Storm “Desmond” - NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT...Carlisle Flood Action Group 12 Months On –...

Carlisle Flood Action Group 12 Months On – “Desmond” Report

Storm “Desmond”

CARLISLE 12 Months On

A Report into the cause and effect of the extensive flooding

in the City of Carlisle from an Atlantic storm on 5

th/6

th December 2015

An investigation prepared by the Carlisle Flood Action Group

[email protected]

2 December 2016

F o r e w o r d

Carlisle flooded badly in 2005 (1600 properties) and December 2015 when Storm “Desmond”

caused the inundation of nearly 2,200 properties in the City some to a depth of 2m. – a previously

unrecorded depth.

The Carlisle Flood Action Group (C-FLAG) was formed in January 2016 following a community

meeting called by inaugural Chair Dr Stephen Gibbs on 11 December 2015, principally involving

residents evacuated to the Crown and Mitre Hotel, when the raw hurt and frustrations of the

represented community was discussed with local politicians. The meeting wanted to know what

happened, why it happened, what was the expectation and implications of yet another event and

what could be done to prevent it happening again (not least because £38m had only recently been

spent on new flood defences to provide 1 in 100 year minimum protection to the affected areas).

The spirited and impassioned chairmanship of Dr Gibbs lit a spark in the gathering who were

determined that the answers to these fundamental questions must be found and that blind trust in

the Environment Agency, local authorities, the water industry and politicians could not be left to

follow the same pattern of events seen after the 2005 flood. C-FLAG was, therefore, formed with a

mandate, approved following two further public meetings in the Ballroom of the Crown and Mitre

each attended by an estimated 600 residents and business owners, to seek out relevant

knowledge and press for solutions guided by that knowledge to further develop visions for the

future.

The group has endeavoured to work with politicians and government agencies where possible but

in a non-political capacity – C-FLAG acts in the role of a „critical friend‟ but always emphasising the

importance and seriousness of the endeavour and holding those involved to account for their

decisions and actions. Testimony from residents has also been invaluable in evidence gathering

particularly from those old enough to remember river management practices in the 1950‟s and 60‟s.

This report is the latest to be issued by C-FLAG and brings together an understanding of the

processes involved resulting in the flooding of the City and is required to inform the group‟s

membership – the flooded community – as well as all communities within the wider Eden

catchment with whom Carlisle is inextricably linked. More importantly, it sets out where C-FLAG

agrees with the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRA) Report HC115 of 2nd

November 2016 and urges the Secretary of State and Government to take due regard of the views

expressed within the EFRA report when it is debated in January 2017 in order to effect real change

and a more secure future.

I thank all the C-FLAG Committee for their continued gift of time, expertise and commitment, all

residents who have provided invaluable first hand as well as historical evidence and information,

and the assistance provided by the agencies that have worked with us.

John L Kelsall

B.Arch, Dip.Arch, MA, ARB, RIBA, MRTPI, FRSA

Chair - Carlisle Flood Action Group

December 2016


C o n t e n t s Page No.

Executive Summary

1

1. Introduction

4

2. What happened on 5th/6th December 2015?

7

3. Why did it happen? 11

- How a catchment works 11

- How the Eden catchment is managed 16

- The Carlisle River Eden Flood Plain 18

- The River Petteril 25

- The River Caldew and Little Caldew 28

- River peak timings

29

4. What are the implications of future occurrences? 32

- The business case evidence

33

5. How can a similar event be prevented? 36

- River Eden catchment area 37

- The Basics of a Plan 39

Bibliography

43

Appendices: 45

Appendix 1 Major Flood events affecting Carlisle

Appendix 2 The C-FLAG “14 Visions”

Appendix 3 Shoothill graphs

River Water Peak Timings

Front cover:

- Eden Bridge 1910 from Bitts Park (downstream side)

- Eden Bridge 2016 downstream side from gravel bank. River bed profile significantly changed and levels raised.

Carlisle Flood Action Group 12 Months On – “Desmond” Report 1

Executive Summary - The post 2005 new City river defences had a major test in December 2015. Much of

the River Eden and River Caldew defences held at their limit, however, this protection

was cancelled out by failures, particularly through the River Petteril backing up at

Warwick Road, the overtopping of the Eden at Hardwicke Circus and Willowholme,

and poorly defended areas such as Rickerby.

- As conditions currently stand the City and Catchment does not appear to be in a

fundamentally better place than 12 months ago.

- Bridges and accumulated gravels continue to obstruct smooth flows through the City.

Botcherby Bridge, particularly, caused an extreme “pinch point” and was unable to

pass the volume of the River Petteril which then diverted into the Warwick Road area

where it was held and accumulated to record depths on the wrong side of the main

Eden river defences. Although some gravel has been removed from this location it is

too little too late and the design of the bridge remains in question.

- The immediate aftermath of the event was characterised by poor local leadership

and/or lack of information. The Environment Agency was very slow to assess works

which could provide short-term contingency benefits – many such projects were not

commenced until the Autumn of 2016. There was an impression that the recovery

was mostly left in the hands of the insurance industry. Public Authority proactivity has

appeared thin on the ground and capable of considerable improvement in the

currently evolving emergency plans.

- The River Eden is one or the largest and longest river catchments in the UK. Carlisle,

being at the end of this river system, was evidently ill-prepared suggesting serious

river modelling failure.

- Contrary to Government reporting on “Desmond” the flooding of Carlisle was not

principally caused by a storm blown in by “climate change” but as a direct result of

long term lack of river maintenance and poor management causing the build-up of

accumulated gravels and thereby forcing rivers to flow higher in their channels than

they used to. This is likely to also be the case for the lower reaches of the Kent and

Derwent catchments.

- Flood alleviation cannot be achieved by Carlisle or any settlement in isolation, it

requires cooperation and strategic planning and action throughout the appropriate

catchment. Even higher flood defences do not represent a coherent solution as the

damaging cycle would continue as the root causes would not be being addressed.


- Land management through the catchment in recent years has favoured piped

drainage in both rural and urban areas, speeding rainfall to rivers. This loss in

attenuation has been, in many cases, inadvertently encouraged by government grant

aid on agricultural land „improvement‟ and also via inappropriate planning consents.

- There has been and remains significant individual physical and mental health issues

arising to add to the massive repair cost to housing and business. Falling property

prices have created an equity trap causing a „prison‟ effect of loss of free mobility –

mortgage debts higher than dwelling value and a market unlikely to be greatly

interested until a solution is found.

- Individual property level flood resilience and £5000 grants have had several negative

effects. A questionable supply industry selling „flood resilient‟ wares has been

bolstered that may not, and frequently are not, appropriate to certain properties. This

industry frequently latches onto local government recovery level support. For

example, the installation of flood doors to a property flooding to 1.5m is potentially

fatal and brings a risk of serious property damage or collapse. C-FLAG calls for a

property flood protection assessment rating much like the current energy rating as a

basic guide to works that will assist in individual circumstances. We do not agree with

the Property Flood Resilience Round Table that this could be covered under Building

Regulations as differing needs for differing properties are so diverse and specialised

that a general regulatory system would not be workable.

- The Government launch of Flood Re to enable affordable property insurance is

welcomed but is in its infancy. While this scheme provides flood cover to households,

insurance costs are nevertheless higher than they were. We are finding that many

insurance brokers, underwriters and sub-underwriters add significant charges for

administering the system. A Council Tax Band „A‟ Flood Re insurance component

cost of £210 – easily becomes a £350 cost to the customer for the flooding element

alone. Further Government intervention to regulate is called for along with similar

type insurance for businesses. All flood affected houses should be able to be rented

by their owners and still retain flood cover via Flood Re in order to free mobility.

- There is an illogicality in the Government resilience grants of £5000 as £1000 of this

returns to the Government in VAT. Indeed C-FLAG see no place for VAT within

disaster repair costs – how can Government be justified in taxing recovery?

- The C-FLAG „Blue-Ribbon‟ campaign acts as a reminder of the flood level reached

and to keep the matter in full view. It may be seen by some as a detrimental factor in

returning property values, however, house values are already financially condemned

by postcode.


- The education, employment and health sectors were all badly disrupted by losses of

power and communication and restricted mobility and the loss of the main north/south

link over the Eden Bridge for nearly two weeks severely disrupted the functionality of

the city.

- Regional and national infrastructure was affected with the loss of the North/South

West Coast Rail Line. The M6 nearly had to be closed which would have had

fundamental costs and losses across all sectors with potential for huge cascading

effect including from international trading damage.

- Government‟s reactive approach to flooding has been criticised by its own adviser as

“sticking plasters” over the problem – funding for works and annual maintenance of

river catchments need to be planned and financed accordingly.

- A clear and strong strategic plan to reduce the extreme level of flooding to Carlisle is

needed together with coordinated planning throughout the Eden catchment. It is

considered that this is best undertaken by a dedicated accountable lead authority with

local representation and a single prime purpose with statutory backing. This call has

been echoed in the EFRA HC115 report and by the Green Alliance and others and we

urge Government to now take this on board urgently.

- The new authority to implement a catchment wide medium term incremental approach

to flood alleviation by „slowing the flow‟ and „smoothing the flow‟ where it will create

maximum cumulative benefits as currently being trialled at Stockdalewath on the Roe

Beck. When the incremental approach is likely to be compromised by prior saturation

conditions contingency controls of storage/divert systems should be developed within

a long term plan.

