Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning

8/12/2019 Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning

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STRATEGIC CITYWIDE SPATIAL PLANNING

SUMMARY REPORT

A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OFMETROPOLITAN PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI


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Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning:A situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Copyright United Nations Human Settlements Programme(UN-HABIA), 2010

HS/135/10E

ISBN : 978-92-1-132238-5

Disclaimer

Te designations employed and the presentation of the material in thispublication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on thepart of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal statusof any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerningdelimitation of its frontiers or boundaries, or regarding its economic systemor degree of development. Te analysis, conclusions and recommendationsof this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United NationsHuman Settlements Programme or its Governing Council.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABIA)P.O. Box 30030, Nairobi 00100, Kenyael: +254 20 762 3120Fax: +254 20 762 3477www.unhabitat.org

All photos UN-HABIA/ sa Forsman and Remy Sietchiping

Acknowledgements

Principal author: sa ForsmanContributors: Remy Sietchiping, Clarissa Augustinus,

Leslie Voltaire, Filiep Decorte, AlbertoParanhos, Maria- Guglielma da Passano,Ulrik Westman, Mohamed El-Sioufi andClaude Ngomsi of UN-HABIA.

Editing and layout: Robert Wagner, Britta Uhlig, Andrew Ondoo

Sponsors: Norwegian Government, Swedish InternationalDevelopment Cooperation and the Governmentof Haiti

Printer: UNON, Publishing Services Section, Nairobi,ISO 14001:2004-certified.


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STRATEGIC CITYWIDE SPATIAL PLANNING

SUMMARY REPORT

2010

A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OFMETROPOLITAN PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI


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CONTENTS

Abbreviations 6

Foreword 8

1. Historical backdrop 9

1.1 General background on Haiti 9

1.2 Citywide strategic planning 13

2. Urban land and infrastructure in Port-au-Prince 17

2.1 Urban trends and development 17

2.2 Human settlements 19

2.3 Basic services and infrastructure 21

2.4 Human and natural risks 25

3. Analysis of challenges and opportunities 26

3.1 Inventory of urban planning and land stakeholders 26

3.2 Evaluation of citywide planning scenarios 26

4. Future activities and policy priorities 28

4.1 Establishment of a metropolitan agency 29

4.2 Metropolitan strategic framework 30

4.3 Reinforcement of the municipalities 32

4.4 Implementation recommendations 34

5. Conclusions 36

6. References 37

The Global Land Tool Network 39

CONTENTS


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A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF METROPOLITAN PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEC Assemble de la Section Communale

CAMEP Centrale Autonome Mtropolitaine dEau Potable

CARICOM Caribbean Community

CASEC Conseil Administratif de la Section Communale

CBO Community Based Organization

CDS City Development StrategyCNRA Commission Nationale la Rforme Administrative

DGI Direction Gnrale des Impts

DSNCRP Document de Stratgie Nationale pour la Croissanceet pour la Rduction de la Pauvret

EDH lectricit dHati

EPPLS Entreprise Publique de Promotion des Logements Sociaux

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIH Groupement echnologie Intermdiaire dHati

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/AcquiredImmunodeficiency Syndrome

IHSI Institut Hatien de Statistique et dInformatique

INARA Institut National de la Rforme Agraire

I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

ME Ministre de lEnvironnement

MEF Ministre de lconomie et des Finances

MIC Ministre de lIntrieur et des Collectivits erritoriales

MINUSAH Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de Hati

MPCE Ministre de la Planification et la Coopration Externe

MPC Ministre de ravaux Public, ransport et Communications

NGO Non Governmental Organization

ONACA Office National du Cadastre


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ABBREVIATIONS

PESLE Political, Economic, Social, echnological,Legal and Environmental factors

PPP Purchasing power parity

PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

SNEP Service National dEau Potable

SWO Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Treats

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UN-HABIA United Nations Human Settlements Programme


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In February 2010, Haiti, particularly the capitalPort-au-Prince was hit by an earthquake that causedextensive damage and loss. In 2008-2009, prior to the

earthquake, UN-Habitat undertook an urban planningassessment of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince,which hosts more than 40% of the Haitian population.

A key finding is that Port-au-Prince is at the epicenterof several challenges and stresses facing Haiti. Teseinclude not only earthquakes but also other natural

disasters, poverty, weak governance, and the absence of urban planning. Inthis context, communities and civil society organisations are key players.Similarly, coordinating multiple urban actors becomes essential.

UN-Habitats situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince provides athorough background to the citys situation in terms of urban developmentand planning, and presents a way forward for future planning of themetropolitan area.

Tis publication makes a case for a participatory approach engaging allkey stakeholders in urban development. Such an approach is especially

needed in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, where municipalitiesare asking for support from central government to develop and implementlocal planning and to deliver basic services. Another key area is the needfor institutional capacity building to better enable municipalities and theirpartners to deliver basic urban services to the citys residents.

Te Citywide Strategic Planning approach presents the key steps forinitiating and implementing a strategic planning process in support ofsustainable urban development. It attempts to address three strategicplanning questions: Where are we today? Where do we want to be? Howdo we get there? Te publication also covers the wider aspects of housingand urban infrastructure as well as the socio-economic situation which

constitute key components for achieving sustainable urbanization.It is our hope that all the urban stakeholders working in Haiti and in thePort-au-Prince metropolitan area will find this publication useful in theirongoing attempts at recovery and reconstruction and with a view to buildingback better.

Dr. Anna Kajumulo TibaijukaExecutive Director, UN-HABIA

FOREWORD


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HISTORICAL BACKDROP

1. HISTORICAL BACKDROP

1.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND

ON HAITI

Haiti is situated in theCaribbean on the island ofHispaniola, which it shares

with the Dominican Republic tothe east. Te two countries haveformally been separate entities

since 1697, when Hispaniola wasdivided between France and Spain,and have experienced very differentdevelopments from that timeonwards. For the past 30 years Haiti

has been regarded as the dark sideof the island because of its troubledpolitical and economic situation.

Te countrys nine millioninhabitants speak Haitian Creole.French is the official language, butmuch less used by ordinary people.Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti,

is situated on the bay of Port-au-Prince in the southern part of thecountry. Other important cities areGonave, Cap-Hatien and Jacmel.

FIGURE 1:Map of Haiti

Source: Geology care

1.1.1 HISTORY AND POLITICS1

Haiti gained independence fromFrance in 1804, after a long slaverevolt. Independence did not resolvethe inequalities in land ownershipthat Haiti had inherited from itscolonial period. Te minoritymixed-race upper class kept its

privileges even after the colonistsleft.1 Information from the following sources has been

used: Sletten, P & Egset, W (2004), The EconomistIntelligence Unit (2007), The Economist IntelligenceUnit (August 2007), World Bank (2006), www.wikipedia.org.

Te political history of Haiti afterindependence is one of incessantrevolts, coups dtat and uprising. In1957 Dr Francois Duvalier, knownas Papa Doc, was elected presidentbut soon turned the democratic stateinto a dictatorship. His oppressiverule marked the beginning of theemigration wave, especially to theUS. At his death in 1971 his son

Jean-Claude, called Baby Doc,took over the presidency.


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After mounting pressure bothfrom within the country andinternationally, the regime collapsedin 1986 and was followed by anumber of military governments.

Elections were finally held in late

1990, and saw the young priestJean-Bertrand Aristide secure aconvincing victory. Aristide wantedto implement major reforms, suchas separating the police from thearmy, reorganising the agriculturalsector, redistributing land andfighting corruption. Tis infuriatedthe army and another militarycoup was carried out in 1991. Temilitary rule was ruthless, especially

on Aristides supporters and around5,000 of them were killed.

International sanctions wereimposed, but it was not until the USdeployed its military and threatenedan invasion that Aristide could bereinstated as president in 1994. TeUS forces left the country and werereplaced by UN troops responsiblefor keeping the peace. In 1995democratic elections were held and

Ren Prval, backed by Aristide,was elected.

Te next elections were held in 2000,when Aristide once again won.However the opposition boycottedthe elections. Te weak conditionof the government led to intensifiedviolence, which lasted for severalyears. In 2004 Aristide left Haiti,but whether he was forced into this

by the US or went voluntarily is stilldisputed. Te UN intervened totry to keep the fragile peace. Aftera few months, these soldiers werereplaced by the UN peacekeepingmission, commanded by Brazil.

Many of the slum areas in Port-au-Prince were strongholds of Aristideand intense fighting happenedbetween the residents and theHaitian police.

Te gangs in the slums, whichwere originally more of a politicalforce, transformed into criminalgangs specialising in robbery andkidnapping.

