STRATEGI PLAN - Georgia Institute of Technology · To sustain Georgia Tech’s global leadership in...
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STRATEGIC PLAN NOVEMBER 2013 Accelerating Innovation in Advanced Manufacturing
Transcript of STRATEGI PLAN - Georgia Institute of Technology · To sustain Georgia Tech’s global leadership in...
STRATEGIC PLAN
NOVEMBER 2013
Accelerating Innovation in Advanced Manufacturing
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
Vision ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1
Mission ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2
Grand Challenges _________________________________________________________________________________________ 3
The Strategic Framework ________________________________________________________________________________ 6
Strategy _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 12
Plans _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 16
Appendix I: Value Propositions of Georgia Tech Interdisciplinary Research Institutes (IRIs) ____ 17
Appendix II: TRL, MRL and BcRL ______________________________________________________________________ 18
Appendix III: GTMI Organizational Chart _____________________________________________________________ 22
Appendix IV: GTMI External Advisory Board By-Laws ______________________________________________ 23
Appendix V: A Discussion (draft) of GTMI Faculty Advisory Committee ___________________________ 26
Appendix VI: GTMI Industry Partners Program ______________________________________________________ 27
Appendix VII: Annotated History of the Manufacturing Research Center _________________________ 28
Contact Information ____________________________________________________________________________________ 29
VISION
Page 1
Vision
“Be the world’s premier institution of manufacturing research, development and deployment powered by
talent, innovation and passion.”
WHY MANUFACTURING MATTERS
There is abundant evidence that manufacturing is a critical sector of a nation’s economy for building wealth.
A number of studies from governments, corporations, policy institutes and academic institutions support
this assertion and indicate that “making things” is an important way to improve a society’s standard of
living1. Without a healthy manufacturing segment, nations spend their wealth obtaining goods versus
receiving wealth for producing and exporting goods.
Manufacturing benefits the United States specifically as follows:
70 percent of U.S. exports consist of manufactured goods;
One manufacturing job produces up to six additional jobs in the general economy;
66 percent of U.S. scientists and engineers are employed in manufacturing;
More than 50 percent of the national research and development expenditures are made in
manufacturing; and
90 percent of patents are credited to the manufacturing sector.
A robust manufacturing sector is also critical to a country’s national security because modern militaries rely
on advanced weapon systems and communication platforms. Without the knowledge, ability and resources
to manufacturing these items, defensive postures become much weaker. As military supply chains
increasingly rely on entities outside of their borders, the ability to obtain the best possible components and
systems that are unavailable to others becomes extremely difficult. Often, the invention required to
conceptualize new products takes place in an industrialized country such as the United States, and the
manufacture of the products is then sent to another country that has lower labor rates in effort to reduce the
total cost of the product. Outsourcing production of a nation’s military weapons and creating industrial
commons for these products in other countries greatly weakens national defense long term.
1 Duesterberg, Thomas J. The Manufacturing Resurgence: What it could mean for the U.S. Economy, A forecast for 2025, The Aspen
Institute, March 2013
MISSION
Page 2
Mission
To sustain Georgia Tech’s global leadership in manufacturing innovation and societal impact by:
1. Developing and growing a community of experts who are passionate about innovative
manufacturing and how manufacturing will enhance the standards of living, innovation and
national security;
2. Defining grand challenges – technological, societal or policy – that affect manufacturing of the 21st
century; and
3. Identifying and building missing capabilities to meet manufacturing grand challenges in the 21st
century.
GRAND CHALLENGES
Page 3
Grand Challenges
At the national level, there are two grand challenges facing U.S. manufacturing. The first is how we speed up
innovation by rapidly turning research results into innovative products. Today’s research translation takes
too long, costs too much, and the results are too random. The second challenge is to establish a national
strategy of “invent here – build here.” In other words, it is critical to ensure that what is invented in the
United States is made in the United States. Conquering these grand challenges will catalyze advanced
manufacturing, and it will act as a vital component for developing a national innovation policy.
GRAND CHALLENGE NO. 1: ACCELERATE INNOVATION
According to a recent White House presentation on the Material Genome Initiative (MGI), on average, it
takes 20 years for a new material to mature from bench top to market, if it ever reaches the market at all.
Cited materials included Teflon, Velcro, Li-ion batteries, and many other familiar materials that we use on a
daily basis.
A good example of this particular challenge is seen in the defense sector. Although defense is a high-tech
industry, the 2006 annual review of the major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), found that only 10
percent of the 62 MDAPs were collecting manufacturing process data and 0 (zero) percent were in control of
their manufacturing processes, which shows a significant lack of manufacturing maturity2. More recently,
the 2009 annual MDAP review by the General Accountability Officer, covering design, technology, and
manufacturing maturity, showed that almost every MDAP lacked manufacturing maturity. This lack of
maturity in all three areas resulted in $300 billion (FY 2010 dollars) of cost overruns, and production
schedules were, on average, 22 months behind original estimates3,4.
