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Strategic Investing

April 2016


Presentation plan

. Quoted Equity with a Private Equity Approach

. The case for equities

. Our investment approach

. Portfolio construction

. Expected returns

. Some words on copper and oil

. A managed account: owner’s reporting

. Appendix

Key message: if approached as a business owner, equities can be a high return, low risk investment.


Key messages

. Private Equity is probably not so “alternative” to Quoted Equity: the underlying asset for both PE and QE is common equity, with all the residual economic interest

. The key differences can favor PE or QE:

. Opportunities to create value through intervention

. Opportunities to modify financial structure

. Opportunities to construct an efficient portfolio

. Price volatility

. Liquidity

. Investors must keep similar time horizons


Two ways of investing in QE

. Buy “shares that will go up” (trading strategy)

. Buy profitable businesses at a discount

"It might have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge beyond that of the average private investor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to himself. It happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and speculator are mainly occupied otherwise. For most of these persons are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public. They are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man who buys it for "keeps", but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence."

(JM Keynes, The general theory of employment, interest, and money, 1936)


Benefits of intervention clearly favor PE

. “Activist” investing is very limited in the world of Quoted Equity:

. Limitations of size

. Limitations of control

. Legal and practical considerations

. On the other hand, active intervention is an essential part of PE investing, and can be the key ingredient in long-term profitability

. Underlying profits

. Multiple expansion

. Leverage


“Financial Engineering” seems to favor PE, but…

. Not necessarily a long-term source of value

. Generates its own endogenous risk

. In reality, it can be replicated in QE investing


…diversification clearly favors QE

. Quoted Equity facilitates enormously diversification across sectors, sizes, and geographies. By definition all quoted stocks are available for investment, only limited in practice by investor’s size

. It is in the essence of PE to intervene, which requires specific knowledge, which requires specialization, which requires huge size to diversify.


The main difference for many investors is volatility

. For years (at least, pre-2008), PE was seen as “less volatile” than QE, and therefore as having a better risk/reward profile

. But volatility is not the same as risk, and QE is actually less risky than PE, often with better long term returns when risk adjusted

. “Making money while the market drops”


. Bubbles and “black holes”

. Mr. Private and Mr. Public

. Mr. Retail

. Who makes money over the long term?

Volatility actually presents opportunity for QE


Finally, liquidity favors QE

. Even with long-term investment horizons, liquidity is clearly an advantage, all other things being equal

. Liquidity also facilitates correcting mistakes at an affordable price

. From a “behavioral” point of view, however, liquidity can end up hurting the investor


Summary

. It’s probably correct to see PE and QE as two ways of investing in the same underlying asset class: residual ownership claims on corporations

. Both have advantages and disadvantages: ability to intervene; ease to diversify.

. Financial engineering is not really a source of value; volatility can be a source of value for Quoted Equity investments: for a long-term, unleveraged investor, volatility is a source of opportunity not a source of risk

. High profitability, low volatility, and immediate liquidity are probably not even worth looking for.

. IN ANY CASE, THE IMPORTANT POINT IS TO UNDERSTAND IS THAT QE ARE “REAL ASSETS”


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



A risky investment?

. Starts with a 3% cash dividend

. Will grow the dividend about 5% every year

. Will try to pay (increasing) cash regardless of macroeconomic conditions

. It is very well diversified

. It is very solid financially


It’s been going on for many years. These are the last 54

Annualized rate of dividend growth: 5.7 % Volatility of dividend growth: 50 bp

39.3034.83

31.1226.35

22.6822.27

28.3628.77

24.6722.16

19.3817.23

16.1215.69

16.3216.63

15.9515.24

14.6213.65

13.1212.5212.40

12.0111.82

11.029.75

8.818.28

7.897.53

7.096.876.63

6.205.65

5.074.67

4.053.683.603.383.153.073.133.163.072.922.872.722.502.282.132.021.95

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

2014

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

1960

Dividends S&P 500 in USD

Expon. (Dividends S&P 500 in USD)

Source: Standard & Poors / Bloomberg


0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

2014

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

1960Dividends S&P 500 in USDExpon. (Dividends S&P 500 in USD) The Vietnam war starts

Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Libya invade Israel Soviet tanks invade Czechoslovakia

On Yom Kippur day, several Arab countries invade Israel. Oil embargo is declared. Oil goes from $18 to $42 in two weeks.

Nixon resigns. US GDP decreases more than 4%. The S&P drops more than 25%.

The Iranian revolution starts

Bretton Woods monetary system breaks down. Nixon takes dollar off gold standard

France nationalizes banks, large companies

JFK is assassinated Cuban missile crisis

The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan “Savings and Loan” crisis: 1,600 banks go bankrupt

This investment exists, and it’s highly liquid. It’s called the S&P 500

Total collapse of the financial system

October 19: the stock market plunges 508 points Pro‐democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square are violently crushed

Iraqi troops invade Kuwait and threaten Saudi Arabia

Open war in Yugoslavia. The EMS breaks down The “tequila crisis” blows up

The Asian crisis explodes Russia defaults both in its domestic and foreign debt

The Nasdaq bubble pops Terrorists destroy the World Trade Center

Euro collapse?

