coastal forests. These provide food, medicine, wood, fibre, energy and water, prevent or reduce the impact of disasters and maintain biodiversity. But some Government and people have been utilising their forest resources in an unsustainable manner, with deforestation and forest degradation becoming a significant source of
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carbon in the atmosphere. Some PICTs have lost most of their original forests and many of their remaining forests are degraded. While governments and people of the region recognise the importance of sustainable forest management, a lack of resources and capacity often prevent them from implementing sustainable forest management practices.
As countries upgrade their energy infrastructure and undertake other development investments, there are cost‐effective choices and opportunities to incorporate climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction considerations at the design stage. Similar openings occur when recovering from a disaster, especially as part of a “build‐back‐better” approach during post‐disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation84.
iii. Strengthened Preparedness, Response and Recovery
Baselines, challenges and opportunities. PICTs are highly vulnerable to natural hazards and are situated in what is recognised to be the most disaster prone region in the world85. Since 1950, disasters recorded in the Pacific region have affected more than 4.4 million people, caused close to 8,800 fatalities and resulted in damage costs exceeding USD3.5 billion. Cyclones have been the most common natural hazard risk accounting for 55 percent of the reported disasters, USD2.73 billion in damage costs, and affecting the highest number of people per event, from 1950–2013. Tsunami events, though less frequent, have caused the highest number of fatalities per event. Fiji and PNG reported the highest number of disasters (49 and 66 respectively), while Guam — with its well‐developed infrastructure and high exposure to strong typhoons – has suffered the highest cumulative economic losses of USD1.12 billion.86
The imperative for disaster preparedness and response has always been strong for both recipient and donor governments, and especially during and immediately following disaster events when there is heightened political and media visibility87. Coupled with the historical metrics of death, injury, damage costs and disruption, the rationale to maintain strong disaster preparedness, response, relief and early recovery skills and capabilities will remain a priority, at regional, national and local levels. While the overall ambition of this strategy for disaster and climate resilient development is to strive for less frequent, lower consequence and less harmful disaster events in the future, there will always be residual risk, and disasters will occur.
Increased access and use of disaster and climate relevant information and tools is essential to being able to effectively address key elements of the humanitarian‐development continuum.88 For example:
• Early warning and forecast information for natural hazards are essential for determining the nature, timeliness and effectiveness of a country’s preparedness and response to a natural hazard event, and can be extremely effective in limiting the potential impact of a disaster event.
• Disaster loss databases for preparedness, and reducing future damage and loss are crucial. Benefits include the ability to analyse and identify patterns or trends of disaster risk, and improve risk understanding and knowledge about disaster‐prone areas, hazards and vulnerability.89,90As disaster loss databases link variables for loss of life and financial costs, including damage to infrastructure, they can be used to guide development policies, plans and practice, as well as monitor, evaluate and assess initiatives that improve priority setting, decision‐making and investment effectiveness.
• Historical hazard and loss databases for major disasters, such as those developed under the PCRAFI, can be used to develop risk financing tools to increase the fiscal resilience for PICT governments, to avoid governments diverting funds from other development programmes or basic public services after major disaster events91. These databases have wider application. Other products and applications, such as urban risk mapping and planning, can contribute to guiding development choices and investment decisions, particularly at sector and local levels.
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Such databases can also be used to determine the impacts of future natural hazards, influenced by climate change, for example taking into account the distribution, frequency and intensity of future hazards and the change in the protection capacity of coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs.
Coordinated and collaborative humanitarian action is vital to avoid duplication and enhance collective efforts to support PICTs in disaster preparedness, response and early recovery. Various mechanisms provide PICTs with a solid platform of support. These include: (i) the Pacific Humanitarian Team92 (PHT), a network of partners with the capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters in the region and who agree to coordinate humanitarian action in support of nationally‐led disaster management; (ii) the FRANZ93 arrangement between France, Australia and New Zealand that seeks to contribute to the coordination and improvement of disaster relief operations in the Pacific; and (iii) the Pacific Islands Emergency Management Alliance (PIEMA) which seeks to strengthen the emergency/disaster preparedness and response capacities of key national response agencies. Given the limited domestic resources that most PICTs have to prepare for, respond to and recover from disaster events, external assistance and support mechanisms are critical to complement and support the efforts of in‐country disaster management actors, when external assistance is requested.94
Local capacities are key in disaster preparedness, emergency response and early recovery. Local actors are usually the first to respond in a disaster or emergency event. Their readiness to respond appropriately can make a critical difference to the humanitarian response, especially in situations where national, regional and international assistance may take considerable time to arrive. Therefore, every effort to advance capacity building and support of local organisations and communities in disaster preparedness, and ensure their active involvement in response to, and early recovery from, disaster events in government‐led responses is crucial and unquestionable. In addition civil society organisations, though critical partners in building local resilience, are often overlooked in government‐led DRM programming initiatives. This also applies to the most vulnerable in society, including children, women, the elderly and persons with disabilities.
Improved coordination and quality of national capacity building and strengthening initiatives would ensure there is national capacity to anticipate and respond to emergencies, under government leadership. Various capacity building mechanisms exist, yet a coordinated strategy among humanitarian actors (including donors, regional organisations, multi‐lateral development banks, United Nations agencies, and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), to consolidate and or combine their efforts for developing national and local preparedness capacity has been weak. This has recently spawned efforts of humanitarian partners to establish PIEMA to support PICTs to improve response capacities and specifically interoperability between key response agencies like national disaster management offices, fire and emergency services and the Police95. Support to PICTs to strengthen their disaster response and contingency plans should be encouraged, though these must seek to build on existing partnerships with national governments.