In this fragile situation, new elections

were held in 2006. Tey wereconsidered fair overall and saw thereturn of Ren Prval as president.Since then the security situationhas improved but there are stilloutbreaks of violence, especially inthe informal settlements of Port-au-Prince. Te UN has a peacekeepingforce of more than 7,000 soldiers inthe country and their presence inPort-au-Prince is obvious.

1.1.2 POVERTY AND ECONOMY

Te reasons for Haitis povertyare numerous. Te combinationof political insecurity, corruptleaders, natural disasters, migrationof academics and skilled workers,unfavorable trade agreements andpoor administration together forman explanation that is a first step tounderstanding the situation.

Haiti is the poorest country inthe western hemisphere. Not onlyare Haitians generally poor, theyalso have low access to vital publicservices such as water and sanitation,education and health care. Te lowservice delivery by the Haitiannational and local authoritieshas created a country where onlyhalf of the population is literate2,

where infrastructure in practice hascollapsed and where almost half ofthe population is undernourished.Te situation has only improvedslightly in recent decades. For thosewho have access to services, thequality and consistency of these stillvary enormously between differentareas and different income groups.

2 School enrolment rate is as low as 55% for childrenaged 6-12.


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Te 2006 elections and the resultingstability since have at least created

the necessary prerequisites toimplement the constitution, whichwas ratified in 1987.

Decentralisation is now theresponsibility of the Ministry ofInterior. However, few practicalchanges have taken place so farand there are still many politicaland economic interests that divertthe process in other directions. Tecentral government does not appear

to be ready to devolve power andresources to lower levels.

Te Municipal Councils in Haitihave, in many cases, managedto do something when it comesto local public administrationdespite unclear mandate and scarceresources. As the constitutionis not fully operational, most ofthe normal responsibilities for

municipalities, such as provisionof water and sanitation, wastemanagement, spatial planning andtraffic management, remain atnational level.

Most of the municipalities inmetropolitan Port-au-Prince Carrefour, Cit Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff,Ption-Ville, Port-au-Prince andabarre are larger than in the

rest of the country and have moreresources. Tey all have a similarorganization, but with different

Dir.Administration et financesFiscalit

dgi

Direction de la planificationVoirie

Planification

Dchet

Dir. Ressources HumainesPersonnel

Informatique

Direction Affaires SocialesAffaires Sociales

Loisir

Maire Adjoints (2) conseil communalMaire principal

directeur gnral

FIGURE 2:General Organogram for Municipalities in Metropolitan Port-Au-Prince.

Source: Mairie de Carrefour (all terms are in French).

number of staff and in some areasdifferent tasks due to circumstances

and capacities. Figure 2 shows thegeneral organization.

Despite limited funds at local level,many municipalities have beenactive and have tried to implementwhat little they can with scarceresources. In metropolitan Port-au-Prince several of the eightmunicipalities (see figure 3) havetaken steps towards assuminggreater responsibilities for their

areas. Tey have also initiatedan informal co-ordination groupfor metropolitan Port-au-Prince,but not many meetings have beenheld and the group needs to bestrengthened.

Grand-Gosier

Banane

Anse--Pitres

Belle-Anse

Cayes-Jacmel Marigot

Logne

Gressier

Carrefour

Kenscoff

GanthierFond Parisien

Fonds-Verrettes

Ption-Ville

Thomazeau

Arcahaie

Magasin

Pointe--Raquette

-

La Chapelle

Saut-d'Eau

Verrettes

'

-

Petite-Rivire-de-l'Artibonite

Mirebalais

SavenetteBaptiste

Belladre

Thomassique

Thomonde

Cerca-la-Source

T -

-

-

-

.

- -F

-

-

.-

-

T - -

F

Massade

Cornillon

Lascahobas

Duvalierville

Croix desBouquets

BainetCtes-de-fer- -

T

I

i

- - i

T

-

' Baradres

Petite Riviresde Nippes Petit-Gove Grand-Gove

Vieux Bourgd'Aquin

Aquin

L'Asile

Cavaillon

Maniche

PestelAnse--Veau

Petit Trou de Nippes

T beck- -

-St.-Jeandu Sud

Chantal

- n St. Louisdu Sud

ThiotteJacmel

Miragone

Les Cayes

Trouin

La Vallede Jacmel

F -i

- i

Saint-Marc

Hinche

Jimani

ta

ngSaum

tre

Cap Raymond

PointeOuest

PointeFantasque

Pointe deMontrouis

LE VACHE

S CAYMITESPRESQU'LE

DES BARADRES

LE DELA GONVE

Lac d ePligre

Baie d eJacme l

Canal deSaint-Marc

Canal dela Gonve

C A R I B B E A N S E A

O U E S T

C E N T R E

-

-

S U D - E S T

S U D

- S E N I P P E S

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

PORT-

AU-

PRINCE

19o

18o

73o 72o

.

I I

T ,

I

FIGURE 3:The locations of the eight municipalities inmetropolitan Port-au-Prince

Source: National Centre for Geospatial Information


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Vision and overall objectives

Te vision should be clear andrealistic and represent the residentsdesired future for their city. Forstable countries the vision couldbe set a couple of decades in the

future, whereas the time span forfragile or post-conflict states shouldonly be five to ten years. In order tomake the vision more manageable,it should be supported by a setof overall objectives to guide thedevelopment efforts throughoutthe planning period. Tese overallobjectives will be of fundamentalimportance for monitoring theprocess.

Strategic action plan and medium-term action plans

Starting from the vision, the overallstrategic action plan is developed.Planning principles and themedium-term action plans takeshape guided by the vision and thestrategic action plan.

Both the strategic action plan andthe medium-term action plans couldbe created using the back-castingmethod (see figure 4). Startingwith a future goal (the vision), the

actions required to reach that goalare developed. Te medium-termaction plans should be realistic andcontribute substantially to reachingthe vision.

1.2.2 PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTSOF CITYWIDE STRATEGIC

PLANNING

Local ownership, participation andcoordination

Te citywide strategic planningprocess should be locally owned, notdonor-driven. It is central that thereare strong and committed leaders forthe process, normally provided byMayors or other politically electedfigures, but subject to the localenvironment, the leadership couldbe located in a relevant Ministry ora special unit set up for planningpurposes.

Te authorities shall strive toinitiate (or maintain) partnershipswith different groups such asother governmental bodies, civilsociety and private sector groups.

In resource-poor countries or citiesit is vital to have solid ties with theprivate sector.

Overall strategic action plan

Medium-term action plans

Check points

Periodical monitoring

VISION

ANALYSIS TIME

FIGURE 4:The road towards the vision. Through envisioning the future objectives, the overall strategicaction plan is decided upon. Medium-term action plans are then created for shorter periods of time,with incorporated checkpoints for periodical monitoring.


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HISTORICAL BACKDROP

Private sector companies will notenter a partnership without therebeing something in it for them;however, in most cases, areas ofmutual interest can be found whereco-operation can take place.

Te citywide strategic planningshould not be an isolated project butinstead endeavour to incorporateother development initiatives andcomplement what is already beingcarried out. Harmonisation andcoordination between differentinterventions is key for the strategicplanning.

Quick win projects to buildcommitment

Demonstration projects have theadvantage that they will strengthenthe stakeholders confidence andbuild trust with donors. Suchquick win projects are especiallyimportant in the beginning of acitywide strategic planning exercise.Tey provide opportunities forearly responses during the planningprocess to urgent needs, as well as

valuable feedback to the on-goingplanning process.

Mapping of drivers

Another starting point for strategicplanning could be the analysis ofdrivers and impediments of the(non-) development of the city andits economy, for both the formal andthe informal sectors. Identificationof markets and other trading

centres, as well as transport systemthat encourages trade, are some ofthe conditions to investigate, butother, more hidden drivers alsoneed to be pinpointed.

Right to the city

Another basic principle for thecitywide strategic planning is theright to the city (UN-HABIAand UNESCO 2005), translated

here as equal access to land, housing,public space and basic services. ointroduce a rights-based approachin urban development also brings

with it the opportunity to talk aboutthe citizens responsibilities. Rightsand responsibilities agreements canbe realised through social contractsbetween local authorities and localcommunities, and/or betweencentral and local governments.

Resource mobilisation and use oflocal resources

As many financial resources aspossible should come from the cityitself and not from outside donors. Iflocal resources from municipalities,national government, private sector,NGOs and individual citizens areused the result tends to be moresustainable and more strategic,as the prioritisation is carried outmore carefully. Only the mosturgent and strategic activities willbe implemented if local resourcesare used to a larger extent.

In most developing countries, itis impossible for a city to financeimplementation of action plansentirely from its own pockets butit is important that the donor

funding only constitutes a part ofthe resources and that resourcemobilisation is included early in theprocess.

Continuous capacity building

Capacity building is not onlynecessary for experts plannersand technicians but maybe moreso for the staff who will use thecitywide strategic plan in their daily

work, such as service providers,notaries, building inspectors. Ifstaff are not competent in using andimplementing the plan, it mightnot no worth developing it in thefirst place.

