Stimson report final

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Future of the Japan-U.S. alliance How Japans defense posture should change for a sustainable allianceCOL. Katsuki TAKATA Visiting Fellow The Henry L. Stimson Center The views expressed herein are those solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Henry L. Stimson Center, Japan Self Defense Force, or the Government of Japan December 20, 2004

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Transcript of Stimson report final

Page 1: Stimson report final

Future of the Japan-U.S. alliance

“How Japan’s defense posture should change for a sustainable alliance”

COL. Katsuki TAKATAVisiting Fellow

The Henry L. Stimson CenterThe views expressed herein are those solely of the author

and do not necessarily reflect those of Henry L. Stimson Center,Japan Self Defense Force, or the Government of Japan

December 20, 2004

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ContentsContents

New National Defense Program Outline( NDPO)New National Defense Program Outline( NDPO)

Four scenarios for the future of JapanFour scenarios for the future of Japan--U.S. alliance U.S. alliance and their analyses and their analyses

Future shape of the Ground SelfFuture shape of the Ground Self--Defense Force Defense Force resulting from scenario research. resulting from scenario research. (What it should be)(What it should be)

ConclusionConclusion

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New National DefenseNew National DefenseProgram Outline( NDPO)Program Outline( NDPO)

Security environment surrounding JapanSecurity environment surrounding JapanRegional security issues(Korean Peninsula, Taiwan strait)Regional security issues(Korean Peninsula, Taiwan strait)The new threat and Various situationThe new threat and Various situation

The basic policy of JapanThe basic policy of Japan’’s securitys securityBasic policyBasic policy

JapanJapan’’s own effort+cooperation to U.S.+cooperation to s own effort+cooperation to U.S.+cooperation to international community(Follow the 4 principle)international community(Follow the 4 principle)

The defense posture of JapanThe defense posture of JapanRoles of defense capability Roles of defense capability

Effectively & appropriate respond to the new threat and various Effectively & appropriate respond to the new threat and various situationsituationPreparations to deal with fullPreparations to deal with full--scale invasionscale invasionTo proactively & positively engage in actives for peace & stabilTo proactively & positively engage in actives for peace & stability ity of international community of international community

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Capability

CapabilityForC4I

Prepare for full-scale invasion to Japan

Anti-armor

operations

Air operations

Anti-submarine operations

Capabilityfor

Anti-newThreat &

Anti-varioussituation

Logistic capability

Capability For

InternationalCooperation

Activity

MD

Nuclear capabilityCapability for

Attack Enemies’ basesMobile strikePower on sea

Education &

training Policy underlying Policy underlying

the conversion to a new SDFthe conversion to a new SDFImprove

ReadinessMobility

FlexibilitySustain at

minimum level

Function

Effectively & appropriate respondEffectively & appropriate respond NDPO

New NDPOProactively &positively engage

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Scenario for the future of Scenario for the future of JapanJapan--U.S. allianceU.S. alliance

axis TThreat perception of Japan-U.S.

Small Large

Small

The Community type

The 1st scenario

The Selective engagement type

The 4th scenario

Large

The 2nd scenario

The Offshore balancing type

axis PU.S. military

Presence(Capability)The 3rd scenario

The Reluctant alliance type

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Scenario for the future of Scenario for the future of JapanJapan--U.S. allianceU.S. alliance

axis TThreat perception of Japan-U.S.

Small Large

Small

The Community type

The 1st scenario

The Selective engagement type

The 4th scenario

Large

The 2nd scenario

The Offshore balancing type

axis PU.S. military

Presence(Capability)The 3rd scenario

The Reluctant alliance type

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Current JapanCurrent Japan--U.S. alliance U.S. alliance

axis TThreat perception of Japan-U.S.

Small Large

Current Japan-U.S. allianceJapan and U.S. don’t have

same threats perception about global activity.

axis PU.S. military

Presence(Capability)

Large

Small

Same threat is recognized about domestic emergency and contingency surrounding Japan

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The 1st scenarioThe 1st scenarioCommunity typeCommunity type

Overlapping strategic goals Overlapping strategic goals Japan cooperates more closely with the U.S. Japan cooperates more closely with the U.S. military campaigns worldwide. military campaigns worldwide. Big barrier to develop this relationshipBig barrier to develop this relationship-- Problems with soProblems with so--called called ““integration with the use of integration with the use of military forcesmilitary forces”” remain to be solved in the minimum.remain to be solved in the minimum.