- It is essential that accurate data for each part of the catchment is kept by the

community as well as centrally by a new authority. Regular inspections and

measures of river channels, and flow volumes will alert any changes in profile and

when maintenance work is required. River channels must be returned to their former

levels in order to maximise efficiency.

- The new Authority must clearly communicate the short, medium and long term goals

to assist residents, businesses, insurers and investors evaluate their exposure risk. A

positive return to full equity value of property must be a stated goal and non-

negotiable.


1. I n t r o d u c t i o n

1. Carlisle is located close to the mouth of the River Eden in North Cumbria where it

flows into the Irish Sea via the Solway Firth at Burgh Marsh after a transit of some 80 miles

through an extensive catchment from its source at Hell Gill, Mallerstang Common. The

Solway Firth is a large tidal estuary bordered by Scotland to the north and England to the

south overseen by a formal cross-border agreement, and the Solway-Tweed River Basin

Catchment. The Solway Firth is believed to be self-cleansing by way of tidal effect, those tidal

effects are felt up into the River Eden as far as the A689 River Eden Crossing. It is believed

doubtful that any self-cleansing effects will benefit this far up the Eden where gravel and silt

deposition are characteristic (Figure 7, page 15).

2. The River Eden Catchment is complex and can be seen on the following fluvial

diagram (see Figure 1 on page 6). The high ground of Lakeland to the south and west and

the Pennines to the east sees a variety of weather systems bearing rain. The most violent

systems tend to occur in late autumn/early winter via low pressure storms from the south east

and the North Atlantic. “Desmond” was one such storm that caused considerable damage,

flooding and extreme disruption to the county of Cumbria as a whole and Carlisle in particular

during December 2015. “Desmond” was not an isolated event but the latest in probably 10

events of similar magnitude to affect Carlisle since 1770 (Appendix 1).

3. The topography of the catchment is one of the most beautiful in the UK and, in turn,

one of the most challenging across many of its attractive facets. It is this diversity that attracts

many international visitors and currently the authorities are making a bid for “UNESCO World

Heritage Site Status” for the wider English Lake District defined area. The impact of storm

damage and flooding upon often widely separated settlements conflicts with these aspirations

and use.

4. The overall annual business economy of the Lake District is worth some £2 billion,

therefore, it is imperative to all who live, work and visit the County of Cumbria, which includes

the 3 river catchments of the Eden, Derwent and Kent, that the systems are monitored and

protected from fluvial flooding and appropriate authorities are held to account to do so

judiciously and effectively. It has been reported (Green Alliance 28/11/16) that flooding cost

the North of England £5billion in 2015 alone. This C-FLAG report focuses upon the part the

Eden catchment plays in these statistics with the primary purpose to evaluate the Carlisle

experience, but it is likely that the content and conclusions of this report will be similarly

applicable in broad terms to the Derwent and Kent.

Our observations and conclusions have been developed from the information currently

available but we encourage comment and welcome feedback in order to have the soundest

possible document to present to the Flood minister when she visits the City in the new year.


5. Of particular importance is infrastructure:-

The County of Cumbria has some 1600 bridges that are vitally important for the

community‟s means of daily accessibility, as highlighted when the road between

Grasmere and Keswick was washed away beside Thirlmere in December 2015,

and the Workington Cloffocks No.2 Bridge in 2009.

In 2009 there were three bridges destroyed and another four badly damaged.

All seven were forensically investigated by consultants Ove Arup and Partners

Ltd and Prof Bill Harvey Associates Ltd appointed by Cumbria County council

and the findings were published and presented during the Proceedings of the

Fifth International Conference on Forensic Engineering organised by the

Institution of Civil engineers and held in London UK 16 – 17th April 2013

providing substantial evidence of the risks involved in low maintenance and

providing direction for successful implementation of repairs/replacements.

During ““Desmond”” many bridges that did not sustain obvious damage had to

be closed on a precautionary basis. The main Eden Bridge, which joins North

and South Carlisle, was closed for nearly two weeks which caused almost

incalculable losses to business, increased fuel costs, time loss seriously

affecting the commercial, educational and health functions of the city.

6. The human cost of the storm and its aftermath is similarly incalculable. The effect of

evacuation and displacement on physical and mental health, with lives put on hold, was

significant and remains so for many. Pressures on alternative accommodation, adequacy of a

work force to undertake repairs and the variations in the approach of insurers have all

contributed to a dynamic rift and unease in the functioning of the City. Of particular relevance

is that the similar flood disaster of 2005 was still in vivid recollection with many residents

being flooded and displaced twice within 10 years. The media and politicians may extol the

resilience of the communities affected and that the City/County is “open for business” to

bolster morale and economic prospects but under the surface there is a deep nervousness,

fragility, anger and frustration for what the future holds in human and financial terms. To do

nothing or progress too slowly is not an option as there is a real potential for these feelings

manifesting in civil unrest or unpredictable direct action. At the present time we are

progressing too slowly and this report looks for a reason why.

7. The C-FLAG mandate to answer the community‟s questions of “what happened”

during “Desmond”, “why it happened”, “what the implications are and how a similar event can

be prevented” are considered here a section at a time. Where it is possible answers to these

questions have been provided – where doubt or lack of information makes answers less than

certain the issues are honed down and directed at what are considered the responsible or

appropriate authorities for further elaboration.

8. This report follows the C-FLAG “14 Visions” presented and adopted at a public

meeting on 4th April 2016 (Appendix 2) and the C-FLAG “Cumbria River Catchments

Authority” Strategic Proposal Report presented to Rory Stewart, Floods Minister at the

Cumbria Flood Partnership meeting on 22 April 2016.


Figure 1 – C-FLAG River Eden Catchment Diagram


2. What happened on 5th/6th December 2015?

Storm “Desmond”

9. The effect of Storm ““Desmond”” was felt across the whole of the North of England

and the South of Scotland on the 5th and 6

th December 2015 with extensive flooding resulting.

“Desmond” was not a violent storm, it was apparently uncharacteristically slow moving for a

North Atlantic stormfront. This meant that it had the opportunity to deposit rainfall for longer

than normally expected – particularly when forced over the higher ground of the Lakeland fells

and the Pennines.

10. The three Cumbrian River Catchments of Derwent, Kent and the Eden suffered with

some 6000 affected properties. The storm followed the prevailing wind direction from the

West/South-West and a wet November. Extensive levels of rain fell on the Lake District Fells

and Pennine Hills which initially created flash flooding, followed by more extensive flooding in

the lower reaches.

11. For the Eden catchment, settlements along the main river were mostly hit by the most

severe adverse effects with settlements along the Caldew and the Petterill less so. Carlisle

being the recipient of all three rivers bore the brunt of the volume. The volume of river water

arriving in the City during and after a storm event does not reflect the conditions experienced

up-stream – these conditions can be very dynamic and cannot be assumed to result from

exactly the same events each time. Similarly, major flooding can appear the same from the

result but can be very different in composition. For example, the 2005 flood resulted from the

River Eden overtopping existing defences, the “Desmond” flood was much less severe from

the Eden itself but significant damage was caused via the River Petteril infilling behind new

defences. Restrictions to the Petteril slowed the river such that the peak was not able to join

the Eden at the optimum time.

12. Extensive flooding of the Carlisle Urban areas adjacent to the River Eden Flood Plain

occurred in the following areas: (shown overleaf at Figure 2)

Warwick Road West

Warwick Road East

Hardwicke Circus

Rickerby

Etterby Terrace

Willowholme and Caldewgate

The Viaduct Estate


Figure 2 – Areas of the City that flooded


13. These are all flood zone 3 areas in common with many historic river settlements i.e.

areas of land with a more than 1 in 100 year likelihood of a flood, however, all these areas are

intended to benefit from upgraded flood defences rendering a likelihood of flooding between 1

in 100 years and 1 in 200 years. Many expected that if there was to be any flooding at all it

would be minor and result from overtopping of the main River Eden berm/walls which would

be gradual and incremental but this was not to be the case.

14. The sequence of events in the City on 5 December has been recorded as follows:

Initially drainage systems surcharged beginning at approximately midday within

Warwick Road West, then receded. Melbourne Park was flooded by 4pm with

another more serious drainage and sewage surcharge experienced and again

receded.

7.00 pm – Botcherby Bridge was backing up the River Petteril and it was

observed to have a differential in water level from upstream to downstream.

Upstream the water level was some 2ft below the bridge parapet and

downstream was several more feet lower indicating that the bridge was causing

a back-up of water upstream. Water was being pressured through the bridge

masonry indicating potential bridge failure of at least the parapets. At

approximately 7.30 pm Warwick Road was closed to traffic.

The River Petteril subsequently out-flanked the upstream flood defences to the

south west of Melbourne Park and diverted into the Warwick Road West urban

area for the next 72 hours causing extensive damage to over 1000 properties

(Figure 3). Due to the area being flood defence protected, the diverted water

initially flowed with significant force into the area and was effectively trapped

with the depth in places up to two metres deep.

Subsequently, Warwick Road East some hours later was inundated via

Botcherby Bridge east flood bank overtopping, and also later via the Tesco

entrance ramp overtopping. The Durranhill Beck flooded Eden Park Crescent

due to the Beck attenuation area flooding over due to loss of the pumping

station equipment failure (fuel shortage).

