t

Section A: Articles and Topicality. p. A·1

THE SCOPE OF NEGATIVE FIAT AND THE LOGIC OF

DECISION MAKING

L. Pall! Sirait. George Mason University

Brett Wallace. George Washington University

"No one can make a decision exccpl me." - Presiden t Dwight

\).

The. Uniled Slul C:<I Jeuerol go)'enunenJ sub-

stantially increase its public healtlt assistance to Sub-Sohanm .4.f

rica. By consensus, aftirmative teams debating this resolution will ad-

vocate a plan during their first constructi ve speech which wi ll be an

exampJe of this resolution. The USFG, or some partictllar part of the

Ugfa will e.sta6I\$b. some QGli.c,{ of Q\.\bli.c health d;'1;I!<:.\ed loward somc identified area of Sub-Saharan Africa. What the negative

teams arc able to advocate in response is a little more controversial,

every year they seem to have more and more flexibility. While

<l.b'Tees that the negative has the right to defend the status quo,

fU'St negative constructives that lack either a counterplan or a kJitik are

becoming fa irly Wlcommon. Although it is certainly reasonable for the

negative to advocate that the USFG (or the specific agent identified in

the affimlativc plan) takc action as a competitive altenuuivc to the

affinnative. the positions most frequently advocated by the negative

these days, either in the form of a countcrplan or a kriti k altemative.

involve a dccision·maker separate from the one named in the plan. On

this topic, many negative strJ.tegies will center around counlerplanning

another country's taking <lction toward Africa instead of the United

States. Another perennial favorite ofncgative teams is \0 counterplan

tbat anotherageul within the USFG should take action (c. g., ifthe anir-

mative advocates Congress enacting legislation, the negative might ad·

vocate the prL--sidcnt issuing an executive order). Lastly, a[mostall kri tik

ahematives endorse someone besides the US FG taking some kind of

action.

In th is mticle, we will take issue with these kinds of negati ve

slr.ltegics by arguing thtH negative fiat should be constrained to the

actor employed in the affinnative plan. In order 10 do thi s, we will first

explain what we believe to be the primary benefits of participating in

policy debate. From there, we will succinctly summarize thinking about

negative fiat that has developed sillce the inception oflhe counterplan

and explain why alternative agent fiat is inconsistent with the logic of

decision-making that undergirds the justification for both affirm<ltive

and negative fiat. We will then explain how dlCSe argtuncnts work against

agent cowlterplans, against demands for plan speciflcation, and against

alternative frameworks. Finally, we will identify and answer somc ar-

guments made in defense of alternate agent fiat that have not been

explicitly answered. With this article in hand. you should be able to write

a fi'ontline for the second a ffinnative constructive, as well as exten·

sians for both rebunals.

We should note that while some portions of this rutide represent

entirely unique and creative applications orthe cenlralline of reasoning

that negative fiat should becotlstrained to agents who have the power

to enact the plan, we are in the intellectual debt of other debate theo·

rists, mosl notably M ich.ael Korcok. Throughout the article, we cite

various ilnportrult articles which helped infOlm our thinking on this sub-

ject, and we recommend you seek these articicsoli l if you areseriollsly

interested in this question. We try our best to summarize the arguments

of others when appropriate. Since the centml thesis of this arti cle has

been articulated extremely persuasively again and again, it is our hope

to make this thesis more palatable to current debaters and coaches by

explaining the relevance of this question to contemporary controversies

in me activity. At a minimum, we would like to do Ollr part to contribute

to the body ofliterature describing the scope of negative fiat, which Solt

(1996) described as "a Illora%. a swamp tilled with exotic species o f

flut ih.cOIyand no theon;::tical consensus."

'The value ot policy debate Since its inception, much oflhl! praise policy debate has received

for educating student" has foclised on the real-world skills adopted

throug.h the processes of research, argwnenlaliol1, crilical thinking. and

pol icy analysis. Studen ts take these skiJJs and apply them It) jobs. poJj.

> 1::>'1 \\"\t\'i \\\e. \"f\Qo;:.o;:.u,\"f\ o.o;:.C:)i,on wo;:.

make, including trivial question.') like where \ve should cm dinner as well

as non-trivial questions like what college we should attend or whom we

should malty. we evaluate all of the relevallt advantages and disadvan-

Tages, consider possiblc alternatives, and come to a conclusion.Apolo-

gists for policy debate oftcn champion the increased critical thinking

skills taught by the activity (hat are necessari ly used to \'lork. through

these kinds of choices. If this is tndy the desired goal of policy debate.

one would think that the way in which deba tes are framed, discllssed,

and adjudicated should closely resemble the logic behind ar/:"1.llnentation

and decision making that everyone. from the highest gOVCl1111lCl1l oft!·

cials to the most " inconsequential" members of sociery, uses when they

themselvcs think through a difliclIlt choicc.

The way in which decisions are made. in the real world always

tak.es into account the considcf3ti.on of who is making the decision.

Decision·makers can only chose from the available options open to

them, and not from all possible options they can think ot: Wltile deci·

sion-making would be a lot easil!r if we could assume the position ofa

universal decision maker. i.e .. sonleom: who is al l powerful and can

magically alter the course of action of anyone in the world they wanted,

reality doesn't ofTerus this option. There is no game genic for decision

making, no cheat code. and no abi lity to 1)lay god. Only oncc we realize

the limi ted power that hUmans possess can \ve develop u cogent basis

tor decision making.

Countless debate theorists have explained this arglllnentand ap·

plied it to the logic of policy debate. From Allan Lichtman and Daniel

Rohrer 's groundbreak ing 1975 artide "A General Theory of the

Counterplan:' we have the earliest observation that negative fiat should

have a limited scope, relatingtothc logic of who is making I.hcdccision:

11 is assumed. of course, that decision mak.ers being addressed

have the power to put a countcrplan into effect. An individual or gov-

emmental unit can reasonably be "sked to n:jccl a palticular policy if an

altemative promises greater net bcncfiUi. If, however, a counterplan

must be adopted by another individual or unit of government, the initial

decision maker Illllst consider the probabi lity tha.t the counterplan will

be accepted. Debate propositions often a.ffinn that a particular po licy

should be adopted by the federal government. Even if adoption 0[[hi5

policy by the indi.vidual Slate govc11lments would be more beneficial, a

reasonable critic would still affiml the resolution if st"1te adoption were

highly unlikely. The federal govemmemshould refT'din from acting only

when the net benefits of state and local action, discounted by the prob.

ability that sllch action will occur, are greater than the net beneflts of

federal action. (p. 74, footnote 13).