Similar training needs are usuallyfound also among political decision-makers. But there is anothertarget group of equal importancefor capacity building, namely

the stakeholders involved in theplanning process.

Private sector

companies will

not enter a partnershipwithout there being

something in it for them.


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Children in on of Port-au-Prince numerous slums photo . Forsman

In order to execute wisely their rolesas vital contributors and members ofthe planning process, they need to

know at least the basics of strategicplanning. Being part of the process,they will learn by doing, but stillan initial training would be a greatadvantage.

Capacity building is not a one-timeevent, but has to be established asa process to last for many years to

come.


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URBAN LAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

2. URBAN LAND AND INFRASTRUCTUREIN PORT-AU-PRINCE

Concentration of theeconomy in one city

is not good for thenational economy

In this section, elements andissues of importance to urbanplanning are presented. It

describes the situation on theground in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, while simultaneouslyoffering entry points for theanalyses and recommendations inthe following sections.

2.1 URBAN TRENDS AND

DEVELOPMENT

Around 30% of Haitis populationlive in metropolitan Port-au-Prince,where 90% of the countrys totalinvestments and formal jobs arefound (Republic of Haiti 2003).Tis heavy concentration of theeconomy in one city is not good forthe national economy, but explainssome of Port-au-Princes attractionpower.

If the current urbanisation ratecontinues, which is likely, morethan four million people will livein the metropolitan area withinthe next ten years. Te pressure oninfrastructure, land, housing andservices, already untenable today

with 2.7 million inhabitants, willbe even more unsound in the nearfuture unless mitigating measuresin the form of urban planning areundertaken.

2.1.1 CITY PROFILE

Port-au-Prince was established in1749, when the French sugar farmersand other important economicactors created a capital for the theircolony Saint-Dominque. By the endof the 18th century, the city had

9,400 inhabitants.6 Up until themid 20th century, Port-au-Princegrew slowly but steadily with littlechange in the citys managementand design.

Between 1950 and 1970 Port-au-Princes population morethan doubled, from 150,000 to

350,000. Decreasing mortalitydue to advances in health care,better employment opportunitiesthan in the countryside, and heavyinvestments by state and otheractors in industries and otherbusinesses all contributed to thisrapid population increase.

Te road network was improvedduring this time, which made it

easier to either move to the city orto commute. Most of the peoplein this early migration wave foundhouses in formal areas, which grewmore dense. Suburbs surrounded thecommercial centre in central Port-au-Prince, where all business tookplace (Republic of Haiti 2003). Bythe end of the 1970s other, smallercentres emerged.

Between 1982 and 1995 the urban

population tripled (see figure5). Te economic crisis madeit necessary for people to movefrom the countryside to the cities,especially the capital, in search ofemployment. With so many peoplemoving rapidly into Port-au-Prince,the need for shelter, basic servicesand markets increased.

6 Commission pour la commmoration du 250eanniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)


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Government housing schemesfailed to supply adequate housing,especially for the poor, who builttheir own dwellings, occupying orrenting private or state owned land.Te provision of basic infrastructure

and services could not keep up withthe rate of urbanisation, and publicservices deteriorated rapidly, apartfrom for the wealthiest people.

From the 1980s Port-au-Princebecame more divided. In one partthere was water and sanitation, withformal, large properties with greenlawns. In another part, chaoticurbanisation took place withoutbasic services, where the plots wereillegal or at best informal, often tinyand built on dangerous land such asdump sites or steep hillsides. Teso-called bidonvillisation of Port-au-Prince had come to stay.

During the past decade, increasingnumbers of NGOs and internationalorganizations began working inthe slums and poor parts of Port-au-Prince. Between 2004 and

2007 about 33 million USD wasspent on different slum upgradingprogrammes in Port-au-Prince(Republic of Haiti 2007).

Unfortunately, these interventionshave not followed any urbanplanning or regulations, they havebeen badly coordinated, oftenoverlapping, and without localanchoring in the municipalities

or other local government. Onaverage, 75,000 migrants havemoved into metropolitan Port-au-Prince every year during the past20 years (World Bank 2006).

More than half of todays populationin metropolitan Port-au-Princeoriginally lived elsewhere, and inthe informal areas more than 70%of the inhabitants came from thecountryside (GHRAP 2008). Insome areas in the capital the annualincrease in population is 8%. Terural migrants, whose main reasonfor moving is greater economicopportunities, normally end upin informal settlements. Of thenew migrants, one-third move toalready built areas, which meansthat the density is increasing, andtwo-thirds move to new informaland often peri-urban settlements

(Republic of Haiti 2003).

3 000 000

2 500 000

2 000 000

1 500 000

1 000 000

500 000

01790 1990194018901840

Sources: Republic of Haiti (2003), Republic of Haiti (2007), The Economist Intelligence Unit(2007), CLED/ILD (1998).

FIGURE 5:Population increase in Port-au-Prince.


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2.1.2 URBAN PLANNING

Te responsibility for spatialplanning of metropolitan Port-au-Prince rests with the centralgovernment, which also takes careof most management, maintenance

and provision of infrastructure andbasic services. Te municipalitiesare marginalised.

Tere is no legally approved masterplan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Several plans with differentgeographic and thematic scope havebeen developed, most with assistancefrom donors, but they have neitherbeen endorsed nor institutionalised.In practice, they have not served

as a proper framework for spatialand social development but onlyas inspiration for a few randominterventions.

Aside from the absence ofan adequate master plan, thestatistics and basic informationof metropolitan Port-au-Princeare scattered and only randomlyupdated. Neither the centralgovernment nor the municipalitieshave databases or registers withreliable information on numbersof inhabitants, infrastructure, legalstatus of land, or access to services.

According to the Ministry ofPlanning there are more than50 institutions that share theresponsibility of managingmetropolitan Port-au-Prince

(Republic of Haiti 2003). Teresponsibilities for metropolitandevelopment and management aredispersed in a maze of governmentinstitutions, agencies, departmentsand divisions without anycoordinating agency. Duplicationand gaps are common.

2.2 HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

Port-au-Prince is a densely populat-ed city, characterised by what manyHaitians call wild urbanisation(urbanisation sauvage). Te smallhills surrounding the city are beingcovered with dwellings of differ-ent quality, many of them situated

precariously on steep slopes and indanger of being washed away by thenext torrent or hurricane. Otherslum dwellers, in the centre of thecity, risk flooding due to their loca-tion in the bottom of the basin ofPort-au-Prince.

2.2.1 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS FOR

LAND AND HOUSING

More than half of the informalsettlements in Port-au-Prince arelocated in ravines and gullies and aresusceptible to inundation. Floodingis also the main threat for those whohave chosen to reside on wetlandareas close to the sea.

ere are more than fifty

institutions that sharethe responsibility to

manage metropolitanPort-au-Prince

Source: Google Earth 2008

FIGURE 6:Overview of parts of Ption-Ville. The map shows thecrowded living situation on the hills to the left, neighbouring aplanned settlement.


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For most informal settlements inPort-au-Prince, the absence of a gridplan makes it difficult to provideservices such as water, electricityand garbage collection to individualhouseholds. Most of the inhabit-

ants in the slums do not have accessroads between their plots.

Many families cannot obtain loansfor buying land and/or building ahouse. Instead they build the houseslowly using available cash, takingfive, ten or even 15 years to finish.Tis piecemeal way of building iswidespread in poor as well as inaffluent parts of Port-au-Prince, andis also encouraged involuntarily bythe tax regulation that exemptspartly built houses from propertytax.

2.2.2 FORMAL AND INFORMAL

SETTLEMENTS

Few Port-au-Prince residents havelegal titles to their land. Even in themore wealthy areas of the city thenormal procedure, when selling and

buying a property, is to go to a publicnotary who makes a declaration ofownership. Te problem is that therecan be several claims to the same

property, as there is no cadastre orofficial register of ownership. Teownership or transfer of ownershipis normally not registered by localauthorities or the legal system andis therefore not fully secured.

Te land and property belonging tothe state of Haiti is divided in twogroups: public and private property.Te states public property is nottransferable and consists mainlyof public spaces such as roads,lakes, rivers, parks, cemeteriesand shorelines. Te states privateproperty can on the other hand beappropriated by an individual or

juridical person, and this propertyfalls under the jurisdiction of theGeneral Revenue Office (DGI).

Te rules for buying and rentingstate-owned and privately ownedland are different. In both cases it isa cumbersome, expensive and longprocedure to become the lawfulowner of a property. One of themany steps in the process involvesthe actual transcription of title at

the DGI which can take betweenone and two years. For thesereasons, most people do not eventry to acquire land.

