STRATEGY

2025Towards a Restored, Enabled and Resilient ECOWAS

Towards an ECOWAS that is RESTORED

to high economic growthENABLED

to reach its full potentialRESILIENT

to climatic and social challenges

STRATEGY

2025

©2021 ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development All rights reserved. Published 2021 The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and non-commercial use with proper acknowledgement of the Bank. Reproduction of this publication or any part there-of for commercial purposes is prohibited. ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development 128, Boulevard du 13 janvier BP 2704, Lomé - Togo Tel: (+228) 22 21 68 64 Fax: (+228) 22 21 86 84 www.bidc-ebid.org

To become the leading regional development and investment Bank in West Africa, spearheading wealth creation, economic growth and industrialization for the well-be-ing of the people in the region.

Vision of EBID

To promote the financing of both national and regional development programmes and projects for the emergence of an economically strong, industrialized and prosperous West Africa that is fully integrated into the global economic system with a view to taking advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization.

Mission of EBID

The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development has evolved over the years into a fully-fledged develop-ment finance institution that has positioned itself to assist Member States in their journey towards achieving economic prosperity and improved standards of living for their citizenry.

Economic growth in the sub-region has been impressive over the past decade, underpinned by the relative political stability that a majority of Member States have enjoyed over the period. Many Member States enjoyed consistent growth in economic activity, with inflation generally trending downwards. That notwithstanding, the Member States’ continued dependence on commodity exports persistently exposed them to the commodity price fluctuations, which were a very present phenomenon in the past five years.Additionally, the year 2020 also ushered in the COVID-19 pandemic, which has decimated many economies in the sub-region. Increased social spending, coupled with low revenues, has led to increased borrowing by Member States to cushion their citizenry against this ravaging pandemic. This threatens to push Member States on the brink of a debt overhang, widening fiscal gaps and low fiscal buffers to intervene meaningfully to repress further unexpected shocks.

These new challenges have informed the Bank’s strategy for the next five years. The widespread recession that is expected in 2020 will undermine hard earned gains made in poverty reduction in our sub-region. The Bank aims to assist Member States to recover quickly from the repressed growth, by investing in the growth poles of the economy. Furthermore, the increased use of technology in education, brought about by the need for social distancing to control the spread of the virus, has heightened the need to enable Member States to provide the requisite ICT infrastructure to institutions of learning to facilitate teaching and learning. Moreover, lessons from the pandemic have shown that the sub-region is ill-equipped to handle health emer-gencies of this nature. The Bank will, therefore, partner with Member States to provide the requisite medical infrastructure in under-served communities, while working to improve the state of existing ones.

To this end, the Bank will strive to help restore Member States to the path of economic growth, enable them to reach their full potential and develop resilience against climatic and social challenges going forward. We are ready to serve.

George Agyekum DONKOR, PhD, DBA President

FOREWORD

6 I Strategy 2025

FOREWORD 6CONTENTS 7LIST OF TABLES 8LIST OF FIGURES 9ABBREVIATIONS 10EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11

INTRODUCTION 13

PART I: MACRO AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 17

1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT 181.2 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA CONTEXT 201.3 ECOWAS CONTEXT 201.4 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES WITHIN THE WEST AFRICAN REGION 25

PART II:THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 33

2.1 ALIGNMENT WITH THE STRATEGIC PLAN 352.2 THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS OF EBID 362.3 PRIORITY INTERVENTION AREAS 50

PART III: FINANCING FRAMEWORK OF THE PLAN 55

3.1 PROJECT APPROVALS 573.2 PROJECTED DISBURSEMENTS 573.3 PROJECTED INVESTMENTS 603.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 603.5 FINANCIAL OUTLOOK 62

PART IV:MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 65

4.1 OBJECTIVES 664.2 THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 664.3 RESULTS FRAMEWORK 684.4 MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING 75

PART V: IMPLEMENTATION RISKS 77

5.1 FAILURE TO ACHIEVE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION TARGETS 785.2 RISK OF IDLE FUNDS 785.3 PAYMENT RESCHEDULING AND/OR DEFAULT 795.4 CREDIT RATINGS DOWNGRADE 795.5 RISK IMPACTS AND MITIGATION 79

CONCLUSION 81

APPENDICES 83

Appendix 1: Forecast Commitments and Approvals for the Period 2021-2025 (Public Sector) 84Appendix 2: Forecast Commitments and Approvals for the Period 2021-2025 (Private Sector) 85Appendix 3: Forecast Approvals and Commitments for the Period 2021-2025 (Private Sector) 86Appendix 4: Forecast Commitments for the Period 2021-2025 (Private Sector) 87

CONTENTS

Strategy 2025 I 7

Table 1: GDP Growth of ECOWAS Member States, 2012-2019 (%) 21

Table 2: Projected Disbursements, 2021-2025 59

Table 3: Projected Resource Mobilization, 2021-2025 61

Table 4: Projected Income Statement 63

Table 5: Projected Balance Sheet 64

Table 6: SP Monitoring and Evaluation Pipeline 67

Table 7: Operational Indicators 68

Table 8: Implementation Framework 71

Table 9: Risks, Impacts and Mitigation Measures 80

LIST OF TABLES

8 I Strategy 2025

Figure 1: Global GDP Growth 19

Figure 2: GDP Growth and Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa 19

Figure 3: Average GDP Growth: 2012-2015 Vs. 2016-2019 23

Figure 4: Per Capita GDP, 2016-2019 23

Figure 5: Original and COVID-19-induced Revised GDP Forecasts for 2020 24

Figure 6: Average Inflation in the ECOWAS, 2012-2019 24

Figure 7: UN Sustainable Development Goals 35

Figure 8: Economic Structure of ECOWAS Member States in 2019 47

Figure 9: Employment by Sector in ECOWAS Member States in 2019 47

Figure 10: Projected Approvals (Number of Projects), 2021-2025 58

Figure 11: Projected Approvals (Value), 2021-2025 58

Figure 12: Share of Number of Projects 59

Figure 13: Share of Value of Projects 59

Figure 14: Sectoral Share in Overall Planned Investment, 2021-2025 59

Figure 15: Projected Concessional and Commercial Loans, 2021-2025 61

Figure 16: Strategic Plan Information Flow 76

LIST OF FIGURES

Strategy 2025 I 9

AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area

CSF Community Strategic Framework

DFIs Development Finance Institutions

DRSP Department of Research and Strategic Planning of EBID

EBID ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development

ECA Export Credit Agency

ECB European Central Bank

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

GDP Gross Domestic Product

ICT Information, Communication, Technology

IMF International Monetary Fund

MEF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SP Strategic Plan

SSA Sub-Saharan Africa

STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics

UN United Nations

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union

WAMU West African Monetary Union

WAMZ West African Monetary Zone

WDI World Development Indicators

WEO World Economic Outlook

ABBREVIATIONS

10 I Strategy 2025

Coming on the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic, this Strategic Plan (SP) is one that seeks to restore hope of economic recovery, through the strategic investments it seeks to make in Member States over the next five years.

Socio-Economic EnvironmentThe global economy is estimated to have declined by 4.4 percent in 2020, after a growth of 2.8 percent in 2019, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Sub-Saharan Africa, economic activity declined by 1.9 percent, down from a growth of 3.2 percent in 2019. The West African sub-region also recorded a 0.7 percent decline in economic activity in 2020, down from 3.5 percent in 2019.

There continues to exist a myriad of developmental challenges in the ECOWAS region, underlined by serious infrastructure gaps, a weak private sector, low intra-regional trade, low industrialization, rising poverty and inequality, among others. These are some of the challenges that the current SP seeks to address, in partnership with Member States.

Strategic Framework of the 2021-2025 Strategic PlanGiven that the Community Strategic Framework has not been finalized, the strategic framework of the SP has been linked directly to the Sustainable Development Goals (Goals 1-10 and 13) and is anchored on 2 pillars, as follows:

I. Repositioning the Bank to deliver on its value proposition; andII. Promoting resilient, inclusive and sustainable growth and development.

Pillar I proposes actions that the Bank will be taking over the five-year period to make it more efficient, responsive and resourceful. Such actions as working to improve its credit ratings, mobilizing capital arrears and other resources, improving financial performance, strengthening the Bank’s governance structures, and procuring state-of-the-art IT infrastructure, among others, will be pursued.

Under Pillar II, the Bank will invest in the growth poles of Member States’ economies to facilitate a quick exit from the COVID-19-induced economic recession phase. It will also finance projects that will enhance economic integration in the sub-region, while investing in healthcare provision, education and climate action initiatives.The Bank will achieve these objectives by investing in agriculture, transport infrastructure, water, finance, education, industry, energy and health projects across the public and private sectors of Member States.

Financing Framework of the PlanThe Bank will work towards securing concessional and commercial loans, while proposing win-win solutions to Member States to recover capital arrears to finance the SP. To this end, the Bank forecasts to mobilize a total of US$1.35 billion in loans made up of US$223.02 million in concessional and US$1.13 billion in commercial loans, and the outstanding capital arrears, which stands at US$126.15 million.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategy 2025 I 11

Following from this, the Bank forecasts an increase in its assets from the provisional US$1.04 billion in 2020 to US$1.85 billion in 2025, by increasing its loans and advances to US$1.65 billion in 2025, from the provisional figure of US$812 million in 2020. The Bank also forecasts to more than double its operating income from US$24.45 million in 2020 to US$54.33 million in 2025.

Over the SP period, the Bank expects that the Board of Directors will approve the financing of 131 projects, made up of 85 private and 46 public sector projects in the amounts of US$1.06 billion and US$695 million respectively, in favor of Member States.

Implementation RisksThe successful implementation of the SP is underpinned by certain key assumptions. The key risks to the implementation of the SP are linked to the unravelling of these key assumptions. The broad risks include failure of the Bank to achieve its resource mobilization targets, liquidity squeeze (occasioned by payment defaults by debtors) and credit ratings downgrade (which will serve to increase the Bank’s funding cost). Furthermore, the persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic could adversely affect the Bank’s liquidity position.

12 I Strategy 2025

INTRODUCTION

Strategy 2025 I 13

The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) was established with the primary aim of assisting Member States in financing infrastructure projects that spur economic cooperation, raise living standards (i.e. reduce poverty) and promote economic development. Even though ECOWAS remains one of the high performing regions globally, average economic growth for 2016-2019 declined, compared to the four years prior. This has resulted from global events that have led to commodity price declines and, given that Member States are mostly commodity exporters, this has affected their fortunes adversely. To make matters worse, ECOWAS has not been able to escape from the debilitating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, having been spared the full impact of the 2007/2008 Global Financial crisis. This has led to supply chain disruptions, loss of remittances, increased health and social spending and revenue losses to Member States, among others, resulting in marked declines in economic growth projections for 2020, with some in the sub-region being plunged into a recession.

Given the havoc the pandemic has wreaked upon Member States, there is the need to chart a path to a rapid recovery in order to avert the resurgence of widespread abject poverty, after the significant gains that have been made in the war on poverty. This encapsulates and defines the Bank’s value proposition to ECOWAS, as outlined in this Strategic Plan (SP), which covers 2021-2025.

This SP outlines the pathways through which the Bank seeks to address the challenges of the post-COVID-19 era and achieve its vision of creating jobs, creating wealth and alleviating poverty by partnering with Member States to identify impactful investment opportunities for our mutual benefit. This is to ensure that the sub-region takes a giant step towards economic recovery (post-COVID-19) and growth, shared prosperity and social inclusion.

This will require that the Bank repositions itself by becoming more responsive to the needs of Member States. For this to happen, there is the need for the Bank to invest in its staff to acquire the requisite knowledge about its business module, recruit more staff with the required technical capabilities, acquire state of the art technology as an efficiency enabler, encourage cooperation among staff (rather than the silo mentality) and become more flexible in our approach to business.

Given the limited resource envelope of the Bank and the need to do more for a quick economic turn-around of the sub-region, the SP also sets out a framework that seeks to mobilize proportionate resources to ensure that the Bank achieves the objectives outlined in the SP in good time. This includes encouraging Member States to pay their capital contributions, accessing commercial facilities and securing concessional facilities from bi-lateral and multi-lateral partners.

Clearly dovetailed into the resource mobilization strategy is a plan to improve the Bank’s credit ratings, which largely determines its cost of funds on the international capital market. Having been downgraded by both Fitch and Moody’s in 2019 and 2020, this SP proposes a myriad of rigorous measures to improve the Bank’s asset quality and strengthen its risk management framework in a bid to improve its ratings.

The SP is a product of broad consultations with key stakeholders within and without the Bank and aligns with the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which seek to ensure social inclusion, while safeguarding environmental sustainability in an era, where the negative effects of climate change have become all the more pronounced.

14 I Strategy 2025

The SP also includes a visibility strategy that is founded on doing good work and letting it show. The Bank will make it a policy to advertise projects it is financing or co-financing within the sub-region, while publishing the maiden West African Economic Outlook (WAEO) in May 2021 and subsequent years. This will become the Bank’s flagship public document, to be distributed throughout the 15 Member States. This and other publications, beyond helping to achieve visibility for the Bank, will also highlight the socio-economic conditions of the West African sub-region to Member States and the rest of the world.

The SP is made up of five parts. Part I discusses the macro and socio-economic conditions, highlighting global, regional and sub-regional socio-economic performances related to the subject matter and providing the proper context to situate the aspirations of the SP. Part II outlines and discusses the strategic framework of the SP. Part III discusses the financing framework that supports the planned interventions in Part II, indicating the size of the resource envelope, the sources of new resources and programming such resources for planned interventions over the five-year period. Part IV lays out the monitoring and evaluation framework, highlighting the indicators to be measured, while Part V discusses the risks that could hamper the successful implementation of the SP.

Strategy 2025 I 15

1MACRO AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Strategy 2025 I 17

1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXTEconomic activity at the global level grew at an average of 2.0 percent in 2016-2020, compared to 3.7 percent in 2011-2015. Unlike in 2011-2015, where Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth stabilized around 3.5 percent for the most part, global economic activity experienced a declining growth in 2017-2020, peaking at 3.8 percent in 2017 (after a 3.3% growth in 2016) and declining consistently to 3.6 percent, 2.8 percent and -3.3 percent in 2018, 2019 and 2020, respectively, as shown in Figure 1.

The year 2016 witnessed a gradual recovery of commodity prices after the plunge in crude oil prices in the latter part of 2014, through to 2015. The decline in crude oil prices brought in its wake a decline in other commodity prices. That notwithstanding, GDP growth in 2016 was marginally below that of the level recorded in 2015. Further to the relatively weak growth in 2016, the trade tensions that built up among key global economic powers also contributed to the growth repression in the years beyond 2017.