Similarly, innovation translation lags behind from research universities and institutes as well. Although
every major research university or institute produces a large volume of scholarly papers each year in
2 “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,”
United States Government Accountability Office, GAO Report No. GAO-
07-406SP, March 2007.
3 Sullivan, M.J., “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs,” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO Report
No. GAO-10-388SP, March 2010, p. 2.
4 Sullivan, M.J., “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs,” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO Report
No. GAO-09-326SP, March 2009, p. 7.
GRAND CHALLENGES
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regards to new knowledge, the number of patents and licensing agreements do not correlate. The number of
scholarly publications by far outpaced those of patents, licensing agreements or royalty income. In other
words, the economic or societal impact of new knowledge is nowhere near where it should or can be.
GRAND CHALLENGE NO. 2: INVENT HERE, BUILD HERE
It is a familiar story that once a new product is invented, the inventor often seeks a manufacturer overseas
to produce the goods. While there are many factors behind such a decision, a lack of robust manufacturing
ecosystems in the United States is a key reason. A manufacturing ecosystem is built on a skilled workforce, a
robust infrastructure, a friendly business climate, a good investment community, and a hot bed for
innovations. Manufacturing ecosystems, also called industrial commons by Pisano and Shih5, provide a
cluster of localized, interdependent businesses that offer design, production, distribution, workforce,
infrastructure, and investment capabilities to help a business thrive. In other words, a business or new
technology cannot prosper in a silo.
Several attempts have been made to build advanced technology products, but many have failed. Take for
example two recent companies that had the potential to have a significant impact on society, but ultimately
did not survive. These two firms were Solyndra and A123. Each company had received approximately
US$500 million in U.S. government assistance, garnered much press, and raised the hopes of many American
manufacturers. Both had highly innovative technologies in the clean energy arena – rechargeable batteries
for hybrid/electric cars (A123) and crystalline thin files (Solyndra).
Why did they fail? The infrastructure to support these technologies, or the industrial commons, had left the
United States years ago. Although the United States was once a leader in battery design and production, for
example, the industry followed electronics manufacturing to Asia in previous decades. For A123, the
“hollowed out” ecosystem for battery manufacturing that this migration created ultimately led to the
company’s demise.
Solyndra’s story took a very similar route. According to Pisano and Shih, “The skills needed to process
ultrapure crystalline into wafers and apply thin films of silicon onto large glass sheets” were lost decades
5 Pisano and Shih, Producing Prosperity: Why America Needs a Manufacturing Renaissance, Harvard Business Review Press, 2012.
GRAND CHALLENGES
Page 5
ago, because the United States outsourced the seemingly mundane manufacturing of semiconductors, power
supplies, controllers, and similar components to low-cost economies. The center of knowledge and skillsets,
or the locus, of R&D and manufacturing had moved to lower cost locations many years ago.
This migration of ideas, skills and knowledge was viewed by U.S. executives as a simple solution to improve
the bottom line for the short term. However, the net result of these “seemingly prudent business decisions”
over past few decades was “lost competencies, lost jobs, and lost capacities for the future rounds of
innovation” in the United States. In other words, the “graze land” for battery-making, thin film-fabrication
and many more foundational technologies has disappeared in the United States. For A123 and Solyndra,
there was no support system to provide assistance and nurturing. Developed in isolation, without a
manufacturing ecosystem, they did not have a chance to grow and prosper.
As the two previous examples show, it is critical to U.S. economic survival to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of its innovation process, and rebuild its manufacturing ecosystem. Innovations have moved to
low-cost countries, taking with them skills, ideals and talents. As the recent recession has proven, the U.S.
economy has allowed its manufacturing base to dwindle, creating an economy based on a few core
industries such as services. History shows that economies or regions that do not balance their industry mix
– manufacturing, services, public activities, and so on – do not stay in the lead and are extremely vulnerable
to economic downturns. Therefore, not only does the United States need to move its technologies to market
rapidly, but it also needs to make sure that manufacturing of those products stays here in the United States
to create middle-class jobs.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
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The Strategic Framework
To face these grand challenges and achieve its mission, GTMI’s Discover here - accelerate Translation - Build
here (DTB)” strategic framework focuses on the concurrent maturation of xRLs – TRL (technology readiness
level), MRL (manufacturing readiness level), BcRL (business case readiness level) and ERL (ecosystem
readiness level). The purpose of this section is to 1) describe the critical and enabling role that academia has
in the translation process in the US and specifically GTMI’s strategy, and 2) explain how the DTB framework
tackles these two grand challenges for industrialized countries, including the United States.
GTMI’s goal is to establish institutional actors, including research and development centers like universities,
as leaders in focusing interdisciplinary research and providing translational prowess for seamless and
capable DTB. In the United States, research-intensive universities such as Georgia Tech have moved toward
addressing grand challenges in recent years with the establishment of a cluster of university-level
Interdisciplinary Research Institutes (IRIs)6. The IRIs have a mission that includes facing outward, forming
industry and government partnerships, and focusing the translation of interdisciplinary research to achieve
real-world economic benefits and societal impact.