Source: Stand

ard & Poo

rs / Bloo

mberg


Of course, the price of the investmenthas been volatile, but not its value

Annualized rate of dividend growth: 5.7 % Volatility of dividend growth: 50 bp

Price annualized return: 6.8 % Volatility of index returns: 16.3 %

Dividend 2014: 700.000 $ Total dividends: 10.500.000 $ Current market value: 34.000.000 $


0

500

1'000

1'500

2'000

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012

Dividends S&P 500 in USD Price S&P 500 Index in USD (r. scale) Expon. (Dividends S&P 500 in USD)


The contrast with bonds is sharp

Dividend 2014: 700.000 $ Total dividends: 10.500.000 $ Current market value: 34.000.000 $

Coupon 2014: 40’000 $ Total interests: 4’000’000 $ Current market value: 1’000’000 $

$ 4 p.a. (1960 – 1969)

$ 4 p.a. (from 2010)

$ 8 p.a. (1970 – 1979)

$ 12 p.a. (1980 – 1989)

$ 8 p.a. (1990 – 1999)

$ 6 p.a. (2000 – 2009)

Source: Stand

ard & Poo

rs / Bloo

mberg

39.3034.8331.12

26.3522.68

22.2728.3628.77

24.6722.16

19.3817.23

16.1215.69

16.3216.63

15.9515.24

14.6213.65

13.1212.5212.40

12.0111.82

11.029.75

8.818.28

7.897.53

7.096.876.63

6.205.65

5.074.67

4.053.683.603.383.153.073.133.163.072.922.872.722.502.282.13

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

2014

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963Coupons Bonds in USD

Dividends S&P 500 in USD


. The essential risk is valuation

. In the end, return is simple: dividend yield (plus net stock repurchase), plus real growth, plus inflation. For an index, these are basically macroeconomic data. For individual stocks, strategic analysis is required.

Risk is low but… overpaying is expensive

Annualized total return (TR) of S&P 500 Index(in %, in USD)



Coca‐Cola(Earning per Share, quarterly basis, from 31st December 1998 to 30th September 2013, in USD)

The real fundamental risk is to overpay

Source: Bloomberg

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

‐$0.4

‐$0.2

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Earnings per share in USD (r. scale)


Coca‐Cola(Price return and Earning per Share, quarterly basis, from 31st December 1998 to 30th September 2013, in USD)


Source: Bloomberg

‐$0.4

‐$0.2

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

‐50%

‐25%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%

COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Earnings per share in USD (r. scale)COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Price return in %


PEPSICO INC ‐ Earnings per share in USD (r. scale)

‐$0.6

‐$0.4

‐$0.2

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

$1.4

$1.6

$1.8

Coca‐Cola & Pepsi Co.(Price return and Earning per Share, quarterly basis, from 31st December 1998 to 30th September 2013, in USD)


Source: Bloomberg

‐$0.4

‐$0.2

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

‐50%

‐25%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%

COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Earnings per share in USD (r. scale)COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Price return in %


PEPSICO INC ‐ Earnings per share in USD (r. scale)

‐$0.6

‐$0.4

‐$0.2

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

$1.4

$1.6

$1.8

Coca‐Cola vs. Pepsi Co.(Price return and Earning per Share, quarterly basis, from 31st December 1998 to 30th September 2013, in USD)


Source: Bloomberg

‐$0.4

‐$0.2

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

‐50%

‐25%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Earnings per share in USD (r. scale)

COCA‐COLA CO/THE ‐ Price return in %

PEPSICO INC ‐ Price return in %

PE: 50PE: 35

Total Return: 67%Annualized: 3.5%

Total Return: 180%Annualized: 7.2%


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



What is strategic investing

. We want to find good companies at inexpensive prices

. Our key concept is that of “intrinsic return” to an “owner”

. We buy companies, not shares

. We don’t look for “shares that will go up”

. We don’t “play the markets”, look for “catalysts” or in any way put our investors’ money in the hands of future price movements

We never “chase” the markets. We use markets’ prices as opportunities to buy or sell. We never act on a view on what the markets will do: we have no way on what the markets will do (except for the long term).


. A “good company” for us is one that delivers a return on equity well above its cost of capital,adjusted by risk, over the cycle

. This only happens when companies’ profits are protected by barriers to entry, i.e., when supplyhas structural difficulties to follow demand:

. Economies of scale

. Privileged access to raw materials or clients

. Proprietary products or processes

. Reputation effects

. Long lead times to add capacity

. In the end, companies earn returns above their cost of capital only if they are somehowprotected from full competition

. To determine if that will be the case, a thorough understanding of the competitive dynamics ofthe sector is necessary

. This is essential to avoid value traps: for instance, European banks, utilities, & telecom in thelast few years…

What is a good company

Nestlé’s ROE (10 year) > 16%Peugeot’s ROE (10 year) < 4%


What is an inexpensive company

. Our target: annual double digit net return to investors

. This requires at least 10‐15% “intrinsic return”: there is growth… and there are fees

. We use a variety of measures (EV/Ebit, PE, P/NAV, IRR, etc.) to determine “intrinsic return”

. Our current portfolio has an expected return above 12%

. Key analytical variables are ROCE, dividend yield, leverage, and the notion of “convergence”.

. Ensuring a company is indeed “inexpensive” implies avoiding “value traps” and finding “hidden gems” through very thorough strategic and financial analysis


Strategic investing and volatility

. Investors seek a “holy grail”: mid‐sized returns with no volatility. This is risky and, long term, not very profitable

. Investors must look first and foremost at fundamental risk: for a long‐term, unleveraged investor, volatility is source of opportunity not a source of risk

. But this requires understanding what one is buying: fundamental analysis, thinking as an owner

. Long‐term investors in a well diversified, well researched equity portfolio bought at a low price run only the long‐term risk that the world will implode. Everything else is pure noise.

. We build our portfolio to mitigate fundamental risk (good companies, low prices) and, to some extent, volatility: fundamental diversification.


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



. Step 1: determine the category of stocks with the least fundamental risk:

. Technological

. Business

. Cycle

. Forex

. Regulation

. Financial

. This stock should have a relatively certain Expected Return

. Step 2: determine the stocks’ Expected Return

. Step 3: Determine the appropriate Return Spreads for the different levels of risk

We start our portfolio construction by determining the “risk‐free” stocks’ Expected Return


Some “micro” data

Reckitt Benckiser Group, UK, in GBPLong‐term growth of EPS: 7.0%Long‐term growth of DPS: 17.4%Total return: 1’324.4%Annualized total return: 12.8%

McDonald‘s Corp, USA, in USDLong‐term growth of EPS: 9.9%Long‐term growth of DPS: 15.5%Total return: 1’593.0%Annualized total return: 13.7%

0

200

400

600

800

1'000

1'200

1'400

‐0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014e

(FY 1990 ‐ 2012)

%GBP

RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC

Earnings per share (GBP) Dividend per share (GBP) Cum.Total return net (r. scale)

02004006008001'0001'2001'4001'6001'8002'000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014e

(FY 1990 ‐ 2012)

%USD

MCDONALD'S CORP

Earnings per share (USD) Dividend per share (USD) Cum.Total return net (r. scale)Source: Bloomberg


Portfolio construction: establishing spreads

After determining the “risk‐free rate of return”, we determine the necessary spreads for all other levels of risk

. Category 1: “risk‐free stock”: 10%

. Category 2: solid, non‐cyclical companies: 12%

. Category 3: solid, cyclical companies: 14%

. Category 4: special situations: 16%

These are entry returns. If the return decreases noticeably, because of share price appreciation or long‐term business deterioration, the stock becomes a candidate for a sale.