Strengthened legal preparedness for international disaster response is needed, to expedite international assistance in the event of a disaster where a request for international assistance has been made. Improved DRM legal frameworks that make adequate provision for expediting international disaster response and assistance, would ensure that affected populations in future disaster events are more likely to receive well‐coordinated, timely and high‐quality levels of disaster relief and initial recovery assistance, when and where it is needed most. To date, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands have completed reviews of their disaster laws, rules and principles and intend to implement changes that would strengthen the efficiency of their disaster response, relief and early recovery arrangements96,97.
Early recovery and reconstruction offer the most obvious opportunities to build resilience in society and in the economy. Achieved through ‘building‐back‐better’ and ‘build‐back‐stronger and
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smarter’ approaches, the links and direct feedback loops between broader recovery and reconstruction/rehabilitation actions on the one hand, and development planning and processes on the other, should inform, influence and improve future choices and investments, starting at the concept phase98. In addition, lessons learned during disaster events should be used to improve future preparedness and response actions. The humanitarian‐development continuum (from pre‐disaster to during‐disaster to post‐disaster) is probably more pronounced in the many PICTs that are regularly exposed to natural hazards and requires engagement of a wider range of development actors, including the private sector.
Implementation
i. Effective Planning and Decision‐making
Increasing the uptake and application of information requires ready access to, and effective use of, relevant decision support tools, such as cost‐benefit analysis. More progress is also required with characterising the links between changes in climate and the consequences, in terms of food and water security, human health and the longevity of infrastructure, for example. Only when decision support systems include detailed representation of such relationships will climate change projections and other risk estimates be utilised to the fullest extent possible, ensuring development planning and decision making are both well informed and timely. Such progress would be accelerated if countries and their development partners are supported by advisors trained within the region, and who have the necessary knowledge, skills and experience in climate and disaster risk assessment and management, within the context of development practice.
There are growing numbers of decision support tools that assist those involved in managing disaster and climate risks. This includes tools that treat climate change as an additional stressor, thus allowing adaptation and other responses to be built into existing decision‐making structures, documentation and priorities. These can assist in the preparation of well‐considered disaster and climate resilient development strategies and plans, or contribute to the assessment of response initiatives. Thus ex‐ante tools are used in policy preparatory work, such as scenarios, appraisal and assessment frameworks, while ex‐post tools are used at the implementation and evaluation stages, such as for monitoring and for evaluation.
However, currently there are few tools that are useful to those working at the interface between the grassroots community level and national government level. Key players at other levels also need access to decision support and related tools. Such players include traditional leaders at local level, as well as those in local government and in the private sector, especially in small and medium‐size enterprises.
ii. Strengthened Governance and Institutional Arrangements
This Strategy, along with the joint national action plans for disaster risk management and climate change (JNAPs) developed by some PICs and expressions of intent by other countries, are clear demonstration of an appetite in Pacific public policy for integration of disaster risk management and climate change at least, and for integration of disaster and climate risk management within development plans, processes and practice at best.99,100This is not the case at the international level where, in 2015, three new agreements for (i) disaster reduction (Hyogo Framework for Action 2 (HFA2)), (ii) climate change (a new protocol under the UNFCCC) and, (iii) sustainable development (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)), will be finalised.
A paradigm shift towards disaster and climate resilient development in the Pacific will therefore require extraordinary levels of commitment, cooperation and collaboration between the DRM, climate change and development communities of practice at all levels, as: established institutional arrangements for DRR, CCA and development are reshaped and rationalised; responsibilities and accountabilities of risk managers and risk creators/takers are defined and described; and as risk management approaches and risk considerations are embedded within development processes,
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systems and practice. There is a need to identify how risks are to be managed within, across and between ministerial sectors and at all levels of government (national, local, city and town); as well as within the private sector, civil society, communities and citizens; and between these and other relevant key stakeholder groups101.
To minimise the humanitarian consequences of disasters, already established national, regional and international arrangements and humanitarian assistance agencies and organisations with mandates to provide timely, effective and coordinated responses during and following an emergency will continue to play an important role in disaster preparedness, response and recovery. Interaction between disaster/emergency management services and resilient development practitioners will be crucial to facilitate continued improvements to better manage future risks. The shift in approach and emphasis will require a reform of existing risk governance arrangements as responsibilities and the remit for managing risk extend beyond government and its traditional alliances, to include other actors and networks, with stakes as either creators of risk or as bearers of risk.102
iii. Partnerships and Coordination
Successful implementation of this Strategy will depend on developing strong partnerships and fostering cooperation and collaboration between PICTs, with current and emerging PICT partner countries, with other regions and globally (connecting and linking governments, businesses, communities, people and places to share, learn and act), with CROP agencies, with donors (to coordinate and harmonise efforts for aid effectiveness expressed in the principles agreed under the Busan Aid Effectiveness Partnership for Effective Development Co‐operation and the Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles), and with other development partners as well as other stakeholders such as the private sector, civil society and groups with special needs/interests (to network and link efforts for better development choices, investment decisions, and effective implementation).103,104,105
Strengthened coordination, cooperation and partnership of existing as well as new networks and alliances will emerge as countries, their governments, businesses, civil society, communities and citizens, and the region‐at‐large embrace the paradigm shift towards disaster and climate resilient development. CROP agencies, donors and other development partners will be encouraged to strengthen, align and consolidate their development assistance support for managing disaster and climate risk within the context of resilient development and using strengthened national finance, planning and reporting systems and processes. Regional and national sector policies and plans will become the vehicle for implementing disaster and climate resilient initiatives, given the cross‐cutting imperatives of disaster and climate risks across the development agenda. This departure from operating DRR and CCA as separate sectors, and tackling priority issues and needs by means of stand‐alone, disparate projects, will reduce fragmentation and duplication of efforts, encourage multi‐sector and cross‐sector interventions and increase the impact of resilient development outcomes that are sustainable and adaptable.106
iv. Information and Knowledge Management, Including Communications and Advocacy
Multi‐hazard and risk assessments undertaken by PCRAFI for all PICs107 provide at high resolution, state‐of‐the art spatial information on assets, population, hazards and risks, including catastrophe risk models for tropical cyclones and earthquakes. The full potential of the data base will be realised only if relevant people in government, civil society and the private sector are given the knowledge and skills to use this information in development planning and decision making. PCRAFI has demonstrated that information critical to ensuring the resilience of development is available for use by PICs. Similar information needs and uses exist for all hazards.