GTMI’s DTB framework captures synergies of manufacturing-related expertise, aligns the regional
ecosystem with the DTB grand challenges, and establishes enabling industry-government partnerships to
accelerate the translation of manufacturing-related research to innovative products manufactured in the
United States. This approach also requires the design and deployment of an Operating System to effectively
institutionalize this future, or “to-be,” manufacturing innovation process. Figure 1 identifies both the “as-is”
and “to-be” characteristics for the DTB innovation, value-creation chain. Recent reports including the White
House Advanced Manufacturing Partnership Steering Committee’s report7 also documented that the
national emphasis for both the “discovery of knowledge” and “product development” phases of the
innovation chain were satisfactory as compared to the “translation” phase, which was characterized as the
“valley of death” or the “missing middle.” GTMI’s strategic framework includes the entire innovation chain
but provides high focus/emphasis on the “to-be” translation capability (an integral view of technology,
6 The unique functions and value propositions of Georgia Tech IRIs are discussed in Appendix I.
7 The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Report to the President on Capturing Domestic Competitive Advantage in Advanced Manufacturing, July 2012.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
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processes, methods, tools, infrastructure, polices and skills), and the realistic environments required for
meaningful translation of research results to innovative products manufactured in the United States.
Figure 1. Framing the DTB grand challenge: Discover Here – Accelerate Translation – Build Here
GTMI’s analysis of the “to-be” seamless and capable innovation chain focuses on: the Discovery of knowledge,
Translation of capability to the U.S. industrial base that Builds products. A number of current capability gaps
have been identified including:
Discovery: This is predominately the emphasis area of academia. Although, universities treat manufacturing-
related research as separate disciplines (e.g., materials, processes, design, modeling and simulation, quality,
supply chains, logistics, economics, finance, business, public policy, economic development and incubators),
this structure incentivizes individual accomplishments and makes use of intellectual property strategies that
are not conducive to collaborations between universities and industry. A seamless and capable innovation
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
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chain requires an interdisciplinary and holistic approach to technology development that is focused on
specific product exemplars. Therefore, academia must develop a value proposition for engaging the “missing
middle” as a viable “knowledge creation” workspace, and some university policies and practices must be
critically examined and properly adjusted. Georgia Tech has addressed this need by establishing new
Interdisciplinary Research Institutes (IRIs) that focus efforts across campus on core research areas including
manufacturing.
Product Development: This is predominantly the emphasis area of industry. The U.S. industrial base has, for
the most part, lost its vertical innovation capabilities in pursuing and transitioning research into products.
“Bell Labs” and other similar organizations have been lost to budget cuts and heightened emphasis on
quarterly profits. New companies with product vision and a willingness to pursue all the knowledge required
for making products are driving transformative innovation. Larger American companies reach into the
“missing middle” for information but seldom reach all the way back to collaborate, or understand, the efforts
within the discovery phase. Startup companies may reach back into the Discovery phase or may rely on
“entrepreneurial researchers” for new products to bridge the gap between discovery and product
development. Although industry may occasionally expend effort to address the “missing middle,” a seamless
and capable innovation chain does not universally exist. As a result, GTMI is developing xRL – a process that
can be used to rapidly and affordably translate research into economic and societal impact.
Translation: In developing xRL, our innovation chain analysis indicated a number of missing capabilities,
including: 1) an integrated and concurrent technique to eliminate technological, manufacturing and business
risks across the “missing middle;” 2) a method to accelerate maturation in a “realistic product use and
manufacturing environment,” 3) an operating system designed to accelerate research translation, and 4)
collaboration among the right set of stakeholders. To address these gaps, the following are necessary:
Integrated and concurrent maturation across the “missing middle” requires measurement of
integrated readiness of technology, manufacturing and the business case; identification of gaps in
readiness; and implementation of actions to close the gaps.
A “realistic” environment, also known as a “relevant” or “representative” environment, for
accelerating translation requires that both the product operational condition (for instance, altitude,
humidity, pressures, temperatures, etc.) and the manufacturing environment (proper validation in
lab, scale up, prototype, pilot production, low-rate production, and full-rate production) be
incorporated at the proper maturity readiness level.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
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The Operating System designed for the seamless and capable innovation chain must incorporate a
number of features that allow acceleration across the “missing middle,” including: 1) initiation of
the exemplar business case at TRL/MRL 2 or 3 to fully engage industry and government in building
the business case for the translation of research to real products and 2) identification of a lead
university, e.g., Georgia Tech, to act as the translational collaboration agent that has strong
interdisciplinary manufacturing-related research and an equivocal commitment to involvement in
the “missing middle.” The business case should ultimately provide a “tipping point” at TRL/MRL 6
or 7 where industry commits to product maturation and commercialization. As for the lead
university, it may subcontract to other research universities to assure full and robust academic
engagement. It should engage the regional manufacturing innovation ecosystem to enable
acceleration across the “missing middle” by aligning technical colleges, workforce development,
public and private equities, incubation of new startup companies, and Manufacturing Extension
Partnership (MEP) for outreach to small and mid-sized enterprises and supply chains.