Hardwicke Circus, Rickerby, Etterby Terrace, Willowholme and Caldewgate,

and the Viaduct Estate were progressively inundated by way of the Rivers

Eden, Caldew and the Little Caldew causing extensive damage to households

and business premises. Rickerby flooded much worse than in 2005 possibly as

a result of new defences to the south bank of the Eden removing flood plain

and thereby increasing river height.

Outlying communities of Warwick Bridge, Warwick Holme, Linstock, Low

Crosby and Little Corby were also inundated causing extensive flood damage.

The Section 19 reports by the Lead Local Flood Authority (CCC) assisted by the EA also

provide background to the events as they occurred in all three catchments.


15. The River Eden Catchment Area stretches from Hell Gill to the Solway Firth and was

extensively affected by flood water with communities of Kirkby Stephen, Great Musgrave

Bridge, Warcop, Appleby experiencing major issues.

16. The River Eden is one of the longest rivers in England some 80 miles in length. All of

the water falling on the catchment eventually has to pass through Carlisle. So it is clear that

“what happened” in Carlisle is inextricably linked to, and a function of, all hydrological and

river/water course activity upstream in the catchment. An analysis of what happened cannot

only be seen in the perspective of the City in isolation – it follows that any solution or remedial

strategy must have influence all the way to Hell Gill east of Sedbergh.

17. “Desmond” has shown why localised works of river defence are an action of last

resort. The confidence provided by, and the reliance placed upon, the major works and

£38m spent on defences in Carlisle after the 2005 flood were such that many personal and

commercial decisions were made and finance invested as a result. It has been said that the

most vulnerable place to be in a winter storm is to be located within a flood zone 3 area

behind man made defences unless the defences have been fully designed and implemented

upon design modelling and appropriate contingency with all dynamic factors catered for and

funding provided as necessary. Clearly such design work and implementation has not been

applied in Carlisle to this standard and what happened was a combination of how much and

where rainfall occurred, the conditions throughout the catchment which determined volumes,

speeds and river flow heights and the competency and effectiveness of designed defences.

Figure 3 – St. Aidan‟s Church, Warwick Road, 6 December 2015 c. ITV


3. Why did it happen?

How a catchment works

18. The Eden catchment funnels all water through the Carlisle Eden Flood Plain. It is

helpful to consider the catchment defined as a process in stages.

Source Pathway Receptor

The Source of the flood waters – the Lake District and North Pennine Hills and

Fells arising from the weather patterns coming off the North Atlantic. See Wind

Rose detailing prevailing wind direction and velocity percentages for the month

of December (Figure 4).

The Pathway includes the communities along the catchment, Lake Ullswater,

the rivers Eden, Lowther, Eamont, Leith, Lyvennet, Caldew, Petteril, Gelt,

Irthing, the reservoirs of Haweswater and Wet Sleddale, and all the becks and

ghylls.

Finally the Receptor being the Solway Firth and Irish Sea.

19. Source – most meteorological scientists would argue that carbon emissions

generated by man, particularly through industrial activity has contributed to changes in the

layers of gases around the planet providing a warming effect. This warming leads to slightly

raised sea temperatures and, therefore, consequent reductions in polar ice. The water that is

freed then enters the ocean systems where the process of transpiration can potentially affect

weather systems. For this country warmer means wetter. This effect is generally

acknowledged to have started showing measurable evidence at the pole caps around 1975.

It does, as a result, appear that North Atlantic storms are more likely to become more

frequent and wetter than, say, 50 years ago. This being said the process is not yet an exact

science and there appears no published data to record the phenomenon reliably as it might

affect the UK. For this reason the rainfall „source‟ on the catchment cannot be regarded as a

known or predictable entity, however what is measurable are the volumes of water conveyed

by the river systems. C-FLAG cannot agree with the Government and its agencies in the

reporting of flooding after “Desmond” which in every case seeks to blame climate change for

why the floods happened. This appears a knee-jerk „run for cover‟ to deflect criticism of

inadequate river management and maintenance as no government wants such a discovery to

occur on its „watch‟ due to the significant draw that would fall to the exchequer to implement

what might have very expensive and long term implications.


Figure 4 – Typical monthly Wind Rose diagrams for Carlisle


20. The climate change argument is, therefore, a viable phenomenon to be factored into

all catchment modelling of the flooding „source‟ but at a level appropriate to the context and

circumstance. This can only be reasonably done at the current time by measuring the effects

on the „pathways‟ – i.e. the river system itself.

21. Pathways – Gills, brooks, streams and rivers convey a flood in embryo down the

catchment on surface terrain. Rain at source is also soaked up by the land and feeds

underground aquifers which provide additional subterranean pathways. Land absorption

varies upon preceding weather conditions and land use, i.e. a moss or heath will be far more

absorbent than a housing estate unless already saturated. The pathways of the catchment

system are, therefore, highly susceptible to „speeding‟ or „slowing‟ upon the physical

conditions encountered. The pathway is not left to its own devices as there are regular

interactions that slow or speed the system whether deliberately or simply as a more random

cause and effect. Bridges in most cases restrict the water flow to some degree – they

channel the river to a particular course when naturally it would otherwise move locations

dependent upon gravels, deposits and erosion. By way of “afflux” the water course can be

backed up upstream when in spate raising the water level depending upon the degree of

restriction. On such conditions a greater „head‟ of water is generated to pass through the

structure resulting in increased flow through the bridge. A “Venturi” effect then comes into

play accelerating the water, silt and gravel and any flotsam that is carried. Hence gravel

shoals occur almost immediately after bridges. Over a period of time a bridge can become

choked and in more serious cases erosion of the bridge‟s support structures, “scour”, may

lead to collapse. See ICE publication Forensic Engineering and for “affflux” image at Figure

5.

Figure 5 – Illustration of “afflux” effect


22. Therefore, if a bridge was originally designed with, as an example, Eden Bridge with

five arches but only two arches currently fully clear, then the bridge under extreme flood

conditions has potential for catastrophic failure if the forces being exerted are beyond the

design tolerances. As illustrated in an image of the Eden Bridge arches, Figure 6, it can be

seen that these are almost completely submerged to the soffit level holding a tremendous

weight of water upstream with a significant differential in height between upstream and

downstream – eye witnesses have estimated that this was at one point as much as a 3m

differential. It is possible that bridges, as built, along the catchment may have design criteria

exceeded under extreme flood conditions, for example Cloffocks Bridge, Northside,

Workington, designed in 1903 but collapsed in the 2009 floods killing PC Bill Barker.

Figure 6 – Eden Bridge on 6 December 2015 showing almost total emergence of the 5 arches

and indicates the differential between the upstream side (foreground) and a drop to

downstream side. This bridge is shown in more normal conditions on the front cover.

c. Helipromo

23. Receptor – The receptor for each catchment system is ultimately the sea. In severe

rainfall conditions significant debris will be carried by the system both in suspension, via river

bed material migration and surface flotsam. It is known that when the force of a river is

calmed by the widening of its channel, such as when it opens out at an estuary, it will deposit

much of its debris. The receptor, therefore, has a role and significance in the lower reaches

of catchments as there is potential to back up progress of river water into the recipient sea. In

the case of the Cumbrian systems – the Irish Sea.


Figure 7 – Silt deposition in River Eden as it enters Solway Estuary c. NFRA

24. The authorities have recorded record rainfall levels over Cumbria for the period and

concluded by implication that flooding was a direct result. This requires some qualification as

the matter is not so simplistic.

The period over which reliable statistics have been recorded is relatively

limited (50 years ?) when serious flooding in Carlisle can be traced back to at

least 10 similar extreme events since 1770 (Appendix 1).

Each Atlantic winter storm will be potentially very wet, however, the rate of

rainfall deposition is not the same on each occasion. The storm in 2005 was

very violent and broad in area but blew through comparatively quickly – all

rivers were high as most parts of the catchment received high rainfall.

Conversely, Storm “Desmond” is understood to have been comparatively

variable in severity but slow moving and sat for some time over the central

and northern Lakeland Fells before passing over to deposit on the Pennines.

Paradoxically, the Petteril and Caldew, south of the City were at a high level

but not higher than during any other major winter storm (Southwaite – River

Petteril records). The intense rainfall over the Central Fells for an extended

period raised the level of the Eden specifically.


Government and agency reporting upon the storm effect and flow volumes

has clearly connected the recorded rainfall closely with climate change effect.

Whilst the existence of climate change is not here challenged (acknowledged

as a phenomenon effect commencing around 1975). We do not believe the

evidence supports Government reporting on the events and considers that

„climate change‟ is a convenient argument levered in to deflect criticisms of

river management and the avoidance of remedial cost.

25. River flood levels should be viewed in a broad context even if such discussion

involves uncomfortable criticism for the Government and its agencies, implied or otherwise, of

events and governance stretching back some 20 years to when the Environment Agency took

over “responsibilities”, if not “duties” for river management. It appears on the evidence that

the actions of the EA have been to deepen the maintenance problem not reverse it.

How the Eden Catchment is managed 26. For decades prior to the changeover from the National Rivers Authority (NRA) to the

EA many aspects of river channel management was consented and carried out locally by

riparian owners, farmers, local authorities and responsible interested countryside bodies. In

1997, on taking up office, one of the first actions carried out by the EA was apparently to

dispose of all dredging equipment stock believed to be upon environmental and maintenance

expense grounds.