Category 1: Sodexo SA

. Sodexo SA designs, manages and delivers comprehensive on‐site service solutions for its clients. The Company offers food, construction management, reception, technical maintenance and housekeeping services, maintains scanners and laboratory equipment, and operates river and harbor cruises and correctional facilities. Sodexo also designs employee benefit and incentive programs. (Bloomberg Ticker: SW FP)

Source: Bloomberg

30

60

120

Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Jan 13 Jan 14 Jan 15 Jan 16

EUR

SODEXO(Price in EUR, 04.01.2008 ‐ 08.04.2016)

log scale

Issue DataLast Price (08.04.2016) 94.28 52wk High (14.03.2016) 96.57 52wk Low (29.09.2015) 70.45P/E (Trailing 12m) 20.64Dividend Yield 2.31Price to Book Ratio 3.90Price to Sales Ratio 0.73EV / Trail 12M EBITDA 11.34Shares Outstanding 157.132Market Cap 14'943.26Enterprise Value 13'019.50

Per Share DataEPS (Trail ing 12m) 4.61Dividend per Share 2.20Book Value / Share 24.36Sales / Share (Trailing 12m) 130.33Cash Flow / Basic Share 6.69Free Cash Flow / Share 4.70

Cash Flow AnalysisPrice / Cash Flow 14.22Price / Free Cash Flow 20.23Cash Flow / Net Income 1.45Dividend Payout Ratio 49.58Cash Generated / Cash Req 1.76Cash Dividend Coverage 2.02Cash‐oper / Sales 5.13Eff Interest Rate 30.68

ProfitabilityEBIT 1'136Operating Margin 5.73Pretax Margin 5.26Return on Assets 4.84Return on Common Equity 20.29Return on Capital 11.82Asset turnover 1.37

StructureCurrent Ratio 1.00Quick Ratio 0.75Total Debt to Total Assets 21.54Total Debt to Com Equity 84.07Acct Receivable Turnover 6.11Inventory Turnover 62.27Gross Margin 15.94EBIT / Total Inter 7.57

Growth PotentialSales 1yr Growth 9.99Asset 1yr Growth ‐0.01Capital 1yr Growth ‐3.80


Category 2: Drägerwerk AG

. Drägerwerk AG & Company KGAA manufactures medical, safety, and aerospace equipment. The Company produces ventilators, monitoring equipment, transportincubators, anesthesia machines, surgical lights, ward equipment, home care equipment, systems for safe breathing in industry, mining and fire fighting, and airplane crew and passenger oxygen systems.(Bloomberg Ticker: DRW3 GY)

Source: Bloomberg

30

60

120

Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Jan 13 Jan 14 Jan 15 Jan 16

EUR

DRAEGERWERK AG ‐ PREF(Price in EUR, 01.01.2010 ‐ 08.04.2016)

log scale

Issue DataLast Price (08.04.2016) 58.81 52wk High (27.04.2015) 123.70 52wk Low (04.02.2016) 51.12P/E (Trailing 12m) 32.84Dividend Yield 0.32Price to Book Ratio 1.12Price to Sales Ratio 0.40EV / Trail 12M EBITDA 7.10Shares Outstanding 7.6Market Cap 993.27Enterprise Value 1'195.70

Per Share DataEPS (Trail ing 12m) 1.82Dividend per Share 0.13Book Value / Share 53.17Sales / Share (Trailing 12m) 147.79Cash Flow / Basic Share 2.24Free Cash Flow / Share ‐3.96

Cash Flow AnalysisPrice / Cash Flow 27.86Price / Free Cash FlowCash Flow / Net Income 1.22Dividend Payout Ratio 7.07Cash Generated / Cash Req 0.28Cash Dividend Coverage 14.15Cash‐oper / Sales 1.53Eff Interest Rate 32.78

ProfitabilityEBIT 73Operating Margin 2.81Pretax Margin 1.90Return on Assets 1.44Return on Common Equity 3.55Return on Capital 3.84Asset turnover 1.15


Growth PotentialSales 1yr Growth 7.16Asset 1yr Growth 3.46Capital 1yr Growth 4.45


Category 2: Bakkafrost P/F

. Bakkafrost P/F operates a fish farm. The Company offers a wide range of salmon products supplied by its own processing facilities. Bakkafrost provides fresh salmon to the fresh fish market, mokehousesand processors of ready meals, and frozen salmon portions vacuum packed in catering boxes or in retailboxes. (Bloomberg Ticker: BAKKA NO)

Source: Bloomberg





StructureCurrent Ratio 4.74Quick Ratio 0.73Total Debt to Total Assets 11.42Total Debt to Com Equity 17.34Acct Receivable Turnover 15.34Inventory TurnoverGross Margin 57.86EBIT / Total Inter 40.64


20

40

80

160

320

Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 13 Mar 14 Mar 15 Mar 16

NOK

BAKKAFROST P/F(Price in NOK, 26.03.2010 ‐ 08.04.2016)

log scale


Category 3: Marine Harvest

Source: Bloomberg

. Marine Harvest is a Norwegian based fish farming plant, raising mainly Atlantic salmon. The Company operates hatcheries, processes and packages fish, as well as sells and markets the products. Marine Harvest operates in Canada, Norway and Scotland. The Company sells salmon worldwide through its sales companies in Norway, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. (Bloomberg Ticker: MHG NO)