Recreating a successful entity such as Bell Labs is too expensive for most companies. However, the
techniques used by Bell Labs to commercialize research can be recreated on a national or regional level via
public-private partnerships. This requires that four critical stakeholders be involved: 1) Universities
possessing campus-wide, manufacturing-related interdisciplinary research capabilities, 2) industrial and/or
government entities that have demands for new and high-impact products, 3) government and/or industrial
entities that will catalyze the translation process with investment, and 4) a non-profit entity that can
manage the overall process, act as an unbiased broker, add value to the accelerated translation, and assure
that the appropriate space and environment are provided for the collaborators.
CORE COMPETENCIES OF ACADEMIA IN THE DTB FRAMEWORK
The above analysis, findings and discussion, led to the current design of the GTMI Operating System (Figure
2). This Operating System is intended to guide the development of the future or “to-be” capabilities that
minimize the “missing middle” and replace it with a seamless and capable innovation chain by providing the
following:
1. Knowledge Exchange. Georgia Tech Interdisciplinary Research Institute findings validate the
importance of knowledge exchange among the research participants in an interdisciplinary project
team and between that research team and the external customers (i.e., end users). The value
propositions of all stakeholders must be articulated, understood and achieved. Within the research
team, the key challenge is to align individual research efforts with the interdisciplinary problem
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
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being solved. In this instance, the manufacturing challenge of acceleration of research into
innovative products. Structured Knowledge Exchanges (SKEs) provide alignment and shorten the
time required to rapidly move from research to actionable findings and products. The SKE
accelerates technology transition by clearly and specifically providing the business, socio, and
technical intents, scope and means. All these measureable activities lead to the genesis of a rapidly
evolving and compelling business case that is critical to gain successful industry buy-in and a strong
market pull.
2. Intellectual leadership in basic and applied interdisciplinary research. Strategies and
processes are required to inventory the manufacturing-relevant research capabilities (processes,
materials, design, quality, process capability, industrial base, supply networks, cost, facilities,
workforce, above-the-shop floor capabilities allowing acceleration of translation, business cases,
policies, regulations, infrastructure, trade, etc.) and skills across the campus. Georgia Tech is
globally recognized leader in many of these discipline-specific research areas. The culture is being
tweaked so the correct skills and research efforts are being applied to the manufacturing grand
challenges.
3. Translational leadership for rapid campus-wide synergy and interdisciplinary alignment of
internal and external stakeholders to address the manufacturing challenge for specific
customer needs.
a. Universities must develop methods to address collaboration across industry sectors and
engage vital members of manufacturing ecosystems. GTMI will use its internally developed
operating system to guide research so it has the highest impact on new products and
services for industry and government. It will also be used to determine the vital members
of a manufacturing ecosystem needed for high impact. This will be accomplished through
close collaboration and engagement of all parties in the sector and ecosystem.
b. Key to the acceleration strategy is a methodology and tool set for quantifying and
mitigating risks to translation acceleration. Early efforts made by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense’s Manufacturing Technology Office to understand the risks to Manufacturing
Readiness Levels (MRLs) illustrates the importance of including a systems view (maturation
of materials, design, quality, process capability, industrial base, cost, facilities, and
workforce) for determining advanced systems and production readiness. The systems view
for the GTMI operating concept includes production-focused manufacturing readiness
(MRL), technology readiness (TRL), business case readiness (BcRL), and regional
ecosystem (ERL) readiness. GTMI calls this set of accelerated translation factors “xRL,” and
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
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many customer-oriented risks are included. One specific example is the inclusion of an
evolving business case that is evaluated and updated as other factor gaps are closed in
moving from xRL 3 to xRL 7.
4. Deployment leadership with stakeholders to commercialize innovative products and
services. xRL factors relating to risks in commercialization are a vital part of mitigating
acceleration risks, as they point to where gaps exist and measure progress on closing those gaps.
The GTMI operating system identifies the method to scale-up manufacturing demonstrations,
provide proprietary evaluations, and catalyze start-up companies to mitigate critical capability
gaps. Effective interfaces are now being created with the GT Enterprise Innovation Institute and
Georgia Manufacturing Extension Partnership to collaboratively integrate them within the value
stream and manufacturing ecosystem.
Figure 2. The GTMI DTB Framework
STRATEGY
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Strategy
GTMI takes a three-prong strategy to achieve its mission:
1. Continue Georgia Tech’s tradition of excellence in basic research and knowledge discovery in
advanced manufacturing.
Georgia Tech’s Manufacturing Research Center (MaRC), now known as GTMI, was initiated in 1988 and
formally created in 1991 as a consortium of academia and industry devoted to developing cooperative
research programs intended to enable American manufacturers to regain and maintain a competitive edge
in world markets. Initially the programs were focused on electronics manufacturing processes and
materials. Over the ensuing 20 years, an original electronics focus has evolved into an impressive portfolio
of advanced manufacturing materials, processes and systems. Georgia Tech’s reputation as a global leader in
basic research and knowledge discovery is evidenced by the many accolades it has garnered over the years:
Boeing Supplier of the Year Award, Boeing Performance Excellence Award, and Strategic Partnerships with
Boeing, Siemens, BMW and many international large corporations.