BOX 1:low-cost publichousing gone amiss

The Public Enterprise forSocial Housing (EPPLS) hashad a shortage of funds forthe last decade and has thusnot provided much housinglately. Even when there wasfunding, production capacitywas inadequate. One exampleof public housing done by theEPPLS is just north of Cit Soleil,in a small suburb called Villagede la Renaissance. Originally,the housing scheme of 700apartments was planned for

inhabitants from Cit Soleilwho needed to be relocatedwhen a public road was builtwhere they lived.

However, corruption resulted inoccupation of the houses by civilservants instead. The cost of theapartments, 1,000 gourdes permonth, is far too expensive formost of the inhabitants in CitSoleil, where typical monthlyrent is 100-200 gourdes per

month. The Village de laRenaissance is not an exceptionin Port-au-Prince or Haiti.Housing schemes constructedfor poor people have oftenbeen used for political gain. Theproblem with the production ofpublic housing is its extremelylow scale of production, whichhardly makes a dent in theenormous housing deficit.

Source: visit in Cit Soleil in March

2008.

In Port-au-Prince, it is common to build on landslide prone areasPhoto . Forsman


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Instead they lease land and build ahouse, rent a house or get propertyon the informal market.

In many cases landowners inPort-au-Prince who obtain theirland legally still have problems

with illegality or extralegality.Building and planning regulations,subdivisions of land and other lawsare not easy to adhere to. Te urbanlegislation that should encourageparticipation in the formal land andhousing sector instead works as anincentive for people to resort to theinformal sector.

2.2.3 LAND REGULATIONS AND

INSTITUTIONS

Te policies and legal frame-work for land issues are dispersed,contradictory and in most cases notimplemented. Even though thereare many layers of administrationset up to manage legal proceduresregarding land, there is an absenceof a wider framework and generalpolicies on how land should beadministered and managed.

One of the reasons for the weakpolicy foundation is that theinstitutions that are supposedto execute the policies do notpossess the necessary capacity.

Another obstacle for registration ofleasehold and freehold is that thecivil registry is incomplete: around40% of Haitians lack identificationdocuments and are not considered

legal. Te identity cards used forthe elections in 2006 are, however,being recognised as a legally bindingdocument, which means that moreand more people are eventuallygetting into the legal system.

It is very difficult for laypersonsand even experts to know to whichauthority to turn to for what servicesconcerning land administration.Other entities might be involved as

well in different land procedures.

BOX 2:Local NGO aims tochange building standards

The Haitian NGO FondationConnaissance et Libert(FOKAL), is amongst the fewcivil society organizations inthe country working with landand property issues. FOKAL ismainly a cultural NGO, focusedon democracy and socialchange. Its programmes targeteducation and cultural andpolitical awareness raising, butit has recently employed a cityplanner to strengthen its workin urban areas.

FOKAL, in collaboration withthe Port-au-Prince municipality,the EU and several internationaland national NGOs, has starteda project to create a botanicalgarden in the slum areaMartissant also working with thesurrounding neighbourhoodson issues such as property, landaccess and building norms.Reduction of local violence,access to water and sanitation

and improvement of theeducation will also be part ofthe programme. FOKAL wantsto carry out an in-depth studyof the communities aroundthe park, including their accessto land and their housingsituation. The NGO hopes itcan initiate small pilot projectson construction norms, whichin the future may be used forpolicy purpose within the Port-

au-Prince municipality.For more information on FOKAL, seewww.fokal.org

Te inefficiency of keeping separatesystems for land information isobvious. Te authorities are not heldaccountable for the land transactionsas the registers are complicatedto access and not designed forinformation retrieval. Te Haitianland sector has no anti-corruptionsafeguard and corruption is rife.

Tere are no special land tribunalswhere ownership issues or otherconflicts regarding properties canbe resolved. Te court of law isalready overburdened with civil andcriminal trials and is not the propervenue for settling land rights cases.

Although property and land issuesare considered to be importantand even potentially explosive inHaiti, there are very few initiativesto deal with the issues. Howeverin the beginning of March 2008an informal, inter-ministerialreference group on land, propertyand human settlement was createdwith representatives from the maingovernment agencies.

2.3 BASIC SERVICES AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

In many places in Port-au-Prince,basic services (water, sanitation,roads) are not provided for thepopulation due to difficult access tothe area. In some informal areas thehouses are built too close togetherfor any pipes to be laid, sewers ordrainage to be installed or roads to

be built. In other areas the accessproblem is related to the hillytopography. Some slums are so proneto flooding that any infrastructurebuilt would be destroyed by heavyrainfall.


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One solution to the malfunctioningof state-provided basic services is

to rely on private providers. Tisis an option for the more wealthybut not for the poor as servicesfrom the private (often illegal)sector are too expensive. Anothercommon solution is for NGOs andlocal community organizations toprovide services such as water supplyor electricity in a community.

Te Government of Haiti admitsthat the residents of metropolitan

Port-au-Prince who can affordto detach from the public servicesystem they usually do (Republicof Haiti 2003). Tey produce theirown electricity with a generator orsolar panels, they use mobile phonesinstead of landlines, they get waterfrom private suppliers and a privatecompany collects their garbage.

2.3.1 WATER AND SANITATION

Tere are two authorities responsible

for delivery of drinking waterin metropolitan Port-au-Prince;Centrale Auto-nome MtropolitainedEau Potable, CAMEP, and ServiceNational dEau Potable, SNEP.

In the 1990s CAMEP carried outa project together with NGOs toconstruct water kiosks in someof the informal areas where it istoo difficult to install pipelines

(Republic of Haiti 2003). Localwater committees now manage thewater kiosks. But publicly providedwater is getting more rare, as figure7 shows. From having had almostthe whole market in the 1980s, thepublic utilities now only have abouthalf of the market.

Individual tap

Public water points

Private well, illegal sources, trucks

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

01985 2005

FIGURE 7:Water provision in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. The difference between 1985 and 2005 intype of service provider is striking. In 1985 the state was the main provider. In 2005 private providersare almost as important.

Source: CAMEP (undated).


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Even for people with individualwater taps the access is irregularand often the water is not suitablefor drinking. Many of the moreaffluent inhabitants, larger hotelsand restaurants, have disconnectedfrom the public service and get waterfrom private water trucks. For the

poorer residents the solutions rangefrom public service water, to buyingfrom water trucks, from neighboursor from private providers. Between25 and 50%of the citys residentshave access to safe water.7

Tere is no system for purificationor other treatment of wastewater inPort-au-Prince and many parts of thecity lack rainwater drainage systems.Instead the rainwater, which iscombined with the wastewater andother polluted water, flows down thegullies, along open water channelsand the few existing gutters, endingup in the sea. Te Ministry ofPublic Works has a master plan fordrainage, proposing to build fivemajor rainwater drainage channels(Republic of Haiti 2003). So far,one has been completed, for thecentre of the city.

7 Republic of Haiti (November 2007), WHO andUNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for watersupply and sanitation www.wssinfo.org, WorldBank (27 April 2006)

2.3.2 WASTE MANAGEMENT

Only half of slum residents haveaccess to latrines. Most householdsin the slums use onsite sanitationwhere the waste from the pitlatrines and septic tanks is collectedfrom that point and not flushedinto sewers. Leaks or overflowsof human waste contaminate thewater system causing health risksfor the whole city. People with noaccess to latrines defecate whereverthere is a reasonably private place behind the house, on the riverbankor wherever suitable - leading togroundwater contamination anddisease. According to UNICEFonly 34% of the population in Port-au-Prince has access to adequate

sanitation.

In the whole of Port-au-Prince,there is no major waste processingor recycling and no well-managedlandfill. Tere are three large dumpsites which are not sufficient fora city approaching three millioninhabitants.

BOX 3:Three quarters ofsolid waste is not collected

Martissant, a mostly informalarea in the municipality of Port-au-Prince, produces 160 tons ofwaste every day. According torecent research, only 25% of thisis collected by the municipalityor private entrepreneurs. Of the75% remaining, half is burnt inshallow pits or by the road orin the backyard. The remaining60 tons is left elsewhere.Some solid waste is recycled orreused, but most ends up in therivers, on the streets, in gullies,the sea and in open channelstransporting both sewage andwater.

Liquid waste disposal is evenworse. There is no sewagesystem, all wastewater simplyflows from the house onto thestreet where it will join a riveror water channel flowing to

the sea. Many water sourcesin Martissant have beencontaminated as a result.

In the whole ofPort-au-Prince,there is no majorwaste processing

Piles of garbage blocking a street in downtown Port au PrincePhoto . Forsman


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Even in the more affluent partsthere are garbage heaps on streetcorners, waiting for days or weeksto be picked up or are burnt to getrid of the stench.