The Strategy recognises, and advocates for, transformational changes around a joint approach to managing disaster and climate risks, where possible and practicable, and around ensuring development outcomes are resilient to both disasters and climate change. The Strategy is now the leading source of high‐level strategic guidance related to climate and disaster resilient development
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in the Pacific. It is important to recognise and herald the Strategy for its role in helping to improve the resilience of development outcomes, including the livelihoods of PICTs and their local communities.
In the case of communications related to the Strategy, they should aim to re‐focus the regional discussion about climate change and disasters, moving it from a process‐dominated discussion about DRM and climate change responses, to resilient development‐focused actions that deliver tangible outcomes and benefits to PICTs and their people.
v. Resource Mobilisation
Human Resources. Most PICTs have neither sufficient human capacity, nor the necessary skills, to be able to realize the full potential of the growing donor resources now being allocated to managing disaster and climate risks. This includes shortages in not only skills related to climate change responses and DRM, but also in development planning, procurement, fiduciary control and overall project management. These are often exacerbated by resources and effort being diverted away from core programmes and projects in DRR by emergency response operations, and from national‐, sub‐national‐ and community‐focused climate change initiatives due to engagement in international and regional negotiations and the like. Many regional partners also face capacity constraints.
There is an urgent need to identify career options for personnel involved in managing disaster and climate risks to development, be they working in government, civil society organizations or the private sector. This, and subsequent succession planning, could help address the widespread challenges of high staff turnover and ongoing capacity building requirements. Capacity building through the use of counterparts, internships and mentoring should also be considered, where appropriate.
Indigenous people are the primary custodians of land other natural resources that are impacted by climate change and natural hazards. There are also important, but dwindling, numbers of practitioners of highly specialized traditional knowledge, such as traditional healers. Collectively, these people have acquired and continue to acquire knowledge aimed at minimizing risks to communities and livelihoods. They must be encouraged to preserve, apply and transfer their knowledge, skills and experience, since indigenous knowledge and coping strategies provide a crucial foundation for community‐based CCA and DRM measures.
While general understanding about the causes and consequences of natural hazards and climate change is increasing for many Pacific people, the extent of individual and community buy‐in to appropriate responses to disaster and climate risks has been very limited. Most individuals are still unwilling to change behaviours in ways that reduce their personal as well as collective risk. Many governments, and others involved in education and raising awareness, still struggle to be effective in achieving meaningful changes in attitudes and behaviours. Many community leaders are unable to make and implement informed decisions that foster disaster and climate resilient development.
The marginalisation of children, the elderly and persons with disabilities often means they are particularly vulnerable in the event of a disaster, as well as vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. They frequently require and need special assistance. This may be because they live in high risk locations or they have little opportunity to protect themselves from the consequences of disaster and climate risk, or because the lack of available support renders them unable to respond and adapt appropriately.
However, since they are exposed to higher risks, and will potentially suffer greater consequences, these stakeholder groups are often more aware of the measures that are needed to reduce their exposure to natural hazards and other sources of risk. Unfortunately, children and persons with mental disabilities still have limited opportunities to become involved in decision making. By contrast, elderly people often enjoy greater authority and therefore decision making power than the average citizen. Disaster and climate risk management should draw on the knowledge and
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experience of older people as well as on the insights and advice of members of other marginalised and vulnerable groups.
Children make up a significant portion of the population of PICTs and therefore represent a huge resource for achieving change. As children are generally eager to learn more, including discovering and understanding their surroundings, it is important to foster their capabilities and to involve them in decision‐making from an early age. They deserve to grow up in settings that protect them from disasters, conflicts and irreversible changes that limit economic and social opportunities. This highlights the need for the education sector to play a much more active role in education and awareness raising related to the management of disaster and climate risks, building on the many successes that have already been achieved in the region, at national and sub‐national levels.
National and regional resilience to disasters and to climate change starts with local actions. The private sector can specifically contribute to enhancing resilience on a local scale. There is a need to transform risk management by bringing in the private sector and other non‐traditional development actors. This needs to be done while at the same time retaining a focus on communities.
The private sector can play a key and influential role in raising awareness around DRR, CCA and emissions reduction. Raising awareness among peers in the private sector, in industry, in the public sector and in communities is recognized as the first step towards resilience.