The basic research component of GTMI will continue the Georgia Tech tradition of excellence in the
following areas: additive manufacturing, bio-manufacturing, clean energy manufacturing, factory
information systems, lightweight nano-composites and structures, model-based systems engineering,
precision machining, public policy, robotics, supply chain management and logistics, and sustainable design
and manufacturing. Prioritization of these and other new areas may be needed in the near future.
Strategically the basic research phase creates a pipeline of enablers that feed into the translational phase of
GTMI to support its industry and government customers and sponsors. To speed up basic research and
expand its impact, GTMI will incorporate the following processes into its basic research regime:
a) Integrated experimental and computational approach for rapid development of materials and
manufacturing processes and systems,
b) Tight integration of modeling, synthesis, processing and characterization to avoid trials and errors,
c) Campus-wide engagement to promote interdisciplinary research,
d) Meta-roadmapping – constantly scan scholarly papers, patents, market forecasts and existing
roadmaps to 1) predict trends, 2) uncover gaps and barriers, and 3) define cross-cutting
technologies and collaborative opportunities.
STRATEGY
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2. Accelerate manufacturing innovation by concurrently mature TRL, MRL and BcRL8. This
addresses Grand Challenge #1 – current innovation process takes too long, costs too much and
the impact is too random.
It is clear that the current innovation value chain is neither efficient nor effective. The current process going
from lab research to marketable products is essentially “a random walk” with little guidance. Concurrent
maturation of TRL, MRL and BcRL offers the following clear benefits:
a) a common language and a measurement of costs, risks and schedules,
b) a framework guiding GTMI-industry discussions and assessing opportunities,
c) a basis for regular progress reviews,
d) a different mind-set, focusing on exemplars, products, requirements, production environments,
market pull, as opposed to “here is a new technology and find a place to plug it in,”
e) a process to catalyze alignment, foster trust and build an innovation culture.
3. Engage Georgia Tech, state, national and global partners in advanced manufacturing to foster
and sustain manufacturing innovation ecosystems. This addresses Grand Challenge #2 – invent
here, build here in the United States.
To effectively address the second grand challenge of “discover here, build here,” a different set of capabilities
is required. To ensure that a new technology or product can survive once it has reached maturity and
entered the marketplace, it requires a manufacturing ecosystem, or industrial commons. An ideal industrial
commons provides a cluster of localized, interdependent businesses, which grow symbiotically and offer
design, production, distribution, workforce, infrastructure, and investment capabilities to help all
businesses in the same ecosystem thrive.
This is where the ecosystem readiness levels (ERL) comes into play. ERL measures the maturity a
manufacturing innovation system relative to a specific technology. It is important to note, however, that
unlike other readiness level tools, the ecosystem readiness level (ERL) does not remain constant once it
reaches a certain level. A manufacturing ecosystem can ebb and flow like any living ecosystem. If certain
pillars of sustainability begin to deteriorate, so does the ecosystem. That is why constant monitoring and
upkeep is important in maintaining an existing ecosystem.
8 TRL, MRL, BcRL are further defined and discussed in Appendix II.
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“The 2013 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index,” published by McKinsey and Council on
Competitiveness, provides a good framework for assessing the readiness of a region9. GTMI will utilized the
following set of measurements in determining ERL:
Talent to drive innovation
Economic, trade, financial and tax system
Cost and availability of labor
Cost and availability of materials
Supplier networks (covered in MRL)
Legal and regulatory system
Infrastructure
Energy cost and policies
Healthcare system
Government investments in R&D, manufacturing and innovation
Quality of life.
GTMI follows the principles outlined below in implementing its xRL strategy:
a) Develop and apply ERL in conjunction with TRL, MRL and BcRL;
b) Engage faculty and research staff in all six colleges, GTRI, IRIs, and EI2 via a dynamic network
structure as opposed to a governance hierarchy;
c) Early and aggressive engagement of SMEs that support original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
through Georgia and the national MEP;
d) Work closely with state partners, including QuickStart, the Technical College System of Georgia,
Georgia Centers of Innovation, Advanced Technology Development Center, Georgia Department of
Economic Development, chambers of commerce, and transportation infrastructure agencies.
e) Develop partnerships with national leaders in advanced manufacturing:
a. Industry, government and academic units
b. Not-for-profit organizations and consortia such as the Georgia Automotive Manufacturers
Association, National Center of Manufacturing Science, South Carolina Research Authority,
etc.
c. Professional societies like the Society of Manufacturing Engineers and Institute of Industrial
Engineers
9 McKinsey and Council on Competitiveness, 2013 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index.
STRATEGY
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d. Think tanks, including the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and Council
on Competitiveness
e. Workforce development organizations such as the Society of Manufacturing Engineers,
Technical College System of Georgia, and QuickStart
f. National Academies
g. Best-in-class foreign organizations, e.g., Fraunhofer Institutes and Catapult (UK).
