STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? 1 Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.) Centre for...

STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR?

STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR?

1

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.)Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Washington, D.C.

REGIONAL INSTABILITY

Southern Asia is the second most unstable region in the world after West Asia.

Southern Asia is the second most unstable region in the world after West Asia.

REGIONAL INSTABILITY• China-Pakistan nexus (nuclear weapons, ballistic

missiles, military hardware development programme;

Chinese military presence in Gilgit-Baltistan.)

• Afghanistan’s endless civil war, marked by Taliban-Al Qaeda terrorism (supported by Pakistan). ISIS…

• Pakistan’s gradual slide towards becoming a ‘failed state’.

• Economic backwardness; political instability; proliferation of small arms; narcotics trafficking…

INDIA

CHINA

BD

MONGOLIA

PHILIPPINES

JAPANNORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

PAK

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

SRI LANKA

VIETNAM

INDONESIA

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPUCHEA

MALAYSIA

NEPALBHUTAN

TAIWAN

SINGAPORE

BRUNEI

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

NUCLEAR NEIGHBOURHOODNUCLEAR NEIGHBOURHOOD

CHINA

MYANMAR

US NUCLEARWEAPONS

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

RUSSIA

ISRAEL

INDIA-TIBET BORDERINDIA-TIBET BORDER

INDIA

CHINA

PAK

NEPAL

MYANMAR

BHUTAN

TOTAL LENGTH - 4056 KM

EASTERN SECTOR - 1326 KMHP

UP

MIDDLE SECTOR - 554 KM

WESTERN SECTOR - 2176 KM38,000 sq km

LAC - 520 KM

ALP90,000 sq km

SIKKIM

BANGLADESH

5180 SQ KM AREACEDED BY PAK TOCHINA IN 1963

POK

J&K

China is in occupation of 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin in

J&K; claims all of Arunachal Pradesh; Pakistan illegally

ceded 5,180 sq km in J&K to China in March 1963.

INDIA

CHINA

BD

MONGOLIA

PHILIPPINES

JAPANNORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

SRI LANKA

VIETNAM

INDONESIA

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPUCHEA

MALAYSIA

NEPALBHUTAN

TAIWAN

SINGAPORE

BRUNEI

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

STRATEGIC ENCIRCLEMENT OF INDIA

STRATEGIC ENCIRCLEMENT OF INDIA

PAK

MYANMAR

String of Pearls

CHINA’S STRING OF PEARLS

GWADAR

HAMBANTOTA

CHITTAGONG

HANIGYI HAINAN IS

WOODY IS

Pakistan’s proxy war over Jammu and Kashmir…

Pakistan’s proxy war over Jammu and Kashmir…

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITYINTERNAL INSTABILITY

POLITICAL SYSTEMPUNJABI MAJORITYFEUDAL MINDSETWEAK DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONSFRACTURED IDEOLOGY

WEAK BASIC FABRICIDENTITY CRISISCOMPETITIVESUB- NATIONALISM

AMERICANCONNECTIONSUPPORTINGNARROW POWERBASE ANDMILITARYCLIENT

AUTOCRATIC REGIMESTRONG ARM TACTICS TOSUPPRESS RESENTMENTAND MUFFLE DISSENT

HOSTILITY WITH INDIAKASHMIR BOGEY

PAKISTAN’S SLOW MOTION IMPLOSION

INDIA

CHINA

BD

MONGOLIA

PHILIPPINES

JAPANNORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

SRI LANKA

VIETNAM

INDONESIA

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPUCHEA

MALAYSIA

NEPALBHUTAN

TAIWAN

SINGAPORE

BRUNEI

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

CHINA-PAKISTAN NEXUS…CHINA-PAKISTAN NEXUS…

PAK

MYANMAR

INDIA

CHINA

BD

MONGOLIA

PHILIPPINES

JAPANNORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

SRI LANKA

VIETNAM

INDONESIA

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPUCHEA

MALAYSIA

NEPALBHUTAN

TAIWAN

SINGAPORE

BRUNEI

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

CHINA-PAKISTAN NEXUS…CHINA-PAKISTAN NEXUS…

PAK

MYANMAR

India must prepare for a two-front war.India must prepare for a two-front war.

REGIONAL INSTABILITY

Insurgency and terrorism in Af-Pak – greatest causes of

regional instability.