Financial Resources. Pacific leaders have often stressed the critical and urgent need for finance to enable their countries and territories to respond to CCA and DRR needs and, in particular, to assist those people who are already suffering, are displaced or are being otherwise affected as a result of the detrimental consequences of disasters and climate change. The bottom line is to ensure that PICTs have equitable access to predictable, adequate and sustainable financing to implement national DRM and climate change response strategies that are aligned with existing development plans.
In spite of a diverse array of funding mechanisms, many Pacific leaders have continued to stress that their countries are not fully benefitting from funding, such as was agreed at COP 15. This is due to complexities, delays and effectiveness of accessing climate funding, and the failure of donors to fully deliver on pledges. Other concerns include the overall adequacy of funding, the balance between allocations for reduction in greenhouse gases and adaptation, whether funds are truly ‘new and additional’ to official development assistance, whether funds are available as loans or grants, and the need for funding mechanisms to take account of the particular and special needs of SIDS.
Since 1950, disasters have cost PICTs around USD3.2 billion, in nominal terms, in associated damage. The cost of restoring infrastructure, maintaining access to basic social services, providing social safety nets to the affected population, and investing in disaster risk reduction, is expected to be around USD120 million, which equates to 22 per cent of GDP over the next three to four years108. The overall indicative resources costs to implement Tonga’s JNAP over the period 2010–2015 are estimated to be USD12 million. Of this, it is estimated that in‐kind staff contributions from the government and partner agencies would constitute two per cent of resource costs109. For PNG’s water resources alone, a projected 2 to 4°C rise in temperature has been estimated to cause economic losses of USD1 billion per year110. In Samoa, comprehensive interventions addressing urgent and immediate needs are estimated to cost USD2 billion111.
Under a business‐as‐usual scenario total climate change costs in the Pacific are estimated to reach 12.7% of annual GDP by 2100. Even under a low emissions scenario the economic loss would still reach 4.6% of the region’s annual GDP by 2100. Losses by the agriculture sector dominate, followed by increased cooling costs and economic impacts in the coastal areas ‐ dryland loss, wetlands loss, and forced migration112.
Under a business‐as‐usual scenario, the Pacific region would require USD 447 million on average every year until 2050 (approximately 1.5% of GDP) to prepare for the worst case (95th percentile) of
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climate change. Annual adaptation costs could be as high as USD 775 million, or 2.5% of GDP per annum. Costs would be significantly reduced under lower emissions scenarios. For example, if the atmospheric CO2 concentration can be kept below 450ppm, annual adaptation costs are expected to be as low as USD 158 million, or 0.5% of GDP per annum until 2050113.
Based on these estimates, and the promised level of international climate finance (globally as much as USD30 billion for 2010‐2012 and USD 100 billion by 2020), it is unlikely that the amounts raised over the next few years will be sufficient to meet all climate and disaster risk management financing needs. This raises the question of how to prioritise the spending of the limited financial resources available to PICTs. The recently developed Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Framework (PCCFAF) assesses a country’s ability to access and manage climate change resources across six interrelated dimensions (funding sources; policies and plans; institutions; public financial management and expenditure; human capacity; and development effectiveness), and uses various modalities to assist in implementing these efforts. The assessment informs preparation of a Climate Change Financing Action Plan that outlines a series of actions to guide efforts by national governments and development partners to improve approaches to climate change financing114.
Efforts to improve development effectiveness consider issues such as leadership, ownership, alignment, harmonisation, achieving results and accountability. All are critical to effective responses to climate change. Pacific Leaders have highlighted the importance of integrating climate change into broader development efforts, and there are established international and Pacific‐focussed mechanisms that guide efforts in this area and facilitate dialogue between development partners. The PCCFAF seeks to draw from and build on these efforts115.
Looking ahead in terms of emerging needs related to climate finance, one of the key findings of the expenditure analyses undertaken to date is that expenditures relevant to climate change are being shaped primarily not by climate change policy, but more generally by expenditure priorities. This means it is important to establish appropriate incentives, and strengthen capacities to appraise projects and programmes in relation to climate change in priority sectors. To date, the analyses undertaken show that governments do not need to build new, bespoke budgetary systems to address climate change issues. Since existing systems of performance budgeting are already creating strains on government systems, the analyses have given priority to identifying opportunities for adapting these systems, rather than creating new analytical and reporting requirements, wherever possible. These findings are beginning to bring into focus questions of the appropriate breadth of coverage of climate expenditure, including, in particular, the treatment of infrastructure, livelihoods and welfare payments.
Figure 5 shows the range of options for risk financing as compared with risk reduction with shading indicating effectiveness. Risk reduction is highly effective for more frequent risk. For less frequent, yet more catastrophic risk with the potential to strongly affect government finance and the economy, a risk acceptance threshold may be passed. Beyond this threshold options such as contingent credit, sovereign insurance, catastrophe bonds and intergovernmental risk pooling become effective. By spreading risk across hazards and regions, regional, national and (potentially) global pools for public‐ and private sector risks can greatly reduce the cost of risk bearing. However, not all risk can be reduced or financed, and donor assistance will continue to cover the extreme risks.