PLANS
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Plans
In its March 2012 strategic retreat, GTMI stakeholders created several major tasks and milestones to
advance GTMI mission and implement GTMI strategy. Tasks 1-3 have been completed. Tasks 4 and 5 are still
on-going
1. perform an organization audit and create a new organizational structure10,
2. create an External Advisory Board11 (EAB) and a Faculty Advisory Committee12 (FAC),
3. initiate an Industry Partnership Program13, or IPP, and hold an annual IPP Symposium,
4. Examine GTMI’s role and unique value propositions to its client base including faculty,
administration and external customers,
5. Conduct a series of workshops and meetings to promote the xRL model.
10 The current GTMI organizational chart is in Appendix III.
11 The GTMI EAB By-law is in Appendix IV.
12 A discussion (draft) of GTMI FAC is in Appendix V.
13 IPP pamphlet is in Appendix VI.
APPENDIX I: VALUE PROPOSITIONS OF GEORGIA TECH INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH INSTITUTES (IRIS)
Page 17
Appendix I: Value Propositions of Georgia Tech Interdisciplinary Research Institutes (IRIs)
GTMI, as a member of Georgia Tech’s IRIs, offers a unique set of value propositions which are not provided by other GT research labs, centers, schools or colleges.
1. Brand management
a. Vision
b. Communications, marketing, media relations
c. Messaging
2. Integration, synergy and collaboration
a. Create a GT community
b. Foster collaboration
c. Seed inter-center, inter-school, inter-college, inter-university research ideas and programs
i. In the confluences of disciplines
ii. Transformative potential
iii. Establish and promote through leadership
iv. Manufacturing enterprise perspective
v. Focused on accelerated translation
vi. Integrated research and education
d. Facilitate large-scaled programs and proposals
e. Integrate research, education and workforce development
3. Services to faculty
a. Human resources
b. Information technology
c. Financial management
d. Facilities
e. Technical supports
4. Infrastructure and core facilities
5. Translational agent
a. The missing Bell Labs
b. Crossing the valley of death
APPENDIX II: TRL, MRL AND BCRL
Page 18
Appendix II: TRL, MRL and BcRL
TRL: TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL
Technology readiness level (TRL) is a method of classifying the maturity of a basic technology for use in a
product or process. TRL defines a set of readiness levels from 1 to 9 that provide an efficient way of
communicating a technology’s current state along its development spectrum. A rating of 1 indicates that the
technology is in a nascent state, just beyond the discovery phase. A rating of 9 indicates the technology is
being used successfully in operations.
TRL was developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the 1980s and is used
by several large agencies throughout the world. Fortunately, most implementations make use of the 1 to 9
rating scale, but the meaning of the ratings can vary based upon the primary mission of the user. NASA and
the Department of Defense (DoD) are two large users of TRL.
xRL makes use of TRL as one component of the overall readiness of a technology. Since TRL is well
established and mature, xRL makes use of TRL without change. Currently, xRL makes use of the DoD
readiness level definitions, but xRL may expand to use additional readiness level definitions to address
various intents.
MRL: MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVEL
Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) is another established measure of overall readiness of a basic
technology. As the name implies, it provides a way to communicate the readiness of a technology for use in a
manufactured product or in a manufacturing process. It was initially developed by the DoD to improve the
quality of procuring systems by the government. Specifics about MRL can be found in the “Manufacturing
Readiness Level Deskbook.”
Whereas, TRL defines a single readiness level of a technology, MRL makes use of threads and sub-threads to
provide a more extensive view of the readiness. Threads address nine manufacturing risk areas and consist
of: Technology and the Industrial Base, Design, Cost and Funding, Materials, Process Capability and Control,
Quality Management, Workforce, Facilities, and Management. Each thread is further divided into sub-
threads that provide additional robustness and completeness to the analysis. MRL also defines a set of
guiding/exit questions that are used to determine the readiness level of each sub-thread. The guiding
questions are of great help to the users of MRL because they provide a systematic method of determining
the current state and provide semantics about the readiness definitions. xRL makes use of MRL without
APPENDIX II: TRL, MRL AND BCRL
Page 19
change to determine the manufacturing readiness of a technology within the xRL framework due to MRL’s
active user community and expanding use.
MRL provides a more robust view of readiness than TRL because MRL studies 22 topic areas versus a single
TRL classification. This robustness requires additional analysis and is more challenging to communicate.
Since xRL combines multiple readiness frameworks into an encompassing analysis, the challenges
associated with MRL will be exacerbated in xRL’s larger context. So xRL must be developed such that it can
be applied without overtaxing resources and the results can be presented in way that is easily interpreted
by the intended audience.