Per Share DataEPS (Trail ing 12m) 3.37Dividend per Share 5.20Book Value / Share 40.39Sales / Share (Trailing 12m) 61.44Cash Flow / Basic Share 3.94Free Cash Flow / Share ‐0.45





20

40

80

160


NOK

MARINE HARVEST(Price in NOK, 01.01.2010 ‐ 08.04.2016)

log scale


Category 3: Leroey Seafood Group ASA

. Leroey Seafood Group ASA is the parent corporation for a group of companies that produce and market ocean and farmed fish and seafood products. The Company also sells a range of processed fish products. Leroey trades with producers, distributers, and importers of fish on a worldwide basis. The Company has subsidiaries in Denmark, France, and Portugal.(Bloomberg Ticker: LSG NO)

Source: Bloomberg




ProfitabilityEBIT 1'380Operating Margin 10.26Pretax Margin 11.16Return on Assets 7.65Return on Common Equity 15.58Return on CapitalAsset turnover 0.87

StructureCurrent Ratio 2.54Quick Ratio 0.40Total Debt to Total Assets 24.04Total Debt to Com Equity 48.72Acct Receivable TurnoverInventory Turnover 16.36Gross Margin 34.48EBIT / Total Inter 14.41


60

120

240

480


NOK

LEROEY SEAFOOD GROUP ASA(Price in NOK, 01.01.2010 ‐ 08.04.2016)

log scale


Category 3: California Resources

. California Resources Corporation explores for and produces oil and natural gas.(Bloomberg Ticker: CRC US)

Source: Bloomberg

Issue DataLast Price (12.04.2016) 1.46 52wk High (17.04.2015) 9.87 52wk Low (25.02.2016) 0.28P/E (Trailing 12m)Dividend YieldPrice to Book RatioPrice to Sales Ratio 0.24EV / Trail 12M EBITDAShares Outstanding 388.1835Market Cap 595.86Enterprise Value 7'035.46

Per Share DataEPS (Trail ing 12m) ‐0.79Dividend per Share 0.03Book Value / Share ‐2.36Sales / Share (Trailing 12m) 6.27Cash Flow / Basic Share 1.05Free Cash Flow / Share 0.01

Cash Flow AnalysisPrice / Cash Flow 1.46Price / Free Cash Flow 264.30Cash Flow / Net IncomeDividend Payout RatioCash Generated / Cash Req 0.98Cash Dividend CoverageCash‐oper / Sales 16.77Eff Interest Rate

ProfitabilityEBIT ‐5'150Operating Margin ‐214.32Pretax Margin ‐227.88Return on Assets ‐36.36Return on Common EquityReturn on Capital ‐47.08Asset turnover 0.25

StructureCurrent Ratio 0.82Quick Ratio 0.35Total Debt to Total Assets 87.10Total Debt to Com EquityAcct Receivable Turnover 9.46Inventory Turnover 33.10Gross Margin 11.15EBIT / Total Inter ‐15.80

Growth PotentialSales 1yr Growth ‐42.42Asset 1yr Growth ‐43.56Capital 1yr Growth ‐41.73

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Nov 14 Feb 15 May 15 Aug 15 Nov 15 Feb 16

USD

CALIFORNIA RESOURCES CORP(Price in USD, 13.11.2014 ‐ 12.04.2016)


Category 4: First Quantum Minerals Ltd.

. First Quantum Minerals Ltd. explores for, mines, and produces copper cathode, copper in concentrate, and gold. The Company also produces sulfuric acid. (Bloomberg Ticker: FM CN)

Source: Bloomberg

Issue DataLast Price (08.04.2016) 6.28 52wk High (01.05.2015) 19.83 52wk Low (20.01.2016) 2.15P/E (Trailing 12m)Dividend Yield 0.28Price to Book Ratio 0.40Price to Sales Ratio 1.35EV / Trail 12M EBITDA 20.15Shares Outstanding 689.3311Market Cap 4'942.50Enterprise Value 8'338.26

Per Share DataEPS (Trail ing 12m) ‐0.53Dividend per Share 0.08Book Value / Share 13.88Sales / Share (Trailing 12m) 4.17Cash Flow / Basic Share 1.84Free Cash Flow / Share ‐0.58

Cash Flow AnalysisPrice / Cash Flow 3.14Price / Free Cash FlowCash Flow / Net IncomeDividend Payout RatioCash Generated / Cash Req 0.74Cash Dividend CoverageCash‐oper / Sales 44.22Eff Interest Rate

ProfitabilityEBIT ‐84Operating Margin ‐3.11Pretax Margin ‐3.41Return on Assets ‐2.72Return on Common Equity ‐5.37Return on Capital ‐1.31Asset turnover 0.15

StructureCurrent Ratio 1.97Quick Ratio 0.61Total Debt to Total Assets 27.18Total Debt to Com Equity 52.90Acct Receivable Turnover 8.34Inventory Turnover 2.02Gross Margin 10.86EBIT / Total Inter ‐0.11

Growth PotentialSales 1yr Growth ‐23.83Asset 1yr Growth 4.45Capital 1yr Growth ‐2.34

2

4

8

16

32

64


CAD

FIRST QUANTUM MINERALS LTD(Price in CAD, 01.01.2010 ‐ 08.04.2016)

log scale


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



The basic calculation:

Expected Return = Dividend yield + Growth (Real growth + Inflation) * changes in PE

The different markets are discounting very different futures, which may not be realistic (companies adjust over the long term):

Market situation

Source: Bloomberg

IndexPrice/EPS2015

Price/EPS2016e

Dividend Yield2015

Dividend Yield2016e

S&P 500 18.3x 15.6x 2.2 2.5Euro Stoxx 50 22.3x 12.6x 3.6 4.3Topix 16.6x 14.0x 1.8 2.1SMI 18.7x 15.6x 3.3 3.7


We expect double digit returns for the future

Table with category 1, 2, 3, 4, with their expected returns and volatilities, as well as the total of the portfolio of the LTIF Classic (as of 31st March 2016)

Portfolio composition, by industry and region for the LTIF Classic (as of 31st March 2016)

Source: SIA Group / Bloomberg

Category Equity Expected Return Marginal Volatility1 17.5% 9.4% 15.7%2 35.6% 11.9% 18.6%3 42.7% 16.5% 25.8%4 4.1% 17.5% 36.0%

Overall 100.0% 13.7% 21.9%


We expect double digit returns for the future

. These returns are annualized: not every year.