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on economic activity led to a downward revision of global economic growth forecasts, particularly for 2020. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its 2020 global GDP growth forecast downward from 3.4 percent to -4.4 percent1 , with all country groups projected to lapse into a recession2 . This was occasioned by widespread intra-country lockdowns, curfews and border closures, which brought economic activity to a virtual halt across countries. At end-2020, however, global growth was -3.3 percent, more than one percentage point better than the October 2020 forecast.The global economy is projected to rebound strongly, growing at about 6.0 percent in 2021 due to the base effect, occasioned by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is contingent largely on

the tapering of the impact of COVID-19 on economic activity, through the discovery of a vaccine or its elimination and the fact that countries have learnt to live with the pandemic.

The year 2018 marked 10 years since the Global Financial Crisis. While the global financial architecture has been strengthened with regulations, performance of the sector has not been able to match pre-crisis levels. Subdued financial flows, partly due to low foreign direct investments, has become characteristic of the period. Interest rates have remained muted, to say the least, with marked rate cuts across advanced countries. The European Central Bank (ECB) maintained a zero percent rate for almost the entire 2016-2020 period. After hiking up the rate for only the second time in a decade in 2016 since maintaining a near zero rate, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States (US) increased its key rate consistently until the latter part of 2019, when rate cuts became a regular feature. The US Fed cut its key rate to near zero levels in the first quarter of 2020, similar to the 2009-2015 levels, mainly as a response action to the COVID-19 pandemic. The US Fed intimated that it would keep its key interest rate close to zero until 2023.

The decline in trade and the COVID-19-induced lockdown had an adverse impact on manufacturing activity in the reference period. Trade policy uncertainty and the erection of tariff and non-tariff barriers by key economic players led to sluggish investment into manufacturing activity and culminated in repressing global trade in capital goods, with automobile manufacturing being one of the worst affected sectors. That notwithstanding, pre-COVID-19 employment numbers held steady in some advanced countries. In the United States, for example, unemployment got close to historically low levels, at an average of 4.2 percent in 2016-2019 (3.7 percent at end-2019), compared to 6.8 percent in 2012-2015. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, increased the unemployment rate to 8.1 percent at end-2020.

18 I Strategy 2025

1 The April 2020 World Economic Outlook (WEO) projected a decline of 3 percent, while the June WEO projected a -4.9 percent growth. The -4.4 percent growth is from the October 2020 WEO.2 The World Bank projected, in its June 2020 edition of the Global Economic Prospects Report, that the global economy would shrink by 5.2 percent in 2020.

Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and EBID Staff Calculations

Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and EBID Staff Calculations

Strategy 2025 I 19

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Figure 1: Global GDP Growth

Figure 2: GDP Growth and Average Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Euro Area also recorded an average unemployment rate of 8.7 percent in 2016-2019, compared to circa 11.5 percent in 2012-2015. The unemployment rate was 7.9 percent at the end of 2020 in the Euro Area. The low unemployment numbers in the United States in 2016-2019 were largely attributable to the stimulus package that was put in place by the government. Also, sustained growth in the services sector contributed to job creation across regions, with the services sector having been on a path to robust growth for quite an appreciable length of time. In a nutshell, the global economy in 2016-2020 can generally be described as one that had:

• Soft global trade;• Weak final demand;• Muted inflation; and• Trade policy uncertainty.

1.2 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA CONTEXTSub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) GDP growth for 2016-2020 was rather subdued, relative to the 2011-2015 period. This was due to the fact that apart from the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Angola and Equatorial Guinea recorded consistent declines in GDP, with Nigeria3 and South Africa recording muted performances over the period. Most of the remaining countries also recorded weak growth, compared to the previous five years. Growth in 2016-2020 averaged 1.8 percent, compared with 4.7 percent in 2011-2015, as shown in Figure 2.

Generally speaking, GDP growth in Eastern Africa held steady, with Ethiopia recording upper single-digit rates, while Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda mostly grew

by more than 5 percent. Southern African countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia, recorded low growth rates, compared to their performances in 2011-2015.

The COVID-19 pandemic ensured that the projected 2020 SSA GDP shifted from a positive to a negative growth territory. The 2020 GDP growth for the Region was revised downwards from an initial 3.6 percent to -3 percent4. This was mainly on account of the reduced economic activity brought about by the widespread lockdowns. Some of the key areas that were adversely impacted included government revenue, international trade, tourism and creative arts, remittances from abroad, among others. Many countries in the Region experienced high inflationary spirals. Inflation surpassed GDP growth year-on-year for an appreciable length of time. Figure 2 shows that inflation exceeded GDP growth between 2011 and 2019, with the situation worsening from 2016. Average inflation reached 9.7 percent in 2016-2020, against average real GDP growth of 1.8 percent. This compares with 2011-2015, where GDP growth averaged 4.7 percent, with an average inflation of 7.6 percent. In a nutshell, SSA’s economic performance is one that can be characterized as having relatively:

• Low growth; and• High inflation.

1.3 ECOWAS CONTEXT ECOWAS Member States experienced uneven growth in 2016-2019. Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, started the referenced period on a negative note. The country’s economy declined by 1.6 percent in 2016, mainly on account of the crude oil price decline

20 I Strategy 2025

3 Nigeria recorded a negative GDP growth (i.e. -1.6%) in 2016.4 The April 2020 WEO projected a decline of 1.6 percent, while the June 2020 WEO forecasted a -3.2 percent. The -3 percent growth is from the October 2020 WEO. The World Bank projected, in its June 2020 edition of the Global Economic Prospects Report, that the Sub-Saharan African economy would shrink by 2.8 percent in 2020.

Member State 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Benin 3.0 4.8 7.2 6.4 1.8 3.3 5.7 6.7 6.9 2.0

Burkina Faso 6.6 6.5 5.8 4.3 3.9 6.0 6.2 6.8 5.7 0.8

Cabo Verde 4.0 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.0 4.7 3.7 4.5 5.7 -14.0

Cote d'Ivoire -4.9 10.9 9.3 8.8 8.8 7.2 7.4 6.9 6.2 2.3

The Gambia -8.1 5.2 2.9 -1.4 4.1 1.9 4.8 7.2 6.1 0.0

Ghana 14.2 8.5 7.2 2.9 2.2 3.4 8.1 6.3 6.5 0.9

Guinea 5.6 5.9 3.9 3.7 3.8 10.8 10.3 6.2 5.6 5.2

Guinea Bissau 9.1 -1.7 3.3 1.0 6.1 5.3 4.8 3.4 4.5 -2.4

Liberia 7.7 8.4 8.8 0.7 0.0 -1.6 2.5 1.2 -2.5 -3.0

Mali 3.2 -0.8 2.3 7.1 6.2 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.8 -2.0

Niger 2.4 10.5 5.3 6.6 4.4 5.7 5.0 7.2 5.9 1.2

Nigeria 4.9 4.3 5.4 6.3 2.7 -1.6 0.8 1.9 2.2 -1.8

Sierra Leone 1.3 4.0 2.4 6.2 6.4 6.4 7.4 6.2 4.4 0.8

Senegal 6.3 15.2 20.7 4.6 -20.5 6.4 3.8 3.5 5.5 -2.2

Togo 6.4 6.5 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.6 4.3 5.0 5.5 0.7

ECOWAS 5.0 5.3 5.8 6.0 3.2 0.8 3.0 3.5 3.5 -0.7

Table 1: GDP Growth of ECOWAS Member States, 2011-2020 (%)

Strategy 2025 I 21

Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and EBID Staff Calculations

for the 3 years ending 2016. The country recovered gradually from there on, growing by 0.8 percent, 1.9 percent and 2.2 percent in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively, as shown in Table 1.

ECOWAS GDP growth averaged 2.0 percent in 2016-2020, compared to 5.1 percent in 2011-2015. Ten (10) out of the 15 Member States achieved an average growth of 5 percent or more in 2016-2019, with most of the others achieving near 5 percent growth5. High growth performers included Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea (whose average growth was almost double that of the 2012-2015 period) and Ghana – all of whose average growth was 6 percent or more.

The average growth for some Member States over the 2016-2019 period was rather tepid, growing below one percent over the period, as shown in Figure 3. Liberia recorded the lowest average growth of -0.1 percent in 2016-2019, down from 4.5 percent in 2012-2015. Other Member States that achieved less than 5 percent growth were Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria.

Provisional data indicates that the ECOWAS Region has recorded broad improvements in per capita GDP. With a few exceptions, most Member States witnessed an end-2018 per capita GDP that was higher than that of 2016. However, per capita GDP for most Member States declined in 2020, relative to 2018 and 2019. Cabo Verde remains the Member State with the highest per capita GDP of US$3,148 at the end of 2020, with Sierra Leone recording the lowest per capita GDP of US$527, as shown in Figure 4. The generally increasing GDP per capita up until 2019 could partly be attributed to the largely declining unemployment rates among Member States. Provisional data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) publication puts the average unemployment rate amongst the 15 Member States at 5.06 percent at end-2019. Cabo Verde, which has a history of double-digit unemployment rates,

has the highest unemployment rate of approximately 12.2 percent, with Niger having the lowest rate of 0.5 percent.

That notwithstanding, the COVID-19 pandemic could potentially jettison all the macroeconomic gains that Member States have made over the past decade. With a GDP growth of -0.7 percent in 2020, the ECOWAS Region experienced a deterioration in key macroeconomic indicators. Such were the uncertainties of the times that it was difficult to pin-point the depth of the impact on GDP growth, except for it being projected to be in negative territory. The Fund projected end-year GDP at -2.5 percent in the October 2020 WEO, compared with a projected growth of 3.8 percent in the October 2019 WEO. This forecast was up from the -2.9 percent forecast in the June 2020 WEO but down from -1.4 percent in the April 2020 edition. Nine (9) Member States – Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Senegal – were projected to experience a contraction in their economies, as shown in Figure 5. This was largely because of the projected decline in remittances, tourism, commodity prices and foreign direct investment, which is consistent with the apparent impact of the widespread lockdowns that became characteristic of the COVID-19 fight in the latter part of the first quarter, through to the second quarter.

Average consumer prices in the ECOWAS Region experienced a precipitous rise from the end-2014 rate of 7.2 percent to 12.4 percent in 2017, before abating to 8.2 percent in 2019, as shown in Figure 6. While West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) prices remained reasonably low and stable (under 2% for most years), non-WAEMU inflation (except for that of Cabo Verde) remained rather elevated, as has been the case for many years now.

The COVID-19-pandemic presented the ECOWAS Region with mixed consumer price results. Given the subdued international trade commodity exports

22 I Strategy 2025

5 This reduces to six (6) when 2020 is included in the average (i.e. 2016-2020).

Strategy 2025 I 23

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Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and EBID Staff Calculations

Figure 3: Average GDP Growth: 2012-2015 Vs. 2016-2019

Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database

1 251

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IMF PROJECTS A GLOBALRECESSION IN 2020

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24 I Strategy 2025

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Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database

Figure 5: Original and COVID-19-induced Revised GDP Forecasts for 2020

Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database

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Figure 6: Average Inflation in the ECOWAS, 2011-2020

to wealthy countries declined in 2020, leading to revenue losses for exporting Member States. The low disposable income levels resulted in low domestic final demand. The low crude oil prices have been a blessing in disguise for net importing countries, while net exporting countries have suffered revenue losses. That said, for all countries, low crude oil prices mitigated the risk of an inflation spike, occasioned by lockdown-induced stockpiling of mainly food, food products and other essentials.However, the reverse is also true that imports declined, as demand for imported goods (final and intermediate) also declined. The downside risks of the COVID-19 pandemic, with regard to price hikes, stemmed primarily from the following sources:

• Supply-side factors: the lockdown has led to supply chain disruptions. As Member States open up, production is not expected to reach 2019 levels. Low supplies will lead to an increase in prices until there is a correction; and• Currency depreciation: low exports means low foreign exchange, putting an upward pressure on ECOWAS currencies, particularly, non-WAEMU currencies (except Cabo Verde, whose currency is pegged to the euro, like the WAEMU Member States).

Public debt has been increasing in the ECOWAS Region, as Member States borrow to tackle key infrastructure challenges and to refinance relatively expensive existing debts. One key risk to the macroeconomic gains in the Sub-Region in 2020 is an imminent debt overhang that has been brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. In spite of the low government revenues, Member States have had to intervene massively in the health sector in a bid to contain the pandemic – and these were not anticipated.

Furthermore, social spending was elevated – from subsidizing the cost of utilities to the citizenry, feeding the vulnerable in lockdown periods, to incentivizing COVID-19 frontline workers (health

workers and security agencies). Given the low revenue performance, Member States had to borrow in a bid to contain the pandemic. This is expected to lead to high interest payments beyond the near term.

1.4 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES WITHINTHE WEST AFRICAN REGIONThe end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020 is a defining moment in human history, with the advent of an unprecedented global health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This crisis, with its harmful and multisectoral consequences, has spared no ECOWAS economy. By mid-June 2020, there were more than 50,000 COVID-19 cases in all ECOWAS Member States, with more than 900 deaths. The lockdown and border closures following the pandemic, led to a downward revision of GDP growth projections, as indicated earlier. The economic and social consequences of this pandemic are highlighted by the IMF’s April 2020 projections. In ECOWAS. these anticipated consequences for the year 2020 are evidenced by a projected recession (i.e. a -1.4 percent GDP growth), a budget deficit estimated at 6.4 percent of GDP, a debt-to-GDP ratio of 42.1 percent and a current account balance (including grants) estimated at -4.6 percent of GDP. In view of the profound disruptions caused by this pandemic, it is projected that its consequences will persist over the medium term, bringing new development challenges alongside those that already exist.

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Among the many development challenges that Member States face are the chronic infrastructure deficit (transport, energy, telecommunications), the low level of industrialization, the low level of intra-regional trade, the sluggishness of the private sector, the mismatch between educational curricula and job profiles, the prevalence of poverty, a non-inclusive growth and a growing inequality, the debt problem, asymmetry of action around the adoption of the Eco, climate change, increasing terrorism and insecurity in some countries of the Region.

1.4.1 Infrastructure Deficit

TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTUREThe realization of the Community vision of moving from an “ECOWAS of States” to an “ECOWAS of peoples” hinges on the development of quality transport infrastructure to facilitate the free movement of goods and people and thus strengthen the process of economic integration in the Region. Notwithstanding this need, it must be noted that much remains to be done in the area of transport infrastructure.

ROAD INFRASTRUCTUREWith regard to the quality of the road network, data from the World Economic Forum (2018) show that apart from The Gambia, Ghana and Cape Verde, which respectively recorded a score of 4.1 and 3.9 on a scale ranging from 1 (poor quality) to 7 (good quality). The other ECOWAS countries are struggling to improve the quality of their road network. Moreover, data from the African Development Bank show that by early 2020, more than 70 percent of ECOWAS roads were not paved.

RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE The ECOWAS Region has limited railway infrastructure. The Dakar-Bamako railway line, which used to carry 75 percent of Mali’s traffic from the autonomous port of Dakar, was dysfunctional in 2018. This epitomizes the state of the railway sector in the Sub-Region, with many countries having experienced a decay in

railway infrastructure that existed at independence. It is heartwarming to note, however, that some Member States have begun to develop railway infrastructure, albeit at a slow pace, since this can unlock massive economic benefits to them and the entire Sub-Region. Railway infrastructure will help to relieve road traffic congestion and reduce the frequency of road maintenance, caused by the effects of carting heavy-duty goods by road. The development of railway infrastructure will have a stimulating effect on the economic integration process in the Sub-Region.

MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE The Sub-Region has a huge comparative advantage in the maritime sector, with twelve of the fifteen Member States having an opening to the sea. The Region is also fortunate to be home to one of Africa’s deep-water ports (the Autonomous Port of Lomé). But beyond these comparative advantages, enormous challenges remain in the sector. The Dakar Autonomous Port, which serves nearly 2,000 trucks daily, has been suffering from a congestion problem for several years and contributes to traffic congestion in Dakar. Senegal has, thus, launched two major projects (the port of Ndayane, with an estimated investment of US$2 billion on a surface area of 1,800 hectares and Sendou, requiring an investment of 500 billion FCFA) so that the Dakar Port Authority will eventually reach a draught of 15 meters for a quay length of 280 meters. That said, there are still concerns about the fluidity of port procedures and in the quality of the infrastructure that will be delivered.

The challenges of the Autonomous Port of Lomé continue to be about how to improve connectivity, management efficiency and the average transit time. Thus, the Port aims to reduce the average transit time from 72 hours in 2016 to 24 hours in 2022, leading to an increase in the volume of containers handled at the port.The challenges at the Port of Tema in Ghana lie in the completion of its new 1.4 km long terminal. Ghana

26 I Strategy 2025

aims to provide the new terminal with four berths, a haulage yard, a 3.5 km breakwater, a 19-meter deep port access channel, various services and other infrastructure.As far as the Autonomous Port of Cotonou is concerned, the Port expects to grow from 526,000 to 800,000 twenty-foot equivalent units by 2025.

The Port has adopted an investment plan for the period 2019-2021, valued at approximately US$511 million. The projections include the extension of the South and North quays to increase processing capacity, the construction of a new berth for increased processing of petroleum products, the relocation of the ferry to expand the entrance to the Port of Cotonou basin

Strategy 2025 I 27

and increased storage and cargo handling capacity.As regards the Autonomous Port of Abidjan and the other Ports of the Sub-Region, the challenges remain similar, notably the need for the construction of new terminals and the reinforcement of maritime security.

ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ECOWAS has made great strides towards the provision of electricity to its peoples, especially between 2009 and 2018, compared to the other Sub-Saharan African blocs. Over the past decade, nearly 68 percent of the urban population had access to electricity, compared to 22 percent for the rural population. While acknowledging the progress made, it is obvious that a lot more remains to be done, given that a great majority of the citizenry do not have access to electricity.

In terms of the share of the urban population with access to electricity, countries such as Liberia (21 percent), Guinea-Bissau (34 percent) and Sierra Leone (43 percent) are the countries where energy challenges remain significant. In relation to the share of the rural population, it should be noted that much remains to be done in all ECOWAS Member States. Apart from the challenges with access to electricity, the fact still remains that the cost of electricity in the Sub-Region is high. This is mainly because external project sponsors factor in what they call the ‘Africa risk’, making credit facilities quite expensive, with its attendant impact on end-user tariffs.

One way of dealing with the high energy costs is for ECOWAS Member States to consider relatively cheaper renewable power options, instead of thermal power. With declining prices of solar panels, Member States could further reduce the cost of solar energy by providing energy parks, fitted with grid connection to reduce the cost of construction and end-use tariffs.

TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTUREInternet use remains low in the West African Sub-Region, averaging an estimated 11 percent of the total population between 2008 and 2017. Niger (2 percent of the population), Guinea-Bissau (3 percent of the population), Sierra Leone (4 percent of the population) and Guinea (5 percent of the population) recorded below average internet use levels, with no ECOWAS Member State recording up to 25 percent internet use per population.

In addition to issues with access, the cost of internet remains high in the Region, further discouraging the citizenry from internet use. Togo, for instance, is adjudged to have the highest internet cost, with an average monthly cost of US$177. Issues with internet access and cost need to be addressed expeditiously, given that the COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the digitalization transition process. For most countries, education has moved online and, even after COVID-19, certain aspects of education and business will remain online. In effect, countries with weak and expensive internet infrastructure stand the risk of being left behind.

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Strategy 2025 I 29

1.4.2 Low Level of Industrialization The structural transformation of ECOWAS economies in 2009-2018 shows that the industrial sector is not only the one that employs the least (13% of the active population) but also the one that generates the lowest value addition (19% of GDP). At the same time, the agricultural sector, which employs the most (47% of the active population), only manages to generate 29 percent of value addition. The services sector, which employs 40 percent of the active population, is the one that generates the most value addition.

Over the last decade, the structural transformation of ECOWAS has resulted in deindustrialization, coupled with low productivity in the agricultural sector. This low level of industrialization has ensured that Member States continue to specialize in the export of raw materials, rather than processed goods. This makes ECOWAS economies highly vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices and other exogenous shocks such as pandemics.

1.4.3 Low Level of Intra-Regional TradeAccording to UNCTAD6 (2019), the share of intra-African trade remains low, at about 14.8 percent in 2017. In 2016, intra- ECOWAS trade was valued at US$11.4 billion. Thus, ECOWAS was behind the Southern African Development Community (US$34.7 billion) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (US$18.7 billion). ECOWAS was followed by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (US$10.7 billion); Arab Maghreb Union (US$4.2 billion); East African Community (US$3.1 billion); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (US$2.5 billion) and the Economic Community of Central African States (US$0.8 billion).

These statistics show that despite the fact that ECOWAS placed third, the level of trade remains low, given the low intra-regional trade in Africa. ECOWAS Member States need to work towards boosting intra-regional trade, in order to benefit from the monetary union agenda as well as the opportunities offered by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

1.4.4 Weak Private Sector The weight of the private sector in ECOWAS economies is far from satisfactory. Private sector investment averaged a mere 14 percent of GDP over the 2014-2018 period, with Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Sierra Leone having the lowest levels of private sector investment. This is partly explained by the huge tax burden borne by private sector enterprises in the Sub-Region. Indeed, the average private sector entity contributes an average of 45 percent of their profit as tax.

This is compounded by the low level of domestic credit granted to the private sector (on average 24% of GDP in all ECOWAS economies over the 2014-2018 period). Sierra Leone (on average 5% of GDP), The Gambia (7% of GDP) and Guinea (9% of GDP) have the lowest rate of private sector credit in ECOWAS.

The availability and quality of credit information to private sector actors in the region is poor. Thus, on a scale of 0 to 8 of the World Bank’s Credit Information Depth Index, all ECOWAS countries recorded an average of 2 over the period 2015-2019.

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6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Apart from Nigeria, Cabo Verde and Côte d’Ivoire, which recorded more or less satisfactory performances in terms of the quality of depth of credit information, the other countries recorded very poor performances over this period.

To meet this challenge, financial sector regulators and banks, in particular, must work to improve the quality of credit information and make it accessible to private sector actors. In addition, banking sector actors must improve their risk assessment and risk management strategy for private sector projects in order to significantly increase the share of credit allocated to this sector.

1.4.5 The Mismatch Between Education Curricula and Job Offer ProfilesIn most ECOWAS Member States, the share of tertiary students enrolled in social sciences and journalism is high on the average (26% in Benin. 15% and 12%, respectively, in Niger and Côte d’Ivoire over the 2014-2018 period) than those enrolled in engineering (3% in Benin and approximately 5% in Niger and Côte d’Ivoire) and mathematics (12% in Benin, 8% in Niger

and 7% in Côte d’Ivoire over the 2014-2018 period). This situation is one of the reasons for the current levels of unemployment and underemployment in the Sub-Region. The uptake for science and mathematics is very low in the Sub-Region, partly because it is perceived to be difficult and not appealing. However, the development challenges of the Sub-Region require that Member States prioritize the study of science and mathematics in order to build a pool of talents that can compete in this fourth industrial revolution era.

1.4.6 Increasing Poverty Inequality and Non-Inclusive Economic GrowthThe World Bank’s Macro Poverty Outlook (2020) projects a slight decline in the poor population, as measured by the international poverty rate (daily expenditure below US$1.9 per day), between 2020 and 2022 in ECOWAS. Indeed, it is estimated that the average poverty rate at the end of 2020 will be 34 percent and is projected to fall by approximately one percentage point in 2021 and another percentage point in 2022. Over the same period, projections show that Guinea-Bissau will be the country in the Region with the highest poverty rates (60% in 2020, 58.3% in 2021 and 56.8% in 2022), followed by Nigeria (52% in 2020, 52.9% in 2021 and 53.4% in 2022). This level of poverty observed in the Region is one of the factors explaining the persistence of inequalities among social classes.

The most recent data published by the World Bank on the evolution of inequalities confirms this persistence of inequalities in ECOWAS countries. The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has led to the loss of jobs in the informal sector, will worsen inequalities in the coming years in the Region. The evolution of poverty levels and inequalities in the Sub-Region show the limits of the economic growth recorded in the countries of the Region. Although in 2019 the Sub-Region recorded a real growth rate equivalent to 3.6 percent led by Cote d’Ivoire (6.9%), Benin (6.4%) and Ghana (6.1%), this growth is far from inclusive.

Strategy 2025 I 31

The looming economic recession in ECOWAS, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, could lead to the poverty aggravation, inequalities and non-inclusiveness of growth. To mitigate the adverse effects, all Member States should work to strengthen their social protection systems through appropriate and effective social policies to accompany economic performance.

1.4.7 The Debt Problem Having had more than 80 percent of their debt relieved at the completion point of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative, many ECOWAS Member States have again become mired in a new debt cycle. Cabo Verde is the most indebted country in the Sub-Region, with an average debt of 126.04 percent of GDP, followed by The Gambia (80.97 percent of GDP) and Togo (75.63 percent of GDP) between 2015 and 2019. Thus, these three countries failed to meet the convergence criterion on the acceptable level of debt in ECOWAS, which is a debt-to-GDP ratio below 70. Anticipating the need for financing that the COVID-19 pandemic will create, it is conceivable that the Community’s economies will face a risk of debt overhang in the medium-to-long-term. This will undermine the resource mobilization capacity of these countries from bilateral and multilateral partners, a major drawback to Members Countries’ ability to recover from the economic ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, this situation could be beneficial for the economies of the Sub-Region if serious consideration is given to controlling budget deficits. The challenge, going forward, is how Member States can improve the business climate upstream and to attract investors, promote the creation of new enterprises and thus broaden the tax base downstream. The challenges remain enormous in terms of consolidating public finances, reducing corruption, misappropriation of public funds and poor governance.

1.4.8 Asymmetry of Action Around the Adoption of the Eco The Eco, the proposed single currency of ECOWAS Member States, long perceived as the instrument that will improve the level of intra-regional trade and consolidate the integration process in the Sub-Region, risks being the Community’s Achilles heel because of the asymmetrical approaches adopted between the bloc of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) States.

To date, ECOWAS economies use eight different currencies, forcing some Community institutions to denominate their operations in foreign currencies (US$, Euro, SDR, etc.). This is an uncomfortable situation for these institutions. However, the entry into force of this single currency is hampered by several technical and diplomatic obstacles. At the technical level, it is noted that most Member States (apart from Togo for the 2019 account) have difficulty in complying with the convergence criteria that could lead to the adoption of this single currency. Reference is also made to the problem of economic cycles between oil-exporting Member States (Nigeria and to some extent, Ghana) and oil-importing Member States (the other Member States of the Community). Some believe that this non-coherence of economic cycles is a handicap to the adoption of the Eco. For others, this situation may have certain advantages. At the diplomatic level, the major obstacle is the desire expressed by the WAEMU bloc to adopt the Eco to replace the CFA Franc they currently use, an approach not shared by the WAMZ bloc.

In view of the advantages that the Eco could bring to the Community (improving intra-regional trade, consolidating economic and monetary integration, etc.), the two blocs within ECOWAS have a great challenge to converge their actions to make this objective realizable.

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2THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Strategy 2025 I 33

Making the Bank visible

Improving financial performance and resource mobilization for impactful investment

Improving the credit ratings of the Bank

Strengthening the governance structures of the Bank

I. Repositioning the Bank to Deliver on its Value Proposition

Recruiting and maintaining highly qualified staff

Procuring and utilizing state-of-the-art IT infrastructure

Investing in the growth poles to enable Member States bounce back from widespread recession

Promoting economic integration in the sub-region

Promoting healthcare delivery

Promoting social protection and climate resilience

II. Promoting Resilient, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth and Development

Investing in Education (specifically science and technology)

34 I Strategy 2025

2.1 ALIGNMENT WITH THE STRATEGIC PLANIdeally, the SP should be linked to the Community Strategic Framework (CSF) or its successor vision (The ECOWAS 2050 Prospective Vision) to ensure that the objectives enshrined in it are consistent with the overarching Community objectives. However, the CSF 2050 Prospective Vision had not been finalized at the time of concluding work on the SP. That said, the SP is aligned with the broad objectives of the draft 2050 Prospective Vision and import of the Final Communique of the Fifty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held on 7 September, 2020, in Niamey, Niger.

The Communique enjoins Member States to, among other things, “continue to pursue strong economic reforms and to mobilize the financial resources necessary for the implementation of their economic recovery plan in order to minimize the social impact of COVID-19, in particular on vulnerable groups”. The Bank will, therefore, work with Member States to realize this admonition.

Furthermore, the Bank has dovetailed the objectives of the 2021-2025 SP to the SDGs, which are shown in Figure 7. This is because the Bank is of the view that given the Community’s commitment to the SDGs, the next CSF will most likely be linked to some of the 17 SDGs, if not all, just as the 2016-2020 CSF.

The SDGs stand for everything that the Bank stands for: poverty alleviation and individual well-being, quality education, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, environmental consciousness, safe drinking water, affordable and safe infrastructure provision, decent work as well as reduced inequalities and gender equality. These are the guiding principles of the 2021-2025 SP, as discussed in the successive paragraphs below.

Figure 7: UN Sustainable Development Goals

Strategy 2025 I 35

2.2 THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS OF EBIDThe 2021-2025 SP objectives have been linked to the following SDGs:

GOAL 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhereThis goal resonates with the Bank’s vision of creating wealth and alleviating poverty. The Bank’s interventions will target social, institutional, and structural weaknesses that impede inclusive socio-economic growth and development. The Bank will seek to promote the achievement of guaranteed prices for crop farmers, identified as some of the most vulnerable in society, through financing agro-processing initiatives as well as the construction of access routes to markets from the farmgate.