27. The result is that the EA “experiment” to leave rivers to behave naturally, “re-wilding”,

has largely failed by way of concentrating on their environmental remits, of which there are

many, forsaking practical hands-on river channel management for extensive and expensive

computer modelling which appears not to integrate local knowledge of river bed and channel

shape, size and condition. The EA policy of protecting “people, property, and then the

environment” appears to have been turned on its head with environment having a firm lead

over people and property.

28. According to the Green Alliance‟s recent report on the “Failings of England‟s Flood

Strategy” (28 November 2016) nearly four times as much public spending (£1.5 billion) was

spent on land management nationally that ignores or even increases flood risk, than on land

management that reduces flood risk (£419 million). If this is the case it is not a sustainable

approach and offers no grounds for a Government defence of such policies.


Figure 8 – Botcherby Bridge – obstructed by gravel accumulation and overgrown banks –

there is doubt that this bridge design allows sufficient cross sectional area for the River

Petteril even in light storm conditions.

c. R Milne

29. The 2005, 2009, 2013/14 and now the December 2015 floods nationally has exposed

a “reactive” method of governance as falling far short of what is required to maintain and

improve river channels. Indeed, the “re-wilding” of our rivers has contributed largely to

causing much anxiety regarding the rapidly degrading rivers and, in many cases, river bank

vegetation excluding access and narrowing river channels.

30. Funding of flood reparations has also been reactive, and instead of planning projects

and establishing goals with practical outcomes to achieve long-term aims, the process has

seen government funding dished out on a project by project basis referred to as “sticking

plasters” by one of the Government‟s own advisers Dieter Helm in his 2016 report “Flood

Defence: time for a radical rethink” (Helm 2016).

31. In the two recent decades, much expertise regarding the husbandry and maintenance

of the river channels has been rapidly disappearing as the individuals with specific and local

knowledge are retiring or moving on. Many individuals‟ memories rapidly fade from mind after

a single decade.


32. Recent evidence FFP141 by the Somerset Drainage Boards Consortium records the

following:

1. Internal Drainage Board (IDB) members raised the matter of the complexity

of undertaking river dredging works and the plethora of bodies and

requirements that need to be licensed.

2. Dredging projects are generally made complex and expensive due to the

regulatory frameworks.

33. The evidence goes to 11 numbered items relating to the above that is a pointer to

how difficult it is to get even simple maintenance carried out – hence a lot of work is never

carried out at all due to expense and heavy bureaucratic methodology.

34. In recent months significant government committees have reported on the “flood

prevention” topic with the following:

Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee published 2nd

November

2016 – “Future Flood Prevention” 2nd

Report of Session 2016-17 HC115

with some 143 statements of evidence. Many highly critical of the

Environment Agency.

Infrastructure UK – Peer Review of Flood and Coastal Risk Management by

Mark Worsfold, published March 2014, Chief Engineer of OFWAT (33

observations and 11 actions).

The above sets the context behind why the flood occurred. We now focus upon Carlisle‟s

three rivers:-

Carlisle River Eden Flood Plain 35. An initial drawing has been produced of the immediate River Eden Flood Plain from

Warwick Bridge to Burgh Marsh Point and furnished with strategic detail relevant to the

“business case”, and identifies the potential incremental risk points on the marked “Godfrey

Edition” Ordnance Survey Map of 1925 Edition of Carlisle – North West, North East and

South West, and 1926 Edition Carlisle South East Cumberland Sheet XXIII. See Figure 9.


1. M6 – RIVER EDEN CROSSING 2. RAIL – WEST COAST MAINLINE 3. ELECTRICITY SUB-STATION 4. MAIN CARLISLE WATER TREATMENT WORKS 5. EDEN BRIDGES 6. NORTH/SOUTH CARLISLE COMMUNITIES 7. RICHARD ROSE ACADEMY 8. NEWMAN AND TRINITY SCHOOLS 9. McVITIE‟S BISCUIT FACTORY 10.CUMBERLAND INFIRMARY

RIVER EDEN FLOOD PLAIN – NATIONAL, REGIONAL and LOCAL STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE Figure 9

KEY


36. Relieving restrictions or slowing the flow upstream is an incremental process applied

to a river/water course pathway to prevent rapid flood water build up. Every improvement to

prevent speed of run-off adds together to form a powerful preventative ability to avoid or

control flood risk.

37. The ability to relieve restrictions across the immediate Carlisle Eden Flood Plain and

to lower the potential flood water levels is a priority, and will benefit not only Carlisle itself but

the whole of the Eden Catchment area by way of “speeding” the flow through settlements at

all times including the Eden/Esk/Solway Estuary. Even a 1 metre lowering of the Eden in

Carlisle to the peak flood level would have significant beneficial effect – keeping flood

conditions within current defences.

38. The Carlisle River Eden Flood Plain at this time is the last settlement before the

Solway Receptor of all the water flows from the total Eden Catchment area. There are a

number of problems apparent as follows:

Lower Eden – Downstream of the Carlisle Eden Bridge

The Solway/Eden/Esk estuaries are being allowed to “silt up” (Figure 7) and

restrictions have been imposed on fishing and use of boats. It must be clearly

understood that any actions here proposed will require co-ordination by the

Environment Agency with the Scottish Environment protection Agency (SEPA)

by way of the “Cross Border Agreement”. It is noted that SEPA has been

dredging near the Annan Channel recently as advertised in the media,

therefore it cannot be too difficult to organise if SEPA can do it, was the

Environment Agency involved in the SEPA project planning and

authorisation? This is not currently known. The Eden River Channel requires

detailed investigation identifying obstructions such as large trees, tree debris,

gravel shoals, and silt build-ups to ensure the channel is free flow and able to

carry its maximum flow capacity at as low a level as possible.

There are a number of “pinch points” along the length of the river caused by

gravel shoals and one significant large meander adjacent to Grinsdale village.

Erosion of the river bank and may well be responsible for the current closure

of a section of the Hadrian‟s Wall Pathway between Kirkandrews and

Beaumont. Erosion generates silt and gravel downstream causing further on-

going restriction to water flow. Bridges feature significantly due to archway

restrictions such as the Carlisle Eden Bridge itself, and the other bridges

currently under investigation are as follows:

- The Carlisle Eden Bridge has five arches, of which barely two are

without some restriction to their open area capability. Significant

photographic evidence is available identifying an “afflux” effect raising

the upstream peak flood water levels that spreads across the entire

Carlisle Eden Flood Plain affecting Rickerby, Linstock and Low Crosby

villages, and eventually Warwick Holme, and Warwick Bridge.


- The former Waverley Rail Bridge now used only as a “foot bridge” have

significant gravel shoals that require clearance.

- The rivers Eden and Caldew confluence has extensive gravel shoals

that restrict the confluence and flow of the rivers themselves. The

gravel shoals are evident on maps of 1865 and 1925 and can be seen

very clearly on recent aerial photographs (Figure 10).

Figure 10 Caldew/Eden confluence gravels

c. NRFA

- The Eden Rail Bridge crossing servicing the England/Scotland “West

Coast mainline rail system” also had gravel shoal restriction similar to

the other bridges.

- The A689 Carlisle Northern Development Route (CNDR) – there is a

substantial Multi Culvert System installed in the vicinity of the A689

river crossing ostensibly to protect the approach road embankment to

the bridge on the east side of the river (Figure 11).


Figure 11 CNDR bypass culverts – was the bridge planned too small?

c. NRFA

At this time there is no information about the use and operation of the

culverts. Suffice is to say that there is an EA document proposing a

“protected area” on the eastern side of the river – for what purpose at

this time is unknown. Whilst it is known that there is an “Archaeological

Area of Significance” behind the flood banks, it has been exposed to

flood waters already over many years. The flood banks installed,

channel the river into a confined area causing “afflux upstream”, hence

this entity has to be investigated thoroughly as to why this channelling

effect has been approved originally, and why the hatched area is being

considered for “protection”. In the event that Local Authority approval

has been given, then the area adjacent to this structure now requires to

be investigated as to why the “floodplain” has been restricted other than

by the bridge itself. Was this another non-flood friendly expedient in

order to save upon the cost of a larger span bridge?

Gravel shoals exist under the arches of the Waverley Bridge which will resist

flows along with the arch piers causing afflux effects.

Etterby Terrace was reported to be flooded from a combination of the blocked

culvert outlet of Gosling Syke and overtopping of the constructed Flood Wall

on the North Bank of the River Eden.

In this North Bank area there appears on Google Earth a further unidentified

potential restriction to be investigated.


In recent weeks the Eden Rivers Trust has removed the Sheepmount Weir to

aid fish movement with associated media publicity. There seems to be

divided opinion on the benefits. If it is “speed the flow” then it must be of

some positive benefit. What should certainly not be contemplated is the

removal of any existing weirs upstream of settlements – indeed the

construction of weirs in such locations may be a realistic weapon in the anti-

flooding armoury.

Upper Eden – Upstream of Eden Bridge, out as far as Warwick Bridge.

The Eden Bridge itself has caused “afflux” (raised water levels) upstream by

virtue of the restricted arches (out of 5 arches some two/three are ineffective –

one had a mature tree growing on ground that should be river indicating how

many years have passed without maintenance.

The Memorial Bridge immediately upstream of the junction of the rivers Eden

and Petteril has been restricted for some years by way of initially silting and

now substantial vegetation and trees.

The M6 River Eden Crossing water level has been observed by eye witnesses

and photographic evidence as being up to the motorway carriageway surface

level. The M6 Motorway is the arterial connector between England and

Scotland. Any inundation or damage of the carriageway surface and structure

will result in closure on grounds of safety with extremely serious economic

and political outcomes that would have almost immeasurable consequences.