. At a 10% annualized return, assets double in 7 years, almost quadruple in 14 years and multiply by 7 in 20 years.

. The essence of ownership is patience, and letting good companies compound.

. This is one of the best ways to preserve and increase wealth for the next generations:

. Profitability: about the best possible real long‐term returns

. Transparency: all audited data

. Very low transaction fees and running costs

. Liquidity: easy of increasing/decreasing positions

. Diversification: enter partnerships with the best companies worldwide, in many different sectors and countries


SIA is well placed to obtain these returns

. Our investment philosophy has proven itself with many investors over many years

. We possess the requisite analytical skill, both strategic and financial

. We provide a thoroughly transparent, owner‐oriented reporting and information

. Our medium size allows us to both have enough resources and total concentration on a number of clients.

. We can exploit relatively small opportunities.

. We have a track record to back our claims:


EUR USD EUR USD

Value at 14th January 2002 86.79 82.69 100.00 89.45

Value at 31st March 2016 152.04 184.54 328.27 374.08

Difference (%) 75.2% 123.2% 228.3% 318.2%

Annualized return (%) 4.0% 5.8% 8.7% 10.6%

MSCI AC World Index TR Net LTIF Classic


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



Copper apparent demand

. Copper apparent demand over the past 20 years shows a trend growth of just above 3%, in line with the growth of the global economy.

. There is variability, of course, in any given year.

. Two‐year periods of flattish demand are not uncommon, especially after a year of rapid growth.

. 2014 saw a growth of 8%, followed by a flat 2015, and a return to trend would imply a 1% growth for 2016.

10000000

12000000

14000000

16000000

18000000

20000000

22000000

24000000

26000000

28000000

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Global Refined Copper Demand

3.2% growth line

Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics, Bloomberg


Copper demand expectations. Some analysts have an expectation of return to trend growth by 2017, although some others see lower growth (down to 2%). This is not what history shows.

. Note that there is no agreement on the definition of demand, as the numbers differ greatly for the historical 2014 and 2015 (depending on adjustments). This is important for later comparing supply expectations.

16000

18000

20000

22000

24000

26000

28000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E

GS Global refined consumption

RBC Total Global Demand '000 tonnes

MCQ Refined Consumption

BMO Total Demand

ML Global consumption

Berenberg Refined Demand

WMB historical demand and 3.2% trend


Copper supply expectations

. Most analysts assume fairly steady supply growth through 2019 just above expected demand growth, resulting in midly increasing surplus.

. 2020 widely seen as the year when supply growth stalls.

16000

18000

20000

22000

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26000

28000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E

GS Global refined supply

RBC Base Case Supply '000 tonnes

MCQ Refined Production

BMO Total Refined Supply

ML Global production

Berenberg Refined Supply

WMB historical supply and 3.2% trend


Copper price reflects these expectations...

. Historical copper price

. Price curve


... And the marginal costs of the industry

. Capacity additions and lower demand than expected has resulted in marginal cost pricing.


But the cost curve is steep

. Small changes in S/D balance can greatly affect the price.


Even with relatively high stocks in China

. The Chinese State Reserve Bureau has been taking advantage of low prices to stock up.

. But stocks can go fast if demand picks up.

. And prices might not wait.


Risks to S/D balance

. Demand. Relatively small changes in demand can tip the balance. Restocking cycles

. Supply. Project delays. Production disturbances: strikes, land slides. Unavailable stocks

. The S/D balance can be altered much earlier than expected.


Eventually new capacity will be needed

. To incentivize new capacity prices have to go at least 50% higher

. Even after getting into an incentive pricing regime, projects take years to build


Oil: the world will need 100m barrels a day by 2020

• The world consumed 95m b/d oil in 2015A

• 100m b/d in 2020, with demand growth at 1.0% p.a., in line with historical averages

• Growth only in developing countries. OECD demand is already flat or decreasing

• Depletion is c.3% per year so we need around 18m b/d new production assets to offset it

• Electric Vehicles, CO2 emission regulation will not have a large impact over 2020


Demand in developing countries keeps growing

• Non OECD demand has been steadily growing for the past few years, around 3%+ per year

• While OCDE demand has been flat to slightly down since the late 90s

• We see no reason for a change in the next few years, a least to 2020. China, India, Indonesia… even Brasil in deep crisis should continue to grow car and transport penetration


ICE Transport penetration Rises

• Transport accounts for c. 2/3 of oil products demand and transport is very much related to GDP growth. Very steady growth excluding large crisis

• China, and further down the road India, and most developing countries will continue to increase motor vehicle penetration. CHI now has around 15% penetration in Motor Vehicles per person vs 80%+ in most advanced economies.

• China sells a similar number of new cars than the US and growth has been monitored by the CHI authorities (licenses, pollution, …)

• Cheap oil prices make the ICE (internal combustion engine) competitive


Supply has surprised the world bringing 4m b/d from scratch

• Growth in supply has been almost entirely coming from shale oil (US): +4m b/d in 4 years

• This happened at high oil prices… at current prices shale oil will fall by1m b/d in 2016

• Back to basics for 2016: Demand up 1m b/d (+1%) and supply down 1m b/d (shale). The market is re‐balancing

• Iran can grow 0.5m b/d in 2016, Libya can do the same (unlikely), still 1m b/d deficit

• The world is approaching an undersupply situation


But OPEC is not really growing

• OPEC has grown production by 3.5m b/d since 2010 (Saudi Arabia alone 2m b/d)

• OPEC could grow a bit thanks to Iran and Libya (if geopolitics stabilise) and there are 2m b/d spare capacity

• Consensus points to 1.5m b/d production increase in 5 years, when the world needs 5m b/d, net of depletion

• There still is disruption risk in countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola, Irak, Libya


US shale production is falling at current prices

• Thanks to shale the US liquids production has grown from c8m b/d to c. 13m b/d 2011‐15

• With high prices of course… at current oil prices, shale production is already falling

• On our estimates shale needs 60$+ to be back to investment mode. Higher prices needed for growth mode

• Should we adjust this number by depletion, it needs rather 80$

• So the response is yes, US shale is needed and prices will incentivise its comeback


And Shale Oil Production is Falling

• Shale Oil Production is expected to fall by 1m b/d in 2016, peak to trough. It is already falling by 0.5m b/d

• Most of productivity improvements are behind us. Main advances have been the number of drilling days and longer laterals

• Cost deflation is also behind us and this industry is cyclical


The clock is ticking… Current spare capacity is all time low

• We estimate 2m b/d spare capacity, mainly in Saudi Arabia

• 2% of global capacity, similar to the levels reached in 2005, before prices shoot up

• 2% spare is below the 4‐5% needed to protect the market from disruptions

• Shale oil will be the swing producer but with a time lag (6 quarters in for a full response)

• There is a risk of oil prices overshooting


The Clock is Ticking… Depletion is Kicking

• Global depletion is around 3‐4% per year and IEA forecasts increased depletion for the next years

• Global depletion is accelerating due to reduced capex globally and tight formations

• Shale oil depletion is much higher


The “MotherFrackers” Depletion

• US shale depletion is 1/3 year 1, 50% year 2 and 2/3 year 3. How do we make numbers when your facilities must be 66% amortised by year 3? Nobody cares

• Global depletion is accelerating due to reduced capex globally and tight formations

• We encourage you to take a look to an excellent presentation made by Mr. David Einhornfrom Greenlight Capital “The Motherfrackers” where you will find accurate calculations on real IRRs on shale. Shale has never made money due to depletion and growth ambitions


US Shale Plays are Uneconomic at current oil price


And Oil Capex has collapsed. It must comeback

• Due to low oil prices the sector has massively cut capex

• 50%+ cut in 2015 and 16 will lead to a lack of new projects as from 2018

• Offshore, oil sands take 3‐4+ years to reach first oil from FID… no new projects for the end of the decade

• Shale oil cannot fully replace other all extraction techniques but even if it could it would need 60$ oil+

• Offshore and oil sands need in our view 80$ oil to break even


Supply down, Demand Up, Oil Market has Started to Rebalance

• We believe that the oil market is already re‐balancing

• Oil price must incentivise shale oil first, then off shore, oil sands and most oil extraction techniques

• We think oil prices will surpass the shale incentive level as there is a time lag and the world has not yet felt the impact from lower capex

• Difficult to assess if te rebalancing will complete in 2016 or 2017 but it has already started


Oil Will Move to 60$+ to incentivise spending in shale


Why is the Oil Price at around 40$ ? Is it a Coincidence?


SIA has ~15% of its AuM in oil related stocks

• We started our positions a bit early, in 2014/15 thinking in a 2015/16 re‐balancing and have been slowly during the downturn

• But the Rebalancing is actually happening in 2016/17

• We have built a small portfolio of energy equities to control the risk.

• We have also bought debt of California resources, at 40c on the dollar

E&Ps: Occidental Petroleum, Petrobras, Premier Oil, California Resources, Bankers Petroleum (taken over by Geo Jade)

Oil sands: Cenovus & Suncor Oil Services: Schlumberger, Halliburton, TGS, Baker Hughes (merger with Halliburton

challenged)

Equipment: Cameron (bought by Schlumberger), National Oilwell Engineers: Amec, Fluor


Appendix. Massive Capex Cuts in 2015 & 2016


Appendix. Supply/Demand estimates. IEA, Morningstar


Appendix. Non OPEC Supply Will not Grow at current Oil Prices


Appendix. Capex has halved


Appendix. US oil rig count & US shale production

Source: GS estimates


Appendix. Inventories are only Short term indicators

• Consensus focuses in the short term and thus inventories

• In OECD countries, there are 3bn bblstored, very high vs recent years

• OECD consumes 17bn bbl per year so there are 2 month of inventories… really not look massive

• There is no data on non OECD countries but our guess is that inventories are lower


Appendix. Shale oil & Rig Count


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



Owner’s reporting

Quarterly • Earnings for the quarter, year‐to‐date, year on year• Dividends for the quarter, year‐to‐date, year on year• Book value

Annually Earnings, dividends and book value, plus:

• Portfolio changes• Brief note on each company• Forward estimates

We’ll report on the whole portfolio on what it is: a diversified, holding company of operating businesses:



Update Typical fundamental reporting sheet

Reporting LTIF Classic as of 31.12.2015 (aggregate data in EUR)

NAV %248.37287.75 15.9%321.19 11.6%331.39 3.2%

Year EPS Growth PE Prof.%MSCI

World PEMSCI WorldProf. %

Year DPS YieldMSCI

World DYYear BPS Growth P/B

MSCIWorld P/B

2012 18.7 13.3 7.5% 15.9 6.3% 2012 6.6 2.7% 2.8% 2012 133.1 1.9 1.82013 19.3 3.2% 14.9 6.7% 19.3 5.2% 2013 6.9 2.4% 2.4% 2013 152.5 14.6% 1.9 2.12014 22.2 14.6% 14.5 6.9% 17.9 5.6% 2014 9.0 2.8% 2.5% 2014 191.9 25.8% 1.7 2.22015e 24.6 11.3% 13.4 7.4% 18.9 5.3% 2015e 10.0 3.0% 2.6% 2015e 229.5 19.6% 1.4 2.12016e 27.1 10.1% 12.2 8.2% 16.0 6.3% 2016e 10.5 3.2% 2.7% 2016e 251.9 9.8% 1.3 2.0

31.12.201431.12.2015

Date31.12.201231.12.2013

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

2012 2013 2014 2015e 2016e

EUR

LTIF Classic EPS

6

7

8

9

10

11

2012 2013 2014 2015e 2016e

EUR

LTIF Classic DPS

100

150

200

250

2012 2013 2014 2015e 2016eEU

R

LTIF Classic BPS


Summary

. Target of double digit returns

. Extremely low fundamental risk: “don’t lose money”

. Owner approach to investing: long‐term, focus on profit growth and not share price movements

. Balanced portfolio across risk levels

. SIA adds value by taking a long‐term approach, applying strategic analysis and discriminating opportunities from value traps.