GOAL 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agricultureThis goal will be pursued, in line with the Bank’s interventions in the identified priority intervention areas, which seek to ensure all-year round farming, aimed at improving food security and ending hunger.

GOAL 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all agesGiven the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is no gainsaying the fact that the sub-region needs to improve on healthcare infrastructure. To this end, the Bank will partner with Member States to provide healthcare infrastructure in underserved communities, and improve urban healthcare systems, while promoting healthy lifestyle practices.

GOAL 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for allThe Bank will work with Member States to promote education opportunities for all, as a form of social resilience, through the procurement of infrastructure and equipment.

GOAL 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girlsThe Bank will work towards achieving this goal as a cross-cutting issue, through investing in Member States’ initiatives concerning gender parity, with the view to enhancing the participation of women in the private and public sectors. The SP will also work to promote girl child education and empower female small holder farmers by prioritizing their applications for support.

GOAL 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for allThe Bank will support initiatives aimed at providing potable water in Member States to improve the living conditions of the citizenry, while reducing morbidity and mortality rates.

GOAL 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for allThe Bank will finance cost-effective renewable energy projects that will lead to a reduction in end-user tariffs for electricity consumers.

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GOAL 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for allThe Bank’s interventions in Member States will create decent and sustainable jobs for the citizenry, leading to inclusive sustainable economic growth.

GOAL 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovationThe Bank will finance the construction of requisite infrastructure that will engender industrialization and innovation.

GOAL 10: Reduce inequality within and among countriesThe Bank’s planned interventions in the industry and energy sectors will enhance skills and increase job opportunities, while its planned interventions in the agriculture sector will develop the rural areas, reducing the inequality between rural and urban areas. These planned interventions will help reduce poverty by increasing incomes, while reducing inequalities at the same time.

GOAL 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impactsThe Bank will be guided by environmental considerations before committing to finance projects across board. It will actively pursue projects that have minimal adverse environmental impacts.The Bank’s strategic orientations are anchored on:

two broad pillars, as follows:

I. REPOSITIONING THE BANK TO DE LIVER ON ITS VALUE PROPOSITION

1. Making the Bank visible;2. Improving the credit ratings of the Bank;3. Improving financial performance and ressource mobilization for impactful investment;4. Strengthening the governance structures of the Bank;5. Recruiting and retaining highly qualified staff;6. Procuring and utilizing state-of-the-art IT infrastructure;

II. PROMOTING RESILIENT, INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Investing in the growth poles of Member States to enable them to bounce back from widespread recession;2. Promoting economic integration in the sub-region;3. Promoting healthcare delivery;4. Promoting social protection and climate re silience; and 5. Investing in education (specifically science and technology).

Strategy 2025 I 37

2.2.1 REPOSITIONING EBID TO DELIVER ON ITS VALUE PROPOSITIONThe development challenges of the ECOWAS region are very well documented. In addition to flagging economic growth in 2016-2019, relative to 2012-2015, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has ensured that the average regional GDP growth for the 2016-2020 SP period (on provisional basis) will fall short of that of 2010-2014 SP period. The risk of low economic activity, leading to low government revenues and the consequent low public spending, could plunge many among the sub-region’s population into abject poverty. With limited resources, Member States may not be able to build adequate financial buffers and safety nets to mitigate their suffering.With this in mind, the Bank needs to reinvent itself to enable it offer carefully considered integrated solutions that will provide economic, social and environmental resilience across the ECOWAS region in the face of the socio-economic challenges that have been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic.

THE BANK’S VALUE PROPOSITIONThe key advantage the Bank has is that it occupies the unique position as the only Community-wide development finance institution, with extensive knowledge of the Community’s socio-economic challenges. Furthermore, it has the requisite experience to help confront the Community’s not-so-novel socio-economic challenges, including the ones that have been triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, after it has contributed in diverse ways to address them over the years. As an indigenous bank mandated to help address the challenges of the ECOWAS region, the Bank will mobilize concessional and non-concessional resources and offer custom-made solutions to our clients. The Bank will place its financial resources, expertise and research into topical developmental issues at the disposal of Member States, with the ultimate aim of creating jobs, creating wealth and alleviating poverty. This is the Bank’s value proposition in the 2021-2025 SP term.As part of efforts to deliver on this value proposition, the Bank has seen the need to continuously work on rebranding itself in a manner that makes it more professional, effective, efficient and responsive to the needs of its clients. These measures are discussed in the successive paragraphs.

38 I Strategy 2025

1 A regional Bank that is knowledgeable in thedevelopment challenges of Member States

2 Evidence -based interventions, spurred by relevant research

3 Bespoke solutions to diverse clients

EBID’s Value Proposition

BANK VISIBILITY: BRAND AWARENESS AND POSITIONINGEBID is tasked with providing development finance support to the public and private sectors in Member States. However, the reality is that apart from a few private sector actors and a few officials of ministries responsible for finance and economy in Member States, a great majority of people in ECOWAS do not know what EBID’s interventions have achieved within the sub-region. Moreover, a great majority of non-regional players and actors are not aware of the important role that EBID plays in the socio-economic development of Member States. This is predominantly due to the low publicity of EBID’s diverse achievements in ECOWAS across different media channels as well as low participation in key industry events.This has resulted in a low brand awareness, regionally and internally, with adverse impact on Member States’ commitment to the Bank and resource mobilization in a variety of ways. Investor relations are constrained because a majority of key international investors do not readily know about the positive impact EBID’s financing has had in the sub-region, given the limited sources from which they could learn more about the Bank’s operational activities and achievements. Member States often do not prioritize paying capital subscriptions because they are not well informed about the Bank’s impact on their economies. The Bank’s low brand visibility has also meant that many private sector players do not know about its existence, let alone to approach it for assistance. This calls for an aggressive push to make the Bank more visible. The Bank’s Visibility Policy and Communication Strategy serve as the basis for its strategy towards creating brand awareness and competitive positioning. The Communication Strategy is aimed at making the Bank significantly more visible on traditional and digital communication platforms, by means of a strategic messaging about EBID’s role in helping to transform ECOWAS communities. Moreover, the strategy focuses on publications on diverse multimedia channels as

well as enhancement in public relations. Informing, educating and sensitizing audiences on all activities of the Bank, will help EBID’s competitive advantage by positioning it as the leading regional investment and development finance bank in West Africa.

Among the key activities to be implemented under this strategy are:

• Rebrand EBID as a knowledge institution in addition to it being known as a project financier, offering advisory services in the area of project design and implementation, knowledge and skills transfer; • Establish EBID as the “go-to” institution with regard to credible information, media and news relating to the investment and development agenda of the West African sub-region;• Drive digital communications by consistently publicizing the Bank’s website and social media platforms. This includes publishing on the website, beginning from 2021 and annually, 6 monthly economic reviews of each of the 15 Member States in the Community, with each issue focused on one Member State;• Enhance media relations to ensure that key audiences are well-informed about the role and value of EBID as well as influence public opinion and create more goodwill for the Bank among its major audiences, positively impacting its reputation;

Strategy 2025 I 39

I. Repositioning the Bank to deliver on its value proposition

Improving the credit ratings of the Bank

Strengthening the governance structures of the Bank

Recruiting and maintaining highly qualified staff

Procuring and utilizing state-of-the-art IT infrastructure

Making the Bank visible

Improving Financial Performance and Resource Mobilization for Impactful Investment

• Enhance engagement with key donors, partners and other stakeholders;• Publish, beginning from 2021 and annually, a socio-economic review of the ECOWAS sub-region dubbed, the “West African Economic Outlook” (WAEO). This report, the Bank’s flagship socio-economic report, will be published on the Bank’s website, with hard copies distributed throughout the Community; and• Publish reviews of topical issues (at least twice a year) that have direct and indirect impact on Member States, such as commodity price trends and commentaries on international trade and finance.

IMPROVING THE CREDIT RATINGS OF THE BANKAs part of efforts to access the international capital market, the Bank submitted itself to credit risk assessment by the Moody’s and Fitch ratings agencies in May 2018 for the first time. Having assessed the Bank’s default risk, Fitch assigned the Bank a Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of ‘B+’, with a Stable Outlook, and a Short-Term IDR of ‘B’. Fitch’s reason for its rating was that even though the Bank was meeting all its financial commitments, there was a great possibility that it could experience material default risk, given that it had limited liquidity buffers. Moody’s also assigned a B1 rating (with a negative outlook) to the Bank in May 2018, citing the following as the reasons for their action:

a. very low capital adequacy, due to weak asset quality, as exhibited by high Non-Performing Loans; b. very low liquidity, which primarily reflected the lack of diversification in the Bank’s funding and liquidity sources; and c. very low strength of member support, primarily resulting from the existence of large capital payments in arrears and the weak credit strength of EBID’s shareholders.

In March 2019, Fitch revised the Bank’s long-term IDR outlook downwards to Negative, from Stable, and affirmed the IDR at ‘B+’. Similarly, Moody’s

downgraded the Bank’s long-term IDR to B2, from B1 around the same period. Following from the first ratings and subsequent downgrades, it is obvious that the Bank will have to take steps to address the factors that have led the ratings agencies to take such actions. Apart from improving the image of the Bank, working towards better ratings will also help the Bank to lower its cost of funds, enabling it to support Member States with concessional or near-concessional facilities for development.

The roadmap to improving the credit ratings of the Bank will seek to:

• improve the Bank’s asset quality;• address liquidity challenges by:

o encouraging defaulting Member States to pay their capital subscriptions; ando mobilizing resources from bilateral and multi-lateral partners.

IMPROVING FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION FOR IMPACTFUL INVESTMENTThe ratings agencies referenced the Bank’s weak asset quality as one of the reasons why they placed the Bank in the ‘B’ category. They point to liquidity constraints, underpinned by the non-payment of capital subscriptions by some Member States and a generally weak liquid asset base as having informed their decision. In effect, the key to improving the credit ratings of the Bank rests upon improving asset quality and liquidity. This will not only improve the Bank’s ratings but help reduce the cost of funds as well.Resource mobilization is at the center of the Bank’s ability to deliver on its mandate of supporting Member States, especially in these difficult times. However, it is obvious that concessional resources are what the Bank needs to focus on, in its quest to bring value to Member States. This objective is even more telling in an era where Member States find themselves on the brink of a debt overhang, on account of the efforts they made to secure resources to address the challenges imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

40 I Strategy 2025

In addition to improving resource mobilization, the Bank needs to improve on its financial performance by rationalizing costs and ensuring optimal allocation of financial resources. To this end, the Bank will continue to work towards achieving the following financial performance and resource mobilization objectives in the 2021-2025 period:

• Build strong partnerships for resource mobilization;• Lay down a clear strategy to recover capital contributions from defaulting Member States;• Work towards recovering bad loans;• Increase revenues faster than the increase in interest expense;• Strengthen collaboration between the operations departments and the Department of Finance and Accounting to avoid the Bank losing money on idle funds;• Pursue intensive sourcing for trade finance transactions; and• Revitalize the Asset and Liability Management Committee to give the Bank a sense of direction.

Building Strong PartnershipsThe Bank will prioritize the pursuit of the outstanding capital contributions by Member States, as a basis to improving the credit ratings of the Bank and to making the Bank more attractive to non-regional members to subscribe to the capital of the Bank. Following from this, there will be a strong push to engage with defaulting Member States on a workable roadmap

to liquidate their obligations, while being mindful of the debilitating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their financial capacities. This can be addressed by assuring Member States that the Bank will invest in critical infrastructure in their economies, using part of these resources and other lines of credit, where necessary, to:

• Explore the possibility of accessing Sovereign Wealth Funds; and• Engage bilateral and multilateral partners for concessionary resources.

Capital RecoveryThe Bank will continue to engage Member States with innovative proposals towards the payment of their overdue capital subscriptions. The thrust of the proposal is to leverage on the capital payments by Member States to channel a six-fold investment in these countries, through ECA-backed financing. In this regard, the Bank would have addressed the capital non-payment and poor asset quality concerns that were raised in the ratings agencies’ verdict on the Bank. In addition to this, the paying countries will receive investment to a tune they never envisaged from the Bank. This would then place the Bank on a pedestal for an upgrade. The strategy is based on a three-pronged approach, as follows:

Strategy 2025 I 41

1. The Member State settling its capital subscription arrears from her own resources;2. The Member State taking a concessional facility from another Development Finance Institution (DFI) to settle her capital subscription arrears; and3. The ECOWAS Commission securing a concessional facility from another DFI to settle Member States’ capital subscription arrears.All the above options will help boost in-year infrastructure investments, with minimal impact on their fiscal position. Furthermore, Member States can elect to channel part of these resources to support private sector projects as well.

Bad LoansThe Bank will continue its re-engagement with defaulting clients to restructure facilities and agree on payment terms, in a bid to improve the Bank’s asset quality. The recovered facilities will improve the Bank’s liquidity position, given that most of these facilities have been written off already, making the Bank better placed for a ratings upgrade. These recovered loans will be applied in critical areas of Member States’ economies.

Idle FundsThe Bank will work assiduously towards averting the incidence of keeping idle funds, due to the delayed closure of projects or delayed disbursement of facilities to projects that have closed. In this regard, the departments in charge of finance and operations will collaborate closely to plan currency-specific needs to guide the Bank in sourcing new facilities, while lining up specific projects to immediately make use of such funds. This will help stave off the cost of idle funds, as part of the Bank’s broad strategy to cut costs and boost its liquidity.

Trade FinanceApproximately 85 percent of global trade (by volume) is conducted on open account terms, with notable risks for the seller. This sometimes impede trade, including trade in the West African sub-region. As part of efforts to boost regional integration, the Bank will vigorously pursue avenues where it can raise trade finance to support businesses in the sub-region. The Bank will focus on financing trade in goods and services that promote domestic production. Trade finance products include asset-backed financing, structured trade finance, factoring (purchase of receivables due exporters), among others. To this end, the Bank will access trade finance facilities from creditors, ranging from other DFIs, EXIMs and other lenders that can advance credit at reasonable costs to ensure that the Bank’s trade facilitation interventions in the sub-region are bankable.

STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNANCESTRUCTURES OF THE BANKThe Bank will continue to strengthen its governance structures, with the view to enhancing good corporate governance, streamlining its internal processes and procedures, ensuring risk mitigation, making it more responsive to clients’ needs and enhancing stakeholders’ confidence in the Bank. To this end, the Bank will work towards the achievement of the three (3)-pronged objectives as discussed in the successive paragraphs.

Inclusiveness The Bank will work towards bringing the views of every stakeholder on board, with the aim of covering every possibility in its operations, while making them feel valued at the same time. As a demonstration of the Bank’s commitment to uphold diversity and inclusion, women will, particularly be encouraged to step forward with innovative ideas that will help steer the affairs of the Bank, going forward. Furthermore, the Bank will work towards ensuring the upward mobility of qualified women within its ranks.

42 I Strategy 2025

EBID will pursue actions that will make it a more trusted brand in the Community, through positioning itself as a knowledge institution and one that helps bring solutions and value to Member States.

Beginning from the grassroots, every staff will be encouraged to share their perspectives on, know and contribute towards the achievement of the Bank’s vision and strategic objectives. This will ensure ownership and cooperation.

Transparency and Accountability The Bank will continue to transparently pursue its corporate objectives, while remaining accountable to its stakeholders. It will work with internal regulations and guidelines at the operational level to procure resources and advance facilities to clients. Furthermore, Management will, working with the Board of Directors, expand the Board Sub-Committees to include a Governance and Ethics Committee, charged with ensuring that agreed Board and sub-committee mandates and codes of conduct are strictly and transparently adhered to.

The Bank will also operationalize the decision to move resource mobilization functions from the Department of Research and Strategic Planning (DRSP) to the newly created Treasury and Resource Mobilization Department. This will give the Treasury and Resource Mobilization Department a complete oversight on liquidity matters.

The Bank will beef up the various process and procedures manuals it works with, including the Liquidity Policy, Treasury Procedures Manual and Risk Management Strategy, with the view to making these internally visible to provide guidance to respective officials whose schedules they affect. This will foster greater transparency and accountability as process audits will elicit compliance with laid down processes and procedures.

Strategy 2025 I 43

Efficiency and Responsiveness The Bank will continue to implement the fit-for-purpose organogram that was approved by the Board of Directors in April 2020. The thrust of the implementation will be to introduce process and procedural efficiency into the Bank. The reorganization of key departments and the addition of new divisions will bring focus to the medium-to-long-term strategic objectives of the Bank. In a bid to make the Bank more responsive, the credit processes will be strengthened, including strengthening the Credit Committee, whose membership will comprise relevant officers in the Bank. Management will also work with the Board of Directors to introduce approval limits, taking into consideration, existing policies and proposed amendments.

RECRUITING AND RETAINING HIGHLY QUALIFIED STAFFDevelopment finance institutions play the role of project financiers, while providing advisory services to their clients. EBID has been actively engaged in the former more than the latter. However, given the experience the staff of the Bank have gathered over the years and the developmental challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic has unleashed upon Member States, it is time the Bank gave more attention to advisory services to help Member States navigate the challenges of the times.To do this, the Bank will need a blend of in-house and freshly acquired expertise. To this end, the thrust of the Bank’s human resource strategy will be as follows:

• attract; • develop; and • retain talents

to ensure the successful implementation of the Bank’s strategic objectives for the period. The Bank will continue to expand its talent pool of experts in the next five years, following from its recent impressive recruitment drive, which has brought in young and experienced professionals alike. There will be a great focus on staff placement in the relevant departments to elicit productivity over the period.

The Bank will also pursue a recruitment policy that maps young, energetic and experienced talents to key schedules to facilitate the achievement of its strategic objectives in the next five years. This is necessary to achieve full functionality of all departments, and resuscitation of dormant and moribund divisions.The Bank will also give attention to staff retention since it is equally as important as staff recruitment. This requires that the Bank makes its staff feel valued, through its inclusiveness drive, invests in tailor-made training and development programmes for staff, while striving to compensate them adequately for their efforts (bringing compensation to the levels of comparable institutions). The Bank will continue to explore ways of keeping staff motivated, through incentive-based performance schemes, while working to provide them with the requisite tools to facilitate their work and make work enjoyable, rather than enduring. The Bank’s Training Blueprint, which falls within the SP period, emphasizes the need for staff continuous development in the areas of operational skills acquisition, leadership and management training. The staff development policy will be anchored on the following:

• Individual training: this will be a product of the staff performance appraisal process, where critical skills and performance gaps will be gleaned as a guide for the development of targeted training for staff. Furthermore, due consideration will be given to training needs proposals by staff themselves, in consultation with their supervisors; and• Joint or departmental training: this will aim at addressing general training needs across departments as well as specialized training across departments or divisions for staff with similar responsibilities.

The Bank will also work to encourage internal training, to be handled by in-house experts on various subject matters, in addition to external training. This will expose staff to hands-on and Bank-relevant skills acquisition, to complement the new industry trends exposure that external training gives staff.

44 I Strategy 2025

To this end, the Bank will operationalize the EBID Academy initiative, with the view to providing training to staff, using internal resources and expertise, while saving cost at the same time.

PROCURING AND UTILIZING STATE-OF-THE-ART IT INFRASTRUCTURE The Bank will prioritize the procurement and utilization of requisite tools and systems that will not only simplify its operations but also make it more efficient. To this end, the Bank will work towards selecting technology that supports existing business operations and fostering innovation into the digital transformation of banking services. The Bank will be guided by the following:

• Deliver business outcomes, goals and objectives supported by technology strategies that have a sound business case before new investments are made; • Maintain flexibility with accountability to respond to new IT service needs; • View IT from the perspective of the entire enterprise, aggregating resources, where feasible, to reduce duplication, increase efficiency and effectiveness; • Promote a culture that recognizes the need for investing in information security resources and implementing information security strategies;

• Employ enterprise solutions capable of reducing the evolving threat and protecting EBID’s informational assets;• Recognize that Information Technology is a bank-wide resource, where technology investments should be aligned with strategic goals of the Bank;• Develop a process that facilitates easy business information between EBID, its partners and customers;• Employ technology that is flexible, scalable, and interoperable so that changing business needs can be responded to quickly and efficiently; and• Develop an IT workforce with the skills required to develop, manage, and fully utilize the Bank’s IT resources.

The Bank will work to reduce manual business processes by automating back office and front office business processes. It will also seek to simplify the mode of work by providing work-from-home technologies platforms and cloud computing to improve data accessibility. The Bank will also upgrade the Local Area Network, provide business continuity management and disaster recovery and enhance the document and data management system within the medium term.

Strategy 2025 I 45

2.2.2 PROMOTING RESILIENT, INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

INVESTING IN THE GROWTH POLES OF MEMBER STATES TO ENABLE THEM BOUNCE BACK FROM WIDESPREAD RECESSIONCountries are reeling under the COVID-19 pandemic, as evidenced by declining revenues and a stuttering real sector that has led to job losses. The narrowing fiscal space, occasioned by faltering revenues and increased social spending, will not only have an impact on the current year, but also on years to come. The revenue and expenditure patterns portend widening fiscal deficits across the sub-region, with debt-to-GDP ratios projected to breach the 70 percent threshold in some Member States, as they continue to borrow to provide social safety nets for the citizenry. This places these Member States on the brink of a debt overhang, with very serious ramifications for debt service and its concomitant impact on fiscal balance in the medium-to-long-term.

For some Member States, compensation of employees and debt service alone used to account for more than 70 percent of revenues before the pandemic set in. The spiraling debt situation can only exacerbate the fiscal tightness, leaving little room for public sector investment. The phenomenon affects the capacity of Member States to invest in the growth poles of their economies, which is very critical for them to exit the widespread recession phase. Given the huge size of

the public sector in Member States, their inability to spend in these areas will have adverse consequences on economic growth.

Development theory teaches that the surest way to exit a recession is to deploy the factors of production as quickly as possible, with government leading the charge. Whether the recovery from the recession will be V-shaped (steep decline, quick recovery) or U-shaped (a gradual recovery) will be dependent on how quickly the government is able to intervene. The Bank’s strategy will be to help Member States attain a V-shaped recovery, which will require growth in key sectors of the economy that will help them rebound quickly from low growth.

The Bank has identified the growth poles of the ECOWAS economy and will size its interventions accordingly, while it continues to develop country strategies (in addition to revising existing ones) with the aim of keeping it informed of the growth potentials of each Member State. Majority of Member States have witnessed a change in their economic structure, moving from a predominantly agrarian to services-induced growth, as shown in Figure 8. This underscores years of consistent growth in the services sector, which coincided with a persistent underperformance in the agriculture sector. Along with the decline in the agriculture share of GDP has come a decline in agricultural employment, from pre-independence levels, as shown in Figure 9. A cursory look at Figures 8 and 9 reveals that even though agriculture has become less dominant in majority of Member States, the sector still employs more people, relative to its share of GDP. It is also a known fact that crop farmers remain the most poor and vulnerable in the sub-region and, given that the Bank seeks to alleviate poverty, a great deal of attention will be given to partnering with Member States to address the needs of crop farmers. In effect, the Bank will apply its resources in growth poles that can also lead to inclusiveness. However, the approach will be country-specific, given that each Member State has its own idiosyncrasies apart from the apparent general trends across the Sub-Region.

1 Investing in the growth poles to enable Member Statesbounce back from whidespread recession

2 Promoting economic integration in the Sub-region

3 Promoting healthcare delivery

4 Promoting social protection and climate resilience

5 Investing in education specifically science and technology

46 I Strategy 2025

26,8

8

20,3

0

4,80

15,6

9

16,7

9

17,3

1

20,3

4

52,5

4

39,1

1

37,3

2

38,1

8

21,9

1

14,7

9

57,4

0

22,8

2

16,3

1 22,3

6

19,6

1

23,1

8

16,3

5

31,9

9

21,0

2

13,2

0

11,9

7

20,8

4

18,4

4

27,3

8

24,3

8

5,60

15,5

4

48,0

3

43,9

6

61,3

9

53,8

8 58,5

2

44,1

4

41,5

4

37,1

7

48,9

2

33,1

2 38,0

7

49,7

3

51,4

4

32,7

8

28,6

2

0,00

10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

70,00

PERC

ENT

Agriculture Industry Services

Source: World Development Indicators database

38,5

8

25,2

3

11,4

6

40,0

5

27,1

2

29,2

6

61,7

4 68,1

4

43,2

7

62,5

9 75,0

6

35,1

0

30,0

5

54,9

3

37,7

0

18,9

9

33,7

0

21,9

9

13,1

7

15,6

8 21,7

8

6,16

7,00

10,2

2

7,58

7,19

12,2

3

13,5

0

6,46

12,8

8

42,4

3

41,0

7

66,5

5

46,7

8 57,1

9

48,9

6

32,1

0

24,8

6

46,5

1

29,8

3

17,7

4

52,6

7

56,4

5

38,6

1

49,4

2

0,00

10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

70,00

80,00

PERC

ENT

Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) Employment in industry (% of total employment)

Employment in services (% of total employment)

Source: World Development Indicators database

Strategy 2025 I 47

Figure 8: Economic Structure of ECOWAS Member States in 2019

Figure 9: Employment by Sector in ECOWAS Member States in 2019

The Bank’s intervention will aim at making farmers more efficient, while helping to build a cluster of agri-business entities that provide a ready market for their produce, in a bid to deal with the rampant post-harvest losses that beset them. The strategy will also focus on helping build forward linkages with industry, in an effort to further reduce the possibility of loss of income to farmers, owing to post-harvest losses.

PROMOTING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE SUB-REGIONThe need to promote economic integration is even more pertinent now than it has ever been, given the urgency to restore intra-regional trade relations, after months of border closures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, the Bank will seek to finance both hard and soft infrastructure, aimed at strengthening regional connectivity and trade initiatives. This will mean partnering with Member States to deliver, among others, the following:

• multimodal transportation: to facilitate cross-border carting of goods to sustain intra-regional supply chains;• trade finance: to support initiatives aimed at enhancing intra-ECOWAS trade; and• electricity connectivity (production capacity, transmission and distribution): to ensure that Member States are able to develop the requisite infrastructure to export/procure excess power to/from other Member States to accelerate their industrialization drive.

The above will also enhance the preparedness of Member States to take full advantage of the AfCFTA initiative, which has been ratified by 10 Member States. Intra-ECOWAS trade currently stands at a woeful 8.5 percent of total trade, according to UNCTAD, valued at US$19,059 million, compared with total trade of US$224,306 million in 2019. The Bank and Member States will collaborate to facilitate trade in the sub-region.

PROMOTING HEALTHCARE DELIVERYThe COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the weak health infrastructure of Member States, albeit not to the extent to which it was expected. Health infrastructure became distressed at the height of the pandemic, with Member States struggling to provide consumables such as ventilators to terminally ill patients and personal protective equipment to professional health staff.The Bank’s strategy, in response to this, will be to partner with Member States to build requisite health care infrastructure and procure state-of-the-art equipment as well as consumables to make them better prepared to provide adequate health care to their citizenry. To this end, the Bank will advise and partner with Member States to pay attention to the provision of small-to-medium size healthcare units in key areas, instead of looking to construct huge healthcare edifices in city centres and towns, which are better served than some other communities. This will ensure that healthcare delivery is brought to the doorsteps of the underserved in society and could contribute significantly to reduce avoidable deaths, including the loss of pregnant women and children under five years.

PROMOTING SOCIAL PROTECTION AND CLIMATE RESILIENCEThe West African sub-region is one of the regions that are most affected by climate vulnerabilities and, given that a sizeable number of the labour force are still employed in the agriculture sector, this undermines their income security. In a bid to promote sustainable growth, the Bank will support Member States to pursue climate-friendly projects in order to avoid exacerbating the adverse climate events that the sub-region has been experiencing in recent years.In line with this, the Bank will support projects with demonstrable climate sensitivity characteristics and/or others that have a climate adaptation strategy, with minimal adverse impacts on the environment and inhabitants as much as possible.

48 I Strategy 2025

INVESTING IN EDUCATION (SPECIFICALLY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)The West African sub-region lags behind other regions, with respect to the human capital indicators. This is partly because of sub-optimal educational standards, characterized by curricula which are not designed to make learners think creatively. These curricula place low emphasis on digital literacy and are not designed to feed the burgeoning industries of the economy. This ensures that the sub-region’s educational system produces more generalists, with little emphasis in specialist training.The Bank will also focus on education provision, as a means to tackling poverty and inequalities. Education, especially in science and technology, has proven to be a catalyst for job and wealth creation. Technology companies have taken over from energy and financial institutions as the most valuable global corporates and this trend will continue into the foreseeable future.For the sub-region to be able to take its rightful

place in the fourth industrial revolution, which is undergirded by information technology, every effort must be made to train the youth in the area of science and technology. To this end, the Bank will partner Member States to:

• procure infrastructure to facilitate the teaching and learning of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM);• incentivize persons to take up interest in the teaching of STEM; and• encourage more persons to venture into the learning of STEM.

The Bank will work with Member States to reverse the COVID-19 era low growth, promoting inclusive growth with improved healthcare delivery, education and climate resilience at the core of its inclusiveness and social resilience strategy.

Strategy 2025 I 49

Sour

ce: W

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ffice

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a

2.3 PRIORITY INTERVENTION AREASFollowing from the Strategic Framework outlined above, the Bank will prioritize five (5) broad areas of intervention in 2021-2025 as follows:

1. Infrastructure development for growth and economic integration

a. Energyb. Transport infrastructurec. ICT

2. Agriculture and climate resiliencea. Agricultureb. Irrigation for climate resilience

3. Industrializationa. Agro-processingb. Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs)

4. Social resiliencea. Education and trainingb. Water c. Health

5. Services sector interventiona. Financial sector

EBID’s Priority Intervention Sectors

50 I Strategy 2025

2.3.1 Infrastructure Development forGrowth and Economic IntegrationThe focus of infrastructure development over this SP period will be on energy and transport infrastructure.

ENERGY The sub-region remains one of the regions with the lowest electricity coverage. The power sector is characterized by poor and/or non-existent infrastructure and high input costs, leading to high end-user tariffs. As earlier indicated, countries like Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone have low urban electricity coverage of 21 percent, 34 percent and 43 percent, respectively, with the situation in rural areas being more dire. The low market access does not allow for economies of scale, making the cost per kilowatt hour very expensive. This partly accounts for the low industrial activities in the sub-region, given that electricity is an enabler of industrialization. Various studies have confirmed the multiplier effects of electricity on economic activity, ranging between 1 percent and 2.5 percent contribution to GDP, depending on the jurisdiction.Given its apparent impact on growth and poverty reduction, the Bank will continue to finance power projects across the value chain: generation, transmission and distribution. The Bank, with its clients, will explore avenues to apply green technology (solar, wind, etc.) to generate electricity. To address coverage issues, the Bank will partner Member States to extend electricity to non-served and under-served communities, while working to improve their installed generation capacities.

The Bank will, together with Member States, also explore bankable mini-grid solutions for distant and island communities, where grid infrastructure is non-existent. This will ensure that they are not cut off from the possibility of accessing electricity for long periods of time.

TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTUREThe sub-region has transportation infrastructure deficit, a situation that constrains the growth in economic activity and undermines social welfare. More than 70 percent of roads in Member States have not been paved, as earlier indicated. This has affected supply chains, with serious implications for the transportation of agricultural produce from the farmgate to the market, for example. Most in-country and major international roads are in a bad state, railway infrastructure are virtually non-existent, sea ports are persistently congested and air transport remains rather sporadic and expensive.The Bank will partner with Member States to close these infrastructure gaps that have persisted for years on end. The Bank’s strategy will be to encourage and support Member States to consider Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the development of new and expansion of existing transport infrastructure. The Bank will also seek to finance the acquisition of climate sensitive mass transportation vehicles such as buses as well as railway coaches and cars to facilitate the commuting of people, while indirectly contributing to reduce carbon emissions associated with the operation of several vehicles.

Strategy 2025 I 51

ICTThe centrality of ICT in education and business cannot be over-emphasized. For one, the COVID-19 pandemic taught us that we could work from home and still stay connected and, for a lot of people, this has come to stay. However, many Member States still have challenges deploying ICT infrastructure beyond city centres. The Bank will, therefore, work with Member States to expand ICT infrastructure to underserved communities in a bid to allow such communities to participate in the gains that technology brings. While the number of people owning and using mobile phones has increased tremendously across the sub-region, there are still a good number of persons who have not been able to exploit the full functionality of the devices they call their own. Many people are not able to access internet connectivity and service in many Member States remains rather slow, inhibiting the speed of business.The Bank will also explore avenues to support the application of ICT in education and training, bringing students in the sub-region up to speed on emerging trends, while inspiring their innovative tendencies.

2.3.2 Agriculture and Climate ResilienceAgricultureThe importance of agriculture in the sub-region is not lost on anyone. As has already been alluded to, the sector employs a sizeable number of the labour force but the reality is that agriculture productivity is low. The yield per hectre is rather low, with declining crop yields occasioned by declining soil quality and the continuous reliance on primitive farming practices in the face of new challenges. The need for States to address the low productivity in the sector is more pertinent, given that large tracts of arable land are being converted into real estate properties, a situation that poses risks for food security. To this end, the Bank will support Member States to assist farmers with the requisite farming inputs such as fertilizers, high quality seeds and

pesticides as well as farming implements (tractors, combine harvesters, etc.) to improve productivity.Attention will also be paid to livestock farmers to produce high quality meat and dairy products and to feed the sub-regions.

IRRIGATION FOR CLIMATE RESILIENCELarge areas of the sub-region have been experiencing climate events for quite some time now, ranging from intermittent droughts to flooding. Given that agriculture in the sub-region is rain-fed, coupled with minimal irrigation infrastructure, farmers have always been at the mercy of the weather and so is food security. Given the uncertainty associated with rainfall patterns, there is the need to intensify efforts to deploy irrigation infrastructure as a coping mechanism.Not only will irrigation infrastructure help crop farmers, but livestock farmers will also be beneficiaries of this strategy once they are connected to the source waterbodies. Alternatively, dams could be created into which water could be channeled for drinking by livestock.

2.3.3 IndustrializationThe sub-region continues to produce and export raw materials, with only a few processed goods. This has resulted from years of infrastructure deficits and the non-implementation of definitive policies that sought to process the raw commodities from Member States. This has led to a marked decline of manufacturing, as a share of GDP, across Member States. The Bank will support Member States to make gains in industrial activity, particularly in manufacturing. Efforts will be made towards supporting the transformation of the sub-region’s natural resources – petroleum, gold, diamonds, cotton, bauxite, cocoa, etc. – into semi-final and final products to take advantage of fair prices for out produce. To this end, the Bank’s strategy towards industrialization is targeted at promoting agro-processing and SMEs.

52 I Strategy 2025

Strategy 2025 I 53

AGRO-PROCESSINGThe Bank will work with Member States to build backward integration with the agriculture sector, through the construction of food processing plants that can serve the sub-region and countries abroad. While this strategy will seek to add value to domestic production, it also has the indirect advantage of reducing post-harvest losses that farmers within the sub-region have, over the years, struggled with.The Bank will give favorable consideration to funding proposals that seek to transform such commodities as tomatoes, pepper, onions, rice, fruits and other farm produce that have short shelf lives over the SP period.

SUPPORT TO SMESThe private sector has been adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Already reeling under various unfavourable market conditions, such as the lack of affordable financing, subdued aggregate demand, brought to bear by the pandemic, has exacerbated their plight. Worst affected are SMEs, whose liquidity positions have been seriously undermined by increasing trade receivables, as counterparties struggle to sell and settle their obligations. To this end, the Bank will support SMEs in all sectors, including in agriculture, with liquidity options to enable them stay afloat. Secondly, the Bank will assist SMEs to scale up production in the most efficient manner. Due consideration will be given to SMEs that utilize local resources, with a view to promoting a more integrated industrial strategy.

2.3.4 Social ResilienceAs a development bank, building social resilience in the sub-region is central to EBID’s mandate. The Bank’s strategy towards social resilience during the SP period will hinge on interventions in three areas: education and training, water and health provision.

EDUCATION AND TRAININGAs already indicated, the Bank will prioritize STEM education in its strategy to invest in education and training. To this end, the Bank will focus on partnering with Member States to provide STEM-based educational infrastructure and equipment. The aim will be to partner Member States to make the teaching and learning of STEM exciting, while improving on the quality of delivery by equipping requisite schools with the necessary tools.

WATERThe supply of potable water in many Member States is more of an urban lifestyle than anything. Even in urban centres, the supply of potable water is at best, erratic and of suspicious quality. As a result, livestock and human beings share the same source of drinking water, with its attendant water-borne diseases.

HEALTHCARE The Bank will partner with Member States to provide appropriate healthcare facilities for underserved communities, while providing requisite equipment and consumables to existing ones. The focus will be on the construction of small-to-mid size polyclinics that will help cut the incidence of under-5 and maternal mortality. The aim is to cut the commuting time to health centres in large towns and cities, en route poor and bumpy roads that only serve to worsen the plight of the sick. The Bank’s support to member States will also be geared towards equipping them to establish both preventive and coping mechanisms to possible epidemics and/or pandemics in the future.

2.3.5 Services Sector Intervention

FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPPORTThe Bank’s support to the services sector will be focused on strengthening local financial institutions to provide the needed financial backstopping to the real sectors of Member States. The Bank will consider advancing short-to-long term facilities to the sector to support agriculture schemes, SMEs and gender-sensitive businesses in the medium term.

54 I Strategy 2025

3FINANCING FRAMEWORK OF THE PLAN

Strategy 2025 I 55

734 812

1 654

2019 2020 2025

27,9 24,4

54,3

2019 2020 2025

Public

Private

Total

US $

Projected Approvals

No. of Projects

Public Private Total

131

85

46

Assets (US$ Million)

985 1 037

1 851

2019 2020 2025

Priority Intervention Areas

Loans and Advances (US$ Million)

Operating Income (US$ Million)

Finance Agriculture

Health Water

Education Transport

Industry Energy

OPERATIONAL FORECASTS FINANCIAL FORECASTS

56 I Strategy 2025

695

1,063

1,758

This section of the SP expatiates the priority areas the Bank seeks to invest in, the expected resource inflows and disbursements to approved projects. It also highlights the number of projects to be undertaken and the key assumptions underlying the financial outlook, including the projected income statement, statement of financial position and resource mobilization efforts.

3.1 PROJECT APPROVALSDuring the SP period, the Bank will seek to approve a total of 131 projects, made up of 46 public and 85 private sector projects, as shown in Figure 10. The SP estimates that a total of 21 projects will be approved in 2021, increasing to 23 in 2022 and further to 32 in 2025. Priority areas of intervention include energy, agriculture, transport infrastructure, industry, health, education, among others, as shown in Appendices 1 and 2.

Total projected investment for these projects amounts to US$1.76 billion over the five-year period, with US$1.06 billion and US$695 million for the private and public sectors, respectively, as shown in Figure 11 and Appendices 1 and 2. The investment in 2021 is projected to amount to US$283 million, rising steadily to US$428 million in 2025. Of the 131 projects valued at US$1.76 billion, 107 of them (US$1.43 billion) are projected to be approved and signed for disbursements to commence, as shown in Appendices 1 and 2. Private sector investments will constitute approximately 65 percent of all projects envisaged to be approved over the period and 60 percent of the funding amount for all the 131 projects, as shown in Figures 12 and 13.

These projects are spread across various sectors, with transport infrastructure (26%) having the largest share, followed by energy infrastructure (23%) and jointly followed by industry and finance (14% apiece), as shown in Figure 14.

3.2 PROJECTED DISBURSEMENTSThe Bank projects to disburse direct loans to the tune of US$221.54 million in 2021, out of which US$70.63 million will be old undisbursed loans and US$150.91 million new loans. Direct loans will increase to US$292.81 million in 2025, with US$111.14 million being old loans and US$181.66 million new loans. In this SP, the Bank will focus on involving itself in direct loan transactions in new disbursements, while disbursing its old equity commitments from 2023 to 2025. In effect, total commitments in 2021 will amount to US$221.54 million, rising to US$230.01 million in 2023 and further to US$293.25 million in 2025, as shown in Table 2.

Strategy 2025 I 57

8 8 9 10 11

46

13 15 17 19 21

85

21 23 26 29 32

131

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Num

ber o

f Pro

ject

s

Public

Private

Total

Figure 10: Projected Approvals (Number of Projects), 2021-2025

Figure 11: Projected Approvals (Value), 2021-2025

120 125 135 150 165

695

163 188 213 238 263

1 063

283 313 348 388 428

1 758

-

200

400

600

800

1 000

1 200

1 400

1 600

2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total

US$

Mill

ion

Public

Private

Total

58 I Strategy 2025

2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total

Figure 12: Share of Number of Projects Figure 13: Share of Value of Projects

Public Private

65%

40%

Public Private

35%60%

Agriculture Transport Infrastructure Energy Water Health Industry Finance

Figure 14: Sectoral Share in Overall Planned Investment, 2021-2025

6%

26%

23%5%4%

7%

14%

14%

Mode of Intervention2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total

US$

Total Direct Loans 221,539,671 222,063,675 229,890,324 265,143,207 292,807,147 1,231,444,024

Old Loans Not Disbursed

70,633,094 79,109,066 88,602,154 99,234,412 111,142,542 448,721,268

New Loans 150,906,577 142,954,610 141,288,170 165,908,795 181,664,606 782,722,758

Total Equity Participation

- - 122,924 444,906 444,906 1,012,736

Old Equity Participation

- - 122,924 444,906 444,906 1,012,736

New Equity Participation

- - - - - -

Total Commitments 221,539,671 222,063,675 230,013,247 265,588,113 293,252,053 1,232,456,759

Table 2: Projected Disbursements, 2021-2025

Strategy 2025 I 59

3.3 PROJECTED INVESTMENTSIn a bid to reposition itself to deliver on its value proposition, the Bank will be making critical investments to help boost the EBID brand, while simplifying operational processes. To this end, the Bank will work assiduously towards completing the full automation of all processes in-house and procuring the requisite architecture to make it materialize. Furthermore, the Bank will procure the necessary office equipment to facilitate workflow efficiency, while maintaining a congenial workplace for all staff.The Bank will expend approximately US$6.7 million on promoting visibility, operational efficiency and workplace safety over the SP period.

3.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATIONMember States will look up to institutions like EBID to come up with innovative products to help them deal with the fallouts from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Bank’s SP will partly help address infrastructural deficits and the needed jolt in private sector operations in Member States. The Bank projects to mobilize a total of US$1.48 billion in new resources (as shown in Table 3), which together with existing resources, will help it implement the planned interventions in Member States over the period. The Bank will also work towards recovering the outstanding capital subscriptions of Member States, while sourcing for loan facilities within and without the sub-region to execute the SP. Table 3

3.4.1 Capital RecoveriesThe capital recovery strategy will hinge on providing Member States with multiple-fold investments, in exchange for payments of Member States’ outstanding obligations, as already indicated. With this strategy, the Bank is of the firm belief that it will be able to make good progress towards recovering the outstanding arrears. Following the recovery of Member States’ capital arrears, the Bank will work towards attracting non-regional capital participation over the next five years and beyondThe Bank projects that it will recover US$25.23 million each year from 2021 to 2025, which will effectively liquidate Member States’ capital arrears, as shown in Table 3.

3.4.2 BorrowingsIn addition to recovering capital arrears, the Bank will endeavor to access the international capital market to raise funds to execute the 2021-2025 SP in order to bring value to Member States. To this end, the Bank will borrow both concessional and commercial loans to the tune of US$1.35 million over the period, as shown in Table 3.

CONCESSIONAL LOANSThe Bank intends to contract a total of US$223.02 million in euro and United States dollar denominated concessional facilities, mainly from the India and other EXIM Banks in 2021-2025. Concessional resources are projected to amount to US$27.03 million in 2021, peaking at US$88.37 million in 2022 and declining to US$20.16 million in 2025, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 15.

COMMERCIAL LOANSCommercial loans, on the other hand, are projected at US$1.13 billion, increasing from US$176.65 million in 2021 to US$265.15 million in 2023 and further to US$300.79 million in 2025, as shown in Figure 15. Commercial loans will be sourced from FCFA-denominated debentures, bilateral loans and ECA-backed loans, with the bulk of resources projected to come from the two latter sources. Figure 15

60 I Strategy 2025

NEW FACILITIES2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total

US$ Million

Debenture from WAEMU - FCFA

88.51 - - - - 88.51

Bilateral Loans 46.16 47.39 156.00 83.52 183.45 516.52

ECA/Trade-Backed Funding

41.98 90.51 109.15 163.29 117.33 522.26

Concessional Funding 27.03 88.37 28.57 58.89 20.16 223.02

Total New Facilities 203.68 226.27 293.72 305.70 320.95 1,350.31

Capital Recoveries from Member States

25.23 25.23 25.23 25.23 25.23 126.15

TOTAL RESOURCES 228.91 251.50 318.95 330.93 346.18 1,476.46

Table 3: Projected Resource Mobilization, 2021-2025

27

88

29

59

20

177

138

265 247

301

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

US$

Mill

ion

Concessional

Commercial

Figure 15: Projected Concessional and Commercial Loans, 2021-2025

Strategy 2025 I 61

3.5 FINANCIAL OUTLOOKThe financial outlook for 2021-2025 is based on the following assumptions:

1. The COVID-19 pandemic is contained and eradicated in 2021;2. The Bank attains investment grade ratings;3. Total new borrowing of US$1.35 billion over the five years; 4. Projected cost of funds not exceeding 4 percent;5. Average tenor of borrowing at 12 years;6. Capital arrears to be paid up during the SP period;7. Loan book to grow from US$812 million to US$1.65 billion, a 104 percentage points growth; and8. Total balance sheet to grow from US$1.04 billion to US$1.85 billion, a 79 percentage points growth.

The Bank projects a more than tripling of profits by 2025, compared to the 2019 levels. This is on the back of ensuring that the rate of increase in net operating income is faster than the increase in expenditure. Operating income net of impairment charges is expected to grow at an average rate of 17 percent over the period, while total expenses will grow at an

average rate of 14 percent. The projected increase in operating income is primarily due to a deliberate effort to increase the Bank’s net non-interest income from US$10.99 million in 2020 to US$18.76 million in 2025, while increasing net interest income from US$13.46 million in 2020 to US$35.57 million in 2025, as shown in Table 4.

The Bank projects that its balance sheet will grow to US$1,850.64 million by 2025. One of the ways of achieving this is to ensure that it increases its loan book, growing it at an average of 15 percent over the five-year period. Over the SP period, deliberate and aggressive actions will be exerted to identify bankable projects within Member States. That notwithstanding, the Bank will ensure that it conducts the necessary due diligence before approving facilities to projects, in order to maintain the path to attaining high asset quality.In addition to the growth in loans, the Bank will also work towards increasing its medium-to-long term investments from US$94.29 million in 2020 to an average of US$108.58 million over the SP period, as shown in Table 5.

62 I Strategy 2025

ITEM2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

US$ Thousand

Interest income 40,421 35,645 43,363 55,788 64,405 74,122 84,162

Interest expense (18,597) (22,184) (28,201) (33,203) (38,488) (43,687) (48,590)

Net interest income 21,825 13,460 15,161 22,584 25,917 30,434 35,572

Fees and commission income 3,408 4,035 5,374 6,237 6,592 7,137 8,106

Fees and commission expense (63) (443) (917) (1,475) (1,574) (1,680) (2,242)

Net fee and commission income 3,345 3,592 4,457 4,763 5,018 5,457 5,864

Trade finance/Other non-funded income

-

-

1,583 2,058 2,469 2,840 3,266

Net trading income - 2,202 - - - - -

Net Income from other financial instrument carried at fair value

(1,307 1,38 1,270 811 858 705 583

Other operating income 4,067 3,810 8,364 8,348 8,814 8,797 9,049

Total other trading income 2,760 7,397 1,217 11,217 12,141 12,343 12,898

Operating income 27,930 24,449 30,835 38,564 43,076 48,234 54,334

Net Impairment Charge on Financial assets

(3,861 (2,406) (3,345) (4,277) (4,908 (5,011 (5,555)

Operating income net of impair-ment charges

24,069 22,043 27,490 34,287 38,168 43,223 48,780

Personnel expenses (10,011) (12,569) (13,841) (13,814) (15,059 (15,916) (17,673)

Depreciation and amortization (2,507 (2,701) (2,246 (2,275) (2,183) (2,138 (2,047)

Other expenses (5,996 (5,343) (8,183 (9,752) (10,856) (11,728 12,200)

Profit for the year 5,617 1,430 3,220 8,446 10,069 13,442 16,860

Table 4: Projected Income Statement

Strategy 2025 I 63

ITEM 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

US$ Million

Assets

Cash and bank balances 19.08 24.05 20.70 17.86 21.51 16.13 16.86

Held-to-maturity investment 125.62 94.29 138.77 110.79 117.25 96.38 79.70

Available-for-Sale Assets 48.11 47.47 46.88 46.14 46.26 47.15 46.79

Loans and advances 734.00 811.55 970.96 1,124.69 1,278.05 1,456.71 1,654.38

Contribution to managed funds 12.54 12.59 12.43 8.84 5.46 5.63 5.79

Inter-institutional accounts Assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Other assets 5.32 5.98 8.21 8.21 8.21 8.21 8.21

Property plant and equipment 39.90 40.83 44.92 43.24 41.49 40.63 38.91

Total Assets: 984.58 1,036.76 1,242.88 1,359.76 1,518.22 1,670.82 1,850.64

Liabilities and Equity

Liabilities

Creditors and accrual 8.23 6.75 7.00 7.74 7.74 7.74 7.74

Defined Benefit Obligation 12.89 11.71 10.86 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

Borrowings 522.24 563.70 531.39 472.67 420.44 373.98 332.65

Managed funds 27.43 31.68 34.07 35.10 36.15 37.23 38.35

New Facility - - 203.68 347.71 522.05 681.35 859.29

Inter-institutional accounts liabilities 4.07 7.85 7.76 7.76 7.76 7.76 7.76

Total Liabilities: 574.87 621.70 794.76 877.96 1,001.13 1,115.06 1,252.78

Equity

Stated capital 414.04 416.23 446.05 471.28 496.51 521.74 546.97

Income surplus (9.98) (7.94) (4.62) 3.82 13.89 27.33 44.19

Other reserve 5.65 6.78 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70

Total Equity: 409.71 415.07 448.12 481.80 517.10 555.77 597.86

Total Liabilities and Equity 984.58 1,036.76 1,242.88 1,359.76 1,518.22 1,670.82 1,850.64

Defined Benefit Obligation 12.89 11.71 10.86 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

Borrowings 522.24 563.70 531.39 472.67 420.44 373.98 332.65

Managed funds 27.43 31.68 34.07 35.10 36.15 37.23 38.35

New Facility - - 203.68 347.71 522.05 681.35 859.29

Inter-institutional accounts liabilities 4.07 7.85 7.76 7.76 7.76 7.76 7.76

Total Liabilities: 574.87 621.70 794.76 877.96 1,001.13 1,115.06 1,252.78

Equity

Stated capital 414.04 416.23 446.05 471.28 496.51 521.74 546.97

Income surplus (9.98) (7.94) (4.62) 3.82 13.89 27.33 44.19

Other reserve 5.65 6.78 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70

Total Equity: 409.71 415.07 448.12 481.80 517.10 555.77 597.86

Total Liabilities and Equity 984.58 1,036.76 1,242.88 1,359.76 1,518.22 1,670.82 1,850.64

Table 5: Projected Balance Sheet

4MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

Strategy 2025 I 65

Progress tracking is critical to ensuring that plan implementation is on course, since it affords the organisation the opportunity to identify gaps early enough for remedial action to be taken to pre-empt failure. The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) is designed to ensure that there is timely information from all parties to help with the assessment of the planned execution of internal and external actions, which are aimed at reducing poverty in Member States.

This MEF does not only track the SP implementation but also the outcomes and developmental impacts of interventions. It also seeks to ensure a systematic collection and documentation of data on the SP implementation to ensure that timeous corrective actions are taken to ensure that the objectives of the SP are achieved. Furthermore, the MEF will ensure a more coordinated flow of routinely collected information to guide Management decision-making.

4.1 OBJECTIVESThe specific objectives of the MEF are as follows:

• To identify and map actors to specific performance indicators; • To serve as a good source of information for measuring project outputs, outcomes and impacts; • To provide a good basis for a possible review of indicator targets and/or deployment of resources to underperforming targets; and• To serve as a guide in the conception, design and implementation of the next SP of the Bank.

4.2 THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORKThe MEF has been designed to systematically track the SP activities and results on the one hand, while measuring the effectiveness or developmental impacts of these activities and results on the other hand. The MEF is split into two main sections–monitoring (on the one hand) and evaluation (on the other). The monitoring function seeks to track resource deployment, processes and procedures as well as outputs, while the evaluation function tracks outcomes and impact. Table 6 demonstrates this by outlining the resource requirements, processes and expected impacts of each envisaged projected output. In effect, the MEF reporting will focus primarily on tracking outputs, outcomes and impact, while giving attention to inputs and processes as enablers of their achievement.

Given the two-pronged strategic framework of this plan– internal and external actions and outcomes – the MEF will measure each of the five components internally as well as externally. The internal measurement will focus on all those actions that seek to help reposition the Bank to deliver on its value proposition, while the external tracking will seek to assess the extent to which the Bank is able to promote resilient, inclusive and sustainable growth and development among Member States.

66 I Strategy 2025

Table 6: SP Monitoring and Evaluation Pipeline

Strategy 2025 I 67

MONITORING EVALUATION

INPUTS PROCESSES OUTPUTS OUTCOMES IMPACT

I. REPOSITIONING THE BANK TO DELIVER ON ITS VALUE PROPOSITION

Human resource, cash and other resources

Budgeting, communication, staff (recruitment advertisements, re-assignment, training), project appraisal and implementation

Resources mobilized Improved liquidityBank plays in big ticket and impactful projects

Public and private sector projects financed and completed/ongoing

Increased productivity Economic freedom enhanced

Improved credit ratings Funding cost reduced

Bank lends to clients at competitive rates, thus, reducing chances of payment defaults

Good quality staff across board

Bank efficiency and effectiveness

Staff innovativeness moves Bank to big ticket and more profitable ventures

ICT equipment and software packages procured

Operational efficiency achieved

Functional and useful IT infrastructure

Improved financial performance

Cost-income ratio reduced

Increased profitability

EBID corporate brand awareness, paraphernalia, publications, business-related events, media, Public relations, key events, etc.

Greater visibility for EBID, enhanced brand awareness and credibility, improved business networks and relations, and attractive investment destination

Competitive advantage, better resource mobilization, enhanced image as a key development and investment player, influential decision maker, which will advance the achievement of EBID’s objectives

II. PROMOTING RESILIENT, INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Healthy GDP growth in Member States

Member States exit widespread recession phase

Member States attain sustainable high growth trajectory

Inter-connecting infrastructure developed

Enhanced intra-ECOWAS trade

Regional integration enhanced

Hospitals and medical equipment procured

Improved healthcare delivery

Reduced morbidity and mortality rates

Irrigation infrastructure installed

Climate mitigation achieved

Increased production for increased incomes. Poverty alleviated

STEM-based infrastructure procured

STEM-phobia alleviated, and a critical mass educated in STEM

Enhanced innovativeness across Member States

4.3 RESULTS FRAMEWORK4.3.1 Operational IndicatorsThe results framework of the SP is inextricably linked to the operational functions of the Bank, given that the mandate of the Bank is to help create value for the Community. In effect, the indicators measure the extent to which the Bank is able to achieve its resource mobilization, project approval, new commitments and disbursement targets to execute developmental projects within Member States, as shown in Table 7.

The framework measures each one of these indicators individually, explicitly defining them and indicating the specific Department or cost centre that is supposed to provide data to facilitate performance tracking and evaluation, while also identifying the requisite recipient(s) of the ensuing report(s).

4.3.2 Impact IndicatorsThe SP measures the following impact indicators:

• Member States’ progress towards the achievement of the SDGs and Regional Development Outcomes: even though the Bank is not directly responsible for achieving these indicators, they will help the Bank to assess Member States’ progress towards socio-economic development and which challenges the Bank should work with Member States to address;• EBID’s contribution towards the achievement of the SDGs and Regional Development Outcomes: these measure the Bank’s specific developmental impact in Member States;• EBID’s Operational Management; and• EBID’s Organizational Efficiency.

Table 7: Operational Indicators

Indicator Approvals/New Commitments/Total Disbursement/Resource Mobilization [Capital and Loans (com-mercial and concessional)]

Definition Total project Approvals, Commitments and Disbursement by sector as well as Resource Mobilization yields, over the period.

Purpose To track performance with respect to Approvals, Commitments, Financing, Total Disbursement and Resource Mobilization (as outlined in this SP).

Sources of Data DRSP will, a week before the end of applicable period, issue memoranda to respective Departments to request data to compile the appropriate reports.

Reporting Tool Periodic activity reports.

Frequency Monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and annually.

Responsible All Departments and cost centres.

Reporting to Management Committee (monthly), Strategy Committee (quarterly), Board of Directors (half-yearly) and Board of Governors (annually).

Baseline 2020.

Target As reported in Part IV of this Strategic Plan.

68 I Strategy 2025

GROUPING/INDICATOR (2021-2025)BASELINE

TargetYear Value

Inclusive and sustainable growth and development

Economic inclusion: Reducing poverty and inequality

1. % of population below the national poverty line 2015 45% Reduce by 10% by 2025

2. GDP per capita growth rate 2019 0.03%

Increase and maintain between 2021 and 2025, GDP and GDP per capita growth (in US$ terms) to 5% and 5%, respectively

Provide quality education, training and employment opportunities

3. Unemployment rate 2019 5.06% 4.0%

Sustaining growth; Building Competitive Economies

4. Intra-regional trade as a percentage * of regional GDP

2019 2.6% 5%

5. Intra-regional trade as a percentage of total trade 2019 8.3% 12%

Building Resilience, securing energy and adapting a changing environment

6. People using safely managed drinking water services (% of population)

2017 69.5% 75%

7. People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population)

2017 29% 40%

8. Population with access to electricity (%) 2018 48.5% 50%

Level 1: Member States’ progress towards the achievement of the SDGs and Regional Development Outcomes

GROUPING/INDICATORTarget

2021-2025

1. Number of transport infrastructure projects 35

2. Number of water projects 6

3. Number of projects financed in the agricultural sector 7

4. Expenditure on educational facilities (US$): Approval 75 million

5. Number of renewable energy projects 8

6. Number of rural electrification projects 6

7. Number of healthcare projects 8

Level 2: EBID’s contribution towards the achievement of the SDGs and Regional Development Outcomes

Strategy 2025 I 69

GROUPING/INDICATORActual Target

2016-2020 2021-2025

Operational Processes, Practices, and Portfolio Performance

1. Loans default /number of projects in portfolio (active) 13% 0

2. Average time taken from request to loan approvals (months) 6 3

3. Average time taken from approval to first disbursement (months) 6 2

4. Average length of loan extension (months) 11 0

GROUPING/INDICATORBASELINE

Target (2025)Year Value

Capacity utilization

1. Ratio of professional staff to support staff 2020 81% 103%

2. Vacancy rate at management and professional levels (%) 2020Professionals: 10 Professionals:

Management: 1 Management:

3. Staff in management positions who are women (%) 2020 13 15

Level 3: EBID’s Operational Management

Level 4: EBID’s Organizational Efficiency

4.3.3 Implementation FrameworkThe implementation framework captures the specific actions to be undertaken over the SP period. Table 8 outlines each proposed action, and these are linked to the strategic framework, the means of verification and target dates.