BCRL: BUSINESS CASE READINESS LEVEL
To bridge the gap between innovation development and technology insertion, it is critical to incorporate
Business Case Readiness Levels (BcRL) and Ecosystem Readiness Levels (ERL) into the process. Although
very effective tools, TRL and MRL are not sufficient to guarantee successful and rapid insertion of a new
technology. Neither has gained such broad-based acceptance as Six Sigma – a doctrine that has gained
tremendous popularity worldwide in manufacturing, services and the public sector.
The reason for Six Sigma’s popularity is that it offers a clear focus on achieving measurable and quantifiable
financial returns by determining “product cost,” the metric of choice for C-suite decision makers. Corporate
executives can clearly see that when the quality level rises from Four Sigma to Five Sigma, the defects per
million produced drop from 6,210 to 233. When the quality level reaches Six Sigma, another 230 defects per
million are eliminated. Decision makers prefer bottom line numbers, and Six Sigma readily offers this data
where TRL and MRL do not.
As a companion measure to TRL and MRL, BcRL captures the “financial” or “business” reasoning for
launching a new technology or manufacturing project. The intent of BcRL is to methodically build a business
case as the technology matures to shorten the time to market. It equips an integrated product and process
design (IPPD) team with a disciplined maturation and evaluation process to bring the technology to market.
Unfortunately, most technology projects ignore the importance of their business case until late in the
development process. As a result, there is not enough market pull to justify the new technology insertion
because associated benefits and risks have not been studied and articulated.
APPENDIX II: TRL, MRL AND BCRL
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For this reason, it is critical to develop technology, manufacturing and business case readiness
simultaneously. The IPPD effort was a significant step in the right direction. However, maturing technology
and manufacturing concurrently without building a business case does not guarantee successful
implementation of the new technology or manufacturing project. In other words, without the prospect of a
solid financial return, it is difficult to push a new technology into the marketplace, regardless of its level of
innovation.
To build the business case, BcRL determines the technology readiness for market transition (technology
push), the targeted unmet needs (market pull), the product insertion timeline (technology roadmap), a
market capture strategy, and the financial benefits to the company. BcRL is compatible with TRL and MRL
because it is organized at nine readiness levels, as shown in Figure 3. The critical phases are BcRL 3-7,
where the technology development reaches a tipping point, and company executives are convinced of the
potential business value of the new technology.
Since the focus is primarily on building a business case in the BcRL 3-7 space, each exemplar selected for a
business case shall address “as risk” properties that are applied to real-world products in a representative
environment. For example, a composite truck suspension link exemplar would be expected to have
operating tensile properties in excess of 60 KSI and to operate in both wet and sandy environments between
temperatures of -15°C to +55°C. These properties and environments are typical of commercial truck service
throughout the world.
BcRL is meant to evaluate technology starting at a TRL of 2 or 3 and ending at the tipping point, at TRL 6 or
7. This tipping point corresponds to BcRL 6 or 7, where the technical concept initially developed at the lab is
transitioned to initial market insertion. A tipping point may be characterized by a commercial success
during test market evaluation.
The overarching objective of BcRL is to transition a technology from an academic or industry lab to market
in a timely fashion so that product insertion immediately results in significant market success for the
company. An additional benefit is when the academic institution starts to receive a positive cash flow and
continuing royalty payments from the transition of its intellectual property. Ultimately, BcRL is a win-win
solution for all engaged parties. Combined with TRL and MRL, the triad addresses the first grand challenge
of ensuring rapid innovation and seamless transition from lab to pilot to production.
APPENDIX II: TRL, MRL AND BCRL
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Figure 3. Nine Levels of Business Case Readiness Maturity
APPENDIX III: GTMI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
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Appendix III: GTMI Organizational Chart
APPENDIX IV: GTMI EXTERNAL ADVISORY BOARD BY-LAWS
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Appendix IV: GTMI External Advisory Board By-Laws
APPENDIX IV: GTMI EXTERNAL ADVISORY BOARD BY-LAWS
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APPENDIX IV: GTMI EXTERNAL ADVISORY BOARD BY-LAWS
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APPENDIX V: A DISCUSSION (DRAFT) OF GTMI FACULTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
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Appendix V: A Discussion (draft) of GTMI Faculty Advisory Committee
MISSION: The mission of the GTMI Faculty Advisory Committee (FAC) is to advise and assist the Executive
Director of the Georgia Tech Manufacturing Institute in surveying and accelerating innovations, while
identifying and addressing grand manufacturing enterprise challenges that have the potential to enhance