Expanding upon Lichtman and Rohrer's work, Michael Korcok

(200 I) keenly explained thaI advantages and disadvantages relating to

political l"t.m1iticutions, resources, policy effectiveness, enforcement, and

so on, all depend lIpon whose task it is to take the desired action. TItere·

fore, questions of the substantive desirability of the affirmative,

reso lutional edl1cation more broadly, and policymakillg in totality are

p.A-2

incoherel1t witbout first specifying who is making the decision.

On this year's resolution the affimmtive is asked to support a

United States federal govemment increase in public hea lth assistance

10 Africa. The affi nnative's job is dearly to cmft a nonnative argument

in favor of alL arpat1 of the United States federal govcmment's taking

aCTion. Arguments as to why other countries, international organiza-

tions, or other agents within the United States should take action are

irrelevant to the question ofthe aftimlative's plan because. as Lichtman

and Rohrer point out, they circunwcnl questions of probability. Thus it

on ly makes sense to analyze the desirabil ity of the affinnativc's action

from the lens of avai lable altcmatives open to the topical actor advo-

cated by the atlinnative. The fmthcr that we stray from this logic, the

less and less usefu l deh,lte becomes and the more and more a flawed

tiarnework for decision-making gets ingra ined in our minds.

Consider what it means when a judge votes aftinnati ve or nega-

tive. Supposing the affinnari vc has preSel1lL'<i a topical plan. tbe judge

voles aflinnative when the plan is shown to be net-advantageous when

compared to the status quo or a competitive alternative; and the judge

votes negative when the plan is shown 10 be less desirable Ihan Ibe

sraws quo or a competitive altemative. Ifgiving testimony to the Con-

gress, thc j udgc could reasonably say: "Based on the arguments ( have

heard over the last hour and a half, il would be bener for you to do X

than Y"' Tn other words, aftcr the dcbate is concluded, one entity could

make <l decision based on the infonnation presented. This not 10 say

that Congress (or anyone else) should make decisions based on the

outcomes of scholastic dc,bate rounds- what is important is that Ihe

debaters will have gone through the process of making ao infomled

decision. Th is is utterly impossible if the negative supports action from

some other 11gent besides the one identified in the plan. Since the enlire

point of fiat is to bracket off questions of'would" in order to focus

completely on questions of "should, " questions of probability never get

discussed. From the perspective orthe agent idcntifit.-d in the plan, the

probabili ty is 100%, since if they decide to adopt the mandates oCthe

plan, there is an absolute guarantee that they will in fact do so. Yet if the

plan is compared to a counterplau in which Japan carries oul public

health assistance rather than the United States. there is nevcr a situa-

tion where lhe United States could make a decision based on a 100%

probabil ity that JClpCln would take action if the United States did not.

Thus, ifthe Congrcss had to consider if they should take action or some

other decision-mt:lking body should take action, if they failed to consider

the chance that that otherdccisionwmaking body would not in tact take

the desired action, they would not have gone through any SOlt of logical

deliberation process. Yet this is exactly the way pl'Oponents of ahema-

tive agen t tiat encoumge judges and debaters to think.

More to the point, debate certainly helps tCflch a lot of skill s, yet

we believe that the way poucy debate participation encourages you to

think is the most valuable educational bene fit, because how someone

makes decisions dctcTITlincs how they will employ the rest of their abili-

ties. including the research and communication skills that debate builds.

Plenty of debate theo!)' articles have explained cither thc value of de-

bate, or th.;: way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to

rea l-world education, but none so far have attcmpted to lie tbese con-

cepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill develop-

ment is the foremost value of policy debate and how this bencfit is the

decisiolHtde to resolving all thooretical discllssions about negative fiat.

Why debate? Some do it for scholarships. some do it for

purposes. and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant

considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as

debate theorists they aren'[ the focus of our concern. Our concern is

finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of

students wi th the highest quality of skills. while at the same time pre-

serving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from

discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing

every single one orus will do every day afour lives besides breathing.

Decision-making tmnscends bmll1daries between categories ofleal1l-

ing like "poliey education"' and "kririk education," il makes irrelevant

considerations of whether we will eventually be po licymakers, and it

transcends questions of what substantive content a debatc round should

The implication for this analysis is that the critical th inking and

argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making arc com-

pumtively greater than ,Illy educ<ltionaldbwdvantagc weighedag::lin. ... t

them. it is the skills we team, not the can lent of mIl' argumcnl';, that can

be.<;r improve all of our lives. While policycomparisol\skillsare going 10

be leamed through debate in one way or another, those ski lls are use-

less if they are not grounded in the kind oflogic actually used to make

decisions.

The academic srudies and rescarch supporting this position arc

numerous. Richard Fulkerson (1996) explains thai "argumentation ... IS

the chief cognit ive activity by which a dcrnocracy. a field of study, a

corporat ion, or a committee functions .. . And it is vitally important that

high school and college studenls learn both to argue well and lo critiquc

the arguments of others" (p. 16). Stuart Yeh (1 998) comes to the con-

clusion that deb,ue allows even cuI rural minority students 10 "idcnti fyan

issue, considerJitlcrent views, fonn and defend a vic\vpoint, ami con-

si.der and respond to COllnlcraq,Tumcnts ... Thc ability to write effective

arguments influences grades, academic success, and preparat ion ror

college and employment" (p. 49). CCl1ain ly, these are all reasons why

debate and argUlnent<ltion themsdves arc valuable, so why is real world

da..ision-makingcriricai to argumentative thinking? Although people might

occasionally think about problems trom the position of an ideal dccision-

maker (c.t: Ulrich. 198 1, quoted in Korcok. 200 1), in debate we should

be concemed with what type of Ilrgumentativc thinking is the most

relevant to real-world inte!! igence and tbe decisions that people make

every day in tbeir lives. not acadl!mic trivialitics. 11 is precisely lx.-cause

it is rooted in real-world logic that argumentative thinking has va lue.

Deanna Kuhn 's research in "Thinking as Argument" explains this by

staring that "no other kind of think ing maners morc--or contributes more-

to the quality and fu lfillmcntofpeople 's lives, both individually and col-

Icctively"(p. 156).

Given these pedagogical concerns, we agree with Korcok's (200 1)

conc lusion that " 'he appropriate scope of negati ve fiat is the scope of

the authority of the decision-maker choosing whether to adopt the aftir-

mative plan" (p. 253). Korcok clearly identified that [his interprt:cation

ofnegaf ive fiat was the on ly way to access thedccision-making logic

that is so valuable. He leaves as an open question, however, who ex-

actly constitutes the dccision-makcr wbo chooses to adopt the affinna-

tive plan. ls that decisionwmaker rhe en tire resolutional agent? Is it the

j udge deciding whcther or not to cndorse the plan academ.ically? Our

proposal is that the decision-maker shouTd be limj,ted to thc topical agenl

chosen by the aflirnultive, which we contend is the logica l extension of

Korcok's retL'>Oning, and has applications both in deal ing with plan speci-

fication issues and with kritik: theolY beyond fUl1herdarifying the limi ts

ofncgati\'c fiat.

Agent counterplans: Fair? The way in which theoretical disputes are handled in actual de-

bate rounds is often muddy and shallow. Frequently, the Second Aftir-

mative speaker will read a quick, hlippy list of complaints about the

counterplan or kritik in question. and then, in the negative block. an

equally quick and blippy list of defenses are read in response. Ra re ly is

a cohesive interpretation which ties all of the arguments togcther of--

fered and compared to a counter-interpretation. as topicality dcbates

are often treatcd. Standards are often debated i.n a vacuum and not

compared to an altenl<1tive vision of debate, which is usually merely

implied. We regard this as unfortunate, mld perhaps 1\ reason why neglltive

teams all [00 frequently win theoretical disputes, regardless of the is-

sue. Nevenheless, in an ideal debare, eacb team will defend competi-

tive visions of negative fiat power, and org;mize their ml,'1.lIuents in temlS

of offense and defense. TIlerc are two impacts to all of these argu-

ments: competitive equi ty and education. \Ve have already explained

tbe educational benefits of adopting our interpretation. Aflirmative teams

will have to be prepared to answer claims Like " But it is soeducationnl

to research about the Congress versus the President." but since these

kinds of arguments are not exclusively accessed by agent counterplans.

we do nor regard thcm as serious d mllcnges to our (lrgument presented

above. Therefore, we shall deal here with (he issue of competitive eq-

uity.

First. we must note that the tenninal impact to all qucst ions of

competici,vc equity is ultimately participation in itself, which is

good because debate is fun and, obviously, educational. Therefore, ifit

is the case thnt the single most valuable benetit one can gain from

participating in debate is that it improves decision-makingski!!s, then the

educational benefit of rejecting an illogical fiat scheme would outweigh

competitive cquity cOllcems that are not absolute. Therefore, un less the

negative Clln show that agent counterplans are absolutely critical to

preserve p3l1 icipalion in debate (fur example. if the affinnat ivc would

will almost every debate without agent cOlmterplans), claims that they

arc "not that bad" do nal get to the level needed to prove that they arc

necessary . It is the negative 'S burden to justify their use of alternate

actor fiat, not the aftimlative's burden to dejustify all agent counlcrplans.

Unfortunately, as we explain next, debates nomlally do not play out tbis

way.

The connection we have already identified between the log.ic of

dee-isioo making and the proper limit of negative fiat ha,<; implications for

competitive equity as well. which gives afftmlative {eams further of-

fense to convince judges to not consider alternate agent fiat. One method

used by negative teams to handle theoretical objections to their

counterplans or mtiks is to minimize their opponents' ability to win of-

fensive impac[S by cro fi ing clever counter-interpretations [hat simulta-

neously allo\,., the particular strategy chosen by thc negative but disal-

low similar, but perhaps more egregious. strategies. For example, sup-

pose the ncgativeadvoca{cs that the president, instcad orlhe congress,

should increase public health assistance. When the affirmati ve team

argues shou ld reject altemative agent fiat, the negative might

offer a counter-interpretation that they should be constrained to the

decision-makers in the resolution (i .e., some part of the USFG). or even

W OI1>C, that (he negative should only be allowed 10 fiat [he particular

decision-maker used in dleir cOUflterpJan, the president. The most egre-

giolls abusL'S of negative fiat would be avoided by this counter-interprc-

tation, the negative would claim, and the judge should certainly allow

their reasonable, predicw.ble countcrplan. j fthc counter-interpretat ion

chosen by the negative only allows the exact counterplan that they

chose to nm. it would cel1ainly be very easy for the atl'innative since

that is the only counterplan they WOllid ever have to deal with! Why on

earth should the judge vote against the countcrplan fo r theoretical rea-

sons if the negative has an interpretation that is very favorable for the

affimlati ve?

We believe that this kindofstra tcgy, while rhetorically strong, is

intellecrually banknlpt. Affinnative teams occasionally respond simi-

larly to topicality arguments by off cli ng that

only their plan is topical. and negative teams have figured out by now

that these kinds of counter-interpretations are highl y arbitrnry. We con-

tend that just like an interpretation of what is topical ought to be grounded

in some non-arbitrary literature, illterpretations of what the negative

ought to be allowed to fiat also should be non-:ubitrary. The cUlTem

repertoire of interpretations dlat debaters use mainly focuses· on d.is-

tinctions likc public vs. private actors, domestic vs. intematiol1a! deci-

sion-makers, multi-actor fiat and object fiat, but these categories miss

themark completely. because they have nothing to do with the founda-

tion of negative fiat, the logic of decision-making.

An examination of the question offiating "'the object" makes our

position even more clear. Except for those who believe in 'negative

flexibility' as a cult-like religion, everyone agrees that the negative should

not be able to fiat the object ofthe plan; otherwise their win percentage

would skyrocket at the expense of the affirmative. Imagine you are

Section A: Articles and Topicality, p. A-3

running an affinnati\'e which gives condoms and educational assistlmce

in order to solve an HIV/AIDS lldvanlage. Wh<lt substantive answer

would YO Ll have to a cOllntcrplan that had all peopJe infected wi th HIV

become celibate? Or suppose your plan was designed to solve a geno-

cide. The counterp lan to have chc culpable govcmment killing

people prob<lbly solves your affinllf1tfve better than you could ever hope

to with the plan. These are intuitively unfair, making it

for the affirmative to generate oftense. But what 111le would

we udopt to preclude their discussion? Perhaps tile negative should not

be able to fiat a decision-maker who is affected by the plan. Even if

thcre was some non-arbirnuy way 10 decide what and who the plan

affects. it is unclear if even that nile would be sufficient. Consider

affirmatives which uf<::l:ue that the World Health Oft,4mlization is making

somcthi ng worse. perhaps by offering defective medicine or equi pl11cnt,

and so the plan has the United States increase public health assistance

in order to offset the poor assistance in rhe status quo. The cOlJllterplao

to have the WHO change its policy solves the whole case, and the plan

does not actually affect the WHO (the object oflhe plan is still some-

where in sub-Saharan Africa), so our previous ly identified mle is insuf-

ficient forexduding this cownerplan, yec it is abo intuitively wl,air. When

alternative agent fiat is allowed, there really is no non-arbitrary method

of preventing object fiat. Sillce every harm area is a consequence Ofll0

onc's solving it, every alternative agent counterplan is at least a little bit

object fiat. While some counterplnns are clearly '"more unfa ir" than

others, if we can agree with the gcneral principle that objecL fiat hanns

competitive equity. the only true solution is to prevent all alteOlative

agent fiat.

One possible answer to this lineofl1:aSoning is that while it is the

case that [here is no real world decision maker who would decide be-

tween the plan and the counterplan, debate is not the real world, and the

judge is the one Singular decision maker\vllO decides to accept the plan

or thc eountcrplan and endorse onc or the other as the "best idea."

Cel1ainly the j udge is a singular decisiml maker with respeCT to The

ballot (most of thc: ti me - but it should be noted that the University of

Louisville has counrerplanned other judges into theirdebatesj. and the

only rca l decision he or she must make is determ ining \-vhi ch team did

the beucr debating. This seriously begs the question, howeve: the judge

must have some criteria for making that decision, and the fact that he or

she is a unitary decision-maker when it comes time to si&,rn the ballot

does not obviate negative teams fro m justifying the particular policy

they are advocating vis-a.-vis the plan. For the most part, teams defend-

ing <lltemate agentcoumerplans still wouLd like the judge toevaluate the

debate with in a traditional policy framework, voting either for the IOpi-

cal plan, a competitive policy 0pfion, or the status quo. If they defend a

competitive policy option which docs not test the opportunity cost ofthe

agent ofthc plall. they still wallt (he judge to decide that the counterplan

is better than the plan. which means they still ha ve to come to grips with

the basic thesis of the single dec,isiol1-makcr argument. This is not the

only possibility, however. The negative team could pos it that the judge is

like an activist deciding which policy to cndorse. The real qucstion.

then, is not which policy is the besf in a Vdcuum. but rather which poLicy

is mOSt worthy of an activist's support. Unfortunately for defenders of

altemate agent eOl1nterplans, thi s argument offe rs [hem no security-

onc of the most critical questions an activist must consider is whether or

Dot they will be listened to, i.e., whether their activism will work. It

might be a worse policy for the Congress to pass legislation than for the

Court fO issue a ruling, but at the same time it might be nearly impossible

to successfhlly lobby the Cowt. Since alternate agent fiat intentionally

ignorcs quesfions ofprobabiJi ty. it is never a lIseful tool for infonning

activists in which organization they ought to place £heir tiust It is ironic

that most negative teams who make this counter-interpretati.on. as part

of a theory debate subsequently seem to ib'11ore the question of activism

when reading solvency evidence for their cOllnterplan or disadvantages

to the plan. Other possible itemtions of the role of the judge as a deci-

are discussed in more detail below when we tum to the

, I ,

I '

, ' , ' I , I I t'

p.A-4

application ofthis theOI)' to critical framework debates.

Separate from the question of the logic of fiating an alternate

agent, there are other serious faimess concems that the debate com-

munity seems to have overlooked. These concerns are not entirely sepa-

ratc, of course- fiat is adecision-making toot, not an exercise in imag-

ined omnipotence. When 1 decide if I am going to get up when my

alarm rings, orinstead hit snooze, it is totally reasonable forme to imag-

ine both waking up and hitting snooze at a probability of 100%, but in

neither case would it make any sense tor me to consider a possible

world in which my friend covered all of my daily duties so that there

would be no disadvantage to getting some extra sleep. In policy debate,

in order to debate topics thatevel),one can equally research, we debate

public actors rather than private ones, and we need to find literature to

support acting in one way or another. Just like it would be unreasonable

for me to consider things other people could (but probably wOllfdn

do, it is wlreasonable for rigorous policy analysts to write evidence

comparing equivalent action between two agents. To be sure, there is

some literature that compares different public actors, but what passes

for quality evidence here is terrihle most of the time. Negative teams

will read cards that say that "the COU1ts are good at making health

policy" or "Japan is decent at public health assistance to Africa" or

even "Japan is good at [insert specit"ic mandates of the plan)." In no

case, however, arc there cards which say "if one had to choose be-

tween Japan or the United States doing X, Japan would be better." The

reason should be obvious-no one would ever make this kind ofdeci-

sian, or anything close. Evidence which states that Japan is better than

the United States or visa-versa in the area of public health assistance

will not cut it, because it is not written ill the context of policy choice,

since there is no Emperor of the World. At best, comparative evidence

that is read misrepresents the comparison because there are implied

probability concems which are intentionally bracketed off with the magic

wand of fiat. That one agent is not likely to act is more often than not

the reason that another agent is "key."

Why is this important? Ifwe are willing to engage in the lunacy

of alternate agent fiat, perhaps the fact that the solvency evidence is

slightly out of context is not the biggest deal. Yet this cuts to the healt of

the matter-if evidence that compares two agents taking action on the

question of the plan is quoted out of context because probability issues

are ignored, the kind of evidenced-based, rigorous policy analysis that is

the mark of the best rounds of debate is impossible. No one rebuts the

claim that Japan, rather than the United States, should give condoms to

sub-Saharan Africa, because that initial claim is not a genuine opportu-

nity cost of the plan. People who write articles analyzing policies usu-

ally do so fora reason-they would like to encourage policy-makers to

behave in one way or another. This means that there is an examination

of possible courses of action with respect to a single agent-an ideal

policy and one or more altematives, all of which come at the cost of

enacting the first policy. Action by alternate agents fails to represent an

Opportlllllty cost to the agent of the plan, and therefore is never going to

be the subject of rational public policy discourse. Since a good literature

base is the sine qua non affair subject matter for policy debate, alter-

nate agent counterplans should be excluded.

We have mentioned that agent counterplans fail to test the op-

portunity cost ofthe plan, but what docs this mean and why is it impor-

tant? Opportunity cost is a concept important in the field of economics.

It refers to the most valuable forgone alternative to an action. This is

very important to economists because of the flexibility of currency-

dollars may be used to purchase a great number of things, and so every-

thing that is pmchased ;costs' the other things that could have been

pmchased with the same money. For example, if a hotdog cost'> one

dollar and a hambmger costs two dollars, the opportunity cost of buying

a hambmger is two hotdogs, because every hamburger purchased is

two less hotdogs that could be purchased. In debate, we test policies

based on their direct costs (disadvantages that will result) and opportu-

nity costs (competitive counterplans or kritik alternatives which may

enjoy a comparative advantage). Acounterplan does not represent an

opportunity cost merely by being competitive, for competition is a nec-

essary but not sufticient condition to prove that one policy represents a

legitimate opportunity cost of another policy. It is critical that the two

policies be enacted by the same agent, because otherwise it is impos-

sible to say that the opportunity to exclusively enact one policy was lost

far any particular policy-making body. This is a key distinction because

everydecisian that people make involves measuring opportunity cost

which means that comparisons of policies which do not represent mu-

tual opportunity costs invoke a kind of thinking totally foreign to any

actual decision-making, and is therefore problematic for all ofthe rea-

sons we have outlined.

Plan specification 11 is impossible to get deeply involved in the debate sUlTounding

alternate agent fiat without addressing agent specification (A-spec) ar-

guments. Typically, the way these arguments are deployed goes some-

thing like this: A. the USFG is composed ofthree branches;B. their plan

specifies no further than the USFG; C. that is bad because it means we

cannot read agent specific disadvantages or establish textual competi-

tion for our agent coullterplans and agent considerations are 90% (!!)

of policy making (Elmore, 1980), which means D. it is a voting issue,

judge. Glancing down at the timer, l2 seconds have gone by. We are

t0111 on the demand for specific agent specification. Adrienne Brovero

(1994) made several solid arguments for requiring the atlinnative to

specify more than simply "the USFG" On the other hand, the most

common practical strategic purpose of the A-spec argument is to legiti-

mize counterplans whieh we tind deplorable. Neveltheless, we believe

that if the affirmative specifIes their agent, rather than establishing a

liability, it makes it easier to defend against altcmatc agent counterplans.

Ifthc negative team's A-strategy (no pun intended) is an alternate agent

cOtmterplan and you are good enough to beat them on "permute: do the

counterplan," you are also good enough to beat them on "agent

counterplans are i!legitimate.'· More to the point, some people have

argued that one possible defense of USFG-specific alternate agent

countcrplans on USFG topics is that the agent of the resolution is still

the USFG, and so if both the plan and the counterplan is under the

jurisdictional authority ofthe USFG. the counterplan is reasonable. Since

in the last two and a halfdeeades we have moved fim1ly past the notion

that the affinnative team is responsible forevery instance ofthe resolu-

tion (it now goes without saying thar the affirn1ative team must only

defend their plan), as long as the affirmative team specifies a topical

agent. there should be no question that the negative only may use that

agent in their counterplans.

In most A-spec debates, the negative team will quote Elmore's

claim that 90% of policy-making concerns the appropriate agent. We

will spare you this card, but we note that the only relevancc that this

evidence actually has is in tenns of deciding between agents over which

you have delegation power.lfl am going to assign one of my debaters

the politics DA llptlates for the next tournament, perhaps 90% of that

coaching decision is picking a student who is going to do a good, com-

prehensive job. Obviously the counterplan to have all the other teams

not update the politics DA solves the case better than the plan, regard-

less of which of my students gets the assignment, but the silliness of

that demonstrates why the legitimacy of altemate agent counte'1Jlans

does not follow from Elmore's claims, rightly understood. Additionally,

Elmore concludes his mticle by arguing that implementation literature is

overwhelmingly descriptive rather than prescriptive, which essentially

makes the argument we have made above - it is impossible to ground

these kinds of debates in the literature:

Richard F. Elmore, "Backward Mapping: implementation Re-

search and Policy Decision," Political Science Qumterly, 94, Number4

Winter 1979-1980, page 605

Students of implementation repeatedly argue that implementa-

tion problems should be considered when policies are made. Better

policies \vould result. we are told, ifpolicymakers would think about

whether their decisions could be implemented before they senle on a course of action. The argument is often made in an accusatOlY way, as

jf policymakers were somehow deficient for not routindy und system-

atically Ihinkingabour implementation problems. Yet when one looks to

the implementation literature for guidance, there is not much to be found.

Implementation research is long on description and shOltOI1 prescrip-

tion. Most implementation research is case· s tudies. nlis facl. by itself,

is nei thcr good nor bad. But it does presenr special prOblems when it

comes to translating research into useful guidance for policymakers.

Cases, ifthey arc well written, focus on a particular sequence of events

illld a specific set of causes and consequences. When drawing conclu-

sions from their data, case writers are characteristically and honesdy

cautious. They are typically carefulnoe to genemlize more than a step

or two beyond lheir data, and they do that very aJXllogelica lly. Thus,

w hen we look to the most intluential implementation studies for guid-

ance about how to anticipate implementation problems, we find advice

that is desultory and strategically vague.

Framework debates Decision-making logic has imJXlrtant repercussions for critical

debates as well, and since the kritik's evolution in debate is so nascent,

the theoretical literature's discussion of these issues in conjunction is

sparse. This is disappointing. because framework debates eire pruticu-

!arly fert ile grounds tor the application of decision-making theory. One

of the centra l questions addressed by uitica l debates is whether the

role of the ballot is to evltluate policymaking on the one hand or micro-

political action (or something else entirely) on the other. Even when

critical teams don 't root their links in an indictment of policy making,

their altemative usually entails some kind of change in the way individu-

als think. This sees up (\ d ichotomy between who should be taking ac-tion, and fundamental ly purs kritiks in the S<1me categolY ofaltematc

agem counlerp l<llls.

The theoretical legitimacy of critical frameworks is the second

area in which Korcok's (200 1) analysis is incomplete. Our view that the

,lppropriate scope of negative fiat is the topical agent chosen by the

affimlative would exclude all kritik alternatives, or at the very least

increase tbe level of specificity required in order to consider them legiti-

male. This is true because me affinnativc's agent, derived from the

r!;;:So lution, has to be an actor within the United States federal govern-

ment. The aftinnative's actor is not the debate critic. ClarifYing this

distinction m,lkes it obvious that for the negative'S criticism to have any

relevance, they have [0 ignore the constraints upon tbe decision maker's

Ilutoority. Alternatives that have the judge endorse a nebulous rejection,

I'ethinking. or criticism of a particular ;J..xiology, epistemolob'Y andlor on-

tology are the exact type of universal decision-making authority that

doesu'texist in the real world. It would bc great if every terrorist in the

world rejected violence, every criminal embmced love, or every hW1lal1

being ended their fetish with capitalism, but the probability that these

would ever occur is n il. This is object fiat al its best. and as explained

ellrlier, it is devastating for the affinnative's capacity 10 develol} of-

fense.

Negative claims that excluding critical alternatives is detrimental

to education fail to be persuasive when decision-making logic is taken

into account. Critical intellectuals and po licymakers both take imoac-

count the probability that their actions will be sllccessful. Fialing that

individuals alter the ir method ofthlnking circwnvents these questions of

probability and thus not only destroys education aboutpolicymaking, but

offers a flawed approach to activi sm (or any other pLUview of actioni

philosophy the negative is advocating), Intellectuals and activists have

many impOItant cons iderations relating 10 resources, press coverage,

political clout and method. These questions all a re directly related to

Il ... ho is taking action. Alternative debates tbusoften become frustmting

because they do a poor job of explaining who the subject is. Consider

the popular Nietzschcan alternative, "do noihing." Who is it that the

negative to do nothing? Does the USFG do nothing? Is it the

deb..1ters? Is it thejudge w ho does nothing? Is it evcry individua l, or just

individuals in Africa that have to do w ith the affinllatives harm area?

A ll of these questions directly implica te the desirabi lity of the alrema-

tive, and thus the education that we Cl1n receive from this mode of

Altematives like "votc negati ve to reject capitalism," "detach

truth from power," or "embrace an intinite responsibility to lhc other"

fall prey 10 similar conce ms. This inability to pin the negative down lOa

course of action allows (hem 10 be sllifty in their second rebutta l, and

sculpt their altemative in a way that nvoids the affirmative's offense.

R,lther than increasing education, clitical frameworks are often a msc

that a llows the negative to intlate their imp0l1ance and ignore crucial

decision-making considemtions.

Several othcroffcnsivearguments can be leveraged by [he affi r-

mative in order to insulnte them from negative claillls that critical de-

bate is a unique and impotiant type of education that the affirmative

excludes. The tirst is discussed above, that the most important benefit

to patticipation in policy debate is not the content of our arguments, but

the skills we learn from debating. As was just explained. since the abil-

ity 10 make decisions is a skill activis ts and in tellectuals must use as

wel l, decision-making is a prerequis ite to effective education about any

subject. nle strength of this argument is enhanced when we realize

that debate is a game. Since debaters are forced to "switch sides" they

go into each debate knowing that a nOll-personal mindset wi!! be neces-

sary at some point because they will inevicably be forced to argue against

their own convictions. Members of the acti vity are aU smart enough to

realize that a votc for an argument in a debate docs no t reflect an

absolute tlUth, but merely that a team making [hat argulll ent did the

better debating. When it comes to educ!Jtion about content, the number

of times someone will change their personal convictions because of

something that happens in a debate round is extremely low, because

everyone know$ it is a game. On the other hand, with cognitive skills

like the da:ision-mHking process which is taught through argument and

debate, repetition is viUli. The best way to strengthen decision-making's

cognitive thinking sk ills is to have smdents practice them ill social set-

tin /:,"S like debate rounds. Moreover, a lot of the decision-making process

happens in strategy sessions and during research periods - debaters

hear about a particular a ffimmtive plan find are tasked with developing

the best rcsponse.lfthey are conditioned to believe lhataltcmate agent

countcrp lans or utopian philosophical alternatives are legitimate re-

sponses, a vital teaching oppottunity will have becn lost.

Much of the in-round ar.b'Ument.ntion and theory literature on

framework debates has rocused on the subject of"affirrnative choice"

over [he last few years, most notably by O'Donnell (2004). As ex-

pla ined in the discussion above about agent specification, the affinlla-

tive clearly gets to chose theirplruvcasc, and thus \vithout also

gets to chose their agent. Champions of"affinnative choice" contend

that just as affilmati ve reams get to choose a (topical) plan , they get to

choose [he u ltimate criteria used by the judge to decide how to vote.

The way in which "atlinna(ivechoicc" gets deployed in tbe Slams quo

is correct, but irreleva nt, for two reasons. first of all , the fact that {he

afiinnarive chooses to answer the question of '\vhether the affinnativc's

policy option is superior to the status quo or competitive policy option" is

not a reason why the negative's framework is not compctifivc. Each

side disagrees about the question that is be ing asked in the debatc,just

Like eaeh s ide disagrees about w hat branch should be acting. S ince the

negative w ill still w in links as to why the framework the affinnativc

chooses has a disadvantage. they are able to disprove why tJ1at choice

is desirable. The majority of all critical debaters incorporate links that

apply not just to the plan but to the logic of policy making, framework

choice, and fairness as well. This makes i[ easy for the negative to win

that aftinnati ve c ho ice isn' t a reason tor the affirmative to win .. be-

cause they indict the log ic of the assumptions behind what the aft-inTUl-

rive chooses, and offer a competitive framework. Currently, "afli nna-

tive choice" as a2Ae response to a kritik is no different than making a

,

p. A-6

Iheol)' argument against the congress counrerplan by saying "well , we

chose the Supreme Coutt, so action by Congress is an irrelevant con-

sideration." The real reason why "aftlnnative choice" is a devastating

response to the negative's framework is because their framework wil l

necesstlTily entail an altcmative that involves action bya differcntaclor.

Tllis is the logical underpUullng behind "affinnative choice" arguments

thai has been missing so far from the literature base. As exp lained

,.\bove. action by actors besides the USFG may be C(Jlllpetilh.le, but

since they do not test the opportunity cost of the plan 's agent. they are

not cogent responses to the speech act presented in the fi rst a tlimlati ve

constructive.

Things get tricky when the negative attempts to explain their

ti-amework as H reason why Ihe judge's intellectual endorsement of the

resolution is a separate consideration from whether the decision-maker

should be acting. This is the Slance Korcok (200 1) takes. saying that

separating the judge from the decision-maker opens up a discursive

space for critical arguments. Clearly the judge then has authority to

choose to endorse an idea that distinct from, and competitive with, an

illtel lecrual a.;tion. UnfOltullately for the nega-

ti ve, this is a separate question than the one the resolution aSKs, and

does not provide a reason to reject the aflinnative. The reason why this

is t11.1e is resolved by a discussion of what the jurisdiclionallimits ofthe

resolution arc and relates to the next problem with current ways 01'

looking at aftinnativc choice.

The second concelll with "affirmative choicc" is that the COIl -

straints on possible affirmative choices are not explained. They do not

get to choose simply any way of looking at the resolution; they get to

ehoose a topical action. This is the crucial diffen:nce that Korcok's

proposal ignores, because it leaves open the possibility that an actor

besides the USFG could be thedee-ision-maker. This isn't [0 say that his

proposal endorses non- topical action, but raking into ,ICColint the fact·

that the aftirmat ivc's actor bas to be topical allows us to narrow down

the range of possible decision-makers and to make a conclusive an-

swer about whm question ihe affirmative is attempting to answer in

order to win the debate. ObviolL';ly, in a policy debate, the congress. the

cxecufive, and Ihe judiciary are all possible decisiolHnakel"s that arc

examples ofthc resolution. But in the context offramework debates,

the resolution gives us only one question to answer. Every year. the

contains the introductory word "rL'Solvcd,·' fo!1O\ved by a course

of action by the USFG. The colon separates the two parts of the reso-

lution trom each other. indicating that we as a community in each round

have to "express an opinion by resolution or vote" about the nOlTIlative

que!:i tion ofUSFG action (Words and Phrases, 1964, p. 478). Individual

panicipallls in the debate round are 110t the agents of the resolurion, but

the one coming to an aflinnative or negative conclusion about the ques-

tion of if it w(Juld he good/or the United States j ederal government

as a decision-Illuker to acr. Each debate critic and individual debater

is clea rly sepamted from thcdccision-maker by the resolution.

tive interpre tations that tum the judge or the debaters into a second

decision-maker are thus attempting to change fhe question that me res0-

lution is asking in order to evaluate the opportunity cost of their localized

action.

the topica l agent identified in the plan the decision-

maker with respect 10 the debate. rather than the judge or the debaters.

has three additional benefits. First., ethical questions rel ating to intellec-

tually endorsing the affirmative and other areas ofJitemture that are not

rrndit iotlally discussed in the context of policy making ean stil l be dis-

CLlSSed under this decision-making fi"amework. but in a more productive

manner. A negative strategy that includes a counterplan that uses dif-

ferent assumptions to solve the affiImative and says the affinnative's

apprmlch is morally bankrupt is a reason why the affinnativc should be

ethically rej ected. Even absentacounrerplan, ignOling implications for

the judge and excluding their ability to individually endorse alternative

moral frameworks forces negative teams to make their criticisms more

specific to the plan. lf thcy are going to say the affinnative is unethica l.

--- --- .

they should be forced to engage the traditional l:lrguments in the utility

vs. deontolob'Y literature like "moral pluity has unint(...'tldcd conS'-""qucnces."

This would mean that the negative's altemative (for the judge to reject

the affirmative's unethical course Ofacti Oll). would have to be much

more specific and engaging on the question ofwhclher it is possiblc to

predict consequences or embl1lce moral absolutism in the context of

the affilmative's advantages. Second. it prevents debate from being

about role-playing. Many critical teams' to policymaking is

that we are not the fedL'Tal government and we should nOl pretend that

we are. Since we are merely saying that the judge's range of fiat is

constrained by the authori ty of::1 single decision-maker. rather than that

the judge should be the decision-maker, debatel,!,; or judges do not have

to accept uncritically the USFG's authority or way ofthinking.lllird, it

is the only way to set a limit upon an unlimited nwnber of afJinnmive or

negative frnmeworks. Just as it is unfair for the negative to change the

question of the debate, the affi rmative should have a prediclable way of

proving the resolution is a good idea.

Other objections The most common objection nt!g.utive teams will make to the line

of reasoning presented in this article is that agent coulltcrpians are the

only way to test the agent. and the affirmative must be prepared to

defend all parts ofthcirplan, including 1'he agent. We tind this argument

disingenuous-disadvantages, not counterp lans. are how P31ts of the

plan are tested. A cOllnterpian will always lose unless it has a net ben-

efit, and it is the net benefit itselfthallests the agent. None of the net

benefit literature, however, will have been written with the pecuIiar

choice of the plan vs. the cOllnterplan in mind. More fO the point. an

Hltemate agent counterplan and a nel bene1it li nked 10 the agent oflhe

plan is less ofa test of the agent than simply the disadvantage presented

by ilSelf This is because. as explained above. one the mosr basic

ccms an agent should evaLuate when dec iding whether or not to take an

action is the probability Ihat othl:r agcnts will do anything. We caillhis

inhcrcncy. Advoca tes of ahem ate agent coun terplans askus to ignore

this impol1ant consideratioll. Rather than being key to testing dle agent,

agcm countcrplans make testi ng the ag.ent impossible.

Another creative objection to the tlotioll ihat the scope of neg a-

live fiat should be limited by the logic ofdec ision-m,lking is that it would

aIlO\lo' for non-intrinsicness arguments to be made against disadvan-

tages. A non-intrinsicness argument is simply an old-school way of ex-

cluding disadvantages that are not intrinsically linked to the desirability

ofthe plan. Consider the situation where the negalive contends that the

plan will result in the USFG passing icgislation which orders drill ing in

the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). 1l1eANWR politics

advantage is not something that a poticymaker would consider when

deciding iffamily planning aid should go loAfiica. lfjudges therefore

allow teams to say things like "ok, do the plan, and also

don't drill inANWR," the negative teams' disadvamage ground is

maticallycurtailed. We will assume for the purposes of discussion that

allowing non-intrinsicness arguments is probably a bad thing, since rhe

line between what is intrinsic and what is not is a blurry one and it

draws into Question whether any disadvantage that is nol an impacr rum is to theaffinnative.

When analyzed closely, the des ire to Hvoid non-illlrinsicnessal"-

guments actually becomes an argument why alternat ive actor

counterplans should be disallowed. The central Unk that the negative

uses when making this argtunent is that if the judge is constrained to

only considerations of action by the appropriate actor then 110 rational

person would decide to not do the plan because it would result in that

same decision-maker deciding to drill inANWR. The more logical thing

to do, as the negative would S<'lY, is to have the dec,isioo-maker do the

plan and also pass ANWR (and thus, ns an mgumenfufll ad ahsur-

dum, alternate agent counterplans should be ullowed). Three mguments

make this objection a poor one. First, this at worsl would eliminate

disadvantages that have an impact based off of actions by the same

decision-maker. which does not nix all wsadvantages.lnternational re-

lations disadvantages, perception based disadvantages and inter·branch

disadvantages could all still be mn.

Second. most inslillu:es where a nOIl-intrinsicness afb>U1Tlcnt could

made are merely reasons why the d isadvaJlfage is weak and C<"ln be

beaten by simple analytical "no intemal link" argument,. Jfthe execu-

Li ve is the aftinnative's actor, the fact thtilt assistance to A fr icu would

callse Bush to no longer have the necessary political capital [0 veto an

Iraq withdrawal bill may not be intrin:sic to [he-desirability ot'executive

action, but that's because it is unlikely tbat Bush would actually c·hange

his mind about an Iraq velO because of political consideralions. lfpoli-

tics did matter, then it is intlinsic to the aftinnative because an individual

would have to consider the probability that a politically impotent Bush

would want to pick a tight with the Congress by vetoing.

Lastly, intnnsicness arguments on ly matter from the perspective

of the age-nt oflhcattiml<ltive's plan. not the judge. TIle judge isn't role-

playing l:L.<; any particul ar individual: he or she is a tbird party who brack-

ets off the status-quo decision-making process of the USFG in order to

be illl impartial intell ectual. At the end of the round, it is the judge, and

110t the USFG, who decides whether (and how) the USFG should act.

This is why separating the judge. from [he decision-maker is vital to

avoiding consider.uionsofintrinsicness. therefore should be

designed to be persuasive to the judge. rarher me USFG The judge

could eas ily be persuaded that an altemate agent counterpJan which

docsn 't test the opportunity cost of the plan's decision-maker is not a

reason to reject the plan, and at the same time not evaluate arguments

with the srune political viewpoints a collgrc:isperson or other poticymaker

would use to eva luate them. If th is is tlUe, there is no reason the judge

ought to consider non·ulUlnsicness link answers.

Conclusion We hope thaI. we have convinced you to rethink reliance all alter-

nate agent tiat as a viable component to l:I strong nega£iw strategy.

Even if we have fa iled in Ihis task, we arc eonfidelll £hat you arc now in

a good position to write powerful blocks that will make teams think

twice about nmning alternate agent countel'Plans or alternatives against

you. In any event. we hope that as you enjoy your debate careers, you

Icarn to set and follow the bestpersona! policies for yourself. If you do

that, you will have gained as much from this activity as you could have

from anyUling in Life.

Tips I . Control the role ofthe ballot. If the negative has not offered a

coherent counter·interprctation to the fr"J,mcwork that "the judge's au-

thority should be restricted to that oflhe atlimlalivc's dl."'Cision·maker,"

then their counterplan is not a reason why the plan should be rejected.

In the 2aryou should know exactly what thcircountcr-inte!'PTCtation is.

explain the disadvantages to it, and explain whichofits advantages your

interpretation captures, If you win that your interpretation oftbe role of

the b.1 11 ot is superior to their.;, you can point out which 2nr arguments

become irrelevant because rheypresume an illogical framework for lhe

judge's amhoriry.

2. Know when you' re losing. Very rarely will you be winning

every argument on the flow, so sometimes you have to acknowledge

that you might lose all argwnent, aud make impact calculus to compare

standards. This is best done by mak ing "even iF statements. and will

increase the likelihood you will both win the debate and improve your

speaker points. For example, "even ifthey win agent counterplans are

fair, we are winning thatreal-worid education outweighs f.1 imess".

3. Slow down! Judges hate when debaters make blippy, incom-

prehensible thcory arguments at top speed because they are bard to

tlow and not fun to listen to.

Section A: Arlicles and Topicality, p. A-7

4. Read evidence for the real world standards and the value of

debate. We recommend you cut cards from this article, other old

Debater's Research Guideat1icles. and the sourccs listed in the bibliog-

raphy of this article to strengthen the persuasiveness of yow' tllcoretical

claims.

5. Be aware of the status of the countc:rplan. If the

isn' t unconditional. you have to win that conditionality is bad in addi-

lio!1 (0 agenl couLlterplans bad in order to win that they are a voting

issue. In mher words, don '( spend yow· whole 2ar on the agents dt:batc

if the ultimate consequence isjust going to be that the eounrerplan goes

away and the negative has a disadvantage that outweighs your

advantage(s).

5. lastly. and most importantly, be aware of judgc's personal

bia,es. The debate community seems to be emnnored with agcnt

counterplans, so much so that when having an argument with II friend

at the TOe this year about their legitimacy, he had to resort ro asking

mndom people who were walking by if they agreed with him that agent

counterplans were good or not. h's obvious thar the position of this

paper would not win a popularity contest. As a result, it is cri(ica l that

when you have a judge who may not be crazy about voting on agent

countcrplans you must make a connection with them during your 2ar.

Saying something like " I know in yOllr hca\t of hearts you may not

3f,'l"ee with us, but the 2nr bas merely made arguments why altemate

actor counterplans are ok. but has 1101 made a single argument why

they are necesSOly . If you real ly think we are wrong about the legiti -

macy of agent countcrplans, {hen punish them for doing such a poor job

of explaining why they should be allowed." This \vill go a long way

towards getting stubborn and obstinale judges to ignore their personal

predispositions.

References Brovero, A. ( 1994 ). ·'SO P, there it is," in Immigmtion t"egufOlil)f7: Bor-

derline policies Research Guide), (cd!). R. E. Soil &. R, K. Smith).

Winston Salem, NC: W3ke Forest Uni versity Press.

Elmore, R. F. (1979). Backward mapping: Impll.'IDcnlation rCSl."'arch and

policy decision, Po/ilic:al Science 94,60 1-616.

Fulkcrson. R. (1996). Teaching the argument Urbana. IL:

The Nat ional Council ofTeachers of English .

Koreok, M. M. (2001). "The decision-maker:' in Per5pecth'es ill eon-

Imvcrs.\': Selec1eJ }i"O/1/ Contempora,.y Argumentation and Debate.

(cd. K. Broda-Bahm). New Y(lrk: Intcmatiom.ll Debate EducationAs:;ocialion,

1'1'.241·264.

Kuhn. D. (1 992). Thinking as argument. Harvard Educational

62, 155-178.

Lichtman,A. & Rohrer. D. (1975). "'Agcncra] lheoryorthccolllllerplan:'

JOllrnal nf the Americal/ Fonm.<;ic,v Associ(Jlion. 12. 70-79.

0' Donnell, T. (2004). "And thc twain shall meet: Affimmtive framework

cll(lice and the 11ltlirC of debate." in Blue hdmet hflles· Uniled Nal iolls

ptw('"l'kecping al1d the United SJates (Deh,,'er$ Research Guide), (cds. S.

Bausc hard & J. P. lacy). WinSlon Salem, NC: Wake Forest University Press.

Solt, R. E. ( t996). "The slale countelplan, ,. in 77w.\·hock, ,he sh(lme, the

horror: Juvenile cf"ime (Debater s Rescarc:h Guide), (cds. R. E. Solt & R. K.

Smith). Winston Salem, NC: Wake Forest University Press.

Yeh, S. S. t "Empowering education: Tcachingrugwnentative writing to cullum I minority middle-school students," Resell/I:h in the Teaching of

Ellglish . .H( 1),49-83.