Highways England is now drawn into the equation as the National Roads

Authority. The M6 bridge shows considerable gravel deposits indicating afflux

effects have been in evidence (Figure 12).

Figure 12 M6 Eden Bridge showing serious gravel deposits

c. NFRA


Gravel beds and “pinch points” are evident for this indicated length of the river

out as far as, and including, Warwick Bridge, and due to the extreme

meandering of the river channel there is multiple evidence of bank erosion

causing gravel and silt to be deposited downstream.

Gravel profiling (dredging) – has been an important part of river channel

management for many years until stopped in the mid to late 1950‟s due, it is

believed, to local authority intervention on the grounds of controlling

unregulated commercial activity. It is strongly recommended that gravel

profiling is now re-introduced to maintain river channels at their maximum

efficiency and in a co-ordinated way.

In 1997 the Environment Agency took over responsibility from the National

Rivers Authority for main rivers management and, it is understood, promptly

disposed of the national stock of dredging equipment.

Fishing activity on the River Eden and its catchment has been over many

years one of the top salmon rivers in the UK. It is sad to say that the river is

now near the bottom of the list due, fishermen allege, to the narrowing and

“wilding” of the river channel and its effect of quickening the flow of water

between, and as a consequence increases gravel deposition which makes

fish migration more difficult.

By way of careful gravel profiling the natural turbulence of water flow

encourages depressions in the river bed and in turn assists fish to have a rest

and an easier path upstream for spawning. There are two types of Salmon

using the Eden Catchment – Cold Water “Spring” Salmon and warmer water

variety of “Grey Back”. The “Cold Water” Salmon migrate to Ullswater and

Haweswater attracted by the colder water and the “Grey Backs” tend to

distribute across the warmer waters of the catchment in general. It is

understood that this understanding conflicts with environmental policy and

requires to be corrected for the good of the communities along the catchment,

the fish health of the river itself, and restoration of the River Eden to its former

top rating in the UK. A lesson can be learned by observation of dredging

(gravel profiling) and realistic channel management of the River South Tyne

which is currently one of the top salmon rivers in the UK and used to be one

on the bottom of the list.

Narrowing of the river channels encourage flash floods and increase peak

levels and reduces elapsed time whereas in the past, wide river channels

absorbed the flood by reducing peak levels and increasing elapsed time

resulting in a more benign flow rate.


River Petteril 39. The River Petteril is some 20 plus miles in length; its source is twin fold (North and

South Petterils) originating near Greystoke and Penruddock adjacent to the A66

Penrith/Keswick respectively.

40. The Petteril is not characterised with flash flooding as it does not receive direct

rainfall from high fells or mountains.

41. For the purpose of this document, only the immediate river channel is examined

upstream of the Botcherby Bridge including the Railway Bridge, the Harraby Bridge (London

Road Bridge) and the Harraby Business Park. The upstream section beyond these points

has natural meanders and a wide flood plain , apart from the narrow valley of Wreay Woods,

with few pinch points – mostly at bridges many of which are old pack-horse bridges of stone

with short span arches. The river generally is low in summer down to as little as 300mm

depth in many places but swells significantly and quickly in winter.

42. Some significant findings on this river section reveal an industrial past and works that

have been both misguided and not representing current river channel management policy.

This can be considered as a microcosm of the overall River Eden Catchment problems as

follows:

43. Harraby Business Park was flooded in 2005 and as a consequence has had a Flood

Wall constructed to protect the properties which have now been mostly redeveloped for

housing. The flood wall succeeded in protecting the area in 2015.

44. Observing this treatment is a lesson in how NOT to manage a river channel.

The Harraby Bridge has three very large arches, one of which is not in use

due to silt up, and one other with substantial gravel shoaling.

The Rail Bridge is similar with large arches, again one arch completely

blocked. In fact it is possible to walk right through it above normal river level.

The flood defences were not of uniform height hence the “West” flooded first

and the “East” much later. It has been difficult to determine whether there has

been land settlement or a planned reason for this height differential.


The Botcherby Bridge has been replaced over the years from what would

have been probably an original series of stone arches. It now has a very

restricted flat cross-section (see Figure 13), which has caused it to become a

major dam in the system. This has created pressure upon the protected

Melbourne Park area upstream resulting in the, out-flanking of the existing

flood defences ultimately diverting the full flow of the river through the

residential areas of Greystone Road, Tullie Street, Brunton Avenue, Brunton

Crescent, Warwick Road, the wider urban area including St. Aidan‟s Church,

and eventually St Aidan‟s Road and the Richard Rose Academy and Newman

School. The flooding commenced here at 4pm Saturday 5th December 2015

and flooded the Warwick road Area West of the Botcherby Bridge. It was not

until some hours later approximately 4am on Sunday 6th December that the

east bank of the Petteril overtopped into Warwick Road East, and later the

River Eden embankment overtopped via the Tesco Store at 8am and 9am

respectively and at 10.30am Eden Park Crescent.

Figure 13 C-FLAG group on 8 January 2016 making a visual statement. 11 months on and

bridge is still there c. News & Star

45. Therefore, we now examine the findings of the cross-sectional areas of the three

bridges involved in this section of the River Petteril.

46. The two upstream bridges Harraby Bridge and the Railway Bridge have arches with

large cross-sectional areas. Also each bridge has one of their arches in-operative, even

considering the lost area they are still much greater than the combined Botcherby Bridge

arches due to meeting road/rail levelling requirements.


47. The EA constructed a flood wall to protect the Harraby Business Park (BP) and it

succeeded in saving the BP in 2015 (on the limit).

48. In consideration of “slow the flow” and “smooth the flow” principles, it appears the EA

design criteria for the upgraded flood defences was based on assumptions as follows:

The Botcherby Bridge throughput was not to be changed due to cost

restraints and potential traffic disruption on the A69 Warwick Road.

The Harraby and Rail Bridge blocked/restricted channel arches were not to be

cleared presumably as height already provided for the required capacity.

Designed and built a flood defence wall at Harraby Business Park that has

narrowly saved the area.

That the Petteril would flow as it had done since it was straightened. Figure

14 shows extensive gravels that will have raised the level of the river. This

image also shows gravel deposits immediately after the Bridge only a

proportion of which have been removed this Autumn.

Figure 14 View of the straightened Petteril – note gravel shoals. The majority of the

properties to the top of this picture were flooded.

c. NRFA


The correct approach should have been:

Review the Botcherby Bridge cross-sectional area for fitness of purpose

enabling a calculated maximum throughput.

Clear the upstream arches sufficiently, of the Rail Bridge and Harraby Bridge

and speed the flow through reducing the “afflux” upstream and not having to

build an expensive flood wall. i.e. if kept clear the river will flow at a lower

level and cause less damage in spate due to reduced gradient.

Harraby Green Business Park would benefit from reduced risk of flooding.

49. The River Petteril flooding has an additional associated problem affecting the local

drainage system. Evidence observations on Saturday 5th December of drainage surcharging

occurred at midday, and 4pm in Brunton Crescent for the first time since the upgraded

drainage system was completed in 2008/2009. The matter has been recorded with both the

EA and Cumbria County Council and as a consequence there has been a de-silting

programme instigated which also covered the gas distribution system. Where are these

deposits coming from and why has the drainage system been designed without maintainable

silt/gravel traps? Of associated concern is that the defence berms and walls, downstream of

the Harraby Bridge, are containing a man-made re-channel of the river. It is known that a

natural river bed will contain deposits of gravels and it is unlikely that these would have been

excavated during the re-channel works, simply back filled. It is understood that the defences

were not sheeted to control ground water migration so there is every possibility that the river

water, particularly when under pressure from flooding, will hydrologically migrate beneath the

defences.

River Caldew and the Little Caldew 50. The River Caldew has a different character to its neighbour the Petteril. It is a little

longer at 28 miles.

The source rises on Skiddaw and flows through a whole series of bridges and eventually links

up with the Rivers Ure and Ive, with the combined flow proceeding to Carlisle to join the River

Eden downstream of the Carlisle Eden Bridge.

51. Stockdalewath village has experienced flash flooding and the community has

received support from the EA and grant aid spread over five years, and has embarked on an

improvement plan of “slow the flow” upstream of the village. The plan has been modelled by

Durham University and has identified “pinch points” that will receive over the next five years

“slow the flow” leaky dams. This type of approach is laudable and applicable throughout the

catchment, however, there will be limits experienced when these measures become saturated

by prolonged rainfall and then subjected to storm conditions. A valuable tool box but not

every tool that may be required.


52. 2015 spared the Denton Holme area however, once again, floods inundated the

Caldew Maltings and Willowholme areas with the predictable damage of:

Loss of electric power as the Willowholme located sub-station was put out of

action causing a blackout of large areas of Carlisle hampering the recovery

operation.

The Sewage Treatment Plant was inundated backing up the system and

surcharging into various urban areas.

Entering McVitie‟s factory and damaging costly ovens and processing

equipment.

Isolating the Stagecoach Bus Company depot.

Timing – Flood Water Levels of the Rivers Eden, Petteril and Caldew 53. Timing adjustment of peak water level has a significant potential for lowering overall

peak water levels across a river catchment by way of “slowing and quickening the flow” at

strategic “pinch” points. It is the peak (flash) water level that causes flooding in certain

circumstances, therefore softening the peak can be significantly beneficial.