Te Service Mtropolitain de

Collecte des Rsidus Solides doesnot have the means to managethe enormous amount of wasteproduced daily in Port-au-Prince. Inthe richer areas private companiescollect the garbage, but in the poorcommunities there is nothing. Solidwaste that is not picked up is piledin the streets, in gullies and in openrainwater and wastewater channels,where it blocks the flow and causes

flooding with filthy water.Much of the garbage is burnt,directly on the street or in garbagepits in the gullies or backyards,polluting the air. Very little recyclingtakes place and no sorting, withwaste from households, industries,hospitals and slaughterhouses beingmixed and either burnt or buriedtogether.

2.3.3 TRANSPORT

From early in the morning the roadsin Port-au-Prince are crammedwith cars, tap taps (shared taxis inthe form of covered pickup trucksor mini buses with vividly painteddecorations), buses, motorcyclesand pedestrians. Some 85% of thecountrys traffic is concentrated inmetropolitan Port-au-Prince (Te

Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).Te roads are in bad conditionand are a mix between dirt andtarmac surface. In the older partsof the city the roads are surfaced,although worn out andoften dustyand corrugated.

Public transport in Port-au-Princehas been totally privatised forthe past 20 years. Te tap-taps(mini buses) are the core of the

public transport and areone of thecheapest ways to travel. Tere is agreat number of them so passengersrarely have to wait.

Despite the fact that walking isby far the most common meansof transport in Port-au-Prince,no policy or plan takes this intoconsideration, and the roador transport projects ignore it(Henriquez, Linonel 2000). Tepoverty of Port-au-Prince has madeit the only city in the Caribbeanwhere walking is more commonthan motorised transport.

Te city is not planned forpedestrians. In the old parts of thecity, pavements exist but are crowdedwith merchants, goods and garbageand thus nearly impassable. In otherparts of the city there are only very

narrow pavements or nothing at all,so people have to walk on the road,in danger of being hit by vehicles.Regardless of the many walkers,vehicle pollution in Port-au-Princeis bad, and is bound to get worsein the near future as the trafficincreases.

Apart from road-based traffic,Port-au-Prince also has a numberof harbours and an international

airport, all of which are importantfor the planning of the city as theyconstitute entry and exit pointsfor both people and goods. Teharbours receive almost all of theimports of goods and likewise areresponsible for exporting goodsproduced in Haiti. All fuel that isimported passes through the ports.

As the harbours are all centrallylocated, this increases the transport,

congestion and pollution.

Walking is by far

the most common

means of transport

in Port-au-Prince


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BOX 4:Evacuation ofchildren from violence-prone areas

Bel Air is an old, poor settlementin Port-au-Prince where theinhabitants have proper landtitles but not much more. TheBrazilian NGO Viva Rio plansto improve the areas access towater and sanitation. Duringthe baseline survey Viva Riorealised that one of the mainchallenges in implementationis the security situation in thearea.

The results of the baselinesurveys data was clearly at oddswith national statistics. Thepopulation pyramid for Bel Airshowed few children betweenthe ages of five and 19.

After further study the NGOfound out that the reason forthe absence of children was thatparents sent their children awayduring times of insecurity.

During the first baseline surveythe political and securitysituation in the area was poor.On average, one child perfamily moved out from Bel Air intimes of insecurity and politicalstruggles in the area. Around13,000 children, out of a totalpopulation of 80,000, weretemporarily sent to relativesor friends in calmer parts ofPort-au-Prince, or out to the

countryside.For more information on Viva Rio,

see www.comunidadseguridad.org

2.4 HUMAN AND NATURAL

RISKS

Both human and natural risks mustbe considered when urban planningis concerned, as they both canendanger the sustainability of the

physical and social environment.

2.4.1 SAFETY AND SECURITY

A World Bank report considersurban violence in Haiti to be oneof the main obstacles to povertyreduction, noting that violence andinsecurity in Port-au-Princes slumsin particular have undermined thepolitical process, fuelled conflict,

and negatively affected developmentand reconstruction efforts (WorldBank 2006).

When discussing violence andinsecurity, it is easy to focus oncrimes such as kidnapping andmurder, for which Haiti has becomenotorious. But the most commonform of crime is domestic violenceagainst women and children. Localwomens organizations observe that

domestic rape is a very frequentthough seldom reported crime.

Tere has been a rise in theoccurrence of gang rapes andpolitically motivated rapes in thepast decade. Increased use of harddrugs and a steady influx of smallarms have encouraged criminalgangs to commit more violent crimessuch as rape or gang rape, murderand physical abuse. Protectionbusinesses and kidnapping havealso become more widespread inmetropolitan Port-au-Prince. Some58% of the capitals inhabitantssaid they felt unsafe most of thetime in their own home and in theirneighbourhood, compared to 15%in the countryside (World Bank2006).

Despite a recent initiative to increase

the size of the Haitian police force,there are still more private securityofficers than police officers in thecountry (World Bank 2006). Te

United Nations Stabilisation Missionin Haiti is active in reinforcing anddeveloping much needed capacityin the Haitian police force. In 2007there was a slight decline in violentcrime numbers, probably due to thestable political situation.

2.4.2 NATURAL DISASTER AND

CLIMATE CHANGE

Situated in the Caribbean, right inthe hurricane belt, Haiti is exposedto tropical storms and hurricanesevery year. Even less serious weatherconditions can cause injury anddamage to people and property,especially more vulnerable people,

such as those living in slums.In 2004 (and also 2008) Haiti washit by flooding and hurricanes thatkilled more than 4,000 people andleft 20,000 homeless. Since then,smaller disasters have occurredregularly, also with loss of life andproperty although not at the samescale. Disaster preparedness inthe country is low, despite regularstorms and heavy rains. In additionto weather hazards, Port-au-Princeis exceptionally ill-prepared to copewith the increased risk of moreunstable weather patterns, rising sealevels and warmer temperatures. Anassessment of people living at riskfrom natural disasters, especiallyflooding and landslides, shouldbe done to estimate the numberof people that can potentially beaffected and ultimately will need to

be relocated.

For all the natural disasters, therisks could be lowered substantiallyif spatial planning existed andplanning regulations and buildingcodes were followed. Allowinghouses to be constructed in drainagezones, densely packed together onsteep hills and on marshy, instableor contaminated ground, worsensthe impact of natural disasters.


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The analyses in this sectionare made to bridge the gapbetween the current situation

in metropolitan Port-au-Prince andthe recommendations for futureactions that follow in section 4.

3.1 INVENTORY OF URBAN

PLANNING AND LANDSTAKEHOLDERS

Te stakeholders of urbanplanning and land interventions inmetropolitan Port-au-Prince consistof all individuals, groups andinstitutions that can affect or beaffected by urban planning, urbandevelopment and land management.Te stakeholders include potentialbeneficiaries as well as those whocould be adversely affected. Mostof the stakeholders in metropolitanPort-au-Prince have been presentedearlier, and their interests andimpacts have partly been covered.

In figure 8, the key players are themunicipalities and the relevantministries. Tey should preferablymove towards the upper rightcorner, where they would have

greater influence over the situation,with keen interest in managingurban planning processes.

Looking at the overall picture,it is troubling that so many ofstakeholders have a low or neutralinterest in urban planning. Inan ideal situation, the level ofinterest would be higher, and afew stakeholders would be givenincreased power. Te important

point is that all stakeholders maketheir voice heard and influencedecisions.

3.2 EVALUATION OF

CITYWIDE PLANNING

SCENARIOS

Due to the politically sensitivesituation and the general instabilityin Haiti it is difficult to judge thegeneral direction of the countryin terms of human development.

Terefore, three fundamentallydifferent scenarios representingpotential futures have beenvisualised for the country and thecapital.

It is assumed for all three scenariosthat the urbanisation rate will remainhigh, as all predictions point in thatdirection. Te scenarios have beendevised to evaluate what type orlevel of citywide strategic planningcan be realistically developed andimplemented in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

3. ANALYSIS OF CHALLENGESAND OPPORTUNITIES

Other donors

InternationalNGOs

NationalNGOs

Land relatedinstitution

Relevant donors

Municipalities

ResidentsPrivate Sector

Other Ministries

RelevantMinistries

PowerPublic Utilities

Level of interest

FIGURE 8:Level of institutional interest and power. The positionsof the different groups show where they are today and the arrowsfor some of them show where they should ideally be. Light/yellowcircles represent national stakeholders, dark/green circles = inter-national stakeholders.


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FUTURE ACTIVITIES AND POLICY PRIORITIES

Scenario 1. Return to politicalinstability

Scenario 1 means a return topolitical turmoil, as the result of acoup dtat, revolution, rebellion,election fraud, mass demonstrationsor other events. Te internationalcommunity will loose faith in theHaitian state, donors will withholdfunding or return to humanitarianassistance. Te UN troops will bereinforced. ension between peoplefrom different political fractionsand with different incomes willincrease and lead to violence.