Organization review of the JSDFOrganization review of the JSDF-- Based on "Territorial defense model" for a Cold War type Based on "Territorial defense model" for a Cold War type threat should be change to threat should be change to ““Capable base modelCapable base model””

Improve the power projection capabilityImprove the power projection capability

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The 2nd scenarioThe 2nd scenarioThe Offshore balancing typeThe Offshore balancing type

Global posture review of U.S.ForcesGlobal posture review of U.S.Forces-- Putting the emphasis on contingency response in the Putting the emphasis on contingency response in the Middle East and Central AsiaMiddle East and Central Asia

Uneasiness and doubt in each country will Uneasiness and doubt in each country will increase increase

-- Emphasis of defense of Japan should be shifted from Emphasis of defense of Japan should be shifted from that based on Japanthat based on Japan--US joint response to independent US joint response to independent defense capabilitydefense capability

Arc of InstabilityArc of Instability

USCENTCOMUSCENTCOM USPACOMUSPACOM

USEUCOMUSEUCOM

[Post-9.11]

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The 2nd scenarioThe 2nd scenarioThe Offshore balancing typeThe Offshore balancing type

Same threat perception is shared Same threat perception is shared -- Request Japan to have a higher power projection Request Japan to have a higher power projection capabilitycapabilityIndependent defense capabilityIndependent defense capability-- Revision of the force structureRevision of the force structure-- ““Capability to attack enemiesCapability to attack enemies’’ bases" and bases" and ““Mobile Mobile strike power on seastrike power on sea””

It will be politically challenging ,both with Japanese public and Japan’s Asian neighbors

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The 3rd scenarioThe 3rd scenarioThe Reluctant alliance typeThe Reluctant alliance type

The threat perception is not sharedThe threat perception is not shared..Becomes a nominal allianceBecomes a nominal allianceOnly economic interdependence remain Only economic interdependence remain JapanJapan’’ssindependent defense capability(same as 2independent defense capability(same as 2ndnd scenario)scenario)

-- ““It sounds appropriate to choose US forceIt sounds appropriate to choose US force’’s withdrawal from Japan s withdrawal from Japan than to continue Marine Corps in Okinawa without support from than to continue Marine Corps in Okinawa without support from Japanese people in order to strengthen the alliance in longJapanese people in order to strengthen the alliance in long--rangerange””

(Mike Mochizuki)(Mike Mochizuki)

-- ““Prime Minister Hashimoto should offer to President Clinton aboutPrime Minister Hashimoto should offer to President Clinton aboutredeployment of Marine Corps to south of Korea from Okinawa.redeployment of Marine Corps to south of Korea from Okinawa.””((Jo Jo SakonSakon; former Chief, Joint Staff Office) ; former Chief, Joint Staff Office)

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The 4th scenarioThe 4th scenarioThe Selective engagement typeThe Selective engagement type

Same bed, different dreams Same bed, different dreams -- U.S.(FU.S.(Focus on security cooperation on worldwide)ocus on security cooperation on worldwide)

-- Japan (USFJ for Japan (USFJ for ““Ensuring the security of JapanEnsuring the security of Japan”” ))

Limited contribution to a military campaign of Limited contribution to a military campaign of the U.S. worldwidethe U.S. worldwide

-- Vital national(JPN) interestVital national(JPN) interest

-- FFinancial support etc.(inancial support etc.( In other region)In other region)

Friction between both countriesFriction between both countries

4th scenario will finally develop into the 3rd scenario

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Small Large

axis P

Small

Summary of scenario researchSummary of scenario research

○○ Same threat perception is shared Same threat perception is shared ○○ Independent defense capabilityIndependent defense capability○○ DDifficulty getting people's support

○○ Same bed,different dreamsSame bed,different dreams○○ JapanJapan’’s military contribution to s military contribution to

U.S. military campaigns worldwideU.S. military campaigns worldwidewill be limitedwill be limited

○○4th scenario will finally develop  into the 3rd scenario

○○ The threat perception is not sharedThe threat perception is not shared..○○ Becomes nominal alliance Becomes nominal alliance ○○ Independent defense capabilityIndependent defense capability○○ Worst scenarioWorst scenario

The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario

The 2nd scenarioaxis T Large

The 1st scenario

●●Overlapping the strategic goals Overlapping the strategic goals ○○Big barrier to developing Big barrier to developing ○○Improve the powerImprove the power

projection capabilityprojection capability

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Future of JapanFuture of Japan’’s defense policys defense policy

Changes of Japanese defense strategyChanges of Japanese defense strategyThe Basic Concept of JapanThe Basic Concept of Japan’’s Defense Policys Defense PolicyPositive use defense power globallyPositive use defense power globally (Active (Active Deterrence)Deterrence)

Further promotion of JapanFurther promotion of Japan--U.S. strategic U.S. strategic dialoguedialogue

““What Japan should doWhat Japan should do””““ What Japan are able to doWhat Japan are able to do””

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deterrence by existence

Active Deterrence

Deterrence byexistence + action

=Exclusively defense-oriented Policy

Image of “Active Deterrence”

Deterrence by action

Deterrence by existence

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ReconstructionReconstructionResponseResponseDeterrenceDeterrencePeacetime PreventionPeacetime Prevention

CON

US

CON

US

JapanJapan ’’ s Territories

s TerritoriesJapanJapan ’’ s Proxim

itys Proxim

ityRem

ote Areas

Remote A

reas

Roles & Mission of Japan-U.S.

Info-Sharing,

Deterrence Options

Info-Sharing,

Deterrence Options

Deterrence Options

RapidDeployment

HRO, Peacetime Engagement

International HRODefense Exchanges

Counter Terrorism、Territorial

Protection etc.