54. In the case of the River Eden Catchment there are a number of opportunities such as

what occurs at the confluences of the Eamont/Lowther, the Eamont/Eden, the Caldew/Ure,

the Caldew/Eden, the Petteril/Eden, the Gelt/Irthing and the Irthing/Eden as examples. In the

case of the Eden/Caldew/Petteril they all have sources geographically separated and of

differing lengths.

55. The Eden is some 80 miles long, the Caldew some 28 miles long, and the Petteril

some 20 miles long. The existing timings of the Eden, Caldew and Petteril have been

examined and found to be as follows: The Caldew and Petteril peaks reach the Eden at a

similar time, the Eden peak arrives some time (approx. 10 - 12 hours) behind before max flow

is reached – therefore giving the Eden Carlisle Flood Plain some respite by way of the peak

water level arriving at different times. If the Eden can be slowed along its catchment and the

Petteril and Caldew quickened there will be created the optimum opportunity for the smaller

river peaks to discharge more successfully into the Eden before they have to compete with it

in order to discharge its flow.

56. Utilising the EA “Shoothill” Gauge Maps and Graphs it has been possible to look at

the timing of the three rivers peak water levels. A diagram is attached identifying peak water

levels and timings from the Shoothill Gauge Map sources. See Appendix 3 – Rivers Eden,

Caldew, Petteril – Peak Water Levels and Timings.


The 2015 Storm Desmond proceeded across Cumbria from a South-Westerly

direction. The subsequent recorded rainfall by nature of our Cumbrian

topography, proceeded first to the “sources” of the Rivers Caldew and Petteril

on the Lake District “Northern Fells, and then onto the Pennine Fells of the

River Eden.

Timing from the Environment Agency “Shoothill” Water Level Gauges

recordings indicate an approximate 10 – 12 hours gap between peak water

levels on the Caldew/Petteril and the River Eden. It is very important that this

“timing gap” is recognised for a variety of reasons as follows:

- Earlier warnings for potentially affected communities by way of use of

existing water level gauges in Kirkby Stephen and Great Musgrave, and

installation of additional gauges in the higher reaches of the Caldew

and Petteril.

- It is understood that EA flood warnings rely on human interpretation of

indicated water levels. Consideration should be given to reviewing

such procedures by way of automating against realistic pre-set alarm

levels, thereby taking out the „qualitative‟ element of interpretation.

These timings are summarised at Appendix 3.

57. In conclusion – hypothetically, with a number of works being completed the following

could be a realistic scenario.

- Increasing the potential throughput of the Botcherby Bridge allowing

water flows to pass through unrestricted and planned removal of

accumulated gravels and deposits thus eliminating the damming effect

and containing any excess within an enhanced protection to eliminate

“out-flanking”. This will necessitate removal of gravels for some

distance upstream to avoid premature back-filling through river action

i.e. more than has been undertaken to date.

- Due to the timing gap of some 10 - 12 hours the Petteril and Caldew

rivers could have evacuated their peak levels before the River Eden

peak level occurs.

- Consideration has to be made upon the efficiencies of “slowing the

flow” projects. To maintain or increase the desired peak differential it is

logical that such projects do not become effective before equivalent

implementation on the main river.

- River Eden Flood Plain alleviation measures reducing the Flood Plain

Flood Peak Level say by a target reduction of one metre.

- The end product would be a reduction in flood risk for the Carlisle Flood

Plain affected communities.


58. Addendum: A Freedom of Information Act request has been made to Cumbria

County Council for access to the following bridge data:

- Eden Bridge – as built drawings giving the river bed datum details to

assess how much the bed height has increased from original design

criteria throughput cross-sectional areas as a trial exercise. If this

shows significant change then it is here suggested the same exercise is

carried out on all bridges and appropriate clearing to return the profiles

and river levels to design parameters.

- A feature of the EFRA Future Flood Prevention Evidence is the

“statements” referring to river bed rise” in height over the original design

river bed height above datum, and therefore cutting down the bridge

arch cross-sectional areas and hence increasing restriction to water

flow and, as agreed by the EA, this has been seen at the Botcherby

Bridge as it acted as a dam.

- EA do not appear to have data for river bed levels particularly at crucial

points such as bridges and confluences so maintenance alerts will not

occur and condition will not be scoped by monitoring.


4. What are the implications of

future occurrences?

59. A repeat of similar weather conditions or combination of conditions to the “Desmond”

storm affecting the three Carlisle rivers is likely. Such North Atlantic storms are not unique as

the history of Carlisle over the last three centuries can attest. With climate change effect

these may well be more severe rather than less. The degree of increased severity arising out

of climate change cannot be accurately determined currently but as previously argued the

likely climate change component in the Eden Catchment problem is not considered significant

within the context of the levels the rivers flow at. The starting point for catchment

management is the highest acceptable river peaks within the system at critical points and all

channel maintenance and attenuation modelling should develop from there.

60. The previous sections of this report have highlighted the far more significant

component to cause flooding generally and in Carlisle particularly. This is the afflux effect on

the infrastructure of bridges, flow restrictions to banks and river profiles which have combined

to lift the volume of the rivers to run higher to datum in their channels thereby extending more

influence to a wider flood plain. This effect has been traced to have been occurring

incrementally over the last 50 – 60 years, so there is no quick fix or “silver bullet” solution.

61. The latter part of the previous 12 months has seen the EA and CCC starting to

undertake a programme of works involving river gravel removal and bridge support checking

and repairs. These are very minor in the scale of the problem and may have a neutral effect

in that it appears all bridges up the catchment are being checked to be fully functional

regardless of whether they sit at positions within the system where “slowing the flow” or

“speeding the flow” is required for optimum lowering of peak flood levels co-ordinated with

timings. The gravels removed will soon re-form as insufficient gravels have been removed

from the system generally so this should be recognised as a „step in the right direction‟ but

only a stop gap measure or another „sticking plaster‟. Benefits in the short term will arise from

the clearing of Botcherby Bridge and other bridges where speeding the flow is beneficial,

however, the clearing of bridges higher in the system will mean water will arrive in Carlisle

quicker than it did during “Desmond” which could exacerbate the current position.

62. Storm rainfall also creates surface flooding when drains cannot cope with volumes or

are blocked/restricted. Pressure results from residents and parish councils to seek

maintenance of surface drainage for road safety and convenience. Flooding by many is seen

as any water where it is not needed i.e. as the same problem, however, with councils

endeavouring to maintain the surface water drainage systems as part of anti-flood works an

element of “slowing the flow” is lost as surface water is quickened into the river systems.


63. It is ironic and unfortunate that these works, intended laudably to assist in main river

flood avoidance, can actually make matters worse – another strong argument, as if further

support is needed, for a single agency to lead on all flood matters of river and drainage

education.

64. In essence, therefore, C-FLAG does not see the settlements of the catchment being

in a fundamentally „better-place‟ than 12 months ago. Action on the ground needs to be far

more extensive and co-ordinated. This will be of no solace or reassurance to the flooded

communities and there remains the prospect of severe regional and national infrastructure

failure so a business case exists justifying expenditure on a far more extensive remedial

programme than previously considered by the existing authorities and ongoing - linking to

adequate annual maintenance budgets.

Business Case Evidence 65. The preceding qualitative assessment of the River Eden Catchment area and

suggested incremental and cumulative actions would most likely be paid for through the

present government funding channels and be subject to appropriate rigour. Whether part of

flood budget funding would be upon the basis of a rate precept or insurance levy (borne out of

the security risk lowering) are issues for future debate.

66. It is, therefore, essential that any Business Case follows the current guidelines – for

the time being.

In the event of preparing a Business Case for Government Funding, damage to strategic-

critical infrastructure and its cascading down-line effects must be taken into account (refer to

Figure 9).

67. COMMUNITY AND BUSINESS COSTS

Between 2,200 to 3,500 homes and small businesses damaged in Carlisle.

Damaging reduction in property values – repaired houses are on average only

worth 60% of what they were pre-2015 and perhaps only 50% pre 2005.

3000 People displaced with attendant saturation of rental markets.

Substantial health issues both physical and mental (Aberystwyth University

April 2011).

Investment slow down if infrastructure, workforce access and supplier trains

cannot be relied upon.


68. NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Main connectors between England and Scotland

M6 River Eden Crossing – peak flood water level to parapet level very close

to closure on 6th December. Potential severe impact on England/Scotland

economies.

Rail – West Coast Mainline flooded with associated breakdown of

England/Scotland economies.

“Lineside Infrastructure” flood damaged cascading damage to Lower Viaduct

businesses and car parks.

69. REGIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE – Carlisle, West Cumbria, North

Cumbria and Border Scotland

United Utilities – Electricity Sub-Station Willowholme flooded – major Carlisle

area blackout.

United Utilities – Carlisle Main Water Treatment Plant – backed up Urban

Carlisle resulting in raw sewage surcharges with identified associated health

problems.

Carlisle Eden Bridge – Communications – closed for 2 weeks post-flood. No

immediate alternative access.

Carlisle Eden Bridge Closure – massive congestion to M6 & CNDR, major

cascading economic and social disruption of North/South City communities

and businesses.

Carlisle City Council Civic Centre flooded and disruption of community

services. Still under repair.

Richard Rose Academy – major flood damage (still under repair with limited

use).

Trinity School and Newman Secondary Schools closures (Newman School

will not recover).