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Figure 5. Effectiveness of financing residual risk compared to financing risk reduction116.
vi. Life‐cycle Approach to Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Learning
Establishment of a robust, yet simple and practical monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning (MERL) process will be essential to measure progress towards achieving the strategic goal and objectives for disaster and climate resilient development (see Figure 6).117,118 It would provide evidence‐based understanding of how priorities under the Strategy are making a difference, what they are achieving and how they could be improved to deliver more impactful outputs and longer‐term resilient outcomes. The aim would not be to establish or develop a ‘new’ instrument, but rather draw on existing monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems and those that are under development, such as the SDGs for the post‐2015 development agenda as well as the successor to the current Pacific Plan.119,120
Using best practices from operational monitoring, evaluation and reporting frameworks and selecting a manageable number of SMART (simple, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely) performance indicators and targets will provide strong starting points to measuring progress and achieving resilient development. It will also help reduce the burden of reporting that is expected from PICTs, by creating a greater awareness among the multiple actors and stakeholders of the existing and potential links that can be drawn between various policy, planning and practice instruments. For example, the development sectors that implement the lion’s share of this Strategy have established links that contribute to measuring the progress and achievements of the Pacific Plan and the MDGs.121 The opportunity exists to apply disaster and climate resilient criteria to existing, relevant, indicators, targets and goals.
The principles of continual improvement in risk management and adaptive management to climate change will be essential to achieving a paradigm shift to disaster and climate resilient development.122 These operational principles share similar characteristics and intent, by: being systematic, structured and formal yet dynamic, iterative and responsive to change; explicitly addressing uncertainties based on the best available information, through learning and participation; and using what has been learned to adjust policy and practice and improve management or the way that things are done, in order to achieve objectives and desired outcomes, and ultimately the vision and goal of the strategy for disaster and resilient development in the Pacific.123,124
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Figure 6: Elements of a monitoring, evaluation, reporting and improvement framework for measuring progress and achievement of the Strategy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Development in the Pacific.125
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Abbreviations
AOSIS CC CCA CO2
COP CRGA CROP CSO DM DRM DRR EU FEMM FRANZ FSM GDP GFDRR GHG HFA HFA2 IATA ICAO JNAP LCD MDGs MERL MTR NAPAs NAPs NDMO NGO PCCFAF PCCR PCRAFI PDN PDRMPN PHT PIC PICTs PIEMA PIFACC PIFS PMC PNG PPCR RDMM RFA
Alliance of Small Island States Climate change Climate change adaptation Carbon dioxide Conference of the Parties Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific Civil society organisation Disaster management Disaster risk management Disaster risk reduction European Union Forum of Economic Ministers Meeting France, Australia and New Zealand arrangement Federated States of Micronesia Gross domestic product Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Greenhouse gas Hyogo Framework for Action Successor agreement to the Hyogo Framework for Action International Air Transport Association International Civil Aviation Organization Joint national action plan for DRM and CC Low carbon development Millennium development goals Monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning Mid Term Review National Adaptation Programmes of Action National Action Plans National Disaster Management Office Non‐governmental Organisation Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Framework Pacific Climate Change Roundtable Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Pacific Disaster Net Pacific Disaster Risk Management Partnership Network Pacific Humanitarian Team Pacific island country Pacific island countries and territories Pacific Islands Emergency Management Alliance Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change Pacific Island Forum Secretariat Pacific Meteorological Council Papua New Guinea Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience Regional Disaster Managers Meeting Regional Framework for Action
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RTWG SIDS SDG SMART SOPAC SPC SPREP SRDP UNDP UNISDR UNFCCC US USD USP
Regional Technical Working Group Small Island Developing State Sustainable Development Goal Simple, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of the SPC Secretariat for the Pacific Community Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme Strategy for Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific United Nations Development Programme United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change United States United States Dollar University of the South Pacific
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Glossary
Adaptive management ‐ using a systematic process that continually improves management policies and practices by learning from the successes and failures of operational programmes, and drawing on new interdisciplinary scientific understanding, practical experience and traditional knowledge.
Climate change ‐ refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the UNFCCC, which defines ‘climate change’ as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’.
Climate change adaptation ‐ actions in response to actual or anticipated changes in the climate that are intended to moderate the adverse consequences or exploit beneficial opportunities.
Climate risk ‐ a risk resulting from climate change, that relates to natural and/or human systems.
Disaster ‐ a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources; disasters may be slow or rapid onset, and intensive or extensive in terms of consequences.
Disaster and Climate Resilient Development ‐ economic and social development that is safeguarded from the consequences of natural disasters and climate change, through development goals and strategies that incorporate the threats and opportunities of a changing climate and natural disasters, including reduced or low greenhouse gas emissions, without compromising achievement of the development goals.
Disaster management ‐ the organization and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and reconstruction, in order to lessen the impact of disasters.
Disaster risk ‐ the potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period.
Disaster risk management ‐ the systematic process of using policies, plans, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards as well as the possibility of a disaster.
Disaster risk reduction ‐ a systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing the risks of disaster; significantly, disaster risk reduction can include adaptation to climate change.
Exposure ‐ people, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses.
Greenhouse gases ‐ those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere, and clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect, whereby absorption of infrared radiation by the atmosphere warms the Earth. ‐Water vapour, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane and ozone are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere. Other greenhouse gases include sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons.
Hazard ‐ A phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause one or more of the following: loss of life, injury or other consequences for humans; property damage; loss of livelihoods and services; social and economic disruption; and environmental damage; a hazard may be slow or rapid onset.
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Horizon scanning ‐ the systematic search for possible future problems, threats, opportunities and likely future developments, including those at the margins of current thinking and planning.
Maladaptation ‐ an action that is designed to deliver adaptation benefits, which in fact causes adverse effects, such as increased vulnerability to climate variability and change.
Resilience ‐ the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.
Risk ‐ The combination of the likelihood of a hazard event occurring, and the potentially negative consequences.