Counter Terrorism

S&RNEO etc.

Info-Sharing, Protection of USFJ, SLOC protection

DomesticSecurity

NationalBuilding

RAS forMNF

RAS forMNF

NEO,RASSAR

Combatarea

Counter-Invasion,

LIC,MD

ProtectionOPS for USFJ,

MD

MilitaryPresence

(Balance),Counter-

Terrorism

Counter-Terrorism, Disaster Relief, Forward Presence

Info-Sharing

Nuc Deterrence

Offensive OPS(Security

OPS, Use ofForce,

CMIC)

Nuclear Deterrence,

OffensiveOPS

Nuc-StrikesLICMD

SecurityOperations

Reconstruction

Assistance

Reconstruction

PSI,SLOC

protection

SLOC Protection、ACSA

PSI、Multilateral Ex/Tng

ACSA

SLOCprotection

SLOC Protection, ACSA

ACSA

SLOC Protection、ACSA

HRONation-BuildingDDR、

Cease Fire

: : Japan’s Role & mission: U.S.’s Role & mission: Japan’s challenge

Red letter : Restricted by legislation

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Future shape of Future shape of the Ground Selfthe Ground Self--Defense Force Defense Force

((““What it should beWhat it should be””))

New organizationNew organizationEstablishment of international duty Establishment of international duty

force force Establishment of an experimental Establishment of an experimental force that can link to the network of force that can link to the network of the U.S.the U.S.Establishment of "A light and strong" Establishment of "A light and strong" force force

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Future shape of Future shape of the Ground Selfthe Ground Self--Defense Force Defense Force

((““What it should beWhat it should be””))

New organizationNew organizationEstablishment of international duty Establishment of international duty force force Establishment of an experimental Establishment of an experimental force that can link to the network of force that can link to the network of the U.S.the U.S.Establishment of "A light and strong" Establishment of "A light and strong" forceforce

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Future shape of Future shape of the Ground Selfthe Ground Self--Defense Force Defense Force

((““What it should beWhat it should be””))

New organizationNew organizationEstablishment of international duty Establishment of international duty force force Establishment of an experimental Establishment of an experimental force that can link to the network of force that can link to the network of the U.S.the U.S.Establishment of "A light and strong" Establishment of "A light and strong" forceforce

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Net work for R

Net work for B

Improve mobilityIT soldier

Maintenance the center of gravity of defense posture

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Coordinate integrate operation

"A light and strong" Force"A light and strong" Force

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Future shape of Future shape of the Ground Selfthe Ground Self--Defense Force Defense Force

((““What it should beWhat it should be””))Improvement of JapanImprovement of Japan--U.S. interoperabilityU.S. interoperability

Eliminate uncertainty Eliminate uncertainty The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed. The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed. Conducting multinational training in order to maintain peace andConducting multinational training in order to maintain peace andstability in Asia Pacific region.stability in Asia Pacific region.

Cooperation between ministries, local Cooperation between ministries, local governments and NGOs, etc. in peacetimegovernments and NGOs, etc. in peacetime

Establish a liaison branch to each ministry Establish a liaison branch to each ministry Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and overseas for international activityoverseas for international activity

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Future shape of Future shape of the Ground Selfthe Ground Self--Defense Force Defense Force

((““What it should beWhat it should be””))

Improvement of JapanImprovement of Japan--U.S. interoperabilityU.S. interoperabilityEliminate uncertainty Eliminate uncertainty The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed. The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed. Conducting multinational training in order to maintain peace andConducting multinational training in order to maintain peace andstability in Asia Pacific region.stability in Asia Pacific region.

Cooperation between ministries, local Cooperation between ministries, local governments and NGOs, etc. in peacetimegovernments and NGOs, etc. in peacetime

Establish a liaison branch to facilitate interagency coordinatioEstablish a liaison branch to facilitate interagency coordination n Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and overseas for international activityoverseas for international activity

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ConclusiConclusionsonsJapanJapan--U.S. alliance should move toward the 1U.S. alliance should move toward the 1stst

scenario, and must avoid the 3scenario, and must avoid the 3rdrd scenario. scenario. Easing the interpretation of the Constitution over Easing the interpretation of the Constitution over the right to collective selfthe right to collective self--defensedefensePromotion of the strategic dialoguePromotion of the strategic dialogue"Territorial defense" the only main task any longer"Territorial defense" the only main task any longerPay attention to 4Pay attention to 4thth scenarioscenarioLogistical support to the U.S. military and coalition Logistical support to the U.S. military and coalition forcesforcesContinue humanitarian and the reconstruction Continue humanitarian and the reconstruction support after conflictssupport after conflictsJapan must clearly communicate its Japan must clearly communicate its ““Roles and Roles and MissionsMissions”” to the United States, and have to share a to the United States, and have to share a common understanding.common understanding.

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““Final Goal Keeper of DefenseFinal Goal Keeper of Defense””

Questions & Comments ?Questions & Comments ?