Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 1 HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED ARMS IN...

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

Unclassified || Slide 1

HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED

ARMS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

1701 VIOLATION – CASE STUDY



Hizbullah Deployment Overview

Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation

for war.

5,000 Activists

≈30,000 Rockets

Hizbullah’s Deployment in Southern Lebanon

Command

Unit

Sector

Village

Each village area contains

dozens of activists and hundreds of

rockets

Concept of Operation

Massive long-range strike

Targeting mostly Israeli population centers

Territorial defense of the launching units



Background

The events of September 3rd join two

previous incidents of explosions in

Hizbullah arms depots located within

villages in Southern Lebanon

Previous Arms Cache Explosions

Tayr Falsay 12/10/09

An arms depot in the house of a senior Hizbullah

official exploded. Hizbullah operatives immediately

began to remove the arms, using trucks to transport

them to the nearby village of Dir Kanoon. UNIFIL

access was denied throughout the event

Hirbit Silim14/7/09

A series of explosions were observed in a building

on the outskirts of Hirbit Silim. Evidence of rockets,

mortars, artillery shells and more were found on

site, as well as vehicles and equipment indicating

that the site was active. LAF played a role in denying

UNIFIL access to the site, as Hizbullah activists

removed military evidence from the scene.



Background

“LAF and UNIFIL should intensify

efforts to discover and remove

weapons…make sure no armed

elements are in the area and prevent

possible smuggling…Ensure that

UNIFIL’s freedom of movement is

fully respected and ensure that

UNIFIL is able to discharge its

responsibilities according to UNSCR

1701”

Strengthen current activities…

improve their capacity to respond

promptly to such incidents and

ensure a presence at incident

sites within a minimum time

delay….include a set of

coordinated procedures to

immediately seal off and isolate

areas in which incidents have

taken place and ensure that they

are effectively secured”

“UNIFIL Investigation - Hirbat SilimUNIFIL Investigation - Tayr Falsay

UNIFIL‘s Lessons Learned

11/09/09 08/01/10



Overview

Based on IDF intelligence, corroborated by Lebanese

media reports, the Shihabiya site, owned by Wisam

Saloum, a senior Hibzullah activist, was known to be used

for Hizbullah military activity. The site contained arms, in

violation of UNSCR 1701, which specifically prohibits

armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of

the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the

Blue Line and the Litani River. In addition, the proximity of

these weapons endangers the local population, which

UNIFIL is required to protect, as per its mandate.A fire broke out at 1245 in a Hizbullah arms asset, followed by some secondary explosions.

Hizbullah operatives immediately cordoned the area, preventing all access. After

extinguishing the fire, the operatives transferred the arms from the shed into the nearby

building and removed all evidence. LAF and UNIFIL representatives were shown into the shed.

At night, after UNIFIL and LAF departed, dozens of activists transferred the weapons into

trucks and nearby buildings, and from there to other villages, all undistributed by UNIFIL or

LAF.

Shehabiyya, Southern Lebanon || 1245, 03/09/10


FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE

First Responders



Initial Events 03 September 2010

TIMELINE

Fire observed in a known Hizbullah arms depot in Shehabiyya. Secondary explosions follow

1245

Hizbullah activists block off the area, extinguish the fire and transfer contents to nearby building

1413

Hizbullah activists arrive on scene1517

LAF forces arrive but are not granted entry into the area of the arms shed

1428

LAF forces depart from the scene1530

IDF informs UNIFIL regarding the incident1330

IDF updates that it believes munitions were present1418

Trucks arrive and begin to load the site’s contents1550

Following UNIFIL request, IDF provides UNIFIL with precise coordinates of trucks

1630

IDF informs that several trucks were 100m from the building and were being loaded

1550


Focus Points


Indications of weapons and ammunition at site - secondary explosions,

shed roof blown off and top was immediately covered with plastic sheets.

The area was blocked off by large numbers of personnel who rapidly

arrived. LAF and UNIFIL arrived on the scene but were not granted access.

Access was ultimately granted to shed only at 1750 (5 hours later).

Reporters were also denied access.

Concealment efforts included cordoning the area, covering the roof,

cleaning the area and waiting for the veil of darkness for clean-up

operations.

Efforts to sanitize the scene relied on large amounts of trucks, other

vehicles, personnel and many hours of labor.



CLEAN UP



Clearing the Depot 03 September 2010

TIMELINE

UNIFIL and LAF officers are permitted entry to the cleared shed, not the building

1750

Long and heavy objects (likely rockets) are transferred from shed to a nearby location

2239

Hizbullah operatives form a human chain to transfer objects to nearby location. Objects are also removed through windows

2254

The trucks headed to Nabatiya0236

IDF conveys 3 possible munitions locations (one in Sela’a and two in Shehabiya), all which buildings known as Hizbullah military sites prior to the incident and to which the trucks arrived from the shed

1900

The convoy crosses the Litani River without being stopped. Materials are transferred to a mosque in Nabatiya.

~0310

UNIFIL states that it does not intend to search the houses with ammunition1945

IDF provides coordinates for truck obscured within a field nearby, intended for later transfer.

2200

IDF requests UNIFIL engagement after extensive activity in the building. FC responds that area is cordoned and that the shed has been inspected.

0005

UNIFIL encounters local resistance2330

UNIFIL informs the IDF that LAF would depart and return the next morning. 2100

IDF informs that the convoy began to move north. UNIFIL responds that exits are blocked.

0240


Focus Points


Hizbullah went through great efforts to obscure the military equipment from the

scene, waiting until nightfall to transfer the goods to other locations in the

village, as well as another nearby village and a village north of the Litani River.

Hizbullah worked throughout the day and at night to clear the scene of evidence. LAF and

UNIFIL were prevented access until this was completed.

UNIFIL and LAF’s assurances of checkpoint effectiveness proved irrelevant, reason remains

to be seen.

The transfer to the mosque in Nabatiya reflects yet again Hizbullah use of civilian and

religious sites for military purposes. Probable rockets appeared in the aerial imagery.

The trucks and houses whose locations were conveyed to

UNIFIL and LAF were not inspected.

Hizbullah’s military assets removed from the scene

under the cover of night.

Side roads were used for the transfers, rather than major

thoroughfares.

THE MOSQUE IN NABATIYA



THE AFTERMATH



The Aftermath 04 September 2010

UNIFIL and LAF arrived late on scene, inspecting the shed only once access

was permitted by Hizbullah.

UNIFIL was only granted complete access to the shed the following day and

the building four days later, on September 7th.

Investigations later showed that massive amounts of water were used to

wash down the shed to obscure evidence.

LAF and UNIFIL failed to maintain grip and control of the scene following the

explosion and especially after nightfall, allowing the removal of equipment.

LAF and UNIFIL checkpoints failed to meet Hizbullah’s convoys and check

them, as required by 1701.

In two similar recent events (Hirbat Silim – 7/09, Tayr Falsay–

10/09), UNIFIL investigations recommended changes and lessons

learned that were not implemented.


Summary


Third event in a little more than a year – emphasizing ongoing Hizbullah violations of UNSCR 1701

Hizbullah’s military deployment within civilian populations and exploitation of local population violates 1701, endangers population in routine and wartime.

LAF’s conduct – cooperation with Hizbullah and ongoing, increasingly hostile provocations

Need for independent and proactive UNIFIL fulfillment of its mandate: prevent illegal arms in AOR, protect population.

Threat to Israeli security, to Lebanon and regional stability.

Need for decisive action from the UN and the International Community to disarm Hizbullah and other armed militias, starting with south of the Litani.

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 1 HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED ARMS IN...

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