STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT

Chapter by Andrew Staniforth

Chapter 5 - Port and Border Security: The First and Last Line of National Security Defence, Pg. 49

5. Port and Border Security: The First and Last Line of National Security Defence, Pg. 49

• In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks governments across the world were quick to review and enhance their existing aviation security regimes, but their efforts did not dissuade al-Qaeda operatives from progressing further deadly and determined attacks.

• The private aviation sector was rightly identified as being in need of additional security measures, especially those centers offering flight instruction. A key component in the success of the 9/11 al-Qaeda Planes Operation lay in terrorists’ ability to overpower and take control of commercial aircraft. This provided an opportunity for the suicide pilots to fly toward identified targets. Some of the flying skills had been acquired in flight training establishments within the U.S. general aviation sector.

• U.S. authorities had already debated suicide hijacking of aircraft prior to 9/11, but these were dismissed on the grounds that there would have been no opportunity for dialog with the hijackers. This dismissal was based on the notion that any suicide hijackers would wish to communicate to authorities to make demands, or outline their intentions or motivations.

Section 1: National Security Strategies and Issues

5. Port and Border Security: The First and Last Line of National Security Defence, Pg. 49

• The 9/11 terrorist cell thoroughly researched its use of aircraft and the security regimes in place at ports and borders. The Commission highlighted that a large extent of the damage at the World Trade Center was initially caused by considerable amounts of burning aviation fuel. It is believed that all the hijackers targeted internal flights that were to cover long distances in the United States thereby maximizing the amount of fuel on board at the time of impact.

• Terrorist plots that successfully managed to defeat all port and border security measures put in place after 9/11 caused great anxiety and concern among national security practitioners. The suicidal component of terrorist tactics used to devastating effect to target commercial passenger jets was, in truth, only part of the diverse range of terrorists threats to port and border security controls.

Section 1: National Security Strategies and Issues

5. Port and Border Security: The First and Last Line of National Security Defence, Pg. 49

• The protection of ports has, over recent years, quite rightly focused upon the determined threat from contemporary international terrorists wishing to expose and exploit vulnerabilities in border security. With That said, there are numerous hazards for port practitioners to counter that directly impact national security, the most pressing are the threats from serious and organized crime. Globally, the United Nations (UN) estimates that the most powerful international organized crime syndicates each accumulate in the region of $1.5 billion a year.

• In this age of economic uncertainty nations across the world must act quickly and effectively to be able to address new and evolving threats to their security. In an increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and globalized world, individual countries of the Western world remain a vital link in the global economic network, which presents great opportunities and potential vulnerabilities.

Section 1: National Security Strategies and Issues