The age of terrorism.

Cult of the suicide bomber.

Nuclear DangersNuclear DangersNuclear DangersNuclear Dangers

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India-China Nuclear Equation

• Both follow similar doctrines…• Both have a ‘no first use’ posture. (China’s NFU is qualified…) • Developments:

– China: MIRV, MaRV, BMD…– India: BMD – technology

demonstrator, SSBNs…• No sabre rattling…• Relative stability.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

• Nuclear weapons designed to negate India’s conventional superiority.• Known to follow “first strike” doctrine. • Would like to convince India that it has a low nuclear threshold.• Believes in “graduated” response.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Red Lines

Red Lines (Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, DG, SPD):

• Large part of sensitive Pakistani territory captured by India (Space threshold).

• Major echelons of war machinery destroyed (Military threshold).

• Economic strangulation of Pakistan (Economic threshold).

• Large-scale internal de-stabilisation (Political threshold).

Developments…• Full spectrum deterrence, including TNWs (Hatf-9 Nasr).• 80-110 warheads (David Albright) – and counting…• Likely capping of Babar and Ra’ad...• Enhanced Pu production; 4 Pu reactors, 3 reprocessing plants in 10 years).

• Naval Forces Strategic Command.• SSM, PAF, Naval (surface-to-surface) triad.• Negative stance at FMCT negotiations…• Safety and security issues…

Lessons: Exercise Azm-e-Nau

• Pakistan army has adopted ‘new concept of warfighting’. • Aim: Checkmate India’s Cold Start/ Pro-active Offensive Operations doctrine.• Quick mobilisation; joint response to Indian offensive operations. • New brigade groups (2 to 4) being raised to stop Indian IBGs using conventional forces; Corps reserves available.• If this effort fails, TNWs will be employed on Pakistani territory.



Pakistan seeks to convince India that it has a low nuclear threshold…


India’s Strategic India’s Strategic RestraintRestraint

India’s Strategic India’s Strategic RestraintRestraint

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India’s Strategic Restraint

• Low-intensity limited conflict since 1947-48 in Jammu and Kashmir; Op Gibraltar 1965. • Pak support to Khalistan movement in Indian Punjab, 1980s.• Proxy war in J&K since 1989-90. • Kargil conflict, May-Aug 1999.• Attack on Indian Parliament, Dec 2001. Op Parakram; no offensive action by India.• Attack on army family quarters, Kaluchak, May 2002; no offensive action.• Mumbai terror strikes, Nov 2008.



Despite grave provocation, India showed immense strategic restraint…

Despite grave provocation, India showed immense strategic restraint…



Mumbai terror strikes were the last straw… Policy of restraint is unlikely to hold.

Mumbai terror strikes were the last straw… Policy of restraint is unlikely to hold.

Likely Contours ofLikely Contours ofFuture Indo-PakFuture Indo-Pak

ConflictConflict

Likely Contours ofLikely Contours ofFuture Indo-PakFuture Indo-Pak

ConflictConflict

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• A major terrorist strike…• Sufficient evidence of Pakistani state

sponsorship… military retaliation.• Aim: Inflict punishment on Pakistan army to

raise cost of waging proxy war.• Air and ground-based firepower strikes likely

limited to LoC; possible use of SF and BATs.• Operations as per planned contingencies.• Carefully designed to prevent escalation.• Risk involved in every military venture.

Trigger and Reaction…

• A major terrorist strike…• Sufficient evidence of Pakistani state

sponsorship… military retaliation.• Aim: Inflict punishment on Pakistan army to

raise cost of waging proxy war.• Air and ground-based firepower strikes likely

limited to LoC; possible use of SF and BATs.• Operations as per planned contingencies.• Carefully designed to prevent escalation.• Risk involved in every military venture.

Trigger and Reaction…

War could spill over to the plains under certain circumstances…

War could spill over to the plains under certain circumstances…



Pakistan believes a few TNWs will halt an Indian offensive; low cost-high pay off option…

Pakistan believes a few TNWs will halt an Indian offensive; low cost-high pay off option…



Pakistan believes no Indian PM will approve massive retaliation for use of TNWs against Indian forces on its own soil.

Pakistan believes no Indian PM will approve massive retaliation for use of TNWs against Indian forces on its own soil.



What if?What if?



What if India resorts to massive retaliation – in keeping with its doctrine?