Presentation plan





. Expected returns



. Appendix



Long‐term performance of the LTIF Classic fund

LTIF Classic, MSCI AC World Index, S&P 500 Index and Eurostoxx 50 Index, incl. annualized returns(indexed, in EUR, 14th January 2002 – 31st March 2016)

Source: SIA Group / Bloomberg25

50

100

200

400

Jan 02 Jan 04 Jan 06 Jan 08 Jan 10 Jan 12 Jan 14 Jan 16

LTIF Classic EUR +228.3% total / +8.7% p.a.S&P 500 Index Total return Net EUR +89.2% total / +4.6% p.a.MSCI World AC Index Total Return Net EUR +75.2% total / +4.0% p.a.EURO STOXX 50 Index Net Return +24.8% total / +1.6% p.a.

log scale


Long Term Investment Fund (SIA) structure

. Daily liquidity, cut‐off time previous day at 4:00 pm CET

. Performance fees are assessed and paid quarterly, subject to High Water Marks or Hurdle Rates

. There are no entry or exit fees. There is a discretionary 1% fee to transfer funds between compartments to prevent excessive market timing, which generates costs for investors

Compartments Classic Series Stability A Cap SeriesInvestment style Long-only Low Volatility

Management fee 1.5% pa 0.9% pa

Performance fee 15% (HWM and Hurdle Rate) 15% (HWM)

Currency EUR CHF USD GBP EUR USD

ISIN number LU0244071956 LU0301246772 LU0301247077 LU0750886714 LU1128810261 LU1132799310

Telekurs valor 2'432'569 3'101'817 3'101'820 18'032'305 25'840'496 25'906'913

Bloomberg ticker LTIFCLA LX LTIFCLC LX LTIFCLU LX LTIFCLS LX LTISTAE LX LTISTAU LX

Compartments Natural ResourcesInvestment style Long-only, centered on natural resources

Management fee 1.5% pa

Performance fee 15% (HWM)

Currency EUR CHF USD GBP

ISIN number LU0244072335 LU0301246939 LU0301247234 LU0457696077

Telekurs valor 2'432'575 3'101'836 3'101'839 10'638'983

Bloomberg ticker LTIFGEV LX LTIFGEC LX LTIFGEU LX LTIFGEG LX


. Market Capitalization of companies in EUR in the LTIF Classic as of 31st March 2016

. Median market capitalization of companies in the LTIF Classic: EUR 16.6 billion

Long Term Investment Fund (SIA) ‐ Classic



Long Term Investment Fund (SIA) ‐ Classic

The evolution of the market value of the shares (NAV) are net of all fees and expenses. Please find the disclaimer at the end of the presentation.

NET PERFORMANCE (logarithmic chart)

PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION

Source: SIA Group

50

100

200

400

Jan 02 Jan 04 Jan 06 Jan 08 Jan 10 Jan 12 Jan 14 Jan 16

LTIF Classic EURMSCI AC World Index Daily Net TR EUR

+228.3% cum.+8.7% p.a.

+75.2% cum.+4.0% p.a.

FUND'S HISTORYYear NAV % cum. % Year NAV % cum. %2002 20102003 20112004 20122005 20132006 20142007 20152008 20162009

228.3%‐0.9%

264.21212.11248.37

15.9% 187.8%321.19 11.6% 221.2%

28.0%

93.10 134.30 171.84

16.0% 164.2%

148.4%112.1%‐19.7%

17.1%

‐6.9%34.3%71.8%

213.2%313.1%31.9%

‐67.4%

27.6%

68.9%

‐6.9%44.3%

231.4%3.2%

127.7%

331.39

42.8% 145.4%

328.2734.9%

287.75245.44 313.21 413.07 134.86 227.72

NET PERFORMANCEPeriod FundYear‐to‐date1 month rolling3 months rolling1 year rolling3 years rolling5 years rollingSince inceptionAnnualized return

‐0.9%‐11.1%20.9%30.2%

‐0.9%5.5%

228.3%8.7%

KEY DATADividend yield (aggregated Bloomberg estimate) 2.8%Standard deviation (annualized, s.i.) 21.3%Sharpe ratio (risk free, s.i.) 0.4Alpha (vs. index, s.i.) 5.5%Beta (vs. index, s.i.) 1.1Expected return (as estimated by SIA) 13.7%Intrinsic value (as estimated by SIA) € 479Number of equity positions 40


Long Term Investment Fund (SIA) ‐ Stability A Cap

The evolution of the market value of the shares (NAV) are net of all fees and expenses. Please find the disclaimer at the end of the presentation.

NET PERFORMANCE (logarithmic chart)


Source: SIA Group

60

120

240

Aug 05 Aug 07 Aug 09 Aug 11 Aug 13 Aug 15

LTIF Stability A Cap EURHFRX Equity Hedge Index EUR

+85.3% cum.+6.0% p.a.

+4.7% cum.+0.4% p.a.