McVitie Biscuit Works owned by Yildiz – major damage, loss of production –

major international employer.

Cumberland Infirmary – operation reduced to emergency only on standby

power resulting in cancelled operations and appointments. Secondary loss

victim due to primary loss of power sub-station.

Telecommunications breakdown of mobile and fixed telephone systems (fibre

optic area junction cabinets exploding due to mains power supplies within).

Working from home options limited due to power outages and lost

telecommunications.


70. Cascading Effect

Primary flood losses such as failure of a bridge or an electric transformer station or the loss of

a school building, often leads to multiple failures and disruption down the line, which may far

outweigh the primary loss. For example, in Carlisle a majority of pupils could not go to school

for some time after the flooding, jeopardising their educational outcomes and leaving parents

at home supervising their children, potentially missing work or other important aspects of life.

The loss of transport systems led to increased travel times, detours and loss of productivity

that was felt throughout the United Kingdom and beyond.

Zurich – JBA Trust: Flooding after Storm Desmond PERC 2015

71. The cost of a “Desmond” Storm on Carlisle has national and international significance

with long term effects and recovery risks and it could have easily been worse. It is our

understanding that Haweswater did not overflow on 6th December 2015 but several days later

when the river peaks had receded. Had there been more storage in Haweswater on the 5th,

and it overflowed during the height of the event, the M6 and many of the more serious

scenarios above could have actually occurred. Similarly, coinciding with a „spring‟ tide would

have had significant additional adverse effect.

72. In the last financial year an assessment (Green Alliance, 28 November 2016) has

shown that more than twice as much funding was spent on dealing with the after effects of

flooding (£613 million) to funds spent on flood defences ((£269 million). This is an

unsustainable position and a nonsense to sound economics.


5. How can a similar event be

prevented?

73. A clear and strong strategic plan to reduce the extreme level of flooding to Carlisle

and throughout the catchment is essential. The recent EFRA Floods Prevention document

HC115 joins with C-FLAG to show that this is best undertaken by a dedicated lead authority

with a single prime purpose and statutory backing.

74. To this end a proactive approach has been taken first of all to examine as follows:

The stated policy of the Carlisle Flood Action Group (CFLAG) to work towards

an autonomous Flood Authority separated from the Environment Agency (EA)

as such due to the extensive impact of flooding on communities and the

“DUAL” role of protection of People and Property and confliction with their

extensive Environmental responsibilities.

Consider any remedial actions to be applied through the whole River Eden

Catchment representing an “integrated proactive plan”.

The extent and complexity of the River Eden Catchment Area of some 80+

miles from “source to sea” is one of the most attractive parts of the UK and

adjacent to two National Parks featuring easily isolated settlements. There is

a need, therefore, for a total Catchment Community involvement.

The extent of direct flooding of the Carlisle River Eden Flood Plain due to

being the “Receptor” of all River Eden Catchment water flows.

A target reduction of the River Eden Carlisle Flood Plain Peak Flood Water

Level of 1 metre.

Assess how best C-FLAG can promote the “Business Case” required of the

Government funding criteria relating to our National, Regional and Local

infrastructure.


River Eden Catchment Area 75. The C-FLAG Catchment Water Flow Diagram (Figure 1) includes information to hand

and is NOT to be considered as a geographically accurate map but a fluvial (water flow) tool

for quick reference, and is neither exhaustive nor complete but as a starting point. The basic

idea behind it is a communication and co-ordination resource. It has already been suggested

that enlarged versions be professionally produced and made available to every community

within the catchment to familiarise themselves with adjacent communities and how all

communities collectively interact with each other. Known EA/Cumbria County Council

Section 19 Investigation Reports of affected communities are marked beside their place

names on the diagram with a view to further information as and when developed.

76. The catchment has been previously described in terms of three sections: Source,

Pathway and Receptor. A summary of alleviation measures can be applied to the crucial

pathway part of the system:

Attenuate where possible taking advantage of any beneficial topography, but

also recognising that some locations will be rocky and have steep fall gradients

such as Glenridding, whilst other areas have absorbent bogs, open areas, and

extensive vegetation and tree plantations. Care will be needed to avoid bog

burst conditions on sloping ground and consideration of Natural England‟s

extensive research into such phenomena.

Other opportunities for potential use as attenuation mediums are the reservoirs

of Haweswater/Blea Water (dammed), and Wet Sleddale requiring co-

ordination with the Water Authorities, and Lake Ullswater.

Any opportunities that can be identified within the catchment for accelerating or

attenuating water purposes need to be assessed and progressed where viable.

“Slowing and Speeding the Flows” must at all times be carefully considered as

to potential benefits and dis-benefits for communities upstream or downstream

of the waterway concerned.

In the example case of Stockdalewath Water Management, their “slow the flow”

operation has been carefully planned with the aid of university developed

computer modelling of their upstream waterways and selecting pinch points that

have potential benefit. The operation has received approval from the EA, Eden

Rivers Trust and the Cumbria Wildlife Trust together with recently announced

financial backing available over a 5 year period. The operation is recognised as

an EA and Cumbria Flood Partnership “Pilot Scheme” and will be observed by

other parts of the country as potential attenuation principles that can be learned

from, and implemented, elsewhere. C-FLAG needs to point out that any such

scheme needs to understand its „delivery‟ effect. Slowing the Roe without

slowing the Eden actually brings peak flood levels closer together at Carlisle i.e.

a detrimental effect.


Whilst the Carlisle Botcherby Bridge restriction to flow is recognised by the EA

as a major factor to Carlisle Urban Flooding. It should now develop a solution

(replacement bridge), there appears to be no other “single” major answer to the

overall flooding problem, therefore an incremental improvement plan is

proposed resulting in a cumulative benefits.

Avoidance of a “pile up” of water on the immediate Carlisle River Eden Flood

Plain. The Flood Plain receives all water flows from the total River Eden

Catchment area. Restrictions of various kinds such as gravel shoals, bridges,

weirs can “slow the flow” but not always in a helpful way depending upon

position in the system because an “afflux” (elevated water level) effect will be

created upstream of the obstruction result in a rise in water level upstream of

the restrictions and also back up of tributary rivers such as the Petteril, Caldew,

Irthing, Gelt, becks and ghylls. So careful planning throughout the whole

catchment water courses is required – before works are implemented.

Any benefits identified by way of lowering the River Eden Carlisle Flood Plain

will be of considerable benefit to all communities upstream within the River

Eden total Catchment Area as „space for water‟ will have been created.

In turn, benefits gained by upstream communities can also be of great benefit to

Carlisle and its River Eden Flood Plain by adjustment of peak flood level arrival

times.

A small C-FLAG team has walked the River Eden Flood Plain both upstream

and downstream of the Carlisle Eden Bridge and identified a number of

problems that are worthy of further detailed investigation with potential

alleviation benefits of removal or re-profiling of gravel shoals and bridges.

“The Guidebook of Applied Fluvial Geomorphology” states “since anyone

involved in flood risk management is familiar with the value of historical

documents for extending the flood record; and ecological surveyors often

lament the lack of longer-term datasets”. Hence our use of the 1865 and 1925

maps to good effect.

Finally, apart from replacement of the Botcherby Bridge and concentrating on

re-timing river confluences, there are no other apparent singular smaller scale

items of works that can give major relief – therefore the overall strategy is one

of an incremental approach of picking off small gains that can have a positive

cumulative effect in water level reduction across the Carlisle River Eden Flood

Plain, it is essential that all catchment communities are active in any decision

making of “Overall” catchment planning and alleviation projects.

Larger scale projects upstream of larger settlements will have to be considered

in tandem with the incremental approach.


The Basics of a Plan

C-FLAG relates closely with the thrust of the recently published EFRA “Future

Flood Prevention” report HC115 and much of the evidence taken by the

committee. It also notes that the Green Alliance is currently recommending a

similar approach. There are areas we would choose to disagree with in HC115

such as the underlying cause of flooding arising through climate change when it

is clear the principal cause is poor channel management but, on the whole, it is

considered a positive way forward. The document proposes the following:

- Establishing a new National Floods Commissioner for England to be

accountable for delivery of strategic, long-term flood risk reduction

outcomes agreed with government. Deliver would be via;

- New Regional Flood and Coastal Boards to co-ordinate regional

delivery of national plans, in partnership with local stakeholders. These

boards would take on current Lead Local Authority and Regional Flood

and Coastal Committee roles;

- A new English Rivers and Coastal Authority, taking on current

Environment Agency roles to focus on efficient delivery of National Flood

Risk Management Plans.

77. This model would streamline roles and pool capacity and expertise to allow bodies to

deliver their unique roles, with funding firmly linked to outcomes. The Commissioner would

hold the English Rivers and Coastal Authorities to account on whether it spends its budgets in

the most efficient manner, whether by directly undertaking work, or commissioning projects

from catchment partnerships for example. The Regional Boards would enable a close link

between national plans and local aims. There is a proposed extension to current water and

sewerage companies roles: as Water and Drainage Companies their remit would include

Land Drainage responsibilities currently held by local authorities, fostering a more holistic

approach to flooding and water supply management. This report shares C-FLAG‟s own view

that this will create a strong direct lead on flooding in each catchment/administrative area.

78. In advance of major reform, C-FLAG comments here upon recommendations on

specific flood management problems:

- Catchment measures to be adopted on a much wider scale:

DEFRA should commission by July 2017 a large catchment trial of the

effectiveness of natural flood risk management approaches such as

“leaky dams, tree planting and improved soil management, alongside

other measures.