Political factors: Te centralGovernment takes back itsmonopoly and becomes even morecentralised, but it is still a weakstate without enforcement power.

Economic factors:Haiti s economydeclines further, causing adeterioration basic services such aswater and sanitation, health andeducation.

Social factors: Increasing povertyand inequality, combined with thepolitically sensitive situation lead tomore crime and political violence.Gangs take control of communitiesand rule over their own littlekingdoms.

Technological factors:Infrastructureis destroyed by riots or lack of main-tenance and the state does not have

capacity to restore it.Legal (and institutional) factors:Tere is a return to lawlessness,corruption thrives. People mistrustthe government authorities. Teinformal sector gains in importancefrom an already high level.

Environmental factors: Te controlsystem breaks down for all sectorsand for the environment this means

increasing degradation. Te watersupply system in the metropolitanregion risks collapsing.

Scenario 2.Continuing stablepolitical climate but withweak economy and institu-tions

Scenario 2 represents a situationwhere the relative political stability

from 2007 is re-established, howeverthe societal development is slow. Tisscenario, probably the most likely, (asdescribed in sections 1 and 2) repre-sents a continuation of the situationin 2007.

Political factors: Te decentralisa-tion process is advancing slowly.Te municipalities will still nothave power or resources to performnormal tasks such as planning,service provision, infrastructure.

Economic factors: No realdevelopment of the economy.Food prices rise. More and morefood needs to be imported. Donormoney will however be more readilyavailable, both as donations and asloans.

Social factors: Inequality persistseven though people slowly aregetting less poor. Te trust in thenational and local Government islow. Outbreaks of gang violencehappen but are rare. Demonstrationsand riots due to soaring food pricesand unemployment occur now andthen.

Technological factors: No majorchanges from current situation.

Legal (and institutional) factors:Capacity development will take placein certain state bodies, according todonor interest. Tere will be a fewstrong institutions but the majorityof them will remain weak.

Environmental factors: No majorchanges in policy or enforcement,so environmental destructioncontinues.

Scenario 3. Institutional, eco-nomic, political and socialimprovements

Scenario 3 is the most desirable butleast likely of the three scenarios.

Political factors:Decentralisation anddevolution will be implemented withsupport from government from alllevels. Municipalities will have morepower and resources and will takeon more responsibilities, especiallyregarding city planning and provisionof basic services and infrastructure.

Economic factors: Te economy issteady, not decreasing. Te donors are

confident in the (new) Governmentand make long-term commitments.

Soc ia l fac tors : Decreas inginequality and slowly decreasingpoverty. Less violence in the streetsas employment rate goes up andeducation is improved.

Technological factors: Due to thestabilised economy, more services willbe provided on a regular basis, which

means that access to electricity andInternet will be more widely avail-able. New mobile or Internet serviceswill emerge, such as banking.

Legal (and institutional) factors:National capacity developmentstrategies are put in place andimplemented. here is a slowimprovement in the overallin s t i tu t iona l , human andorganizational capacity, both in

government and civil society. Newlaws are passed that institutionalisethe constitution and activate thedecentralisation process.

Environmental factors: Strongerenvironmental policies and controlleads to a more sustainable metropol-itan area. Problems are not resolved,but at least the environmental damagedoes not continue unabated.situationfor its residents. Section 4 investigates

future avenues for metropolitan plan-ning and development.

ANALYSIS OF CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES


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The informal settlements andthe slums of Port-au-Princeare permanent. Te people

and most of the houses are there tostay. Te slum cities that have beencreated are permanent cities, andmay change over time like any city,but they will not disappear.

Terefore, the solution to thelow living standards in the slumscannot be found in isolated slumupgrading projects, but requiresthe development of the wholemetropolitan Port-au-Prince. Slumprevention could also be achievedthrough proper use of planningtools such as spatial plans andregulations on land subdivision.

Decentralisation has been anobjective for the Haitian stateofficially since 1987, when theconstitution emphasised theimportance of a decentralised state.In reality, there are today even largergaps between central and localgovernments, perhaps as a result ofcompetition for resources. Te large-scale or so-called grand corruptionhas its foundation in the governmentstructure and behaviour, and affects

the whole society, undermining itspolitical and economic stability andallowing corruption to thrive inother sectors.8

Urban planning involves landuse, land administration andconstruction, thus it is a corruption-prone area with strong individualand political interests. Tis makesit a priority area for interventions

also for anti-corruption andaccountability reasons.

8 Transparency International & UN-HABITAT (March2004)

Responsible planning and landadministration can decreasecorruption and graft.

Te three main avenues that thissituational analysis suggests are:

1. Establishment of a metropolitanagency with these major tasks:

coordinating all bodies with astake in urban planning anddevelopment in metropolitanPort-au-Prince; developingplanning policy, regulations andlegal frameworks; delegatingimplementation and ensuringan efficient execution of thecitywide strategic plan.

2. Development of a citywide strategicframework for metropolitan Port-

au-Prince with major planningprinciples, enabling andcontrolling rules, regulationsand tools that will set the agendafor spatial, social and economicdevelopment in the capital. Inparallel with the developmentof a strategic framework, severaldemonstration projects shouldbe implemented to keep theprocess moving and generate

feedback.3. Reinforcement of the municipalities.

he municipalities will be inthe centre of all metropolitandevelopment and need to bestrengthened. Regardless of howlong the decentralisation processtakes, the municipalities wouldbenefit from gradually increasedresponsibilities coupled withincreased assistance for capacity

building and institutionalstrengthening.

4. FUTURE ACTIVITIES ANDPOLICY PRIORITIES


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4.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF

A METROPOLITAN

AGENCY

Te idea of a co-ordinating body

for the metropolitan area appears inmany of the documents and plansfor improving the living standardand environment in metropolitanPort-au-Prince. Although moststakeholders agree on the necessityof such a body, the idea has notbeen executed. Reasons for the non-accomplishment of a coordinatingagency are, amongst others,restricted financial means and lack

of political will.Apart from securing funding andpolitical will, it is crucial to keepthe structure of the agency simpleand basic, such as is shown in figure9.

Te metropolitan agency shouldbe small and not necessarily withautonomous legal responsibility. Inorder for the agency to still have the

legal and political instruments tofulfil its mission, it could be housedunder one Ministry.

Te agencys main tasks are to:

Coordinate stakeholders

Coordinate the strategic frame-

work Policy development

Develop regulations and legalframeworks

Delegate responsibilities

Te agency should set up aframework, planning principles,regulations and developmentstandards. hese should beenforced and controlled by national

government, municipalities and/orcommunity wards. It is importantthat the metropolitan agency is notresponsible for implementation,which should be carried outby central government and,increasingly, the municipalities.

Te agency should be responsiblefor coordination of all governmentbodies with a stake in urban

development. Tis is the mostimportant of its tasks and also themost politically sensitive.

SITUATIONANALYSIS

SPATIALANALYSIS

CITYWIDESTRATEGICPLANNING

METROPOLITANSTRATEGIC

FRAMEWORK

Institutional strangthening

Implementation

Additional data

collection and analysis

Continuous cityconsultation

Private sectorpartnerships

Capacity Building

Enforcement

FIGURE 9:Set-up of the metropolitan agency. The networking func-tion is the most important for the agency, which will coordinate allrelevant stakeholders.


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Strong political support from allinvolved parties and all levels isnecessary for the co-ordinationand cooperation to work. Teagency should also interact withcivil society, the private sectors anddevelopment partners.

4.2 METROPOLITAN

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Te administration in Port-au-Prince is exceptionally weak. Afully-fledged citywide planningprocess is difficult to implementwithin the present institutionalsetting and level of capacity. Itis instead suggested that a more

general citywide scheme bedeveloped; called the metropolitanstrategic framework.

4.2.1 BASIC CONDITIONS FOR

A SUCCESSFUL PLANNING

PROCESS

Citywide strategic planning is moreholistic and more participatorythan traditional urban planning.

Although the difference may seemsmall, it actually means changingthe whole process, making it moredemanding and complex.

Terefore, a stronger institutionalfoundation is a necessity. In the caseof metropolitan Port-au-Prince,an incremental approach towardscitywide strategic planning issuggested, starting with a citywidestrategic framework that sets the

rules of the game, which willconstitute the foundation for thefuture citywide strategic plan.

Prerequisites for undertakingcitywide strategic planning

Political commitment

Relevant legislation in place,for example, concerningdecentralisation

Local authority with enoughcapacity, resources andmandate for planning andimplementation

Reliable and updated mapsand other basic informationavailable

Mechanisms for publicparticipation and representationof women and vulnerable

groups Longer-term funding to ensure

implementation

Enabling environment for closecooperation between nationaland local authorities

4.2.2 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

FOR THE METROPOLITAN

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Many of the steps in a full-scalecitywide strategic planning processalso apply to the more limitedvariety that is recommended formetropolitan Port-au-Prince.See box 5 for the major stepsin developing the metropolitanstrategic framework.