70 I Strategy 2025

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Enhance resources and capacity of CER Team

Quality of compelling content production, improved PR, Digital content, and Influential networks

2021

Increase EBID’s digital presence by regularly publishing articles and press statements about all positive Bank activities on its corporate website and social media platforms.

The number of new followers, content shares, comments, views, mentions and likes on social media platforms- Dwell time, number of visits, bounce rate & page views on website- Share of voice (SOV)

2021-2025

Events and promotions - The number of readers/viewers reached

2021-2025

Drive media relations

- The number of readers/viewers reached- The number of new investors investing in EBID- The number of new customers (i.e. promoters)- The number of mentions

2021-2025

Promote key stakeholder networking to increase EBID's engagement with and encourage information exchange among stakeholders

- The number of visitors to EBID stall during trade fairs/shows- The number of new investors investing in EBID- The number of new business partners/relations- The number of new customers (i.e.promoters)

2021-2025

Table 8: Implementation Framework

A. Enhancing Brand Awareness and Visibility Proposed Action Means of Verification Target Dates

Strategy 2025 I 71

Table 8: Implementation Framework

B. Improving Financial Performance and Resource Mobilization for Impactful Investment

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Work towards attaining investment grade rating to unlock low funding costs for the Bank

Bank attains BB Fitch and Ba Moody's ratings

2023

Bank attains BBB Fitch and Baa Moody's ratings

2025

Operationalize the Treasury and Resource Mobilization Division

The Department is fairly resourced to lead resource mobilization efforts

2021

Ensure full implementation of the Bank's Treasury Policy

Annual Report on the implementation of the Treasury Policy

2021-2025

Work towards recovering capital arrears of Member States

All capital arrears recovered and reported to the Board of Directors

2025

Mobilize and increase short-term trade financing interventions to facilitate intra-ECOWAS trade, while optimizing the Bank's returns

ECA-backed finance of not less than US$522.26 million raised and disbursed to bankable projects

2025

A Trade Finance Desk in EBID established to foster the successful execution of the Bank's trade finance transactions

2021

Focus on generating non-interest income to cover key expenditure line items

Net non-interest income sufficiently pays at least 30% of personnel expenses

2025

Put mechanisms in place to ensure expenditure rationalization

The Bank's Procurement Policy, Vendor Management Procedure and Cost Reduction Strategy operationalized

2021

The Bank's cost-income ratio reduced to less than 60%

2025

Improve the asset quality of the Bank

The Operations Departments made the first line of defense against NPLs (including their involvement in loan recoveries) by including KPIs in this regard as part of their deliverables

2021

Non-performing loans reduced to below 5% 2022

72 I Strategy 2025

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Implement the approval limits for the President and the Board Risk and Credit Sub-Committees

Project documents 2021

Strengthen the Credit and Asset and Liability Management Committees to carry out their respective mandates in this direction

Frequency of meetings (as evidenced by minutes of meetings) and the number of times the decisions of the Committee are turned down, without proper justification

2021-2025

Implement the policy on sovereign and sectoral limits

Bank's Annual Report to spell out country and sectoral limits vis-a-vis the policy

2021-2025

Establish a Governance and Ethics Committee to ensure that agreed Board and sub-committee mandates and codes of conduct are strictly and transparently adhered to

Board resolution and subsequent minutes of Committee

2021-2025

Ensure full implementation and compliance with the Bank's Risk Management Strategy

Annual Report on the implementation of the Risk Management Strategy

2021-2025

Ensure full implementation and compliance with the Bank's Liquidity Policy

Annual Report on the implementation of the Liquidity Policy

2021-2025

Table 8: Implementation Framework

C. Strengthening the Governance Structures of the Bank

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Reduce manual business processes and simplify the mode of work

Back office and front office business processes automated, as evidenced in minimal paper trails

2021-2025

Work-from-home technologiesplatforms and cloud computing provided to improve data accessibility

2021-2025

Implement the Information System Master Plan

IT Continuity Plan drafted, approved and implemented. Annual reports to indicate stage of implementation

2021-2025

Table 8: Implementation Framework

D. Procuring and Utilizing State-of-the-Art IT Infrastructure

Strategy 2025 I 73

Table 8: Implementation Framework

E. Investing in The Growth Poles in Member States and Promoting Regional Integration

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Invest in energy, transport and ICT infrastructure, given the spin-off effects they have on the rest of the economy

Project appraisal, Implementation and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Invest in cross-border power (generation and grid infrastructure) and transport infrastructure

Project appraisal, Implementation and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Prioritize investment in irrigation infrastructure as a means of mitigation against climate events

Project appraisal, Implementation and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Support initiatives to provide agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, etc., to farmers in Member States

Disbursements to agricultural projects 2021-2025

Invest in manufacturing initiatives, with the aim to transforming agricultural products into high value output, while ensuring guaranteed prices for farmers

Project appraisal, Implementation and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Support the financial sector to provide affordable credit to projects in Member States

Project appraisal, Implementation and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Support the ECOWAS Commission's efforts to achieve economic integration

Project appraisal, Implementation,Annual Reports and Community reports

2021-2025

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Continue with environmental and climate change mainstreaming, placing emphasis on renewable energy provision and financing projects that are climate sensitive

Project Appraisal Reports 2021-2025

Execute climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies in project implementation

Implementation reports 2021-2025

Table 8: Implementation Framework

F. Ensuring Environmental Consciousness

74 I Strategy 2025

PROPOSED ACTION MEANS OF VERIFICATION TARGET DATES

Promoting Healthcare Delivery

Number of healthcare facilities financed, as captured in the Annual Reports

2021-2025

Number of healthcare equipmentprocured, as captured in the Annual Reports

2021-2025

Provision of Potable Water to alleviate water-borne diseases

Number of water projects captured in Annual Reports

Investing in Education (Specifically Science and Technology)

Number of STEM equipment procured, as captured in project documents and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Number of classroom and/orlaboratories financed, as captured in project documents and Annual Reports

2021-2025

Table 8: Implementation Framework

G. Promoting Social Resilience

4.4 MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING The management and reporting structure of the MEF is one that mimics a bottom-up approach. It demonstrates the flow of information from the appropriate Departments and cost centres, through to the development of reports and to the users of the information contained in such reports.

To ensure an effective implementation of the SP, Management has established a Strategy Committee, whose mandate includes, among others, the effective monitoring and implementation of the SP over the period. The Strategy Committee, Management Committee, Board of Directors and the Board of Governors will constitute the recipients of the various MEF reports for decision-making, as shown in Figure 16.

The reporting tools will be made up of monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports. DRSP, working with other stakeholders, will be required to produce mid-term and end-term evaluation reports for consideration by the Board of Directors.

Strategy 2025 I 75

ALL DEPARTMENTS

(Supply of data for writing of reports)

DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

(Compilation of various reportsfor Management)

TOP MANAGEMENT

MONTHLYREPORT

QUARTERLYREPORT

HALF-YEARLY, MID-TERM AND END-

TERM EVALUATIONREPORTS

ANNUALREPORT

MANAGEMENTCOMMITTEE

STRATEGYCOMMITTEE

BOARD OFDIRECTORS

BOARD OFGOVERNORS

Figure 16: Strategic Plan Information Flow

76 I Strategy 2025

5IMPLEMENTATION RISKS

Strategy 2025 I 77

The SP is underpinned by some key assumptions about the Bank’s own preparedness to reform, receive capital arrears payments from Member States, attract competitive concessional and commercial loans, improve on its credit ratings, and improve on its internal processes and procedures. This section identifies the potential headwinds the Bank might encounter in 2021-2025, which could undermine its ability to attain all the benchmarks it has set for itself in the SP period.

5.1 FAILURE TO ACHIEVE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION TARGETS 5.1.1 Non-Payment of Capital Subscription by Member StatesThe fallouts from the COVID-19 pandemic could lead to a debt overhang in Member States, given the need to borrow to cushion the citizenry against the impact of the pandemic, as earlier discussed. Furthermore, the tightness of the fiscal position, underlined by low revenues and spiraling expenditure levels, could adversely impact Member States’ appetite to retire their capital arrears, if they do not buy into the Bank’s value proposition for liquidating the arrears.This will have profound consequences on the Bank’s liquidity position and financing strategy since the entire arrears amount has been programmed into the SP. If this happens, some of the projects enshrined in the SP will have to be scaled back to accommodate shortage of funds.

5.1.2 Failure to Mobilize Planned BorrowingsThe markets have been badly hit by the COVID-19 pandemic as well, as a result of the pandemic’s impact on the real sector of Member States and their implications for the predictability of debt service and asset quality. This has introduced an element of uncertainty in the markets, with its attendant cost of funds implications.The Bank’s ability to achieve average cost of funds of not more than 4 percent is contingent on a number of factors, including its credit ratings, lender perception and appetite as well as market conditions. These factors could undermine the Bank’s ability to borrow at concessional or near-concessional rates, making it difficult for it to make impactful investments in Member States.

5.2 RISK OF IDLE FUNDSThe cost of a facility is one critical factor clients consider before deciding to accept it or not. The Bank’s relatively high borrowing costs and tied facilities (particularly for ECA facilities) make it uncompetitive in its chosen priority sectors. This has led to a situation whereby some Member States have declined to accept the Bank’s interventions in certain areas of their economies. This is because some Member States have unsustainable debt levels and a high cost loan could undermine their ability to service such loans, with its attendant punitive debt service default rates.Secondly, other Member States are on IMF programmes, which given their austere nature, prohibits them from accessing non-concessional facilities, which could increase their debt service obligations over time. The COVID-19 pandemic could push some Member States to extend their programmes with the IMF, while others will enter into

78 I Strategy 2025

new programmes with the Fund, making them unable to access EBID facilities (unless the Bank succeeds in contracting low cost funds). Furthermore, project implementation delays, arising from delays from within and without the Bank will worsen the situation of idle funds, just like low facilities uptake. Idle funds are costly to the Bank because it has to service such loans, even when it has not succeeded in on-lending to clients.

5.3 PAYMENT RESCHEDULING AND/OR DEFAULT Following the liquidity squeeze that has been unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic, some of the Bank’s debtors have negotiated a restructuring of the payment schedules. The longer the economy takes to recover, the more likely it is that such clients will return to the Bank to request a complete restructuring of facilities. This will have adverse implications for the Bank’s liquidity position. Furthermore, if the Bank is not able to mobilize concessional resources, the cost of its facilities will remain high, increasing the probability of default. This will adversely affect the Bank’s asset quality and liquidity position.

5.4 CREDIT RATINGS DOWNGRADEMember States’ non-payment of capital arrears and deteriorating liquidity stance (owing to possible default payments) could affect the Bank’s credit ratings, since these were two major reasons cited by the ratings agencies when they rated the Bank and downgraded it subsequently. A further downgrade will only serve to expose the Bank to high cost of funds, with implications for its products to clients.

5.5 RISK IMPACTS AND MITIGATION Table 9 highlights the impact and mitigation measures for each of the risks that have been identified above.

Strategy 2025 I 79

SRN RISKS IMPACTS MITIGATION MEASURES

1Failure to achieve resource mobilization targets

Non-Payment of capitalsubscription by MemberStates;

Failure toMobilizePlannedBorrowings

Ratings downgrade;

Inability to mobilize low-cost funds in the secondary market;

Inability to finance planned projects;

Reduction in interest income

Consider reallocating shares to other willing Member States/shareholders;

Apply the Annex B of the Articles of Association, which specifies that unpaid shares (treasury shares) can be taken over by other Member States

2 Risk of idle funds

Excess and unnecessary liquidity;

High interest cost;

Loss of credibility

Continuous deal pipeline meetings;

Make a calendar to help with follow ups;

Agree conditions with potential lenders before every due diligence;

Align the borrowing conditions to the lending conditions, especially in situations where lenders fail to meet the conditions precedent

3Payment rescheduling and/or default

Loss of revenue;

High financial charges;

Gap on the cashflow

Agree to workable terms and ensure regular follow-ups;

Access EPC and/or credit insurance;

4 Credit ratings downgrade

Makes borrowing very expensive;

Makes borrowing almost inaccessible;

Potential bad loans will be attracted

Make efforts to recover capital;

Ensure good quality loans;

Ensure adherence to the Bank’s policies and procedures

5 Risk of ownership of the plan itself Failure to achieve SP objectives Put in a monitoring mechanism (quarterly)

Table 9: Risks, Impacts and Mitigation Measures

80 I Strategy 2025

CONCLUSION

Strategy 2025 I 81

The 2021-2025 Strategic Plan is borne out of broad inter-departmental consultations and expert advice regarding the developmental path the Bank ought to take to maximize its impact in the sub-region. It is also informed about recent occurrences within the global financial architecture and the what the fallouts from the COVID-19 pandemic could mean for resource mobilization and project finance.The SP has, thus, been crafted to partly address the needs of Member States by investing in critical areas of their economies that will help them recover from the widespread recession, occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, while taking care of basic needs such as education, water and healthcare.In a nutshell, at the end of 2025, the Bank would have worked with Member States to:

• RESTORE them to high economic growth;

• ENABLE them to reach its full potential; and

• Make them RESILIENT to climatic and social challenges.

The above will be achieved through close collaboration with Member States. The Bank will bring value to its stakeholders by investing in critical public and private sector projects that will seek to create jobs, alleviate poverty, ensure inclusiveness and social justice, while addressing issues that border on climate change.EBID, as the sub-region’s development finance institution, will approach developmental issues in ECOWAS from a point of knowledge, proffering tailor-made solutions to the peculiar developmental challenges that have plagued the sub-region.

82 I Strategy 2025

APPENDICES

Strategy 2025 I 83

Appe

ndix

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84 I Strategy 2025

Appe

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Strategy 2025 I 85

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86 I Strategy 2025

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Strategy 2025 I 87

STRATEGY 2025

www.bidc-ebid.org