- Flood Risk communication must be simplified:

While the “1 in x year” measure does not fully explain that flood events

can occur at any time, even in concurrent years. C-FLAG disagrees with

EFRA on this point and feels that the terminology has had a long term

and consistent grounding and it is easier to educate what these terms

mean than re-evaluate and devise a new method.

- Resilience must be improved

“The government must make developers who fail to comply with planning

requirements liable for the costs of flooding”; It is difficult to see how

such measures can be calculated and policed – certainly breaches of

Planning Conditions would force compliance so the teeth to control

already exists – it is just not used.

- “Water companies should be made statutory consultees on planning

applications, and the right to connect surface water to a sewerage

system should be removed”. In Carlisle this will be a major issue as the

City is largely connected on a combined system basis requiring the laying

of a complete City-wide surface water system. Most local planning

authorities already consult with water companies.

- C-FLAG does not agree with an expansion of the Building Regulations to

include personal resilience measures – this will make already complex

regulations even more difficult to administer and the variety of flood

protection needs would make a national regulatory system unworkable.

Better to rate individual houses according to a scale of risks similar to

house energy efficiency rating with each classification carrying targeted

advice. The wrong resilience could be life threatening.

C-FLAG believes that the only way forward is to work towards an autonomous

Flood Authority similar to the Somerset Drainage Boards Consortium, and have

a stream-lined management process that is efficient, cost effective and free

from unnecessary inter-administration dogma and restrictions. However,

Somerset is currently suffering from the above restrictions. Reference EFRA

Document HC115 Evidence Refs: FFP 132 and 141 so this model would

require review.


In order to ascertain the extent of the problems and the best long term

solutions, it is necessary to examine areas of the catchment initially to identify

key issues that have early multiple benefits for the whole catchment. These will

include addressing ”river bed rise”, “afflux” – raising water levels upstream due

to restrictions to flow - and associated structures, vegetation, gravel shoals,

silting, river bed flow resistance and general associated surface drainage

anomalies. These should be progressed as short-term works and piggybacked

with the development of larger schemes of wider benefit on a medium and long

term programme e.g. storage areas, weirs and piped relief channels all of which

cannot be adequately planned and implemented without adequate lead-in

periods.

SHORT TERM GOALS

Notwithstanding the C-FLAG fear that the „quick win‟ projects have been slow to

launch and some urgency is overdue. In priority order these short term tasks

are:

PRIORITY 1 Botcherby Bridge to be replaced, probably with a single span slightly

cambered profile to suit maximum required volume and projected peak

level. C-FLAG is critical that this has not already been implemented as it

was clear from January 2016 that its design profile and poor maintenance

of gravels and adjacent banks were a fundamental cause for the flooding

of 1000 houses.

PRIORITY 2 Eden Bridge to be given a full investigation for structural fitness of purpose

to ensure safe use during a similar event. River peak levels to be lowered

to designed parameters – this is likely to require large sections of the arch

spans remaining above the peak level.

PRIORITY 3 Attention to develop an integrated catchment plan designed to address

control of river peak levels.

PRIORITY 4 Communication initiative to locate all riparian owners to co-ordinate

approach.

PRIORITY 5 Lower Eden below Carlisle – removal of gravel shoals particularly near and

under Eden Bridge and commence silt removal from the Solway in

conjunction with SEPA.

PRIORITY 6 Upper Eden above Carlisle – removal of gravel shoals such as at around

the M6 bridge and Great Corby etc., maintain weirs so Eden stays in an

appropriate channel.


PRIORITY 7 Reassessment of CNDR Bridge and function of culverts and “what the

„protected area‟ requires”.

PRIORITY 8 Planned protection/rebuilding of main electricity substation and water

treatment works – to create defendable primary services.

MEDIUM TERM GOALS

Produce an incremental co-ordinated plan for flood alleviation works with

potential for flood water storage and „slowing the flow‟ initiatives throughout

the catchment and „speeding/smoothing the flow‟ through settlements.

LONG TERM GOALS

Developing contingency storage up stream of settlements such that piped

or divert channels can be operated if incremental approach is

compromised by saturation.

Now is the time to be commissioning design work for a replacement Eden

Bridge at Carlisle and a second crossing point to maintain sound

infrastructure. (There is potential for a significant new iconic structure).


Bibliography

Blake, Joyce & Brian, (1958) The Story of Carlisle – The City of Carlisle Education Committee

Illustrated by Colin Allen

C-FLAG (2016), “14 Visions”, C-FLAG public presentation to flooded Carlisle community at Crown and Mitre Hotel, 4 April 2016. Available on website http://www.carlislefloodaction.org.uk/ C-FLAG (2016), Cumbria Rivers Catchment Authority – A Strategic Proposal Report to Rory Stewart, Floods Minister and Cumbria Partnership meeting, 22 April 2016. Available on website http://www.carlislefloodaction.org.uk/ Couper-Johnston, Ross, El Niño – The Weather Phenomenon that Changed the World

Crow, Vivienne, Walking in the Eden Valley

DEFRA (2016), The Property Flood Resilience Action Plan, haired by Dr Peter Bonfield, Sept 2016 EFRA Report (2016) “Future Flood Protection” 2

nd report of Session 2016-17, HC115

Environment Agency – Channel Management Handbook

Environment Agency (2016), Reducing Flood Risk from Source to Sea, First steps in an integrated catchment plan for Cumbria, June 2016 Environment Agency with Cumbria County Council (2016), Section 19 Reporting (Flood & Water Management Act), Carlisle Flood Investigation Report, 3 May 2016 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2016) – House of Commons Future Flood

Prevention HC115 2nd

November 2016 – Future Flood Prevention and 140+ items of

Evidence.

Fisher, K/Ramsbottom D, River Diversions – A Design Guide, HR Wallingford / DTLR

Fleming, G., Editor, Flood Risk Management

Green Alliance (2016), England’s Flood Strategy Failing, 28 November 2016 Helm, D. (2106) Flood Defence: time for a radical rethink, www.dieterhelm.co.uk HMG (2016), National Flood Resilience Review, Sept 2016.

Institute of Chartered Engineers, Forensic Engineering, Informing the Future with Lessons

from the Past

Institute of Chartered Engineers, Land Drainage and Flood Responsibilities, 5th Edition

Larcombe, Ewan, Afflux Illustrations – http://www.jubileeriver.co.uk 06/11/2016 HC115 –

Evidence FFP0078. Index.

Lead Local Flood Authority, Cumbria County Council/EA, (2016), Section 19 Flood Event reports – various, 2016.

http://www.carlislefloodaction.org.uk/

http://www.carlislefloodaction.org.uk/

http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/

http://www.jubileeriver.co.uk/


Milne, R & M “Rivers Eden, Caldew and Petteril Peak Water Levels and Timings” –Shoothill

Water Level Graphs,

Milne, R & M, “Cumbrian Community River Eden Catchment Map”

Milne, R & M, River Eden Flood Plain – River Eden Flood Plain – National, Regional and

Local Strategic Infrastructure”

Milne, Richard and Mark (2016) for C-FLAG, River Eden Community Catchment Diagram, V.3 National Rivers Flow Archive [NRFA] – Risk Assessment Rivers Images of Eden, Caldew,

Petteril and Solway Firth.

NFRA (2016), National River Flow Archive, available at http://nrfa.ceh.ac.uk/data/search.

Old Ordnance Survey Maps – Godfrey Editions for Carlisle [4] NW, NE, SW and SE 1924/25

Ordnance Survey 1:10,560 County Series Maps: Cumberland XXIII: Survey of 1865.

Ove Arup and Partners Ltd, & Professor Bill Harvey Associates (2013), Forensic Bridge Investigations for Cumbria County Council. Included in proceedings of Fifth International Conference on Forensic Engineering by CICE, London UK 16-17 April 2013 Sear, David A. et al, Guidebook of Fluvial Geomorphology –- Thomas Telford Publications

ICE

Shoothill – River Level Graphs for Rivers Eden, Caldew and Petteril catchments.

Somerset Drainage Board Consortium Report FFP141. Stedman, Henry, Hadrian’s Wall Path

Worsfold, Mark, Chief Engineer for OFWAT, in Infrastructure UK (2014), Peer Review of Flood and Coastal Risk Management, March 2014 Zurich – JBA Trust: (2015), Flooding After Storm Desmond, PERC 2015

http://nrfa.ceh.ac.uk/data/search


Appendix 1

Some of the recorded flood events with media description where available.

1771 - Eden never so high. 1794 - Eden at so great a height as can be remembered. 1809 - Eden, Caldew and Petteril flooded worst in memory. 1815 - The Great Flood of Eden – water up to the Three Crowns, Rickergate. 1821/22 - Eden swollen to height ever scarcely seen. Storm and flood exceeds the blast worse than 1771. 1856 - Great Flood of Carlisle – greatest flood since 1822. 1903 - Eden at highest level. 1947 - Severe flooding. 1968 - Bowman Street/Warwick Road flooded, 6,000 people Hit by rising water. 2005 - Worst flood since 1822, 1600 properties flooded. 2015 - 2128 properties flooded.


Appendix 2

C-FLAG 14 Visions presented and approved

at public meeting, Crown & Mitre Hotel,

Carlisle on 4 April 2016.


Appendix 3

River flood peak diagram

Shoothill graph

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