Several of the listed activities can andshould take place simultaneously.Te goal is to develop the framework

in a participatory manner. Tismeans that the process, managed bythe metropolitan agency, encouragesdifferent stakeholders from stateand non-state organizations toexpress their views, needs andideas. Te private sector should beincluded in the consultations fromthe start. Te main ownership ofthe process must be within thestate, with as many of the activities

taking place at municipal level aspossible. Te participatory processand consultations thus serve at leasttwo purposes: to ensure ownershipthat achieves a more sustainableframework, and to build capacityamongst stakeholders.

Alongside the development ofthe citywide strategic framework,implementation work shouldstart. It is better to start small-scale implementation while stilldeveloping the framework.

BOX 5: Steps for developingthe Metropolitan StrategicFramework

1. Ensure that there is adequatepolitical support and leadershipand that all stakeholders haveownership over the process.Establish a core team that willbe responsible for the process.

2. Define what metropolitanstrategic framework impliesfor metropolitan Port-au-Prince;choose an entry point of greatimportance for the metropoli-tan development, such as landissues or waste management.

3. Initiate the process by definingroles of stakeholders; preparework plan and budget.

4. Review key documents, includ-ing relevant legislation, tobenefit from past experienceand specify potential barriers inthe process. Continue the anal-ysis of the current situation,e.g. with a spatial analysis and/or rapid assessment of differentareas.

5. Arrange a brainstorming eventwith the stakeholders anddefine a common vision andoverall objectives for the metro-politan strategic framework.

6. Prepare the overall strategicaction plan and get the metro-politan strategic frameworkagreed upon by the key stake-holders.

7. Revise the metropolitan stra-tegic framework to match

laws and regulations so it canbe formally endorsed by thegovernment.

8. Market the overall strategicplan, disseminate it to stake-holders and ensure that theinvolvement remains high.

9. Hold regular follow-up meet-ings to check the progressagainst benchmarks. Revise theframework/action plans accord-ing to any new needs.

10. Continue capacity building -not only while the plan is devel-oped but for many years intothe future.


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If strategic interventions are beingimplemented at an early stage,it will also assist the frameworkdevelopment process in terms offeedback. Early implementation

projects provide opportunities forquick response to urgent needs,building confidence among thepublic and other stakeholders thatstrategic planning delivers realbenefits.

4.2.3 COMPONENTS OF THE

METROPOLITAN STRATEGIC

FRAMEWORK

Te content of the citywidestrategic framework will bedeveloped following the structuresdescribed above. Regardless of whatcontent the metropolitan strategicframework will have, it needs toencompass issues of equity, gendersensitivity, sustainability andaffordability. Decisions should betaken at lowest level of governmentand with as much public controlof implementation and budget as

possible.

Without steering the process in acertain direction, it is useful to give

examples of what types of issueswill be covered by the framework.

Some of these components havealready been presented in the 2003

Government plan for metropolitanPort-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti2003). As much information aspossible should be used from this toavoid reinventing the wheel. Otherdocuments that have been producedshould also be reviewed relativelyearly in the process.

Many of the residential servicesin metropolitan Port-au-Princeare already provided by private

companies (see figure 7 for waterprovision). Te tendency is towardsmore privatization and moreinvolvement of the informal businesssector in service provision. Insteadof combating this development, themetropolitan area could take a pro-active step and make it easy for theinformal sector to become formal.Many of the private service providersare not illegal, merely informal. Te

state should be responsible for thecoordination and control of theproviders to ensure a fair marketwith equal access to these services.

Coordinationwithin the

municipality

Coordinationbetween themunicipality

Metropolitancoordination

FIGURE 10:Three levels of municipal coordination. 1. metropolitancoordination through the metropolitan agency, 2. coordinationbetween municipalities, 3. coordination within each municipality.


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Private sector engagement

Tere are already a few examples ofprivate companies engaged in urbandevelopment projects in Port-au-Prince, in particular in the informaland slum areas.

In Cit Soleil for example, there aremany private companies that buildnew schools, parks or other publicplaces. Tis type of isolated projectshould be encouraged, as all effortsare needed, but metropolitan Port-au-Prince should also develop astrategy for cooperation with theprivate sector.

Te strategy could involve different

projects. One example could be thata company or group of companiesbecomes responsible for keepinga certain street or neighbourhoodclean. Another idea used in othercities with good results is thatcompanies are offered to adopta light through paying for astreetlight that the company canuse for advertising.

Protection from natural disasters

Port-au-Prince and its inhabitantsare exposed to natural disasterssuch as flooding and landslides, aswell as to manmade disasters suchas fires. Ways to mitigate the effectsof flooding include constructingretaining walls to control floodingfor the most vulnerable parts of thecoastline; establish escape routesand safe places for when a disaster

occurs. In the long term, people indangerous areas, such as on steephills and along the coastline, needto be relocated to other areas.

Regardless of what types ofdemonst ra t ion pro ject s a r eimplemented, the emphasis shouldbe on policy influence, on buildingstakeholders capacity and onfollowing the planning principlesthat are part of the metropolitan

strategic framework. Rememberthat a failed demonstration projectcould be worse than no projectat all, so the projects should becarefully planned.

4.3.3 CAPACITY BUILDING

One of the first capacity buildingactivities is a needs assessment. Itidentifies the needs in detail andspecifies what kind of capacitydevelopment would best suit the

particular municipality.Corruption in the land sector in Haitiis rife, especially in Port-au-Prince,where land values are higher, as is thecompetition for land. Corruptionis more widespread when there islack of transparency, when there isa monopoly situation, when rulesand regulations are complicatedand when the public cannot easilycontrol the distribution of the good

in question.9 All of this is true forthe land sector in Port-au-Prince.

Ways for munic ipalit ie s tocounteract corruption and lowaccountabil ity include moreopenness and better organizationand division of roles. Rules andregulations need to be simplifiedand made understandable to thecitizens. Accurate and updatedinformation on land ownership,distribution of basic services,poverty and other key municipaldata should be made available to thepublic. Te capacity building needsassessment should not only covertechnical skills but also attitudinalcapacity such as gender equality,focus on pro-poor and affordablebasic services, and equity in accessto information.

Tere are many possible capacitybuilding interventions forinstitutional strengthening andorganization, but only a few forhuman capacity building. Tereason is that human capacitybuilding is more specific and notmuch can be said before the needsassessment is carried out.

9 Transparency International & UN-HABITAT (March2004)


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4.4 IMPLEMENTATION

RECOMMENDATIONS

Most previous development plansof Port-au-Prince were never carriedout. Inadequate funding, lowinitiative, lack of capacity, political

support and commitment fromcivil servants and politicians alikewhere some of the reasons that weregiven in the April 2008 stakeholderworkshop. Most of the problemscould be solved or at least mitigatedwith capacity building, clarificationof roles and responsibilities andinstitutional strengthening, so thisis where to focus interventions.

A nother c ha l lenge i s t he

powerlessness of the municipalities.Many of the municipalities arenevertheless trying to gain moreinfluence with their scarce resourcesand unclear mandate and there aremany examples that can be sharedbetween them.

o avoid creating yet another urbanplan that is not implemented, theprocess must be transparent and

information on it made available forstakeholders and also the inhabitantsin the whole metropolitan area. Testructures must be clear and easyto access so that the citizens knowwhere to turn to inform themselvesor to influence the process.

Another lesson is that if the planningtakes place at a high level, themunicipalities will not implementit. Tey must therefore be at the

core of the process, from the start,even though the administrative andpolitical system does not yet givethem the authority to formally leadthe process.

o carry out activities and policiesproposed in the previous section,some short recommendations aregiven. For the implementation it isalso important to put extra effortinto developing systems to measureresults and avoid risks, and thereforethese issues are looked upon as wellin this section.

4.4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

STATE ACTORS

Te proposed activities will mainlybe planned and implemented by themunicipalities and the state. Civilsociety will be part of the process,

but will not take on the roles ofimplementation or coordination.

Both the metropolitan agency andthe work to develop and implementthe citywide strategic frameworkcan also serve as a way to increaselocal level influence. From todaysvery low level of responsibilityfor most of the municipalities, anexpansion in the scope of theirtasks would imply that more staff

is needed. One way of solving thisproblem could be seconding stafffrom the line ministries to themunicipalities.

If Haitis Government chooses toembark on a metropolitan strategicframework for Port-au-Prince, staffmust be made available to the alreadyvery stretched municipalities. Temost obvious way of solving thisproblem is with salary increases,but this may not be financiallypossible.