our nation’s wealth, security, and competitiveness.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES: Faculty at the Georgia Institute of Technology are known for producing meaningful, ethical, cutting-edge research within a supportive, intellectually free environment. Many are ideally suited to advise, assist, support, and advocate the education, research, and technology transfer activities associated within GTMI. Hence, the service of those selected to the FAC is not to “rubber stamp” what already exists, but to offer suggestions for improvements that will help the program grow and expand. Key to success is commitment on the part of the committee members as well as participating administrators. PURPOSE: The GTMI Faculty Advisory Committee (FAC) shall advise the Executive Director on matters of policy and thought in support of the research, development and commercialization of manufacturing-related technologies. The FAC shall provide guidance on the selection of faculty that request GTMI membership, offer advice on the management of GTMI space and resources, and serve as a forum to discuss manufacturing-related issues at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The committee is a direct two-way communication channel that faculty who choose to support GTMI and administration can use to convey issues and receive information about manufacturing-related concerns. Facilitating communication, engaging members of the research community, and addressing policies that accelerate innovations and address grand manufacturing enterprise challenges are key issues for this committee. LEADERSHIP: The FAC shall operate as a committee of tenured faculty members with a Chair selected from its membership, who will work with the GTMI Executive Director in establishing an agenda. To ensure continuity, members in leadership roles will serve three successive years as members. At the end of the academic year, a first-year member of the committee will be elected Chair-Elect and will serve in that role during his or her second year on the committee. The Chair-Elect will assume the role of Chair in the third year of service on the committee and will continue as a non-voting member (Past Chair) the following year. The GTMI Executive Director and Past FAC Chair shall serve as ex-officio members. COMPOSITION: This committee shall consist of 12 voting members, who are tenured faculty and qualified as members of GTMI. The twelve shall include four senior and or emeritus representatives known for their substantial contributions to Georgia Tech and GTMI, four internationally renowned faculty from diverse departments within the Georgia Institute of Technology, and four residents within GTMI facilities. These members shall serve staggered non-succeeding three-year terms. If elected to the FAC Leadership, an additional year on the FAC as Past Chair is expected.
GTMI MEMBERSHIP: To be a GTMI faculty member, eligible to serve on the FAC, one must share and
embrace the idea of conducting collaborative research that encourages stakeholders of the regional
manufacturing ecosystem and supports the concept of discover here, build here.
APPENDIX VI: GTMI INDUSTRY PARTNERS PROGRAM
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Appendix VI: GTMI Industry Partners Program
APPENDIX VII: ANNOTATED HISTORY OF THE MANUFACTURING RESEARCH CENTER
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Appendix VII: Annotated History of the Manufacturing Research Center
By Steven Danyluk, 2013
The genesis of the Manufacturing Research Center (MARC) was initiated in 1988 when the administration
sought and received support from the State of Georgia and industrial partners for a dedicated research
center to be housed in a new building at the north end of the campus. Funding was committed by the then
Governor Joe Frank Harris and continued under Governor Zell Miller, the Institute under president John
Crecine and four companies: Motorola, IBM, AT&T, FORD and the Department of Defense Manufacturing
Technology program who each committed $1M each over a five year period i.e. $200,00 per year each. To
spur participation, the overhead rate for company support was reduced and additional funding was
provided by the Institute. The focus and emphasis of this group was in electronics manufacturing.
The first Interim Director was Dr. Michael Thomas, the Chair of the Industrial and Systems Engineering
School, who subsequently became provost, and the building construction completed and dedicated in 1991.
ME faculty took over residence of approximately 40 percent of the building shortly after the dedication with
the remaining space occupied by the faculty of the school of Industrial and Systems Engineering. A
permanent Director, Dr. Michael Kelly, was hired in 1991.
MARC had a permanent staff of 14 individuals including a Facilities Manager, a Research Director, Public
Relations and IT support. A technician and Admin support rounded out the staff.
One of the first major organized activities to occupy MARC was the Materials Handling Center, an NSF-
supported Industry-University Cooperative Research Center, headed by John White, who subsequently
became dean of the College of Engineering and is currently the president of the University of South Carolina.
Another major activity addressed food processing and was led by the Georgia Tech Research Institute.
Steven Danyluk (Morris M. Bryan, Jr. Chair in Mechanical Engineering for Advanced Manufacturing Systems)
assumed Directorship of the Center in 1994 with two Associate Directors: Leon McGinnis (Gwaltney Chair in
the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering) and Edward Kamen (Hightower Chair in the School of
Electrical and Computer Engineering). This leadership team worked closely with the school chairs and
expanded the focus of MARC to include precision machining, rapid prototyping, electronic board assembly,
sustainability, and digital design. The center operated by working closely with a lead (senior) faculty
member in each of these areas, hiring a research professional for each of these areas and providing funds to
sustain the activity. New research ideas were reviewed periodically and funding was provided to seed the
most promising areas of research. The admin staff, facilities manager, IT support and technician provided
the support of this activity. Over the years, MARC has expanded to include offices in the Management
building in Tech Square, and at the MRDC, and the Associate Directors included faculty from ME, ECE and
ISyE.
CONTACT INFORMATION
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Contact Information
DR. BEN WANG EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DR. SHREYES MELKOTE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
TINA GULDBERG DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
Tel (404) 385-2068
Tel (404) 894-8499
Tel (404) 385-4950
Georgia Tech Manufacturing Institute
813 Ferst Drive, NW
Atlanta, GA 30332-0560
Tel (404) 894-9100
www.manufacturing.gatech.edu