*Inception Date of Stability A Cap EUR: 11.06.2015 @ EUR 183.69Performance from 31.08.2005 ‐ 10.06.2015 is a conversion in EUR of our Stability Growth CHF Total return rebased to official inception price

FUND'S HISTORYYear NAV % cum. % Year NAV % cum. %2005 20132006 20142007 20152008 20162009201020112012

85.91 0.3% 0.3% 160.46 12.2% 87.4%96.49 12.3% 12.7% 166.16 3.6% 94.0%118.58 22.9% 38.5%

‐2.3% 85.3%123.92 29.1% 44.7%

162.35 ‐2.3% 89.6%95.96 ‐19.1% 12.1% 158.66

132.35 ‐11.2% 54.5%149.02 20.3% 74.0%

143.02 8.1% 67.0%


‐2.3%3.2%‐2.3%

2.8%‐15.5%

85.3%13.0%

6.0%

KEY DATADividend yield (aggregated Bloomberg estimate) 2.8%Standard deviation (annualized, s.i.) 10.5%Sharpe ratio (risk free, s.i.) 0.5Alpha (vs. index, s.i.) 6.1%Beta (vs. index, s.i.) 0.4Expected return (as estimated by SIA) 13.7%Number of equity positions 40


Long Term Investment Fund (SIA) ‐ Natural ResourcesNET PERFORMANCE (logarithmic chart)


The evolution of the market value of the shares (NAV) are net of all fees and expenses. Please find the disclaimer at the end of the presentation.Source: SIA Group

50

100

200

Feb 05 Feb 07 Feb 09 Feb 11 Feb 13 Feb 15

S&P Global NaturalResources Net TR Index EURLTIF Natural Resources EUR

‐22.8% cum.‐2.3% p.a.

+16.9% cum.+1.4% p.a.

FUND'S HISTORYYear NAV % cum. % Year NAV % cum. %2005 20132006 20142007 20152008 20162009201020112012

‐10.1% ‐14.0%131.53 4.3% 31.5% 82.91 ‐3.6% ‐17.1%126.13 26.1% 26.1% 86.05

55.84 ‐65.5% ‐44.2%68.52 ‐17.4% ‐31.5%161.72 23.0% 61.7%77.22 12.7% ‐22.8%

149.85 27.6% 49.9%117.48 110.4% 17.5%

95.68 ‐3.6% ‐4.3%99.27 ‐33.8% ‐0.7%


8.9%12.7%

‐6.8%12.7%

‐46.4%‐20.7%

‐2.3%‐22.8%

KEY DATADividend yield (aggregated Bloomberg estimate) 2.7%Standard deviation (annualized, s.i.) 29.4%Sharpe ratio (risk free, s.i.) ‐0.1Alpha (vs. index, s.i.) ‐2.0%Beta (vs. index, s.i.) 1.4Expected return (as estimated by SIA) 17.7%Intrinsic value (as estimated by SIA) € 144Number of equity positions 30


SIA Funds AG

. Alpenblickstrasse 25

. 8853 Lachen

. Switzerland

. Tel: +41 55 617 28 70

. Fax: +41 55 617 28 71

. website: www.s‐i‐a.ch

. e‐mail: info@s‐i‐a.ch

Contacts


LTIF (SIA) Classic, Stability A Cap and Natural Resources. Performance up to 31.05.06 is that of the BVI‐based LTIF, of which the LTIF Luxembourg is an identical successor. Previous performance is audited by Ernst &

Young. Past performance is neither a guarantee nor a reliable indicator of future results. Performance data does not include the commissions and fees chargedat the time of subscribing for or redeeming shares. This information has been furnished to you upon request and solely for your information and may not bereproduced or redistributed to any other person. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of shares of the Sicav. Neitherthe Central Administration Agent nor the Investment Manager assume any liability in the case of incorrectly reported or incomplete information. Please beaware that investment funds involve investment risks, including the possible loss of the principal amount invested. For a detailed description of the risks inrelation to each share in the investment fund, please see the latest version of the prospectus, simplified prospectus, annual and semi‐annual reports, whichmay solely be relied upon as the basis for investment decisions; these documents are available on www.s‐i‐a.ch or from the Central Administration AgentFundPartner Solutions (Europe) SA, 15A, avenue J.F. Kennedy, L ‐ 1855 Luxembourg. LTIF Classic, Stability A Cap and Natural Resources (previously GlobalEnergy Value) were approved for distribution in and from Switzerland by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) according to Art. 19 al. 1 ofthe Collective Investment Schemes Act, paying agent is Banque Pictet & Cie SA, Route des Acacias 60, 1211 Geneva 73, Switzerland. Legal representative inSwitzerland is FundPartner Solutions (Suisse) SA, Route des Acacias 60, 1211 Geneva 73, Switzerland; notified to the Austrian Finanzmarktaufsicht according to§36 of the Investment Funds Act; authorised in France by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) pursuant to Art. 411‐58 of the AMF General Regulation;authorised by the German Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) according to §132 of the Investment Act; authorised in Italy by the Bank ofItaly and the CONSOB according to Article 42 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 24 February 1998; registered in the register of foreign collective investmentschemes commercialized in Spain by the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) pursuant to Art. 15 of the Law on Collective Investment Vehicles;recognised in the United Kingdom by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) as a recognised scheme within the meaning of Section 264 of the Financial Servicesand Markets Act 2000.

LTIF Stability (SIA Funds). Performance up to 30.09.06 is that of the LTIF BVI Fund restated in CHF, of which the LTIF Stability is an identical successor. Previous performance is audited by

Ernst & Young. Reports are available from SIA Group. Past performance is neither a guarantee nor a reliable indicator of future results. Performance data doesnot include the commissions and fees charged at the time of subscribing for or redeeming shares. This information has been furnished to you upon requestand solely for your information and may not be reproduced or redistributed to any other person. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation with respect to thepurchase or sale of shares of the Sicav. Neither the Fund Management Company nor the Investment manager assume any liability in the case of incorrectlyreported or incomplete information. Please be aware that investment funds involve investment risks, including the possible loss of the principal amountinvested. For a detailed description of the risks in relation to each share in the investment fund, please see the latest version of the prospectus, simplifiedprospectus, annual and semi‐annual reports, which may solely be relied upon as the basis for investment decisions; these documents are available from theFund Management Company FundPartner Solutions (Suisse) SA, Route des Acacias 60, 1211 Geneva 73, or the Investment manager, SIA Funds AG, Parkweg 1,CH‐8866 Ziegelbrücke (www.s‐i‐a.ch).

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