4.4.2 BENCHMARKS AND

INDICATORS

In all interventions a monitoringsystem is needed to track progress,measure results and apply the lessonslearnt to the ongoing process.Te basic requirements for any

monitoring system are benchmarks(or checkpoints) and indicators.Tese not only assure the residentsand donors that they get value fortheir tax money or funding, butalso, and more importantly, theywill be a tool in the implementationof the process.

Benchmarks measure progress atcertain reference points in time andindicators identify exactly what will

be measured. When the benchmarkshave been identified and agreedupon, a baseline will be developedso that the starting point is clear.


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Information for the baselinewill come mostly from existingdocuments, such as the 2003development plan, UN reports,government statistics and municipalstatistics. Others will have tobe found through interviews orsmall assessments of certain issues(Republic of Haiti 2003).

Te indicators are specified by themeans of verification, which forthe media campaign above couldbe; number of people reached bythe campaign, number of peoplein low-income areas involved in theprocess as a result of the campaign,

percentage of the reached populationthat improved their knowledge in acertain area. Setting actual numbersfor the indicators makes it possibleto measure if a benchmark has beenachieved.

4.4.3 RISK ASSESSMENT AND

MANAGEMENT

Tere will be risks that are external that cannot be controlled bythe intervention such as naturaldisasters and conflicts. Other risksare internal can be controlled andmanaged by the intervention suchas the design of the interventionand the management. Some risksfall in between can only partiallybe controlled and influenced suchas the political environment with itspolicies, institutions and politicalwill. Risk assessment looks at all of

these. [the full version gives a morein-depth description of risk assessmentissues]

Political instability

If there are more changes ofgovernment and new staff in theministries and municipalities, itwill be difficult to keep the politicalsupport and also the continuity of thein te rvent ion . he proposed

mitigation of the possible impactof such a situation is to startsmall, start with a strategic

framework that can adapt tothe political situation and alsoallow for scaling down if need be.

Slow decentralisation

Te decentralisation process in

Haiti is slow, which will negativelyinfluence the proposed metropolitanstrategic framework. On the otherhand, the framework will in itselfsupport the decentralisation process,as it increases the responsibilities ofthe municipalities. While workingto influence the decentralisationprocess, the framework will have toaccept the limitations that followfrom the centralised environmentand adapt its activities to thereality.

Ownership by municipalities

Te municipalities are overstretched,with so many emergencies to dealwith on a daily basis that theydo not have time for planning orcoordination. Apart from capacitybuilding to increase efficiency atthe municipalities there are othermeasures that could be taken.Secondment of staff from theministries to the municipalities isone solution. Another way forwardis to lobby for a clarificationand possibly upgrading of themunicipalities role. Developmentpartners should be involved in thelobbying, as they normally haveaccess to powerful politicians.


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The overwhelming insti-tutional confusion of thecitys administration, closely

linked to the lack of coordination,needs to be dealt with. Tis study isa guide to how such a change can beinitiated. Te establishment ofa metropolitan agency is a keyrequirement in order to initiate amore holistic and integrated strate-gic planning of the city.

Metropolitan Port-au-Princeshould start small with a processthat can be attained. Te city andall stakeholders should agree on arealistic vision. Te metropolitanstrategic framework must be tailoredto the needs and capability of thestakeholders in Port-au-Prince.

Most of the funding can comefrom metropolitan Port-au-Prince,including the key city stakeholdersincluding the private sector, and notfrom outside development partnersor donors. Te intervention thusmore focused and sustainable,targeting the most urgent needsof the city. Development partnersshould not be left outside theprocess, but be seen as catalysts.

Tey should be used for technicalexpertise, sharing experiences andassisting in putting pressure onthe politicians for support and forfast-tracking the decentralisationprocess.

Tis study makes clear that thereare huge gaps between the stateand the civil society that will haveto be bridged. Te residents do notfeel included in the state and theydo not have the opportunity toinfluence decisions concerning theirdaily lives. Te state on the otherhand feels that the residents, andin particular the NGOs and CBOs,are pushing their own agenda,without any will to coordinate withthe authorities. Provision should bemade for residents representativesto participate in and contributeto planning and delivery of basicservices. Te metropolitan agencyshould be designed to that end.

For metropolitan Port-au-Prince

to develop positively, the majorstakeholders will have to agree on away forward and commit themselvesto work in that direction. It will notbe easy to merge the many differentopinions on how the metropolitanarea should develop and views onwho will be in charge of differents e c t io n s . Co mmunica t io n ,coordination and participationdo not happen by chance but

are achieved through hard work.When a shared vision of the futureis agreed upon it will be easier tocommit to that work.

5. CONCLUSIONS


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REFERENCES

Cadre de Coopration Intrimaire, CCI: Eau potable et assainissements,Rapport,24 May 2004.

Cadre de Coopration Intrimaire, CCI: Services Urbains: dchets solides etbidonvilles, Rapport Final,22 June 2004.

Centrale Autonome Mtropolitaine dEau Potable, CAMEP: Eau etassainissement Port-au-Prince Projets CAMEP, undated.

Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Democratie / Instituto Libertad yDemocracia, CLED/ILD: La Capitalisation des Pauvres en Hati, 2003.

Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Democratie / Instituto Libertad yDemocracia, CLED/ILD: Urban Real Estate Formalization Program inHaiti, Situation Analysis Report October 1997- March 1998, 1998.

Commission pour la commemoration du 250e anniversaire de lafondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (ed. Holly, Grald): Les problmesenvironnementaux de la rgion mtropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, 1999.

Henriquez, Lionel: Les consquances du dficit en infrastructurespitonnires dans un espace urbain non rgul: le cas du rsau viaire de

Port-au-Prince, November 2000.

Henriquez, Lionel (in Freeman & Jamet (ed): Urban Transport Policy. ASustainable Development Tool): Les effets ngatifs de la degradation acclredun milieu urbain: le cas de Port-au-Prince,1998.

International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED):Stakeholder Influence Mapping,March 2005.

Republic of Haiti (MPCE): Document de Stratgie Nationale pour laCroissance et pour la Rduction de la Pauvret, DSNCRP, 2007-2010,November 2007.

Republic of Haiti & IMF:A window of opportunity for Haiti, Interim PovertyReduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP),27 September 2006.

Republic of Haiti & UNDP (prpar par Robert Deniz): Dcentralisation:Note Preliminaire,February 2005.

Republic of Haiti (MPCE): Carte de pauvret dHati,2004.

Republic of Haiti: Plan-Programme de Dveloppement de la Zonemtropolitaine de Port-au-Prince,2003.

Sletten, P & Egset, W: Poverty in Haiti, Fafo,2004.

Te Economist Intelligence Unit: Haiti, Country Profile 2006,2006.

Te Economist Intelligence Unit: Haiti, Country Report,August 2007.

6. REFERENCES


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ransparency International & UN-Habitat: Tools to Support Transparency inLocal Government,March 2004.

UNDP: Human Development Report 2007/2008,2007.

UNDP/GEF: UNDP/GEF Risk Management Strategy,April 2006.

Universit Quisqueya: Analyse de la Situation de lHabitat en Hati,June 2000.

UN-HABIA:Manuel des Bonnes Pratiques Scurit Foncire et Accs auSol,2007.

UN-HABIA: Pro-Poor Land Management. Integrating slums into cityplanning approaches,2004.

UN-HABIA: Rapid Urban Spatial Analysis (RUSA) Guidelines,November 2004.

UN-HABIA: Situation Analysis of Informal Settlements in Kisumu, 2005.

UN-HABIA & ransparency International: Tools to Support Transparencyin Local Governance,March 2004.

UN-HABIA & UNESCO: Discussion Paper: Urban Policies and theRight to the City,2005.

Ville de Montral & Ville de Port-au-Prince: Plan dAction 2008-2013,December 2007.

World Bank: Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti, A Country SocialAnalysis,27 April 2006.

WEB PAGES

Cities Alliance, www.citiesalliance.org

Haitis Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2008-2010, pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08115.pdf (in English)

Human Development Report, http://hdrstats.undp.org

Institut Haitien de Statistique et dInformatique, www.ihsi.ht

ransparency International, www.transparency.org

United Nations Population Fund, www.unfpa.org

UN-Habitat, www.unhabitat.orgWorld Banks Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp


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Te main objective of the Global Land ool Network (GLN) is tocontribute to poverty alleviation and the Millennium Development Goalsthrough land reform, improved land management and security of tenure.

Te Network has developed a global land partnership. Its members includeinternational civil society organizations, international finance institutions,international research and training institutions, donors and professionalbodies. It aims to take a more holistic approach to land issues and improveglobal land coordination in various ways. Tese include the establishment

of a continuum of land rights, rather than a narrow focus on individual landtitling, the improvem

Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning

Documents

Transcript of Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning