STEPHANIE QUINN JACKSON 28 Burnt Creek Court SW | Lilburn, GA 30047 | 404-825-8075 | sqjpara@gmail.com | www.linkedin.com/in/stephqj

NOTE ON LEGAL WRITING SAMPLES:

All documents pertaining to clients—self-proving wills, divorce decree, corporate documents—are examples of work for in my substantive law classes at Georgia Piedmont Technical College. No client information is being disseminated. Legislative analysis, case briefs, and other legal opinion writings pertaining to issues were generated as part of my internship with the ACLU of Georgia.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE

COUNTY OF ROCKDALE, STATE OF GEORGIA

SARA MARIE SUTTON, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) VS. ) Civil Action No. ___________ ) DANIEL RAY SUTTON, ) ) Defendant )

_____________________________________________________

FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE _____________________________________________________

Upon consideration of this case, upon evidence submitted as provided by law, it is

the judgment of the court that a total divorce be granted, that is to say, a divorce a vinculo

matrimonii, between the parties to the above stated case upon legal principles.

It is considered, ordered, and decreed by the court that the marriage contract

heretofore entered into between the parties to this case, from and after this date, be and is

set aside and dissolved as fully and effectually as if no such contract had ever been made

or entered into.

Plaintiff and Defendant in the future shall be held and considered as separate and

distinct persons altogether unconnected by any nuptial union or civil contract whatsoever

and both shall have the right to remarry.

Mutual Restraining Order Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby enjoined and restrained from doing or

attempting to do, or threatening to do any act, which harasses, interferes or intimidates

the other part or the other party's immediate family, or child of the parties, if any.

Child Custody

The Permanent Parenting Plan entered on this date is incorporated herein by

reference and made a part of this Final Judgment and Decree. Each party is ordered and

directed to comply with the terms and provisions herein.

Child Support

The Child Support Addendum entered on this date is incorporated by reference

and made a part of this Final Judgment and Decree. Each party is ordered and directed to

comply with the terms and provisions herein.

The Court finds that such payments are in compliance with the child support

guidelines.

Internal Operating Procedure 99-39, and/or any subsequent Internal Operating

Procedure entitles; in re Alimony and Child Support Payments is incorporated herein by

reference and made a part of the Final Judgment and Decree.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-32, the Court finds that an Immediate Income

Deduction Order for Award of Child Support is not warranted. However, pursuant to

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-31, 32 & 33, the recipient of the child support has the express right,

without notice to the other party, at the time of this Final Judgment and Decree is entered

or at any time thereafter, to submit a separate Income Deduction Order for Award of

Child Support to the Court for immediate entry.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-30, 31, 32 & 33, whenever in violation of the terms

of this Final Judgment and Decree, there shall have been a failure to make the support

payments due hereunder so that the amount unpaid is equal to or greater than the amount

payable for one month, the payments required to be made may be collected by the

process of continuing garnishment for support and/or by Income Deduction Order for

Award of Child Support.

Marital Home Division of Personal Property Debts and Financial Obligations

The Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties is incorporated herein

by reference and made a part of the Final Judgment and Decree.

Decree and order entered this 21st day of June, 2014.

__________________________________________ Judge, Superior Court

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE

COUNTY OF ROCKDALE, STATE OF GEORGIA

SARA MARIE SUTTON, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) VS. ) Civil Action No. ____________ ) DANIEL RAY SUTTON, ) ) Defendant )

_____________________________________________________

PETITION FOR CITATION OF CONTEMPT _____________________________________________________

NOW COMES Sara Marie Sutton, Petitioner in the above-styled action, and files this Petition for

Citation of Contempt and shows the Court as follows:

1. An Order was entered in the Superior Court of Rockdale County, Georgia as follows:

Sara Marie Sutton v. Daniel Ray Sutton

Civil Action No. 2014-CD-444-3

Ordered and Filed May 2, 2014

A copy of that Order is attached.

2. Respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and may be personally

served with a copy of this Petition and Rule Nisi at ______________________________

and shall be served with a copy of this Petition and Rule Nisi by second original.

3. In the prior Order, Respondent was ordered to pay to Petitioner the amount of

$1202.00 per month in child support, and owes $1,800.00 to Petitioner as of the date of

the filing of this Petition.

4. Respondent was able to do what the Court ordered. Respondent's refusal to do so

is willful.