Risk assessment ‐ A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that together could potentially harm exposed people, property, services, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend.
Risk management ‐ The systematic approach and practice of managing risks in order to minimize potential harm and loss.
Vulnerability ‐ The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard.
Weak signals ‐ early signs of possible, but not certain, changes that may later become more significant indicators of critical changes.
Wild card ‐ a surprising, unexpected event with potentially high impact and strategic consequences.
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Endnotes: 1 UNISDR and UNDP, 2012: Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in the Pacific: An
Institutional and Policy Analysis. Suva, Fiji: UNISDR, UNDP, 76pp. 2 In 2005 Pacific Leaders approved two regional frameworks designed to help address the challenges posed
to sustainable national development by the range of natural hazards, and by climate change, namely the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for Action (2005 – 2015) (RFA) and the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change (2006 – 2015) (PIFACC).
3 Held in Nadi, Fiji, from July 8 to 11, 2013. 4 The RTWG comprising senior officials of SPC, SPREP, UNISDR, UNDP and USP provided technical oversight
and support to PICTs in the development of the Strategy. 5 The Committee comprised PICT representatives from the SPREP Meeting, the SPC Committee of
Representatives of Governments and Administrations (CRGA), the Regional Disaster Managers Meeting (RDMM), the Pacific Climate Change Roundtable (PCCR), the Pacific Meteorological Council (PMC), the Forum of Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM), and a representative from the French Territories. These Committee members jointly represented the interests of the Pacific region.
6 This and the previous paragraph will be moved to an Annex in final versions of the Strategy. 7 ADB, 2011: Workshop Report ‐ The Millennium Development Goals in Pacific Island Countries: Taking
Stock, Emerging Issues, and the Way Forward. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila, The Philippines, 50pp.
8 SPREP, 2012: Pacific Environment and Climate Change Outlook. Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Apia, Samoa, 232pp.
9 Adapted and updated from Hay, J.E. and C. Pratt, 2013: Regional Situation and Needs Assessment of Programming Priorities for Australia’s Pacific Disaster Risk Management, Environment and Climate Change (DEC) Development Agenda and Delivery Strategy. Report to the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Canberra, 58pp.
10 The eight PICs, in descending order of disaster losses are Vanuatu, Niue, Tonga, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, the Marshall Islands, and the Cook Islands.
11 PCRAFI, 2012: Risk Assessment ‐ Summary Report. Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI). World Bank, Washington DC, 95pp.
12 World Bank, 2012: Acting Today, for Tomorrow: A Policy and Practice Note for Climate and Disaster Resilient Development in the Pacific Islands Region. World Bank, Washington DC, 28pp.
13 Source: EM‐DAT ‐ the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database www.emdat.be UniversitéUniversite catholique de Louvain Brussels Belgium (accessed October 2013).
14 World Bank, 2012 op.cit. 15 PCRAFI, 2013: Current and Future Tropical Cyclone Risk in the South Pacific. Pacific Catastrophe Risk
Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI). World Bank, Washington DC, 12pp. 16 Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011. Climate Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment
and New Research. Volume 1: Regional Overview. Volume 2: Country Reports. 17 IPCC, 2013: Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2013: The
Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, 36pp.
18 Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011 op.cit. 19 Power, S., Delage, F., Chung, C., Kociuba, G. and K. Keay, 2013: Power Robust twenty‐first‐century
projections of El Niño and related precipitation variability. Nature 502, 541–545. 20 World Bank, 2012 op.cit. 21 FSPI, 2013: Views from the Frontline: 2013 ‐ Pacific Region Summary Report. Foundation of the Peoples of
the South Pacific International (FSPI), Suva, Fiji, 6pp. 22 see, for example, Hay and Pratt, 2013. op.cit. 23 see, for example, GFDRR, 2013: Managing Disaster Risks for a Resilient Future: A Strategy for the Global
Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 2013 – 2015. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington DC, 27pp.
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24 Hay, J.E., 2009: Implementation of the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change (PACC) Project: Process,
Status and Assessment. Technical Report, Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Apia, Samoa, 48pp.
25 SOPAC and UNISDR, 2010: Mid‐Term Review Pacific Regional DRM Framework for Action. SOPAC and UNISDR, Suva, Fiji, 11pp.
26 SPC, 2013: Regional Synthesis Progress Report ‐ Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for Action 2005‐2015 Report for the Period of 2009 – 2013. Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), Noumea.
27 Ibid 28 Ibid 29 Ibid 30 Lavell, A., and A. Maskrey, 2013: The Future of Disaster Risk Management: An Ongoing Discussion.
FLACSO and UNISDR, San Jose, Costa Rica, 20pp. 31 World Bank, 2012, op.cit. 32 Ibid 33 World Bank and UNISDR, 2010: Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters: the Economics of Effective
Prevention. World Bank, Washington DC, 254pp. 34 World Bank, 2012 op. cit. 35 Sven Harmeling and Linde Grießhaber, 2013: Policy Brief – How can the Green Climate Fund Initiate a
Paradigm Shift? Climate & Development Knowledge Network, Germanwatch, 6pp. 36 UNISDR and UNDP, op.cit. 37 World Bank, 2012, op.cit. 38 Lavell and Maskrey, op.cit. 39 Ibid 40 World Bank, 2012. op.cit 41 World Bank, 2006: Not If But When – A Policy Note for Adapting to Natural Hazards in the Pacific Islands
Region. World Bank, Washington DC, 46pp. 42 World Bank and UNISDR, op.cit. 43 Ibid 44 The Pacific Climate Change Portal (http://www.pacificclimatechange.net/project‐search/) and the
Disaster Risk Reduction Project Portal (http://www.drrprojects.net/) contain databases that include DRR and CCA projects that have been implemented in the Pacific Islands Region (websites accessed October 2013).