What if India resorts to massive retaliation – in keeping with its doctrine?



Deterrence is a mind game…Deterrence is a mind game…

• Combat command advancing two combat groups up; desert terrain; 20-25 km frontage.

• One 10 kt TNW, low air burst; on one combat group; 8-10 km frontage; (AFVs with NBC protection).

• 20-25 personnel killed/ injured; 8-10 AFVs destroyed.

• Reserve combat group can resume operations in 6-8 hours.

Impact of use of TNWs…

India’s OptionsIndia’s OptionsIndia’s OptionsIndia’s Options

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Pro-active Operations

Option 1: Deep strikes – call Pakistan’s

nuclear bluff:

• Launch Strike Corps operations to achieve strategic gains quickly.

• Emphasise retaliatory strategy that a nuclear strike on Indian soldiers even in Pakistani territory will invite massive counter value (and counter force strikes).

STRIKE CORPS OPERATIONSSTRIKE CORPS OPERATIONS

‘X’ CORPS

‘Y’ CORPS

‘Z’ CORPS

N.B. Schematic representation only

• Analysts believe that political leaders may not approve the option of deep strikes.

• Cold Start Doctrine: Large number of division-size thrusts (IBGs); shallow penetration along wide front; simultaneous destruction of war-waging potential of Pakistan.

Political Guidance

INTEGRATED BATTLE GROUPSINTEGRATED BATTLE GROUPS

Each IBG = Division/ Division plus, with some armour and mechanised infantry.

N.B. Schematic representation only

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Option 2: Strike hard, but not deep:

• Launch a number of Integrated Battle Groups across the IB to achieve shallow penetration and capture a wide swathe of territory as a bargaining counter.

• Develop and employ (land and air) firepower asymmetries to destroy Pakistan’s war-waging potential.

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION• As long as the dispute over Jammu and

Kashmir continues, as also the proxy war, the probability of conventional conflict cannot be ruled out.

• India has exercised immense strategic restraint, but must find a way out to fight and win conventional war under a nuclear overhang.

• Cold start doctrine gives India the option to launch offensive operations in the plains with minimum risk of nuclear escalation.

• The doctrine needs fine tuning to mature.

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION

A major achievement of the Cold Start doctrine is that it has created uncertainty in the adversary's mind!

A major achievement of the Cold Start doctrine is that it has created uncertainty in the adversary's mind!

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I do not know with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.

- Albert Einstein (Attributed)

Thank you!

Military ModernisationMilitary ModernisationMilitary ModernisationMilitary Modernisation

51

India’s Military Modernisation

• Stagnated for long; picking up steam… • Mountain Strike Corps; blue water navy; MMRCA, LCA, PGMs…• Recent acquisitions from the US: INS Jalashva (USS Trenton), 6xC-130J Super Hercules aircraft for India’s Special Forces, 10xC-17 Globemaster heavy lift transport aircraft, 12xBoeing P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft and 12xAN-TPQ37 Weapon Locating Radars. • In the acquisition pipeline: 6xC-130J and 7xC-17 aircraft are expected to be purchased over the next few years. M-777 light artillery howitzers, Apache attack helicopters and Chinook medium lift helicopters are being considered.

India’s Military Modernisation

• “Arming without Aiming” (Steve Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta)?? Not entirely true…• Tri-service capabilities are being created for conventional conflict and military intervention (RRDs with air assault capab).• India is gradually moving towards becoming a net provider of security in its area of strategic interest. • HADR in Asian Tsunami, Anti-piracy operations off Horn of Africa, Nepal earthquake, Yemen HADR, patrolling of SLOCs…

INDIABD

MONGOLIA

PHILIPPINES

JAPANNORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

PAK

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

SRI LANKA

VIETNAM

INDONESIA

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPUCHEA

MALAYSIA

NEPALBHUTAN

TAIWAN

SINGAPORE

BRUNEI

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

CHINA

MYANMAR

RUSSIASTRATEGIC STABILITY IN STRATEGIC STABILITY IN

SOUTH ASIASOUTH ASIASTRATEGIC STABILITY IN STRATEGIC STABILITY IN

SOUTH ASIASOUTH ASIA

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.)Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Washington, D.C.

STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? 1 Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.) Centre for...

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Transcript of STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? 1 Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.) Centre for...