5. Respondent should be held in contempt of this Court's Order and confined to the

common jail of Rockdale County until he purges himself of said contempt.

6. Respondent should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for cost incurred in this

action.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner demands:

a) That process and summons issue as provided by law; b) That Respondent be served with a copy of Petitioner's Petition for Citation of Contempt; c) That Respondent be held in contempt for failure to obey the terms of the Court's Order; d) That a hearing be set ordering Respondent to come to Court and tell the Judge why

Petitioner's request should not be granted; e) That Respondent be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for the cost of this action; and f) That Petitioner be awarded any other relief this Court finds right and proper.

This the 27th day of July, 2014.

_________________________________________ ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CELIA MURRAY State Bar No. 123456 8100 Bob Williams Parkway Suite 227 Covington, Georgia 30014 (770) 555-1212

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF

THOMAS PIERCE, SR. STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF ROCKDALE

I, Thomas Pierce, Sr., a resident of Rockdale County, Georgia, being of sound and

disposing mind and memory, do make this my Last Will and Testament, hereby revoking

and annulling all other wills and codicils heretofore made by me.

ITEM I

I desire and direct that my body be given a Viking funeral pyre on Lake Oconee,

in the regular manner, suitable to my circumstances and condition in life, and a suitable

memorial erected, the cost of my rites and the memorial to be paid out of my estate.

ITEM II

I desire and direct that all my just debts and taxes be paid without unnecessary

delay, except as hereinafter provided, by my Executrix hereinafter named and appointed.

ITEM III

Should my wife, Nancy Pierce, not survive me or be unable to act as guardian of

my minor children, I appoint Ragnar Laghbrok to be the legal guardian of my minor

children until such time as they attain the age of 18 years. I direct that my nominated

guardian shall not be required to furnish security for acting in that capacity.

ITEM IV

All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, I give

bequeath and devise to my wife, Nancy Pierce, but if said spouse does not survive me,

then I give, bequeath and devise all of said property in equal shares to my surviving

children, and in the event that any of my said children shall predecease me, that child’s

share shall go to the children of that child, per stirpes.

ITEM V

I hereby constitute and appoint Nancy Pierce the sole Executrix of this my Last

Will and Testament, and I expressly confer upon her power, as such, to administer my

estate, excusing her from giving any bond, or making any returns to the Court of Probate,

and I expressly confer upon her the full authority and power to sell any part of my estate

not hereinbefore specially devised, at public or private sale, with or without notice, as she

may deem best, and without any order of Court, making good and sufficient conveyances

to the purchaser and holding the proceeds of said sale to the same uses and trusts as

hereinbefore declared in the several items of this my will. I further hereby expressly

confer upon her the authority and power to borrow money for the use of my said estate, in

any instance where she may think it necessary and proper, and to secure the same by lien,

mortgage, security deed or trust deed, or other form of security to or upon any part of my

estate, not hereinbefore specifically devised; this she may do without the order of any

Court. In addition, I specifically incorporate by reference all the powers contained in

O.C.G.A. 53-12-261, as of the date hereof or amended hereafter.

ITEM VI

If for some reason, either physical or mental, Nancy Pierce is unable to act as the

Executrix of my estate, or in the event she elects not to act, I hereby constitute and

appoint Ragnar Laghbrok as the sole Executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and I confer upon him all the power, duties and immunities as set forth in Item V above.

This 7th day of March, 2015.

THOMAS PIERCE, SR.

The foregoing instrument was signed, sealed, declared and published by Thomas

Pierce, Sr., as his Last Will and Testament, in the presence of us, the undersigned, who,

at his special instance and request, do attest as witnesses, after said Testator had signed

his name thereto, and in her presence and in the presence of each other.

This 7th day of March, 2015.

1214 Moon Place Road Gemini Jones Lilburn, GA 30047

629 McGill Street Alberta Cross Marietta, GA 30067

SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF ROCKDALE

Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Thomas Pierce, Sr., Gemini Jones, and Albert Cross, known to me to be the Testator and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed to the annexed or foregoing instrument in their respective capacities, and, all of said persons being by me duly sworn, Testator declared to me and to the said witnesses in my presence that the said instrument is his Last Will and Testament and that he had willingly made and executed it as his free act and deed for the purposes therein expressed. The witnesses, each on his/her oath, stated to me in the presence and hearing of the Testator that the Testator had declared to them that the instrument is his/her Last Will and Testament and that h executed same as such and wanted each of them to sign it as a witness; and upon his/her oath each witness stated further that he/she did sign the same as a witness in the presence of the Testator and at her request; that he/she was at least 14 years of age or over and was of sound mind; and that each of said witnesses was then at least 14 years of age.

Thomas Pierce, Sr.

Gemini Jones

Alberta Cross

Sworn to and subscribed before me by Thomas Pierce, Sr., Testator, and sworn to and subscribed before me by Gemini Jones and Alberta Cross, witnesses, this 7th day of March, 2015.

SEAL

(Signed) Notary Public

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF

NANCY PIERCE STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF ROCKDALE

I, Nancy Pierce, a resident of Rockdale County, Georgia, being of sound and

disposing mind and memory, do make this my Last Will and Testament, hereby revoking

and annulling all other wills and codicils heretofore made by me.

ITEM I

I desire and direct that my body be donated to science, in the regular manner,

suitable to my circumstances and condition in life, and a suitable memorial erected on the

campus of Georgia Piedmont Technical College, the cost of my arrangements and the

memorial to be paid out of my estate.

ITEM II

I desire and direct that all my just debts and taxes be paid without unnecessary

delay, except as hereinafter provided, by my Executor hereinafter named and appointed.

ITEM III

Should my spouse not survive me or be unable to act as guardian of my minor

children, I appoint Ragnar Lathbrok to be the legal guardian of my minor children until

such time as they attain the age of 18 years. I direct that my nominated guardian shall not

be required to furnish security for acting in that capacity.

ITEM IV

All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, I give

bequeath and devise to my husband, Thomas Pierce, Sr., but if said spouse does not

survive me, then I give, bequeath and devise all of said property in equal shares to my

surviving children, and in the event that any of my said children shall predecease me, that

child’s share shall go to the children of that child, per stirpes.

ITEM V

I hereby constitute and appoint Thomas Pierce, Sr., the sole Executor of this my

Last Will and Testament, and I expressly confer upon him power, as such, to administer

my estate, excusing him from giving any bond, or making any returns to the Court of

Probate, and I expressly confer upon him the full authority and power to sell any part of

my estate not hereinbefore specially devised, at public or private sale, with or without

notice, as he may deem best, and without any order of Court, making good and sufficient

conveyances to the purchaser and holding the proceeds of said sale to the same uses and

trusts as hereinbefore declared in the several items of this my will. I further hereby

expressly confer upon him the authority and power to borrow money for the use of my

said estate, in any instance where he may think it necessary and proper, and to secure the

same by lien, mortgage, security deed or trust deed, or other form of security to or upon

any part of my estate, not hereinbefore specifically devised; this he may do without the

order of any Court. In addition, I specifically incorporate by reference all the powers

contained in O.C.G.A. 53-12-261, as of the date hereof or amended hereafter.

ITEM VI

If for some reason, either physical or mental, Thomas Pierce, Sr. is unable to act

as the Executor of my estate, or in the event he elects not to act, I hereby constitute and

appoint Ragnar Lathbrok as the sole Executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and I

confer upon him/her all the power, duties and immunities as set forth in Item V above.

This 7th day of March, 2015.

NANCY PIERCE

The foregoing instrument was signed, sealed, declared and published by Nancy

Pierce, as her Last Will and Testament, in the presence of us, the undersigned, who, at

her special instance and request, do attest as witnesses, after said Testatrix had signed her

name thereto, and in her presence and in the presence of each other.

This 7th day of March, 2015.

1214 Moon Place Road Gemini Jones Lilburn, GA 30047

629 McGill Street Alberta Cross Marietta, GA 30067

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF ROCKDALE

Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Nancy Pierce, Gemini Jones, and Alberta Cross, known to me to be the Testatrix and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed to the annexed or foregoing instrument in their respective capacities, and, all of said persons being by me duly sworn, Testator/ix declared to me and to the said witnesses in my presence that the said instrument is her Last Will and Testament and that she had willingly made and executed it as her free act and deed for the purposes therein expressed. The witnesses, each on his/her oath, stated to me in the presence and hearing of the Testatrix that the Testatrix had declared to them that the instrument is her Last Will and Testament and that she executed same as such and wanted each of them to sign it as a witness; and upon his/her oath each witness stated further that he/she did sign the same as a witness in the presence of the Testatrix and at her request; that he/she was at least 14 years of age or over and was of sound mind; and that each of said witnesses was then at least 14 years of age.

Nancy Pierce

Gemini Jones

Alberta Cross

Sworn to and subscribed before me by Nancy Pierce, Testatrix and sworn to and subscribed before me by Gemini Jones and Alberta Cross, witnesses, this 7th day of March, 2015.

SEAL

(Signed) Notary Public

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: SUPERVISING ATTORNEY FROM: STEPHANIE JACKSON SUBJECT: PARKS ADOPTION DATE: DECEMBER 8, 2014

Issue: Under Glynn law, did the Hartfield Adoption Agency and Sara Walker deliberately and fraudulently misrepresent the medical history of Tripp Parks' birth mother to his adoptive parents, Alex and Ann Parks, and can the Parkses file a claim for wrongful adoption or other tortious actions?

Short Answer: Yes. Adoption agencies are not immune from tort actions, which could include wrongful adoption, fraud, or misrepresentation. Ms. Walker withheld relevant information she was required to disclose to the Parkses.

Facts: On May 30, 2013, Alex and Ann Parks adopted Alex Parks, III, (Tripp) through the Hartfield Adoption Agency. Case worker Sara Walker was employed by and an agent for Hartfield throughout the process.

Ms. Walker provided the Parkses with an information form, listing basic information about Tripp's birth parents. According to the form, Tripp was a "normal, healthy newborn" whose birth mother had received prenatal care beginning at 12 weeks gestation. Pregnancy and delivery were also noted as "normal".

The 19-year-old birth mother is listed as having had usual childhood illnesses and chronic bronchitis as a child but "no other known conditions, illnesses."

According to the Parkses, Ms. Walker told them that the birth mother had never used drugs other than alcohol, which she had not used since 8 weeks gestation, and she was reportedly "afraid" of drugs.

Tripp was diagnosed with maternally transmitted AIDS in September 2013, and the diagnosis has created a tremendous financial and emotional burden on the Parkses. Alex and Ann Parks believe Sara Walker was aware and did not disclose that the birth mother had lived with and had sexual relations with an intravenous drug abuser in 2008.

Discussion: Wrongful adoption has not been recognized by the state of Glynn as an actionable tort, but it is anticipated that it will be, as other jurisdictions have done so. Ferenc v. World Child, et al., 977 F. Supp. 56 (Glynn, 1997). Glynn allows for private causes of action for statutory violations, and the Glynn legislature has taken no action to immunize adoption agencies from tort liability. Wolford v. Children's Home Society of

2

Glynn, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577 (Glynn, 1998). As such, a claim for "wrongful adoption" is likely to be recognized by the court, although traditional tort claims may be extended to the case of adoption.

In Cesnick v. Edgewood Baptist Church, et al., 88 F.3d 902 (Glynn, 1996), the court did not recognize wrongful adoption as a tort action, but it allow consideration of fraud as a viable claim. However, Plaintiffs in Cesnick filed outside the statute of limitations, and the count was barred. Cesnick further differs, because the Plaintiffs pursued breach of contract and RICO violations, neither of which is alleged in this case.

Glynn requires adoption agents to provide adoptive parents with a "written recital of all known circumstances surrounding the birth, medical and family history of the child, and an itemization of any facts or circumstances unknown or requiring further development." O.C.G. § 48-4-6. Ms. Walker and the Hartfield Adoption Agency provided minimal information to the Parkses via the information form from the Chatham County Department of Human Services, signed by Ms. Walker on May 15, 2013.

Defendants (s) would likely claim they provided all information known to them, in writing, as required by law.

Willful misrepresentation of a material fact that induces another to act constitutes deceit, even if the party making the accusations does not know the facts are false, and such deceit is actionable as fraudulent or reckless misrepresentation. O.C.G. § 6-2-51 (2012). Fraud has four essential elements: (1) that the fraudulent act was performed or induced by the defendant; (2) that it was material and false; (3) that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon it; and (4) that the plaintiff was damaged because he relied on it. Negligence requires (1) proof of duty of care on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) actions of the breach were the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff; and (4) that the harm caused damages to the plaintiff. Wolford v. Children's Home Society of Glynn, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577 (Glynn, 1998) Intentional misrepresentation requires that the defendant (1) makes a false representation, (2) regarding a material fact, (3) with knowledge that the representation was false, (4) with intent to deceive, and (5) which induced action in reliance on the representation. Negligent misrepresentation requires (1) negligent communication of false information, (2) which the defendant anticipated or should have anticipated was likely to induce action or inaction by the plaintiff, (3) and upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied. Ferenc v. World Child, et al., 977 F. Supp. 56 (Glynn, 1997) According to the Parkses, Ms. Walker knew that Tripp's birth mother had engaged in a sexual relationship with an intravenous drug user, which was the likely source of Tripp's maternally-transmitted AIDS. This information was not relayed on the information form. The Parkses allege Ms. Walker intentionally withheld this information, in her role as agent for the Hartsfield Adoption Agency, which would constitute fraud or intentional

3

misrepresentation. O.C.G. § 48-4-6 imposes a duty of care upon the adoption agent(s) to relay known information about the child and the birth parents' respective histories. Had the Parkses been aware of the risk of illness for Tripp, they would have had the opportunity to halt the adoption process or to seek immediate medical care for their son. Tripp was denied appropriate treatment during the first six months of his life, which may have impacted his prognosis and future treatment plan. Additionally, the financial and emotional tolls on the family have been enormous. Defendants would likely claim no intentional withholding of information. If Ms. Walker or Hartsfield was aware of the birth mother's history and mistakenly did not relay the information to the Parkses, the misrepresentation would be negligent rather than intentional. In Ferenc v. World Child, Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the moving Defendants, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The adoption agency and agents relied on information supplied to them by the child's Russian doctors (non-moving Defendants) and relayed that information appropriately to the adoptive parents. Ferenc differs, because there was no evidence that the agents intentionally or negligently withheld information they knew or should have known. The statute of limitations in Glynn for fraud and personal injury claims is two years. Wolford v. Children's Home Society of Glynn, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577 (Glynn, 1988). The Parkses were aware of Tripp's diagnoses in September of 2013 and are well within the limits.

Conclusion: There is enough evidence to suggest that a Glynn court would find Sara Walker and the Hartfield Adoption Agency liable for damages to the Parks family. Even if the court refuses to recognize wrongful adoption as an actionable tort, there is still a strong possibility of negligent or intentional misrepresentation, as well as fraud.

This is likely a case of first impression for Glynn state courts. At this time, there are no known binding precedents, and cited cases are persuasive authorities only. Although the cases were each adjudicated in Glynn, they were heard in various federal courts.

Brian P. Kemp Secretary of State

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE CORPORATIONS DIVISION 2 Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. SE

Suite 313 West Tower Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 656-2817 sos.georgia.gov/corporations

TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION GEORGIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

IMPORTANT

Remember to include your e-mail address when completing this transmittal form.

Providing your e-mail address allows us to notify you via e-mail when we receive your filing and when we take action on your filing. Please enter your e-mail address on the line below. Thank you.

E-Mail:

NOTICE TO APPLICANT: PRINT PLAINLY OR TYPE REMAINDER OF THIS FORM

1.

LLC Name Reservation Number (If one has been obtained; if articles are being filed without prior reservation, leave this line blank.)

LLC Name (List exactly as it appears in articles)

2.

Name of person filing articles (Certificate will be mailed to this person at address below.) Telephone Number

Address

City State Zip Code

3.

Principal Office Mailing Address of LLC (Unlike registered office address, this may be a post office box.)

City State Zip Code

4.

Name of LLC’s Registered Agent in Georgia

Registered Office Street Address in Georgia (Post office box or mail drop not acceptable for registered office address.)

GA

City County State Zip Code

5. Name and Address of Each Organizer (Attach additional sheets if necessary.)

Organizer Address City State Zip Code

Organizer Address City State Zip Code

6. Mail the following items to the Secretary of State at the above address:

1) This transmittal form; 2) The Articles of Organization; and 3) Filing fee of $100.00 payable to Secretary of State. Filing fees are NON-refundable

Authorized Signature: Date:

Print Name:

Signer’s Capacity: (Choose one) Member Manager Organizer Attorney-in-fact

Request certificates and obtain entity information via the Internet: sos.georgia.gov/corporations

FORM 231 (Rev. 4/2015)

Articles of Organization Of

Rent a Wife, LLC

Article 1. The name of the limited liability company is Rent a Wife, LLC.

Article 2. Management of the limited liability company is vested in one or more managers whose names and addresses are as follows:

Sally B. Smith 123 Main Street Covington, Georgia 30013 Sarah T. Jones 789 North Avenue Covington, Georgia 30016

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed these Articles of Organization.

This 6th day of July, 2015

____________________________________________

Sally B. Smith Managing Member, Rent a Wife, LLC

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. _____ (2015)

Facts: In 2000, Arizona voters approved Proposition 106, which amended Arizona’s Constitution to remove redistricting authority from the Arizona Legislature (AZ Leg) and vest it in the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC). AIRC was made up public officers chosen via a method outlined in Prop 106. After the 2010 census, AIRC adopted redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts. In 2012, the AZ Leg challenged the AIRC’s maps and authority on the grounds that they violated the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution: “The Times, Paces and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” AZ Leg contended that “Legislature” meant the State’s representative assembly, which precludes any sort of independent commission, created by initiative, from redistricting.

AZ Leg sued for declaratory judgment and injunction. District Court of Appeals held that AZ Leg had standing to sue but rejected its complaints on merit.

Issues: (1) Does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring the suit? (2) Do the (a) Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution and (b) 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts?

Holding: (1) Prop 106 and the Arizona Constitution’s ban on efforts by AZ Leg to undermine the purposes of a voter initiative stripped AZ Leg of its constitutional power to draw congressional districts, and its injury is “concrete and particularized” or “actual or imminent”. Thus, AZ Leg has standing to contest the constitutionality of Prop 106. (2) (a) The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause was to empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way States enact legislation, and it does not require assignment of redistricting authority to the State’s representative body. (b) Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto. 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) provides that a State must follow federally prescribed redistricting procedures until that State enacts law to provide for apportionment in any other way. Prop 106 was enacted by referendum and allowed for a method of redistricting, which was the AIRC and which led to the presumptive governing map.

Arizona constitutionally defined “legislature” as including the people as part of the process when its citizens ratified the State constitution and the ability of the people to enact legislation through initiative. Such initiative granted power for redistricting to the AIRC, which was constitutionally sound in regard to the State constitution. Further, the Elections Clause does not exclude lawmaking by the people.

Judgment affirmed.

SB61 – New Americans Program Act

Sponsors:

[1] Sen. Lester Jackson (D) [2] Sen. Steve Henson (D) [3] Sen. Vincent Fort (D)

[4] Sen. Curt Thompson (D) [5] Sen. Horacena Tate (D) [6] Sen. Emanuel Jones (D)

Committee: Government Oversight

Status: Read and Referred 1/28/2015

Description: SB61 would create the New Americans Program Act (amended to Title 49, Social Services):

§ 49-11-1 - in an effort to facilitate naturalization of legal immigrants (lawfully admitted for permanent residence, per 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)) who are residents of Georgia for at least 30 days prior (per O.C.G.A. § 40-2-1(7)). Stated intention is that legal immigrants who receive assistance under this act generally obtain citizenship within two years of their eligibility to apply.

§ 49-11-2 –

(1) identify and contact legal immigrants for purpose of helping with naturalization; (2) develop programs to inform legal immigrants of how to obtain citizenship; (3) coordinate efforts with existing resources – governments, schools, etc.; (4) “within available funds”, ensure qualifying immigrants are referred to or offered

naturalization classes; (5) assist immigrants in obtaining appropriate test and exemptions in the naturalization

process, per federal law; (6) report to the General Assembly about the progress and barriers.

Analysis: Generally, SB61 seems to be a good plan. It aims to help legal immigrant residents become naturalized citizens within two years of eligibility. The bill is unclear as to the specifics of who would administer this program, though it refers to “the department” as being responsible for this program. Additionally, funding for the program is not directly addressed. So while the New Americans Program may be mandated by law, there’s a possibility that the State claims resources are not available to implement the mandated actions.

The program seems to be relying on the idea of acting as a middleman for legal immigrants and USCIS, as a clearinghouse for information that’s readily available from other public sources. The mandate to coordinate with existing resources potentially places an additional burden on

local governments, schools, colleges, etc., to be the ones to actually identify the legal residents and share that information with the program. Those agencies are likely to argue that their own resources are stretched thin by other regulations and operational procedures, potentially making actual and logistical implementation of the program difficult.

The requirement to refer qualifying immigrants to naturalization classes, or otherwise offer naturalization classes, may be both fiscally difficult and statutorily questionable. There may be potential for litigation if the classes are not available in some areas, especially rural ones. Would this law require the State to take on the burden of providing naturalization classes if USCIS has no easily accessible offering?

It seems possible that enactment could result in little more than some state official standing before the General Assembly and reporting (per section (6)) that there are a lot of barriers to executing the mandated responsibilities of some nebulous department.

While a well-enacted program could go far toward helping qualifying Georgians obtain citizenship, this bill seems to have problems that could make the New Americans Program ineffectual.

Recommendation: The ACLU should support SB61 but acknowledge that there are potential problems with implementation if it’s enacted.

Privacy Concerns over Use of Body Cameras by Georgia Police The White House announced in December that it would provide funding for 50,000 body

cameras to be used by local law enforcement agencies across the country. At least half a dozen Georgia agencies equip their officers with body cameras currently, and the list is growing quickly. During the recent legislative session, six separate bills attempted to address the use of body cameras by Georgia peace officers, but only SB 94 made it through both chambers of the Georgia Assembly. The new law—which is expected to be signed by the Governor and enacted on July 1, 2015—will bring much-needed reform to witness identification procedures, but it also poses concerns with how the burgeoning use of body cameras may be eroding the privacy rights of citizens.

In light of the nationwide string of police-involved civilian deaths, it seems obvious that body cameras can protect both officers and private individuals, providing an unbiased perspective of police-civilian engagements and documenting details that may otherwise be lost during a heated encounter. However, well-publicized events around the country and in Georgia are not the norm for law enforcement, and it is the day-to-day encounters that warrant the most protection.

Georgia law currently permits officers to use a recording device in the lawful performance of their official duties, when those encounters occur in a public space where there is no expectation of privacy. While body cameras are meant to keep police accountable, the handling of routine law enforcement engagements with private citizens can be problematic. SB 94 specifically allows officers to record their encounters with civilians in private places without the notice or consent of the other person being recorded.

One of the most important tasks of police officers is to gather intelligence about crime that occurs in their communities. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, body cameras can inhibit intelligence-gathering efforts because some witnesses and informants are reluctant to speak if they know they are being recorded, concerned for their own safety or privacy or comfort when sharing sensitive information.

There is no greater expectation of privacy than in a home, and a private citizen must generally give consent for an officer to enter his or her residence. Innocent persons who might be eager to tell law enforcement everything they know—and want it recorded for maximum benefit—may be uncomfortable with in-home visual recordings, which memorialize far more than mere audio recording can. Unless there is an emergency situation, a private citizen who is not suspected of any wrongdoing should also have to consent to the recording of his conversation with police.

Further, crime victims should have the option not to have their encounters with law enforcement recorded at all. While officers are obliged to accurately document the events

surrounding a crime, some victims simply would be uncomfortable having the aftermath of their attack so vividly recorded for posterity. Victims of sexual assault or domestic or gang violence—especially those concerned with retaliation or escalation—should not be subjected to visual documentation of their statements, if they so choose.

Seemingly routine encounters that start peacefully can shift in a moment and become emergency situations. Even where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, officers should be required to activate their cameras during any encounter that becomes adversarial after the initial contact. They should also have the discretion to record if they have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed in their presence.

Like recordings from police dash cameras or 911 calls, video from police body cameras is subject to retention and public disclosure under the Open Records Act, although Georgia law does not specifically address the length of time body camera recordings are to be kept. SB 94 includes guidelines for circumstances under which public disclosure is not required, but the legislation does not prohibit public agencies from releasing the recordings, even if the recording includes a crime victim, a crime witness, a minor, or an innocent citizen who did not wish to be recorded in their private residence.

Moving forward, Georgia law enforcement agencies and professional organizations should work together with citizens and civil rights groups to craft uniform regulations for the use of body cameras by police. Incorporating best practices with the best interests of Georgians can produce meaningful legislation that balances the evidentiary value of recordings and the need for governmental transparency against the privacy concerns of citizens.