45 World Bank and GFDRR, 2012: The Sendai Report – Managing Disaster Risks for a Resilient Future. World Bank, Washington DC., 61pp.
46 Lavell and Maskrey, op. cit. 47 World Bank and UNISDR, op.cit. 48 A recent analysis shows that between 1980 and 2009 about 2 percent of total development assistance
was allocated for disaster‐related activities. Of this amount, the majority was spent on emergency response (69.9%), and reconstruction and rehabilitation (24.8%), with 3.6% allocated to disaster prevention and preparedness in GFDRR, op.cit p9
49 PACCSAP, 2013 op.cit. 50 World Bank, 2012 op.cit. 51 Lavell and Maskrey, op.cit. 52 Ibid 53 Harmeling and Grießhaber, op.cit. 54 World Bank and GFDRR, op.cit. 55 Mabey, N., J. Gulledge, B. Finel and K. Silverthorne, 2011: Degrees of Risk – Defining a Risk Management
Framework for Climate Security. E3G, London, UK., 179pp. 56 For example, Hay and Pratt op. cit. 57 For example, GFDRR op.cit. 58 Schwartz, P. and D. Randall, 2003: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United
States National Security. Pentagon Summary Report, Washington DC, 3pp. 59 Brewer, P.G., 2013: A short history of ocean acidification science in the 20th century: a chemist’s view.
Biogeosciences Discussions 10, 8715–8748.
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60 This is an indicative list and subsequent discussion. Both will be revised after stakeholder consultations ‐
e.g. should we include security and conflicts? 61 Doney, S.C., Fabry, V.J., Feely, R.A. and J.A Kleypas, 2009: Ocean acidification: the other CO2 problem.
Annual Review of Marine Science, 1, 169‐192. 62 IPCC, 2011: IPCC Workshop on Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine Biology and Ecosystems:
Workshop Report. Edited by Christopher B. Field, Vicente Barros, Thomas F. Stocker, Qin Dahe, Katharine J. Mach, Gian‐Kasper Plattner, Michael D. Mastrandrea, Melinda Tignor, and Kristie L. Ebi, IPCC Working Group II Technical Support Unit, Carnegie Institution, Stanford, California, United States of America, and the IPCC Working Group I Technical Support Unit, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, 174pp.
63 Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011 op.cit. 64 PACCSAP, 2013: Supplement to Climate Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment and New Research,
Volume 2: Country Reports. Draft Version, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the Commonwealth of Australia through its Bureau of Meteorology, Pacific‐Australia Climate Change Science and Adaptation Planning (PACCSAP) Program, 250pp.
65 Bell, J.D., Johnson J.E. and A.J. Hobday, 2011: Vulnerability of Tropical Pacific Fisheries and Aquaculture to Climate Change. Secretariat of the Pacific Community, NouméaNoumea, New Caledonia, 941pp.
66 GFDRR, 2010: Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment, Guidance Notes, Volume 2: Conducting Damage and Loss Assessments after Disasters. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington DC, 98pp.
67 Government of Fiji, 2013: Fiji, Post‐Disaster Needs Assessment, Tropical Cyclone Evan, 17th December 2012. Ministry of Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics, Government of Fiji, Suva, Fiji, 98pp;Government of Samoa, 2013: Samoa Post‐disaster Needs Assessment, Cyclone Evan, 2012. Government of Samoa, Apia, 172pp.
68 Warner, K., van der Geest, K., Kreft, S., Huq, S., Harmeling, S., Kusters, K., and A. de Sherbinin, 2012: Evidence from the frontlines of climate change: Loss and damage to communities despite coping and adaptation. Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative. Policy Report No. 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU‐EHS), Bonn, Germany, 16pp.
69 AOSIS, 2008: Proposal to the AWG‐LCA ‐ Multi‐Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 8pp.
70 Ginnetti, J. and C. Lavell, 2013: Overview of current and anticipated population movements in the Pacific. Paper presented at the Nansen Initiative Pacific Regional Consultation: “Human Mobility, [Natural] Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific”, Rarotonga, Cook Islands 21 – 24 May, 2013.
71 Nansen Initiative, 2013a: Background Paper: “Human Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific”. The Nansen Initiative, Geneva, Switzerland, 27pp; Nansen Initiative, 2013b: Conclusions: Nansen Initiative Pacific Regional Consultation. The Nansen Initiative, Geneva, Switzerland, 3pp.
72 UNESCO‐SCOPE‐UNEP, 2011: Engineering the climate. Research questions and policy implications. UNESCO‐SCOPE‐UNEP Policy Briefs Series, Paris, France, 6pp.
73 ECLAC, 2011: The Economics of Climate Change in the Caribbean – Summary Report 2011. United Nations Economic Commission For Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean , Port‐of‐Spain , Trinidad and Tobago , 106 pp.
74 Becken, S. and J.E. Hay, 2012: Climate Change and Tourism: From Policy to Practice. Routledge/Taylor and Francis, U.K, 240pp.
75 World Bank, 2012, op.cit. 76 FAO, 2008: Climate and Food Security in Pacific Island Countries. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations, Rome, 280pp. 77 UNESCAP, 2013: Position Paper ‐ the Status of the Water‐Food‐Energy Nexus in Asia and the Pacific
region. UNESCAP, Bangkok, 43pp. 78 FSPI, op.cit. 79 Davies, M., K. Oswald, T. Mitchell and T. Tanner., 2008: Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk
Reduction and Social Protection – Briefing Note. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, 12pp.
80 World Bank and GFDRR, op.cit. 81 SPC, 2010: Towards an energy secure Pacific: Framework for Action on Energy Security in the Pacific.
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), NouméaNoumea, 29pp.
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82 SPC, 2011: The costs and benefits of introducing standards and labels for electrical appliances in Pacific
Island countries. Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), NouméaNoumea, 66pp. 83 IRENA, 2013: Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2012: An Overview. International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA), IRENA Secretariat, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 96pp. 84 World Bank, 2012 op.cit. 85 ADB, 2013 op.cit. 86 refer endnote 14 (accessed October 2013). 87 Lavell and Maskrey op.cit. 88 World Bank and GFDRR, op.cit. 89 UNDP, 2009: Risk Knowledge Fundamentals: Guidelines to Establishing and Institutionalising Disaster Loss
Databases. UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok, UNDP, Bangkok. 100pp. 90 see 90 see http://www.desinventar.net (accessed October 2013) (accessed October 2013) 91 PCRAFI, 2012, op.cit. 92 UNOCHA, 2013: Pacific Humanitarian Team Performance Review 2008‐2012. Prepared by Kristel Griffith
for OCHA Pacific. UNOCHA, Suva, Fiji, 52pp. 93 see http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign‐Relations/Pacific/0‐franz.php (accessed October 2013). 94 In‐country disaster management actors include national and local level government departments and
agencies, the private sector, community‐based and civil society organisations, and Red Cross national societies.
95 See http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JM2013_SAM_CN_Final_EN_20130408.pdf (accessed October 2013) (accessed October 2013)
96 IFRC, 2011: International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles – A study on Vanuatu’s legal and policy framework for managing foreign disaster response. IFRC, Geneva, 280pp.
97 IFRC, 2012: International Disaster Response Law in the Cook Islands – A study on legal preparedness for facilitating and regulating international disaster assistance. IFRC, Geneva, 132pp.
98 World Bank and GFDRR, op.cit. 99 UNDP and UNISDR, op.cit. 100 SPC, 2013: Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction
and Disaster Management Framework for Action 2005‐2015 Report for the Period of 2009 – 2013 – Regional Synthesis Progress Report. SOPAC Divisions of the SPC, Suva Fiji, 60pp.
101 World Bank, 2013: Building Resilience – Integrating Climate and Disaster Risk into Development, the World Bank Group Experience. World Bank, Washington DC, 58pp.
102 OECD, op.cit. 103 PIFS, 2011: The Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific. PIFS, Suva Fiji,
2pp. (www.forumsec.org ‐ accessed October 2013) 104 The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2012. (http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/Busan%20partnership.pdf ‐ accessed October 2013) 105 PIFS, 2007: Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles – adopted in Koro Palau. PIFS, Suva. 2pp. 106 World Bank, 2012. Op.cit. 107 PCRAFI, 2012 op.cit. 108 PCRAFI, 2013b: Disaster Risk Reduction and Financing in the Pacific: A Catastrophe Risk Information
Platform Improves Planning and Preparedness. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:23
176294~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:226301,00.html?cid=3001_3 (accessed June 21, 2013). 109 Government of Tonga, 2010: Joint National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Management. Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Nuku’alofa, Kingdom of Tonga, 88pp. 110 New Agriculturalist, 2013: Country Profile ‐ Papua New Guinea. http://www.new‐
ag.info/en/country/profile.php?a=2924 (Accessed May 30, 2013). 111 Government of Samoa, 2011: Climate Resilience Investment Plan. Ministry of Finance, Apia, Samoa,
122pp. 112 Asian Development Bank, 2013: The economics of climate change in the Pacific. Mandaluyong City,
Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 103pp. 113 Ibid. 114 PIFS, 2013: Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Framework. Final Report, Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat, Suva, Fiji, 39pp.
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115 Ibid. 116 ADB, 2013: Disaster Risk Management in Asia and the Pacific: Issues Paper. A Joint Study of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Development Bank Institute. Manila, The Philippines, 34pp. 117 Figure is modified after Jones, G., 2005 . Is the management plan achieving its objectives? in Worboys, G,
Lockwood, M & De Lacy, T, Protected Area Management. Principles and Practice , Second edition, Oxford University Press.
118 Australian Government, 2009: Natural Resource Management Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Improvement Framework. Commonwealth of Australia, 40pp.35pp. 119 Mitchell, T., L. Jones, E. Lovell and E. Comba, 2013: Disaster Risk Management in Post‐2015 Development
Goals – Potential Targets and Indicators. ODI, UK., 136pp. 120 Mitchell, T., M. van Aalst and P. Villanueva. 2010: Assessing Progress on Integrating Disaster Risk
Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in Development Processes: SCR Discussion Paper 2. Strengthening Climate Resilience (SCR), UK., 31pp.
121 PIFS, 2012. op.cit. 122 Villanueva, P., 2011: Learning to ADAPT: monitoring and evaluation approaches to climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction – challenges, gaps and ways forward: SCR Discussion Paper 9. Strengthening Climate Resilience (SCR), UK., 49pp.
123 Ibid. 124 Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, 2009: AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009 Risk Management –
Principles and Guidelines. Standards Australia, NSW and Standards New Zealand, Wellington. 24pp. 125 Jones, 2005. op.cit.